SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132916. November 16, 2001]

RUFINA TANCINCO, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, praying for the reversal of the
Resolutions[1]dated May 30, 1997 and March 5, 1998 issued by the former Sixteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44148. The first resolution dismissed petitioners appeal
from the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission, whereas the second resolution
denied her motion for reconsideration.
The facts are:
At around noon of July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of his house
along the National Road in Barangay Palanas, Lemery, Batangas, SPO1 Eddie G. Tancinco was
shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed men. SPO1 Tancinco was a member of the NCR Security
Protection Group of the Philippine National Police, and at the time of his death, was assigned as
part of the close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E. Estrada. SPO1 Tancinco was
off-duty at the time inasmuch as the former Vice-President was in the United States for medical
treatment.
His widow, petitioner Rufina Tancinco, filed a claim for benefits before the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). On February 19, 1996, the GSIS denied petitioners claim on the
ground that there was no proof that petitioners husbands death was work-related. Petitioner
appealed the denial to the Employees Compensation Commission (Commission) which, on
December 19, 1996, issued a Resolution[2] dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. As ruled by the
Commission:

It is evident that the death of SPO1 Tancinco on July 17, 1995, when he was on off
duty status did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as a member of
the PNP Security Command.

Apparently, the conditions aforementioned were not satisfied in the present

We would like to stress once more that not all contingencies such as injury, disability,
or death which befall an employee are compensable. The same must be the result of
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Since the cause of SPO1 Tancincos death is no longer part of his official functions,
the claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
cannot be given due course.

Petitioner filed a petition for review from the aforesaid decision of the Commission before the
Court of Appeals. On May 30, 1997, the appellate court issued the first assailed
resolution[3]dismissing the petition for review on the following grounds: (a) that the certification of
non-forum shopping was defective; (b) that certified true copies of material portions of the record
were not attached to the petition; and (c) that the petition failed to state all the material dates which
would establish the timeliness thereof. As admitted by petitioner herself, she received a copy of
the resolution on June 9, 1997, and yet it was only on January 27, 1998, or seven-and-a-half (7 )
months later, that she filed a motion for reconsideration. As can be expected, the appellate court
denied her motion in the second assailed resolution[4] of March 5, 1998.
Petitioner seeks recourse before us via this petition for review on certiorari, arguing that:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

In lieu of a comment, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation[5] signifying its
solidarity with petitioner. The Solicitor General adopts the view that SPO1 Tancincos death is
work-related given the circumstances under which he was killed, given that (a) the deceased was
a policeman and (b) the killing was done in a professional manner. He speculates that the motive
behind the killing is likely to have arisen during the duration of the almost eighteen (18) years that
he served as constable in the PC and as a policeman.
With regret, we deny the petition.
The conclusion is inevitable because the instant petition was not timely filed.[6] Under section
1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised Rules of Court, which was then still in effect, an appeal from
a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals to this Court must be made within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or the denial of a motion for reconsideration filed in due time. In the
case at bar, petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from receipt of the resolution of
dismissal two hundred thirty one (231) days late, thereby rendering the said resolution final and
executory. The gap of more than seven (7) months is too large for us to ignore. Petitioner did not
even offer any explanation to account for the tardiness. It behooves the party invoking liberality
in the application of procedural rules to at least explain his non-compliance therewith.[7] We have
held that the period of appeal is not only mandatory, but more importantly, it is
jurisdictional.[8]Even we cannot ignore the immutable character of a final judgment.[9]
Prescinding from the finality of the appealed resolutions, the appeal will still fail on the
merits. Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first, as part of the former Vice-
Presidents security detail, the decedent was required to guard the person of the former; hence, his
presence was officially required wherever the Vice-President would go. At the time of his death,
SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty since Vice-President Estrada was out of the country. In fact, he was
at home; it is not even known if he was temporarily re-assigned to another detail while the Vice-
President was away. Clearly, he was not at the place where his work required him to be.
As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established that SPO1 Tancinco died
while performing his official functions. In this regard, we held that policemen are regarded as
being on twenty-four (24) hour alert. As we explained in Employees Compensation Commission v.
Court of Appeals,[10]

xxx But for claritys sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members
of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions
technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave,
policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by
any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the
community.

xxx xxx xxx

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No.
626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.
 The twenty-four hour duty rule was originally applied to members of the armed forces,[11]until
it was applied by extension to policemen, as aforesaid, and eventually to firemen.[12]
However, in the more recent case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of
Appeals,[13] we clarified that not all deaths of policemen are compensable. Thus,

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to
claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his
work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why
SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the
matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying
passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it
did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of
such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of
the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit
permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is
no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC
guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave
will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a
situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In
fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty
detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers,
serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope
of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that
may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer
but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically
police service in character. [italics supplied]

In the present case, the decedent was repairing a service vehicle when he was killed. We have
tried to view it from all possible angles, but the inescapable conclusion is that he was not
performing acts that are basically police service in character. As a policeman, SPO1 Tancinco is
part of an organized civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crimes, and
enforcing the laws xxx.[14] Based on these parameters, it cannot be said that the deceased was
discharging official functions; if anything, repairing a service vehicle is only incidental to his job.
Neither was the last requirement satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1 Tancinco
was at home, it was incumbent on petitioner to show that her husband was discharging a task
pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This also was not done.
 In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary to support a claim is substantial
evidence,[15] which is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[16] Unfortunately, the burden was not successfully met.
In closing, we express our heartfelt commiseration with petitioner for the misfortune which
has befallen her and her family. Even this Court, the embodiment of justice dispensed
impartially, can feel very human emotions, as it does so now. However, for reasons both
procedural and substantive, we cannot grant her petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated May 30, 1997
and March 5, 1998 are AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.