Undecidability: pseudo-political Derrida for Europe

AMNA RAZA ABBASI

Abstract:
Jacques Derrida one of the foremost philosophers of twentieth century not only is alive because

of being father of deconstruction but also for a lot of his proclamations that still stir controversy

and ambiguity. And one of that concept is of Decision or Undecidability; although opposites they

are correlated for Derrida. For Derrida a decision taken after much contemplation and time taken

is not a decision, but a program. A decision is what happens beyond every preprogramming. This

paper attempts to historicize Derrida’s concept of decision in his works, the ambiguity and

criticism to his emphasis on undecidability and how Derrida is still relevant while deconstruction

is long gone in the present context.

Keywords: Derrida, Deconstruction, Decision, Undecidability

Introduction

Jacques Derrida was the one of the foremost philosophers of twentieth century. His acclaim was

that he distanced himself from the philosophical paradigms that preceded him like existentialism,

phenomenology, and structuralism and created a new approach to study things called

deconstruction.

Derrida's work predominantly inherits from theories of Ferdinand de Saussure who developed a

branch of linguistics called Structuralism. Saussure asserted that thought process is highly

MPhil European Studies, University of Karachi Abbasi.r.amna@gmail.com
 Amna Raza Abbasi

indebted to language, if language was not there to assist thought it would remain an unexplained

nebula. Language after Saussure's assessment is regarded vital for human cognition, it was not a

simple tool for communication but important part for human’s building and understanding of

himself and the world around him. Affected by Saussure, different field of human sciences

especially philosophy, anthropology, history, sociology and literary criticism got towards

structuralism. Derrida's deconstruction also basis its tenets on Saussure's thought.

Deconstruction is not a negative study of things as the name suggests, but a critique that is

focused with analysis of Western metaphysical thought. The main purpose is to bring out the

binaries the western thought is fixating on like presence/absence, speech/writing etc.

Deconstruction has two dimensions literary and philosophical: one concern with critical analysis

of text while the other is related to greater philosophical strategies. In which Derrida asserted that

the western metaphysics have always created dichotomies and always tried to privilege one over

other like presence over absence, speech before writing. And the main task of deconstruction is

to subvert these dichotomies and while doing so undecidables occur like a ghost who is neither

absent nor present or on other hand absent and present at the same time.1

Derrida made sure in the beginning that deconstruction does not involve with any politics. But

this remains a fact that Deconstruction that was hailed like a cult in North American Universities

from its inception in late eighties has gone into darkness three decades past. What still remain

relevant is Derrida himself. Most of it can be contributed to his later turn towards politics. It

began with his in words of David Bates “highly influential, dramatic and audacious talk” entitled

1
Jack Reynolds, “Jacques Derrida”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/derrida/
(accessed December 29, 2018)
 Amna Raza Abbasi

Force of Law: the mystical foundations of authority.”2 Additionally William Sokloff sees Force

of Law as statement of Derrida which not only elucidated “politics” back on basic foundations

but also re-evaluated what politics is through deconstructive readings of Montaigne’s phrase

used by Pascal –‘the mystical foundations of authority.’ Derrida has also indicated that such an

investigation creates new notion of politics and justice without being authoritative or reductive. 3

His other works also followed like Spectres of Marx and Politics of friendship. These delved into

a solely political insight, but Europe as a philosophical and a political project remained Derrida’s

forte from the beginning. His master’s dissertation Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie

de Husserl (1953-54), dealt with idea of Europe. And for the next fifty years concept of Europe

remained a recurring theme in his works. And this continued till his last conversation with

newspaper Le Monde before his death in 2004. Works like Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic

Suicides, “Deconstructing Terrorism,” “A Europe of Hope,” Enlightenment: Past and to Come,

“February 15; or what binds Europeans together,” Learning to Live Finally: the Last Interview,

The Other Heading, is few of many that included Derrida’s critique on Europe. For this reason,

Rodolphe Gasché wrote off Derrida as the ‘philosopher of Europe.’4 Others like Ross Benjamin

and Heesok Chang dubbed him as “The Last European” due to his sincere reverberations on

Europe’s past, present and future. But they also mentioned that Derrida’s notions regarding

Europe are complex, at times self-contradictory and differentiated.5

One of the contradictory concepts of Derrida is that of Decision. Derrida asserted that a decision

deliberated upon with time taken is not a decision but ‘a program.’ A decision is what infers

2
David Bates. "Crisis between the Wars: Derrida and the Origins of Undecidability." Representations 90, no. 1
(2005): 1.
3
William W. Sokoloff. "Between Justice and Legality: Derrida on Decision." Political Research Quarterly 58.2 (June
2005): 342-343.
4
Rodolphe Gasché, "This Little Thing that is Europe" CR: The New Centennial Review 7, no. 2 (2007): 5
5
Heesok Chang and Ross Benjamin, "Jacques Derrida, the Last European." SubStance, 2006: 141.
 Amna Raza Abbasi

itself in a moment –as ambiguous as it might seem; Derrida’s decision on the conceptualization

of ‘Decision’ never changed.

Conceptualization of Derrida’s Decision

In The Gift of Death Derrida reminds us that although some people associate responsibility with

historicity, our long established notion of responsibility and decision is assumed to be devoid of

any genealogical or historical connection and we also like to believe that responsibility and

decision are not any religious notions. Additionally it is assumed that the act of decision-making

or responsible action cannot be developed as a skill.6

Derrida says that although we subordinate responsible decision making to knowledge, Jan

Patocka believed that any such subordination of decision making to accumulation of knowledge

actually lessens the effectiveness of responsibility. And Derrida fully subscribed to this notion7.

Assuming that you can only take a responsible decision only by having a certain skill or

knowledge then a person lacking any knowledge or skill would not be able to make a decision?

But it is not a case with decision-making.

Derrida articulates that if one says that responsible decision should be made on basis of

knowledge, science or conscience then lack of it is also an impossibility of deciding process. But

when a decision making process is supposed to follow a certain procedure it will simply become

a ‘mechanistic deployment of theorem’.8

6
Jacques Derrida. The Gift of Death. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5.
7
ibid, 24
8
ibid 24
 Amna Raza Abbasi

The archaic concept of responsibility implies that there will be a responsible action which will be

done with a clear picture in mind about what action certain decisions will take and what the

consequences will be.9 So there will be a certain theorization before decision making.

But “the activating of responsibility (decision, act, praxis)” will take place even without any

theorization. The decision should thus culminate without any prior knowledge. This is a very

vague conceptualization of decision making, and Derrida adds that it should be so.10

Another aspect of Derrida’s decision is secrecy. While evaluating Kierkegaard’s Fear and

Trembling, Derrida highlights the story of Abraham. In the story we see a double play of secrets.

There is secrecy between God and Abraham; Abraham did not know that there would be a lamb

in the end. Secondly Abraham kept secret from Eliezer, Sarah and Isaac himself. He did not

disclose what he was going to do until the very end. But by keeping the secret Abraham

infringed the basic ethical norms –sharing important details with his own people. Abraham in

this way assumes a responsibility which establishes him to become lonely and singular in the

decision making process. “Just as no one can die in my place no one can make a decision, what

we call a decision, in my place.” Derrida adds that speaking up make the one responsible lose the

singularity in decision making. Decision-making by default should be a secret singular process.11

Kierkegaard also indicated that ethical need of decision making demands us to speak out

responsibly to general public about our decision making. Spill out details of what our actions will

be, importantly if they involve others. While we have seen that Abraham safeguarded his

9
Ibid 25
10
Ibid 25-26
11
ibid 58-60
 Amna Raza Abbasi

singularity by not divulging into the details of his decision. This, for Derrida, is aporia around

decision making and responsibility.12

If Abraham was morally tempted to speak up with his own people about what he was going to

do; wouldn’t that have made him irresponsible.13 This is the complication intertwined with the

motif of responsibility. To be responsible to God, Abraham was being irresponsible to his

family.14

God would not have demanded a sacrificial offering from Abraham of his son, until and unless

Abraham’s love for Isaac wouldn’t be absolutely unique and immeasurable. According to

Kierkegaard the sacrifice would actually be a test of Abraham about his two great loves (God

and Isaac). In these circumstances the feelings of Abraham cannot be grasped through our simple

humanistic paradigms. Because it will be only in that instant in which Abraham’s feelings are in

contradiction to themselves that Abraham would have been able to give sacrifice of his son. On

the other hand in the eyes of the world Abraham should be called a murderer. Derrida italicizes

the word instant and focuses Kierkegaard’s saying that “the instant of decision is madness”.15

Derrida believed that these concepts of decision and responsibility can logically only be called a

paradox.16

Derrida also mentions that Abraham had no knowledge of what is going to happen at Mount

Moriah, but this did not halter Abraham’s decision making. He went to fulfill his act only on the

basis of faith and stood by it. His decision was in no way lead by any prior understanding or

information. This in fact is another paradox around decision making because knowledge does not

12
ibid 60-61
13
ibid 61
14
ibid 62
15
Ibid 65
16
Ibid 68
 Amna Raza Abbasi

need to be a prerequisite. So in this way we might not have a complete illustration of what a

certain decision would be and would have effects. Abraham’s decision is responsible and

irresponsible at the same time to God and ethical reasoning of men simultaneously.17

As we have seen Abraham tilts towards his responsibility for the wholly other and relegated his

responsibility towards his son the other. Derrida mentions that for Levinas there is no distinction

between other and the wholly other so the question of ethical and religious creates problem to

this notion of responsibility. The decision making process then in essence is an ordeal of

undecidabilty. For Derrida "the experience of absolute decisions made outside of knowledge or

given norms is made therefore throigh the very ordeal of undecidable."18

Derrida reuses the term 'undecidability' which was initially used to explain the structural

interdeterminancy of textual aporia. Derrida articulates that understanding of undecidability is

important for the very possibilty of justice. And it has concrete implications in the real world,

other than being a concept of aporia in literature.19

Undecidable

The notion of undecidable has never been as famous as Derrida’s others terms like differrance,

jeu, grammatologie and even deconstruction, but it has been a part of Derrida’s deconstructive

strategies from the start. Although undecidable might portray for some a loose play of meaning,

for Derrida it was not the case. It was a very structural concept; undecidability was what had to

come before any ‘deciding’ action. As deconstruction applies to a text, so to decide a meaning –

the reader has to go through a process of undecidable. Deconstruction does not encourages no-

17
Ibid 77
18
Ibid 84,5
19
Bates. "Crisis between the wars," 2.
 Amna Raza Abbasi

meaning (nihilism), it advocates choosing one meaning over several other (often opposing

meanings) that come after the process of undecidable.20

For Derrida the most important task is to evaluate or assess “certain marks” that are present

within the history of philosophy, or in literary texts which he has labeled as the undecidables.

These properties either semantic or verbal cannot be secluded in any one of the two binary

oppositions.

They form an uncertain dialectics like the case of a pharmakon –which is:

“neither remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither the inside nor the outside,

neither speech nor writing; the supplement is neither a plus nor a minus, neither an

outside nor the complement of an inside, neither accident nor essence, etc. ; nor

difference, neither consummation nor virginity, neither the veil nor the unveiling, neither

the inside nor the outside, etc. … Neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either/or . .”21

The major part of Derrida’s undecidable depends upon the translation of word pharmakon in

Plato’s Phaedrus. Pharmakon in Greek means both remedy and poison. And the translators of

Plato’s work have choosen one meaning over the other, trying to decide what in Plato remains

undecidable. And keeping in view the death of Socrates we can relate how crucial the

undecidability between poison and remedy might be.22

Derrida wished to demonstrate that the translation of pharmakon “in the most striking manner the

regular, ordered polysemy that has, through skewing, indetermination, or overdetermination, but

20
Bates. "Crisis between the Wars" 4
21
Jacques Derrida. Positions. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 42-43
22
Barbara Johnson. “Translator’s Introduction” in Dissemination by Jacques Derrida (London: The Athlone Press,
1981), xxv
 Amna Raza Abbasi

without mistranslation, permitted the rendering of the same word by "remedy," "recipe,"

"poison," "drug," "philter," etc”.

For Derrida despite the fact that it is a problem with translation of pharmakon, the problematic of

which is not only a translation from one philosophical language to other but “as we shall see, in

the tradition between Greek and Greek; a violent difficulty in the transference of a non-

philosopheme into a philosopheme. With this problem of translation we will thus be dealing with

nothing less than the problem of the very passage into philosophy.”23

Decision infers upon us, undecidabilty –a moment to choose between a poison and drug, and to

complicate it more, these two could be one thing –the pharmakon. For Derrida, decision thus

racks up to a level of absolute risk

There must be decision, there must be absolute risk and there must be the undecidable. If

there are no undecidables, there is no decision. There is simply programming, calculation.

There must be political, ethical decision, but these decisions are possible only in

situations where the decidable is a necessary dilemma, the law. Without this dilemma,

one is content to apply a program, to deploy causality. But at the moment of the

undecidable, decision is not possible, either.24

If we look it with the association of Levinas’ concept of other on which Derrida heavily depends

upon, then the absolute risk is actually the openness to the other. Because an acceptance to other

is never a co-habitation but it is a submission “to a height, to another, that is always greater and

higher, prior and in excess of the self.” Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity that with relation

to other, you are always in a state of absolute risk because other gives you freedom from

23
Jacques Derrida. Dissemination (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), 71-72
24
Jacques Derrida. Negotiations: Interventions and interviews 1971/2001. Translated and edited
by Elizabeth Rottenberg. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2002), 31
 Amna Raza Abbasi

authority of self and thus jeopardizes and lay open “all the markers of your self-identity on which

your many daylight lives depend.25”

Moreover Derrida accepts the fact that the decision is not easy, “it is not a simple, heroic and

neat enterprise.” And the real reason we find ourselves in state of defeatism is that we overlook

the intricacies Derrida was not overlooking. Nick Mansfield writes that the decision forever

becomes a site of peril, which is infested with the logic of calculation that may annihilate it and a

impending doom of undecidable, that we tend to miss every time we take a decision.26

Undecidable in other domains

Such a concept of undecidable is not a novel one and David Bates mentions that they are already

present in other disciplines. He traces the origins of undecidability in domains of Mathematics,

Biology and Politics.

Kurt Gödel a mathematician purported that any systematic basic arithmetic rule have

“undecidable propositions.” Additionally Gödel insisted that these formal systems would always

be incomplete because their consistency could never be demonstrated within the system.27

Kurt Goldstein’s clinical analysis of The Organism (1934) shows organisms’ ability to survive in

crisis situations through an undecidable route. Goldstein elaborated that a frog with one limb

being damaged will instantly start moving on other limbs or insects lacking any legs without

delay will restructure their movement for balance. Goldstein described that living organisms’

answer particular ‘crisis’ situations by showing symptoms. The symptom after a disease, injury

or crisis is not an abnormality but its natural way. In these ways organisms inherent processes

25
Nick Mansfield, “Refusing Defeatism: Derrida, Decision and Absolute Risk,” Social Semiotics 16, 3 (2006): 480-1.
26
ibid
27
Bates. "Crisis Between the Wars" 9
 Amna Raza Abbasi

change sometimes altering its basic functions. These organisms would tackle new situations with

available “shortest route” called “Wege.” These are the characteristics of organisms that can

never be determined by any perceived or already written logic.28

In the field of political science it is Carl Schmitt who wrote in detail on the concept of

undecidability. Schmitt between the two world wars wrote extensively about the questions

concerning legislative decision making, politics, etc.29

Schmitt declared that “sovereign” is he who decides on exception.30 Schmitt elaborately

described that most constitutional governments by their legal system completely rejects

sovereign power. Although there are legal formulations covering all aspects to guard a social

order; it is only in their moments of exception that sovereign power has to interfere because in a

new situation that is in an exception already defined laws do not apply and new ones have to be

created. This shows that we can never conquer the problems of human life, by writing down

legal notes.31

Decision taken in exceptional moments disrupts the legal framework already established so

Schmitt questions that in events that are undecidable, the prevailing order is disrupted or is

unable to give solutions how can the order be contained. Schmitt stressed that written laws are

merely articulations for safeguarding a social order and in reality these laws are only

“situational.” In the times of exceptions in a country, the sovereign has to take decision, such

28
Ibid 14-15
29
Ibid 18
30
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge,
Mass., 1985): 5.
31
Bates, Crisis Between the Wars, 15
 Amna Raza Abbasi

decisions are usually detached from earlier forms of laws but when as the sovereign has been

given authority from the law his decision is considered legal.32

Schmitt was articulating that the sovereign authority is basically formed through laws but this

authority make decisions outside the written law. Schmitt’s political problem revolves around

these questions: To know what the “genuine foundations” are; what the reorganization of laws

are; and what the interruptions in basic law are. But Schmitt’s decision making is not divine

interventions, it is what the mathematicians labeled as “intuition” and Canguilhem dubbed as

organismic vitality, the internal power to react in moments of mayhem.33

Schmitt enunciated the consequences leading to a political decision; a politico-legal body decides

its own origin so it shows that decision was not made with earlier ideas. It was initiating a new

political entity itself and "the decision was proleptically structured”. So likelihood of wars and

external threats is always there and undecidability haunts political foundations, their resulting

crisis and much needed decisions. Schmitt’s decision that constituted a new order was used by

Hitler and his party and it became the decision inflicting a pandemonium on politico-social basis

of world civilization. Bates theorized that what Schmitt wanted us to know is that when an order

is in chaos decisions can never be guaranteed.34

Bates asserted that it is too early to theorize what Derrida’s philosophy is worth in political

scenario. Only when his work will be seen in ahistorical linkage then the true worth of Derrida’s

work for our world will be evaluated.35

32
ibid, 18
33
ibid
34
ibid 21
35
ibid 23-24
 Amna Raza Abbasi

But a relation of Derrida’s decision to that of Carl Schmitt has actually opened a pandemonium

against Derrida and the most of criticism on Derrida falls in this aspect.

Criticism on Derrida

Alan Megill is skeptic if deconstruction can be called political.36 Ann Mc Lintock and Rob

Nixon accuse Derrida’s “Racism’s Last Word” as not radical enough.37 Nancy Fraser details in

length impasse relating deconstruction being political;38 others consider deconstruction as ethical

but unable to transcend to political.39

Russel Berman states that Deconstruction has never brought about a positive contribution and it

lacks radical vision40. William W. Sokoloff asserts that to understand Derrida we have to look

beyond the fundamental assumptions regarding politics. Pickstock said that Derrida’s work

shows “reactive compliance with political authority.41” Sokoloff adds that “given Derrida’s claim

that all authority is unable to ground itself his radical critique of the status quo, and his

orientation to the future”, Pickstocks claim is inaccurate.42

Mark Lilla has also labeled deconstruction as amoral and without an answer for socio-political

world, something which has not been able to contribute positively for political thought. He level

an accusation of Derrida being nihilistic.43

36
Allan Megill. Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1985): xii.
37
Ann McLintock, and Rob Nixon. "No Names Apart: The Separation of Word and History in Derrida’s ‘Ledernier
mot du racisme’." Critical Inquiry 13.1 (1986): 140-54.
38
Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1989): 69-92
39
Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992): 189
40
Russell A. Berman “Troping to Pretoria: The Rise and Fall of Deconstruction“ Telos 85 (1990): 6
41
Catherine Pickstock “Postmodern Theology.” Telos 110 (1998 ): 178
42
Sokoloff, "Between Justice and Legality," 342
43
Mark Lilla, The Reckless Mind: The Intellectuals in Politics, (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001): 174
 Amna Raza Abbasi

Countering that, Sokoloff asserted that Derrida is political and for that his ruminations on

concept of decision need to be evaluated more carefully. He added that Derrida’s articulations

regarding decision can help reinvent politics in the modern domain. Additionally, the claim that

deconstruction is nihilistic and do not abide by ethics, we should not overlook the fact that

deconstruction has always been about the discourse of other. It is a rejoinder to the call of other.

But responsibility towards other cannot be fulfilled without knowing what we are doing is just

and justice.

But so is the problem of justice, law can be seen in policies and conventions, in directives and

rule, in edicts or acts; but justice cannot be seen as such. Derrida emphasized this point by

mentioning that to say “this is just” or “I am just” would be unfaithfulness to justice itself (FL

237). Plato conceptualized the concept of good in similar patterns, “the good is negative. It is

beyond and superior to being in rank and power.44”

Here Derrida’s justice is nonexistent; it takes form of an aporia. Aporias shows lack of any

decisive factor, they are the times of crisis. The aporetic occurrences might seem unlikely but

they are a definite part of justice. This is to emphasize that point of decision making between just

and unjust can never be gauged through a set of rules.45

The real need of decisions comes in times of aporia, but these decisions aggravate the same crisis

situation they are needed in. Anxiety heightens in the absence of any criteria or rule for decision

making.46 It is the instant where an estimation of justice is required which is otherwise

“incalculable.”47 Derrida’s decision is closely linked with the on time estimation of justice in the

44
Sokoloff, "Between Justice and Legality," 344
45
Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority,” Cardozo Law Review (1990): 244
46
Sokoloff, “Crisis between Wars,” 344
47
Derrida, “Force of Law,” 257
 Amna Raza Abbasi

moments of decision making. This will eradicate the negative connotation that decision like that

of Derrida would not be done through reasoning.

Most importantly there has been accusation that Derrida is professing decisionism48 –an

attribute of extra-legal actions which are unbounded by any reasoning. It is the reason as

mentioned that before Derrida it was Schmitt who professed a similar politics. Although

Derrida’s decision is a problematic but it should not be associated with the policy of Carl

Schmitt’s because Derrida has already disassociated his philosophy with that of Schmitt’s in his

book Politics of Friendship.49.

Additionally Mark Lilla (who accuse Derrida of Decisionism) in his works has caved in the two

different thoughts of Derrida and Schmitt and tries to disrepute Derrida’s works. If we read

Derrida carefully he is more Kantian because he validates the authority of respect, freedom and

justice.50

Adding to that point of view Marguerite La Caze also establishes the relation between Kant and

Derrida and concludes that Derrida goes beyond Kant in his political conceptualizations and

especially of ‘decision’ with respect to ethics, friendship, forgiveness etc. towards other.51

Articulating the presence of legal order will only mean something when the law is imposed, and

the relation between general law and particular instances (in need of law) can only be established

through decision. The decision’s main motive is to mold itself to situations and try to ascertain

less violence when a particular order is deduced from general law.

48
Lilla, The Reckless Mind, 174
49
Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship (London: Verso, 1997): 83-171
50
Sokoloff, “Crisis between Wars,” 344
51
Marguerite La Caze "At the Intersection: Kant, Derrida, and the Relation between Ethics and Politics." Political
Theory 35.6 (2007): 798.
 Amna Raza Abbasi

To recreate itself, decision has to be both at the same moment: “regulated and without

regulation,” law preserving and law obliterating. True decisions are made without any support of

legal statutes, the undecidability inherent in these situations merit responsibility.52

With the initial study of this concept, it looks like that because of undecidability one would never

make a decision but when does mental tumbling stop one from decision-making, undecidability

does not lead to paralysis but it is the requisite for political activity. If we already know what to

decide, decision-making would never happen, undecidability is thus an integral part of

decision.53

Another claim is that although deconstruction enables openness to other but Derrida shies away

from politics in his actualization of decision. It can be seen in the light that Derrida wanted to

encapsulate middle grounds which neither turns violent in implementing political decisions nor

simply are metaphysical musings.54

Derrida’s decision-making comes with standards of deference of others, ability for less violence

etc. There are critics who demanded Derrida to come out with his distinct political thought like

Dominic Moran55. Sokoloff also asserted that to demand Derrida of political map to define him

as a political theorist is basically an incomplete understanding of the significance of Derrida’s

idea of Decision.56

Lilla (2001) counter argued that if cognition does not keep decision in check as Derrida has sided

with Kierkegaard’s view that instant of decision is madness, then Derrida obliterated any option

52
Sokoloff, “Crisis between Wars,” 344-345
53
ibid 345
54
Ibid 346
55
Moran, Dominic. "Decisions, Decisions: Derrida on Kierkegaard and Abraham." Telos 123 (2002): 124-130.
56
Sokoloff, “Crisis between Wars,” 346
 Amna Raza Abbasi

for responsible action. He labels Derrida’s theories as “proto-fascist.” Sokoloff says that it is

noteworthy that Derrida thought that actions based on reasoning might not always be just. And

even responsibility can be easily forsaken through simply abiding by the written laws and not

taking in consideration the human sensitivities involved in the case. The simple reason because

of which Derrida discarded the kind of decision that is created by following a strict reasoning; is

for the sake of others, because decision should be ethically bounded by deference to the

others.57”

Derrida has attempted to re-demarcate politics into a domain that will be attuned to respecting

“others,” be sensitive to relation of law and justice and be able to produce an insightful and

“vibrant liberalism.” Sokoloff stressed Derrida’s Decision as a valid proposition but he adds that

Derrida’s Decisionism is probably in conflict with the present political thought and Derrida’s

writings direct towards a new dimension that is worth attention from political scientists.58

A decision is conventionally made after thoughtful consideration of pros and cons of it. But

Derrida deconstructs such a concept and articulate a different model for Decision-making. As

mentioned earlier Derrida’s decision demand us to do something in a whim of moment instead of

preprogramming a certain decision. For Derrida every case is unique and singular and each one

demands its particular elucidation because no prior law or rule would warranty that case an

interpretation. So when decisions are needed to be made, they demand certain basis for

themselves but all bases are arbitrary because of the mystical foundation of authority. So the

founding moment of authority is a paradox it is like “a woman giving birth to her-self.59”

57
ibid
58
Ibid 341
59
Ibid 342-343
 Amna Raza Abbasi

To avoid the capriciousness of ‘founding decisions and moments’, claims are made that it is

natural law or universal truth or Almighty have intervened, this is to avoid any further

discussions. In every founding decision there is violence because there was no preexisting law.

So there is no second opinion that founding decision is or is not violent but Derrida insists that

government’s that are capable of keeping a fluid system and a possibility for change are better

than those states who praise their founding doctrines as sacred. After their establishment,

governments create laws, which have no prior basis; such laws are a form of violence.60

Governments that camouflage their actual formation in violence in essence stops any legal

possibility to be questioned.

It will be better for governments, to refute the claims that their origin and power is inconsistent.

When an authority was established on no ground it does not end in commotion but is in fact

better for those political regimes. Adding to that Derrida kept justice as forefront in all his

discussions because justice brings forth the ‘other. Although justice for Derrida is immeasurable

and impractical and law is quantifiable, Derrida insisted on a relation between these two.61

Derrida tried to highlight the violence that is present in political foundations and ask for a

deconstruction of foundations, not simply destabilizing but using this opportunity to make out a

way to pursue law in lesser violent ways.62 As Derrida has also indicated that with “radical evil,

perjury and absolute crime” comes options for responsibility, freedom and decision making63.

Deconstruction might open up possibility of political flexibility and a politics bounded by ethics.

This will result when governments will be more attuned to the possibility of violence present as

60
Ibid 343
61
Ibid
62
ibid
63
Derrida, Politics of Friendship, 1997, 219
 Amna Raza Abbasi

their origin, and also will try new ways for reducing the use of violence in its affairs. Walter

Benjamin also said that the end of any institution begins with the ignorance of the fact that

violence is present at its base.64

Democratic regimes tend to suspend a political situation and keep discussions going on for sake

of agreement between all parties. Schmitt labeled this “perpetual discussion” as “political

romanticism.” And it is also Derrida’s decision’s attribute. Miyazaki Yusuke in his article

claimed that Derrida’s articulation on Decision can be taken as the best alternative, which would

not be either apolitical undecidability or Schmitt’s political decision. Yusuke like Sokoloff

considered Derrida’s Decision as a very important and well-reasoned idea.65

Towards Ends: Political Derrida for Europe

Using Derrida’s concept of decision we can see how much applicable such notion is on Europe’s

politics and how much Europe stands for Derrida’s ideals (to become a responsible decision-

making entity).

The decision-making capability of Europe was tested at the initiation of Iraq War in 2003. On

March 19, 2003, President George Bush declared war on ‘the axis of evil’ and asked the world to

support them. Germany and France wanted to give more time to UN inspectors, if war was

avoidable and Iraq could be cleaned up with International pressure and under UN auspices it

would have been better.

64
Sokoloff, “Crisis between Wars,” 343-344
65
Miyazaki Yusuke,"Responsibility of Making Decisions without Decisionism: From Carl Schmitt to Jacques
Derrida," Glauben und Wissen in der Geistesgeschichte, (2011): 140-141
 Amna Raza Abbasi

In UNSC, on 5 February 2003, Dominique de Villepin, French foreign Minister at that time

dubbed war as acceptance that the world has failed.66 It was the same meeting where Collin

Powel the US Secretary of Defense’s unprecedented information about Iraq’a weapons of mass

destruction was also discussed.

Former German Foreign Minister Hans Dietich Genscher in an interview to Deutschlandfunk

radio in August of 2002 aired Europe’s concern in its neighbor, because what happens in Middle

East will have more effect on Europe than US.67 Jacques Derrida along with Habermas also tried

to convince the “European public sphere” to not to be run over by US’ hegemonic policies in

their public letter at the time when Europe was asked to fight with US.68

But they were only two countries, vocally against US’ invasion. Other Europeans countries

favored US on the very first instance. Soon the heads of Government from Denmark, Great

Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic and Hungary issued a public letter

pledging support for the US approach to the Iraq question warning that Europe’s and US’

relation need not turn into victim of Iraq of war.69 At that time France and Germany were not

asked to sign the public letter, while Greece was kept out deliberately. Jacques Chirac was

equally dismissive of the ‘Villainous 10’ countries and said that these countries have shown that

they are badly brought up. France and Germany were trying to counter US but other countries

quick attempt to please US was evident of the fact that they knew what they have to look up to.

66
Anton La Guardia, "Old Europe gloats as it wins the first round." Telegraph. February 15, 2003.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/1422173/Old-Europe-gloats-as-it-wins-the-first-
round.html (accessed January 12, 2012).
67
Ulrich Rippert and Peter Schwarz, “German chancellor speaks against US war vs. Iraq,” World Socialist Website,
August 12, 2001, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/aug2002/iraq-a12.shtml (accessed January 14, 2012)
68
Jacques Derrida and Jurgen Habermas, “February 15 or What Binds European Together: A Plea for a Common
Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 31, 2003.
69
John Ehrenberg, Patrice J. McSherry, and Jose R. Sanchez, The Iraq Papers, (2010): 124
 Amna Raza Abbasi

It was the time the European Unity learned a lesson that co-operation in Europe cannot be

achieved by going against US policies. Donald Rumsfeld actually showed who the boss is, by his

remarks that Germany and France was a little nuisance but others countries complied with US

without delay.70

This entire event showed a lack of that authoritative decision-making that Derrida envisioned for

Europe. Writing at that time with Jurgen Habermas, Derrida also hinted that what Europe lacked

a collective stance at that moment of decision.71 Although Derrida complimented the stance of

France and Germany of trying to stop or lest slow US down but he said that the cohesiveness of

Europe needs to be addressed. Despite any claims made the unity of Europe is not there.72

It all came to a full circle when on live BBC commenting on the Nov, 13 2015 attacks in France

Sylvie Bermann the French Ambassador said that the terrorists know that US is also involved in

fighting with Iraq and Syria alongside European countries like France but attacking US is

“difficult because it’s very far away. 73”

It is also what Derrida was saying more than a decade ago, and there were mass demonstrations

in Europe against the plans of George Bush. Europe (Germany and France) decided in very little

time that they would not go with US and wage a war in its neighbor like a decision –what

Derrida calls decision. But we all know that Europe fell back into the archaic mode of decision

70
CNN, "Rumsfeld: France, Germany are 'problems' in Iraqi conflict." January 2003, 23
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/01/22/sprj.irq.wrap/ (accessed February 2015, 05)
71
Derrida and Habermas, “February 15 or what binds us together,” 292
72
Derrida, Philosophy in time of terror, 118-119
73
Jack Doyle, "'This is our 9/11': French Ambassador says Paris attacks are 'act of war' then weeps as opera singer
performs her country's anthem." November 15, 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3319378/This-9-
11-French-Ambassador-says-Paris-attacks-act-war-weeps-opera-singer-performs-country-s-anthem.html (accessed
February 11, 2016).
 Amna Raza Abbasi

and with deliberation (programming in Derrida’s terms) decided to help US attack Iraq that led to

other countries in the region.

And at present; Donald Trump is taking his troops out of Syria and Iraq and Europe remains

there to keep receiving that backlash of its much deliberated upon decision.