Criti c a l l y exa m i n e th e nuc l e a r det e r r e n c e the o r y

Given their overw h el m i n g dest r u c tiv e powe r, why are nucle a r weapo n s
som e ti m e s argu e d to be a stabilizing force? This has bee n justified by the
theo ry of nuclea r dete r r e n c e . Nucle a r det e r r e n c e hypot h e siz e s that if a
nation arm e d with nucle a r wea po n s thre a t e n s nuclea r ret alia tion, othe r
count ri e s will refrain from initiatin g a milita ry atta c k again s t it. 1 The daw n
of the nucle a r age beg a n at Hiros hi m a , as nucle a r weapo n s thre a t e n e d to
dest r oy cities. 2 During the Cold War, nuclea r dete r r e n c e pres e r v e d the
peac e betw e e n the two supe r p o w e r s by makin g the pros p e c t of total war
irra tion al. There were econo mi c warfa r e and proxy battle s, for exam pl e in
Afgha nis t a n 3, but no direc t war was recor d e d . How ev e r, during the 1962
Missile Crisis, the Unite d Stat e s and the Soviet Union cam e close to nucle a r
war over the Soviet Union’s plac e m e n t of nucle a r wea po n s in Cuba, and a
pote n ti al nucle a r conflict was ther efo r e nar ro wly avoide d 4. Since 1945,
howev e r, ther e has neve r bee n a nuclea r war; not even a single use of a
wea po n in ange r . 5 But will nucle a r dete r r e n c e ever come close to failing?
Divergin g views have eme r g e d conce r ni n g the theory – som e schola r s
welcom e the prolifer a tio n of nucle a r wea po n s while othe r s see it as a thre a t
and try to preve n t it. This ess ay will look at the realis t pers p e c t iv e, followe d
by the bure a u c r a t i c politics (orga niza tio n al) theory’s point of view, and both

1 POLITICS.CO.UK (2012). “Nucl e a r Dete r r e n c e ” [Online] Available from:

htt p://ww w . politics.co. uk/ r ef e r e n c e / n u cl e a r- det e r r e n c e [Access e d 01/03/ 1 5]

2 WARD, W. (2008), “The Myth of Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e Theory,” Nonp r olife r a t i o n Review,
Vol. 15, No. 3

3 OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2013). “The Soviet Invasion of Afgha ni st a n and the U.S.
respo n s e , 1978- 1980,” U.S. Depa r t m e n t of Sate [Online] Availabl e from:
htt ps://histo r y.s t a t e . g ov/ mil e s t o n e s / 1 9 7 7- 1980/sovie t- invasion- afgha ni st a n [Accesse d
02.03.1 5]

4 BELFER CENTRE (2015). “What Was the Cuba n Missile Crisis”[Online] Available from:
htt p://ww w .c u b a n m i s sil e c ri si s.or g/ b a c k g r o u n d /f r e q u e n t l y- asked- ques tio n s/ # 1 [Access e d
03/03/ 1 5]

5 SAGAN, S. D. (1994), “The Perils of Prolifer a tio n: Orga niz a tio n Theory, Dete r r e n c e
Theory, and the Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s,” Inter n a t i o n a l Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 66
will be backe d by the stanc e s of political scientis t s and gam e theo ris t s such
as Iklé, Schelling, Mea r s h e i m e r , Bull, Lavoy, Ward. Ultim a t ely howev e r ,
prolifer a tio n of nucle a r wea po n s will only exace r b a t e the relation s betw e e n
stat e s . Rene w e d tension s betw e e n Russia and the West (with proxies in
Syria and Ukrain e) are an indicatio n that the r e may be an alar mi n g
escala tio n in the conflict, thus disru p ti n g the stability of both inter n a t io n a l
and region al secu ri ty.

Curre n t ly, ther e are eight decla r e d nucle a r wea p o n stat e s in the world:
Unite d Stat e s, Unite d Kingdo m, Fra nc e, Russia, China, Nort h Korea,
Pakist a n and India. 6 In 1968, the Stra t e g ic Arms Limitatio n Talks (SALT)
were signe d, and in May 1972, the Moscow accor d s 7 were desig n e d to
pres e rv e the mut u al dete r r e n c e betw e e n the Unite d Stat e s and the Soviet
Union. These agr e e m e n t s would help stabilize the relation s hi p by limiting
the build- up of nucle a r forces. 8 Howeve r , at the time, the r e are 39
rem ai ni n g stat e s that had yet to sign Non- Prolifer a tio n Trea ty as req ui r e d ,
with anot h e r 90 stat e s signing up for addition al protocols for their
safeg u a r d agre e m e n t s with the IAEA. Both Nort h Korea and Iran did not
sign up to the addition al protocols agr e e m e n t . 9 Thom a s Schelling believe s
that major nuclea r powe r s such as the Unite d Stat e s should contin u e to
dete r othe r stat e s from developin g and pote n ti ally using nuclea r wea po n s in

6 BUSINE S S INSIDER (2014). “Nine Nation s Have Nuke s – Her e’s How Many Each
Count ry Has” [Online] Available from: http://ww w. b u si n e s si n si d e r . c o m / ni n e- nations- have-
nukes- -her e s- how- many- each- count r y- has- 2014- 6 [Accesse d 14/03/ 1 5]

7 MCWHIN N EY, E. (1978), “The Inte r n a ti o n a l Law of Déte n t e ,” Net h e rl a n d s : Sijthoff &
Noord h off Inte r n a t io n al Publish e r s, p. 70

8 IKLE, F. C. (1973) “Can Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e Last out the Cent u r y?,” Forei g n Affairs, Vol.
51, No. 2, pp. 267

9 THE ATLANTIC (2013). “Nort h Korea, Iran, and the NTP” [Online] Availabl e from:
htt p://ww w .t h e a t l a n t i c.c o m /i n t e r n a t i o n al / a r c h ive/ 2 0 1 3 / 1 2 / n o r t h- kore a- iran- and- the-
npt/28 2 4 5 9 / [Access e d 16/03/1 5]
the futur e , and this should be the goal of inter n a t io n a l orga niz a tio n s within
10
the 21st cent u ry.

Nation s want nucle a r wea po n s for many reas o n s . Powe r s aim to count e r he
wea po n s of othe r gre a t powe r s , usually by copying thos e who have
11
introd u c e d new wea po n s . The book “Winnin g with the Bomb” 12 looks at
crises betw e e n two stat e s and the impac t of nucle a r wea po n s contr olling for
othe r varia bl e s. They reac h two conclusio n s: stat e s with nucle a r wea po n s
are more likely to prevail in inter s t a t e crises and crises involving nucle a r
wea po n s stat e s are short e r than those withou t. This provide s a good
backg r o u n d and a good found a tio n for why stat e s would want to prolifer a t e .
It also tells us some t hi n g about barg ai ni n g over prolifer a tio n: if a stat e was
to think about acquirin g a nucle a r wea po n, its rival would want to avoid
13
that. So prolifer a tio n yields conce s sio n s .

The domin a n t pers p e c t iv e on mut u al dete r r e n c e , accor di n g to Fred Iklé, has

14
thre e principles . Firstly, nuclea r forces must be design e d for the sole
purpo s e of ret aliatio n in res po n s e to an atte m p t to disar m a stat e throu g h a
sudd e n strike. Secon dly, thes e forces mus t be mad e in such a way that
ret aliation can be swift and can caus e consid e r a b l e dam a g e s such as
dest r oyin g anot h e r stat e’s ret alia to ry res po n s e . Thirdly, this ret aliation
mus t be elimin a tin g a large num b e r of cities; similarly, the othe r stat e
involved mus t have the ability to kill a larg e fraction of the “ene my’s”

10 SCHELLING, T. C. (2005). “Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e for the Fut u r e ” [Online] Available from:
htt p://ww w .iss u e s .o r g/ 2 3. 1/ s c h e lli ng. h t m l [Access e d 13/03/ 1 5]

11 WALTZ, K. (1981), “The Spr e a d of Nuclea r Weapo n s: More May Be Bett e r,” Adelphi
Pape r s , Num b e r 171 (London: Inte r n a t i o n a l Instit ut e for Str a t e gi c Studi e s)

12 BEARDSLEY, K. & ASAL, V. (2007), “Prolifer a tio n and Inte r n a t i o n a l Crisis Behavior,”
Journ al of Peac e Rese a r c h , 44 (2), pp. 1260- 1288

13 SPANIEL, W. (2013) “Inte r n a t i o n a l Relations 101: Barg ai ni n g over Prolifer a ti o n.” [Online
Video]. Marc h 16 th . Available from https://ww w.yo u t u b e . c o m / w a t c h ? v = R H 7 H L kJs 3i 4.
[Access e d 26/02/ 1 5]

14 IKLE, F. C. (1973) “Can Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e Last out the Cent u r y?”, Forei g n Affairs, Vol.
51, No. 2, pp. 268
popula tio n. Thus, det e r r e n c e is "stabilize d" by keepin g it mut u al. It was
Winston Churc hill who in 1955 first expou n d e d the esse n ti al idea s of mut u al
15
dete r r e n c e to the world at large.

From a realist pers p e c tiv e, the military logic of self- help mea n s that stat e s
have to crea t e their own individu al secu rity to prot e c t agains t inte r n al and
exte r n a l thre a t s beca u s e they canno t rely on othe r stat e s for prot e c tio n, nor
16
take their ulterio r motives for gran t e d . Kenne t h Waltz is a firm believe r of
‘ration al det e r r e n c e theory’ whe r e he come s up with a new conce p t and
sepa r a t e s the milita ry ideas of both defens e and dete r r e n c e into two
individu al s. He stre s s e s that poss e s sio n of nucle a r wea po n s by stat e s make s
the m ‘excee din gly cautiou s’. 17 Crises no longe r are just simply cont e s t s of
18
milita ry stre n g t h ; they beco m e cont e s t s in risks taking. Both sides face
pote n ti al nation al suicide if they start e d a nucle a r war. It can be argu e d
that safeg u a r d s for nuclea r arm s are likely to beco m e more string e n t . When
it come s to defect s in safeg u a r d s that might lead to an accide n t a l nucle a r
19
war, societie s cannot survive by lear ni n g throu g h trial and error.

Furt h e r m o r e , dete r r e n c e is achieve d not thro u g h the ability to defen d, but

20
thro u g h the ability to punis h. Secon d- strike nuclea r forces serve that kind

15 IKLE, F. C. (1973) “Can Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e Last out the Cent u r y?”, Forei g n Affairs, Vol.
51, No. 2, pp. 269

16 SAGAN, S. D. & WALTZ, K. N. (2003) “The Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s: A Debat e

Rene w e d ,” New York W.W. Norto n & Com pa n y, pp. 5

17 SAGAN, S. D. & WALTZ, K. N. (2003) “The Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s: A Debat e

Rene w e d ,” New York W.W. Norto n & Com pa n y

18 THE BROOKINGS ESSAY (2013). “The Rhym e of History” [Online] Availabl e from:
htt p://ww w . b r o o ki n g s . e d u / r e s e a r c h / e s s a y s / 2 0 1 3 / r h y m e - of-history # [Access e d 18/03/ 1 5]

19 IKLE, F. C. (1973) “Can Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e Last out the Cent u r y?,” Forei g n Affairs, Vol.
51, No. 2, pp. 273

20 WALTZ, K. (1981), “The Spr e a d of Nuclea r Weapo n s: More May Be Bett e r,” Adelphi
Pape r s , Num b e r 171 (London: Inte r n a t i o n a l Instit ut e for Str a t e gi c Studi e s)
of stra t e g y. The possibility of mut u ally assu r e d dest r u c tio n (MAD) 21 dete r s
nuclea r stat e s from att ac ki n g one anot h e r . MAD is possible for both the
atta c k e r and the defen d e r . What this mea n s is that if one count ry has an
overw h el mi n g supe rio rity, nucle a r wea po n s could be used with impunity.
Howeve r , if both sides have surviva bl e secon d- strike forces, then it does not
mat t e r how badly stat e s were struc k, they could still survive with enou g h
nuclea r weapo n s to impos e assu r e d dest r u c ti o n of the othe r side. That
prod u c e s a major pote n ti al const r ai n t on both sides - not only do nuke s
dete r atta ck s on the hom el a n d , they det e r atta c k s on any vital stra t e gi c
22
inte r e s t s , and that lowers the stak e s of war.

Waltz believes that gra d u a l spre a d of nucle a r wea po n s is bett e r than no

spre a d or rapid spre a d . So far nuclea r wea po n s have prolifer a t e d only
vertic ally as the major nucle a r pow e r s have add e d to their arse n al s .
Horizont ally, they have spre a d slowly acros s count ri e s, and the pace is
23
unlikely to know any dras tic chan g e s . Furt h e r m o r e , anot h e r promin e n t
neor e alist John Mear s h e i m e r agre e s with Waltz by saying that “nucle a r
24
wea po n s are a supe r b det e r r e n t . ” He believes that with their adva n c e d
econo mic, social and political infras t r u c t u r e , count ri e s Germ a n y, Ukrain e ,
Japa n and possibly Brazil 25 could succe s sf ully emb a r k e d on a nucle a r
26
prog r a m . Howev e r, Waltz also mentio n e d that nucle a r wea po n s should
21 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (2014). “Will Mut u al Assur e d Dest r u c ti o n Continu e to Dete r
Nucle a r War?” [Online] Available from: http://ww w. sci e n t ifica m e r i c a n . c o m / a r t i cl e/ will-
mut u al- assu r e d- dest r u c t i o n- continu e- to- det e r- nucle a r- war/ [Access e d 06/03/1 5]

22 SAGAN, S. D. & WALTZ, K. N. (2003) “The Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s: A Debat e

Rene w e d ,” New York W.W. Norto n & Com pa n y

23 SAGAN, S. D. & WALTZ, K. N. (2003) “The Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s: A Debat e

Rene w e d ,” New York W.W. Norto n & Com pa n y

24 THE NEW YORK TIMES (1998). “Here We Go Again” [Online] Available from:
htt p://ww w . nyti m e s. c o m / 1 9 9 8 / 0 5/ 1 7 / o pi nion/ h e r e - we- go- again.h t m l [Access e d 24/03/ 1 5]

25 Brazil did have a nuclear weapons program, but agreed to disarm mutually with Argentina.

26 SAGAN, S. D. & WALTZ, K. N. (2003) “The Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s: A Debat e

Rene w e d ,” New York W.W. Norto n & Com pa n y, pp. 10- 47
only come in the poss e s sio n of stat e s that have stron g leade r s hi p over its
citizens and that are dee m e d “politically reliabl e” and the r efo r e resist a n t to
pote n ti al coup d’état s. Othe r neor e a lis t schola r s like Step h e n Van Evera,
27
Barry Pose n, Pete r Lavoy, and Shai Feldm a n reac h e d similar conclusio n s.

Additionally, the possibility and unacc e p t a b ly high cost of des t r u c ti o n

28
make s stat e s more careful and miscalc ul a tio n difficult and dang e r o u s . The
idea that war is obsole t e come s from John Muelle r in a book called “Retr e a t
from Dooms d a y.” He explains why thes e nucle a r wea po n s may not in fact
be very impor t a n t to this peac ef ul period that we had since 1945 betw e e n
29
major powe r s . Snyde r and Diesing note that befor e the introd u c tio n of
nuclea r weapo n s , stat e s could more rea dily accep t the risk of war or eng a g e
in war to avoid the loss of a cont e n d e d value. But today und e r similar
conditions , it is far more difficult to think of resor tin g to war when the r e is a
high risk of nucle a r war, withou t forget ti n g the cost of actu ally fighting
one. 30 Weake r stat e s are also not more likely to use nukes irres p o n s i bly –
they would lose in a conve n tio n al war. 31 Enoch Powell has a similar opinion,
yet he reject s the view that nucle a r wea po n s det e r r e d Russia’s takeove r of
West e r n Europ e . Russia would not have dare d to invade Weste r n Europ e
"for one simple overw h el mi n g reas o n: it would have mea n t a war they
32
couldn' t expe ct to win" agains t the Unite d Stat e s . Powell believes that
27 SAGAN, S. D. (1994), “The Perils of Prolifer a tio n: Orga niz a tio n Theory, Dete r r e n c e
Theory, and the Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s,” Inter n a t i o n a l Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 66

28 WALTZ, K. (1981), “The Spr e a d of Nuclea r Weapo n s: More May Be Bett e r,” Adelphi
Pape r s , Num b e r 171 (London: Inte r n a t i o n a l Instit ut e for Str a t e gi c Studi e s), pp. 1

29 SNYDER, G. H. & DIESING, P. (1977), “Conflict Among Nations: Barg ai nin g, Decision
Making, and Syst e m Str uc t u r e in Inter n a t i o n a l Crises,” Princ e t o n Univer sity Press, pp. 450

30 GELLER, D. S. (1990), “Nucle a r Weapo n s, Dete r r e n c e and Crisis Escal a tion,” The
Journ al of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 291- 310

31 WALTZ, K. (1981), “The Spr e a d of Nuclea r Weapo n s: More May Be Bett e r,” Adelphi
Pape r s , Num b e r 171 (London: Inte r n a t i o n a l Instit ut e for Str a t e gi c Studi e s)

32 COLLINGS, R. & POWELL, J. E. (1992), “Reflection s: The Selec t e d Writings and

Spe ec h e s of Enoch Powell,” Bellew Publication Co. Ltd., pp. 647- 649
nuclea r dete r r e n c e was only a cover- up. The fact that both Fra nc e and
Britain had their own nucle a r weap o n s demo n s t r a t e d that they believe d that
the United Stat e s would not risk a nucle a r war over Weste r n Europ e , and
that the r efo r e the Russia n s’ reas o ni n g was flawe d since neith e r Fran c e nor
Britain would the m s elv e s use nucle a r weapo n s as the cons e q u e n c e s of
nuclea r war outw ei g h the benefits.

On the othe r hand , Scott Sag a n, looking from the bure a u c r a t i c politics
(orga niz a tio n a l) theory, has a comple t ely differe n t opinion of nuclea r
dete r r e n c e . He dedu c e s that “nucle a r wea po n s progr a m s are not obvious or
inevita bl e solution s to inte r n a t i o n a l secu rity proble m s ; inste a d they are
solutions looking for a probl e m to which to att a c h the m s elv e s so as to justify
33 34
their exist e n c e .” As a group of Manh a t t a n Project scientis t s said, the
“whole history of mankin d teac h e s ...t h a t accu m ul a t e d wea p o n s of mas s
dest r u c tio n ‘go off’ soone r or late r, even if this mea n s sens el e s s mut u al
dest r u c tio n.”

Military orga niz a tio n s , unless man a g e d by stron g civilian- cont rol
instit utio n s , can inadve r t e n t ly lead to dete r r e n c e failur e s and delibe r a t e or
accide n t a l war, beca u s e of com m o n biase s, inflexible routin e s , and
paroc hi al inte r e s t s 35. Sag a n talks about the conditions that can cre a t e
insta bility like hair trigg e r alert, or inflexible routin e s that comp r o m i s e
secon d- strike capa bility. 36 All of thes e are antony m o u s to thre e ass u m p t io n s
mad e by Waltz. Firstly, ther e must not be preve n tiv e war durin g the period

33 BEKER, Y. (2008), “Nucle a r Prolifer a ti o n and Iran: Thoug h t s about the Bomb,” Isra el
Journ al of Foreig n Affairs II:3, pp. 33. [Online] Available from:
htt p://isr a e l cfr.co m / d o c u m e n t s /i ss u e 6_i r a n . p df

34 SAGAN, S. D. (1988), “Moving Targe t s: Nucle a r Stra t e g y and Nation al Secu ri ty”,
Princ e t o n: Princ e t o n Univer sity Press, p. 3

35 SAGAN, S. D. (1994) “The Perils of Prolifer a t io n: Orga niz a ti on Theory, Dete r r e n c e

Theory, and the Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s,” Inter n a t i o n a l Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 68

36 SAGAN, S. D. & WALTZ, K. N. (2003) “The Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s: A Debat e

Rene w e d ,” New York W.W. Norto n & Com pa n y, pp. 184
of building nuke s; secon dly, both stat e s mus t develop secon d- strike
capa bility and surviva bility; thirdly, nucle a r arse n al s must not be pron e to
accide n t a l use.

Sag a n views nucle a r prolifer a tio n as a tool to enforc e milita ry powe r

beca u s e from an orga niz a tio n a l app ro a c h , “milita ry bure a u c r a c i e s , like
othe r orga niz a tio n s are usually inter e s t e d in having more reso u r c e s : they
want more weap o n s , more men in unifor m, more of the budg e t pie.” 37 The
conc e p t of secu ri ty dilem m a within IR can also lead to nucle a r prolifer a tio n
as inter n a t io n a l tension can inten sify into an arms race, and nowa d a y s with
nuclea r weapo n s unde r the spotligh t, it is not long until they beco m e the
38
motivation to prot e c t stat e s’ inter e s t s .

During the heigh t of the Cold War, 68,00 0 nucle a r weapo n s were active in
39
the world. Now the num b e r is down to an estim a t e d 4,100. One of the
reas o n s why stat e s have cut dow n on the num b e r is to take prec a u t io n s with
existing nucle a r wea po n s cach e s and make sure that they do not fall into
40
the wron g hand s. Ther e are historic al case s that raise the risk and should
cre a t e conce r n s of an accide n t a l nucle a r war, like the Kwajalein Atoll

37 SAGAN, S. D. & WALTZ, K. N. (2003) “The Spre a d of Nucle a r Weapo n s: A Debat e

Rene w e d ,” New York W.W. Norto n & Com pa n y, pp. 64

38 BOOTH, K. & WHEELER, N. J. (2008), “Unce r t a i n t y in Secu ri ty Studi e s: An Intro d u c ti o n

by Paul D. William s,” Oxon: Routle d g e , pp. 133- 150

39 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2014). “50 Fact s About U.S. Nucle a r Weapo n s Today.”
[Online]. Available from: http://ww w. b r o o ki n g s. e d u / r e s e a r c h / a r t i cl e s/ 2 0 1 4 / 0 4 / 2 8- 50-
nucle a r- facts. [Accesse d 17/03/ 1 5]

40 BUZAN, B. & HANSE N, L. (2007), “Inte r n a t i o n a l Secu ri ty Vol. 1: The Cold War and
Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e ,” Sage Libra ry of Inte r n a t i o n a l Relation s, 1 (1), pp. 34
incide n t 41, for exam pl e. A book called “Atomic Audit: The Costs and
42
Cons e q u e n c e s of U.S. Nucle a r Weapo n s Since 1940” actu ally looks at the
costs of the Unite d Stat e s Nucle a r Progr a m in total. It shows that the cost
to maint ain this weapo n prog r a m equ als twice the cost of the Iraq war
which is arou n d $3 trillion.

43
Sag a n also talked about the stability- insta bility para d ox. He arg u e s that it
is not possible to credi bly det e r anot h e r count ry from eng a gi n g in a
conve n tio n al atta c k. As Thoma s Schelling put it, “a count ry could thre a t e n
44
to stu m bl e into a war even if it cannot credi bly thre a t e n to invite one.” As
45
he also wrot e, “if brink m a n s h i p mea n s anythi n g, it mea n s manip ul a ti n g the
sha r e d risk of war. It mea n s explorin g the dang e r that some b o dy might
inadve r t e n tly go over the brink, dra g gi n g the othe r with him.” 46

The Kargil War (1999) betw e e n India n and Pakist a n is both a conflict that
cuts again s t Democ r a ti c Peac e Theory and also agains t Nucle a r Peac e or
Nucle a r Stability Theory. Democ r a ti c Peac e Theory is the proposition that
47
demo c r a ci e s and nucle a r weapo n s stat e s do not fight one anot h e r . As
Devon Hagg e r t y once wrote, “Ther e’s no more iron clad in inter n a ti o n al

41 BURNS, R. D. & SIRACUSA, J. M. (2013), “A Global History of the Nucle a r Arms Race:
Weapo n s, Stra t e g y, and Politics,” Prae g e r Secu ri ty Inter n a t i o n a l. In 1962, durin g the
Cuba n Missile Crisis, the Unite d Stat e s routi n ely kept a sm all num b e r of ICBMs with test
warh e a d s , radios and othe r kind of equi p m e n t that they could launc h an ICBM from
Vande n b e r g Air Forc e base in Califor ni a to the Kwajalein Atoll. Becau s e they wer e
conce r n e d that a war might bre a k out, the Air Forc e put actu al nuclea r warh e a d s on nine
of the ten missiles and then shifte d their aim point from the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marsh a ll
Islan ds in the Pacific to aim it at China and the Soviet Union. By doing so they were
incre a si n g the risks of a nuclea r war if the Soviet Union cam e to find out.

42 SCHWARTZ, S. I. (1998), “Atomic Audit: The Cost s and Conse q u e n c e s of U.S. Nucle a r
Weapo n s Since 1940, ” Washin g t o n , D. C.: The Brookin gs Instit ution, pp. 5- 10

43 SAGAN, S. D. (2009), “Inside Nuclea r Sout h Asia,” Stanfor d Unive rsi ty Press, pp. 281

44 ROEHRIG, T. (2007), “From Dete r r e n c e to Enga g e m e n t : The U.S. Defens e Com mit m e n t
to Sout h Kore a,” Lexingt o n Books, pp. 18

45 POWELL, R. L. (2003), “Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e , Nucle a r Prolifer a t io n, and Nation al Missile

Defens e,” Inte r n a t io n al Secu ri ty, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 91

46 SCHELLING, T. C. (1966), “Arms and Influe n c e ,” Yale Unive rsi ty Press, pp. 93- 125
 48
relation s in this, that nucle a r stat e s don’t fight wars with eac h othe r.” The
Polity IV data sets show the democ r a c y scor e s*, thre s h ol d usually being
seve n as the stat e being democ r a t i c enou g h. In 1999, Pakist a n was a seven
and India was at nine, and yet nonet h e l e s s , they went to war. The Stability-
Inst a bility Para d ox is also illustr a t e d her e: Neil Joeck, a Political Scien tis t
who has worke d inside the Govern m e n t in the U.S. Lab Syste m note d that
the brinks m a n s h i p of trying to crea t e som e risk again occu r s in the 1999
crisis. 49 Rece n tly howev e r India and Pakist a n have been seeking to improve
relation s with each othe r, but Paul Kapur sugg e s t s this is from the shift of
dome s ti c priorities, politics and non- nucle a r stra t e gi c calculation s within
50
the region rat h e r than from nucle a r det e r r e n c e .

Univer s al inter e s t in the secu rity of inter n a ti o n a l society as a whole is also

jeopa r diz e d if prolifer a tio n slips throu g h the finge r s of sover ei g n stat e and
51
nuclea r weapo n s find their way towa r d s non- stat e actor s. In 1999, milita ry
officers during the Kargil Cam p ai g n secr e tly cont a c t e d Taliba n Officials
about moving nuclea r ass et s into Afgha nis t a n for safek e e pi n g – a requ e s t
52
that they acce p t e d with open arm s. In June 2003, Presid e n t Mus h a r r a f

47 REITER, D. (2012). “Democ r a t i c Peac e Theory.” Oxford Bibliogr a p h i e s [Online: Political

Scienc e]. Availabl e from: http://w w w.oxfor d bi bliog r a p h i e s . c o m / vi e w/ d o c u m e n t / o b o-
97801 9 9 7 5 6 2 2 3 / o b o- 9780 1 9 9 7 5 6 2 2 3- 0014.xml [Access e d 24/03/ 1 5]
*Refe r to APPE N D ICE S

48 KREPON, M. (2003), “The Sta bility- Inst a bility Para d ox, Mispe r c e p t i o n, and Escal a tio n
Cont rol in Sout h Asia,” The Hen ry Stimso n Cent e r , pp. 1- 24. [Online]. Available from:
htt p://ww w .s ti m s o n .o r g /i m a g e s / u pl o a d s / r e s e a r c h - pdfs/ESCCO NTR OLC HAPTER 1.p df.
[Access e d 07/03/ 1 5]

49 JOECK, N. (2009), “The Kargil War and Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e , ” New York: Routle d g e , pp.
117

50 KAPUR, P. S. & GANGULY, S. (2009), “Nucl e a r Prolifer a tio n in Sout h Asia,” New York:
Routle d g e , pp. 87

51 BUZAN, B. & HANSE N, L. (2007), “Inte r n a t i o n a l Secu ri ty Vol. 1: The Cold War and
Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e ,” Sage Libra ry of Inte r n a t i o n a l Relation s, 1 (1), pp. 126

52 TRIBUNE INDIA (2001). “Whe n Pak Offere d to Help Taliban on Nuke s,” [Online].
Available from: htt p://ww w .t ri b u n e i n di a .c o m / 2 0 0 1 / 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 / w o r l d. h t m # 3 [Access e d
19/03/ 1 5]
admitt e d on the ABC show Nightline that ther e was 10% prob a bility of
53
terro ris t grou p s seizing thos e wea po n s . If wea po n s fell into the hand s of
rogu e stat e s , this could have terrible cons e q u e n c e s for inter n a ti o n al
secu ri ty.

Hedley Bull is anot h e r oppon e n t of nucle a r det e r r e n c e . No stat e s can

achieve a splen did first strike. This is wha t MAD see m s to point at. Yet,
accor di n g to Bull, nucle a r dete r r e n c e is vulne r a bl e to tech n ologic al cha n g e ,
partic ul a rly if one or both sides can acqui r e effective defe nsive syste m that
54
can prot e c t their people if det e r r e n c e can ceas e to work. Furt h e r m o r e , up
until now, the world has not had irratio n al lead e r s that would use nucle a r
wea po n s . For him, the usag e of nucle a r weap o n s could escala t e into a
holoca u s t.

55
Howeve r , Wilson Ward has a comple t ely differe n t pers p e c tiv e. He argu e s
that people arou n d the world, but Americ a n s in partic ul a r, cam e to the
conclusio n that nuclea r wea po n s had uniqu e psychologic al powe r s , as U.S.
Secr e t a r y of War Stimso n stre s s e d out. Everyon e believe s in the physical
dest r u c tiv e n e s s of nucle a r weap o n s . But it was their psychologic al pow e r,
the fact that it cloud e d their mind that got beyon d what we could imagin e.
Contr a r y to popula r belief, it was not the bombi n g of Hiros hi m a and
Nag a s a ki that force d the Japan e s e to surr e n d e r . The invasion of Manc h u ri a
by Russia n s playe d a part as well. This was lie cre a t e d by both sides for
prop a g a n d a purpo s e s . Moreove r , the United Stat e s and the form e r- USSR
had not fough t a war since 1945 and people pre s u m e d that nucle a r wea po n s

53 ABC NEWS (2003). “’Nightlin e’ Inte rvie w with Pakist a ni Presid e n t Mush a r r a f .” [Online
Trans c ri p t ] Available from: http://a b c n e w s . g o. c o m / Ni g h t li n e/ s t o r y?id = 1 2 8 6 0 . [Access e d
13/03/ 1 5]

54 AYSON, R. (2012), “Hedley Bull and the Accom m o d a t i o n of Powe r,” Palgr a v e Mac milla n,
pp. 66

55 WARD, W. (2013), “Five Myths About Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e . ” [Online]. Availabl e from:
htt p://ww w . p u bli s h e r s w e e k ly.co m / p w/ by- topic/ind u s t r y- news/ti p- shee t/ a r t i cl e/ 5 5 5 5 2- 5-
myths- about- nuclea r- weap o n s . h t m l
mus t the rea so n for that long peac e . Howev e r , it is not possibl e to test this
hypoth e si s as proof by abs e n c e is the sort of evide n c e stat e s neve r accep t in
any circu m s t a n c e s whe r e real risk is involved. He asks for a chan g e of the
minds e t , bec a u s e as long as nucle a r bomb s are reg a r d e d as a dete r r e n t to
war, prolifer a tio n will not come to an end. 56

In the light of the above, propo n e n t s believe that nucle a r weap o n s act as a
dete r r e n t to a pote n ti al nucle a r war. Oppon e n t s of the view, howev e r, stre s s
that if we want to uphold the race to a nucle a r cata s t r o p h e , the bes t way to
proc e e d is to abolish nuclea r wea po n s and put all mat e ri al vital for the
prod u c tio n of nuclea r weapo n s unde r strict and effective inte r n a t i o n al
cont rol. Differe n t new dyna mic s are involved nowa d a y s that we did not face
during the Cold War, so we canno t put the futur e of hum a nity at risk.
Achieving nuclea r disar m a m e n t is a goal endor s e d by US Presid e n t Bara ck
Obam a , Unite d Nations Secr e t a r y- Gene r al Ban Ki Moon 57, the Dalai Lam a
and many othe r disting ui s h e d leade r s . In 2009, Presid e n t Obam a on a stat e
visit to Czech Repu blic said, “The exist e n c e of thous a n d s of nucle a r
wea po n s is the most dan g e r o u s legacy of the Cold War.” 58 Even Hen ry
59
Kissing e r, Bill Perry, Georg e Shultz and Sam Nunn admit t e d in 2007 that if
they were once propo n e n t s of nucle a r dete r r e n c e , they now believe d
nuclea r weapo n s may cre a t e unac c e p t a b l e risks of accide n t al or
unau t h o riz e d launc h.

Word count: 2599

56 WARD, W. (2008) “The Myth of Nucle a r Dete r r e n c e , ” Non- prolifer a ti o n Review,

Routle d g e , Vol. 15, No. 3

57 THE GUARDIAN (2008). “Five Step s to a Nucle a r Fre e World.” [Online] Available from:
htt p://ww w .t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / c o m m e n t i sf r e e / 2 0 0 8 / n ov/ 2 3/ n u c l e a r- disar m a m e n t - unite d-
nation s [Accesse d 03/03/ 1 5]

58 BBC NEWS (2009). “Oba m a Promo t e s a Nucle a r Fre e World’ [Online] Available from:
htt p://n e w s . b b c. c o. u k/ 1/ hi/7 9 8 3 9 6 3 . s t m [Access e d 12/03/ 1 5]

59 ECONOMIST (2011) “The Growin g Appeal of Zero.” [Online]. Available from:

htt p://ww w . e c o n o m i s t . c o m / n o d e / 1 8 8 3 6 1 3 4 . [Accesse d 12/03/ 1 5]
App e n d i c e s

Polity IV data sets 60

60 http://ww w. syst e m i c p e a c e . o r g / p olity/ p a k 2. h t m

htt p://ww w .syst e m i c p e a c e . o r g / p olity/ind 2. h t m

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