Was the Roman Imperial Army Small?

A Comparative Study of Ancient Imperial Military Forces

At its greatest extent the Roman Empire incorporated about 2.5 million square miles.

This made it one of the largest empires in the world in antiquity.1 To help protect this massive

empire, Emperor Augustus implemented a permanent, professional army in the late first century

BCE. Unfortunately there are no surviving records that indicate the exact strength of the Roman

army as a whole or the exact strength of the Roman imperial legion or auxiliaries. Historians

have attempted to reconstruct the military strength of imperial Rome through a mixture of

imperfect literary and material evidence, available unit statistics, and speculation. Yet the

estimates of the total size of the Roman imperial military have ranged from as little as 200,000

men to as much as 1,000,000 soldiers.2 This paper will first attempt to settle upon acceptable

army figures for the first three centuries of the Roman Empire; it then will address the judgment

of whether or not the Roman imperial army was large or small. It will accomplish this task

through a comparative analysis of the Roman imperial army with the armies of the other great

imperial powers of antiquity. Due to the time limitations of presenting this paper in a conference

forum, I am able only to discuss briefly the military capabilities of the Achaemenid Persians, the

Hellenistic empires, the Parthians, the Sassanid Persians, and the ancient dynasties of China. I

hope to demonstrate that the Roman imperial army was in fact comparatively massive.

The “Small” Roman Army?

Some scholars view the Roman imperial army as a force that was not large.3 In fact,

Susan Mattern calls the Roman imperial army small on several occasions.4 These scholars

generally maintain that the Roman army was not large enough to secure the expansive Roman
Empire. Yet such a conclusion is too simplistic and does not necessarily mean that the Roman

army was small. There are two main issues with this scholarly opinion. First, it is unclear within

what parameters these scholars compare Rome to other militaries. Are they comparing Rome to

other ancient armies or modern armies? They typically do not consider the former comparison,

and the latter comparison would be misleading. To call the Roman imperial army small because

it maintained fewer soldiers than modern European nations would be deceptive and unhelpful.5

The second issue involves an aspect of the first issue. To investigate the “bigness” or “smallness”

of the Roman imperial army, one has to compare it with the armies of other, fairly contemporary

ancient empires. To only focus on the Romans is inappropriate. One cannot simply state that the

Roman army was small without first comparing it with the armies of other ancient states. Once

one accomplishes this task, it becomes quite clear that the Roman army, although perhaps not big

enough, was in fact massive in comparison to other ancient states.6

The Size of the Roman Army from the Principate to the Dominate

Much ink has been spilt in the quest to determine the standing force of the Roman army

under the Caesars. It is not the goal of this paper to lay out the historiography of this debate. 7 Yet

it is necessary first to settle upon acceptable military figures for the Roman imperial army in

order to then address that number of soldiers in comparison to other, even more problematic,

army figures from other ancient states.

The Roman army was divided into legionaries and auxiliaries. The precise number of

soldiers in a legion is unclear, but 6,000 men is the figure most commonly recognized.8 In an

army of twenty-five legions that makes for 150,000 soldiers; twenty-eight legions would be

168,000 soldiers; and thirty-four legions would be 204,000 soldiers. At the end of the first

century CE, Tacitus records that there was an approximately equal number of auxiliaries to

2
legionaries.9 The auxiliary force under Augustus was roughly 150,000 soldiers; under Nero it

was approximately 180,000 soldiers; and under Hadrian it was about 220,000 soldiers.10 If for

the reign first century CE we add 10,000 men for the garrison at Rome and 40,000 men for the

Roman navy to the 168,000 potential legionaries and 180,000 potential auxiliaries, we get

398,000 soldiers.11 Now if we admit that these units rarely would have been at full strength due

to desertion, sickness, or death and subtract from the total number 10% in order to account for

these loses, the total would come to 358,200 soldiers.12 By using this similar formula we can

calculate an acceptable number for the second century CE as well. If we add 24,000 men for the

increased garrison at Rome and 40,000 men for the navy to the 204,000 potential legionaries and

220,000 potential auxiliaries, we get 488,000 soldiers. After subtracting 10% from that figure,

we get 439,200 soldiers.13

An attempt to establish military figures for the third and fourth centuries is even more

challenging and open to interpretation. It is possible that by 280 CE there were thirty-nine

legions in the Roman army and that by 305 CE Diocletian had added another twenty to thirty

legions to this number.14 Yet it is likely inappropriate to think that these new legions contained

the standard 6,000 soldiers. It seems more likely that these new legions numbered about 1,000

men apiece.15 It is important also to remember that the number of auxiliaries would have

increased in this period. If thirty-five 1,000 man legions were added to the original thirty-four

6,000 man legions, then the total legionary force of Diocletian’s army was around 239,000 men.

If we then add to that figure 24,000 men for the garrison at Rome, 40,000 sailors for the navy,

and a conservative number of 260,000 auxiliaries, the total comes to 563,000 men. When we

subtract 10% from this figure, we get 506,700 soldiers.16 This increase from the military

3
numbers of the Principate is not nearly as drastic as some historians have argued but generally

aligns with the speculations for total Roman army figures of most scholars.17

For this study it is unnecessary to chase phantom military figures past the early fourth

century CE. This brief analysis demonstrates that it is reasonable to set the figures for the total

Roman imperial military force at around 350,000 men for the early Principate, around 425,000

men for the late Principate, and around 500,000 men for the Dominate.18 Now it is left to

determine whether this military force was substantial or small.

The Achaemenid Empire

As difficult as it is to estimate the total military strength of the Roman Empire, it is even

more so to calculate the strength of the armies of other ancient states. The records are scarcer and

often exaggerated. Yet it is possible to get a sense of the size of imperial armies from other

ancient states. Arguments must be made with care since speculation is unavoidable. However,

for our purposes we only need to reconstruct a sense of the scope of the militaries of these states

in order to compare them with the Roman imperial army.

The Achaemenid Empire was one of the world’s first great imperial powers. The empire

reached its zenith under Darius I and stretched from the Danube to the Indus. This region yielded

massive reserves of men and material. In the eighth century BCE the Assyrian military numbered

150,000 to 200,000 men and was the largest military force in the Near East. By the fifth century

the Persian kings could raise twice this amount.19 Although there is debate over the numbers, it

is likely that Xerxes invaded Greece with 100,000 to 200,000 soldiers and 68,000 sailors.20 In

344 BCE, a Persian army of 100,000 men invaded Egypt, which was the largest military force

assembled since the invasion of Greece.21 In the civil war between Artaxerxes II and Cyrus, the

combined strength of their armies was around 100,000 to 180,000 soldiers.22

4
 If we combine the Persian forces that Alexander the Great defeated while on campaign,

we perhaps can get a sense of the maximum potential of the Persian military. The numbers

offered in our sources are again often exaggerated, and scholars do not agree on total figures.23

Alexander faced 40,000 men at the Granicus River, about 120,000 men at Issus, around the same

number at Gaugamela, and roughly another 47,000 soldiers in Iran.24 If generously we allow for

68,000 sailors and unaccounted for garrisons at 50,000 men, then the maximum strength of the

Persian army was around 405,000 soldiers. This would make it slightly larger than the army of

Augustus but smaller than the army of Severus and Diocletian. Moreover, the vast Persian army

was not a standing professional force. The vast majority of Persian soldiers were short term

levies.25 When Darius III mustered around 400,000 soldiers, he did so out of desperation. This

was not a normal Persian military force and was not sustainable permanently.

The Persian army was large, but it did not dwarf the Roman imperial army. In fact, the

Roman army is far more impressive because, although in the Principate it was comparable in

size, it was a permanent, professional force. One cannot consider the Roman imperial army small

in comparison to the military of the Achaemenid Empire.

The Macedonian Empire

Briefly, let us discuss the Hellenistic empires of Alexander and his Successors. Philip II

and Alexander wielded a more professional army than the Persians. Yet their armies could not

match the Persians in size.

Alexander’s army during the campaign in India was 121,500 men strong at its height. He

lost only 1,000 soldiers, but garrison figures are unknown. If we add Antipater’s 21,500 soldiers

to those scattered throughout the empire in garrisons, we get a potential total of 179,000

5
solders.26 This number includes Alexander’s fresh recruitment of 30,000 Persian epigonoi

(“successors”) that he had trained and equipped in the Macedonian fashion.27

The total of 179,000 soldiers is roughly the maximum possible size of the military

capabilities of Macedon under Alexander the Great.28 Perhaps if he had lived longer, he could

have implemented more Persian recruitment and incorporation into the Macedonian military.

However, he did not, and it cannot be reasonably argued that the entire Macedonian military was

any larger than 200,000 men at any point. Although much of this force was a professional

standing army, this figure makes it far smaller than the Roman imperial army. In comparison the

Roman army is anything but small.

The Seleucid and Ptolemaic Empires

After the death of Alexander in 323 BCE, his generals immediately began to fight over

his empire. They carved out Successor states and divided the potential military power of the

Macedonian army but expanded its professionalism and technical expertise.29 Many of the

Successors had sizable armies under their command. At the battle of Ipsus in 301 BCE, both

sides commanded collective armies of 80,000 men.30 Antigonus the One-Eyed alone commanded

a force of roughly 70,000 men, which was the largest of its day.31 Yet most of the Successor

armies were between 20,000 and 45,000 men.32 None of the Successors could amass or manage

the resources and manpower wielded by Alexander the Great.33

Since the professional, standing armies of the Successors relied mostly on immigrated

Greeks and Macedonians, these young men had compulsory military service.34 The

responsibilities and opportunities of military service passed from father to sons for generations.35

The overall recruitment potential from these military settlements in the Seleucid Empire was

55,550 men.36 A full levy of the empire yielded Antiochus III a force of about 70,000 soldiers in

6
the late third century BCE.37 After his decisive victory at the battle of Panium in 200 BCE, he

retained his 35,000 man professional army and sent his 35,000 reservists back home.38

Meanwhile, the Seleucid army in 166 BCE with a garrison force of 15,000 to 20,000 men was in

total 70,000 to 80,000 men strong.39 If we allow that Antiochus III had 20,000 men in garrisons,

70,000 men at Panium, and a royal navy, the maximum standing military strength of the Seleucid

Empire cannot have been higher than 150,000 men.40

The Ptolemaic Empire perhaps had a slightly larger recruitment pool because of its

greater use of mercenaries and native levies than the Seleucid Empire.41 The maximum size of

the Ptolemaic military at its height has been estimated by one historian at 240,000 men.42 This

figure appears to be highly generous and at most represents the maximum military potential of

the Ptolemaic Empire. In practice the empire never could have supported such a force.43 The

battle of Raphia in 217 BCE illustrates that the military resources of the Ptolemaic Empire were

limited. The government exhausted all avenues of recruitment to field an army of around 70,000

soldiers.44 It is probably more likely that the Ptolemaic Empire shared a similarly sized

maximum standing army to that of the Seleucid Empire. There is no argument that can be made

to describe the Roman imperial army as small in comparison with the military forces of the

Successor states.

The Parthian and Sassanian Empires

Although the Parthian Empire consisted of around 1.2 million square miles, the Parthian

army could not have been as large as those of the Successor states.45 The Parthian military relied

on a vassalage system; there was no regular army.46 Like the Achaemenid Persians before them,

the Parthian kings raised an army for a campaign but were forced to disband the force after the

campaign season.47 The Parthian king depended on the military support of his vassals and had

7
weak control over the army.48 When it was necessary, the king called on his vassals to marshal

their retainers and foreign auxiliaries. Most vassals could summon a small force of on average

125 men. In rare occasions a powerful vassal could summon around 10,000 men.49 Poor

logistical means further limited the size of the Parthian armies and their ability to sustain long

campaigns.50

A dearth of evidence makes any estimate of the total military power of the Parthian

empire highly speculative. However, we may argue safely that their military was quite modest. If

we are generous and include a Parthian garrison force comparable to that of the Seleucid Empire,

we get a total military force of around 50,000 soldiers.

With the rise of the Sassanian Empire in the 230s CE, Rome faced a more militarized

enemy than the Parthians. Shapur II commanded an army of 100,000 men against Constantius

II.51 Peroz I raised a similarly sized force from the entirety of his empire in the 470s CE.52

Chosroës II perhaps raised a force as large as 140,000 men in the 570s CE.53 However, these

were unique, empire wide assemblages of soldiers. The average Sassanian army was 30,000 to

60,000 men.54 It can be reasonably argued that the maximum military potential of the Sassanian

Empire was similar to that of the Seleucid Empire at around 150,000 soldiers. Although the

Sassanian Empire was more of a military threat to Rome than the Parthians, their military is not

comparable to that of imperial Rome.

The Ancient Imperial Dynasties of China

Although it similarly suffers from imperfect source materials and lack of evidence, it is

worth investigating the military potential of the great imperial Chinese armies. This is especially

relevant because the Han Dynasty contemporarily ruled over an empire almost exactly the same

size as that of the Romans. If we can demonstrate that the military of ancient China did not dwarf

8
the Roman imperial army in size, then we can further discard the opinion that the Roman

military was small.

It is likely that imperial China had the capability to field an army comparable in size to

the Roman imperial army. Both powers put great effort into posting several hundred thousand

men on their peripheries.55 In 9 CE, Emperor Wang Mang mobilized 300,000 men to protect the

northern border of the empire.56 The Wei dynasty in the third century CE could perhaps support

up to 400,000 men.57 The Sung Dynasty commanded 300,000 men in the eleventh century CE.58

In the twelfth century the Kin dynasty mustered 270,000 men.59

New developments, such as economic expansion and heightened diplomatic activity,

allowed the Han Dynasty to recruit much larger armies than its predecessors.60 Yet imperial

armies of the Han and proceeding dynasties rarely appear to have cracked 200,000 men.61

Moreover, these forces were based on short term conscription; they were not professional armies

like those of imperial Rome.62 Hence the imperial armies of China were more like the armies of

the Achaemenid Empire than the Roman Empire. It is reasonable to argue that the Han Dynasty

could potentially muster 400,000 – 500,000 men. Yet this occurred only in rare, extreme

instances. Further, this potential force is only equivalent to the numbers of the Roman imperial

army. Although imperial China, like Achaemenid Persia, could field armies that were roughly

equivalent to those of imperial Rome, there can be no argument that they dwarfed the Roman

army. In comparison the permanent, professional army of imperial Rome is uniquely large and

powerful. Instead of being small, the Roman army was exceptional for its size, organization, and

capabilities in the ancient world.63

9
The Army of the Roman Republic

Perhaps when scholars refer to the Roman imperial army as small, they mean that it was

small in comparison with the armies of the hyper-militarized late Roman Republic. The period of

civil war in the first century BCE saw a rapid increase in the size of the military. Until the first

century BCE, the Roman army consisted of no more than eleven legions at a time.64 Yet there

was an explosion of military buildup as a warlord culture developed around the figures of men

such as Marius, Sulla, Crassus, Pompey, Caesar, Antony, and Octavian. Antony and Octavian

had forty-three legions in their service before the battle of Philippi in 43 BCE.65 From 49 – 32

BCE, 420,000 Italians were recruited into the Roman army, a task which was accomplished only

through wide scale conscription.66 At the end of the Roman civil wars, there were sixty legions in

the field.67 On paper this would place the Roman army at 360,000 legionaries with perhaps

200,000 added auxiliaries.68 If we add to these figures 40,000 sailors for the navy, we get a total

potential force of 600,000 men. Yet it is impossible to argue that Roman armies during the civil

wars would have been at full strength. Caesar had thirty-three legions in 48 BCE; most of which

were severely undermanned.69 In fact, at Pharsalus in 48 BCE Caesar’s nine legions only

amounted to around 23,000 men, putting them at a little over half strength. Pompey’s twelve

legions came to about 50,000 men.70

It is reasonable to subtract at least 25% of the total potential strength of the standing

Roman army at the end of the bloody civil wars.71 This would put the fighting strength of the

army in 31 BCE at roughly 450,000 men, which is comparable to the size of the army under the

Severans. Yet there is a further problem with this figure. Many of these “soldiers” were quickly

recruited, six year conscripts, who had little interest in remaining in the army.72 It was only

natural that the army decreased in size after the exhaustive civil wars.

10
 Augustus lowered the total of the army to a roughly 300,000 to 350,000 man permanent,

professional force for three main reasons: he wished to eliminate special levies of troops; after 31

BCE he no longer needed sixty legions plus auxiliaries to secure the empire; and the extensive

military buildup of the late Republic was an anomaly and unsustainable in the long-term.73 To

bring sixty legions up to full strength and to maintain them permanently would have been

ruinously expensive and simply unnecessary.74 Augustus had no need for an imperial army of

800,000 men; his immediate enemies could not field an army larger than 50,000 men. Nor could

the empire support such a massive force.75 At 350,000 soldiers, the Caesars already commanded

the greatest professional army of any state in the ancient world. This force was more than large

enough to secure the empire in the first century CE and in no way can be considered small.

Thank you

1
Only the Achaemenid Empire, the Sassanid Empire, and the Rashidun, the Umayyad, and the Abbasid
Caliphates were larger.
2
See Ramsay MacMullen, “How Big was the Roman Imperial Army,” Klio 62:2 (1980): 451-2.
3
Rose Mary Sheldon calls the Roman imperial army “astonishingly small” and “not especially large.” Rose
Mary Sheldon, Rome’s Wars in Parthia (Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 2010), 201, 212. Sara Phang calls the
Roman imperial army “quite small in proportion to the empire’s breadth.” Sara Phang, “New Approaches to the
Roman Army,” in Recent Directions in the Military History of the Ancient World, ed. Lee Brice and Jennifer
Roberts (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2011), 122. Both Brian Todd Carey and Anthony Everitt view Augustus’
imperial army as not a large enough force considering the size of the Roman Empire. Everitt also argues that
Augustus reduced the army to its minimum strength to guard the empire. See Brian Todd Carey, Warfare in the
Ancient World (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2005), 122. Anthony Everitt, Augustus: The Life of Rome’s First
Emperor (New York, NY: Random House, 2006), 206, 233. None of these scholars acknowledge that the Roman
army was in fact comparatively large.
4
Susan Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
CA: University of California Press, 1999), 91, 99, 103, 122, 130, 171, 208.
5
Sara Phang attempts to do this. Phang, “New Approaches to the Roman Army,” 122. See also L.
Addington, The Patterns of War through the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990),
140-1.
6
Fergus Millar agrees that the scale of the Roman imperial army was significant. He argues that by the
third century CE there was one soldier for every one hundred civilians in the Near East. Fergus Millar, The Roman
Near East 31 BC – AD 337 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 527. Peter F. Bang argues that the
Romans fielded a significant force and could do so because of their considerable wealth. Peter F. Bang, “Predation,”
in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy, ed. Walter Scheidel (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 201.

11
 7
Although scholars continue to debate Roman army statistics, MacMullen’s brief article from 1980 helps
clarify the major points of contention. See “How Big was the Roman Imperial Army,” 451-60.
8
Ibid., 452.
9
Tac. Ann. 4.5
10
G. L. Cheesman, The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army (Chicago, IL: Ares Publishers Inc., 1975), 53,
55-6.
11
For the garrison at Rome and the navy, see Yann Le Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2000), 34-5. The strength of the Roman navy is not definitively stated in the surviving record. Like many
other aspects of reconstructing the strength of ancient militaries, the numbers are speculative. Chester G. Starr is
more conservative than Le Bohec and argues that the navy was around 30,000 men strong for the entirety of the
Principate. Chester G. Starr, The Roman Imperial Navy 31 B.C. – A.D. 324 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1941), 16, 167.
12
MacMullen also uses a 10% deduction to compensate for loses and undermanned units. “How Big was
the Roman Imperial Army,” 454.
13
For the increased garrison at Rome, see Christopher J. Fuhrmann, Policing the Roman Empire: Soldiers,
Administration, and Public Order (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), 130. I chose the auxiliary figure
from Hadrian’s reign and left the Augustan figure for the navy in order to keep the estimate more conservative.
14
For the debate over the figures of W. Seston and A. H. M. Jones on the increase in Roman legions, see
Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, 31.
15
See ibid., 31-2. For our purposes it is better to remain conservative in the estimation of total army
numbers. Hence, I shall use the 1,000 man figure for the later legions.
16
This size of a force would need almost 30,000 new recruits every year. Hugh Elton, Warfare in Roman
Europe AD 350-425 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 128. Diocletian introduced conscription in
order to help raise these new troops. Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, 17, 67.
17
A. H. M. Jones argues that Diocletian increased the army drastically and that the army at the end of the
fourth century was double that of the second century. A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire: 284-602 (Norman,
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 1035. M. Rostovtzeff put the figure at an impossible one million soldiers.
See MacMullen, “How Big was the Roman Imperial Army,” 451. Sara Phang agrees that the army increased to half
a million soldiers. However she views this increase as significant. Phang, “New Approaches to the Roman Army,”
155. For more background on the changing size of the Roman imperial army and the scholarly debate that surrounds
this issue, see W. T. Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, 284-1081 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995),
43-64. See also A. D. Lee, War in Late Antiquity (Malden, MA: 2007, Wiley-Blackwell), 74-7.
18
Walter Kaegi calculates that by the early seventh century CE the imperial army had shrunk to 130,000
men, less than 50,000 of which would have been deployable. In fact, expeditionary forces rarely were larger than
20,000 men. He also argues that the army under Justinian a century before was one third larger. There had been a
significant decline in the size of the army since the fourth century CE. Walter Kaegi, Byzantium and the Early
Islamic Conquests (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 39-41.
19
Carey, Warfare in the Ancient World, 26.
20
See Fred Eugene Ray, Land Battles in 5th Century B.C. Greece: A History and Analysis of 173
Engagements (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2009), 61, 69-70. See also F. Maurice, “The Size of the
Army of Xerxes in the Invasion of Greece 480 B.C.,” JHS, Vol. 50, Part 2 (1930): 227. This was the largest army
organized in the world up to this point. Jonathan P. Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B.C. – A. D.
235) (Boston, MA: Brill, 1999), 329.
21
Fred Eugene Ray, Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century B.C.: A History and Analysis
of 187 Engagements (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2012), 123.
22
Carey, Warfare in the Ancient World, 58.
23
For the controversy surrounding the Persian army numbers at Gaugamela, see ibid., 162 n.68.
24
See ibid., 68, 71, 76. For the Persian troops in the geographical boundaries of Iran, I followed Arrian’s
figure. Arr. 3.18.2
25
The Persians only maintained a standing army of about 10,000 professional soldiers. Paul Cartledge,
After Thermopylae: The Oath of Plataea and the End of the Graeco-Persian Wars (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 78.
26
For the calculation figures that I used in order to arrive at my total figure estimates, please see Engels,
Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, 146-152. Keep in mind that all estimates are
imperfect and at times speculative. The hope is to demonstrate Macedon’s largest possible military potential.

12
 27
For background on the epigonoi, see Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian
Empire (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002), 1037.
28
One must remember that calculations for losses due to illness or desertion and the number of native
troops employed are not possible. Even though most garrisons were temporary and some rejoined the army, I
included total garrison figures as an added portion of the total Macedonian military in an attempt to minimize any
statistical oversights for use of native troops.
29
See Glenn R. Bugh, “Hellenistic Military Developments,” in The Cambridge Companion to the
Hellenistic World, ed. Glenn R. Bugh (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 265.
30
John D. Grainger, The Syrian Wars (Boston, MA: Brill, 2010), 37.
31
Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, 92. See also M. M. Austin, “Hellenistic Kings, War, and the
Economy,” The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1986): 460.
32
Bosworth, The Legacy of Alexander, 79, 88, 89, 90, 96, 125.
33
A. B. Bosworth, “Alexander the Great and the Creation of the Hellenistic Age,” in The Cambridge
Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed. Glenn R. Bugh (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 22.
34
Grainger, The Syrian Wars, 226. Egypt experienced a rush of Greek and Macedonian immigrants after
Alexander’s conquest. These men often became military settlers. See Naphtali Lewis, Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt:
Case Studies in the Social History of the Hellenistic World (Oakville, CT: American Society of Papyrologists,
2001), 20-21, 24-6.
35
Lewis, Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt, 125.
36
Bar-Kochva, Seleucid Army, 9, 42-3.
37
Grainger, The Syrian Wars, 257. Bezalel Bar-Kochva argues that Antiochus III’s eastern expedition came
close to 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry. He believes this represents an absolute maximum effort. Bar-Kochva,
Seleucid Army, 10. This aligns with my maximum estimate of 150,000 men, including the royal navy.
38
Grainger, The Syrian Wars, 261.
39
Ibid., 314.
40
Garrison troops were directly responsible to the king, and many cities, even in heavily militarized Asia
Minor, had no royal garrison. See John Ma, Antiochus III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 114, 118-20.
41
The Ptolemaic Empire was more reliant on mercenaries and native levies than the Seleucid Empire. Bar-
Kochva, Seleucid Army, 53. The empire became increasingly dependent on native levies for its armies. Lewis,
Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt, 29-30.
42
See Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2006), 82 n.12. See also P. Lévêque, “La guerre a l’époque
hellénistique,” in Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne (Paris: Mouton & Co, 1968), 270.
43
In fact, it seems definitive that the Seleucid Empire could muster the largest army in the Hellenistic East.
See Winthrop L. Adams, “The Hellenistic Kingdoms,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, ed.
Glenn R. Bugh (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 48.
44
Grainger, The Syrian Wars, 205-6, 233.
45
George Rawlinson, The Seven Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias
Press, 2002), 19.
46
Peter Wilcox, Rome’s Enemies 3: Parthians and Sassanian Persians (London: Osprey, 1994), 6.
47
Rose Mary Sheldon describes the Parthian army as a militia. After King Artabanus defeated the Roman
Emperor Macrinus in 217 CE, he was unable to keep his men on campaign. Sheldon, Rome’s Wars in Parthia, 175.
48
Malcolm A. R. Colledge, The Parthians (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), 66, 75.
49
Rawlinson, The Seven Great Monarchies, 226.
50
Colledge, The Parthians, 66.
51
See Adrian Murdoch, The Last Pagan: Julian the Apostate and the Death of the Ancient World
(Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 2008), 156.
52
See Rawlinson, The Seven Great Monarchies, 417.
53
Ibid., 479.
54
Ibid., 596.
55
See C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study (Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University press, 1994), 84 n. 34.
56
It is important to remember that these figures are inexact and might be exaggerated. C. J. Peers, Imperial
Chinese Armies 200 BC – AD 589 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 9, 14.
57
Ibid., 21.
13
 58
Chris Peers, Imperial Chinese Armies 590 – 1260 AD (London: Osprey Publishing, 1996), 22.
59
Ibid., 40.
60
Michael Loewe, Military Operations in the Han Period (London: The China Society, 1961), v, 2.
61
See Peers, Imperial Chinese Armies 200 BC – AD 589, 8, 11, 18, 24, 39, 42. Peers, Imperial Chinese
Armies 590 – 1260 AD, 37, 43.
62
Sawyer, Ancient Chinese Warfare, 11-12.
63
Mattingly notes that the exceptional size and organization of the Roman imperial army was a major
advantage that the Romans held over their neighbors. The overwhelming scale and resources of the Roman Empire
were incomparable. Mattingly, Imperialism, Power, and Identity, 269. The Romans demonstrated unmatched
logistical organization, support, and capability. Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army at War, 5.
64
Mattingly, Imperialism, Power, and Identity, 25.
65
John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons, Warriors and
Warfare in the Ancient Civilisations of Greece and Rome, ed. Philip de Ste. Croix (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2004), 179.
66
Brian Campbell, The Roman Army 31 BC – AD 337: A Sourcebook (New York, NY: Routledge, 1996),
9.
67
Carey, Warfare in the Ancient World, 122. Everitt, Augustus, 206.
68
Auxiliary numbers for this period are completely unknown. At least at the major battles of Pharsalus and
Actium, there does not appear to have been a close to equal number of auxiliaries to legionaries.
69
Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 104-5.
70
Carey, Warfare in the Ancient World, 117.
71
This percentage accounts for men lost to desertion, disease, and death; it represents roughly the actual
state of the undermanned army.
72
Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 145.
73
For the elimination of special levies, see Campbell, The Roman Army, 20.
74
In fact, the triumvirs were settling veterans into colonies during the civil wars. They did not need nor
want every available man in service. Ibid., 210-11.
75
The maintenance of the Roman army was hugely expensive and absorbed much of the annual budget.
Bohec, The Imperial Roman Army, 212-13.

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