Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 1 of 26 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION (at Owensboro)

JACOB CLARK : Case No. 4:19-CV-166-JHM

432 Shrewsbury Road :
Leitchfield, KY 42754 : Senior Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.
:
AND :
:
GENETTA CLARK :
432 Shrewsbury Road :
Leitchfield, KY 42754 :
:
AND :
:
JACOB CLARK, as guardian, next friend and :
guardian of H.C., a minor :
432 Shrewsbury Road :
Leitchfield, KY 42754 :
:
Plaintiffs :
:
v. :
:
BERNADETTE STONE :
100 McCubbin Blvd :
Leitchfield, KY 42754 :
In Her Individual and Official Capacities :
:
AND :
:
CATHERINE CAMPBELL :
100 McCubbin Blvd :
Leitchfield, KY 42754 :
In Her Individual and Official Capacities :
:
AND :
:
DOUGLAS HAZELWOOD :
100 McCubbin Blvd :
Leitchfield, KY 42754 :
In His Individual and Official Capacities :
:
AND :
:
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MARCUS HAYCRAFT :
445 Hwy 44 E. Suite 208 :
Shepherdsville, KY 40165 :
In His Official Capacity Only :
:
AND :
:
ADAM MEIER :
275 E. Main Street :
Frankfort, Kentucky 40621 :
In His Official Capacity Only :
:
Defendants :
:
Also Serve: :
:
Hon. Andrew Beshear, Attorney General :
700 Capitol Ave, Ste. 118 :
Frankfort, KY 40601-3449 :
__________________________

PLAINTIFFS VERIFIED COMPLAINT WITH JURY DEMAND ENDORSED HEREON

Plaintiffs Jacob and Genetta Clark, for themselves and as Next Friend and Guardian of

H.C., a minor (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”), by and through counsel, for their Verified

Complaint (the “Complaint”), against defendants, Bernadette Stone, Catherine Campbell, and

Douglas Hazelwood in both their official capacity and individual capacities, and against Marcus

Haycraft and Adam Meier in their official capacities only (collectively “Defendants”), state and

allege as follows:

A. INTRODUCTION.

1. This action, put simply, challenges repeated invasions into the home and invasions into

fundamental parent-child relationships of the Plaintiff, by the Defendants -- agents of the

government. "The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care,

custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

interests recognized by [the Supreme Court]." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73

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(2000). The "Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental

right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge [or CHFS

worker] believes a 'better' decision could be made." Id. "[T]he fundamental right of parents

to direct the upbringing of their children necessarily includes the right to discipline them."

Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 522 (7th Cir. 2003). The notion that ‘corporal punishment serves

important educational interests’ is deeply rooted in this republic's history.” Id., citing

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681 (1977). “We also acknowledge that people of many

faiths, and perhaps some of no faith at all, genuinely believe in the truth of the oft-recited

phrase: ‘Spare the rod, and spoil the child.’ John Bartlett, Bartlett's Familiar Quotations

263:21 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (phrase attributed to a poem by Samuel Butler

entitled "Hudibras").” Id. Thus, while “[t]he right of parents to discipline their children does

not give them a license to abuse them,” “[i]t does, however, preclude state officials from

interfering with the right of parents to physically discipline their children.” Id.

2. Thus, this case involves the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights by the official and individual capacity Defendants named herein.

Specifically, this action involves the illegal, and baseless trumping of knowingly false

charges by the Defendants. As it turns out, the individual capacity Defendants have a

troubling pattern and practice of illegally falsifying dependency/neglect charges, among

other illegal and unconstitutional activities. As for the official capacity Defendants,

Kentucky has promulgated a regulation that specifically interferes with, and classifies as

abuse, reasonable and proportional parental discipline, which runs afoul of the Constitution.

Thus, this action seeks declaratory and prospective injunctive relief halting this practice.

This action also challenges, and seeks redress for, the constitutional violations committed by

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the individual capacity Defendants towards the Plaintiffs beginning on or about December

16, 2018, and ending in August, 2019. This suit seeks money damages against the individual

capacity Defendants, and injunctive and declaratory relief against all Defendants regarding

the unconstitutional regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and costs and attorney fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1988.

B. PARTIES

3. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiffs Jacob Clark (“Jacob”), Genetta Clark (“Genetta”), and

H.C. Clark (“H.C.”) (collectively the “Clarks”) were and are citizens and residents of

Leitchfield, Kentucky, in Grayson County, Kentucky. Jacob and Genetta have three minor

children together, C.C., age 16, N.C., age 14, and H.C., age 12.

4. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Bernadette Stone (“Stone”) was employed full-time

as a social worker with the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”)

located in Leitchfield, Kentucky. Stone is and has been a state actor for purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

5. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Catherine Campbell (“Campbell”) was employed full-

time as a social worker with CHFS located in Leitchfield, Kentucky. At all pertinent times,

Campbell supervised Stone. Campbell is and has been a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

6. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Douglas Hazelwood (“Hazelwood”) was employed

full-time as the supervising social worker with CHFS located in Leitchfield, Kentucky.

Hazelwood is and has been a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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7. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Marcus Haycraft (“Haycraft”) was employed full-

time as the supervising and regional manager for CHFS located in Shepherdsville, Kentucky.

Haycraft is and has been a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Adam Meier (“Meier”) was the Cabinet Secretary of

CHFS located in Frankfort, Kentucky. Meier is and has been a state actor for purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

9. Attorney General Beshear is served pursuant to K.R.S. 418.075, but is not made a party, in

that the constitutionality of an administrative regulation, 922 K.A.R. 1:330, Section 2 (5) (f),

regarding a “mark,” is at issue.

C. JURISDICTION AND VENUE.

10. Subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs in this

action is conferred on this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 U.S.C.

§1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and other applicable law.

11. Subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims brought against Defendants in their

individual capacities is conferred on this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

12. This Court has in personam jurisdiction over each Defendant.

13. Venue in this District and division is proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 and other

applicable law, because all of the deprivations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights occurred in

counties within this District, and future deprivations of their constitutional rights are

threatened and likely to occur in this District.

D. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS

14. At all times relevant, Stone was a social worker employed by CHFS and posted at the

Leitchfield, Kentucky office.

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15. At all times relevant, Meier, as the Cabinet Secretary of CHFS, was responsible for the

promulgation of administrative regulations and their enforcement by his staff including

Defendants Haycraft, Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone under K.R.S. 194A.010, K.R.S.

194A.025, K.R.S. 194A.050, and other applicable law. Furthermore, Meier, Haycraft,

Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone have in the past, and will in the future, enforce the

regulations that are challenged herein.

16. Haycraft, Hazelwood, and Campbell were intimately involved with all of the actions of

Stone, as set forth herein, and, as noted later, encouraged and personally participated in

Stone’s actions by encouraging her to take the actions complained of herein.

17. Stone, for her part, was new to the Cabinet, and was supervised and mentored by Campbell,

her supervisor Hazelwood, and Hazelwood was supervised by the regional supervisor,

Haycraft.

18. Prior to December 16, 2018, Jacob and Genetta had been dealing with serious disciplinary

issues with their son, N.C. Some of those issues had spread to school, where N.C. had been

involved in getting trouble for slamming doors and pushing and hitting his classmates. He

also had issues at home and had been fighting with his siblings. His parents had warned N.C.

that his behavior was unacceptable and that there would be consequences if his bad behavior

continued.

19. Jacob and Genetta believe, as part of their fundamental religious beliefs, that the use of

corporal punishment is appropriate when necessary. Jacob is a part time minister. He has no

record of violence and no criminal record whatsoever. He does, however, believe in actively

raising his children to be good adults and responsible citizens.

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20. For the avoidance of all doubt, physical punishment is the exception, not the rule, in the

Clark’s home, and is generally only utilized when other methods of disciplinary measures,

such as removal of privileges, fails.

21. On or about December 16, 2018, Jacob, Genetta, C.C., N.C., and H.C. were at home. At that

time, Genetta was sitting with N.C. and assisting him with treating his acne.

22. N.C. then became aggravated with her help, stood up, and slammed his bedroom door in his

mother’s face. At that point, she opened the door, but he stuck his chest out towards her in a

threatening manner as if he was going to strike her. As a result, she concluded that only

physical discipline would get his attention, and so she struck him twice on his rear end with a

wooden back scratcher.

23. At that point, N.C.’s behavior did not improve and he continued his threatening posture

towards his mother, and escalated his behavior to the point that Jacob became involved,

grabbed his belt, and spanked N.C. 5 or 6 times across his rear end. N.C. pushed his arm

down to try and intervene and it appears that the belt struck his arm at that point.

24. Making matters worse, C.C., who was on the phone with his girlfriend, also attempted to

intervene to stop his parents from disciplining his brother, at which point he was also

disciplined using the belt.

25. The following morning, N.C. apologized to his parents for his bad behavior, and recognized

that the disciplinary measures that were taken were overdue given all of the issues that led to

them.

26. In contrast, C.C. was embarrassed by the discipline he received, and made a report to his

school with the intent that it make a report to the CHFS. The school did exactly that.

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27. The following day, Stone, a social worker from CHFS, received information regarding the

incident.

28. Under the full force and authority of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, under the color of

state law, in complete bad faith, and without reasonable or probable cause that the children

were “neglected” or “abused” in any way, Stone required school staff to remove the children

from their classrooms for interviews. Jacob and Genetta Clark were unaware of the

interviews and would not have granted permission for them had they been so made aware.

29. In fact, it appears that CHFS has a pattern, practice, and policy of interviewing children

without the consent of their parents, on any report of “abuse.”

30. At Stone’s direction, at each school, the school staff had the children removed from their

classroom, and brought them into a room alone with Stone, who was a stranger to the

children.

31. Stone saw a light red mark on N.C.’s arm during her interview with him. A photograph of

N.C.’s arm on the day of the interview taken by Stone is attached as Exhibit A in which the

mark is barely discernable.

32. All of the Clark children were questioned about whether they were safe at home, and whether

they were abused. They all answered the questions that they were safe at home, and were not

abused.

33. In particular, H.C. did not believe she was free to leave the room until she was released by

Stone. The reality is she was not free to leave.

34. Significantly, H.C. told Stone that her parents did not injure her or her brothers, and, at most,

when disciplined, there would be a red mark on the children’s buttocks for a short period;

Stone, for her part, wrote down on her investigation form that H.C. told her that she was put

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in danger from the parents who injured the children through corporal punishment. When

H.C. saw this misquotation of her statement, H.C. corrected Stone and told her that what

Stone had wrote was not true. H.C. believes that Stone then corrected her notes, but Stone

told H.C. that she was not supposed to be looking at the interview notes anyways.

35. H.C. was told by Stone, at the end of the interview, that she was then free to go and return to

class.

36. The Clark children, and specifically HC, returned home that afternoon terrified and crying.

H.C. was afraid of being “taken away” and wanted to know if her parents were going to jail.

Their sense of safety within the family that each possessed when school started was severely

damaged.

37. The CHFS promulgated an administrative regulation that violates the constitutional rights of

Kentucky’s parents. Specifically, under 922 K.A.R. 1:330, Section 2 (5) (f), the Cabinet has

established a policy and regulation that any parental discipline that leaves a “mark,” however

slight, and however fleeting, constitutes “evidence of abuse”. For instance, a slight handprint

on the rear end of an errant child is considered abuse by CHFS.

38. CHFS promulgated 922 K.A.R. 1:330, Section 2 (5) (f), despite the fact K.R.S. 503.110(1)

establishes that parents have the right to discipline their children where: (a) the force used is

necessary to promote the welfare of the minor; and (b) the force used is not designed to cause

or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious physical injury, disfigurement,

extreme pain, or extreme emotional distress.

39. Upon completion of the interviews, on December 17, 2018, Stone telephoned Jacob, who

informed her that he utilizes corporal punishment sporadically and only when necessary to

discipline his children. He also confirmed that such discipline is used when other means of

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discipline fail. He informed her that he is a preacher, and, among other things, the Bible

instructs parents to reasonably discipline their children, including through the use of corporal

punishment.

40. Stone then directed Jacob to bring his children into CHFS to discuss the issue and to enter

into a prevention plan.

41. In response, Jacob indicated that he would do no such thing without a court order.

42. All prevention plans in the Commonwealth of Kentucky contain the following language in

the form: “ABSENT EFFECTIVE PREVENTATIVE SERVICES … PLACEMENT IN

FOSTER CARE IS THE PLANNED ARRANGEMENT FOR THIS CHILD.”

43. There is an ongoing pattern and practice by Defendants, and, indeed, the entire CHFS,

including Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell, in attempting to force parents into signing

prevention plans.

44. The basis for this is a pattern and practice of the Cabinet, and its workers, to obtain federal

reimbursement funds pursuant to Title IV-E, 42 U.S.C. § 672 et seq. Thus, there is a pattern

and practice of falsely pushing parents into these plans, and, as this case demonstrates,

retaliating when they fail to do so. See, also, Schulkers v. Kammers, et. al., EDKY 2:17-cv-

00076; Holliday v. Leigh, EDKY 2:17-cv-00113.1

45. For this, and other reasons, Defendants carried out their actions in bad faith.

46. That same day, on December 17, 2018, Stone made good on her threat, and proceeded to file

three neglect/abuse cases in the District Court of Grayson County, Kentucky (styled 18-J-

1
Each of these cases makes clear that there is a systemic abuse by CHFS officials around the
state to force unwitting parents into prevention plans to increase funding to the state by the
federal government.
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00251-001, regarding NC; 18-J-00252-001, regarding CC; and 18-J-00253-001, regarding

HC) (collectively, the “Abuse Cases”).

47. The petitions at issue in the Abuse Cases were filed pursuant to K.R.S. 620.070. No

emergency custody order affidavit was included.

48. Significantly, and tellingly (because Stone knew that her charges were retaliatory and

unsubstantiated), Stone did not make any report to local law enforcement in completing the

Abuse Cases form, despite the requirement to do so under K.R.S. 620.030(1), in instances

where abuse or neglect had allegedly occurred.

49. There was no legal or factual bases for the cases filed by Stone, and, in fact, K.R.S.

620.060(1)(b) specifically permits “reasonable and ordinary discipline recognized in the

community where the child resides.” Further, K.R.S. 600.020(1)(a)(1) limits abuse to

physical or emotional injury by other than accidental means; K.R.S. 600.020 (26) limits

emotional injury to “substantial and observable impairment in the child’s ability to function;”

and K.R.S. 600.020(49) limits physical injuries to those causing “substantial physical pain or

any impairment of physical condition.” None of these conditions were present with any of

the Clark children at any time

50. Further, in completing her investigation related to the Abuse Cases, Stone knowingly made

various false statements. Specifically, Stone knowingly and purposefully made the false

statement that she “observed vertical abrasions on [NC’s] right arm.” She likewise

knowingly and falsely claimed that there was a risk of harm. Neither of these statements

were true.

51. But Stone’s actual basis for the investigation and her actions is contained in her investigative

report that was incorporated in the complaints. In that investigative report, Stone notes that

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she “believes the children to be at Risk of Harm if Jacob Clark and Genetta Jenny Clark

continue to be noncompliant with the Cabinet,” specifically referring to their refusal to sign

the prevention plan and thus permit CHFS to dictate parental actions to them for a period that

could last years.

52. Again, there was no abrasion on NC’s arm, rather, there was a light red mark on NC’s arm,

which was unintentionally caused when NC moved his arm over his buttocks.

53. The matter was first heard on December 19, 2018, by Judge Embry. Prior to the hearing,

Stone only informed Jacob and Genetta just minutes before the Court hearing of the hearing

itself, in contravention of their rights to reasonable notice under procedural due process. She

also falsely told the Court that Jacob and Genetta had been informed of the Court hearing,

and had chosen not to be there, which was untrue.

54. Prior to this Court hearing, Stone had called Jacob’s father and stepmother, to determine if

they would take custody of the children and told them that the children would be removed

from Jacob and Genetta’s care. This information was passed back to Jacob and Genetta. It

also demonstrated Stone’s plans to separate the children from their parents.

55. In point of fact, there is a systemic problem with CHFS: approximately 10,000 children have

been placed in foster care, and, upon information and belief, some of them have been so

placed due to the inappropriate financial incentives stated herein, as well as the

unconstitutional regulation contained at 922 K.A.R. 1:330, Section 2 (5) (f), regarding marks.

56. At that same hearing on December 19, 2018, Stone again perjured herself by telling the Court

that NC’s skin was broken and that a laceration was caused. In fact, no such thing ever

happened and Stone knew it.

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57. On December 19, 2019, as a result of the perjured testimony of Stone, Judge Embry entered

an order that stated: “no physical discipline, parents to cooperate w/ CHFS.” Judge Embry

did not make findings of abuse or neglect, and continued the matter to January 9, 2019.

58. On January 9, 2019, the matter was called again into court. At that time, a different judge

with the Court directed that Jacob and Genetta “cooperate” with the cabinet by permitting

home visits to occur whenever and however Stone and her co-workers wished. Jacob, for his

part, objected and noted that he had a Fourth Amendment right for a warrant to issue for such

a search. In response, the presiding judge, Kenneth H. Goff, II, informed Jacob that his

Fourth Amendment rights did not apply when CHFS was involved and if he did not

cooperate, the judge would enter an order taking away his children.

59. This statement by Judge Goff is patently false, contravenes clearly established law in the

Sixth Circuit, and the plain language of K.R.S. 620.040(5)(a), which collectively and

generally require a warrant to enter a home. Andrews v. Hickman County, 700 F.3d 845 (6th

Cir. 2012).

60. On January 28, 2019, Stone and Campbell appeared at the residence of Jacob and Genetta.

They were accompanied at the time by Sergeant Fred Norder with the Grayson County

Sheriff’s office.

61. Jacob taped to the front door a copy of the entirety of the text of the Fourth Amendment.

Stone and Campbell identified themselves.

62. Believing that he was the victim of perjured testimony and not trusting Stone, Jacob

videotaped the entire interaction between himself and Stone and Campbell. Both Stone and

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Campbell objected to the videotaping. Sergeant Norder told them that Jacob had a

constitutional right to videotape the encounter.2

63. At that time, Jacob also indicated that he was not consenting to the entry of Stone and

Campbell into his home on the grounds that they did not have a warrant and could not enter.

Ultimately, however, Jacob opened the door, and indicated that he was doing so “under

duress and coercion.” Stone and Campbell followed Jacob into the Clark home.

64. The January 28, 2019, home visit itself yielded no evidence of abuse or neglect, but did yield

significant evidence of the bad faith of Stone. The video recording of that home visit

demonstrates Stone admitting that there was never an abrasion or laceration to N.C. That

admission is startling, and demonstrates the bad faith, perjury, and lack of probable cause for

the entirety of her actions. This statement was made in front of Campbell.

65. Rather than immediately terminating the case and the illegal search, in light of Stone’s

admission of perjured testimony, Campbell and Stone continued their illegal search.

66. On January 30, 2019, the parties had another court hearing; rather than dismissing the

charges, Stone decided to continue them, alleging that Jacob was “not cooperating” because,

while the home visit occurred, he insisted on videotaping it and argued about the need for a

warrant. In short, Stone retaliated against Jacob for the exercise of his First and Fourth

Amendment rights.

2
Sergeant Norder was correct on this point. Indeed, by early 2019, the right was clearly
established: Glik v. Cuniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2014); Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3rd Cir. 2018); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver,
848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Fordyce v. City of
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000);
Crawford v. Geier, 131 F.Supp.3d 703 (SDOH 2015) (indicating that while the right was not
clearly established in the 6th Circuit prior to the decision in that case, the court recognized such a
right in that case).
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67. At least as of January, 2019, Stone and others in the Leitchfield office of the CHFS referred

to Jacob as the “crazy preacher,” deriding his sincerely held religious beliefs, including those

regarding reasonable corporal punishment, and demonstrating an animus towards him.

68. On February 20, 2019, the matter was again heard in court. At this time, Stone indicated that

CHFS had completed their investigation, observed that the Clark home visit occurred and law

enforcement “had to get involved,” and continued her allegations about non-cooperation

because the Clarks asserted and exercised their First and Fourth Amendment rights.

69. On February 25, 2019, Defendant Hazelwood came for a home visit and had taken over the

case from Stone; he likewise came without a warrant, and was aware of Jacob and Genetta’s

objection to his presence in their home without such a warrant. He nevertheless entered the

home without a warrant. Again, Plaintiffs videotaped the interaction, and Hazelwood then

objected to that videotaping and left, again reporting the Plaintiffs were uncooperative

because of their exercise of their First and Fourth Amendment rights.

70. At some time prior to May 28, 2019, CHFS terminated its investigation of Plaintiffs.

71. Nevertheless, Hazelwood again entered Plaintiffs’ home without a warrant and without their

consent on May 28, 2019, despite the fact that CHFS’ investigation was supposedly over.

72. Additional court hearings occurred on March 20, 2019, April 11, 2019, and June 6, 2019, in

which Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone were in attendance. At each, the Defendants urged

that the case be continued, largely due to (a) their hostility to Mr. and Mrs. Clark’s religious

beliefs; (b) their desire to continue to interfere with Mr. and Mrs. Clark’s parenting including

the use of reasonable corporal punishment; and (c) their hostility due to the Clarks insistence

on videotaping their interactions with Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone. They also stated

their belief that Jacob was non-cooperative when he refused to take assessments for anger

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management or mental health assessments. Again, there was absolutely no basis to require

him to do so.

73. Finally, on August 1, 2019, the Abuse Cases were dismissed with prejudice by the district

court as baseless, and thus the proceedings were terminated in Plaintiffs’ favor.

74. During the entire pendency of the Abuse Cases, from December 19, 2018 through August 1,

2019, the orders to “cooperate” and orders that prevented physical discipline of the children

were in force.

75. The of the investigation, home invasions, Abuse Cases, and the orders at issue, were

predicated upon nothing short of knowingly perjured testimony.

76. This same misconduct by Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone caused repeated warrantless

searches into the Plaintiffs’ home, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.

77. This same misconduct by Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone caused substantial interference

into Jacob and Genetta’s ability to direct the education and upbringing of their children and

their fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their

children.

78. Specifically, the “cooperation” provision required Jacob and Genetta to be second guessed in

all parenting decisions of the Clark children by Stone, Hazelwood, Campbell over a period of

seven and a half months without cause. Similarly, the prohibition against physical discipline

had a significant and deleterious effect on the Clarks’ ability to parent their children,

specifically their two teenage sons; as both sons were aware of the order and the fact they

could not be physically disciplined, and repeatedly defied their parents during the period the

order was in place, causing turmoil in the home. This interference remained in place,

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notwithstanding the fact that there was no finding that either of the Clarks were unfit as a

parent.

E. Prospective Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Allegations.

79. The Clarks, at present, reasonably fear engaging in reasonable corporal punishment of their

children; the regulation that they challenge, 922 K.A.R. 1:330, Section 2 (5) (f), as to

“marks,” as well as the pattern and practice of Defendants to prosecute as child abusers

parents who engage in reasonable discipline of their children, the Defendants hostility

towards their religion, and the Defendants’ punitive reaction to the videotaping, have chilled

the exercise of their fundamental rights. Unless the declaratory and injunctive relief sought

herein is issued, their rights will continued to be chilled. But for the violations and issues

contained herein, Plaintiffs would subject their children, as necessary, to reasonable and

appropriate corporal punishment, appropriate for the children’s ages.

F. Fourteenth Amendment Violation – Interference with the Fundamental

Right of Parents to Raise, Supervise, and Reasonably Discipline their
Children (All Defendants as to injunctive relief and declaratory relief; Stone,
Hazelwood, and Campbell as to damages).

80. The regulation at issue, 922 K.A.R. 1:330, Section 2 (5) (f), as to “marks” constitutes an

unconstitutional interference with the rights of parents to raise, supervise, and reasonably

discipline their children. The “no discipline order” in Abuse Cases obtained by Stone,

Hazelwood, and Campbell constituted a similar interference with parental rights. The

general interference by Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell herein violated the right of Jacob

and Genetta to reasonably parent their children. These rights are clearly established under

the Fourteenth Amendment. See, also, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997),

citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510

17
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 18 of 26 PageID #: 18

(1925); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 72 (2000); Schulkers v. Kammer, 367 F.

Supp.3d 626 (E.D. Ky. 2019), appeal filed (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2019).

G. Fourteenth Amendment Violation – Procedural Due Process (Stone).

81. Stone’s misconduct of deliberately informing Jacob and Genetta minutes before the

December 19, 2018, court hearing, and then falsely informing the Court that Jacob and

Genetta had been informed of the hearing and had chosen not attend in an effort to deprive

them of their children without a hearing, violated clearly established procedural due process

law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Doe v. Staples, 706 F.2d 985, 990-991 (6th Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1033 (1984). See also K.R.S. 620.070 (requiring notice by

summons). This misconduct caused Jacob and Genetta to be unable to respond to the charges

at a time and place when their response would likely have forestalled the entire chain of

events that followed.

H. First Amendment Violation – Hostility towards religious beliefs motivated

adverse governmental action (Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell).

82. The hostility of Stone, Campbell, and Hazelwood in instituting the investigation, and then in

continuing the child abuse action, was motivated by a hostility by them towards Jacob and

Genetta’s religious beliefs, which violated their clearly established rights regarding religious

beliefs, as set forth in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543

(1993); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012).

I. First Amendment Violation – Retaliation towards recording (Stone,

Campbell, and Hazelwood).

83. Jacob and Genetta have and had an absolute First Amendment right to video and audio

record Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone at the time they came to Plaintiffs’ home. Glik v.

Cuniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014); Fields v.

18
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 19 of 26 PageID #: 19

City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3rd Cir. 2017); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848

F.3d 678, 688-690 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595-596, 599-600 (7th

Cir. 2012); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); Smith v. City of

Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); Crawford v. Geier, 131 F.Supp.3d 703, 714-

715 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (indicating that while the right was not clearly established in the 6th

Circuit prior to the decision in that case, the court recognized such a right in that case).

84. Defendants Stone, Campbell, and Hazelwood retaliated against the Plaintiffs for the exercise

of this right, taking and continuing actions against them that would deter an ordinary person

from exercising these rights.

J. Fourth Amendment Violations – Unlawful custodial interview of H.C. by

Stone, and the illegal and unconstitutional home searches without a warrant
(Stone, Campbell, and Hazelwood).

85. Students have clearly established rights under the Fourth Amendment. Safford Unified Sch.

Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009); New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985). This

extends to Fourth Amendment searches and custodial interviews by social workers. Andrews

v. Hickman Cty., 700 F.3d 845, 849 (6th Cir. 2012); see, also, Schulkers v. Kammer, 367 F.

Supp. 3d 626 (EDKY 2019) and cases cited therein and Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dept of Human

Services, 901 F.3d 656, 686 (6th Cir. 2018). Stone’s interview of H.C., where H.C. did not

believe she was free to leave, and was not free to leave, is thus in contravention of clearly

established law and constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.

86. The warrantless, unconsented-to, home invasions in 2019 by Stone, Campbell, and

Hazelwoood also constituted illegal and unconstitutional searches since they were conducted

without a warrant, and further any court order at issue did not describe with particularity the

persons and/or places to be searched. This law was clearly established under Andrews v.

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Hickman Cty., 700 F.3d 845, 849 (6th Cir. 2012), Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dept. of

Children and Family Services, 724 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013).

87. Nor can the Defendants rely on the orders of the court in the Abuse Cases, because those

orders failed to describe the home of the Plaintiffs at all, and likewise did not describe the

things or places to be searched with particularity, and, further, the order was procured with

knowingly false testimony by Stone. Thus, clearly established law establishes that these

were unconstitutional searches. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004); Knott v. Sullivan,

418 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2005); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); McCallum v.

Geelhood, 742 Fed. Appx. 985 (6th Cir. 2018).

K. Damages

88. The Constitutional violations set forth above have actually and proximately caused Plaintiffs

damages. In addition to the full non-economic damages permitted under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and

state law, Plaintiffs have suffered damages as a consequence of the foregoing, including,

without limitation, the costs of the flash drives upon which the recordings were made, court

copying costs to defend themselves, legal expenses to defend themselves, and other out of

pocket special economic damages.

COUNT I – VIOLATION OF FIRST, FOURTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

89. Plaintiffs hereby reincorporate the preceding paragraphs of their Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

90. Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States of America.

91. Plaintiffs have clearly established rights and protections under the United States Constitution

and its statutes to Freedom of Speech, Association, and Expression, Religion, and other First

Amendment guarantees.

20
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 21 of 26 PageID #: 21

92. Plaintiffs also have clearly established rights and protections under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

93. Defendants, using their respective offices and acting under color of state law, violated and

are violating Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Rights, which have deprived, are depriving, and

will deprive them of their rights to Free Speech, Expression, Association, and Religion

guaranteed to them under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which rights are

clearly established. Defendants thereby subjected themselves under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to

prospective injunctive relief, and to declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq., and

the individual capacity Defendants subjected themselves to liability for monetary damages

sought herein.

94. Defendants, using their respective offices and acting under color of state law, violated and

are violating Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment Rights, which have deprived, are depriving, and

will deprive them of their rights to “be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures,” which rights are clearly established.

Defendants thereby subjected themselves under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to prospective injunctive

relief, and to declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq., and the individual capacity

Defendants subjected themselves to liability for monetary damages sought herein.

95. Defendants, using their respective offices and acting under color of state law, violated and

are violating Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights, which have deprived, are depriving,

and will deprive them of their rights to equal protection and due process, including the

fundamental right to parent their children, which rights are clearly established. Defendants

thereby subjected themselves under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to prospective injunctive relief, and to

21
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 22 of 26 PageID #: 22

declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, et seq., and the individual capacity Defendants

subjected themselves to liability for monetary damages sought herein.

96. Defendants abused the authority of their respective offices and, while acting under color of

law and with knowledge of Plaintiffs’ established rights, used their offices to violate

Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

97. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, and prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, declaring the rights set forth herein, and the interference or

retaliation of the exercise of those rights, in contravention of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. They further seek a declaration that the

administrative regulation is unconstitutional as to “marks.” Plaintiffs further seek their costs

and reasonable attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

98. Plaintiffs further seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants: (a) declaring that

they violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights as set forth in this Complaint; and (b) enjoining

future violations of Plaintiffs’ rights by Defendants.

99. As against Defendants Stone, Campbell, and Hazelwood, Plaintiffs further state that they

were the actors responsible for the constitutional violations complained of. As such,

Plaintiffs seek damages in an amount to be determined at trial under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for

violations of their clearly established constitutional rights as set forth herein. The measure of

such damages shall be proven at trial.

Supervisory liability

100. As against Defendants Campbell and Hazelwood, they are liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983

supervisory liability. Specifically, they either directly participated in the misconduct, as set

forth above, or were aware of the misconduct and encouraged it. Further, Campbell and

22
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 23 of 26 PageID #: 23

Hazelwood implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional

conduct complained of. Mr. Clark telephoned Hazelwood, in particular, complaining of the

misconduct at issue, and he continued to permit it to occur and encouraged it.

Punitive Damages – Federal law claims

101. The foregoing misconduct and constitutional violations by Stone, Hazelwood, and

Campbell, and the other Defendants were pursued with an evil motive or intent on the part of

Defendants, or a reckless indifference or disregard by Defendants, for Plaintiffs’

constitutional rights, life, or safety, entitling Plaintiffs’ to punitive damages.

COUNT II – STATE LAW CLAIMS BY PLAINTIFFS AGAINST STONE, CAMPBELL,

AND HAZELWOOD IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

A. Malicious Prosecution (state law claim)

102. Plaintiffs hereby reincorporate the preceding paragraphs of their Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

103. Defendants Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell, in their individual capacities, instituted

original judicial proceedings or caused such proceedings to be instituted, specifically the

filing of the Abuse Charges against the children and Jacob and Genetta Clark. As respects

Hazelwood and Campbell, they encouraged, supervised, and directed Stone to file the

charges in question.

104. Such charges were done by, or at the insistence of Defendants Stone, Hazelwood, and

Campbell.

105. The proceedings were resolved in Plaintiffs’ favor.

106. Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell, each of them in an individual capacity, maliciously

instituted such proceedings, knowing that the charges were false, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, and were made with the intent of injuring Plaintiffs.

23
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 24 of 26 PageID #: 24

107. There was a want of probable cause for the proceedings at issue.

108. Plaintiffs have been directly and proximately damaged by the unlawful conduct of Stone,

Hazelwood, and Campbell in amounts to be proven at trial.

109. Finally, Defendants Hazelwood, Campbell, and Stone engaged in bad faith, depriving

them of qualified immunity under Kentucky law. Evidence of this bad faith includes the

following facts: (a) the Abuse Cases were based on perjured and patently false testimony by

Stone; (b) Stone knew and admitted that her statements and testimony about abrasions and

lacerations was false, yet she persisted in telling them anyways; (c) Stone falsely told the

Court that she had notified the Clarks of the proceeds in December, 2018 hearing and they

chose not to be there, even though she did not give them appropriate notice and they never

told the Court they were choosing not to be there; (d) Stone’s actions during her interview

with H.C. where she wrote down a narrative that was totally contradicted by H.C. and H.C.

had to correct her; (e) Stone submitted to Judge Embry a black and white photo of Exhibit A,

to deprive Judge Embry of being able to make her own determination that the action at issue

was baseless; (f) Stone was aware that if the actual facts were submitted to the Court that the

matter would be dismissed; (g) Hazelwood and Campbell were aware of all of these facts,

encouraged Stone, and were complicit in her misconduct; (h) Stone’s perjury is a violation of

Kentucky law. In addition to the foregoing, the misconduct of the individual capacity

Defendants were objectively unreasonable, and Stone, Campbell, and Hazelwood willfully or

maliciously intended to harm the Plaintiffs, and they acted with a corrupt motive.

110. As such, Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell, in their individual capacities, are liable to

Plaintiffs for malicious prosecution in an amount to be proved at trial.

24
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 25 of 26 PageID #: 25

B. Punitive Damages (state law claim)

111. Plaintiffs hereby reincorporate the preceding paragraphs of their Complaint as if fully set

forth herein.

112. The actions complained of were done by Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell, each in an

individual capacity, with malice, fraud, or oppression.

113. As such, Defendants Stone, Hazelwood, and Campbell are liable for punitive damages, in

an amount to be proved at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendants as prayed for, including:

A. That this Court issue the declaratory and/or injunctive relief prayed for;

B. That Plaintiffs be awarded money damages, including compensatory and punitive

damages, against the individual capacity Defendants, in an amount to be proven at trial;

C. That trial by jury be had on all issues so triable;

D. That Plaintiffs be awarded their costs in this action, including reasonable attorney fees

under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and

E. Such other relief as this Court shall deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to FRCP 38, Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all causes so triable.

/s/ Christopher Wiest___________

Christopher Wiest (KBA 90725)

25
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 26 of 26 PageID #: 26

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Christopher Wiest___________

Christopher Wiest (KBA 90725)
Chris Wiest, Atty at Law, PLLC
25 Town Center Blvd, Suite 104
Crestview Hills, KY 41017
859/486-6850 (v)
513/257-1895 (c)
859/495-0803 (f)
chris@cwiestlaw.com

/s/ Thomas B. Bruns____________

Thomas B. Bruns (KBA 84985)
Bruns, Connell, Vollmer, Armstrong
4750 Ashwood Dr., Suite 200
Cincinnati, OH 45241
513-326-0274 (v)
tbruns@bcvalaw.com

/s/ Robert A. Winter, Jr.__________

Robert A. Winter, Jr. (KBA 78230)
P.O. Box 175883
Fort Mitchell, KY 41017-5883
(859) 250-3337
robertawinterjr@gmail.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

26
 Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1-1 Filed 11/20/19 Page 1 of 2 PageID #: 27
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-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1-2 Filed 11/20/19 Page 1 of 2 Pa

Exhibit A - photos by Stone

-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1-2 Filed 11/20/19 Page 2 of 2 Pa
Case 4:19-cv-00166-JHM-HBB Document 1-3 Filed 11/20/19 Page 1 of 1 PageID #: 31