Sealtiel I.

Abayon

1. White Light Corporation et. al. vs. City of Manila

FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses
and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels
and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
private rights of their patrons. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of White Light
Corporation. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution.

The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the
Local Government Code, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The Cour of
Appeals ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Not
all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only.
Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.

Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to
a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only
to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare.
Dave Adricula

2. MMDA vs Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising

December 16, 2009

Facts: Respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising entered into a contract for advertising
with the Metro Rail Transit Corp. and thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and
other advertising media in different parts of the MRT 3 premises. Sometime in 2001 MMDA
requested Trackworks to dismantle said billboards and signages pursuant to MMDA Regulation
No. 96-009 wherein the MMDA prohibits the posting, installation, and display of any kind or
form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center-island,
posts, trees, parks and open spaces. Trackworks refused the said request and then MMDA
proceeded to dismantle the billboards and similar forms of advertisement. Trackworsk filed a
civil case before the Pasig RTC, a temporary restraining order was issued against MMDA. The
MMDA filed a petition with the Court of Appeals but denied said petition and affirmed the order
of the RTC. Petition was then filed with the SC which denied the same and eventually this
resolution after a petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the power under its mandate to cause the dismantling of
respondents’ advertisement materials.

Held: The Court ruled that MMDA had no power on its own to dismantle, remove or destroy the
billboards and other advertising materials installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. The
MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration. Nothing in
Republic Act 7924 granted MMDA police power let alone legislative power. Trackworks
derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT 3 from
MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3
structure or to obtain advertising income is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement,
MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer
ownership of the MRT3 to the Government. Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner
of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the
contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership. MMDA
also may not invoke that it is implementing the Buliding Code rules and regulations because the
power to enforce this lies with the DPWH and not in the MMDA. The DPWH hass not delegated
the MMDA to implement such Code. Petition is denied.
Abundio Bacatan

3. Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. vs. CA,

G.R. No. 100152

March 31, 2000

Facts: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City.
After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit
but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon
prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed
to practice optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to
the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the
said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then
assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is
estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the
imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were
entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police
power.

HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to
practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The
conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application
therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the
mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions
on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is
not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.
Arex June Baligala

4. Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. vs. Sec of the DAR, 175 SCRA 343

Facts: In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his
life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules
flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their
struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued
grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any
part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the
air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful
Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of
life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to
stay alive. "Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of
this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it
has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a
plot of earth as their place in the sun. Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy
of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the less
privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably
diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate
and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil."

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one
whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but
undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following
words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental,
or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits,
the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.

A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the
petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners
by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped
the legislature’s power. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental
against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund
withinitial fund of P50Billion. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of
rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

Issue:Whether the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc exempted from agrarian
reform program .

Held: The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands
and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are
less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for
they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from
agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay

5. Philippine Press Institute vs. COMELEC

Facts:
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the constitutional
validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and
its corresponding Comelec directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers.
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free
Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and
candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and
their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for
dissemination of vital election information.
Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional.

To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private
personal property for public use or purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency
of such compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or 21 March
1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often as Comelec may direct during
the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of
a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property
It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal
rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to
be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner PPI
reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to "donate" free print space
for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free
print space, as Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to
prevent newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec
for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does
not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the
kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2
does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Christine Lily Angely Chin

6. G.R. No. 124795 December 10, 2008

FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL

RAILWAYS

Facts: Petitioner Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) is a domestic corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, while respondent Philippine National
Railways (PNR) is a government corporation engaged in proprietary functions. Forfom is the
registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna. President
Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the Presidential Commuter Service Project, more commonly
known as the Carmona Project of the President. Resolution No. 751 of the PNR Board of
Directors, authorized its General Manager to implement the project. During the construction of
said commuter line, several properties owned by private individuals/corporations were traversed
as right-of-way. Among the properties through which the commuter line passed was a 100,128
square-meter portion owned by Forfom.

On 24 August 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for Recovery of Posssession of Real Property
and/or Damages. PNR explained that former President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved what was
known to be the Carmona Project a 5.1 kilometer railroad extension line from San Pedro, Laguna
to San Jose, Carmona, Cavite to serve the squatters' resettlement area in said localities. Dr. Felix
Limcaoco, was not paid because he failed to present the corresponding titles to his properties

Issue: Whether or not the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without due process of law
and without just compensation.

Held: Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. The fundamental power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. It
may be delegated by Congress to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities.
In the case at bar, PNR, under its charter, has the power of expropriation.

A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent
domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or
otherwise informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property
for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property.

PNR's entry into the property of Forfom was with the approval of then President Marcos and
with the authorization of the PNR's Board of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring
around eleven hectares was devoted to public use - railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances
for use of the Carmona Commuter Service. Forfom's inaction for almost eighteen (18) years to
question the absence of expropriation proceedings and its discussions with PNR, has waived its
right and is estopped from assailing the takeover of its land on the ground that there was no case
for expropriation that was commenced by PNR. The recovery of possession of the property by
the landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of
public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public.

The PNR's occupation of Forfom's property for almost eighteen (18) years entitles the latter to
payment of interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent on the value of the land at the time of
taking until full payment is made by the PNR. However, since Forfom no longer appealed the
deletion by both lower courts of said prayer for exemplary damages, the same cannot be granted.
Jeyan Chin

7. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC

ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) vs SPOUSES AGUSTIN and IMELDA CANCIO

G.R. No. 170147. January 30, 2009.

Facts: On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot at P52,294,000 for the
whole property. The letter containing the offer further instructed respondents to consider and
accept however, instead of accepting, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against
Maitland in the Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu City.

Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property with the
Regional Trial Court. Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the property for which it
was willing to deposit 10% of the offered amount.

Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974 which
requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal
valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner should make the
required payment under the law because RA 8974, which took effect before the commencement
of the expropriation case, applied to all actions of such nature regardless of whether the
government agency was already in possession or not.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable in this case or not.

Held: RA 8974 governs this case. RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the
national government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects.
Undeniably, the economic zone is a national government project – a matter undisputed by both
parties. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one
year after the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its
applicability to this case.

There was also confusion regarding the nature of the amount to be paid for the issuance of a writ
of possession. In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, we clarified that
the payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is
different from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the
provisional value is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on
the prevailing fair market value of the property.

There is no need yet to determine with reasonable certainty the final amount of just
compensation in resolving the issue of a writ of possession. In fact, it is the ministerial duty of
the trial court to issue the writ. No hearing is required and the court cannot exercise its discretion
in order to arrive at the amount of the provisional value of the property to be expropriated as the
legislature has already fixed the amount under the aforementioned provision of the law. It is only
after the trial court ascertains the provisional amount to be paid that just compensation will be
determined.
Frank Cuevas

8. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez

G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007)

Facts:

After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform, on November 16, 1993, of
respondent Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60 as just compensation,
for which respondent rejected. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section
16 (d) of the CARL. On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, rendered judgment
ordering the LBP to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property
covered with the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50). A
petition for the fixing of just compensation was then filed by LBP's counsel before the Special
Agrarian Court (SAC) of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon. Meanwhile,
respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of the
PARAD a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on
November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004. LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash
the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution. On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash
was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September
28, 2004 dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of
execution despite the pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC?

Held: In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD resolutions and at the same time
petitioned for their annulment via certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties are
identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the two actions, petitioner also has a singular
stance: the PARAD resolutions should not be executed in view of the pendency of the petition
for fixing of just compensation with the SAC. Thus a situation is created where the two fora
could come up with conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be avoided by the
rule against forum-shopping. We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of certiorari by
the appellate court because the Office of the PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
undertook to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure. · In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and in Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule
to the effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the
15-day period. Considering therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the fixing
of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of the PARAD's decision, or eleven days
beyond the reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality. The PARAD could very
well issue the writ of execution.

“An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision;
otherwise, the decision shall become final.
Lovely De la Torre

9. HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A. BERNARDO, VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the

CITY OF PASIG, Petitioners, v. JOVITO M. LUIS, LIDINILA LUIS SANTOS,
ANGELITA CAGALINGAN, ROMEO M. LUIS, and VIRGINIA LUIS-BELLESTEROS,
Respondents.

G.R. NO. 162474 October 13, 2009

Facts:

Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land taken by Pasig City to be used as a
municipal road in 1980. On 1993, a resolution authorizing payments for said land was passed.
However, respondents were not agreeable with the assessed value and went on to negotiate the
same. On 1994, a letter was addressed to the mayor calling his attention as a property in the same
area had been paid for by petitioners at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said
property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.

Counsel for respondents sent a demand letter on 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount
of P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents
property.

Respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages praying that the property be
returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square
meter, or P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from date of filing of the complaint
until full payment, or in the event that said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be
ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of
use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum from
the date of filing of the complaint until full payment.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by the CA upon
appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city
government in the 1980s and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how
should just compensation to respondents be determined.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that failure to question the taking of the property for a long period of time,
respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just
compensation as addressed in Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National
Railways.

With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence
that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner
files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation
proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
Donna Fernandez

10. NPC vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay

G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011

FACTS:

On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square
meters situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC and alleged that they had belatedly
discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus
River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed
their land; that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra, President
of the Federation of Arabic Madaris School, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of
the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic Language Training Center
and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the
withdrawal by Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land
into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence of the
underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge
and consent; that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial,
industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also become an unsafe place
for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant
shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds. After trial, the
RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs (Heirs of Macabangkit), which CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation had prescribed under
section 3 of Republic Act No. 6395 or under Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

The court upheld the liability of NPC for payment of just compensation. The action to recover
just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages.
The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of
property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full
and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not
the takers gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to
vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the
exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held
responsible.
Zarian Lyn Gasapo

11. ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO, MARIO P. OUANO, LETICIA OUANO

ARNAIZ, and CIELO OUANO MARTINEZ

- versus -

THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES, THE MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT AUTHORITY, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF CEBU

G.R. No. 168770

Facts:

in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA's predecessor agency pursued a
program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators. NAC met
and negotiated with the owner of the properties situated around the airport, which included Lot
Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the
landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, assured them that they could re-
purchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through
or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport.

Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right to re-
purchase. Others, however, refused to sell because the purchase price offered was viewed as way
below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then CAA, as successor
agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746,
747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947. On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the Republic: a. Declaring the expropriation
justified in and in lawful exercise of the right to eminent domain. When Lahug Airport
completely ceased operations prompted the former lot owners to formally demand from the
government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to re-purchase.

Issue:

Wether or not the former owners of lots acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu
City has the right to re-purchase or secure reconveyance of their respective properties.

Held:

The Ouano petition is deemed meritorious. The MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not
actually used the lots subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. r-1881 for the
purpose they were originally taken by the government. The Lahug Airport had been closed and
abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for
development as a commercial complex. it has been preponderantly established by evidence that
the NAC, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that
they would be entitled to re-purchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for
airport purposes.
Lizanne Gaurana

12. LUMIQUED v. EXEVEA

G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997

Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director (DAR)- Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Regional DAR-CAR Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio filed three
complaints. First was charging Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official
documents due to unreasonable gas expenses. With the benefit of falsified receipts, Lumiqued
claimed and used this for reimbursement. In the second complaint, Lumiqued was accused of
violation of Commission on Audit rules and regulation, due to the unliquidated cash advances he
made which he purportedly defrauded the government “by deliberately concealing his
unliquidated cash advances through falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on
‘Cash advances of other officials’ under code of accounting rules.” On the third complaint,
Lumiqued was charged of oppression and harassment due to the issue that he unjustly removed
Zamudio from work. The complaints were referred to DOJ under acting Justice Secretary
Eduardo G. Montenegro, and Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea. Committee hearings
were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the
second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to enable him to employ the services of counsel.
The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he
himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The
Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his right to
security of tenure.

Issue: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?

Held: These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at
bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No.
145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for
the complaints filed against him. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was
not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding
Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation. While investigations conducted
by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under
existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective
of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on
such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. The Supreme Court also
emphasized that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.
Public office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But when the dispute
concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous
to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.
Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was proven, as in this
case, that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept i.e., that all
public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Audreylyn Gonzales

13. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v HON. RALPH LANTION

G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000.

FACTS:

On June 18, 1999 the DOJ received from DFA of the United States requesting for the extradition
of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US tax and election laws. In compliance with
PD No. 1069 “Prescribing the procedure for extradition of persons who have committed crimes
in a foreign country” and the established “Extradition treaty between the Philippines and USA,”
the department proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct technical
evaluation and assessment.

Pending the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for the copy
of the official extradition request, however, the Secretary of Justice denied the request as it
alleges such information is confidential and that it is premature to provide such as the process is
not a preliminary investigation but mere evaluation.

On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Court dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the
petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers
and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent is entitled to two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings

RULING:

The Court held that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.

The private respondent buttresses his position by likening an extradition proceeding to a criminal
proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation. The Court is not persuaded.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the
process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.
His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of
an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are
still undergoing evaluation.

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an

extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in
the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case
at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by the public
respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT.
Joshua John Granada

14. GOVERNMENT of the USA vs. HON. PURGANAN

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002

FACTS: Secretary Lantion was to give Mr. Jimenez copies of the request for extradition, its
supporting papers, and to grant the latter a reasonable period to file a comment and supporting
evidence. But on motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Justice, the decision was
reversed. It did however, hold that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing.
On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA filed the Petition for Extradition with the RTC,
praying that an order for his “immediate arrest” be issued right away in order to prevent
Jimenez’s flight. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before the same an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” praying that his application be set for hearing. After
the hearing, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum therein stating that he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000 should a warrant be issued. The court ordered the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty. The US Government filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary
liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process.

RULING: No. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental
fairness. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. Thus, there can be no violation of due
process. Mr. Jimenez would have the full opportunity to be heard when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. He would also enjoy, during the hearings, the full chance to be
heard and fundamental fairness. Also worth of note is that, before the US government requested
the extradition of Mr. Jimenez, proceedings had already been conducted. Having had the
opportunity in the requesting state, instead of taking it, he ran away.
Ro Ann Marie Gumban

15. G.R No. 190529 April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC

vs

COMELEC

FACTS:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for
reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated
October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These
resolutions delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act,
COMELEC, upon verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered. For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC
en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the
list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.

Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2%
of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its opposition
to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list organization. One of
the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 –
MINERO(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the
instant controversy. One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed
from PGBI's. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's
ruling in G.R. No. 179271 – BANAT (Barangay Association for Advancement and National
Transparency) vs COMELEC.COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that
the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

HELD:

No. PGBIs right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it
did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity
to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing
x x x. The court finds it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due
process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for
complaint on due process grounds.
John Paul Hervas

16. TELEBAP VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

FACTS

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an

organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates
radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted
by Congress. They challenge the validity of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and
television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of
candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses
running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time and they raised the following
issues (1) that it takes property with-out due process of law and without just compensation; (2)
that it denies radio and television broad-cast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3)
that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
media of communication or information during the period of election. Petitioners complain that
the provision singles out radio and televi-sion stations to provide free air time. They contend that
there was a different treatment with news-papers and magazines for they are not similarly
required for the print space.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection clause in this case.

HELD:

The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the
same treatment under the free speech guarantee of the Constitution as the print media. There are
important differences in the characteristics of the two media, however, which justify their dif-
ferential treatment for free speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast
spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those wishing to
use them. There is no similar justification for government allocation and regulation of the print
media. The reason for this is that, as already noted, the government spends public funds for the
allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does not do in the case of the print
media. To require the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the
COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. The broadcast media have also
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. On the other hand, the
transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their
message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners
including the indif-ferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or
television set. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the
printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the
utterance.

Petitioners' assertion therefore that assailed provision denies them the equal protection of the law
has no basis.
Cristy Marie Ituriaga

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

En Banc

17. G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000

The People of the Philippines, plaintiff

vs.

Romeo Jalosjos, accused-appellant

Facts:

Jalosjos was reelected as a member of the Congress when his conviction for heinous
crime of statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is
pending appeal. He filed a motion to allow him to fully discharge of his duty and
attend session of the Congress. Jalosjos argued that his conviction should not bar him
from performing his duty and deprived the electorate of their “sovereign will”.

Issues:

Whether or not Jalosjos’s conviction which barred him from performing his duty as a
member of the Congress violated the “sovereign will” of the electorate.

Held:

No right of the electorate was violated. The Congress can still function even with the
absence of some of its members. Being elected for a public office is not an absolute
right but a privilege, holding a public office does not give priority over other right or
interest, including the police power of the state.
Roxanne Jordan

18. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission

G.R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010

FACTS: On July 30, 2010, President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010. It was established is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President.
The primary task of the Philippine Truth Commission was to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.

PTC has all the powers of an investigative body but it is not a quasi-judicial body. Although it is a fact-
finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin
the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers; (b)
That provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1; (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers and (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations; 2] E.O. No.
1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds; 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body; 4] The Truth
Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 1 violated the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through
the state’s duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members
of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as it violated of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification. The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must,
at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared unconstitutional insofar as it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Jerelyn Ligaray

19. COMELEC vs. Conrado Cruz, et.al., November 20, 2009

Facts:

On October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some
of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a
petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991):

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials
after the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected.

This are there arguments:

1. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

2. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal

protection of the law.

3. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 2 of R.A No. 9164 is constitutional.

Ruling:

The assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160
(the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be
considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been
specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term
limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied
retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is
no vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to
the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.
Ryce Magalit

20-A. JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DOJ

G.R. No. 199082

September 18, 2012

FACTS: The Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the
Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution

ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while
that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ

Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?

Ruling: Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team
is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the
investigation and prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel
was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the
Arroyo Administration.

While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who
were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties.
Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is

intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the
existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Daphne Jade Panes

20. Lim vs Felix

G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991

Facts:

At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of
Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts,
namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked
and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa,
Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. For the crime
of multiple murder and frustrated murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim
of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor
Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho. The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause
has been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court ordered
the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.

The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate.
Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. A petition to
transfer the venue of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
was filed by petitioners and granted by the SC.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the
petitioners herein.

Issue:

Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution’s certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists

Held:

No. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “x x x
probable cause to be personally determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any other officer or
person. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable
cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement
has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. The records of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate
as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’
motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to
issue a warrant of arrest.
Jed Paracha

21. ALAIN MANALILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

Facts: At about 2:10 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-
Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along A.
Mabini street, Kalookan City. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery
who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the
male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo
Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter
showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the
wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet
and its marijuana contents. Then the accused was arrested.

Issue: Whether a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest.

Held: Yes. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives
this guarantee. This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna
enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.:
"(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable
search and seizure." In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that in these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Stop-and-
frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a
warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances where a
search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of
which was stop-and-frisk. To require the police officers to search the bag only after they had
obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious
individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining
more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur. Herein,
Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that Manalili had red
eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to
police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts.
Evonnie Parreño

22. PEOPLE v. EDISON SUCRO

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991

FACTS

On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by
P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.

As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house
of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2
meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking
something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside
the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo.
Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed
Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again
called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant.

At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and
Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw
something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted,
Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of
the chapel. The police team then was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the
cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,

ISSUE

Whether or not the arrest of the accused without warrant is lawful and whether or not the
evidence of such arrest is admissible.

HELD

As the Solicitor General has pointed out:

There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable
cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and
seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike
in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances
(monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest
appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule
(Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990).
Stephen Rodriguez

23. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA

CRUZ, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000

Facts: This is an automatic review for the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27 sentencing Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz to death penalty for violating
Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

SPO3 Marcelo Tipay testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip
from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by
appellant. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction
team from his operatives to verify the report. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions
to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their
informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-
hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place
pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot
high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.PO2
Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed
2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that
upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium
carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.

Issue: Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful?

Ruling: The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on
the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable."
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In the instant case, recall that PO2
Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a
warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to
search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only
where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first
had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain
view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where
they are; and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search. Valdez is ACQUITTED.
Pearl Diamond Sillador

24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN

G.R. No. 128222. June 17, 1999

FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of
Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan
coastline with his officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted
a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao
requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily used by fisher folk of
the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with
Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later
identified as Chua Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a
multicolored strawbag, and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man
changed direction and broke into a run. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from
fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not understand
what they’re saying. CID then resorted to "sign language;" he motioned with his hands for Chua
to open the bag. Chua apparently understood and acceded to the request. The said bag was found
to contain several transparent plastics containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was
later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to
Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his
constitutional rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police
Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant requirement.

HELD: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a
valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However, warrantless searches may be
permitted in the following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles, (2)seizure in plain view,
(3)customs searches, (4)waiver or consent searches, (5)stop and frisk situations (Terry search),
and (6)search incidental to a lawful arrest. It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances convincingly
indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case
at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's
participation in ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer
or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing
boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense.
With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there
was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to
him, how could he understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically
be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he deliberately, intelligently,
and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search. Finally, being a forbidden
fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence. Hence, the accused
was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Silva Yugin

25. PEOPLE vs TANGLIBEN

G.R. No. L-63630, April 6, 1990

Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando
Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a
traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found
marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations.
The Trial Court found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Issue: Whether or not the search is unlawful

Ruling: The court ruled that the search was lawful.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case
therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest
and is consequently valid.

In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, Appellant Claudio was caught transporting
prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in
flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos
of marijuana.

In People v. Amininudin, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-
appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip,
they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the
marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally. The records show,
however, that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the Court to declare
the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:

The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it
is clear that they had at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In contrast, the instant case presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it,
the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-
appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the
police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot
therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-
spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of
contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the
crimes with which these persons are associated.
Lenicia Soldevilla

26. People of the Philippines vs. Leila Johnson Y. Reyes

G.R. No. 138881 December 18, 2000 Second Division

I. Facts:

Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker of the NAIA departure area. When Ramirez frisked
Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States, she felt something hard on the
latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty
girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied
with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile who
directed her to take accused-appellant to the nearest women’s room for inspection accompanied
by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Inside the womens room, Johnson brought out three plastic packs,
later identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 580.2 grams.
Johnson claimed that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible as evidence because she was
forced to affix her signature on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office,
without the assistance of counsel and without having been informed of her constitutional rights.

II. Issue:

Whether or not the shabu confiscated is inadmissible as evidence.

III. Ruling:

No, the shabu is not inadmissible as evidence. What is involved in this case is an arrest in
flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her person. The constitutional right of the
accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly
arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

Travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures. The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been
obtained through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against Johnson.
Johnson’s subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto.

Anent Johnson’s allegation that her signature on the shabu packs had been obtained while she
was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor
General correctly points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that Johnson was required
to affix her signature to the packs.
Krianne Solis

27. G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MIKAEL

MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.

Facts:

Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989,
Captain Alen Vasco ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer
14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said
area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. During the
inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to
bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out
to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer
noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Issue:

Whether or not the search and arrest of the accused was illegal for it is made without a
valid search warrant.

Held:

A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person
when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. The receipt of information by NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole,
led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of
the accused.
Anne Pauleen Sombrea

28. G.R. No. 83988 | September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA

FACTS:

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) aver that: (1) because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of
their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant
and/or court order; (2) the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make
searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution;
and, (3) instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conduct of military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people
against unreasonable search and seizures

RULING:

No. Military and police checkpoints do not violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures. The Court held that not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or
simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search.

Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Genevieve Tersol

29. People of the Philippines vs De Gracia

G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 06, 1994

Facts:

The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-
rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino
People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various government establishments
and military camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-
tora" planes.

In the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division,
National Capital Region Defense Command was conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office, together with his team, pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that
said establishment was being occupied by the elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication
command post. The surveillance team was later attacked by a group of five men.

As a consequence , at around 6:30 in the morning of December 5,1989, a searching team raided
the Eurocar Sales Office. The team was able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs
inside one of the rooms. De Gracia was the only person then present in the room; as a result of
the raid, he was arrested along with two others. . No search warrant was secured by the raiding
team because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
consequently closed.

Issue:

Whether or not the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the
December 1989 coup d’etat.

Held:

It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed
with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that
said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of
men coming from the Eurocar building. There was general chaos and disorder at that time
because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby
Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas
were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under
one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team
had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed.
Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with.
Robespierre Tersol

30. Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board, et al

November 3, 2008

Facts:

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c),(d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 which provides that random
drug testing will be conducted on Students of secondary and tertiary schools and also to officers and
employees of public and private offices persons, while mandatory drug testing to All persons charged
before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) day on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm, for the persons
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is breached by said provisions.

Issue:

Whether or not paragraph (c) and (d) and (f) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 violates the persons constitutional
right against unreasonable searches.

Held:

Sec. 36 (c) and (d) of RA 9165 is Constitutional but Sec. 36(f) is unconstitutional. Using US
Jurisprudence, the Court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of Sec 36(c) applying the following
reasonable deduction: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis,
have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. It is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary
level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 (d) of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner Social Justice Society, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to
be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in
such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing. The intrusion into the employees privacy is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal. Like
their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes
the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for
civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency. In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure,
let alone waive their right to privacy.
Joselito Toledo

31. POLLO VS CONSTANTINO-DAVID

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-

David marked "Confidential" was sent through a courier service. Acting upon the letter-
complaint, Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in
information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and
specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD)
and Legal divisions. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and
Legal Services Division was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo
and Unite who closely monitored said activity. The contents of the diskettes were examined by
the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs. It was found that most of the files in the On the basis of this
finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner, who had gone
on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner then denied that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which
had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer. He accused CSC officials of conducting a
fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and
subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-
incrimination. He averted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while
he was on leave, that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister,
relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,
duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection
against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s claim to avail the right to privacy over his computer and electronic
files as a government employee is valid.

HELD:

No. The Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office
or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. On the contrary, he submits
that being in the public assistance office of the CSC; he normally would have visitors in his
office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his
computer which to him seemed a trivial request. The search of petitioner’s computer files was
conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an
anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-
ROIV. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work-related misconduct. Therefore petitioner’s right to privacy is not violated in the
case at bar and his claim to avail such right is not supported by sufficient grounds.
Charrie Ursua

32. G.R. No. 180906

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED

FORCES OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. RAYMOND MANALO

Facts: On February 14, 2006 past afternoon, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo were
abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August
13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and
omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the
Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all
official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present
places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports
and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the CA.

Issue: Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a
person may be invoked.

Held: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation
of the Manalos right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or
entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. The right to security of person is a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without
a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security
of a person.
Sealtiel I. Abayon

33. Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales, December 3, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007. On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul
Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering to include in the Hold Departure
List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others in
the interest of national security and public safety. RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for
Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioner argues that the
DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order and has no legal basis since
Rebellion case has already been dismissed but the HDO has not been lifted.

Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that every time petitioner would leave
and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for
several minutes because of the existing HDO. The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on
the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. The CA dismissed
the petition and denied the privilege of the writ of amparo. The motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation
by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of
amparo.

HELD: Petition is denied. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo
under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and
(3) right to security. In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the court made a
categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two
instances of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to threats thereof.

The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his
right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy. The direct recourse to this Court is inappropriate, considering the provision of Section
22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which provides, that when a criminal action has
commenced no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be
available by motion in the criminal case.
Dave Adricula

33-A. In the matter of the petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of
NORIEL H.RODRIGUEZ, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, et al

Facts:

Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan

(Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess
to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place,
and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former
Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent,
as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.

Held:

The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court
from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to
identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever
processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute
criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to
protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still
subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Abundio Bacatan

34. Marynette Gamboa vs. Marlou C. Chan et. al., July 24, 2012

Facts: On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order
No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country”, forming the Zeñarosa Commission to investigate the existence of
private army groups (PAGs) with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and
permanently in the future.

Gamboa alleged that without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that
her association with a PAG also appeared on print media.

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for
the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database;
(b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage
done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her;
and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless reports.

Issues:

Whether or Not her right to privacy was violated and,

Whether or not the writ of habeas data is the proper remedy for the violation of her rights.

Ruling: The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed
groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ
of habeas data must be denied.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. That it was leaked to third parties and the
media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to
establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure.

In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained
that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome.
Arex June Baligala

35. Felipe Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, August 26, 1999

Facts: The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and
Enrique Ike Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario
Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had
seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a
strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. At that point, the
floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know
why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job. Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.

This angered Lingan. The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: Masyado kang abusado, alisin
mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above
the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner
Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and
said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo
diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon. He then poked his
gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could not affix his
signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. Capt. Coronado, the station
commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial
Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the
hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able
to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.

Issue: Whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping

Held: SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder,
or however otherwise described: It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record,
disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided,
That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court
was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to
belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording;that the tape
played in court was the one he recorded;]and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and
Lingan.A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the
prosecution.

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena;
and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter
getting the worst of it.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay

36. Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In August, 1929, the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Government of the Phil. Islands vs.
Colegio de San Jose, declaring that two parcels of land bordering on Laguna de Bay and
identified as Lots 1 and 2 form an integral part of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan belonging
to the Colegio de San Jose. Ten years later, the Colegio de San Jose sold the said two lots,
together with an adjoining unregistered land, to the Government. The three parcels of land
acquired by the Government became known as the Tunasan Homesite. The Rural Progress
Administration (RPA), which was charged with the administration and disposition of the
homesite, caused the subdivision thereof into small lots for the purpose of selling them to bona
fide occupants. In December, 1940, Lot 17, Block 78 of the Tunasan Homesite, which was part
of Lot 2, and containing an area of 5,158 square meters, was sold by the RPA to Apolonio Diaz.
In May, 1948, Lot 19 of the same homesite, which was also a part of Lot 2, with an area of 1,170
square meters, was acquired by Apolonio Diaz, although his son Pastor Diaz was made to appear
as the vendee. In January, 1955, the heirs of Apolonio Diaz transferred their rights to both Lots
17 and 19 to Marta Ygonia, wife of Arcadio Ramirez (said spouses being the parents of herein
petitioner), who paid the balance of the purchase price for the lots. The Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources approved the deeds of transfer of rights executed by the heirs of Apolonio
Diaz, and in July, 1958, the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale in favor of
Marta Ygonia over Lots 17 and 19. An original application for registration was filed by spouses
Marta Ygonia and Arcadio Ramirez (docketed as LRC Case No. B-46) with the then Court of
First Instance of Laguna in May, 1957. It had for its subject matter a parcel of land on the eastern
side of Lot 17, with an area of 11,055 square meters (later increased to 11,311 sq. meters), which
was claimed by the applicants as an accretion to their land gradually formed by alluvial deposits.
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the grounds that the applicants did not possess
sufficient title to the land sought to be registered, and that the land in question is a part of the
public domain.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Hon. Court of Appeals committed grave error in the interpretation
and application of the doctrine of res judicata, more particularly on the issue of public domain.

Ruling:
After careful deliberation and consultation, we find ourselves in agreement with petitioners
contention. Seen from the perspective offered by the aforequoted ruling, it is evident that one of
the elements of res judicata is lacking in the case at bar. Respondent Court declared that identity
of causes of action between Case No. B-46 and Case No. B-526 exist since they both sought
registration of the land formed by alluvial deposits, but failed to recognize that the basis for
claiming such registration was different in each case. In Case No. B-46, applicants-spouses
Arcadio Ramirez and Marta Ygonia (herein petitioners parents) claimed that their possession of
the land, tacked to that of their predecessors Apolonio Diaz, et al. (allegedly from 1943
onwards), was sufficient to vest title in them by acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, in
LRC Case No. B-526, petitioner claimed that the duration of possession by his parents
(commencing allegedly in 1958), combined with his own possession (counted from 1988 when
he purchased the accretion from his parents) gave him sufficient title thereto by acquisitive
prescription.
As to the parties pleas before the respondent Court for the issuance of an order to cause the
taking of a verification survey to determine whether they are referring to the same parcel of land
or to two different properties, suffice it to say that the disposition of this case is not a bar to such
a survey.
Christine Lily Angely Chin

37. G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

Facts: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between
Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case
for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had
filed against her husband.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained can be held inadmissible as it violated his right of
privacy of communication.

Held: The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Jeyan Chin

38. Waterous Drug Corporation

vs

NLRC

G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts:

Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at
P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is
P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that
the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents
refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms.
Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp.
confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants. In the light of the
decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence

Held: Yes. The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was
insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment Suspicion is not
among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
Frank Cuevas

39. Marquez v Desierto

G.R. No. 135882. June 27, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in
camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected are Account Nos.
011-37270, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the
Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al.

The lower court rendered a decision in favor for the Ombudsman.

Marquez prayed that the previous decisions be set aside and the issuance of TRO and/or
preliminary injunction to the order of the Ombudsman and court decisions. ISSUE: Whether the
order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as
an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405). HELD: No. SC ruled that
before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending case before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the
Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado
Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which
would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Lovely De la Torre

40. BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,

HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA
REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF
THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.

G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998

Facts:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued AO No. 308 entitled “ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL

COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM”. Petitioner assailed its
constitutionality on the grounds that the administrative order issued by the executive is deemed
to be a law and not a mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the
congress to make laws, and it impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy.

Issue:

Whether or not AO No. 308 violates a person’s right to privacy.

Ruling:

The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. Administrative Order No. 308 violates the
constitutional right to privacy because its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s
right to privacy in clear and present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper
safeguards for protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics
and other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous
persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it
may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Donna Fernandez

41. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp vs. COMELEC January 28, 2000

FACTS:

COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN
or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution
was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN
has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to
make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that
it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. Two days before the
elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from
implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In
fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or
problem.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not ABS-CBN, in holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results
validly exercises freedoms of speech and of the press.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It, cited the following: First, by the very nature of a
survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as
possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or
group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official
Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in
general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals.
Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises
that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results
of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If
at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize

or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the
fundamental rights of our people.
Zarian Lyn Gasapo

42. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN

PUBLISHING CORPORATION

-versus-

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 147571

Facts:

Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan
Publishing Corporation., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper
of general circulation and features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS
and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act),
especially section 5.4 which provides the surveys affecting national candidated shall not be
published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be publishes
7 dyas before the election. SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of
the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish election
survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.

Issue:

Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on
the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.

Held:

Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press. The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to
ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates
of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among candidates.
here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the
O'brient test for content related regulation because (1) it supresses one type of expression while
allowing other types such as editorials, etc.: (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to
protect government interest because the interest can be protected by narrower restrictions such as
subsequent punishment punishment. Justice Kapunan's dissenting opinion basically says that the
test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this section.
Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing the circumstances to
determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other considerations should outweigh the
value of freedom of expression.
Lizanne Gaurana

43. Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial of in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
cases against the former President Joseph E. Estrada.

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001

Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Broadkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), sent a letter requesting the court
to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed
against former President Joseph Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public
of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history. The petitioners
invoked that in involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of. Moreover, the live radio and
television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired
transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of
the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-received attempts on the part of the
present dispensation, to railroad the instant criminal cases against the former President Estrada.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 23, 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due process, to prevent
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.

Issue: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of
public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.

Held: An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone
else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not
too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants
from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during
the proceedings. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate
and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration
is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions. Television can work profound changes in the behavior of
the people it focuses on. There will be conscious and unconscious effect that such coverage may have
on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be
said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. Due process guarantees the
accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its
individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open
court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. It may be difficult to quantify the
influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public
opinion, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. With the possibility of losing not only
the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of
pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from
its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an
unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Audreylyn Gonzales

44. NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. v HON. CEASAR G. DY

G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411, April 2, 2009.

FACTS:

Petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting

System, Inc. (CBS) operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC) and Star FM DWIT
Cauayan in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation in Minante
2, Cauayan City, Isabela. The HLURB and OMPDC affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location
is classified as a “commercial area”.

The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter. However in 2002, petitioners’
renewal of mayor’s permit was denied on the ground that they have not submitted conversion
papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked
the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s permit but the same was denied. In the meantime,
DAR Region II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property
from agricultural to commercial.

In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayor’s permit, attaching the
DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, denied the same, claiming that it was void on the
grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order. The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15,
2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia closed the radio station. Due to the
provision of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the
pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate
before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Cesar Dy on the grounds
that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until
June 10, 2004 after elections. Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of
mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners’ constitutional right of freedom of expression was violated

RULING:

In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001
certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped
from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.

It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure
“approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from
prime agricultural land to commercial land.” Respondents closure of petitioner’s radio stations is
clearly tainted with ill motives. Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread
election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political
dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondent’s denial of the renewal
applications on the ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real
agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice. This is a
blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.

Joshua John Granada

45. HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA vs. PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., et. al.

G.R. No. 164437

FACTS: Petitioner was a mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the 1992
elections. Two months prior the elections, Ricardo Nolan, petitioned for the disqualification of
petitioner before the COMELEC. Nolan’s petition however, was denied. Two days prior the
elections, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing Corporation published a story that
COMELEC had disqualified petitioner. A day prior the elections, respondent Philippine Daily
Inquirer, Inc. also came out with a similar story. Subsequent the articles, when the results of the
elections came out, petitioner lost. Under the belief that said articles led to his defeat, petitioner
sued respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin, alleging that the articles were maliciously timed to
defeat him. He sued for actual damages worth P270,000, moral damages worth P10,000,000, an
unspecified amount of exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees of P300,000. Respondents
disclaimed liability, asserting that they acted without malice, stressing that the stories were
privileged in nature.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondents, being members of the press, abused the freedom of the
press.

RULING: The Court did not consider that the respondents had abused the freedom of the press.
Newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press
reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith
and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. For liability to arise without offending the
freedom of the press, the test to meet is whether or not the constitutional guarantees require a
federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct, unless it be proven that the statement was made with ‘actual
malice,’ or with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. Absent proof that they were obtained from a press conference or release, respondents were
not impelled by malice. Still, the news items were derogatory and injurious to petitioner’s
reputation and candidacy. The Court simply faulted respondents for failing to verify the truth of
the news tips they published and held them respondents liable for negligence. Petitioner was
awarded damages, as amended.
Ro Ann Marie Gumban

46. G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA,

in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners,

vs.

DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL

RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE
LEGARDA, Respondents.

Facts:

PGM Garcia, as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges
against respondents and eventually found them guilty for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and meting out the penalty of one (1) year
suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto. The charges contained that
respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the
latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises.

On appeal, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red
shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action prescribed
above. CSC added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

Issue:

Whether or not an unruly mass gathering of employees to protest the prohibition against the
appearance of their leader as counsel in the administrative case, falls within the constitutional
purview of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.

Held:

Yes. As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political
rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action prescribed must be
coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their
demands of force concession. Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the
GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing
the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or
service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out
their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally
depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to
hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this
basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSCs Resolution No. 02-
1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated
these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited
concerted activity or mass action.
John Paul Hervas

47. SORIANO VS MTRCB

G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010

FACTS:

Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang Dating Daan aired nationwide daily from
10:00 p.m. to midnight over public television. The program carried a general patronage rating from
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Soriano regu-larly engaged in
verbal sparring on air with the host of Iglesia ni Cristo’s Ang Tamang Daan, hurling accusations and
counter-accusations with respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices. It appears that in
his program Ang Tamang Daan’s Michael M. Sandoval attacked So-riano for alleged inconsistencies
in his Bible teachings. Michael compared spliced recordings of Soriano’s statements, matched with
subtitles of his utterances, to demonstrate those inconsisten-cies. On August 10, 2004, in an apparent
reaction to what he perceived as a malicious attack against him by the rival television program,
Soriano accused Michael of prostituting himself with his fab-ricated presentations. Michael and
seven other ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against Soriano before the MTRCB.
Acting swiftly, the latter preventively suspended the airing of Soriano’s Ang Dating Daan television
program for 20 days, pursuant to its powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree 1986 and its
related rules. Soriano challenged the validity of that pre-ventive suspension before this Court in G.R.
164785. After hearing the main case or on September 27, 2004, the MTRCB found Soriano guilty as
charged and imposed on him a penalty of three months suspension from appearing on the Ang Dating
Daan program. Soriano thus filed a second petition in G.R. 165636 to question that decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of freedom of speech in this case.

HELD:

Soriano’s Bible ministry has been on television continuously for 27 years since 1983 with no prior
record of use of foul language. For a 15-second outburst of its head at his bitterest critics, it seems
not fair for the Court to close down this Bible ministry to its large followers altogether for a full
quarter of a year. It is obscenity on television that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
does not protect. As the Courts decision points out, the test of obscenity is whether the average
person, applying contemporary standards, would find the speech, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest. A quarter-of-a-year suspension would probably be justified when a general
patronage program intentionally sneaks in snippets of lewd, prurient materials to attract an audi-ence
to the program. This has not been the case here.

The Court concedes that Soriano’s short outburst was not in the category of the obscene. Soriano
actually exercised some restraints in the sense that he did not use the vernacular word for the female
sexual organ when referring to it, which word even the published opinions of the Court avoided
despite its adult readers. The word puta or prostitute describes a bad trade but it is not a bad word.
The world needs a word to describe it. The Court claims that, since Ang Dating Daan carried a
general patronage rating, Sorianos speech no doubt caused harm to the children who watched the
show. This statement is much too sweeping. There is no question that Soriano attacked Michael,
using figure of speech, at past 10:00 in the evening, not at 2:00 in the afternoon. The average Filipino
child would have been long in bed by the time Ang Dating Daan appeared on the television screen.

It is a direct, unconditional, and total abridgment of the freedom of speech, to which a re-ligious
organization is entitled, for a whole quarter of a year. Since this case is about protecting children, the
more appropriate penalty, if Soriano’s speech during the program mentioned was indecent and had
offended them, is to raise his programs restriction classification. The MTRCB classify programs to
protect vulnerable audiences.
Cristy Marie Ituriaga

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

En Banc

48. G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., petitioners

vs.

Anti-Terrorism Council, et al, respondent

Facts:

Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 9372
otherwise known as Human Security Act of 2007. The petitioners raise that the law
suffers vagueness and overbreadth. There is vagueness when the law lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
aspects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcements
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle. There is overbreadth when the law is too sweeping that it
restricts even those rights that are protected. The petitioners assail that the definition
of the crime of terrorism under the said law was vague and broad.

Issues:

Whether or not the RA 9372 suffers vagueness or overbreadth that should be grounds
for a facial invalidation or challenge.

Held:

No penal laws should be subject to a facial challenge. A facial invalidation of a statute

is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation
are rightly accepted. The petitioners invoked that the law penalizes speech,
contending the element of “unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism must be
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by free speech
clause. The court held that the notion of the petitioners is entirely inaccurate, as it

focused on just one element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails
consideration of every word in the elements and mincing of the words of the offender.
Roxanne Jordan

49. Bayan, Karapatan, et.al. vs. Ermita, et.al.,

G.R. No. 169838.April 25, 2006

FACTS: The Petitioners alleged the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880. They alleged
that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rallies, marches and
protests that they have participated were violently dispersed, by policemen implementing BP No.
880.

The Petitioners come in three groups: First is Bayan, et al in GR No. 169838, second is Jess del
Prado, et al in GR No. 169849 and third is Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al in GR No. 169881.
The Petitioners seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy.
They contended that: 1) BP No. 880 is a violation of the Constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which Philippines is a
signatory; 2) That the provisions of BP No. 880 are not mere regulations but prohibitions as it is
allegedly a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances;
3)That BP No. 880 requires permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger and that it is not content-neutral as it does not
apply to mass actions in support of the government; 4) That two standards stated in the law, the
clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger were inconsistent.

ISSUE: Whether or not BP No. 880 is constitutional.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of BP. 880. The Supreme
Court ruled that the right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances are fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the
constitution but it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies
that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society.

The Court further reiterated that the power to regulate is vested to the government through police
power. The permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health and that is the recognized
exception to the exercise of right even under the Universal Declaration on Civil and Political
Rights.

The SC ruled that BP No. 880 is only a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies. The law provides a precise and sufficient standard - the clear and
present danger test and that the reference to "imminent and grave danger of substantive evil
substantially means the same thing and is not inconsistent standard. A fair and impartial reading
of BP No. 880 readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public
places that the reference to "lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies
have to be for lawful causes otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection.
Jerelyn Ligaray

50. IBP vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, February 24, 2010

Facts:

In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit
with the office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at
the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed
to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.

IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled
rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza
did was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to
freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.

Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge.
Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly
violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from
what was indicated in the rally permit.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within
his power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.

Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal
case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).

2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally permit without
consulting with the IBP.

HELD:

1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this
certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the
criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding
in the said criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be
made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal
from the civil action.

2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place
different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest
opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is
favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the
Public Assembly Act.

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case,
Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue
without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of
expression.
Ryce Magalit

51. Estrada v. Escritor

492 SCRA 1

June 22, 2006

Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a
son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it
will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights
in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious

morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG
has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary
to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Daphne Jade Panes

52. Soriano vs. Laguardia

Facts:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
which then aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against Iglesia ni Cristo(INC). Two days
after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo,
against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host
of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:

Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” program a part of
the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III of the 1987 Constitution?

Held:

No. The SC ruled that “Soriano’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child,” and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing
decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be “context
based” and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television
broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all
factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how
the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that
they were used.” The SC also said “that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a “form
of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment.” In affirming the power of the
MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that “it is a sanction that the MTRCB
may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause.” visit
fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension “is not a prior restraint on the right of
petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to
him by MTRCB,” rather, it was a sanction for “the indecent contents of his utterances in a “G”
rated TV program.”

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation
of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s
suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above, a requirement that indecent
language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
offensive language.
Jed Paracha

53. Austria v. NLRC

G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999

Facts: The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services were
terminated. On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several
communication from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to
admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,
Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the
Negros Mission. The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it
was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since he
was very ill to be able to do the collecting.

A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of dismissal
citing:

Misappropriation of denominational funds;Willful breach of trust; Serious misconduct; Gross

and habitual neglect of duties; Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly
authorized representative as grounds for the termination of his services.

Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for
reinstatement and back wages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. SDA
appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.

Issue:1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair,
and, as such, involves the separation of church and state. 2. Whether or not the Labor
Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the
SDA.

Held: 1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee,
which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of faith, worship or
doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor
Code. 2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to fire
an employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different case if Austria
was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
Evonnie Parreño

54. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC v.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 153888 July 9, 2003

FACTS

On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities.

On May 8, 2002, a news article entitled "OMA Warns NGOs Issuing Illegal 'Halal' Certification" was
published in the Manila Bulletin, a newspaper of general circulation. In said article, OMA warned
Muslim consumers to buy only products with its official halal certification since those without said
certification had not been subjected to careful analysis and therefore could contain pork or its
derivatives. Respondent OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to secure the halal
certification only from OMA lest they violate EO 46 and RA 4109.As a result, petitioner lost
revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing certifications from it.

Hence, this petition for prohibition.

Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State. It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on
the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity
or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to petitioner, a food product
becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing
Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for food. A government agency like herein respondent
OMA cannot therefore perform a religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was a violation in Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

HELD

We grant the petition.

OMA was created in 1981 through Executive Order No. 697 (EO 697) "to ensure the integration of
Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino society with due regard to their beliefs, customs,
traditions, and institutions." OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of
the Muslim community as a"national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing
in mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA
does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free
exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this
Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the
broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good."
Stephen Rodriguez

55. Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs. SOCIAL JUSTICE

SOCIETY, respondent.
G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004
Facts: This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12,
2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch
49).
The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief filed before the
RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner
Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister
Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The
Petition prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like
any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in
urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the
letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions.

Issue: May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from
endorsing candidates for public office?
Ruling: The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF
CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly
deserves serious consideration. As stated earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be
of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and
its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court,
this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to
entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.
Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual
and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the
assailed Decision.
We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for
its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no
factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the
assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In
effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts
constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made
no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally
inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just
modify.
Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount
question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of
a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned.
Pearl Diamond Sillador

56. DOMINADOR L. TARUC vs. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005

FACTS: The petitioners are lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao City. Petitioners led by Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Rustom Florano
for the reason that the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged to a political party opposed to
petitioner Tarucs. However, Bishop De la Cruz found this reason too flimsy so he denied their
request. Things worsened when Taruc conducted an open mass for the town Fiesta celebrated by
Fr. Ambong who was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao. Petitioners were then
expelled/excommunicated from the PIC for the reason of (1) disobedience to duly constituted
authority, (2) inciting dissension resulting in division of the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual
Help and (3) threatening to forcible occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety among the
General Membership.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz
and impleaded Fr. Florano and a certain Delfin Bordas for conspiring with the Bishop. They said
that their rights to due process were violated because they were not heard before the order of
expulsion was made

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.

HELD: Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides
that:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

The case at bar is purely ecclesiastical matters which is considered to be outside the providence
of the court due to the form of government where the complete separation of civil and
ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon. Hence, the civil courts must not allow themselves to
intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature. Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal
affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those
rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property. Those who
unite to an ecclesiastical body do so with implied consent to submit to the Church government
and they are bound to submit to it.

The power to exclude membership from the church of those considered unworthy lies solely to
the Church thus it is outside the province of the civil court. The expulsion of membership of the
petitioners was legally made. They have not violated the due process of law because they were
given opportunity to be heard when they were also warned of the consequences of their actions.
Silva Yugin

57. CHAVEZ, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that what impelled him to bring
this action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997.
These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in
various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose
publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and
all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of paramount
public interest, since it has a debilitating effect on the countrys economy that would be greatly prejudicial
to the national interest of the Filipino people. Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioners action is premature,
because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements.
And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms
and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.

Issue: Whether or not recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest.

Ruling: The Court ruled in affirmative.

Executive Order No. 1, , created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the
recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos. Under Executive
Order No. 2, all persons and entities who had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties
were warned.On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the
PCGG which, taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no
doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest. We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public
character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and properties
purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives
and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or
properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences
or relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to
supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to
the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another
declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used
for national economic recovery.

Also, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite
propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of
information in general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
Lenicia Soldevilla

58. Francisco I. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation

G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002 En Banc

I. Facts:

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084
tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.” PD No. 1085 transferred to
PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP for brevity). On April 25, 1995, PEA
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation
without public bidding. On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered
a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a
result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. On April 27, 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition and prayed that
PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II,
and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before
petitioner can invoke the right.

II. Issue:

Whether or not the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement.

III. Ruling:

Yes, the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going

negotiations before a final agreement. Contrary to AMARI's contention, a consummated contract
is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never
exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late
for the public to expose its defects. The right to information covers three categories of
information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research
data used in formulating policies. The constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.
Krianne Solis

59. G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, respondents.

Facts:

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified on
matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by
the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for
his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions
relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be
specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve it. On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before
respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. Respondent
Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory.

Issue:

Whether or not the questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

Held:

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.

The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national
security matters"; and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as
‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."

In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific
questions, did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of
public accountability and transparency. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable power” of the President. Second, the communications are “received” by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test. Third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Anne Pauleen Sombrea

60. G.R. No. 189546 | September 21, 2010

CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE vs COMELEC

FACTS:

On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), a non-
government organization, wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of
the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) programs, the Board of Canvassers
Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS) programs for the municipal, provincial, national,
and congressional canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house
COMELEC programs called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.

On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the
CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in processing the Lists of
Voters which is not part of the voting, counting and canvassing systems contemplated by R.A.
9369. According to COMELEC, if the source code for the DCS were to be divulged,
unscrupulous individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit
certain candidates or parties.

Rejecting COMELEC’s excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition for
mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately make its source codes available to
CenPEG and other interested parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC violated the constitutional right to information

HELD:

Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is
selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that
technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct
their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was
not yet available when CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that
reason is already stale.

The Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and directs the COMELEC to make the source
codes for the AES technologies it selected for implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369
immediately available to CenPEG and all other interested political parties or groups for
independent review.
Genevieve Tersol

61. In Re: Edillon

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

Facts:

Marcial Edillon is a duly licenced practicing lawyer in the Philippines. In 1975, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board Board of Governors recommended the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing
the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.

The respondent argues that the said provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:

Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillon to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

Held:

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Assuming
that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
Robespierre Tersol

62. MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO

129 SCRA 359

Facts:

Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They sought
and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00
P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general
assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place
indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second floor
lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The
same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was
outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their demonstration, giving utterance to
language severely critical of the University authorities and using megaphones in the process.
There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non-academic employees,
within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created. The demonstration also
went beyond the period allowed. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should
not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly. Then on September 9, 1982, they were
informed that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an
illegal assembly. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture,
and Sports. Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which
was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes
and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year. Hence this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the Student’s Councils constitutional right to form association has been violated.

Held:

Yes, with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and
present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of
disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there
be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to
present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by
an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being
susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny
such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to
the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-
academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred
should not be disproportionate to the offense.
Joselito Toledo

63. UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION VS LAGUESMA

FACTS:

On March 20, 1995 the United Union of Pepsi Cola, who is the Petitioner of this case filed a
petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial
employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of
the Labor Code, citing the ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization
right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any
Labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own. Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order,
dismissed. Hence, this petition. Pushing through for resolution its contention that the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be
ineligible to form, assist or join unions, which is in contrast of Art. III, Section 8 of the
Constitution which provides that the right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the Union consisting of supervisors to form an
association.

HELD:

The Court ruled that the right of the people whether employed by the State or Private
establishments to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, Section 8 infringed by a
ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, Section 8 is
subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not contrary to law.” In the case
of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or
joining Labor organizations. Petition therefore must be denied. Their right to association has not
been violated.
Charrie Ursua

64. GR No. 132088, 28 June 2000

Acosta vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public school in Metro Manila. On various dates in
September and October 1990, petitioner did not report for work and instead, participated in mass
actions by public school teachers at the Liwasang Bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress of their grievances. Petitioners were administratively charged with such
offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules
and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without
official leave. Petitioners failed to answer these charges. Following the investigations conducted
by the DECS Investigating committees, Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty as charged and
ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Petitioners appealed and the CSC modified
the said orders of Secretary Cariño to six months suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed
the orders of Secretary Cario to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and later to the
CSC. Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their petition.

Issue: Whether Petitioner’s participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their
constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances

Held: Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass actions
which they participated in have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public
School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr. wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions'
were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for
essentially economic reasons." The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In
the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work
stoppages for any purpose. Further, herein petitioners, are being penalized not because they
exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances but because of
their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their
students for whose education they are responsible. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, “It is
not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was
punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila.
For, indeed, there are efficient and non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances.”

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail
services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government
employees. It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in
staging the “mass actions,” but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent
school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.

In the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the alleged non-observance of due process by the
DECS Investigating Committees only upon appeal to the MSPB. Significantly, however, it has
been our consistent ruling that an appeal is curative of any supposed denial of due process.[
Thus, after full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and CSC, and later on before the Court
of Appeals, petitioners cannot now allege denial of due process to justify their claim for back
wages.
Sealtiel I. Abayon

65. Pacific Wide Realty and Dev’t. Corp. vs. Puerto Azul Land, Inc., November 25, 2009

FACTS: Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex
situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the development of Puerto Azul into a satellite
city with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers with recreational areas.
In order to finance its operations, it obtained loans from various banks. PALI and its
accommodation mortgagors, i.e., Ternate Development Corporation (TDC), Ternate Utilities,
Inc. (TUI), and Mrs. Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, secured the loans. In the beginning, PALIs
business did very well. However, it started encountering problems when the Philippine Stock
Exchange rejected the listing of its shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad signal to
the real estate market. This resulted in potential investors and real estate buyers shying away
from the business venture. The situation was aggravated by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and
the decline of the real estate market.

Consequently, PALI was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations, both current and
those that were about to fall due. One of its creditors, the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), later
substituted by Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation (PWRDC), filed foreclosure
proceedings on PALIs mortgaged properties. Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition for
suspension of payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a proposed rehabilitation plan and
three (3) nominees for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. EIB and the other creditors of
PALI filed their respective comments/opposition to the report/recommendations of the
rehabilitation receiver. On November 2, 2005, EIB, together with another creditor of PALI,
Tranche I (SPV-MC), Inc., filed an urgent motion to disqualify the appointed rehabilitation
receiver. The RTC denied the motion in an Order dated December 9, 2005.

ISSUE: Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are unreasonable and in violation of the non-
impairment clause

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. There is no merit in PWRDCs contention that
there is a violation of the impairment clause. Section 10, Article III of the Constitution mandates
that no law impairing the obligations of contract shall be passed. This case does not involve a
law or an executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its
creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be
invoked. Furthermore, as held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. even assuming that the same may be
invoked, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights
and contractual rights are not absolute. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State for the common good of the
general public.

Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,

employees, and the economy in general. The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over
the opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its
judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is
manifestly unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding upon the debtor and
all persons who may be affected by it, including the creditors, whether or not such persons have
participated in the proceedings or have opposed the plan or whether or not their claims have been
scheduled.
Dave Adricula

66. Hon. Heherson Alvarez vs PICOP Resource, Inc.

Facts:

PICOP filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) an application
to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted into an IFMA. In the middle of
the processing of PICOP’s application, however, PICOP refused to attend further meetings with
the DENR. Instead, on 2 September 2002, PICOP filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Secretary Heherson T. Alvarez.
PICOP seeks the issuance of a privileged writ of mandamus to compel the DENR Secretary to
sign, execute and deliver an IFMA to PICOP, as well as to issue the corresponding IFMA
assignment number on the area covered by the IFMA, formerly TLA No. 43, as amended; b) to
issue the necessary permit allowing petitioner to act and harvest timber from the said area of
TLA No. 43, sufficient to meet the raw material requirements of petitioner’s pulp and paper mills
in accordance with the warranty and agreement of July 29, 1969 between the government and
PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest; and c) to honor and respect the Government Warranties and
contractual obligations to PICOP strictly in accordance with the warranty and agreement dated
July 29, 1969 between the government and PICOP’s predecessor-in-interest.

The Respondent Secretary Alvarez is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum of P10 million a
month beginning May 2002 until the conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, to IFMA is
formally effected and the harvesting from the said area is granted.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non -impairment clause by
which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA).

Held:

The court ruled that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment
clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,
which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be
invoked. The approval of the Sanggunian concerned is required by law, not because the local
government has control over such project, but because the local government has the duty to
protect its constituents and their stake in the implementation of the project. Facts: PICOP filed
with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43 converted
into an IFMA. PICOP initially sought to comply with the requirement under Sections 26 and 27
of the Local Government Code to procure prior approval of the Sanggunians concerned.
Abundio Bacatan

67. Diaz vs. Secretary of Finance (2011)

G.R. No. 193007 July 19, 2011

Facts:

Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol (petitioners) filed this petition for
declaratory relief assailing the validity of the impending imposition of value-added tax (VAT) by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of toll way operators. Court treated the
case as one of prohibition. Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the
NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the meaning of "sale of services" that are subject to
VAT; that a toll fee is a "user's tax," not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would
amount to a tax on public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the formula for
computing toll fees, its imposition would violate the non-impairment clause of the constitution.
The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees,
including toll way operations; that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law from
the words used in the statute; and that the imposition of VAT on toll way operations has been the
subject as early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and circulars. The government also argues that
petitioners have no right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since they clearly have
no personal interest in existing toll operating agreements (TOAs) between the government and
toll way operators. At any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit the State's sovereign
taxing power which is generally read into contracts.

Issue:

May toll fees collected by toll way operators be subjected to VAT (Are toll way operations a
franchise and/or a service that is subject to VAT)?

Ruling:

The toll way operator is no different from the service providers under Section108 who allow
others to use their properties or facilities for a fee. Toll way operators are franchise grantees and
they do not belong to exceptions that Section 119 spares from the payment of VAT. The word
"franchise" broadly covers government grants of a special right to do an act or series of acts of
public concern. Toll way operators are, owing to the nature and object of their business,
"franchise grantees." The construction, operation, and maintenance of toll facilities on public
improvements are activities of public consequence that necessarily require a special grant of
authority from the state. A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government principally
for the purpose of raising revenues to fund public expenditures. Toll fees, on the other hand, are
collected by private toll way operators as reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in
the construction, maintenance and operation of the toll ways, as well as to assure them a
reasonable margin of income. Although toll feesare charged for the use of public facilities,
therefore, they are not government exactions that can be properly treated as a tax. Taxes may be
imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority; toll fees may be demanded by
either the government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of ownership.
Arex June Baligala

68. RE: Request of the National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Clients from Paying
Filing, Docket and other Fees, August 28, 2009

Facts: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested the
IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the payment of
filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP chapters.
Resolution No. 24, series of 2008

At the outset, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP for its effort to help improve the
administration of justice, particularly, the access to justice by the poor. Its Resolution No. 24,
series of 2008 in fact echoes one of the noteworthy recommendations during the Forum on
Increasing Access to Justice spearheaded by the Court last year. In promulgating Resolution No.
24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the IBP has effectively performed its duty to participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
administration of justice.

The means and merit tests appear to be reasonable determinants of eligibility for coverage under
the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless, they may be improved to ensure that any
exemption from the payment of legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA and the
legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to justice by the
poor. This will guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor trivialized. Towards this
end, the following shall be observed by the NCLA and the legal aid offices in IBP chapters
nationwide in accepting clients and handling cases for the said clients.

Issue: Whether the Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and
to adequate legal assistance.

Held: Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there
is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective and efficient, but also
readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at all.

The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts and to adequate
legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP
chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance. Recipients of the
service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by
exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a complaint
or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of
Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and
removing a major roadblock.

The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is hereby Commended for
helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request of the Misamis Oriental Chapter
for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and other fees of the clients of the legal aid
offices of the various IBP chapters is Granted. The Rule on the Exemption From the Payment of
Legal Fees of the Clients of the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) and of the Legal Aid
Offices in the Local Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) (which shall be
assigned the docket number A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC [IRR] provided in this resolution is hereby
Approved. In this connection, the Clerk of Court is Directed to cause the publication of the said
rule in a newspaper of general circulation within five days from the promulgation of this
resolution.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay

69. People vs. Galit

Facts:
Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit
by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow,
was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a
result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More
than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban picked up the herein accused,
Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of
the murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited
facilities of the Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the
NBI where he was investigated by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something
drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers
began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will have to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat
him. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into toilet bowl full of human waste.
The prisoner could not take it anymore. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on
him and the indignities he had to suffer. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him
to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures
as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment. The following day, September
9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the
commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in
the crime. As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.

Held:
The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries
or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall over do
himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the
imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from
the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period,
temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability
for the physical injuries or damage caused.
There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not
even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is
his alleged confession. It behoves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The alleged confession and
the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in
a manner contrary to law.vTrial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances
surrounding the taking of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been
maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be
rejected in toto.
Christine Lily Angely Chin

70. G.R. No. 132154 June 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs

PACITO ORDOO and APOLONIO MEDINA

Facts: On 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a 15 year old girl named Shirley Victore was
found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union who three (3)
days before was reported missing. According to a post-mortem examination conducted by Dr.
Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, the victim was raped and strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as the authors of the crime.
However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime, they were allowed to go
home. On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina returned to the police
station one after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on
their admission, the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in
writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the two
(2) accused in the course of the investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the
Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. The investigation was
conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving of the voluntary
statements of the two (2) suspects who admitted their participation in the crime.

Issue: whether or not their confession is inadmissible due to the lack of counsel to assist them
during custodial investigation

Held: Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the
confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent
and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and, (d) the confession must be in
writing. Among all these requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him from the otherwise
condemning nature of a custodial investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the
offense. Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement
elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This exclusionary rule is
premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion,
physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
Jeyan Chin

71. People

vs

Lugod

GR No. 136253. February 21, 2001.

Facts: On September 15, 1997 at around 7 PM, Helen Ramos, the victim’s mother, was asleep in
her house together with her husband and their children, Nemrod, Neres and Nairube. At around
12:30 a.m., they noticed that Nairube was gone. The backdoor of their house was left open where
a pair of slippers that did not belong to the family was found. In the morning, the police began
their search for Nairube wherein a panty belonging to the victim was found, as well as a black
colored shirt belonging to the accused , Lugod. Witnesses testified that both slippers and shirt
were worn by Lugod. Lugod was then brought to the police station where he was temporarily
incarcerated. Although he admitted to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube, Lugod
refused to make a statement regarding the same.

On September 19, 1997, the Vice Mayor visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his
conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense. He was
charged for rape with homicide.

Issue: Whether or not Lugod’s confession can be used against him.

Held: At the time of the arrest, records reveal that the accused was not informed of his right to
remain silent and his rights to counsel. There was also no evidence that he intended to waive
these rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no
matter how brutal the crime is.

The records do not support the confession allegedly made by the accused to the Mayor and Vice
Mayor. The records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not appear in trial. Moreover, the
testimony of the Vice Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by the accused is not
conclusive.

The accused merely responded to the questions that the Vice Mayor propounded to him. He did
not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. Amidst such a highly
coercive atmosphere, accused- appellant’s claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the
police officers raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession.
Frank Cuevas

72. People v Taboga

G.R. Nos. 144086-87. February 6, 2002

FACTS:

Francisca Tubon, a widowed septuagenarian, was robbed, stabbed and burned beyond
recognition when her house built of strong materials was set on fire.

Edralin Taboga was charged with Robbery with Homicide.

On April 1, 1998, in the Municipality of Magsingal, Province of Ilocos Sur, the accused Taboga
entered the house of Tubon and killed her. Then after he take/steal three finger rings, one
necklace with pendant and one vial of perfume and four gantas of rice belonging to Tubon. He
also set the house on fire.

Taboga was arrested. He was brought to the police station for further investigation.

Taboga confessed to SPO1 Panod but he did not sign the confession upod advice of his lawyer.

The following day, April 2, 1998, Mr. Mario Contaoi, a radio announcer of DZNS, went to the
Magsingal Municipal Police Station to interview the suspect, Edralin Taboga. Again, Taboga
admitted killing the deceased and setting her and her house on fire.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of Taboga to the radio announcer is admissible as evidence.

HELD:

YES, There is nothing in the record to show that the radio announcer colluded with the police
authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against accused-appellant. Neither is there anything on
record which even remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed by the police to
extract information from him on the details of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked
permission from the officer-in-charge to interview accused-appellant. Nor was the information
obtained under duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of what was going on. He
was informed at the outset by the radio announcer that he was a reporter who will be
interviewing him to get his side of the incident

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, Branch 24, in Criminal Case Nos. 1818-K, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Edralin
Taboga is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He
is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
addition to the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P115,960.00 as actual damages, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lovely De la Torre

73. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUANITO BALOLOY,

accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 14740 April 12, 2002

Facts:

Juanito Baloloy was convicted by the trial court of rape with homicide and imposed on him the penalty of
death for having raped and killed an eleven-year old Genelyn Camacho.

The facts of the case show that on August 3, 1996, Genelyn was asked by her father Jose to borrow some
rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog whose house was about 200 meters away. She left their house
but never returned. Jose looked went to Wilfredo’s house to look for his daughter but was informed that
she already left with one ganta of rice with her. Together, they looked for Genelyn but was not able to
find her. When Jose got home, his neighbors Ernesto Derio and Juanito Baloloy arrived and told him that
Juanito saw the dead body of Genelyn at the waterfalls. They went to the waterfalls and informed
Barangay Captain Ceniza who ordered the members of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body and
reported the incident to the police station.

The next day, a black rope was found at the spot where Genelyn’s body was found. Brgy. Captain Ceniza,
who at that time was at the wake of the victim, asked the people present as to who owns the rope. Juanito
claimed ownership of the same, hence, he and Brgy. Captain Ceniza had a private talk where he confessed
having committed the crime. He was brought to the police headquarters.

On the same day, they went to Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon’s office to swear to their affidavits
before him. Brgy Captain Ceniza pointed to Juanito as the culprit in her affidavit. Judge Dicon turned to
Juanito and asked him whether the charge against him was true. Juanito responded that he was
demonized, and he spontaneously narrated that after he struck Genelyn’s head with a stone, he dropped
her body into the precipice.

The following day, a complaint was filed against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence against the accused the alleged confession of
the latter to Brgy. Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon

Ruling:

Jurisprudence provides that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary
manner whereby the suspect orally admits having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions
or confessions made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under investigation.

In the case at bar, the accused, after admitting ownership of the black rope, voluntarily narrated to Ceniza
that he raped Genelyn and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This narration was a spontaneous
answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed
under custody for investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.

However, as for Judge Dicon’s questioning, Juanito’s rights were violated when he was propounded with
incriminating questions without informing him of his constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment
the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started. Thus, his extrajudicial confession before Judge Dicon made without a counsel is
inadmissible in evidence, however, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused, which could
be established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of
the accused.
Donna Fernandez

74. NARCISO vs. STA. ROMANA-CRUZ

G.R. No. 134504. March 17, 2000

FACTS:

After a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito
Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and
thereafter filed the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso. Narciso thereafter asked for
a review of the prosecutor’s resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was
however denied. He moved for reconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ. The Motion
was granted and the case was set for reinvestigation by another prosecutor.

Accused filed an Urgent Ex-Parte to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail. On November
3, 1992 private complainant moved for the postponement of the trials set on November 9, 16 and
23 and the subsequent hearings thereon pending the resolution of their Urgent Motion to Lift
Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail. On November 9, 1992, the court issued the first assailed
order stating therein to wit: On November 16, 1992, the court cancelled the hearing upon motion
of the public prosecutor because no prosecution witness was available. In the hearing of
November 23, 1992, the private prosecutor again moved for postponement because of the
pendency of his Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail. On the same date, the court
issued the second assailed order which reads:"Not obtaining any resolution on her Motion To
Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail, private complainant filed this petition before the CA."

As earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals granted private respondents Petition for Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was lawfully granted with his right to bail.

Ruling:

As to the validity of the grant of bail, Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also
provides: "No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution." Although petitioner was charged with parricide which is
punishable with reclusion perpetua, he argued before the CA that he was entitled to bail because the
evidence of his guilt was not strong. He contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for
Bail was tantamount to a finding that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong. The Court
of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had been
conducted on the application for bail summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten
minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a
lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any
evidence. We agree with the CA. Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's
own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The
summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.

Clearly, the grant of bail by Executive Judge Santiago was laced with grave abuse of discretion and
the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing him.
Zarian Lyn Gasapo

75. Miriam Defensor-Santiago

-versus-

CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special

Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA

G.R. Nos. 99289-90

Facts:

Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. An
order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that
she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the
arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure order against Santiago by reason of the
announcement she made, which was widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that
she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed
a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC.
She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered.
The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise
argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom
of speech.

Issues:

Whether or not Miriam Defensor-Santiago's right to travel been impaired?

Held: By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders and processes
of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of
the case. Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from
leaving the country during the pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for
permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the
best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor
since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.
Lizanne Gaurana

76. AGULLO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 132926, July 20, 2001

Facts: Elvira Agullo, the disbursing officer of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways,
Region 8, Palo Leyte was charged of the crime of malversation of public funds thus paid,
collected and received by her in her official capacity, and by reason of which she is accountable
thereof, taking advantage of her official position, for her own personal use and benefit she had in
her possession in the amount of (P26,404.26), belonging to the government of the Republic of
the Philippines. On arraignment, Agullo, assisted by her counsel de officio, Anonio Manzanoo,
pleaded not guilty. When this case was called for pre-trial, the accused personally and through
her counsel Atty. Antonio Manzano of the CLAO readily entered into stipulations insofar as her
official position in government as well as the fact of audit of her accounts are concerned. In a
letter[7] dated 25 August 1986, addressed to the Resident Auditor of the MPWH, petitioner
complied with the directive by explaining that the cash shortage was, in effect, due to a fortuitous
event where the amount could have been stolen/taken by somebody on the day she suffered a
stroke on 22 October 1985. With petitioners admission of the fact of cash shortage, the
prosecution then rested its case. During trial, the defense offered to present the testimony of
witness Austero for the purpose of proving the said amount was withheld from the salary and
other compensation of petitioner Agullo. At the witness stand, petitioner Agullo unrelentingly
maintained her innocence and vehemently denied the accusation against her. Striking down the
defense as incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed decision,
convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded or overlooked certain evidence of

substance which violates the petitioner’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise.

Held: The pieces of evidence presented against petitioner in this case do not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction. Aside from the
aforementioned documents, the prosecution opted not to present a single witness to buttress its
bid for conviction and relied merely on the prima facie evidence of conversion or presumption of
malversation. To put it differently, the presumption under the law is not conclusive but
disputable by satisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize the public funds
or property for his personal use, gain or benefit. if the accused is able to present adequate
evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use,
then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This
Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by
the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed
to have existed at all. Worth noting is that the Sandiganbayan, in its impugned decision, admitted
that conversion or the placing of malversed government funds to personal uses has, indeed, not
been proven in the case at bar. the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain
evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of
petitioners guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven otherwise. Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more
on the flaws and deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and
merit of the prosecutions evidence. This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the
prosecution clearly cannot sustain a conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The constitutional
presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish the Bill of Rights.Its
purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone
individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command.
Audreylyn Gonzales

77. PEOPLE v BATO

G.R. No. 113804, January 16, 1998.

FACTS:

This postulate is applied by this Court in reversing the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding
Sergio and Abraham Bato guilty of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.

The trial court ruled that the prosecution witness, Ernesto, Jr., positively identified the accused
who invited him and his father for a drink. He witnessed how they tied the hands of Ernesto Sr.
before they took him away. That the police blotter failed to state the names of the assailants did
not negate appellant’s participation in the slaying. Further, the entry was based on the
information relayed not by the witness himself but by the barangay chairman, who had not
witnessed the incident. The trial court further appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
treachery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Appellants raised the defense of denial. They maintained that their identification as the alleged
perpetrators of Ernestos murder is merely an afterthought, necessitated by a death of strong
evidence on the part of the prosecution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is circumstantial evidence as to evoke moral certainty that appellants is
guilty.

RULING: The Supreme Court pored over the entire records of both lower courts and concluded,
after careful deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal. The circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke moral certainty that appellants are guilty.

It has been held that a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the defendants are guilty, to the exclusion of any other conclusion. The
circumstances proved must be concordant with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any hypothesis other than that of guilt.

In the instant case, the totality of the prosecution evidence does not constitute an unbroken chain
leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt of the accused. In acquitting the herein appellant,
this Court is not decreeing that he did not participate in the killing. It is merely ruling that the
state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Appellant ABRAHAM BATO is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
Joshua John Granada

78. PEOPLE VS. DE GUZMAN

G.R. NO. 186498

FACTS: Accused-appellant Ronaldo De Guzman was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs by a lower court, and such decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Appellant argued that the technical provisions required by RA No. 9165 was not
complied with by the police officers, namely: that the seized items were not marked immediately
after the arrest; that the police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized items in his
presence or in the presence of his counsel; and that no photographs were taken of the seized
items. Appellant also claimed that the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not
established. Appellant contended that the failure of the police officers to enter the buy-bust
operation in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, and the failure to observe the requirements of R.A. No.
9165 effectively overturned the presumption of regularity of the police officers in the
performance of their duties. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the degree of proof has been met.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court correctly determined that the buy-bust
transaction took place. The buyer, SPO1 Llanillo, and seller, appellant De Guzman, were both
identified. The purported sale of the illegal drugs that took place were clearly demonstrated.
Therefore the prosecution positively established the first and third elements of the crime.
Nonetheless, the prosecution failed to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti. In a
prosecution for violation of the RA 9165, the existence of the dangerous drug is an essential
condition for conviction as the dangerous drug is the very heart of the crime. The requirement of
the chain of custody ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence would be
removed. The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR
(Implementing Rules and Regulations) must be explained satisfactorily as courts cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist. In the case at bar, it was said that SPO3 Yadao
marked the seized items, and only when he saw the items at the police station for the first time.
Moreover, there was no physical inventory made nor photographs of the seized items taken.
Neither was there any mention that media or DOJ representatives, nor any elected official, were
present during the inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for these lapses. The
failure to observe the proper procedure negates the operation of the presumption of regularity
accorded to police officers. Despite the general rule that the testimonies of apprehending police
officers are accorded full faith due to the presumption that they have performed their duties
regularly, when the performance of their duties is tainted with failure to comply with the
procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively destroyed. Thus, even if the
defence’s evidence is weak, the prosecution’s whole case still falls. Appellant was acquitted.
Ro Ann Marie Gumban

79. G.R. No. L-32888 August 12, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELOY MAGSI ET AL

FACTS

Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was actually set and
rescheduled for six (6) times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that date, despite
appointment by the court of Atty. Mario Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing
was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it
because of accused desire to be represented by a de parte counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty.
Rivera moved to withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably acted on by the court on
September 7, 1970. At the second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and
de parte counsels to appear, despite a second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the next
day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the
third hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera
was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only. The accused del
Rosario entered a plea of guilty but qualified it with the allegation that he committed the crime
out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the other co accused. Appellant was found guilty of
murder and made to suffer the death penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether the court had been remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an
improvident plea of guilty.

HELD:

Of the six hearing dates held relative to the case, accused at two instances entered a qualified
plea of guilty. De officio counsel Atty, Rivera and accused were hardly afforded by the Court
any opportunity to discuss the case together, and the qualified plea of guilty resulted from the
Court's proddings rather than from accused's spontaneous volition. The Court knew that
accused's prior plea of guilty was qualified by alleged duress employed on him by the other
accused. It behooved the Court to allow the accused an opportunity to present evidence on the
alleged duress, as well as discover for itself the reasons for accused's change of mind regarding
his plea. But more importantly, the Court could have complied, as it failed to do so the first time,
with its bounden duty to apprise and advise the accused of the seriousness of the charges, the
meaning of the qualifying and modifying circumstances, and gravity of the penalty that may be
imposed on him despite the plea of guilty, as well as received prosecution's evidence on the
alleged aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense charged. But these
considerations notwithstanding, sans any evidence whatsoever from the prosecution nor from the
defense, after Atty. Cariaso's manifestation, and its trite queries addressed to the accused whether
he confirmed the same or not, the Court proceeded to decide the case. The Court has consistently
enjoined strict and substantial adherence to its rulings in cases where defendants are charged
with capital offenses. Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely
protect the interests of the accused, resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of
evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory queries addressed to the accused whether
he understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, are not sufficient compliance with the
Court's injunctions. The conduct of the trial court clearly established the fact that it had been
remiss in its duties to the accused, who was convicted on an improvident plea of guilty.
John Paul Hervas

80. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROLANDO RIVERA

G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001

FACTS

On March 1997 in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga Rolando Rivera raped his 13 year old daughter,
Erlanie. Rolando pleaded not guilty. Prosecution presented Erlanie as its witness like-wise her
aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin, who conducted the physical exami-nation.
The court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection and is also ordered to
indemnify the offended party for compensatory and moral damages. Rolando appealed and con-
tends that he was denied of due process because the trial judge disallowed his lawyer from cross-
examining Erlanie concerning the latter’s sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and im-
materiality; the trial court denied the motion made by accused-appellants counsel to postpone the
cross-examination because of which the said counsel consequently waived the cross-examination
of Dr. Barin; the judge propounded numerous questions to accused-appellant during his cross-
examination by the prosecutor; and the decision was promulgated just one day after accused-ap-
pellant submitted his memorandum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of Rolando’s right to be heard.

HELD:

Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard before he is condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of person’s basic rights, not a mere formality that may be dispensed
with or performed perfunctorily. With both the evidence and the law applicable to this case, the
Supreme Court hold that Rolando has been accorded his right to due process.

After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for accused attempted to cross-
examine her on matters relevant to the complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness which was objected to
by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that private complainant did not
testify on that matter but limited her testimony on the rape case only. Counsel for the accused argued
that although that is correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn statement executed by pri-vate
complainant identified by said witness in her direct examination and marked as Exhibit C for the
prosecution, he is at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her sworn statement
including that portion touching on the acts of lasciviousness subject matter of another case before
another court.

The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence pro-vides that the
witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accu-racy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing
upon the issue.

The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify anything about acts of las-civiousness
committed upon her person. She may not therefore be questioned on this matter be-cause it is not
connected with her direct testimony nor has any bearing upon the issue. To allow adverse party to
cross-examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is pending trial in another court and
which the witness did not testify is improper.

The decision of the trial court is affirmed with the modification.

Cristy Marie Ituriaga

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

Second Division

81. G.R. No. 138335, May 20, 2014

People of the Philippines, appellee,

vs.

Oscar Alcanzado, appellant

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Makati found accused Oscar Alcansado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder. This petition for a review on certiorari assailing the said
decision was filed. A careful examination of the records reveals that the assailed
decision will have to be set aside and the records remanded back to the RTC for
reception of evidence for the defense. The RTC committed a serious error in
promulgating a decision after denying the demurer to evidence filed by the appellant
upon prior leave of court, without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his
evidence.

Issues:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be

heard on his defense.

Held:

The court held that the appellant has not been accorded due process and his right to be
heard was violated. The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to the RTC’s assertion in
its decision that the demurer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not
reveal that there was any prior order denying appellant’s demurer to evidence before
rendition of the assailed judgment. Due to the procedural unfairness and complete
miscarriage of justice in the handling of the proceedings in the trial court.
Roxanne Jordan

82. People vs. Rodrigo Bayya,

G.R. No. 127845. March 10, 2000

FACTS: In 1994, Rosie Bayya claimed in her testimony in court that when she was still 12 years
old, her father, Lodrigo Bayya, forced her at the point of a knife to have sexual intercourse with
him. He repeated the bestial act in their house about twice a week afterwards, and then later used
her four (4) times a month, the last she remembered being on July 5, 1995.

During the trial, the accused-appellant admitted having carnal knowledge of his daughter twice
but theorized that he was "out of his mind" when he committed the incestuous rape. Having
admitted the authorship of the offense charged, the appellant does not dispute the trial courts
finding of guilt. In view of the facts established, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction,
sentencing appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.

Upon appeal, Lodrigo Bayya questioned the penalty imposed under R.A. 7659, considering that
the Information filed against him was silent about the applicability of the same. He alleged denial
of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a transgression of appellant's right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him, in view of the fact of information is silent about the
applicability of R.A. No. 7659.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled affirmed the conviction of rape with the modification
that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Supreme Court claimed that a careful perusal of the Information indicting the appellant
reveals a crucial omission in its averments of the minority of the victim. The objectives of the
defendant's right to be informed are: (1) to furnish the accused with such a description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; (2) to avail himself of his conviction
or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same cause; and (3) to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they were sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.

The Court claimed that the information does not allege the minority of the victim although the
same was proven during trial as borne by the records. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense not
charged in the Complaint or Information on which he was tried or therein necessarily included.

The Information charges nothing more than simple rape as absent are the special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority which had the capacity of increasing the penalty by
degrees.
Jerelyn Ligaray

83. People vs. Malansing, 378 SCRA 685

Facts:

This is an automatic review for the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
convicting appellants of two counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death
for each count. Appellants are brothers. Joey Manlansing denied participation in the killing, but
he admitted boxing Jorja in the face to prevent her from shouting, while Mario was assaulting
her husband. Mario Mallansing claimed he alone was responsible for the deaths. In open court,
Mario affirmed his confession and insisted that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths

He claimed that Joey woke up only after he killed Magin and that Joey tried to unsuccessfully
stop him from attacking Jorja. He said he killed the couple out of anger after Jorja told him that
he was going to be ejected as a tenant. Mario said Joey knew nothing of his motive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and taking advantage of night-time.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
informations nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance
elevating either killing to murder. Thus, conformably with Gario Alba, the offenses committed
by appellants only constitute two counts of homicide and not murder. Since the penalty for
homicide under 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect to sentence
both appellants to death. In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the crimes to murder, the
trial court considered, aside from evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, and use of a

deadly weapon, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and dwelling The
Supreme Court note that abuse of superior strength and dwelling were not alleged in the
informations. In accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, abuse of superior strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the
brothers. Further, should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of superior strength is
absorbed by the former. We are thus left to review only the allegation that the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were present in the
commission of the crimes.

At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the
darkness of the night was not purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate the commission of
the crime nor to ensure its execution with impunity.
Ryce Magalit

84. People v. Alvarado

379 SCRA 475

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52, finding accused-appellant Armando Alvarado guilty of rape of his 14-year old
daughter Arlene and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty. Accused-appellant argues that
complainant’s testimony should not have been given credence. He contends that, although Dr.
Villarosa found that complainant had sexual intercourse recently, it could not have been with
accused-appellant since the examining physician testified that complainant might have had
sexual intercourse either a week or a month before her examination on September 19, 1997, and
complainant had sexual relationships with different men in August 1997. He contends that the
trial court should have given greater weight to his defense as the same purportedly conformed to
the findings of the expert witness.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled disagree with the petitioner's contention. It is a time-honored
rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the
utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to
appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies.
The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case.
In this case, the Supreme Court find no compelling reason to depart from this rule. Indeed,
complainant proved herself to be a credible witness. Her narration of how she was sexually
assaulted by her own father remained, as also noted by the trial court, plain, candid,
straightforward, and unflawed by serious contradictions in spite of the lengthy and tedious cross-
examination by the defense counsel. It is also noteworthy that, in the course of her testimony,
Arlene’s eyes overflowed with tears, which only revealed the depths of the shame and suffering
she endured as a consequence of the violation of her virtue and personhood, and the truthfulness
of her charge. She was not impelled by any bad motive to testify falsely against accused-
appellant, as shown by the admissions by the latter and his mother that they did not know of any
reason why Arlene filed the rape charge against him. The reasons offered by accused-appellant
that Arlene had many boyfriends and that he would always scold her for attending dances and
entertaining suitors are flimsy. In fact, when the trial judge asked her if her accusation against
her father was true considering that the death penalty could be imposed on him, Arlene
unhesitatingly answered in the affirmative.
Daphne Jade Panes

85. Teves vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves
seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting them of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia. Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the
petitioners pleaded “not guilty.” On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their
Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the prosecution and moved for leave of court to
file a demurrer to evidence. On 29 July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits “A” to “S” of
the prosecution’s evidence but rejected Exhibits “T,” “U,” and “V.” It also denied petitioners’
demurrer to evidence, as well as their motion for reconsideration On 16 July 2002, the
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision. The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed
serious and palpable errors in convicting them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged
unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license
in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct
financial or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under
Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different from the offense with which
they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed because they were never
apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with,
and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance doctrine invoked by the
respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their constitutionally-
guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners'constitutional right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be convicted of second mode of violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest considering that it was
not charged in the information. When there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved. It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form
part of those constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of
the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the
offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby
warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
Jed Paracha

86. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

Facts: From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of
problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on
October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords.

On October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the House of representatives and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. At noon of April 14, 2001, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.

Issue: Whether or Not the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

Held: No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced
the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases
against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case
would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.
Evonnie Parreño

87. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE
MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET
AL.,

A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC June 14, 2011

FACTS

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while
on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindana Touted as the worst election-related violence and the
most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the
Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of
rebellion against 197 accused Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.

On November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from
various media entities, and members of the academ filed a petition before this Court praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g.,
still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media
coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media
personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders,
and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast
coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one
reporter for each media institution.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was a violation on the exercise of the freedom of the press.

HELD

The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of
serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment so treat it
deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest
for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation that massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally
necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.

The Court concluded in Aquino:

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right
of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and
prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed.
Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the
courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of
official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of
court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.
Stephen Rodriguez

88. JONATHAN D. CARIAGA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and DAVAO LIGHT and POWER CO., respondents.
G.R. No. 143561. June 6, 2001
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 11, which convicted
petitioner Jonathan Cariaga of the crime of Qualified Theft. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, Systems
Analyst of the Davao Light & Power Company, Inc. (DLPC), initiated a covert operation.
Aboitiz sought the assistance of Sgt. Fermin Villasis, Chief, Theft & Robbery Section, San
Pedro Patrol Station and also hired one Florencio Siton, as his undercover agent under the
pseudonym Canuto Duran. Canuto Duran struck an acquaintance with one Ricardo Cariaga, a
private electrician, at the Miguel Store, situated in front of the DLPC office. Canuto
purchased small electrical wires which, according to Ricardo, came from his cousin, Jonathan
Cariaga, nicknamed Totoy. Ricardo introduced Canuto to Jonathan who was then assigned
driver of DLPC Service Truck S-143. Sitons undercover work came to an abrupt end on
February 1, 1989 when members of Sgt. Villasis team apprehended Canuto and turned him
over, including the electrical wires that he previously purchased from Jonathan through
Ricardo, to the San Pedro Patrol Station. The prosecution was unable to present Ricardo as
its witness as the subpoena could not be personally served upon him as according to his wife,
Antonieta Cariaga, he was in Sultan Kudarat and the date of his return to Davao City was not
certain. Petitioner argues that the sworn statement of Ricardo Cariaga who was not presented
in court is inadmissible. The prosecution presented in evidence, Ricardo Cariagas sworn
statement which was attached as Annex 8-A to DLPCs position paper in the labor case filed
by Jonathan Cariaga against the latter for illegal dismissal. The trial court admitted the same
in evidence despite the timely objection of the defense counsel; and the Court of Appeals
upheld the admission thereof citing as basis, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
and Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the fundamental right of the accused to meet the witnesses
against him face to face.
Ruling: “In Toledo, Jr. vs. People, this Court emphasized that the preconditions set forth in Section
47, Rule 130 for the admission of testimony given by a witness out of court must be strictly complied
with and that there is more reason to adopt such a strict rule in the case of Section 1(f) of Rule 115,
for apart from being a rule of evidence with additional specific requisites to those prescribed by
Section 47, more importantly, said provision is an implementing translation of the constitutional right
of an accused person to meet the witnesses (against him) face to face. In Tan vs. Court of Appeals, it
was ruled that unable to testify or for that matter unavailability, does not cover the case of witnesses
who were subpoenaed but did not appear. It may refer to inability proceeding from a grave cause,
almost amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the power of speech. It does not
refer to tampering of witnesses.” The threshold question then is the admissibility of the sworn
statement of Ricardo Cariaga which was attached to DLPCs position paper in the labor case filed by
Jonathan Cariaga against it for illegal dismissal. The records reveal that witness Ricardo Cariaga was
subpoenaed only once and did not appear to testify in the criminal case against petitioner.
Concededly, this witness was not deceased or out of the Philippines. In fact, the private prosecutor
informed the court that he is in Sultan Kudarat and previously, his wife informed the sheriff that he
was in Sultan Kudarat which is in Cotabato, a mere four hours drive from Davao City. Against this
backdrop, can this witness be categorized as one that cannot be found despite due diligence,
unavailable or unable to testify. We are inclined to rule in the negative and reverse the Court of
Appeals on this point. It must be emphasized that this rule is strictly complied with in criminal cases,
hence, mere sending of subpoena and failure to appear is not sufficient to prove inability to
testify. The Court must exercise its coercive power to arrest. In the instant case, no efforts were
exerted to have the witness arrested which is a remedy available to a party-litigant in instances
where witnesses who are duly subpoenaed fail to appear. On this score alone, the sworn statement of
Ricardo Cariaga should not have been admitted as evidence for the prosecution, and we shall no
longer delve into the other aspects of this rule. DECISION is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Pearl Diamond Sillador

89. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM ONG y LI and CHING DE MING @
ROBERT TIU

G.R. No. 137348. June 21, 2004

FACTS: Based on prosecution through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales, in the
afternoon of July 23, 1998, a confidential informant (CI) of the Special Operations Division
(SOD), PNP Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ignatius Ferro about the alleged
illicit drug activities of accused William Ong and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu. As per order of
Chief Inspector Ferro, a team of eight decided to conduct a buy-bust operation. Once, CI
confirmed the meeting time and venue with the drug dealer, and exchanges of gift-wrapped
packages rendered of one (1) sealed plastic bag with a white crystalline substance by the accused
Ong and boodle money placed in a “W. Brown” plastic bag by SPO1 Gonzales, thereafter, the
latter arrested Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested co-accused De Ming.The two (2)
accused were brought to the police office where the corresponding booking sheets and arrest
report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the illegal drug substance, was referred to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, positive for methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. However, appellants denied the story of
the prosecution and maintained innocence to the crimes charged. On November 18, 1998 the trial
court convicted appellants as charged and imposed on them the penalty of death. It likewise
ordered each of them to pay a fine of P1 million pesos. However, the case was on automatic
review. Appellants insist on their innocence. They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them was violated.

HELD: Yes. Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides: SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed
or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.

The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese nationals. Their
Certificate of Arraignment states that they were informed of the accusations against them. It does
not, however, indicate whether the Information was read in the language or dialect known to
them. Moreover, after arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower court had to secure the
services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as Chinese interpreter. What leaps from the records of the
case is the inability of appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend any other language than
Chinese and any of its dialect. Despite this inability, however, the appellants were arraigned on
an Information written in the English language. The Court emphasized that the requirement that
the information should be read in a language or dialect known to the accused is mandatory. It
must be strictly complied with as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The constitutional
protection is part of due process. Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the
arraignment. Therefore, the appellants were acquitted of the crime charged.
Silva Yugin

90. PEOPLE vs.BOHOL.

G.R. No. 171729, July 28, 2008

Facts: On August 2, 2002, between 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. of the same day, there was a buy-
bust operation against Bohol,headed by the informant, PO2 Estrada Consequently, the police
officers brought Bohol to the police station and the confiscated four plastic sachets of white
crystalline substance were subjected to laboratory examination. The specimens were confirmed
to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu.

Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of "not guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.

On March 7, 2003, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the

Issue: Whether Bohol’s arrest and the search on his person were illegal.

Ruling: The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and
provides in the Bill of Rights that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by competent judicial authority. However, it is a settled exception to the rule that
an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest
is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which states:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.–A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

In the present case, the arresting officers were justified in arresting Bohol as he had just
committed a crime when he sold the shabu to PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law.

Considering the legality of Bohol’s warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless search that
resulted in the seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise valid. In a legitimate
warrantless arrest, the arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize from the
offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain exceptions. This Court has ruled that the following instances constitute
valid warrantless searches and seizures: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in
plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
Lenicia Soldevilla

91. People vs. Alicia A. Chua

G.R. No. 128280 April 4, 2001 First Division

I. Facts:

In September 1992, Harmony Electronics Company in Taiwan asked Alicia A. Chua to call up
Zenon To-ong and Domingo Tercenio and tell them that they were needed in Taiwan. Chua
contacted To-ong and told him the message. In October 1992, To-ong and Tercenio went to the
office of Chua and the latter told them that she could send them to Taiwan upon payment of a
placement fee of Php. 15,000.00 each. She also asked them to secure NBI clearances and
medical certificates. On October 29, 1992, Tercenio, together with Lonito Baluis, went back to
the office of Chua and submitted the requirements. They paid Php.15,000.00 each for which they
were issued a receipt. Chua assured Tercenio and Lonito Baluis that they would be able to leave
for Taiwan soon. Three months passed, but they were not deployed. After a few more months,
Tercenio could not anymore locate Chua. Chua used the same modus operandi on the other
private complainants. The complainants inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA for brevity) about Chua’s activities. The POEA issued a certification that Chua
was not licensed to recruit persons/workers for overseas employment. As a result, the trial court
found Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and
eight (8) counts of estafa. Chua appealed and claimed that she was denied her constitutional right
to compulsory process.

II. Issue:

Whether or not Chua was denied of her constitutional right to compulsory process.

III. Ruling:

No, Chua was not denied of her constitutional right to compulsory process.

The 1973 and 1987 constitutions expanded the right to compulsory process which now includes
the right to secure the production of evidence in one’s behalf. U.S. vs. Ramirez laid down the
requisites for compelling the attendance of witnesses, as follows: (a) that the evidence is really
material; (b) that he is not guilty of neglect in previously obtaining the production of such
evidence; (c) that the evidence will be available at the time desired; and (d) that no similar
evidence could be obtained. In the case at bar, the trial court correctly denied Chua’s motion for
the production of the records which were the basis in issuing the POEA certification dated
February 3, 1994, as the same would not in any way alter the undisputed fact that Chua was not
issued a license until then.
Krianne Solis

92. G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE

ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused-appellant.

Facts:

Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. Appellant questions the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out their
alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident. Appellant derided the
non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if
appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime. Even assuming
arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991,
or after the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does
not render their testimony less credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the
police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is
not entirely against human experience. appellant asseverates that the admission as
evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence
certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, violates his right against
self-incrimination. Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because during the
custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place
where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the accused to be informed.

Held:

These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in
uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The admissibility of
other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded
by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation. Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and
to have his own counsel by the investigating policemen during the custodial
investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance
with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do
not affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate
and keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the
wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki
on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys
found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet
really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of
evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's culpability
considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's
identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.
Anne Pauleen Sombrea

93. G.R. 125687 | December 9, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DELFIN RONDERO

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

ART III SECTION 3. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

FACTS:

Delfin Rondero was seen by the victim’s father, Maximo Doria, pumping the artesian well with
an ice pick clenched in his mouth and was washing his bloodied hands. The 9 year old victim,
Mylene Doria, was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm.
Rondero was convicted of homicide. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of
evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair
found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood-stained undershirt and
short pants taken from his house. Rondero avers that the acquisition of his hair strands was
without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends
is a violation of his constitutional right, specifically those under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of
the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence gathered can be admitted as evidence

HELD:

Yes. Under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of
the accused may be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine
forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against him. Consequently,
although Rovero insists that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the NBI
for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are
inadmissible in evidence. They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police
officers. Accused-appellant’s wife testified that the police officers, after arresting her husband in
their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper authority. This was never
rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the
poisonous tree,” evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other
evidences because the illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
Simply put, accused-appellant’s garments, having been seized in violation of his constitutional
right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in court as evidence.
Genevieve Tersol

94. Marcelo vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999

Facts:

In1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, Projecto
Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferageof mail matter in the post office. For this
reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group
responsible for mailpilferage in the Makati Post Office. NBI agents were then dispatched to Legaspi
Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day.

Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero were arrested and were brought by the NBI agents to their headquarters.
The motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession were also
brought in. The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of the
addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters.
Many of them, after proper identification, were able to claim their letters. Some letters contained money.

Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They
did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people
transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to
do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them.

They were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another
information for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan. In 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of qualified theft.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioners guilt the letters signed by the
accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in utter disregard of his
constitutional right.

Held:

The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to authenticate the
envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This purpose and their signatures on the
envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from
Marcelo were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since
these signatures are actually evidence of admission obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused under
circumstances contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For
indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under
custodial investigation, defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the
Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of

counsel, that he must be provided with one. However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in
evidence. The letters were validly seized from Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A
ruling that Marcelo's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion
on 17 February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the
letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a
lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of Marcelo and his companion and
seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, Marcelo and his co-
accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other
evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses.
Robespierre Tersol

95. BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITEE

203 SCRA 767

Facts:

Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa
Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG.
Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Section 5.

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the
"sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his
constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents
Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who
are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the
petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a
resolution dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the
Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Claiming that the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony
in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear
and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a
prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.

Issue:

Whether or not the the petitioners constitutional right against self incrimination would be
violated if they are required to attend the Senate Inquiry

Held:

No, The right against self-incrimination is construed as the right to remain completely silent and
may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case, but it may be invoked by other witnesses
only as questions are asked of them, Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to
respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. At the case at bar, since petitioners is not an
accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and
testify, and that they can invoke their right against self-incrimination only when a question which
tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate them is propounded to them. Clearly then, it is not
the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege
has consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
Joselito Toledo

96. PEOPLE VS GALLARDE

FACTS:

The accused, Gallarde was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. The trial court
convicted him of murder only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of the accused
immediately after the incident on the ground that the same were taken when the accused was
already under the mercy of the police. During the arraignment Gallarde, with the assistance of
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived
the holding of the pretrial conference. The Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch
51, rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of murder only, not of the complex
crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the late Editha
Talan, the victim in the negotiated sum of P70, 000.00. His motion for reconsideration, having
been denied by the trial court in its Resolution of 28 February 1998, Gallarde appealed to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the
offense he was charged.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled to sustain Gallarde’s contention that the trial court erred in convicting
him of murder in information charging him of rape with homicide. A reading of the accusatory
portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance.
Although it is true that the term “homicide” as used in special complex crime of rape with
homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this jurisdiction that where
a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in order to
be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. The
rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. The importance of
circumstantial evidence is more apparent in the prosecution of cases of rape with homicide. It is
well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in or around the vagina does not negate the
commission of rape. There is in fact a doubt on the commission of rape as it was based on the
fact that there is at all no convincing proof that the laceration of the vagina and the rupture of the
hymen of EDITHA were caused in the course of coitus or by a male organ.
Charrie Ursua

97. G. R. Nos. 148948 & 148951-60. February 17, 2003

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, respondent.

Facts: Petitioner Commission on Elections seeks the nullification of the orders of 16 March
2001and 9 May 2001 of respondent Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the Regional Trial Court. That
on May 11, 1998 elections, Florentino A. Bautista ran for the position of mayor in the
Municipality of Kawit, Cavite. On 8 July 1998, he filed with the COMELEC a complaint against
then incumbent mayor Atty. Federico Poblete, Bienvenido Pobre, Reynaldo Aguinaldo, Arturo
Ganibe, Leonardo Llave, Diosdado del Rosario, Manuel Ubod, Angelito Peregrino, Mario
Espiritu, Salvador Olaes and Pedro Paterno, Jr., for violation of Section 261 (a) and (b) of the
Omnibus Election Code. The complaint was supported by the separate affidavits of forty-four
(44) witnesses attesting to the vote-buying activities of the respondents. On 25 February 1999,
the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution directing the filing of the necessary information
against the respondents. Before the trial commenced, or on 2 December 1999, a complaint was
filed by Innocencio Rodelas and Gerardo Macapagal with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
in Imus, Cavite, for violation of Section 261(a) of the Omnibus Election Code against the
witnesses in the criminal case for vote-buying. On 10 April 2000, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor resolved to file separate informations for vote-selling in the various branches of the
RTC in Imus, Cavite, against the respondents. On 23 June 2000, the respondents appealed, the
the COMELEC en banc denied the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The COMELEC en banc, upon
the recommendation of its Law Department, declared null and void the resolution of the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor. It held that the respondents therein are exempt from criminal
prosecution pursuant to the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known
as The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which grants immunity from criminal prosecution
persons who voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-
buying or vote-selling. It further directed the Law Department to file the necessary motions to
dismiss the criminal cases filed against the said respondents. The Law Department filed a motion
to dismiss. This Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
required it to manifest whether it is adopting the petition. In a Manifestation and Motion filed
with this Court, the OSG stated that it repleads the submissions contained in the petition and
adopts the petition as its own.

Issue: Whether the rights of the accused have violated.

Held: The petition is meritorious. In this case, when the COMELEC nullified the resolution of
the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99-1080, which was the basis of the information for vote-
selling, it, in effect, withdrew the deputation granted to the prosecutor. Such withdrawal of the
deputation was clearly in order, considering the circumstances obtaining in these cases where
those who voluntarily executed affidavits attesting to the vote-buying incident and became
witnesses against the vote-buyers now stand as accused for the same acts they had earlier
denounced. The contention is without basis. A reading of the motion to dismiss Criminal Cases
Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 shows that a certified true copy of COMELEC Minute
Resolution No. 00-2453 was attached thereto and was made an integral part thereof. The attached
resolution indicated that the accused in the cases sought to be dismissed had voluntarily given
information and were willing to testify against the vote-buyers, and are therefore utilized as
witnesses in the pending case for vote-buyers docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99. The
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he denied the motion to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 7950-00 to 7959-00 and 7980-00 despite COMELECs determination that
the accused therein are exempt from criminal prosecution for vote-selling pursuant to the
provision in the fourth paragraph of Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646. Wherefore, the petition is
granted.
Sealtiel I. Abayon

98. People vs. Echegaray, February 7, 1997

FACTS: The Supreme Court rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of
the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death. The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion
for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that
precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was
dismissed.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of
the Philippines. A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of
accused-appellant. In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main
issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty.

HELD: The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question
of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments.

Harden- "The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and
barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.

Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough Nothing is more defining of the true
content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the
legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge
of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the
existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659
states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to
rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes."
Dave Adricula

99. People of the Philippines vs Mercado

November 29, 2000

Facts:

Twelve-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at around 9 oclock in the evening of February
9, 1994, he and Richard Buama were picked up by accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado near
Mercados house in Sto. Tomas, Bukid, Pasig, Metro Manila. Mercado arrived in a car, together
with Eric Ona. Mercado suspected Florencio Villareal and Richard Buama of being the ones who
had broken into his store and stolen money. Florencios friend, Rex Bugayong, was able to run
from Mercado. Florencio and Richard were pushed into Mercados car. Florencio said Mercado
poked a gun at Richard. Mercado drove the car to Tanay, Rizal.

Upon reaching Tanay at around 11 oclock in the evening Mercado took the three of them
(Florencio, Richard, and Eric) to an apartment. Florencio was led inside the apartment while
Richard was held outside by Mercado. When Florencio looked through the window, he saw
Mercado slap and box Richard. Then he was brought inside. Mercado later went upstairs.
According to Florencio, Richard asked if they could leave the place as he held his stomach in
pain, but Florencio replied that the door was padlocked. Mercado thereafter ordered Richard to
take off all his clothes and lie face down on the kitchen floor. Mercado asked his aide Jeff to get
a rope. Jeff brought a piece of rattan rope and tied Richards hands, while Mercado tied Richards
feet. This happened at about 11:30 in the evening. Mercado also ordered Jeff to get rags with
which to blindfold and gag Richard and then asked Acebron to get a bolo or a big knife. After
getting a bolo, Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado's car.
They then drove away, leaving behind Florencio and Eric in the apartment. After two hours,
Mercado and Acebron came back. Florencio saw Acebron washing the bloodstains off the bolo.
He asked Mercado where Richard was, to which Mercado replied, "Wala na. Pinatahimik ko na."
The trial court found both accused guilty and sentenced them to death.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No.7659 violates the constitutional ban against infliction of cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment.

Held:

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that
punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life. It is an
exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural
and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are established.
Abundio Bacatan

100. EDUARDO CUISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS , respondent

G.R. No. 128540 April 15, 1998

Facts:

On February 7, 1989, respondent Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
(Branch 39) rendered a Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3553 and L-3554.

Judgment was rendered finding accused Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double homicide,
beyond reasonable doubt and therefore sentences him to suffer imprisonment from 6 years and 1
day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for
each offense, with the accessories provided by law and to pay the costs. Accused is also ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Rafael Sapigao the amount of P30,000.00 and the heirs of Rulo Castro
also the amount of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the
civil indemnity was increased to P50,000.00.

The accused elevated the decision on a petition for review docketed as G.R. Nos. 108985-86 but
the Supreme Court denied the said petition on December 1, 1993.

The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Br. 39) for promulgation of
the decision. However, respondent Judge promulgated on April 4, 1995 the decision of the Court
of Appeals only with respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but did not commit the
accused to jail to commence service of his sentence.

Asst. City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II reported the matter to the Solicitor General and
requested that a motion for clarification be filed with this Court to clarify the decision

Issue:

Whether or Not to pursue the promulgation will violate the accused's constitutional right against
jeopardy.

Ruling:

As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a
decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused.
Here, trial court promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.

As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth,
the promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the
trial judge rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on April 4, 1995, and he repeated
his mistake in his April 12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered
the aforementioned act of the trial court void. 28 Since the criminal cases have not yet been
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense.
Arex June Baligala

101. Almario v. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 1

Facts: The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioner’s arraignment on March 18, 1992,
pre-trial was held, which was terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases were scheduled for
continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and February 1995, but the hearings were cancelled because
the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to this Court and no trial judge was immediately
appointed/detailed thereto. The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all
the accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private prosecutor, and without
objection on the part of petitioner’s counsel, postponed to July 24, 1995. However, for lack of proof of service
of notice upon petitioner’s three co-accused, the hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the
cases were reset for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.

On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon motion of
petitioner’s counsel, respondent court issued the following order: When this case was called for hearing,
private complainant is not in Court despite notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario,
moved that the case against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused is
entitled to a speedy trial.

Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent court in its Order
dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995. The pertinent portion of said order reads
as follows: In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme Court held that
the right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to (e) lapse without
the party having his case tried. At least this right is relative, taking into (the) account the circumstances of each
case.

There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified postponements of the trial, or a
long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party having his case tried which would constitute, according to
the above case, violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the accused, the pre-
trial was set and the same was ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On June 21, 1995, the case was set for
initial presentation of evidence of the proof of service of the notices to the accused and their respective
counsels. On July 17, 1995, counsel for the accused did not interpose objection to private prosecutor’s motion
to postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial could not proceed as, being a joint trial of
three criminal cases, the three other accused were not present. There were only three settings from the date of
termination of the pre-trial for the prosecution to present evidence and the same were postponed with valid
reasons.

The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of the accused since the
right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the motion
of the accused there is no double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether petitioner invoke the right against double jeopardy.

Held: It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that order
was reconsidered seasonably. For as petitioner’s right to speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the
fifth element of double jeopardy – that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused – was not met. The trial court’s initial order of
dismissal was upon motion of petitioner’s counsel, hence made with the express consent of petitioner. That
being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had
occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244 SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste, where we overturned
an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial –

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to
prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. It
must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy
trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents
to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot invoke their right
against double jeopardy.
Pearlle Joyce Calampinay

102. Manantan vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being
then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and
unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the DaangMaharlika at Barangay Malvar, in
said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident
to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F
driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down resulting to the
death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.

Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless
imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantancivilly liable
and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of
P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his
civil liability.

Ruling:

The lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate
court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil liability was not
extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial courts declaration that did not discount the
possibility that the accused was really negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent
with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court and since said hypothesis is
consistent with the recordthe Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction.

The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his
guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.The
foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private
respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being
in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending
actions as in this case.
Christine Lily Angely Chin

103. G.R. No. 136258. October 10, 2001

The People of the Philippines

vs

Carlos Feliciano

Facts: From being the subject of moral condemnation, the Kiss of Judas appears to attain a
different dimension in criminal procedure. That the State should agree to become a party to
setting up a premium on "treachery," and that it should reward conduct from which an honorable
man would ordinarily recoil with aversion, paradoxically illustrates the perceived necessity of
such kind of an arrangement in criminal procedure. Pending resolution by the trial court on the
motion, Carlos Feliciano and Rodel de la Cruz were arraigned on 08 February 1996. The two
accused entered a plea of not guilty. On 18 June 1996, the court a quo granted the motion of the
prosecution and the name of Rodel de la Cruz, an accused turned state witness, was forthwith
stricken off from the Information. When the trial concluded, the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo,
Aklan, found for the prosecution and pronounced accused Carlos Feliciano guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the
extreme penalty of death.

Issue: whether or not the discharging of the accused as state witness tantamounts to violation of
his right against double jeopardy.

Held: It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the
same effect as an acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the
competency and quality of the testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing his
immunity from prosecution. A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already
attached, is equivalent to an acquittal, such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the
state reneging on its part of the agreement and unconstitutionally placing the state witness in
double jeopardy. The rule, of course, is not always irreversible. In an instance where the
discharged accused fails to fulfill his part of the bargain and refuses to testify against his co-
accused, the benefit of his discharge can be withdrawn and he can again be prosecuted for the
same offense.

Despite an obvious attempt to downgrade his own participation in the crime, state witness de la
Cruz, nevertheless, did not renege from his agreement to give a good account of the crime,
enough to indeed substantiate the conviction of his co-accused, now appellant Carlos Feliciano,
by the trial court. On significant points, the damaging testimony of de la Cruz against appellant
was corroborated by Ruben Barte and Ramon Yael.
Jeyan Chin

104. Merciales

vs.

Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124171. March 18, 2002.

Facts: The public prosecutor filed a motion for the discharge of the accused Nuada so that he
could be a state witness but the prosecution contended that it was not required to present
evidence to warrant the discharge of Nuada because he was already under the Witness Protection
Program. But this motion was denied for failure of prosecutor to present evidence. Prosecution
then filed petition for certiorari before the SC questioning such denial.

The private respondents then filed a motion to set the case for hearing based on their
constitutional right to speedy trial which was granted. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, instead of presenting further evidence. The hearing was postponed and was set
for another schedule. On the date of hearing, the prosecution again filed for MR and invoked its
pending petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court but the respondents objected to reset the
hearing again. The judge called for recess to allow the prosecution to present the NBI agent
would be presented to prove the extrajudicial confession of the accused Nuada. However, after
recess the public prosecutor declined to present the NBI agent and manifested that it would not
present any further evidence. The defense then moved to that the cases be deemed submitted for
decision and asked leave of court to file a demurrer of evidence. In the decision of RTC, It
dismissed the charge of rape with homicide based on demurrer to evidence filed by private
respondents/accused.

Issue: Whether or not there be an acquittal by demurrer to evidence.

Held: The RTC judge was ordered to complete presentation of all available witnesses for the
prosecution. There was grave abuse of discretion by the trial court. The court required the public
prosecutor to present evidence to justify Nuada’s discharge as state witness but insisted there was
no need to do so because Nuada was already under the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
The trial court directed the public prosecutor the NBI agent who took Nuada’s extrajudicial
confession but the prosecutor declared that he was resting his case knowing that the evidence he
previously presented was not sufficient to convict the accused. And due to that, a demurrer to
evidence was filed by the accused and was granted by the trial court. It was then clear that the
public prosecutor was guilty of serious nonfeasance. When grave abuse of discretion is present,
an order granting a demurrer to evidence becomes null and void.
Frank Cuevas

105. Potot v People

GR No. 143547

FACTS:

Joey S. Potot, petitioner, was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 2739 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. The information against
him, filed on December 12, 1999, alleges:

That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1999, at about 3:00 oclock in the early morning in
the public cemetery of the Municipality of Mondragon, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
knife locally called dipang, with deliberate intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then
and there wifully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab RODOLFO DAPULAG @
PILI with the use of said weapon which the accused had provided himself for the purpose,
thereby inflicting upon said Rodolfo Dapulag @ Pili a mortal wound which caused the death of
said victim.

On February 3, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed a manifestation with motion informing
the trial court that he is not appealing from the Decision and praying that a commitment order be
issued so he could immediately serve his sentence. Attached to the motion is petitioner's letter to
the court stating that he does not intend to appeal from its Decision.

However, on February 11, 2000, the private complainant, Rosalie Dapulag (wife of the victim),
filed through counsel, a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying that the Decision be set aside
and that the case be heard again because there were irregularities committed before and during
the trial which caused miscarriage of justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against double

jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.

HELD:

YES. The February 1, 2000 order Decision had become final.

To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has
pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged with homicide
in Criminal Case No. 2739 under a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction
over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner
was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy
for the crime of homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged.
Lovely De la Torre

106. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CLARENCE ASTUDILLO,

CRISANTO ASTUDILLO, alias ANTENG or ENTENG, HILARIO ASTUDILLO, alias
BODA, appellant.

G.R. No. 141518. April 29, 2003

Facts:

On November 21, 1995, the accused-appellant was arraigned and the accused pleaded not guilty.
On March 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was convicted of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength. The accused-appellant appealed and, upon review of the case, the Court of
Appeal revised the decision, modified, and replaced the qualifying circumstance into treachery,
thus increasing the accused-appellant’s civil liability. Hence this appeal by accused-appellant on
the grounds that the actions of the Court of Appeals violated his right against double jeopardy.

Issues:

Whether or not the modification of the charge from murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength to murder qualified by treachery violates the accused’s right against double jeopardy

Ruling:

When the accused himself files or consents to the filing of a motion for reconsideration or
modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be
placed therein by filing such motion. His motion gives the court an opportunity to rectify its
errors or to reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them
conformable with the statute applicable to the case in the new judgment it has to render. The
raison detre is to afford the court a chance to correct its own mistakes and to avoid unnecessary
appeals from being taken. In effect, a motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or with
consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for the review of the trial court without,
however, conducting further proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof. Let it be known
that appellate courts are triers of law, and not triers of facts.
100 . Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, March 23, 1984 Fernandez, Donna Mae
Zarian Lyn Gasapo

108. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES -versus- HON. SIMEON FERRER

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14

Facts:

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act
of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.)
Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to
afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating
people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of
Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the
powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved
20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and
for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is
punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice
be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death.
Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9
declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and
association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held:

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a
legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to
a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following
requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively
and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)In the case at bar, the
statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be unlawful, it must be shown that membership was acquired with
the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of membership

with knowledge that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Section 4
prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before
the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in
accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary
changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
Act. The existence of Substantive Evil justifies the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression
and Association" in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble,
careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in
freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak
considering national security and preservation of democracy. The court set basic guidelines to be
observed in the prosecution under RA1700.
Lizanne Gaurana

109. ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO
FERNANDO, ROSENDO DOMINGO and LEONARDO LUCENA, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-19328 December 22, 1989

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and

MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK defendants-appellants.

G.R. No. L-19329 December 22, 1989

Facts: This issue involved the constitutionality of R.A. 1379 “An Act Declaring Forfeiture in
favor of the State of the any Property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public
officer or employee. The civil cases were instituted by the spouses Alejandro and Mercedes
Katigbak. In their complaint they praye: that the solicitor general be enjoined from filing a
complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the said act; the said statute be declared
unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired before its approval;
properties acquired by Alejandro when he was out of the government service be excluded from
forfeiture proceedings; and the NBI officers and the investigating prosecutor be sentenced to pay
damages. The second action commenced by petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines
against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes Katigbak, and his son, Benedicto, seeking the
forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro allegedly gotten by him illegally, in
accordance with RA 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while Katigbak was holding
various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of the Bureau of Customs;
and title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names of his wife and/or son.
The cases were jointly tried.

Issue: Whether or not RA 1379 unconstitutional for being an expost-facto law, because it
imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly
in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted.

Held: The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a
penalty; and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act,"
or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of
a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed
by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running afoul
of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. In the case, The
trial court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No.
1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a liean thereon. Such a
disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally permissible. R.A. No. 1379 is not penal in nature, its
objective not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the recovery of property held under an
implied trust. With respect to things acquired through delicts, prescription does not run in favor of
the offender. As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be
made answerable for damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080,
resulted from a preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an
arbitrary and highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any intention
to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The trial court
further found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19, 24, 25
and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao
A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary investigation was
terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily signify that he was
denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the Trial Court's factual conclusion that no
malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained of, and consequently no
award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this Court absent any
showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.
Audreylyn Gonzales

110. WRIGHT v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 113213, August 15, 1994.

FACTS:

To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of
Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on
September 10, 1990. The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides
for broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries and embraces crimes
punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows extradition for crimes committed
prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books of the
requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of
the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense."
A request for extradition requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the
requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of arrest of the person,
or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought to be extradited.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the DFA indorsed to the DOJ
Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the
DOJ through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an
Australian Citizen.

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings

was initiated on April 6, 1993 before the RTC of Makati. On June 14, 1993 RTC granted the
petition for extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the
extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense was committed. The extradition
proceeding resulted in an order of his deportation. The decision was sustained and motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:

Whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex
post facto law

HELD:

The Supreme Court cited the case of Calder v. Bull where it concluded that the concept of ex
post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal and criminal statutes which affect
the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the Treaty is neither
a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. This being so, there is absolutely
no merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s
retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s coming into force
and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an
offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time
the treaty was ratified." WHEREFORE, instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Joshua John Granada

111. PANFILO M. LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et. al.

G.R. NO. 128096

FACTS: Petitioner Lacson was involved in a criminal case that started when eleven persons
suspected to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed by the Anti-Bank Robbery
and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Petitioner was one of the heads of said group. In a
media expose, it was said that what happened was a rub-out and not a shoot-out. Among other
issues, petitioner argues that Republic Act 8249, enacted as his case was pending, had a
retroactive effect; that it was tailored-suit to match petitioner’s case, making the same an ex-post
facto law that would affect his right to procedural due process. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 8249 is an ex post facto law that may affect the petitioner’s right to
due process.

RULING: Petitioner’s contention is incorrect. R.A. 8249 does not have the qualities of an ex-
post facto law. Generally, an ex post facto law exerts a retroactive effect on penal laws.
However, R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. As the Court defines, ‘Penal laws are those acts of the
legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties thereof; or those that defines
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment’. Republic Act 8249 is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character and thus is not considered to be an
ex post facto law. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the law in question has
retroactive effect and may affect his right to due process is wrong.
Ro Ann Marie Gumban

112. G.R. No. 207264 October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.

TAN

FACTS:

The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the
Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of
Marinduque. On October 31.2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to
Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on
the ground that it contained material representations. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC cancelled the
certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013,
COMELEC en banc denied her MR. However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May
13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and
Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at
noon of June 30, 2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she
was duly proclaimed 20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET
has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ongsiako is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship.

HELD:

For respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law requires
that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal
and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.

In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on
in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her American citizenship,
contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has
become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.

Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to
use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of
RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for
and hold any elective public office in the Philippines."

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends
that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator
of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. said oath of
allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to
be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules)
and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner s
oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance
with R.A. No. 9225.
John Paul Hervas

113. JAPZON VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009

FACTS

Manuel Japzon and Jaime Ty were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007. On 15 June 2007, Japzon filed
before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground
of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino,
migrated to the United States and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last
25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein
that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, Gen-eral Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before
14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have
applied for the reacquisition of his Phil-ippine citizenship, he never actually resided in said place for a
period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required under the Local Government
Code of 1991. In his an-swer, Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to
work and subse-quently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty claimed that he had reacquired his
Philippine citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May
2007elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzons petition.

Pending the submission by the parties of their respective position papers, the elections were already held.
Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was declared Mayor. Following the submission of the
Position Papers of both parties, COMELEC First Division rendered its Resolu-tion dated 31 July 2007 in
favor of Ty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ty was able to meet the citizenship required for a public office.

HELD:

There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and eventually
became an American citizen. Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by tak-ing his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consulate Gen-eral in USA, in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, American and
Philippine. It was only on 2007 that Ty renounced his Amer-ican citizenship before a notary public and
became a pure Philippine citizen again.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizen-ship, and provides for his
rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does
not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions.
Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency require-ment for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is
also a citizen.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and ex-isting laws; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.Yes he is eligible for public office. The fact that he had dual citizenship
did not disqualify him from running for public office.
Cristy Marie Ituriaga

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

Second Division

114. G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013

CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA. RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run
for public office despite his continued use of a US passport. Arnado was naturalized US citizen
but he renounced such citizenship and took Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on July 10, 2008. Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy on November 30, 2009 to run for
Municipal Mayor of Kausawagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 election.

Issues:

Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship tantamount to
undoing a renunciation earlier made.

Held:

The court held that Arnado is not qualified to run for public office because of his continued use
of his American Passport he continually and voluntarily represented himself as an American.
Arnado’s citizenship is dual, he is a Filipino by birth and an American through naturalization.
Dual citizens are not qualified to run as provided by Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Roxanne Jordan

115. Bengzon III v. HRET

357 SCRA 545. May 7, 2001

FACTS: Teodoro C. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63.

The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that
“no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act
Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He
won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Antonio Bengson III filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since
he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: 1) by naturalization, 2) by
repatriation, and 3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1.)desertion of the armed forces; 2) services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; 3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and 5) political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand,
if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

The Supreme Court reiterated that R.A. No. 2630 provides under Section 1. Any person who had lost his
Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the
United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the afore cited provision, Cruz is deemed
to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Jerelyn Ligaray

116. Tabasa vs CA, August 29, 2006

FACTS: When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizenship when his
father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of BIR. The
Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the BID that his passport has
been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges against
him.Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with the
RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by
the BID.

ISSUE: Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.

RULING: No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. The
only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a Filipino woman who lost her
Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor
children who lost Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner
was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The act cannot be applied in his case
because he is no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA
8171 only belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition for
repatriation.
Ryce Magalit

117. Loida Nicolas - Lewis v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 162759

August 4, 2006

Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, sought
registration and certification as “overseas absentee voters” however they were advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003,
they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence
requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the Constitution.

When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the COMELEC

replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the petitioners and that they are
considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution.
Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment) stating
that “all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of
suffrage, may do so,” observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered
the petition moot and academic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A.
9189.

Ruling: As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 -
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before
they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that
duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as
that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189
aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
vote.

The Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No.
9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
Daphne Jade Panes

118. Valles vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and
an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is
an Australian. ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a
child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth,
as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
place of birth. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into
effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April
11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the
time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship,
xxx So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein
private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also
claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Jed Paracha

119. Tecson vs. COMELEC,

GR No. 161434 March 3, 2004

Facts: On December 31, 2003 Ronald Allan Kelly Poe a.k.a Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ) filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Presidency in the Republic of the Philippines.
Victorino Fornier initiated a petition before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disqualify FPJ and to cancel his certificate of candidacy due to the reason that FPJ is not a
natural born Filipino because his parents were foreigners. On January 23, 2004 the COMELEC
dismissed Fornier’s action for lack of merit. Three days later, he filed his motion for
consideration but was denied on February 6, 2004 by the COMELEC. On his part, respondent,
presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a
certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of
the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe,
d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643,
No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of
Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie
Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946
were totally destroyed during World War II.

Issue: Whether or not Ronald Allan Kelly Poe is a natural born Filipino or not.

Held: Yes. It is proven that FPJ is a natural Filipino due to the fact that his father, Allan F. Poe,
is also a Filipino Citizen. FPJ’s grandfather, Lorenzo Poe, has claimed his citizenship under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 which declared that those who resided in the Philippines are already
considered Filipino Citizens which has been extended to FPJ’s father. Since FPJ was born under
the 1935 constitution which states that a child whether legitimate or not shall be considered
Filipino citizens as long as their fathers are. Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would
tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. Allan F. Poe, showed that he
was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espanol mother,
Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940.
In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a
Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen.
Evonnie Parreño

120. BALGAMELO CABILING MA, ET. AL V.

COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ET. AL

G.R. No. 183133 July 26, 2010

FACTS

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., Valeriano Cabiling Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma,
Nicolas Ma, and Isidro Ma are the children of Felix Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling,
a Filipina.

They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years;
they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the
country.

During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
Registration (ACRs) and immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that
those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Having taken their oath of allegiance as
Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the
civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen).

On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit of a certain Mat
G. Catral, alleging that Felix Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens.

ISSUE

Whether or not children born under 1935 constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who
executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the
government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation.

HELD

We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under
the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens
under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory
requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the
right to Philippine citizenship.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register
the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent
fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to
the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted
supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although
belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the
Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other
issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within
a reasonable time.
Stephen Rodriguez

121. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA

BATUGAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 183110. October 7, 2013

Facts: On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga
del Sur. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
Motion. Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing.
Hence, Azucena’s counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted.
Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to receive Azucena’s evidence.
During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due
notice. Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has
never departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano.
Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. Azucena married
Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen. They have five children. All of them studied
in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals.Azucena and her husband, as conjugal
partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra.

The RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Petition.The OSG then appealed
the RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement
under CA 473. The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the commissioner is not a
"public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the public in attendance.
Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she had to quit to help in the retail
business of her husband, and they were able to send all their children to school. Azucena denied that the
hearing for her Petition was not made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of Court was conducted in
the court’s session hall. Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments it
raised before the CA, i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income and public hearing
requirements of CA 473.

Issue: Whether or not Azucena does not have the qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as
she does not have any lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not in the
nature of a public hearing.
Ruling: The Court held that the OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena during
the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the lower court to order ex parte
presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004. The OSG was also
notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had raised
this same issue at the CA and was denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no reason
to disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of
Philippine citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the Philippines, and
devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under
judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second issue, we also affirm the
findings of the CA that since the government who has an interest in, and the only one who can
contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial
Prosecutor’s office, the proceedings have complied with the public hearing requirement under CA
473. No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen: He must
own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or
must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she had to
quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint provider, together
with her husband, in order to support her family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise
all their five children, provided them with education, and have all become professionals and
responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s
lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume teaching at anytime. Her
profession never leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a
charge to the only country she has known since birth. Petition is DENIED. Petition for
Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pearl Diamond Sillador

122. MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC, et al

G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700

FACTS: Grace Poe (Poe) was found abandoned by Edgardo Militar in a church in Jaro Iloilo
sometime in 1968. The relatives of Edgardo then reported and registered the child as a founding
with the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary Grace Militar. In 1974, the
child was adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan Roces. Necessary annotations were placed in
the child’s foundling certificate but it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces discovered that their
lawyer failed to secure a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating Poe’s new name as well as the
name of the adoptive parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of
Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.

At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. In 1988, she was issued a Philippine
passport. However, in 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the US right after the
wedding. She then gave birth to her eldest child in the US. In 2001, Poe became a naturalized
American Citizen and she obtained a US Passport that same year. In April 2004, Poe came back
to the Philippines in order to support her father’s candidacy. It was at this time that she gave
birth to her youngest daughter. In July 2004, she then returned to the US with her two daughters.
Poe returned in December 2004 after learning of her father’s deteriorating condition. The latter
died and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the funeral arrangements. Poe stated that
she wanted to be with her grieving mother hence, she and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of 2005. They prepared for
resettlement including notification of their children’s schools, coordination with property movers
and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to how they can bring their pet dog. According to Poe,
as early as 2004, she already quit her job in the US. Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and
immediately secured a TIN while her husband stayed in the US. She and her family stayed with
her mother until she and husband was able to purchase a condominium in San Juan sometime
February 2006. On February 14, 2006, Poe returned to the US to dispose the other family
belongings. She travelled back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe and husband acquired a
property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon City where they built their family home.

On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
R.A. 9225. On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children. The Bureau of
Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18, 2006. She and her children were then
considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August 2006 and secured a Philippine
passport thereafter. On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB.
Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US
before a notary public in Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she submitted the
Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as MTRCB Chairperson. According to
Poe, she stopped using her American passport from then on.

On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the US

before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila. On December 9, 2011, the US Vice
Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective October 21, 2010. On
October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for Senator stating that
she was a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6 months before May 13, 2013.
She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16, 2013.

On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 elections. She
declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day before

election would be10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Several petitions were
filed against Poe alleging that (1) she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when
she stated that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years 11 months up to the day
before May 9, 2016 Elections, (2) she is not natural born considering that Poe is a foundling. It
was argued that international law does not confer natural born status and Filipino citizenship to
foundlings hence, she is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under
R.A.9225 as she is not a natural citizen to begin with.

Assuming that Poe was a natural born citizen, she lost it when she became a US Citizen.

COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born citizen and that
she failed to complete the 10 year residency requirement. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Mary Grace Poe, as a foundling, is a natural born citizen of the
Philippines.

2. Whether Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

HELD: On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that foundlings are as a class, natural born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
that would exclude them either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a
need to examine the intent of the framers. The amendment to the Constitution proposed by
constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural born citizens was not carried out, not
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens,
but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. There was no intent or
language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. Likewise, domestic laws
on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first
place to be adopted. Recent legislation all expressly refers to “Filipino children” and includes
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

The argument that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of
a foundling certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship is without merit.
Hence, the argument that as a foundling, Poe underwent a process in order to acquire or perfect
her Philippine citizenship is untenable. “Having to perform an act” means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this case, the determination of foundling status was done by
authorities, not by Poe. Second, the object of the process is to determine the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child and lastly, the process is not analogous to naturalization
proceedings.

Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally accepted principles of international
law which include international customs form part of the laws of the land. The common thread of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:

1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a
foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)

2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of the

country where he is found) bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these

conventions. Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms Article14 of the Hague
Convention. Likewise, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness affirms Article 15 of
the UDHR. By analogy, although the Philippines have not signed the International Convention
for the Protection of Persons from Enforced Disappearance, we (the Supreme Court) ruled that
the proscription against enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as a generally accepted
principle of international law.

Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe
have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept
that foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in
which it is found.

Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.

On the second issue, the COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation which states that repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. A
natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status
as natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit
etc). In passing R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit to decree that natural born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it has been lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress’
determination. Neither is repatriation an act to ‘acquire or perfect’ one’s citizenship. In the case
of Bengson, the Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987
Constitution: natural born and naturalized. There is no third category for repatriated citizens. The
COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent.

Hence, COMELEC’s decision is wrapped with grave abuse of discretion.

Pearl Diamond Sillador

122-A. MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC, et al

G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700

J. Carpio – Dissenting Opinion

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS: A presidential candidate who is deemed a natural born citizen

by less than a majority and deemed not a natural-born Filipino citizen by five Justices and with
no opinion from three Justices is now allowed to run for President of the Philippines. He notes
that the ruling of the majority will lead to absurd results by allowing a presidential candidate
with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially elected. The majority wants to resolve the
citizenship status only after the election, and if the petitioner wins.

Poe failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines for
the last ten years hence, she is not eligible to run as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

ON CITIZENSHIP: The 1935 Constitution, which is applicable in Poe’s case, allows only two
methods of acquiring Philippine citizenship:

1. By blood relation to the father or mother who must be a Filipino citizen

2. By naturalization according to law

The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis principle or the “law of the blood” to determine
citizenship at birth. An individual acquires Filipino citizenship at birth solely by virtue of
biological descent from a Filipino mother or father. This view is made evident by the suppression
from the Constitution of the jus soli principle.

Poe contends that as a foundling, she is deemed included in par. 3 and 4 of Article IV of the 1935
constitution (Par 3 - Those whose father are citizens of the Philippines and Par 4 - those whose
mother are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching the age of majority, elects Philippine
citizenship). Poe is gravely mistaken as the framers of the 1935 Constitution voted to
categorically reject the proposal to include foundlings as Citizens of the Philippines. The
delegates actually voted to reject Rafol’s amendment to consider children of unknown parentage
as Filipino citizens. Three delegates even voiced out their objections to this amendment and
stated that the Congress should instead provide an enabling law for foundlings to be considered
as Filipino citizens. Poe argues that the reason why the provision on foundlings was not included
in the 1935 Constitution was because there is already a clear principle existing in domestic and
international law on foundlings. Carpio comments that there is no such domestic law as well as
international law existing during the proceedings of the 1935 Constitutional Convention
explicitly governing citizenship of foundlings and thus there could not have been any
redundancy to speak of. The Spanish Civil Code which has a provision on foundlings ceased to
have any effect in our land upon the cession by Spain of the Philippines to the US. Likewise,
only the 1930 Hague Convention relating to the Conflict of Nationality law, which articulated
the presumption on the place of birth of foundlings, was in existence during the deliberations of
the 1935 Constitution. This Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth
and there is no prevailing customary international law at the time, as there is still none today,
conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth. While the framers of the 1935
Constitution discussed the matter of foundlings, they not only rejected the proposal to include a
provision relating to them (foundlings) but also clearly manifested that foundlings could not be
citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of Filipino fathers. The framers

intended to exclude foundling from the definition of natural born Filipino citizens by expressly
rejecting Rafol’s proposal. Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to
refer to natural-born citizens as only those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being
born to fathers who were Filipino citizens – nothing more nothing less. As a matter of course,
those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens or are both unknown, as the case of foundlings,
cannot be considered natural born Filipino citizens.

FOUNDLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: It is a fundamental principle that every

independent state has the right and prerogative to determine who its citizens are. This principle is
applied in the Philippines as early as 1912 in the case of Roa. The 1930 Hague Convention
explicitly recognizes this principle. Hence, it is the municipal law, both constitutional and
statutory, which determines and regulates the conditions on acquiring citizenship. There is no
customary international law presuming a foundling as a citizen of the country where the
foundling is found. Poe anchors her claims on the Convention of the Rights of the Child, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), the 1930 Hague Convention, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness (CRS).

1. Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified by the Philippines only on August
21, 1990. This convention binds the Philippines only on the day of ratification. Since Poe was
born in 1968, her citizenship at birth cannot be affected in any way by the Convention.
Moreover, the CRC does not guarantee a child a nationality at birth much less a natural
citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine constitution, but merely the right to
acquire a nationality in accordance with a domestic law.

2. ICCPR – the ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 1976. The ICCPR does not obligate states
to automatically grant a nationality to children at birth. The covenant does not guarantee a
foundling a nationality at birth.

3. UDHR – The UDHR (Art. 15 on the right to a nationality) is merely a declaration. It does not
obligate states to automatically confer nationality to a foundling.

4. 1930 Hague Convention – the Philippines is not a signatory to this convention, hence,
Philippines is not bound by it. Poe claims that this convention is evidence of “generally accepted
principles of international law.” Note that Article 14 of this convention states that foundlings
shall have the nationality of the country OF birth”. It does not say that a foundling shall have the
nationality AT birth. There is nothing in this article that guarantees the nationality of a foundling
at birth, much less natural born citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine
constitution. Moreover, Article 15 of the convention acknowledges the fact that acquisition of
nationality by reason of birth in a state’s territory is not automatic. It actually states that
municipal law determines the conditions governing the acquisition of nationality.

5. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness – the Philippines is not a signatory to this

convention. The convention does not bind the Philippines. Likewise, Art. 2 of the CRS which
states that “foundling found in the territory of a contracting state, shall in the absence of proof to
the contrary, to have been born within that territory of parents possessing the nationality of that
state” binds only contracting states, of which, the Philippines is not.

In sum there is no international treaty to which the Philippines is a contracting party, which
provides expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed a natural born citizen of the country

in which the founding is found. On the issue of customary international law, one of its elements
(widespread and consistent practice of states) was not duly proven by Poe. She failed to show
that Article 2 of the CRS is an established, widespread and consistent practice of a majority of
sovereign states. On the other hand, international law writers generally accept that the CRS does
not constitute customary international law precisely because of the small number of states that
have ratified the convention. Since the first element of customary international law is missing,
the second element (opinion juris) is lacking as well. There is no general international law,
whether customary international law or generally accepted principle of international law,
obligating the Philippines, or any state, to automatically confer citizenship to foundlings at birth.
There are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings;

1. First, that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is found (they
have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth)

2. A founding is deemed born in the country where the foundling is found.

These two general principles have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.

Assuming that there was in the 1935 and thereafter, a customary international law conferring
nationality to foundlings at birth, still foundlings could not be considered as natural born Filipino
citizens as such would conflict with the concept of jus sanguinis under the 1935 Constitution. In
case of conflict between customary international law and the Constitution, the Constitution
prevails. Moreover, there is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli and
citizenship at birth because of jus sanguisinis. The former may be granted to foundlings under
the constitution but the citizenship granted is not of a natural-born citizenship but that of
naturalized citizenship. Only those citizens at birth because of jus sanguisinis, which required
blood relation to a parent are natural citizens under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitution.

On burden of proof: Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of
proving his or her Philippine citizenship. A person who claims to be qualified to run for the
position of President, because he or she, is a natural born citizen, has the burden of proving that
he/she is indeed a natural born citizen. Any doubt should be resolved against him/her. In this
case, there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling with unknown biological parents. Hence,
her certificate of live birth does not show on its face that she is a natural born Filipino citizen.
This shifted the burden of evidence to the petitioner that she is eligible to run and she could have
used evidence such as DNA.

Summary: Petitioner is not a natural born citizen because:

1. No Philippine law automatically confers Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth

2. The 1935 constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being considered natural born citizens

3. There is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural or

naturalized.

4. There is no treaty, customary international law or general principle of international law

granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth.

5. Assuming that there is a customary law presuming that foundling is a citizen of the country
where it is found, such presumption cannot prevail over the Philippine constitution which adopts
the jus sanguinis principle

6. Petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural born Filipino citizen

7. Foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his/her status as a foundling to acquire a
Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino
citizen because he/she has to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.

Not being a natural born citizen, petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy
for President can motu propio be cancelled by the COMELEC. There is no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Silva Yugin

122-B. GR. No. 221697 - Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections and Estrella C.

Elamparo,

GR. Nos. 221698-700 - Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections,et.al.

Dissenting Opinion

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Considering the conclusion Associate Justice Del Castillo that have reached relative to
petitioner's material misrepresentation regarding her period of residence in the Philippines, and
considering further that based even only thereon, her 2015 CoC should be cancelled and denied
due course, Associate Justice deem it wise and prudent to withhold passing judgment at this time
regarding petitioner's citizenship. All, any judgment at this time upon this issue might directly
impact on GR. No. 221538 (Rizalito Y. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal), which is a Quo
Warranto case seeking the removal of petitioner as a Senator of the Philippines wherein her
natural-born citizenship status is directly assailed.

Furthermore, he believed that the resolution of the issue on petitioner's citizenship must be
carefully studied. Any hasty or ill-considered ruling on this issue could open the floodgates to
abuse by certain groups and individuals looking only after their own interest to the prejudice and
undoing of our motherland. Non-Filipinos might use the ruling to advance their vested interests
by simply posing as foundlings so that they would be presumed or cloaked with natural-born
citizenship. They could use this as an avenue to obtain Filipino citizenship or natural-born status
which they could not ordinarily gain through ordinary naturalization proceedings.

Further he said that it is not improbable, that petitioner was born to Filipino parents; yet the fact
remains that their identities are unknown. In short, petitioner's citizenship is uncertain. While it
defies human nature to resist the natural impulse to claim one's own child, the sad reality is that
there are still many parents who abandon their child, depriving said child not only of parental
love and care, but also identity and pedigree. Every opportunity should thus be given to the
innocent child to trace his/her parentage and determine compliance with the Constitution. As the
Court has declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration: whenever the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, vthe
ruling therein as to the person's citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata. Thus, it
may be threshed out again and again as the occasion demands.

Finally he concluded that, it is imperative for the Court to carefully tread on the issue of
citizenship for the issue of citizenship impacts not solely on petitioner but also on those similarly
situated like her; it also involves the sovereignty and security of our country. We must not lose
sight of.the fact that the citizens of the country are the living soul and spirit of. the nation, and
the very reason and justification for its existence and its preservation. Our rights, prerogatives
and privileges as Filipino citizens are the bedrock of our Constitution.
Lenicia Soldevilla

122-C. Separate Dissenting Opinion of Assoc. Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, et. al.

G.R. Nos. 221697-700 March 8, 2016 En Banc

Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro (A.J. De Castro for brevity) claimed that Mary
Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares’ (Grace Poe for brevity) representation that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen, hence, eligible to run for president, is false. Under the Constitution,
natural-born Filipino citizenship is based on blood relationship to a Filipino father or mother
following the “jus sanguinis” principle. Grace Poe, being a foundling, does not come within the
purview of the constitutionally ordained principle. Likewise, Grace Poe cannot find succor in the
provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in claiming
natural-born Filipino citizenship primarily due to the following reasons: 1.) the Philippines has
not ratified said International Conventions, 2.) they espouse a presumption of fiction of law
which is disputable and not based on the physical biological ties to a Filipino parent, 3.) said
conventions are not self-executing as the Contracting State is granted the discretion to determine
by enacting a domestic or national law the conditions and manner by which citizenship is to be
granted, and 4.) the citizenship, if acquired by virtue of such conventions will be akin to a
citizenship falling under Section 1 (4), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, recognizing
citizenship by naturalization in accordance with law by a special act of Congress. In addition,
under the said international conventions, citizenship is not automatically conferred but will entail
an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or legislative enactment, so that the nature of
citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by naturalization. Section 2 of Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution defines “natural-born citizens” to cover “those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship”. A foundling, on the other hand, is one who must first go through legal process to
obtain an official or formal declaration proclaiming him/her to be a foundling in order to be
granted certain rights reserved to Filipino citizens. This being the case, a foundling does not meet
the above-mentioned definition of the natural-born citizen who is such “from birth”. This will
somehow prevent opening the floodgates to the danger foreseen by Justice del Castillo that non-
Filipinos may misuse a favourable ruling on foundlings to the detriment of national interest and
security. Furthermore, A.J. De Castro claimed that the argument of the Solicitor General in
favour of Grace Poe in citing the ratio of children born in the Philippines of Filipino parents to
children born in the Philippines of foreign parents during specific periods is false. Statistics have
never been used to prove paternity or filiation. With more reason, it should not be used to
determine natural-born citizenship as a qualification to hold public office, which is of paramount
importance to national interest. Natural-born citizenship, as a qualification for public office, must
be an established fact in view of the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the Constitution, which
should not be subjected to uncertainty nor be based in statistical probabilities.
Krianne Solis

122-D. SET Case No. 001-15

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, petitioner v. MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, respondent.

SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

BRION, J.:

Facts:

Grace Poe was found abandoned on September 3, 1968, by a certain Edgardo Militar in front of
the Parish Church in Jaro, Iloilo. In 1974, the spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa L. Sonora
filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Rizal a petition to adopt Grace Poe
and on May 13, 1974, the MTC approved the spouses Poe’ s petition for adoption. On July 27,
1991, Grace Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a Filipino-American citizen.
July 29, 1991, Grace Poe went to live with her husband in the U.S. On October 18, 2001, Grace
Poe became an American citizen through naturalization. On May 24, 2005, Grace Poe returned
to the Philippines with the intent to resettle in the country for good. On July 10, 2006, Grace Poe
filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn Petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of the Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003. On July 7, 2006, she took her Oath of Allegiance under the Act. In its
July 18, 2006 Order, the BI approved Grace Poe’ s petitions for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and for the derivative citizenship of her children. On December 9, 2011, the U.S.
Vice Consul issued a “ Certificate of Loss of Nationality” certifying that as of October 21, 2010,
Grace Poe had lost her U.S. citizenship when she took her oath of office as MTRCB
Chairperson. On October 2, 2012, Grace Poe filed her certificate of candidacy (CoC) for Senator
in the May 13, 2013 elections.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is a natural- born Filipino because she is a foundling.

Held:

The respondent admitted her status as a foundling, thus, lifting the petitioner’ s burden of
proving his claim that she is a foundling. The Constitution requires – with no exceptions or
qualifications – that Filipino senators must be natural-born Philippine citizens. Article VII,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides a clear, absolute command, couched in the strongest
language possible, that is, through a negative phraseology – “ No person shall be a Senator
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.” The amendment of the respondent’ s birth
certificate to attest to her Philippine citizenship, however, ignores the evidentiary reality that at
the time her birth certificate was amended, NO BASIS existed to recognize the respondent as a
natural-born Philippine citizen. Other government documents only relied on the respondent’ s
birth certificates for information on her citizenship and, hence, cannot have any higher probative
value than these birth certificates.

Citizendhip under the 1935 Constitution, as a foundling, the respondent’ s parentage is unknown.
This is an undisputed point. And because the identities of the respondent’ s parents are unknown,
their citizenship cannot as well be determined. Thus, the respondent could not have acquired
Philippine citizenship through paragraph (3) of Section 1 which requires that the respondent’ s
birth father be a Philippine citizen so she herself can be a Philippine citizen. Neither could the
respondent have acquired her Philippine citizenship through her mother under paragraph (4)
since her birth mother’ s identity is also unknown.
122- E. Assoc. Justice Del Castillo- Dissenting Opinion Sombrea, Anne Pauleen
Genevieve Tersol

122-F. Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC

GR. No. 221697, GR. Nos. 221698-700

Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe Dissenting Opinion

Justice Bernabe claimed that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC’s ruling
that petitioner (Grace Poe) had made a false material representation in her 2015 Certificate of
Candidacy ( CoC) when she declared that she was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Natural-born citizens, as defined in the Constitution, are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire of perfect their citizenship.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Here, the child
follows the nationality or the citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth.
Blood relation to a Filipino parent is therefore necessary to show that one is a Filipino citizen by
birth under this principle.

In the case at bar, there was no evidence whatsoever that would show blood relation to a Filipino
parent. While the petitioner initially did not bear the burden of proving that she made false
material representation on her 2015 CoC, that burden shifted to her when she admitted her status
as a foundling.

Without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent, and without any mention in the
constitution that foundlings are considered or are presumed to be Filipino citizens by birth, the
COMELEC’s ruling that a petitioner was not a natural-born citizen cannot be taken as patently
unreasonable and grossly baseless so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
122- G. Assoc. Justice Leonen- Separate Concurring Tersol. Robespierre
Opinion
Joselito Toledo

122- H. POE VS COMELEC

Justice Jardeleza Concurring Opinion

FACTS:

The Philippine Constitution requires that a person aspiring for Presidency must be a natural-born
Filipino, citizen of the Philippines for at least Ten Years immediately preceding the election. The
question is whether the petitioner as a foundling and former resident of the United States satisfies
these requirements. First consideration is the issue if the jurisdiction raised by the parties. A
petitioner Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares contends that in the absence of any material
misrepresentation in her certificate of Candidacy, the public respondent, COMELEC had no
jurisdiction to rule on her respondent eligibility. She posits that the COMELEC can only rule on
whether she intended to deceive the electorate when she indicated that she a natural-born and
that she has been a resident for 10 years and 11 months. For the petitioner, absent such intent, all
other attacks on her citizenship and residency are premature since her qualifications can only be
challenged through the post-election remedy of a petition for quo-warranto. On the other hand,
COMELEC argues that since citizenship and residency are material representations in the COC
affecting the qualifications for the office of the President, it necessarily had to Constitution rule
on whether Poe’s statements were true.

ISSUE:

Whether or not balikbayan may establish domicile in the Philippines even prior to reacquisition
of his citizenship.

HELD:

As for Justice Jardeleza’s concurring opinion, is beyond question that issues affecting the
citizenship and residence of Poe are within the purview of Section 78 which the issue of
Citizenship by RA 9174 to RA 6768 differentiate the present case from Coquil which was
decided prior to the enactment of RA 9174. The Court concluded that a Visa-Free balikbayan
visitor could not have established domicile in the Philippines prior to a waiver of his non-
resident status. However the amendments introducing the reintegration provisions, a balikbayan
is no longer precluded from developing intent to stay permanently in the Philippines. Therefore
Poe, who entered the Philippines after the effectivity of RA 9174 had the ability to establish a
lawful domicile in the Philippines even prior to her reacquisition of Filipino Citizen.
122- I. Assoc. Justice Caguioa- Concurring Opinion Ursua, Charrie