PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS
y CORDOVA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due
to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General then submitted a comment stating that
the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of
the accused claimed that in the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs
Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is
rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In
the Castillo case, the Court said that civil liability is extinguished only when death of the
accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated
that civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the case.
There will be no civil liability if criminal liability does not exist. Further, the Court stated
“it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of
the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources
of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states
that civil liability will only survive if death came after the final judgement of the CFI of
Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support to the
ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused
while his conviction is on appeal. The Court also gave a summary on which cases
should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

Virginia Sarmiento and Apolonia Catibayan VS Court of Appeals and Simon Arguelles
GR No. 96740
March 25, 1999

Facts:

The petitioners are sisters, their parents being Tiburcio and Leogarda. The respondent is the half
brother of Leogarda, with Francisco as their common father. The petitioners filed a complaint for partition
of a piece of land. They claim that as granddaughters of Francisco, they and respondent are co-owners of
½ of the lot, as the only heirs of Francisco. But according to private respondent, petitioners are not legal
heirs of Francisco because the mother of the petitioners, Leogarda, was allegedly an illegitimate child of
Francisco and Emilia who were not married. Under the old Civil Code, Which should be applied since
Francisco died in 1949, an illegitimate child does not have successional rights. The lower court ordered the
parties herein to partition among themselves subject ½ portion of the lot. The Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the Trial Court.

Issue:

Whether or not a man and a woman who lived together as husband and wife are presumed married.

Ruling:

The fact that no marriage certificate of Francisco and Emilia was submitted as evidence does not
lead to the conclusion that the said parties were not legally married and that leogarda was their illegitimate
child. The respondent admitted that Francisco and Emilia lived and cohabitated together as husband and
wife. The presumption is that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.

In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present preponderant evidence to prove the marriage
of Francisco and Emilia. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing
the lower court’s decision.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the
place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went
to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio
Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel
ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the
back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano
paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the
hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by
tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano
was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the
Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on
November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death
Held:
A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the
time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause
of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3
or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational
mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for
failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot
be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition
or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between
such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
NICASIO BERNALDES, SR., PERPETUA BESAS DE BERNALDES and JOVITO BERNALDES, aided by NICASIO
BERNALDES, SR., as Guardian-ad-litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION, INC., defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-18193 (February 27, 1963)

FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellants, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's
passenger trucks(B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, on
the way to Tagbilaran. However, the bus fell off a deep a high cliff in barrio Balitbiton,
municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, resulting in the death of Nicasio and in serious physical
injuries to Jovito.
Hence, a complaint for damages against apellee, Bohol LandTransportation Co. was
filed. On the other hand, defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds:
(1) that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment, and (2) that it did
not state a cause of action.
Subsequently, it was established that in Criminal Case No. 2775 of the same court at
the hearing on the motion to dismiss that the driver of the bus involved in the accident, was
charged with double homicide thru reckless imprudence but was acquitted on the ground that
his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. Further, appellees, through their
attorneys, intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not reserve the right to file a
separate action for damages.
The motion on the ground of bar by prior judgment and dismissal of the the case were
sustained by the lower court. The offended party appeals.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on
breach of contract of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the
driver has been disposed of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve his right to enforce civil
liability in a separate action.

2. Whether or not the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the
prosecution of the criminal case against the driver — who was acquitted on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence — will bar him from suing the latter's employer for damages for breach of contract, in an
independent and separate action.

HELD
Yes. The Court found the appeal interposed by appellants to be meritorious as pursuant
to Article 31 of the Civil Code which provides that “ when the civil action is based uponan
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceedindependently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Thus, the Court held the following grounds for finding the appeal meritorious:
1. The civil action instituted against appellee in this case is based on alleged culpa
contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes and his
 brother Jovito to their place of destination, whereas the criminal action instituted against
appellee's driver involved exclusively the criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his
criminal negligence. In other words, appellant's action concerned the civil liability of appellee as
a common carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver who was charged in the criminal case
2. True, appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene — whether properly or
improperly we do not here decide — in the criminal action against appellee's driver, but if that
amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil indemnity, the claim could
have been only against the driver but not against appellee who was not a party therein
3. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement in its decision concerning the civil liability
of the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due to the fact that the criminal action
did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity
4. appellee's driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages against him
may be instituted for the same act or omission
 ABERCA v. VER

FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive
strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses,
employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people without
warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats
and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1) plaintiffs may
not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their official duties;
3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion
to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited
himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed out of time.
Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba
for officers accountable in the said complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in
the constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in
the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a
superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just
followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights
of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official duties”.
Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of these
constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from
claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional
rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an
individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It cannot
suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their
rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the rights
stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at hand,
the superior officers are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered indirectly
responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who directly and
indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they admitted all the
facts stated in the complaint.
 DYOGI v. YATCO et al.
G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957

FACTS
An automobile driven by one Ligayu run over and mortally injured Teresita Dyogi. The
driver was charged with information of homicide due to negligence. As a result, a civil action
for damages against the owner of the car and the driver were brought by the the husband
and children of the deceased. On the other hand, defendant argued that this civil action was
dismissed on the ground that the cause of action arose out of criminal case which was still
pending and which is not among those provided for in Art. 33 of the New Civil Code. Supreme
Court allowed the mandamus filed by petitioners.
ISSUE
Whether or not civil action was dismissed on the ground that the cause of action
arose out of criminal case which was still pending and which is not among those provided for
in Art. 33 of the New Civil Code.

HELD
No. The Court held that “the reason most often given n for this doctrine is that the
two proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rules as to the competency of
witness and the weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings always
exists. Under the article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict culpa-aquiliana."
 YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Br. 19 of the RTC of
Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents.

G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990

FACTS

Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado,
sideswiped a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. The latter was charged with the crime of recklessimprudence resulting to
slight physical injuries in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. Subsequently,
a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso,
against Yakult and Salvado in RTC Manila.

A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally
the plaintiff the sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills;
P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
As a result, defendants filed a petition for certiorari in the CA arguing that the civil
action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being
without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE
Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if
there was no reservation to file a separate civil action.
HELD

Yes. The law provides that the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action; provided
that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

The Court held that “in this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor
reserved the right to institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil
action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before
the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge
presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal
action no damages was awarded.”
 Hence, the Court maintained that although the separate civil action filed in this case was
without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before
the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal
case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the
offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.

The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering
damages twice for the same act or omission.