LEGAL ETHICS PRELIMINARY Legal Ethics, Meaning.—It is the branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an attorney owes to the court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profes- sion and to the public (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 8 [1949]) as embodied in the Constitution, Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons of Profes- sional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral law and special laws. Legal Ethics, A Prescribed Subject.—Legal Ethics is a prescribed subject in all law schools. It provides the needed moral foundation in the study of law intended to guide the student throughout his life. It has been one of the subjects in Bar Examinations in the Philippines since 1918. Significance Of Legal Ethics. —The practice of law which covers a wide range of activities characteristic of the legal profession, including the pursuit and defense of clients’ rights and interests before the courts, will be transgressive, anarchic, riotous, lawbreaking, defiant and disobedient to courts—if there are no sets of governing Tules to limit the parameters and tame the exercise of the profession. Legal Ethics will guard against the abuses and ills of the profession such aS dishonesty, decéit, immorality, negligence, slothness, lack of diligence and the many2 LecaL Eruics forms of malpractice of the members of the Bar. On the positive side, it will raise the standard of the legal profes. sion, encourage and enhance the respect for the law, assure an effective and efficient administration of justice, assist in the keeping and maintenance of law and order in coordination with the other Departments of the Govern- ment. It also provides the basis for the weeding out of the unfit and the misfit in the legal profession for the protec- tion of the public. Original Bases Of Legal Ethics.—Legal Ethics in the Philippines is originally based and rooted in the following 1. Canons of Professional Ethics. The Canons were framed by the American Bar Association in 1908. The same were adopted in the Philippines in 1917 by the Philippine Bar when the country was still a colony of the United States. The Canons were subsequently revised. The revised Canons were adopted in the Philippines in 1946 2. Supreme Court Decisions. Many of our rules on ethics were drawn from decisions of our Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States which have relevance and bearing to the practice of law in the country. 3. Statutes. Some laws provide for sources of legal ethics like the Civil Code (Art. 1491 [5], Art. 2208), the Revised Penal Code (Art. 209) and many special laws. 4. Constitution. The Constitution bestowed on the Supreme Court the prerogative to promulgate rules on the admission to the Bar, the integration of the bar! and legal sistance to the underprivileged 5 [5h 1987 Constitution), “pened (Art VIL Section 5 | 5. | Treatises and Publications, Works on the subject of well-known autho1 5 as standards anthers have been used and cited by courts Practice of aw. uReS On the right conduct in the the nent Basis Of Philippine Legal Ethics —T0d2’: oe main basis of our legal ethics is the Code of Profes” ‘The “¢ Provisions were based on the 1973 ConstitutionPRELIMINARY 3 sional Responsibility. It is the embodiment into one Code of the various pertinent and subsisting rules, guidelines and standards on the rule of conduct of lawyers sourced from the Constitution, Rules of Court, Canons of Profes- sional Ethics, statutes, special laws, treatises and deci- sions which must be observed by all members of the Bar in the exercise of their profession whether in or out of court as well as in their public and private lives. The Code of Professional Responsibility was initially drafted in 1980 by the IBP Committee On Responsibility, Disciplinesand Disbarment and was submitted to the Supreme Court for approval. It took the Supreme Court more than seven years to decide on its formal promulgation as a code of ‘conduct for members of the Bar. The Code of Professional Responsibility was finally promulgated by the Supreme Court on June 21, 1988. The Code is a judicial command, not a suggestion, promul- gated as it is by no less than the Highest Court of the land which has supremacy of supervision over all members of the Bar. Importance Of The New Code.—The Code has pro- vided the legal profession an impression of identity and sense of independence attuned to the local traditions, practices and customs in the country. This sense of iden- tity and independence ‘has given the Filipino lawyer the feeling of pride and emancipation from foreign Canons. There seems to be nothing more which is not covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility compared to the American Canons of Professional Ethics which have for Many years (starting in 1917) nurtured the code of ethics for the Filipino lawyers. As the years go onward, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Supreme Court may find reasons and time to improve the Code of Professional Responsibility to better enhance and strengthen the ethics of the legal Profession.e LecaL Emmics Definitions Of Terms Commonly Used In Legal Ethics to the whole body of at. Bar and Bench. Bar refers torneys and counsellors; collectively, the members of the legal profession; they are figuratively called the “bar” to distinguish them from the “bench,” which terms denote the whole body of judges (See Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 148) Bar refers to the “collectivity of persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys (Garcia vs. De Vera, 418 SCRA 27) In the Philippines, it is kown as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines where membership is mandatory. Bar Admission. Act by which one is licensed to prac- tice before courts of a particular state or jurisdiction after Satisfying certain requirements such as bar examinations, Period of residency or admission on grounds of reciprocity ears as member of bar of another jurisdic- tion (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Editior n, p. 149), ____ Lawyer. This is the general term for a person trained in the law and authorized to advise or represent others in legal matters, A lawyer is a person licensed to pra : ctice law (Black's ‘aw Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. agg) Practice law ( in aoe Lawyer. A lawyer who Personally handles cases » administrative agencies or boards which means engaging in actual trial work either { for the defense of ° r the prosecution or f cases of clients, Practisi, law. “Practice Sia Sr One engaged in the practice of the means any activity, in or out of court Knowledge, treint i application of jaw, legal procedure. Practice of law ig to ind experience, ‘To engage in the teristics of the rofe Perform those acts which are charac” Bive notice or faa ae Generally, to practice law is t? Service requires the wee ein of service, which device OF oF skal” (Cayetano vs. Monsod, 204 a ‘egal knowledge . 10).PRELIMINARY 5 (Note: All trial lawyers are practising lawyers, but not all practising lawyers are trial lawyers) Client. One who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice or for purposes of prosecuting or defending a suit in his behalf and usually for a fee. Attorneys-at-Law. That class of persons who are by license, officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence (Cui vs. Cui, 120 Phil. 729). An attorney-at-law is a person admitted to practice law in his respective state and authorized to perform both civil and criminal legal functions for clients, including drafting of legal documents, giving of legal advice, and representing such before courts, administrative agencies, boards, etc. (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 128). (Note: Attorney-at-law is synonymous with counsel- lor-at-law, lawyer, attorney, counsel, “abogado” and “bo- ceros”). Alawi vs. Alauya 268 SCRA 639 Facts: Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. A complaint was filed against him by Sophia Alawi with the Supreme Court seeking his dismissal from the service. Alawi's complaint is anchored on Alauya’s “malicious and libelous charges” resulting in undue injury to her honor and reputation, contained in letters sent to E.B. Villarosa and Company and Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. In his letter to the Asst. Clerk of Court, Atty. Marasigan, Alauya signed his name with the prefix “Atty.” Issue: As an officer of the Shari'a court, is Alauya entitled to use the title “Attorney”? Held: As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “At- torney,” this Court had already the occasion to dec-LecaL ETHICS lare that persons who pass the Shari'a Barare not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional ca- pacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “at- torney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdic- tion. ‘Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, “counsellor” or “counsellor-at-law,” because in his re- gion, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legisla- tors. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of “counsellor” does not warrant his use of the title of attorney. In re: Garcia 2 SCRA 985 Facts: A Filipino citizen who had finished the law course in Spain and thereafter allowed to practice the profession in said country, filed a petition to prac- tice law in the Philippines without passing the re- quired bar examinations provided for in Section 1 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Can Arturo E. Garcia be admitted to practice law in the Philippines without passing the ar? Held: After due considerations, the Court re- solved to deny the petition on the following grounds: (1) The provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof:PRELIMINARY, “The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recogni- tion of the validity of their academic de- grees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their professions within the territory of the Other, xxx.” (Italics supplied). from which it could clearly be discerned that said ‘Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desir- ing to practice their profession in Spain, and the citi- zens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Span- ish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. (2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides: “The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by compe- tent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. x x x” It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made ex- pressly subject to the laws and regulations of the con- tracting State in whose territory it is desired to exer- cise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before any- one can practice the legal profession in the Philip- pines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and (3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded bet- ween the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the8 Lecat Ernics practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. xxx (See: Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987 Phil. Constitution for the present provision). Attorney-in-Fact. An attorney-in-fact is simply an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing him, though he may do things not mentioned in his appointment necessary to the performance of the duties specifically required of him by the power of attorney appointing him, such authority being necessarily implied (Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, p. 66). His authority is Provided in a special power of attorney or general power of attorney or letter of attorney. An attorney-in-fact is not necessarily a lawyer. A counsel de oficio need not be a lawyer. In localities where members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of t! repute for probity and ability, to di 7, Rule 116, Rules of Court [1985)) » a counsel de oficio is a lawyer or attorney appointed ae 7 cut to represent a Party, usually an indigent =a * i7.@ criminal case (People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA Attorney Ad Hoc. 4 Person named and appointed by id an absentee defendant in the suit in ment is made (Bi “5 & Co., 83 La Aaa Soa vs. Factor’s court to defen: which the appoint Traders InsurancePRELIMINARY 9 as his agent upon whom service of papers may be made (Reynolds vs. Reynolds, 21 Cal. 2d 580, 134 P.2d 251, 254) An attorney of record is one who has filed a notice of appearance (e.g., through a praecipe) and who hence is formally mentioned in court records as the official attorney of the party. Once an attorney becomes an attorney of record, he often cannot withdraw from the case without court permission (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 129). De Leon vs. Court of Appeals 383 SCRA 216 Held: When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law (De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 216). Of Counsel. To distinguish them from attorneys of record, associate attorneys are referred to as “of counsel” (6 Am. Jur. 264). Lead Counsel. The counsel on either side of a liti- ated action who is charged with the principal manage- ment and direction of party's case, as distinguished from his juniors or subordinates, is said to “lead in the cause,” and is termed the “leading counsel” on the side. It may also refer to the chief or primary attorney in class action or multi-district litigation (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 888) House Counsel. Lawyer who acts as attorney for business though carried as an employee of that business and not as an independent lawyer. Generally, such lawyer advises business on day to day matters. Larger businesses have legal departments with attorneys assigned to special- ized areas of law affecting particular business; e.g.. labor law, taxes, personal injury litigation, corporate law. etc. (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 740)10 Lecat ETHICS Amicus Curiae. Literally, it means, a friend of the court. A person with strong interest in or views on the subject matter of an action, but not a party to the action, may petition the court for permission to file a brief, osten- sibly on behalf of a party but actually to suggest a ration- ale consistent with its own views. Such amicus curiae briefs are commonly filed in appeals concerning matters of a broad public interest; e.g., civil rights cases (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 82). Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the dis- position of issues submitted to it (Sec. 36, Rule 138, RRC as amended by Resolution of the Supreme Court, dated May 20, 1968). Amicus Curiae Par Excellence. Bar associations who appear in court as amici curiae or friends of the court are referred as amicus curiae Par excellence. An amicus curiae has no control over the suit and has no right to institute any Proceedings therein; the amicus curiae cannot assume functions of a party in an action or pro- ceedings pending before the court. Ordinarily, the amicus Curiae cannot file a pleading in a case. e “ Pi an amicus curiae acts merely as a consultant a a ie ry Court in a doubtful question or issue pending © amicus curiae serves without compensation. Bar As: eae sociation. An association of members of the ession like the Integrated B, i ‘ar of ines where membership is integrated or mies a Phitipne, ie aa voluntary bar associations in the Pine Lawyers Ase ippine Bar Association, The Philip- the Philippines, Vanguang ws tial Lawyers Association of ssocieud Of the Philippine Constitution." ia Bar , Philippines Association, Catholic Lawyers’ Guild of the Society of International Law. Philippine “The VPC 's Presently headeq by the autho: r.PRELIMINARY ll WILOCI, WLAP, FIDA, ASEAN (Philippines) and many others. Commission On Bar Discipline (CBD).—This is the National Grievance Investigators Office referred to in Section 2, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. During the presidency of Dr. Leon Garcia as National president of the IBP, upon suggestion of Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda, this Grievance Office was named Commission on Bar Discipline and those appointed in that body were called Commissioners. The CBD is the investigating arm of the Supreme Court on administrative matters involving disbarment cases against lawyers. Its recommendation is subject to review by the IBP Board of Governors. If the resolution of the latter is one of suspension or disbarment, it is auto- matically elevated to the Supreme Court for final disposi- tion. Nature Of Proceedings In The CBD.—While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceed- ings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Supreme Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character (Sambajon vs. Suing, 503 SCRA 1). Other Relevant Terms And Definitions Advocate. The general and popular name for a law- yer who pleads on behalf of someone else (Philippine Legal Eneyetopacia, p, 2i). Cae whe ta lencced in the law wad duly admitted to practice law (17 C.J.S. 102). . An advocate is one who Pleads the cause of another fore a tribunal or judicial court; a counsellor (Villegas Vs. Legaspi, 113 SCRA 45). _ Barrister. (England). A Person entitled to practice law yn advocate or counsel in superior courts (17 CJ-S. 102, 103). In England, an advocate; a counsellor learned 'e law who has been admitted to plead at the bar, ant12 LeGaL Etuics who is engaged in conducting the trial or argument of causes. A person called to the bar by the benchers of Inns of Court, giving exclusive right of audience in the Supreme Court (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 151). Solicitor. (England). A person prosecuting or defend- ing suits in Courts of Chancery (17 C.J.S. 102). And a Court of Chancery is a court which administers equity and proceeding according to the forms and principles of equity (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 356). Solicitor. (Philippines). A government lawyer at- tached with the Office of the Solicitor General. Proctor. (England). Formerly, an attorney in the ad- miralty and ecclesiastical courts whose duties and busi- ness correspond exactly to those of an attorney-at-law or solicitor in Chancery (Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edi- tion, p. 1207) Titulo de Abogado. It means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word “titulo” is defined as “testimonio o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion” (Diccionario de la Lengua Espanola, Real Academia Espanola, 1974 ed., p. 1224) and the word “abogado,” as follows: “Perito en el derecho positivo que s¢ dedica a defender en juicio, por es escrito o de palabra, los derechos 0 intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones 0 puntos legales que se le consultan.” (Id., p. 5). A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic re quirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of ‘abogado’ is lawyer OF attomey-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signifi cation, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appe@ Prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties: responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law a8 4 consequence (Cui vs. Cui, 11 SCRA 759).PRELIMINARY 13 Integration Of The Bar.—The integration of the Phil- ippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population, and this requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members—they are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility. (Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., Re- questing Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, 458 SCRA 209). Integrated Bar Of The Philippines.—Integrated Bar of the Philippines is the national organization of lawyers created on January 16, 1973 under Rule 139-A, Rules of Court, and constituted on May 4, 1973 into a body corpo- Tate by Presidential Decree No. 181. General Objectives Of The IBP.—The general objec- tives and purposes of the IBP are the following: 1. To elevate the standards of the legal profession: 2. To improve the administration of justice; 3. To enable the Bar to discharge its public respon” sibility more effectively; 4. To assist in the administration of justice: 5. To foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence, Public service and conduct; f its of its 6. To safeguard the professional interests members;14 Leca Erxics 7. To cultivate among its members a spirit of cor- diality and brotherhood; 8. To provide a forum for the discussion of law, ju- risprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the relation of the Bar to the Bench and to the public and publish information relating thereto; 9. To encourage and foster legal education; 10. And to promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon. (Per Curiam Reso- lution of the Supreme Court, January 9, 1973) Membership In The IBP Chapter.—A lawyer does not automatically become a member of the IBP chapter where he resides or works after becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar. He has the discretio} mn. to choose the IBP Chapter he wants to join (See: Garcia vs. De Vera, 418 SCRA 27) Without paying IBP dues, a lawyer cannot engage in Practice of law, no matter how limited is his practice (Santos, Jr. vs, Llamas, 322 SCRA 529). The exemption from Payment of income tax granted to senior citizens by y Republic Act No. 7432 does not in- clude payment of membership or association dues of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (id.). Similarly, as regards dues, they are not entitled to twenty percent (20%) discount. There Is No Retirement In The IBP.—There is n0 Such thing as retirement in the IBP as understood in labor law. A lawyer, however, may terminate his bar member ship after filing the Tequired verified notice of termination with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar (In re: Atty. Jose Principe, Bar Matter No. 543, September 20, 1990). IBP Is A Non. Political Bar.—The Int shall be strictly non-political, and integrated Bar ee every activity tending t? impair this basic feature is Strictly prohibited and shall be Penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective:PRELIMINARY 15 judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Gov- ernment or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any judi- cial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Govern- ment or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof (Rule 139-A, Section 13). When Constituted As A Body Corporate.—The IBP was constituted as a body corporate on May 4, 1973 under PD. 181. Positions In IBP Are Honorary. —Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local officer or committee member shall receive any compensation, allow- ance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein or be entitled to reim- bursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions (Rule 139-A, Section 14). Voluntary Bar Associations—All voluntary Bar as- Sociations now existing or which may hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith (Rule 139-A, Section 17). Effectivity Of Rule 189-A.—Rule 139-A, which is the Rule on the Integration of the Bar became effective on January 16, 1973, The first election of IBP Chapter officers Was held on February 17, 1973. On March 17, 1973, the House of Delegates (composed of IBP Chapter Presidents and some other designated Delegates) elected the Board of Governors, which in turn elected the National Officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Membership Is Mandatory. —Membership in the Na- tional IBP is mandatory. It is not a violative of a lawyer's16 LecaL Enics ate (In re: Edillon, 101 SCRA 612). Law- freedom to associ: er he wants to join. yer may choose however the Chapt ‘The IBP Is The Investigating Arm Of The Supreme Court In The Investigation Of Disbarment Cases — Under Rule 139-B, the IBP is given the power to entertain cases of disbarment filed before it, or cases filed before the Supreme Court and referred to it for investigation, report, and recommendation. It does not, however, have the power to suspend or disbar. Its recommendations are subject to appeal to the Supreme Court which alone has the preroga- tive to disbar. [The disciplinary powers of the IBP are treated in the Chapter on Disbarment]. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW Power To Admit To Practice, Vested In The Su- preme Court.—The power of admission to the practice of law is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. The 1987 Constitution’ explicitly so provides: “SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: (1) xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, Practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the Speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish. in fe e ae Substantive rights. Rules of proce- een pee and quasi-judicial bodies shall Court." (art, Vin wue8® disapproved by the Supreme * VIIL See. 5 (5), 1987 Constitution) * Unlike the 193 stitution did not provi or supplement the Ru 5 and 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Com ide power to the Legislature to repeal, alte? r pi “S Promulgated by the Supreme CourtApmission To Practice Law 17 ‘The constitutional power to admit candidates to the legal profession is a judicial function and involves the exercise of discretion. Petition to that end is filed with the Supreme Court, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action (In re: Cunanan, 94 Phil, 534; In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; In re: Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245). ‘The Supreme Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee in the exercise of its judicial function to admit candidates to the legal profession. Thus, “In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other. is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Com- mittee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final ap- proval of the Court.” (In re: Lanuevo, 66 SCRA 245). Basic Requirements For All Applicants For Admis- sion To The Bar — “Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar—Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Phil- ippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfac- tory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philip- Pines.” (Section 2, Rule 138, RRC) —It ordi- Academic Requirements For Candidates s of study narily takes a candidate a period of eight (8) Ye"18 LecaL EtHics after graduation from high school to finish Law, and take the Bar Examinations. Before he is allowed to enroll in the College of Law, he must have already earned a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences which ordinarily takes four years to finish. This is what is referred to as Pre-Law Course. The Law course itself is ordinarily finished in another four years of study with completed courses on civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics (See Rule 138, Sections 5 and 6, RRC). No Particular Law School Has A Monopoly Of Knowledge Of The Law. — Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane vs. Judge Medel Belen AM. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008 Held: An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hur- dling the Bar Examinations which this Court admin. isters, taking of the lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be compe- tent to discharge his functions and d n luties as, inter alia, an officer of the cou the sine qua non by moral character 11 py, c14° with the possession of good d mo: that with regard to the hold and continue tq or2! character, the candidate must to possess it e ven aft been al Profession, after he hasApission To Practice Law 19 After passing the Bar Examinations, the candidate shall take his lawyer's oath before the Supreme Court (Rule 138, Section 17, RRC) followed later by his signing of the Roll of Attorneys—in which Roll he is assigned a per- manent number. Thereafter, he is issued a certificate of membership by the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. From this point in time, he is deemed authorized to prac- tice law in the Philippines (Rule 132, Section 18, RRC). Disqualification To Take The Bar Examinations.— In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations 431 SCRA 146° Held: The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also es- sential for remaining in the practice of law. By concealing the existence of such pending cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be umwar- ranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant. While Practice Of Law Is A Privilege, It Has Also The Nature Of A Right.—The practice of law is not a pro- Perty right but a mere privilege (In re: Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291) and as such must bow to the inherent regula. tory power of the Court to exact compliance with the ee public responsibilities™* (In re: Edillon, 84 SCRA Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer (Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, : See also: In re: Ramon Galang, 66 SCRA 282 Cecilio 5 w80: In Te: Del Rosario, 52 Phil, 399; Letter of Atty. IBP Due, Arevalo. Jr. Requesting Exemption from Payment ues, 458 SCRA 209,20 LacaL Eriics Inc., 399 SCRA 601; Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio, 486 SCRA 24; Uy vs. Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422). It is not also a natural or constitutional right. In The Matter Of The Petition For Authority To Continue Use Of Firm Name Ozaeta, Romulo, Etc.‘ 92 SCRA 1 Held: A partnership for the practice of law can- not be likened to partnerships formed by other pro- fessionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. “A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal en- tity. It is a mere relationship or association for a par- ticular purpose. x x x It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on a trade or business or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.” xxx “The right to practice law is not a natural or con: stitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or JSranchise. It is limited to persons of good moral char- acter with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its Possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly per sonal and partaking of the nature of a public trust. While it is unquestionable that the practice of law is 2 privilege, it is also in the nature of a right because the lawyer cannot be prevented from practising law except for valid reasons as the practice of law is not a matter of State’s grace or favor (Ex Parte Garland, 18 L. ed. 366: Wilner vs. Committee On Character and Fitness, 10 L. ed: 2d 224), * See also: Bongalonta vs. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310.Apmission To Practice Law 21 An instance of a valid reason where a lawyer may bt prevented from appearing in court is the provision of the Constitution prohibiting Senators or Representatives from appearing before courts and Electoral Tribunals. Thus, in Marcos and Concordia vs. Chief of Staff, AFP (89 Phil. 246), lawyers Ferdinand Marcos and Manuel Concordia were disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in the General Court-Martials. ‘The Supreme Court held: “A constitutional provision extending to the ac- cused the right to be represented by counsel in any trial court whatever. applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the undeniable right to defend by counsel, and a court-martial has no power to refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is prop- erly licensed to practice in the courts of the country. (89 Phil. 246). In another case, it was held that the Director of the Philippine Patent Office cannot restrict lawyers from ap- pearing before the said Office by requiring them to pass first an examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice in the said Office. Any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quast he Philippines (Philippine judicial or administrative, in Lawyers’ Association vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173) without need of passing another examination. ‘The ruling applies to all quasi-judicial bodies. Lawyers cannot also be prevented from seeing their clients under detention. Lawyers cannot also be deprived of their license to practice law without due process. In a sense, the privilege to practice law is also a right by oa " But just like any other rights, it is subject to limitations. of Who Are Entitled To Practice Law? ne 7 Court explicitly states who are entitled to prac’ the Philippines.22 LecaL ETHICS “SECTION 1. Who may practice law.—Any per- son heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.” (Rule 138, Sec. 1, RRC). Practice Of Law, Concept.—Generally, to engage in the practice is to do any of those acts which are character- istic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA vs. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; J.K. Mercado, etc. vs. De Vera, 371 SCRA 251). Strictly speaking, the word practice of law implies the customary or habitual holding of oneself to the public as a lawyer and demanding compensation for his legal services (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; OCA vs. Ladega, 350 SCRA 331; Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc., 399 SCRA 601; Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 342). Latest Ruling On The Meaning Of Practice Of Law.—The Supreme Court’ has recently laid down the definition of practice of law in the Philippines, following the modern concept. Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 Facts: On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. * The decision penned bi ae y Justice Edgardo Paras was © ies by Justices Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera. eliciano. Justices Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and Padilla dissent Justices Sarmiento, Regalado and Davide, Jr. did not take pat7 OoVe 1e Apission To Practice Law Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s nomi- nation, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appoint. ment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Phil- ippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philip- pines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo). After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief execu tive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of @ business conglomerate, and since 1986, has ren- dered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As for- mer Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAM- FREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal ca- pacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobby- ing for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrar- ian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as 4 member of the Davide Commission, a quasi:judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and 2324 Lacan Ernics as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986. 1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountabil- ity of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Munoz: Palma for ‘innumerable amendments to reconcile gov- ernment functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.’ (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Italics sup- plied). xxx Held; Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law. le- gl procedure, knowledge, training and experience. ‘0 engage in the practice of law is to perform those ‘acts which are characteristics of the profession. Gen- erally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” (111 ALR 23). xxx Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term “practice of law,” particularly the modem concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-man- ager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer- negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.“ Dissenting Opinions In Monsod Case. Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. dissented as follows “Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod; ! cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practice law is stretching the term beyond rational limits See also: J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Ent’ prises, Inc. vs. de Vera, 371 SCRA 251Apmission To Practice Law 25 “A person may have passed the bar examina- tions. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.” 3K KKK “The Constitution uses the phrase ‘engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.’ The delibe- rate choice of words shows that the practice envi- sioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or ex- temporaneous. To be ‘engaged’ in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something Which is the result of one’s decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise: one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla who also dissented said— “What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, ‘practice refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habit- ual, repeated or customary action. To ‘practice’ law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitu- ally, repeatedly or customarily. Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the ‘practice of medicine.’ A certifled public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal De- partment of a corporation or a governmental agency. cannot be said to be in the practice of law. cay _ustice Isagant A. Cruz, another dissenter has this to26 Lecat Eruics “Coming now to the qualifications of the Private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase ‘practice of law’ as to render the qualification practically tooth- less. From the numerous activities accepted as em- braced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be en- gaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peri pherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely ‘to become involved in litigation.” The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another busi- ness and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every com- Pany organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modem society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the defini- tion, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a busi- ness concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehi- cle as his main source of livelihood. he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and Tegulations of the Energy Regulatory Board The ponencia quotes an American decision de- fining the practice of law as the ‘performance of any acts . . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law,’ which tells us absolutely noth- ing. The decision goes on to say that ‘because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commer- cial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.’ADMISSION To PRacTICE Law 27 The effect of the definition given in the Ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) con- w, ordinance, or regulation. The The author who has been in the active practice of law for more than three decades, fully agrees with the dissent- ing opinions, for truly, for one to be a Practising lawyer or to engage in the Practice of law, he must be in actual, active and habitual exercise of his legal knowledge or skill Specially in court appearances and pleadings and this is done generally for compensation. The decision of the Su; preme Court in People vs. Vil- lanueva (14 SCRA 109, 196: 5) must be maintained— “x x x Practice is more than an isolated appear- ance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, 4 Succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cortner, 127, P. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law ‘o fall within the prohibition of statute has been in- terpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding Payment for such services," General Coverage Of Practice Of Law. tice of his Profession, a licensed attorney af engages in three Principal types of profes: legal adv —In the prac- it law generally sional activity: ice and instructions to clients to inform them Tights and obligations\\preparation for clients of nts requiring knowledge of legal principles not Possessed by ordinary laymanCdnd appearance for clients ina Public tribunals which Pp 0 det OSsess power and authority Srmine rights of life, liberty, and property according of their “ See also: Tite Giiniins on tn Jah Od OLay eee 28 Laca. Ernics to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. (Ulep vs. Legal Clinic Inc., 223 SCRA 378). Basic Characteristics Of The Practice Of Law— Practice of law is not a matter of right but merely a privi- lege bestowed upon individuals who are not only leaned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character (Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473). Practice of Jaw is not a money-making venture (Canlas vs. CA, 164 SCRA 160). Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from gov ernment interference, is impressed with public interests, for which it is subject to State regulation (Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 377) Practice of law cannot be assigned or inherited, but must be earned by hard study and good conduct (In re Clifton, 155, Am. 324). It is not a right de jure (In re: Elis. 203, p. 957). Practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions (Adez Realty vs. CA, 251 SCRA 201) Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer (Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap. Inc., 399 SCRA 601; Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio, 486 SCRA 24; Uy vs. Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422). It is reserved only to those who are academically trained in law and possessed of good moral character not only at the time of his admission to the Bar but even mort So, thereafter, to remain in the practice of law (See People vs, Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692; Melendrez vs, Decena, 176 SCRA 662; In Re: AIC. Argosino, 246 SCRA 14) The practice of law is a Profession and not a business a is an essential part in the administration of justice: * fes ssion in pursuit of which sit: u Pecuniary reward is com! ered as merely incidental; it is a a of learned art‘ApMission To Practice Law 29 the interest of public service (See Koscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5). Non-Lawyers Who Are Authorized To Appear In Court. —The general rule is that only those who are li- censed to practice law can appear and handle cases in court. There are however exceptions, to wit: 1. In cases before the Municipal Trial Courts, a party may conduct his own case or litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose (Rule 138, Section 34, RRC; Laput vs. Ber- nabe, 55 Phil. 621; Cantimbuhan vs. Cruz, Jr., 126 SCRA 190) 2. Before any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally. But, if he gets someone to aid him, that someone must be an authorized member of the bar (Rule 138, ibid). He is bound by the same rules in con- ducting the trial of his case. He cannot, after judgment, claim he was not properly represented by counsel (see People vs. Sim Ben, 98 Phil. 138; See also: People vs. Larrafiaga, 421 SCRA 530; Cruz vs. Cabrera, 441 SCRA 211) Cruz vs. Mina 522 SCRA 387 Held: The basic question is whether the peti- tioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law stu- dent, from entering his appearance in behalf of his fa- ther, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accred- ited by the law school. Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, Provides:30 Lecat Erxics “RULE 138-a LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE “Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice —A Jaw student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curricu- lum and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clini- cal legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school. Sec. 2. Appearance.—The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs. memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic However, in Resolution dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: ‘The rule, however, is different if the law stu- dent appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In in- ferior courts, a law student may appear in his per sonal capacity without the supervision of a law yer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides: Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted—I0 the court of justice of the peace, a party may Col” duct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or Wi the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of a? attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney. and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly a thorized member of the bar.Apmission To Practice Law 31 Thu: law student may appear before an in- ferior court as an agent or friend of a party with- out the supervision of a member of the bar. XXX There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A, In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of @ party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the lat- ter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may ap- pear before the courts. Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts @ quo in denying permission to act as private prose- cutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's ap- pearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the Supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.” 3. In a criminal case before a municipal trial court in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is Not available, the judge May appoint a non-lawyer who is a resident in the province, of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense (Rule 116, Sec. 7. RRC). If there are available members of the bar, the judge Cannot appoint a non-lawyer as defense counsel for the accused (Paar vs. Borromeo, 79 Phil. 344). 4. A senior law student who is enrolled in a recog- nized law school’s clinical education program approved by the Supreme Court may appear before any court without Compensation, to represent indigent clients accepted by32 LacaL Ernics the Legal Clinic of the law school. The student shall be under the direct supervision and control of an IBP member duly accredited by the law school (Rule 138-A, Sec. 1 RRC). 5. Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the National Labor Relations Commission or any Labor Arbiter, if (1) they represent themselves, or if (2) they represent their organization or members thereof with written authorization of the latter, or (3) they are duly accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by the latter (Art. 222, P.D 442, as amended; Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co Inc. vs. NLRC, 279 SCRA 337). 6. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can repre- sent a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Act No. 2259, Section 9). 7. Any person appointed to appear for the Govern: ment of the Philippines in accordance with law (Rule 138. Sec. 33, RRC). 8. A non-lawyer may represent a party before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DA- RAB). Those mentioned above are allowed to appear only it certain cases. They do not practice law. All members of the Bar may practice law. A nom lawyer who practices law will be guilty of illegal practice Jaw (Zeta vs. Malinao, Adm. Case No. P-220, Dec. 20, 1978) Punishment For Persons Who Pretend To Be L@¥” yers.—The unauthorized practice of law by assuming to an attorney and acting as such without authority const! tutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine % imprisonment or both (Tan vs. Balajadia, 484 SCRA 659) A Disbarred Or Suspended Lawyer Had No Mote Authority To Appear In Court As A Lawyer Amat) Balon, Jr., who was disbarred previously (414 SCRA 5! '™!:‘Apwission 70 Practice Law 33 but continued to represent himself as a lawyer was found ilty of indirect contempt by the Supreme Court and fined P30,000.00 with imprisonment in case of failure to pay within five (5) days. A suspended lawyer cannot prac- tice law during the period of his suspension (In re: David, Adm. Case No. L-98, 93 Phil. 461 (1958). PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO CANNOT PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES The following public officials are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law: 1. Judges and other officials or employees of the su- perior court (Rule 138, Section 35, RRC);" 2. Officials and employees of the Office of the Solici- tor General (Ibid); 3. Government prosecutors (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino vs. Blanco, 79 Phil. 647); 4. President, Vice President, Members of the Cabi- net, their deputies and assistants (Art. VIII, Section 13, 1987 Constitution); 5. Members of Constitutional Commissions (Art. IX- A, Section 2, 1987 Constitution).’ 6. Members of the Judicial Bar Council;* 7. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Section 8 (2nd par.], 1987 Constitution) 8. All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Section 90);* * See Comments under Rule 5.07 for judges and clerks of Court who were dismissed for practising law. ” Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission; IX-A, Section 2, 1987 Constitution. ” See: Minute Resolution, JBC-003, In Re: Appointment of Atty, Melvin Encanto, as JBC member, 14 May 1992 * Constitutionality of Section 90, RA 7160 was SU by the Supreme Court in t. of Interior sen Javellana vs. Dept. istained yr, 21234 LecaL Etnics 9. Those who by special law are Prohibited from en. 8aging in the practice of their legal profession.” Public Officials With Restrictions In The Practice Of Law.—Some public officials are not absolutely disquali- fied to practice law. They are merely subject to certain restrictions: (a) Under the Constitution, no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies (Art. VI, Section 14, 1987 Constitution). Since the practice of law covers a wide range of legal activities (see Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210), the Senator or Congressman is allowed to engage in the other aspects of the law practice such as the giving of legal advice to cli- ents, negotiating contracts in behalf of clients which necessitates legal knowledge, preparation of documents of conveyancing and similar others. (b) Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160, Section 90), Sanggunian members may practice their professions, provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not: (1) Appear as counsel 1 before any court in any civil case wherein a local govern: ment unit or any office, agency. or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party: a Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government 's ww Used of an offense committed in relation to his of ice: (3) Collect any fee for their appearance in adminis- trative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and * See R.A. No. 6713, Sect '° Javellana vs. Dept. have violated RA 7160. tion 7, [b-2] 5 libid.)—where lawyer was foundnis- it of and t° Apmission To Practice Law 35 (4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defend- ing the interest of the Government. (ec) Under RA 910, Section 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the Government, cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which the Gov- ernment or any of its subdivisions or agencies is the ad- verse party or in a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense in relation to his office. Resumption Of Privilege To Practice Law By A Filipino Lawyer Who Lost Philippine Citizenship But Later Acquired Dual Citizenship. — Petition For Leave To Resume Practice Of Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007 Facts: Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law in the Philip- pines until his migration to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention to his ailments. Later, in May 2004, he became a Canadian citizen. On July 14, 2006, he acquired Philippine citi- zenship pursuant to RA No. 9225. On same day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intends to Practice law. Hence, this Petition. Issues: (1) Has Dacanay ceased to become a member of the Philippine Bar after he lost his Filipino citizenship following his naturalization in Canada? (2) May he be allowed to resume his privilege to Practice law in the Phili ippines after reacquiring Phil- ippine citizenship? ea (3) Assuming he qualifies to resume the privi- lege to practice law, is it automatic? >36 Lect. Ernics Held: Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No as a general rule. (1) The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law." Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, conse- quently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizen- ship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. (2) The exception is when Filipino citizenship {s lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of an- other country but subsequently reacquired pursu- ant to RA No. 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizen ship under the conditions of [RA No. 9225]. There- fore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accor- dance with RA No. 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. (3) Under RA No, 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he Teacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its pro- visions “(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA No, 9225 ca? Tesume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned 02 (a) the updating and payment in full of the a" nual membership dues in the IBP; "® See last paragraph of Section 14, Article Xl.Apmission To Practice Law 37 (b) the payment of professional tax; (c)_ the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education: this is spe- cially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (@)_ the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Repub- lic of the Philippines. BACKGROUND OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY The Code of Professional Responsibility is the princi- pal source and basis of the rules of ethics for members of the Bar who do not belong to the judiciary. For judges and justices, it is the Code of Judicial Ethics as enhanced by the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in the government service except the magistrates (Avance vs. Liwanag, 406 SCRA 300) All lawyers are bound to uphold and obey the Cons- titution, the laws of the country, the legal orders of duly constituted authorities and the different mandates of legal ethics with the end in view of assuring that justice is served to everyone without discrimination and that the legal profession is always placed in high esteem and res- pect. In revivifying the canons of legal ethics for all lawyers, the Supreme Court has approved and promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility on June 21, 1988—drafted in 1980 by the IBP Committee on Responsibility. Discipline and Disbarment! and submitted to the Supreme Court foF " For brevity, reference to the Comments of the aa mittee On Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarmert Cae drafted the Code is hereafter referred to as “Report of mittee.”i se 38 LecaL AND Jupicial Erics approval. The Committee was chaired by Dean Irene Cortes, later appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Before the promulgation of the Code, the Supreme Court had promulgated Rule 139-B (Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys) of the Revised Rules of Court granting the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the concur- rent power to investigate its members—preserving however the final authority to suspend and disbar attorneys to the High Court The Code is substantially based on the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association. Supreme Court Not Predisposed To Grant Full In- dependence To The IBP.—While some quarters in the legal profession have been advocating the complete inde- pendence of the IBP from the Supreme Court on matters of its administration and the power to discipline all members including those in the Government service, the Supreme Court, is not yet predisposed or persuaded to agree with this clamor for independence. In fact, in Circular No. 3-89. February 9, 1989, the Supreme Court, just a few months after it had approved and promulgated the Code of Profes: sional Responsibility, clarified (during the pendency of the investigation of charges against certain Justices of the Court of Appeals), that the IBP Commission On Bar Disci- pline™ has no authority to investigate incumbent justices and judges by interpreting the second paragraph of Sec tion 1 of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court as "ot applicable to them: Thus, “(Ihe Supreme Court reiterated its reso- lution dated 19 November 1988 directing that all complaints against justices and Judges of the lower courts filed before the Commission On Bar Discipline should promptly be referred to the ‘Supreme Court for appropriate action. The Supreme Court interpreted The author was then Commissioner of the Commissi™™ On Bar Discipline having taken his oath of office on August * 1988. »BackGROUND OF Cope OF PROFESSIONAL 39. Resronsiatary Section 1, second paragraph of Rule 139-1 of the Re vised Rules of Court, such that “attorneys—tn the government service” should be understood as not in. cluding members of the Court of Appeals, the ganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals and judges of other courts. In general, the Court refers to thos who perform judicial functions and before whose courts the members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines appear in the exercise of thelr profession.” (Re: Letter of Acting Presiding Justice, Rodolfo A. Nocon, etc, of the Court of Appeals, 3 Jan. 1989, En Bane, Minute Resolution). wnd When the clarification was handed down, a great number of IBP leaders were disappointed, for they belleve that members of the judiciary should be investigated by an independent body, and not by members of the same judi. lal structure. They are afraid, comradeship might affect the outcome of the investigation. In the US, it i is the American Bar Association which has the power of di isbarment and discipline. Code Of Professional Responsibility Is Binding On All Lawyers. Violation Thereof Is A Ground For Disci- Plinary Action—It must be recalled that while the Can- ons of Professional Ethics have not been reduced to statu- tory rules, nonetheless, they have attained the level of duct which every attorney must obey and Director of Lands vs. Ababa, 88 SCRA 523). With more reasons should the present Code of Professional Responsibility be accorded greater respect and recognition ¥ all members of the Bar, Promulgated as it was, by no c8s than the Highest Court of the land. Considering that the Canons of Professional Responsibility were promul- Sated in the exercise of the constitutional authority of the40 Lecat Eruics Supreme Court concerning the admission to the Practice of law (Art. VIII, Section 5 [5], 1987 Constitution), it natu- rally follows that the Canons like the Rules of Court, when not contrary to any legal provision, have the force and effect of law and any breach thereof will make the lawyer liable for disciplinary action for professional misconduct,"* DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS UNDER THE REVISED RULES OF COURT The Revised Rules of Court enumerates the duties of an attorney: {a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines; (b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers; (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceed- ings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law: (d@) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer of an artifice or false statement of fact or law; (c) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and 4 every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledg? and approval; (9 To abstain from all offensive personality and (° advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation © 4 ' See Alvero vs. Dela Rosa, 76 Phil. 428; Domingo A Santos vs. David, 68 Phil, 134; Tadlip vs. Borres, Jr., 474 SC 441.to fa and SRA BACKGROUND OF CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL 41 RESPONSIBILITY party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged; (Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed: ()_ In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. (Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court). Duties Of Attorneys Spread In The Code Of Profes- sional Responsibility—The aforementioned duties of attorneys are expressly or impliedly incorporated, though dispersely, in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, letter (a) is part of Canon 1; letter (b) is part of Canon 11; letter (c) is implied in Rule 15.05; letter (d) is implied in Canons 3 and 10; letter (e) is incorporated in Canon 21 and Rule 20.03; letter (f) is part of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01; letter (g) is part of Rule 1.03; letter (h) is incor- Porated as Rule 2.01; letter (i) is part of Rule 14.01 and Rule 19.01. The Code of Professional Responsibility has imposed other duties and obligations on the part of the members of the Bar based on law, Jurisprudence and time-honored Principles of justice and equity. Nature Of The Position Of An Attorney As An Offi- cer Of The Court.—An attorney is not an officer in the enstitutional or statutory meaning of the term (National Savings Bank vs. Ward, 100 U.S. 195). However, in a lmited sense, he is considered a public officer occupying a (uast-judicial office (Langan vs. Borkowski, 43 ALR 622: People vs. Sesbreno, 130 SCRA 465). Having been admit- ted to practice of law by no less than the Supreme Court which alone has the authority to admit persons to practice tp42 Leal Eruics law before all courts in the entire country, the lawyer jg considered an Officer of the Courts—which incidentally are all created by law. As such an Officer, he directly participates in the administration of justice, either as private practitioner or public prosecutor. Through him, the judicial machinery is set in motion by his filing of cases in court on which the judge is called upon to act. His partici pation in the dispensation of justice is indispensable. If there are no lawyers, courts cannot operate to dispense justice. His intimate and indispensable relationship to the court makes him a part of the court. Hence, the reference to him as “Officer of the Court.” Nature Of Legal Profession.—The legal profession is a form of public service or public trust intimately related to the administration of justice, in the practice of which pecuniary rewards are considered as merely incidental. It must signify for its followers a mental and moral setting apart from the multitude—it is a priesthood of justice (See Ledesma vs. Climaco, G.R No. 12815, June 28, 1974) The practice of law is a profession and not a business as it is an essential part in the administration of justice, 2 profession in pursuit of which pecuniary reward is consi ered as merely incidental; it is a pursuit of learned art i? the interest of public service (See Koscoe Pound, TH Lawyer From Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5).Coe oF PRoFEssioNal. RESPONSIBILITY 43 ‘The Lawyer and Society CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CHAPTER I—THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTI- TUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishon- est, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02—A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 1.03—A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause Rule 1.04—A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.44 Lecat Etuics CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTI. TUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LE. GAL PROCESSES. COMMENTS: Lawyer's Primary Duty To Society Or State; Attor- ney's Oath.—It is the lawyer's primary duty to society or State to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. This duty is enshrined in the Attorney's Oath which every lawyer in this country has to take before he is allowed to practice law. The full text reads— of to solemnly (place of birth) swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood. nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any Gemal Feservation or purpose of evasion. So help me oa The Rules of Court in enumerating the duties of @ lawyer also ordains the attorney, “(T)o maintain allegian® {0 the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the la ines” (Rule iseteen on anes Wws of the Philippine “See: Form 28, appended to the Rules of Court as revis™! on Oct. 25, 1979 (91 SCRA xv),Cope oF PRoressional. RESPONSIBILITY 45 ‘The Lawyer and Soctety Lawyer's Oath Is A Sacred Trust, Not A Mere Cere- mony.—The Lawyer's Oath, to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards, nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. (Ting-Dumali vs. Torres, 427 SCRA 108). In re: Gutierrez 5 SCRA 661 Held: Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them un- der foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, ar- gues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and danger- ous elements of the body politic (Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556)."* Delay No Man For Money Or Malice. —The lawyer's cath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice (Reyes vs. Gaa, 246 SCRA 64). Lawyers Will Be Disciplined For Disobeying Legal Orders Or Processes Of Courts.—Lawyers must not only uphold and obey the Constitution and the laws but also legal orders or processes of courts. Thus a lawyer was admonished for his failure to in- form the Supreme Court of his answer or reaction to his appointment by the Court as counsel for one of the appel- lants (People vs. Dalusag, 62 SCRA 540). And a lawyer was Teprimanded for failure to file the Comment required of him by the Supreme Court (Luzon Mahogany Timber Industries, Inc. vs. Castro, 69 SCRA 384). ™ See Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Palma, 438 SCRA 307-46 Lecat Ernics Suspension was meted out to a lawyer for failure to file Comment despite the several extensions he asked for and which were granted by the Court (Casals vs. Cusi, Jr. 52 SCRA 58; see also Achacoso vs. CA, 51 SCRA 424) i And for continuing to practice law in clear violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension from the practice of law, the Supreme Court ordered the name of the lawyer stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys (Geeslin vs. Navarro, 185 SCRA 230). Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disci- plinary sanctions as well (Bantolo vs. Castillon, dr., 478 SCRA 443). Graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes (Bantolo vs. Castillon, Jr., 478 SCRA 443). All lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and to obey its lawful processes and orders and if he has not taken this to heart, he is unfit to engage in the practice of law (Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals. 242 SCRA 352). A Lawyer Who Issued Bouncing Checks Violates The Law And Is Subject To Disbarment Or Suspension. People vs. Tuanda’® 181 SCRA 692 Facts: A lawyer was convicted of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which the Court considered a crime in- "* See also: Co vs. Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102; PAGCOR ¥S Carandang, 480 SCRA 512; Huyssen vs. Gutierrez, 485 SCRA 244; Moreno vs. Araneta, 457 SCRA 328; Vda. de Espino ‘e Presquito, 432 SCRA 609; Barrios vs. Martinez, 442 SCRA 32 Arroyo-Posidio, 520 SCRA 111.Cope oF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsiBILity ‘The Lawyer and Society volving moral turpitude as this mischief creates not only @ wrong to the payee or holder, but also an in. jury to the public, The lawyer was suspended by the Court of Ap- peals. She went to the Supreme Court asking for the lifting of the Order of suspension arguing that the is suance of the bouncing checks does not relate to the exercise of her legal profession. Held: We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and vio- lation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Profes- sional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to ‘obey the laws of the land.’ Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Bg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral char- acter of a person convicted of such offense. In Melen- drez vs. Decena, this Court stressed that ‘the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This quali- fication is not only a condition precedent to an ad- mission to the practice of law; its continued posses- sion is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.’ (Suspension affirmed) Sanchez vs. Somoso 412 SCRA 569 Held: When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had al- ready been closed, the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. His conduct deserves nothing less than a severe disciplinary sanc- tion, 4748 Lecat Eruics Significance Of Lawyer's Oath —By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice—a vital function of democracy, a failure of which is disastrous to society (Busifios vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407). Effect Of Failure To Take The Attorney's Oath—A successful bar candidate who was allowed to sign by the Clerk of the Supreme Court to sign the Roll of Attorney's but was unable to take his oath before the Supreme Court, although he paid his IBP dues and listed as “qualified voter” in IBP affairs, cannot be admitted to the Bar with- out having actually taken his oath of office as an attorney (im re: Elmo S. Abad, B.M. No. 139, March 18, 1983) Oath Alone Will Not Make A Bar Passer A Full Fledged Member Of The Bar.—A bar passer must not only take his oath as a member of the Bar, but he must also sign the Roll of Attorneys. This last act makes him a full-fledged lawyer (Aguirre vs. Rana, 403 SCRA 343). Rule 1.01.—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dis honest, immoral or deceitful conduct. COMMENTS: Lawyer Must Constantly Be Of Good Moral Charac- ter.—A lawyer should not engage or participate in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The moral character he displayed when he applied for admis Sion to the Bar must be maintained incessantly. Other wise his peg 9 Practice the legal profession may > People vs. Tuanda Adm. Case No. 3360 Jan. 30, 1990 Held: The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral a.Cove oF PRoFEssional. REsPoNsiBILity 49 The Lawyer and Society character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law." The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes in- volving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in violation of the attorney's oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC) Purpose Of Requirement For Good Moral Charac- ter— Dantes vs. Dantes 438 SCRA 582 Held: The purposes for the requirement of good moral character are: (1) to protect the public; (ii) the protect the public image of lawyers; and (li) to protect, prospective clients. The Supreme Court added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves. Unlawful Acts Or Violation Of Laws.—A lawyer is bound to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land (Rule 138, Sec. 20 [a], RRC). He can be disciplined for violating the laws of the country. Being a lawyer, he is Supposed to be a model in the community in so far as Tespect to the law is concerned. Thus, a lawyer was suspended for promoting an or- 8anization designed to violate or evade the laws against crime with knowledge of its aims (In re: Terrell, 2 Phil. 266). So, also a lawyer who agreed to purchase opium—a Prohibited drug—although the sale was not consummated because he was robbed of the purchase price by the ven- dors (Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350). And a lawyer who "See also: Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662; Villa- guea Vs. Sta. Ana, 245 SCRA 707; In Re: Al C. Argosino, 246 pa 14; Huyssen vs. Gutierrez, 485 SCRA 244: Lijauco vs. 'tado, 500 SCRA 301.o Leca Etnics engineered a scheme through his brother to defraud an Sag person was disbarred (In re: Quiambao, 102 Phil The transgression of any is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the court will not countenance (Gonzaga vs. Realubin, 242 SCRA 322). A lawyer who after borrowing court records stole ex: hibits by tearing them off, was disbarred for the second time.'” He descended to the level of a common thief (Fer- nandez vs. Benjamin Grecia, Adm. Case No. 3694, June 17, 1993, 223 SCRA 425). Provision of law by a lawyer The law violated need not be a penal law. Thus, the violation of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code by a lawyer is a sufficient ground for disciplinary sanction (Bautista vs. Gonzales, Adm. Case Matter No. 1625, 12 Feb. 1990). A lawyer was disbarred for transmitting and distrib- uting the stolen Bar Examination questions to some mem- bers of his fraternity to give them undue advantage over the other examinees (Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, 42! SCRA 703). A lawyer was suspended for committing dishonesty concerning the excuses for his failure to attend hearing! and lack of respect for legal orders (Batac, Jr. vs. Cru Jr., 538 SCRA 135). Unlawful Conduct.—Unlawful conduct includes an lation of the statutory prohibition on a government or ployee to “engage in the private practice of [his] Poe ait unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Pro with that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict {his] official functions” (Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio. SCRA 11) Conviction For Crimes Involving Moral me tude—A number of lawyers have been suspen J state’ ‘7 He was already disbarred before and then rein: ‘This is his second disbarment.Cope oF PRorEssional, ResronsisiLiry 51 The Lawyer and Society disbarred for conviction of crimes involving moral turpi- tude such as estafa, (In re: Abesamis, 102 Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815: Medina vs. Bautista, 12 SCRA 1); bribery (In re: Delos Angeles, 106 Phil. 1); murder (In re: Gutierrez, 5 SCRA 661); bigamy (In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313); seduction (De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces, 111 Phil. 569); abduction (In re: Basa, 41 Phil. 275); concubinage (In re: Isada, 60 Phil 915; Leynes vs. Veloso, 82 SCRA 325); smuggling (In re: Rovero, 92 Phil. 128); falsification of public document (In re Avancena, 20 SCRA 1012); violation of B.P. Big. 22 (People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990) The lawyers involved in the aforementioned cases had shown their unfitness to protect the administration of justice, or are no longer of good moral character, which therefore justifies their suspension or disbarment (Rule 138, Sec. 27, RRC). Honesty, Still The Lawyer's Best Virtue.—Lawyers must deal with their clients, brother lawyers, courts of Justice and the public with honesty. Honesty is essential for every lawyer to retain his standing as a member of the bar (People vs. Gilmore, 177 NE 710). Lawyers must always conduct themselves in their professional and non-professional life with good moral character and without deception. __ Dishonesty is condemned and is a ground for disci- Plinary action. Some Cases Of Dishonesty And Deceit Which Me- rited Discipline By The Supreme Court. 1. Misappropriation of client’s funds (Macoco vs Diaz, 40 0.G. 17; Capulong vs. Alino, 22 SCRA 491; Cabi- 820 vs. Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20; Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8 In re: Paraiso, 41 Phil. 24; In re: Booram, 39 Phil. 247; In ey Bamberger, 49 Phil. 946; Quilban vs. Robinol, 171 ae 769; Businos vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 415: Co vs. emardino, 285 SCRA 102 (1998).52 Lecat Erxics 2. Act of fraudulently concealing dutiable importa. tion or smuggling (In re: Rovero, 92 Phil. 128). 3. Giving false statements under oath in an Infor- mation Sheet submitted in connection with the lawyer's application for the position of Chief of Police (Calo vs, Degamo, 20 SCRA 447). 4. Wanton falsehood made in an ex Parte petition in court wherein the lawyer attached affidavit of his grandfa- ther and which affidavit he notarized knowing that the supposed affiant is already dead (Agdoma vs. Celestino, 6 SCRA 637). 5. Manuevering reconveyance of property in the name of the lawyer instead of the client—in a case involv. ing sale with pacto de retro (Imbuido vs. Fidel Sor Man- gonon, 4 SCRA 760). 6. Submission or presentation of mutilated copies of certain documents to court for the Purpose of deceiving and misleading it (Annotation, 45 Am. St., Rep. 852; cited in Martin, Legal Ethics, 198: 8 Ed., p. 241). 7. Falsification of Srades in the Bar Examinations (in re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399). 8. Collecting several thou: that counsel would allegedly ap to the Supreme Court of th necessary for him to go to sand pesos on the pretense peal the complainant's case ie United States, and that it was Washington, D.C. which he did. knowing that the decision could no longer be appealed because itis already final (Malegrito vs. Barba, 58 Phil- 9. Inducing someo: that it is not for sale (In 10. Del: the client (Lict ne to buy a piece of land knowing re: Quiambao, 102 Phil. 940). ayed failure to account money collected for ‘uanan vs. Melo, 170 SCRA 100). 11. Stealing evidence attached 7 to the rt rect (Fernandez vs. Grecia, Adm, Case No 3694, June ut 1993), —_Cope oF ProressioNAL RESPONSIBILITY 53 ‘The Lawyer and Society 12. Adamant refusal to return money he received but intended for a party and issuing a bouncing check in payment therefor (Castillo vs. Taquines, 254 SCRA 554) 13. Notarization of a falsified deed of sale of his cli- ent’s property (Roces vs. Aportadera, 243 SCRA 108: Reyes vs. Maglaya, 243 SCRA 214). 14. Misappropriating the settlement amount which he received for the client (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, Adm. Case No. 1037, Dec. 14, 1998). 15. Evading payment of debt (Yuson vs. Vitan, 496 SCRA 540 [2006)). 16. Misrepresenting that he was still connected with a law firm (Afurong vs. Aquino, 315 SCRA 77). 17. Committing falsehood in stating in his Urgent Motion for Postponement that he had to appear in another case, when there was none (id.). 18. A lawyer who altered a material date to make it appear that her Notice of Appeal was timely filed commit- ted an act of dishonesty (Rivera vs. Corral, 384 SCRA 1 Perea vs. Almadro, 399 SCRA 322) 19. Notarizing of documents despite expiration of notarial commission (Modejar vs. Rubia, 496 SCRA 1). Morality, Concept.—Morality is that quality (or property) of a human act whereby it measures up to what it should be as a step towards the objective last end of human action, or fails so to measure up. It consists there- fore in the relation existing between human acts and the norm of morality (Ethics, Paul Glenn, 1965 Ed., p. 100). The Norm Of Morality—Glenn explained the norm of morality as follows—“There is an eternal plan for the ordering or government of all acts and movements in the universe, and that this plan directs things towards their last end. But, as we also learned, man is free and rational; he is not coerced (in the field of free choice) by the plan, but is meant to recognize it by his reason and freely follow it in all his free or human acts. Human acts which are in54 LecaL EtHics harmony with the eternal plan are good; those not in harmony with it are evil. Now, the eternal plan is the Eternal Law which is the Divine Reason (and Will) express- ing itself in the ordering of the universe. Thus human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict with the Divine Reason. Now, how is the Divine Reason recog- nized by man? Obviously by human reason, which pro- nounces on individual human acts—in a word, by Con- science. Hence, the Eternal Law (Divine Reason) on the one hand, and conscience (human reason) on the other, constitute the Norm of Morality. From this it will be seen that we were right when we said that human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict with the dictates of reason (divine and human).” “The Divine Reason, or the Eternal Law, is the ulti- mate Norm of Morality. But that which serves man imme- diately in action, that which is available to his proximate use, is human reason pronouncing upon the good or evil of individual human acts: in other words, conscience is the proximate Norm of Morality.” “Summing the matter up, we say that the Norm of Morality is, remotely and ultimately (but primarily). the Eternal Law; while proximately (but secondly) it is con science. In reality, then, there are not two norms but only one; for conscience is the judgment of human reasom recognizing and applying the Eternal Law in individual human acts.” “A human act, to be a morally good act, must be found in agreement with the Norm of Morality on all three Points, i.e., it must be good in itself or objectively, in its end, and in its circumstances. A human act is evil i! fails to conform with the Norm of Morality in any one the points or determinants, viz.: (a) the act itself (i.e object); (b) the end of the agent; (c) the circumstances other than the end of the agent ({bid., p. 103)." Morality As Understood In Law.—This is a hu™” standard based on the natural moral law which is e™be ded in man’s conscience and which guides him to 40 & :Cope oF ProressionaL RESPONSIBILITY 55 ‘The Lawyer and Society and avoid evil. Immorality then is the doing of an act which is contrary to conscience. And moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals (in re: Basa, 41 Phil. 275). Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and res- pectable members of the community” (Arciga vs. Mani- wang, 106 SCRA 591). Immorality is not confined to sexual conduct (Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239). A lawyer should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity (Arciga vs. Maniwang, Ibid.; Talens- Dabon vs. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354) Morality Must Be A Lasting Virtue —Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal ca- reer, in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honoured fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. (Cordon vs. Balicanta, 337 SCRA 662; See also: Barrientos vs. Libiran-Meteoro, 487 SCRA 209). Moral Character Distinguished From Good Reputa- tion.—Moral character is what a person really is. Royong vs. Oblena 7 SCRA 871 Held: The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examina- tions in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erro- neous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not @56 Lecat ETHICS subjective term, but one which corresponds to objec- tive reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As for- mer Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion gener- ally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of per- sonal and professional integrity which should be ap- plied to persons admitted to practice law is not satis- fied by such conduct as merely enables them to es- cape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral char- acter includes at least common honesty. (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 ed. 626, citing In re: Weinstein, 42 P. (2d) 744 B.L.D., Cooper vs. Greeley, 1 Den. N.Y. 3447; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People vs. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Bricia An- geles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render hima person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar. Advincula vs. Macabata 517 SCRA 609 Held: In Bar Matter No. 1154,"* good moral eae was defined as what a person really is, a8 fon general ‘Tom good reputation, or from the opin- Sanne mA entertained of him, or the estimate in is known. Moral ee the public in the place where he but one which wpenatacter is not a subjective term Corresponds to objective reality.Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 57 ‘The Lawyer and Society It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; 93) to protect prospective cli- ents; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from them- selves. In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips. ‘This act of kissing was not found as grossly im- moral as to justify the imposition of serious penalty. Case was dismissed but respondent was repri- manded. (Note: The Court reviewed the various cases involving gross immorality before reaching its deci- sion). All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar (In Re: Al C. Argosino, 246 SCRA 14) Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct ex- pected from members of the general public. Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evi- dent rejection of that moral duty and was totally irrespon- sible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character (ibid). Psychological Incapacity Of A Lawyer Does Not Necessarily Make Him An Unfit Member Of The Bar — Paras vs. Paras 529 SCRA 893 Held: One's unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa. The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declara- tion of nullity of marriage. While Rosa's charges suffi-58 Lecat Ernics ciently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically in- capacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, “the real question for determi- nation is whether or not the attorney is still a fit per- son to be allowed the privileges as such.” Its purpose is “to protect the court and the public from the mis- conduct of officers of the court.” On the other hand. in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental in- capacity that renders him truly incognitive of the ba- sic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the inno- cent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psycho- logically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer. Instances Of Gross Immorality.—For immorality to be a ground for disciplinary action, it must not only be merely immoral but also grossly immoral. Meaning, it must be one which is unquestionably so corrupt or un- principled (see Arciga vs. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 591 and cited cases therein). The following are instances of gross immorality and the resulting consequences— 1, Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. Disbarred (Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757; Obu- san vs. Obusan, 128 SCRA 485). 2. Bigamy perpetrated by the lawyer. Disqualified from admission to the Bar (Villasanta vs. Peralta, 101 Phil 315; Terre vs. Terre, 211 SCRA 7 [Disbarred]; Mijares VS- Villaluz, 274 SCRA 1 [Suspended)) 3. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge with a wo man through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill. Disbarred (Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439: se also Almirez vs. Lopez, 27 SCRA 169; Bolivar vs. Simbdl 123 Phil. 450). 7Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 59 The Lawyer and Society 4, Seduction of a woman who is the niece of a mar- ried woman with whom the respondent lawyer had adul- terous relations. Disbarred (Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). 5. Lawyer arranging the marriage of his son to a woman with whom the lawyer had illicit relations. After the marriage of the woman to the respondent's son, he continued his adulterous relations with her. Disbarred (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586). 6. Lawyer inveigling a woman into believing that they had been married civilly to satisfy his carnal desires. Disbarred (Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256; see also Pomperada vs. Jochico, 133 SCRA 309). 7. Lawyer taking advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine and asked a lady student to go with him in Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under threat that if she refused, she would flunk in all her subjects. Disbarred (Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 655). 8. Concubinage coupled with failure to support ille- gitimate children. Suspended indefinitely (Laguitan vs. Tinio, 179 SCRA 837). 9. Maintaining adulterous relationship with a mar ried woman. Suspended indefinitely (Cordova vs. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680). 10. Delivering bribe money to a judge on request of clients. Sternly warned. (Lee vs. Abastillas, 234 SCRA 29) But, the judge was dismissed. Ll. Seducing a woman thru promise of marriage Py a married lawyer. Disbarred. (Barrientos vs- Daarol, 218 SCRA 30).Leoa. Emuics rality Is Not Confined To Sexual Matters.— ‘advineula vs. Macabate 517 SCRA 614 ot been confined to sex- Immo} Held: Immorality has 0! ual matters, put includes conduct inconsistent with f corruption, indecency, de- rectitude, OF indicative ©! s; or 1s willful, flagrant, or moral indifference to opinions of ff the community. and an inconsideraté public welfare. Guided by the definitions above, We perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderle 27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respon Se though, in turning the head of complainant to wards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and aedesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral ot counsel or abet activi: Rule 1.02.—A lawyer shall n f the law or at lessening ties aimed at defiance o: confidence in the legal system. COMMENTS: eaaried By ‘The Law Not To Be Abetted, Nor Acts mona eee idence In The Legal System.—A lawyer eee ne owe ler any service or advice to any client-1 involve disk powerful or important is the cause—which poanalial ee to the laws of the country which he is mere ereiaad and obey. If he does so, he invites and Just condemnation (Canon 32, CPE): What A Of His Picterelea cre Do To Advance The Hone See Sees eae eee the ssion and the best interest of his client * Atty. Aquino v. Ji SCRA 1, 9 (2002) judge Acosta, 429 Phil, 498, 510: 58° 2CobE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ‘The Lawyer and Society 61 when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe and advise his client to observe the statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent. But above all, a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen (Canon 32, CPE). Duty To Be Performed Within The Law.—In the ju- dicial forum, the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client (Canon 15, CPE). More, he had sworn to uphold the Constitution and to obey the laws and the legal orders of duly constituted authorities. Thus, he will be traversing this oath, if he assists an organization, the “Centro Bellas Artes” known to him as organized for the purpose of evading the law in force in the City of Manila (In re: Terrell, 2 Phil. 266), or allows himself to be engaged by an organization whose members are violating the law and to defend them when they get caught (American Bar Association Opinion 281, March 11, 1952). A lawyer shall not act in clear defiance of the purpose of the law.62 LecaL ErHics Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union vs. Lo Bu 63 SCRA 321 onduct on the part of counsel (at- writ of execution) is far from com- id, of course, be casuistic and take the paragraph of the petition in addition to being rather rded, also prolix, with un- vecessary matter being included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar He could add that his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not previously admitted. That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected to de- fend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disre- gard of the truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obli- gation as an officer of the court, no less than the dig- nity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into seri ous question his good standing in the bar. Held: Such c tempts to frustrate mendable. He coul refuge in the fact that which he denied, was, poorly and awkwardly wo ) Respect For Law Is Gravely Eroded When Lawyers Themselves Engage In Unlawful Practices And Brush Aside The Rules Of The IBP Formulated For Their Observance. In re: 1989 IBP Elections” 178 SCRA 398 Held: The candidates and many of the particl- pants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession im- posed on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation '™ See also: Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. Request ing Exemption from Payment of IBP Dues, 458 SCRA 209. >Cope oF ProressionaL ResPoNsipiuity 63 ‘The Lawyer and Society : to obey and uphold the Constitution and the laws, the duty to “promote respect for law and legal proc- esses” and to abstain from “activities aimed at de ance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system” (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Re- sponsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance. Preparation Of A Document Contrary To Law And Morals Is Malpractice.—A lawyer who advised his client that after 7 years of separation from his spouse, he could remarry and in the process prepared a document declaring the spouses to be single again and could contract subse- quent marriages, and after the spouses signed it, notarized it, is guilty of malpractice. He was suspended for one year (in re: Santiago, 70 Phil. 661). ‘Acts Which Corrode Confidence In The Legal Sys- tem.—All acts of lawyers which are unlawful, dishonest. immoral or deceitful corrode public confidence in the legal system. Hence, lawyers must always conduct themselves in accord with the immutable tenets embodied in the lawyer's oath and the rules of legal ethics. Rule 1.03.—A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause. COMMENTS: Basis Of The Rule.—The Rule is based on Section 20 (@ of Rule 138— “It is the duty of an attorney—not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action oF proceeding, or delay any man's cause from any corrupt Motive or interest.”64 Lecat Eriics Obligation Not To Encourage Suits. —Lawyers ove it ty not to stir up litigations. While to the court and to societ fe nok ak crea, Hein pemvecteed by Coe cael OF eget ethics. ‘The reason for the rule is to prevent barratry and ambulance chasing. Barratry And Ambulance Chasing, Prohibited, Meaning. —Barratry is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or other: wise (4 Bla. Com. 134: Co, Litt. 368; see 1 Cow, p. 154, by Lood Mansfield). It is the lawyer's act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services to one of them for monetary motives or purposes. “Ambulance chasing, figuratively speaking, is the law yer’s act of chasing an ambulance carrying the victim of an accident for the purpose of talking to the said victim or relatives and offering his legal services for the filing of @ case against the person who caused the accident. ‘An ambulance chaser is a lawyer who haunts hosp tals and visits the homes of the afflicted, officiously intrud: ing their presence and persistently offering his service 0” oe of a contingent fee (Warvelle, Legal Ethics. PP The lawyer is guilty of ambulance chasing whether the act is done by him personally or by person under his employ The effect is the same as when he personally does it. Term “Ambulance-Chaser”; Origin.—The term orig nated from the activities of Abraham Gatner of Manhatta™ New York. In 1907, Gatner persuaded a New York law firm to act as its agent in soliciting retainer agreements {0 accident victims. Gatner would hang around police hea” quarters and with the cooperation of a clerk in the polit department succeded in getting a daily list of accident victims. Gatner, who was not a lawyer, eventually set up? 24-hour a day law office in partnership with a lawye inCope oF Proressional, RESPoNsiBiLity 65 The Lawyer and Society the early twenties, Gatner was making a net profit of $165,000.00 on a gross of $400,000.00. He was convicted of fraud in 1928 and served a brief jail term (The Lawyer in Modern Society, by Countryman, Finman Schneyer, 2” Ed., 435-436) Evils Spawned By Ambulance Chasing —Some of the evils of ambulance chasing are: (a) fomenting of litiga- tion with resulting burdens on the courts and the public (b) subornation of perjury, (c) mulcting of innocent per- sons by judgments upon manufactured causes of actions and (d) defrauding of injured persons having proper causes of action but ignorant of legal rights and court procedure by means of contracts which retain exorbitant percentages of recovery and illegal charges for court costs and expenses and by settlement made for quick returns of fees and against the just rights of the injured persons (Hightower vs. Detroit Edison Co., 247 NW 97, 86 ALR 509 11933). Volunteer Legal Advice To Bring Lawsuit, Unethi- cal; Exception.—It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volun- teer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so (Canon 28, CPE). Tempering Client's Propensity To Litigate.—It is even the lawyer's duty to resist the whims and caprices of his client and to temper his client's propensity to litigate (Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, 24 SCRA 291; Castafeda vs. Ago. 65 SCRA 505) Lawyers must not file pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary (Banogon vs. Zerna, 154 SCRA 593). Lawyer Should Not Be An Instigator Of Contro- versy But A Mediator For Concord And Conciliator For Compromise.—It is the duty of a lawyer in his exalted Position as an officer of the court not to be an instigator of any controversy.66 Leoa, Ernics Castaneda vs. Ago” 65 SCRA 512 Held: “We condemn the attitude of the respon. | who, ‘far from viewing courts dents and their counsel fas sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried fo use them subvert the very ends of Justice. Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the seat, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict in- aaa of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct Of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice ‘A. counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be en- couraged and is to be commended: what we do not gna cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence des- pite the patent futility of his client's position, as In the case at bar." ‘It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it Is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is supe” ee to his duty to his client; its primacy indisput- co Delaying Any Man's Cause For Corrupt Motive, ndemnned.—It is one of the duties of a lawyer not encourage either the commencement or the continuance® an action or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause from any corrupt motive or interest (Rule 138, Section 20 [él 's his lawyer's oath, he had sworn not to delay any *° De Ysasi III vs. NLRC, 231 SCRA 173 (1994).Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY The Lawyer and Society cause for money or malice. (See Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 285 SCRA 100; Lim vs. Barcelona, 425 SCRA 67; Unity Fishing Development Corp. vs. Macalino, 446 SCRA 11) ‘Thus, a lawyer cannot delay the approval of a com- promise agreement entered into between the parties, just because his attorney's fees were not provided for in the agreement (Jesalva vs. Bautista, 105 Phil. 348). Appealing A Case For Purposes Of Delay Is Ob- struction Of Justice—An appeal interposed by counsel for purposes of delay is condemned. Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado 24 SCRA 402 Held: One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyen's claim is based took place in 1956. Yet through the present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the litigation, for the compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more, petitioner's contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected by this Court as early as August, 196]. Then again, the com- Pensability of Abuyen’s disability had never been questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case, like the previous one, has been merely to delay a policy, “often resorted to” in the languange of Mr. Justice Reyes (JBL]—"as a means of draining the resources of the poorer Party’—in this case a tuberculosis patient—“and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion.” Thus, the conduct of Petitioner's counsel is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the administration of justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same.” (Note: Treble costs were imposed upon the lawyer)68 Pleadin, always be reminded of Lecat Ernics Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguna 54 SCRA 243 Held: There is something more to be said about the nature and apparent purpose of this case which has its genesis in the case for illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City Court, What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately pro- tracted and made to suffer undue delay in its dis- posal. It was originally filed on September 13, 1960, it reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice be- fore the Court of Appeals, once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and twice before this Court. The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the Part of petitioner and her counsel deserves the vigor- ous condemnation of this Court, because it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be resorted to in cases of lack of jurisdic- tion or grave abuse of discretion by an inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious cases. Significance Of An Attorney's Signature On A 'é—Not Interposed For Delay.—A lawyer must the consequences of his signature in a pleading as explicit} Rules of Court. PI 'y provided under the SEC. 3. Signature = d- ere and address.—Every plea‘ ‘igned by th it fag ihig! se by the party or counsel represent ting in either ich should not be a post office box, N® Address. wh The signature of counsel ¢: i onstitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading: that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is 2Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 69 ‘The Lawyer and Society good ground to support it: and that it is not inter- posed for delay. An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect, However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule. or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action (Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Proce- dure). Roxas vs. Court of Appeals 156 SCRA 253 Held: Thus, the petition to review the assailed resolutions must fail: Let this serve as warning among members of the Philippine bar who take their ‘own sweet time with their cases if not purposely delay its progress for no cogent reason. It does no credit to their standing in the profession. More so when they do not file the required brief or pleading until their motion is acted upon. Not only should they not pre- sume that their motion for extension of time will be granted by the court much less should they expect that the extension that may be granted shall be counted from notice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within the extended period requested. Fail. ing in this, they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or case ts dismissed Some Instances Of Delay Condemned By The Su- Preme Court—In the following cases, delay was con- demned by the Supreme Court. _ 1, Resort to technicalities as a means to frustrate Justice (Economic Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Uy Realty Company. 34 SCRA 745). “Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation” (Ibid: see also Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 137):70 LecaL Eriics 2. Befuddling of the issues in the case by counsel which invariably will be exposed for what they are (Lim Tanhu vs, Ramolete, 66 SCRA 429); 3. Filing of multiple or repetitious petitions—which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment (Gabriel vs. CA, 72 SCRA 273; Millare vs. Mon- tero, 246 SCRA 1): 4. Filing of several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief (Macias vs, Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251); 5. Filing frivolous appeals for purposes of delay—an improper step often taken as a means of draining the resources of the poorer party and compelling him to sub- mit out of sheer exhaustion (Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado, 24 SCRA 402), which waste, as it does, the time that the Courts could well devote to meritorious cases (Uypuanco vs. Equitable Banking Corporation, 27 SCRA 1272; see also FAR Corporation vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 698); 6. Filing of motions for postponement and other kinds of motions for dilatory purposes: 7. Indiscriminate filing of suits against a party clearly intended for harassment (Dimagiba vs. Montalvo. Jr., 202 SCRA 641; Ong vs. Unto, 376 SCRA 152; Rayos: Ombac vs. Ombac, 285 SCRA 93; Saburnido vs. Madrono, 366 SCRA 1; Javier vs. Judge de Guzman, 192 SCRA 434). 8. Delaying cases or services for money (Collantes vs. Renomeron, 200 SCRA 584; Vitriolo vs. Dasig, 400 SCRA 172; Ong vs. Grijaldo, 402 SCRA 1) Rule 1.04.—A lawyer shall encourage his clients t° avold, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. COMMENTS: Nature Of Compromise.—The nature of a comp! mise agreement is such that a me of party must give up $0! the rights that he has, in consideration of the same act ©"Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ‘The Lawyer and Society 71 the part of the other side (Jesalva, et al. vs. Bautista, et al., 105 Phil. 348) Authority Of A Lawyer To Bind Clients.—Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash (Section 23, Rule 138). Settlement Of Cases Authorized And Encouraged By Law.—The settlement of cases in court is authorized and even encouraged by express provision of law (Articles 2028 and 2029, Civil Code; Republic of the Philippines vs. Villarosa, G.R. No. L-11782, April 30, 1958). The law does not limit. compromise to cases about to be filed or cases already pending in courts. That compromise which may be effected even after final judgment is impliedly allowed by Article 2040 of the Civil Code (Jesalva, et al. vs. Bautista, etal., 105 Phil. 348). Lawyer Must Encourage Fair Settlement.—A “com- Promise is as often the better part of justice as prudence is the part of valor and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the client's champion in settlement out of court than he is the client's champion in the battle in court” (Curtis, The Advocate; Davenport, Voices In Court, 5 11958); cited in Agpalo’s Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 Ed.). Whenever the controversy will admit of fair judgment, the client should be advised to avoid or to end the litiga- tion (Canon 8, CPE; De Ysasi Ill vs NLRC, 231 SCRA '1994)). This will save the client from additional expenses and help prevent the clogging of docket (Pajares vs. Abad Santos, 30 SCRA 748; Flores vs, Chua, 306 SCRA 465). Comittomey's Fees Not Ground For Disapproval Of then muse—The rights of lawyers to the fees due °F services in a litigation cannot have a higher72 Lea Ernics standing than the rights of the clients or the parties themselves. Lawyer's rights may not be invoked by some of the parties as a ground for disapproving the compro- mise. The lawyer affected can enforce his rights in a Proper proceeding in accordance with the Rules, but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise (Jesalva, et al. vs. Hon. Bautista, et al., 105 Phil. 348-349; Mun. of Pililla, Rizal vs. CA, 233 SCRA 484 [1994)). A Lawyer Cannot Compromise Case Without Cl- ent’s Consent, Exception.—A lawyer cannot, without special authority, compromise his client's litigation or receive anything in discharge of the client's claim but the full amount in cash (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662)."" A compromise entered into without authority is merely unenforceable. It can be ratified by the client, if he so desires. However, a lawyer has the exclusive management of the procedural aspect of the litigation including the en- forcement of rights and remedies of the client. Thus, when the case was submitted for decision on the evidence so far presented, the counsel for private respondents acted within the scope of his authority as agent and lawyer in negotiating for favorable terms for his client (Mobil Oil Phil. vs. Yabut, 208 SCRA 523). A lawyer cannot compromise the case of his client without the latter's consent even if he believes that the compromise is for the better interest of the client (Philip- pine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. vs. FASGI Enterprises, In. 342 SCRA 722). “ In Manalang vs. Angeles, 398 SCRA 687, the lawyer WS suspended from the practice of law for compromising less the amount mentioned and fixed in the writ of execution witho"" the consent of his client. See also: Agustin vs. Empleo, 484 SCRA 91; People * Carpo, 356 SCRA 248 2Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 73 The Lawyer and Society If the client is not agreeable to the must immediately repudiate the same, ot not be heard to complain later. compromise he herwise he can- A lawyer cannot receive a property subject of a pend- (eeuligation where he is appearing by way of compromise (See: Art. 1492, New Civil Code)2 Lecat Ernics CANON 2. A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL skp. VICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER’ COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFEs. SION. Rule 2.01—A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or op- pressed Rule 2.02—In such a case, even if a lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render le- gal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard latter's rights. or permit to be done any Rule 2.03—A lawyer shall not do ily to solicit legal busi- act designed primaril ness. Rule 2.04—A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily or prescribed. unless the circumstances so warrant.Cove oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 75 ‘The Lawyer and Society CANON 2. A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SER- VICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFES- SION. COMMENTS: Attitude In Practice, Efficiency —Whenever a law- yer decides to handle a case or to extend his legal services for a fee or even for free, he must see to it that he must do so with efficiency and convenience with the end in view of maintaining the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the legal profession at all times. Rule 2.01.—A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause of the defenseless or the op- pressed. COMMENTS: Cause Of The Defenseless Or The Oppressed, Not To Be Rejected.—The defenseless are those who are not in a position to defend themselves due to poverty, weak- hess, ignorance or other similar reasons. The oppressed are the victims of acts of cruelty, un- lawful exaction, domination or excessive use of authority (US. vs. Deaver, 14 Fed. 597). Except for valid reasons,” the cause of the defense- less or the oppressed must not be rejected by a lawyer whose services are being engaged. It is the lawyer's prime duty to see to it that justice be accorded to all without discrimination. Even tyrants ought to be challenged by lawyers to free and save the defenseless and the op Pressed. the, Rule 14.03 (CPR) provides some valid reasons 10 rect € cause of the defenseless or the oppressed76 Lecat ETHIcs A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoney must not ask to be excused for any trivial reason anq should always exert his best efforts in his behalf (Canon 4, CPE). A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relation with paying client (Rule 14.04, CPR). And he must delay no man for money or malice (Attorney's Oath). Neither, will he decline to repre- sent a person solely on account of the latter's race, sex, creed or status in life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person (Rule 14.01, CPR). He should not also decline appointment as counsel de oficio for the defenseless and oppressed, unless there are valid reasons therefor. And under the Rules of Court,” it is one of the duties of a lawyer never to reject, for any considera. tion personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless ot oppressed. Legal Aid Is Not A Matter Of Charity, But A Public Responsibility —The legal aid extended to the destitute is a matter of public responsibility. Thus in the Legal Aid program of the IBP in the entire country through its chap- ter offices, the guiding policy is that “legal aid is not a matter of charity.” It is a means for the correction of social imbalance that may and often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should, therefore, underlie all legal aid offices. The same should be administered to indigent and deserving members of the community in all cases matters and situations in which legal aid may be neces” sary to forestall an injustice (Art. 1, Sec. 1, Guidelines Governing the Establishment of and Operation of Legal Aid Offices in IBP Chapters). *® Rule 138, Sec. 19 (h), RRC.Cove oF PRorEssioNal ResPonsipiLiry 77 The Lawyer and Soctety Rule 2.02.—In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept @ case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the ex- tent necessary to safeguard the latter's right. COMMENTS: In Case Of Non-Acceptance Of The Case Of The De- fenseless Or Oppressed, Legal Advice Should Still Be Rendered To Safeguard Their Rights.—If a lawyer, for valid reasons, could not handle the case of defenseless or oppressed persons, he must not refuse to provide them with immediate legal advice necessary to protect their rights. Thus, if a lawyer, for reasons of health, could not handle the case of a detainee or detainees incarcerated in a military camp, he could advise the latter's relatives to make representations with the proper authorities or to file a petition for habeas corpus with the proper court and even to recommend a competent lawyer who could render prompt assistance under the circumstances. Rule 2.03.—A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal busi- ness. COMMENTS: The Practice Of Law Is A Profession Not A Money- Making Trade.—In the fixing of attorney's fees, it must not be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-making trade (Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Canon 12, CPE). It is not a business but a profession (In re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37; Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, 74 Phil. 579) Counsel of repute and of eminence welcome opportu- nitles to be appointed counsel de officio for this makes Manifest the principle that the practice of law is dedicated {0 the ideal of service and not a mere trade (Ledesma vs Climaco, 57 SCRA 473).78 Lecat Eriics The protection of the weak and highest form of public service that a (Albano vs. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411) the powerless is the lawyer could render The Primary Characteristics Which Distinguish The Legal Profession From Business —The Supreme Court quoting from H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) enumerated the following as characteristics which distin- guish the legal profession from business— 1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money. 2. A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the admini- stration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability. 3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fidu- ciary. 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients (In re: Sycip, 92 SCRA 1) Improper Solicitation Of Legal Business, Prohibi- ted.—As the practice of law is a profession, it is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant. Director of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot 74 Phil. 579 Facts: Respondent is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in Sunday T bunal of June 13, 1943 which reads as follows— “Marriage license promptly secured thru our | sistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired and marriage arranged to wishes © parties. Consultation on any matter free for the Po Everything confidential.Cove oF Proressionat. Resonsipiuity ‘The Lawyer and Society : 2 “Legal assistance service 12 Escolta, Manila, Room 105, Tel 2-41-60" ___ Held: It is undentable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen soliet tation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a mer- chant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his pro- fession who stoops to and adopts the practice of mer- chantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. “The most worthy and effective advertisement possi ble, even for a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct.” (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.) Advertisement Lowers The Standards Of The Pro- fession.—The Supreme Court in the case of In Re: Tagorda (53 Phil. 42), condemned the practice of solicitation of cases. In Re: Tagorda 53 Phil. 42 Held: It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that PFO fession. It works against the confidence of the col munity in the integrity of the members of the D&T (7 results in needless litigation and in incenting (© otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.Lecat Ernics The solicitation of em @ ground for disbarment be distinctly understood. ployment by an attorney is or suspension. That should People vs. McCable 18 Colo. 186 Facts: Respondent caused the publication of the following advertisement in a newspaper: “If you like a divorce, communicate with me, and your desire will be gratified. No one will know it. You see I adver, tise anonymously. I did not even subject myself to criticism. Everything will b e done very quietly and you will be able to secure the dissolution of the dis- agreeable marriage tie wi ithout public scandal and hence without reproach. Good everywhere. Box 2344, Denver.” Held: This advertisement is highly reprehensi ble. It is well calculated to encourage people to make application for divorces who might otherwise have re. frained from so doing. It is against good morals public or Private, It is a false representation and a libel upon the court of justice. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic, Inc.” Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993 Held: The Supreme Court enjoined the said Corporation from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose of Annexes “A” and “B” of the petition, to wit: SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE, ABSENCE, ANNULMENT, VISA. ** See also: Khan vs. Simbillo, 409 SCRA 299.eee Cove oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 81 ‘The Lawyer and Society Please call: 521-0767 THE LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. 7-Fir Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla. GUAM DIVORCE DON PARKINSON an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immi- gration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remar- riage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Child- ren. Call Marivic. THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave. LEGAL, Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232 521-7251 522-2041 521-0767 These advertisements are contrary to Rule 2.03 a Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibil- The prime incorporator, major : stockholder and Proprietor of the Legal Clinte, Inc. being a member of the Philippine Bar is reprimanded with a stern warning jot to repeat the same or similar act. ror ellctation Of Legal Business, When Permissible — dignity of the Z be proper, it must be compatible with the detorous mn Bal Profession. If made in a modest and to the bar rit would bring no injury to the lawyer or simple aga wells, Legal Ethics, p. 55). Thus, the use of Profession coating the name or names of the lawyers, Vers, the amncards Bearing the name of the lawyer or law- © and residence address and special lines in >.82 Lecat Ernics ments in legal periodicals bearing the same fe. Even the use of calling cards with s now acceptable. law, advertisen brief data are permissibl 1 a formal picture (lace) of the lawyer I Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner con sistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data Is allow- able (Ulep vs. The Legal Aid Clinic, Ine., supra) ‘Advertisements In Newspapers, When Permissi- ble.—Modest announcements in newspapers. periodicals or magazines about the opening of a law office or law firm stating the names of the lawyers and the address of the office or firm is not improper. ‘Any self-laudatory or self-praising statements in newspaper advertisements or professional cards disgrace and abase the lawyer and his profession. Worse, if the advertisements are effected through radios and televisions. It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through letters, or by per sonal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation offend ie uo and lower the tone of our profession and are ?prehensible; but the customary use of the simple profes: sional cards is not improper (Canon 27, CPE) cart advertisement bearing the name of the lawyer. his solicitation (Bar ara ae ‘po sr gion {Barton vs. State Bar of California, 20 Cal advertising his leva watts & Fadlo program of a lave! averting bis egal skill and receiving phone question ave ened Nich he answers in the form of Ie ‘wise improper and reprehensible. However, a le - lowable. al aid program as a public service Is 4 ,Cope oF Proressional. ResPonsipiLiry 83 The Lawyer and Society Best Advertisement For A Lawyer.—The best adver- tisement for a lawyer is a well-deserved reputation for competence, honesty and fidelity to private trust and public duty. Of these, honesty reigns paramount. A lawyer Prust not only be honest but must appear to be honest. By his honesty, he gains public confidence and this public confidence is his greatest advertisement, Rule 2.04.—A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circum- stances so warrant. COMMENTS: Rates To Be Charged.—Some IBP Chapters in the country have approved Schedules of Attorney's Fees pro- viding specific guidelines in the fixing of attorney's fees for legal services, including but not limited to consultation, documentation, notarization, pleading, research, trial work, appearance fees, acceptance fees, retainers and similar others. Other Chapters, while they do not have such Sche- dules, have followed and are still following a long standing local custom or tradition on the amounts of attorney's fees for their legal services. To avoid any demeaning and degrading competition. lawyers as much as possible should be in unison in res- pecting such custom or tradition. They must refrain from charging rates lower than the customary rates unless there are valid justifications—such as when a client Is a relative or a brother lawyer, or is too poor that it would be inhumanitarian to charge him even the customary rates of attorney's fees. In the latter situation when the client is ed fee or no fee at indigent, the lawyer may charge a reduc’ all, and he will be commended for such act of legal assis- tance. Well-meaning lawyers ordinarily oe Poor or indigent without charging his is one of the burdens of the privilege to pract extend legal aid to any attorney's fees. ice law84 LecaL Emacs which lawyers must not frown upon. Law is not a business but a noble profession with attendant social responstbility If the attorney's fees customarily charged in an area are too low and petty which affect the respectability of the jegal profession, the lawyers may agree to modify and calculate the rates chargeable within the paying capacity of the ordinary clients. CANON 3. A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HON- EST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Rule 3.01—A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, un- dignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal ser vices. Rule 3.02—In the choice of a firm name, no false, mislead ing or assumed name shall be used. The com tinued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased, Rule 3.03—Where a partner accepts public office, he shal! withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law 4 lows him to practice law concurrently. Rule 3.04—A lawyer shall not pay or give anything value to representatives of the mass media anticipation of, or in r Ue s eturn for, publicity attract legal business.NAL RESPONSIBILITY 85 wer and Society Cope or Prove The CANON 3. ALAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HON- EST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. COMMENTS: A Lawyer May Make Known His Legal Services.—it is not unethical for a lawyer to make known his legal services. However, he must do so only by using true honest, fair, dignified and objective information or state- ment of facts. He must not resort to false and misleading information. And even if the information is true, the man- ner of making it known must not be undignified and demeaning to the legal profession. The practice of law is not a trade like the sale of commodities to the general public where “the usual exag: gerations in trade, when the other party had the opportu- nity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent” (Art. 1340, NCC). Rule 3.01.—A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, un- dignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal ser- vices. COMMENTS: Self-Praises Or False Claims On Qualifications Or Quality Of Legal Services, Unethical—This rule is Closely intertwined with Rule 2.03" which reads, “A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primar- lly to solicit legal business.” Any claim or statement of a lawyer about his qualifications or quality of legal services Must not be deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair. Thus, a lawyer should not pretend to a prospective See: Comments Rule 2.03, CPR.yy 86 LecaL Erics client just to get the latter's trust and confidence that he is a seasoned trial lawyer and an expert in a particular law or laws when in truth he is not and had not even prose- cuted or defended a case yet in his lifetime. Or, that he had not lost a case in his practice, when in truth, he had not won a single case yet because of his incompetence and lack of skill. It is deceptive and fraudulent of a lawyer to claim that he is an associate/partner of big law firm or that he is a specialist on a certain line when he is not Just to attract potential clients. In the U.S. these misrepresentations are expressly prohibited.”"" A lawyer who uses as his office address the office of his wife who is a judge was found guilty of using a fraudu- lent, misleading and deceptive address that had no pur- pose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his clients that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary (In re: Atty. Renerio G. Paas. 400 SCRA 543). Any false pretense by a lawyer intended to defraud, mislead and deceive or to tout on his qualifications oF quality of his legal services is unethical—whether done by him personally or through another with his permission. The Supreme Court has condemned the use of a card ay ff Pathe containing self-laudatory statements about his In Re: Tagorda”” 53 Phil. 37 Held: Atty. T% he adyartided these ‘agarda contributed cards where “As a notary public, he can execute for you @ of : fe a purchase of land as required by office, can renew lost documents of deed the ¢; ABA Model Cod BC 2-14; DR-2-105, See: Khan vs. Simbillo, 409 SCRA 299 of Professional Responsibility (198%)Cove oF Pros ‘The Lawye HONAL RESPONSIBILITY 87 and Society young animals, can make your application and final requisites for your homestead, and execute any of affidavit. As a lawyer, he “1 loans, altogether long overdue, as well as any plaints for or against you. He offers free consultation and is willing to help the poor.” He was ended, It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares (Dir- ector of Religious Affairs vs. Bayot, 74 Phil. 579). Rule 3.02.—In the choice of a firm name, no false, mis- leading or assumed name shall be used. The con- tinued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased. COMMENTS: What Name Shall Not Be Included In A Firm Name—A group of lawyers who desires to establish a partnership for general practice of law may adopt a firm name. However, no false name or misleading or assumed name shall be used in the firm name adopted. No name not belonging to any of the partners or associates may be used in the firm name for any purpose. Ifa partner died, and the continued use of the name is desired by the surviving partners, the name of the deceased may still be used provided, in all the communi- cations of the law firm, there is an indication that said Partner is already dead. The use of a cross after the name of the deceased Partner is a sufficient indication. It is advisable though that the year of death be also indicated. The Rule, In Effect Is An Abandonment Of The Ruling In Sycip Case."—The Supreme Court had the Use 9; it the Matter of the Petition for Authority to baronet foe of the Firm Name “Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez es “stllo” and the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the88 LecaL Eraics n to rule in Sycip that a partner's name, upon his death, must be dropped from the firm name, as its reten. tion has the tendency to improperly exploit its advertising value. The rule in Sycip is that Law partnerships are prohibited from continuing their business under firm names that include the names of deceased partners.” Under the new Rule (Rule 3.02), partnerships are al- lowed the continued use of the name of a deceased partner provided that there is an indication that sald partner is already deceased. The purpose of retaining the name of a deceased partner is to maintain clients who have been provided legal services by the law firm. While the firm benefits from the goodwill attached to the personality of the deceased partner, that motivation is legitimate. Name To Use In The Practice Of Law.—A lawyer is not authorized to use in his practice of the profession @ name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys. In Pangan vs. Ramos (93 SCRA 87), the Supreme Court held that the respondent has resorted to deception and demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts in representing himself as Pedro D. Ramos, instead of Dionisio D. Ramos, the name inscribed in the Rol o Attorneys. For this deception, the lawyer was severely reprimanded by the Supreme Court. Name Of A Partner In Law Firm Should 5 Dropped If Appointed As Judge; Other Positions. —!'* partner in a Law Firm had been appointed as a judge: B* name in the firm should be dropped because he is ™ longer allowed to practice law. The public will be misle occasior Firm Name “0; : fm Name “Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Rey id “Five Justices of the S supreme Court, namely Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrea, Isagani Cruz, Emo & iyco, Teodoro R. Padilla and Abraham Sarmiento resist". dissent to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Professional Responsit!” because of the Sycip Decision. Justice aAaB Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 89 “The Lawyer and Society his name will be retained. In the same manner, a partner who has been appointed or elected to a government posi- tion which prohibits private practice of law, should like- wise cause the removal of his name in the Law Firm to avoid a display of influence on the part of the firm. Use Of The Firm Name Of A Foreign Law Firm Is Unethical —The use by the respondents of the firm name Baker and Mckenzie constitutes an unethical practice because that firm is not authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction (Dacanay vs. Baker & Mckenzie, 136 SCRA 349). Presumption Regarding Dissolution of a Law Firm. Antonio vs. Court of Appeals 153 SCRA 592 Held: It is safe to presume that a law firm which registered and represented itself as such, with at least two named partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that this law office was earlier dissolved, the winding up process is presumed to have been performed in a regular manner, with all the obligations properly accounted for. Very concrete evidence must be presented in order that these pre- sumptions may be rebutted Main Law Office and Branch Office Do Not Consti- tute Two Law Firms. Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. vs. Aleonar 202 SCRA 619 Facts: Petitioner's counsel was and is the firm of Ledesma, Saludo and Associates (and not any par- ticular member or associate of that firm) which firm ‘appens to have a main office in Makati and a branch ce in Cebu City. The Court notes that both the Same and branch offices operate under one and the Teprege®, Saludo, Ledesma and Associates. Having firm nated itself to the public as comprising a single ' LSA should not be allowed at this point to pre- a90 Lecat Ernics tend that its main office and its branch office in effect constitute separate law firms with separate and dis- tinct personalities and responsibilities Held: Petitioner does not deny that Atty. Ma- nalo, a partner in LSA based in its Makati main office, received the copy of the decision. Such a receipt binds the LSA law partnership, Death Of A Partner Does Not Extinguish The Client. Lawyer Relationship With The Law Firm. B.R. Sebastian Enterprises Inc. vs. Court of Appeals” 206 SCRA 28 Held: We find no merit in petitioner's conten- tions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAI- ZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner. The ‘confusion’ in the office of the law firm fol: lowing the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid Justification for its failure to file the Brief With Baiza’s death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is $0 because it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was des- ignated to handle the case, later left the office alter the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could have replaced him. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re- assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could con- tract the services of a new lawyer. * Bernardo vs. CA, 275 SCRA 413.Cove oF Proressioal, Respoxsipiuiny The Lawyer and Soctety ED Negligence Of A Member In The Law Firm Is Negli- gence Of The Firm.—When the counsel of record is the Law Firm, the negligence of the lawyer assigned to the case consisting in his leaving for abroad without notifying his colleagues is negligence of the Law Firm (see Antonio ys. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 592) Rule 3.03.—Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law al- lows him to practice law concurrently. COMMENTS: Name Of Partner Should Be Dropped From The Firm Name When He Accepts Public Office. —If a partner in a law firm has accepted a public office, his name shall be removed from the firm name. Exception: If the law allows him to practice law concurrently while holding the position such as a Sanggunian member who is allowed to practice law subject to certain restrictions (see RA 7160, Section 90). The reason for the Rule is to prevent the law firm or partners from making use of the name of the public official to attract legal business and to avoid suspicion of undue influence (Report of IBP Committee, p. 16). When a member of the firm, on becoming a judge is precluded from practising law, his name should not be continued in the firm name (Canon 33, CPE). A Judge is among the public officers who Is not allowed to practice Jaw (Dia Anonuevo vs. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81). Some other officers not allowed to practice law are—the President of the Philippines, Members of the Constitutional Commis- sion, Members of Congress, Members of the Cabinet. Members of Judicial and Bar Council, Governors, Mayor. Prosecutors, Solicitors and others specially disqualified by92 LecaL Ernics law or regulations.” If they belonged to a law firm before, their names must be dropped therefrom upon assumption of their public positions which do not allow concurrent practice of law. Rule 3.04.—A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in an- ticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. COMMENTS: Seeking Publicity, Prohibited —A lawyer who seeks publicity to attract legal business is debasing the legal profession, specially so, if he pays something of value for it. Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position and all other self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of the profession (Canon 27, CPE). If competitive advertising is allowed among lawyers, the good and ethical lawyers will be pushed to the sides by the moneyed and unscrupulous ones. Advertising may then lead to assertion of fraudulent claims, corruption of public officials; more, it will encourage lawyers to engage in overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation and misrepresentation.” It will also lead to the creation of false status and reputation of lawyers which in the end wil mislead the public and clients to their detriment in repos” ing trust and confidence on lawyers who may not be competent and trustworthy at all. * See: Rule 138, Section 35, RRC; Art. VI, Section 13: A" IX-A, Sections 2 and 8 (2nd par.) 1987 Constitution; RA 7) Section 90. ® advertising, Solicitation and the Professional Duty ™ Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 Yale, L.J. 1184 (Note)essionAl, RESPONSIBILITY The Lawyer and Society 2 Best Advertisement For A Lawyer. —The most wo nd effective advertisement possible, even for a oe lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited painting for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and con duct (Canon 27, CPE; Director of Religious Affairs vs Bayot, 74 Phil. 579). thy a A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE CANON 4. IMPROVEMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE ADMINI- STRATION OF JUSTICE. COMMENTS: The Legal System.—It is every the legal system in the country, lawyers can contribute to the enhancement of the system by presenting position papers or resolutions for the introduction of pertinent bills in Congress; petitions with the Supreme Court for the amendment of the Rules of Court or introduction of New Rules; petitions with the IBP and other forums which have any relevant influence to the system. Lawyer's associations may devise and maintain programs of continuing legal education throughout the country; create law centers and law libraries for legal research. Experienced legal practitione! may write legal publications or improving the legal system. Lawyers who are members of Congress position to take a close look at the system and introdue bills for the improvement thereof; others, who MAY not be members of Congress may assist in legislation by writing their Congressmen and urge them to initiate suggested law reform Improvement Of lawyer's duty to improve ‘Through collective efforts, rs and professors of law books as an avenue of are in the best94 LecaL ETHICS The improvement of the administration of justice is a duty that falls on the shoulders of every Filipino. But, more than anyone else, it is the lawyers who should be in the forefront of this endeavor as they are the best trained and learned in the law. The fair administra- tion of justice is not a stranger to them being a daily companion. While the lawyer's task in contributing to the im- provement of the legal system is not a matter of strict Guty, it is a duty nonetheless which flows from a lawyer's Sense of his public responsibility. Indeed, this duty is so well recognized that Arthur T. Vanderbilt, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, once pointed- ly said: (Another) task of the great lawyer is to do his part individually and as a member of the orga- nized bar to improve his profession, the courts, and the law. As President Theodore Roosevelt aptly put it. “Every man owes some of his time to the upbuilding of the profession to which he belongs.’ Indeed, this obli- gation is one of the great things which distinguishes a profession from a business. The soundness and the necessity of President Roosevelt's admonition insofar as it relates to the legal profession cannot be doubted. The advances in natural science and technology are so startling and the velocity of change in business and in social life is so great that the law along with the other social sciences, and even human life itself. a p grave danger of being extinguished by new gods of its own invention if it does not awake from its leth- orev faa eat The Five Functions of the Lawyer: (1954) eres the Public, 40 A.B.AJ. 31 ‘ommittee, p. 20). Lar myers as officers of the court must assist in the administration of justice (Cordova vs. Labeyan, 249 SCR 172).1 3 tne cRA Cope oF ProressionaL RESPONSIBILITY 95 ‘The Lawyer and Society CANON 5. A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PRO- GRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DIs- SEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. COMMENTS: Lawyers Must Update Themselves With The Law and Must Participate In The Dissemination Thereof. — The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a) elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice, and {o) to enable the bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philip- pines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal develop- ments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and jurisprudence. He must ac- quaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders, administrative circulars, regula- tions and other rules promulgated by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyer's life is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to obsoleteness, t Judges, Must Also Keep Abreast Of The Laws, Rul- te’ And Doctrines Of The Supreme Court —Judges by awe ure Of their functions, must keep abreast with the Ca ee and decisions of the Supreme Court (Uy vS: ‘Pulong, 221 SCRA 89; Rule 1.01, CJC).96 132; Lecat Etuics De Roy vs. Court of Appeals 157 SCRA 757” Facts: This Court finds that the Court of Ap- peals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for extension of. time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed en- try of judgment and denied their motion for reconsi- deration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs. Japzon, (G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46) that the Ar ten-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. xxx. Held: Petitioners contend that the rule enunct ated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals ‘was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring the publication of the Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effee- tive. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in ac tive law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.S) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. Zualo vs. CFI of Cebu CA-G.R. No. 27718-R July 7, 1961 Held: Attorneys should familiarize themselves with the rules and comply with their requirement’ ‘They are also chargeable with notice of changes in the rules which have been held as including not only & sci *' See also: PAFLU vs. Bureau of Labor Relations. eS a Bautista vs. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 525; People vs: 64! 242 SCRA 514. ge JtCope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 97 ‘The Lawyer and Society ress reglementary provisions but also a regular prac- tice under the Rules of Court. Legal Education Does Not Stop With The Lawyer's Admission To The Bar—Once a person becomes # law. yer, he incurs a three-fold obligation. First, he owes it to himself to continue improving his knowledge of the law: second, he owes it to his profession to take an active interest in the maintenance of the integration of the Philippin: has given renewed significance to the obligations to: 1. Encourage and foster legal education: 2. Devise and maintain a program of continuing le- gal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the Profession throughout the country; and The term legal education is mean the special tr, generally understood to 1 aining that goes into the making of a nae ms x has long been recognized that this education end with Committec cs admission to the Bar (Report of IBP » And Not Just Be cont Lo oe The Pursuit For Support are, L°8l Education Pro 8.—Lawyers must Standards in our age efforts for tee achievement of high studs 7 law schools, in ti © practi Programe SUCH as thos98 Leoat Ernics complished through publications of legal articles in law journals, newspapers or through other media of communi- cations. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education —To keep the lawyers, specially practising lawyers, abreast with the law and jurisprudence, continuing legal education should be made mandatory by the Supreme Court. ‘On August 22, 2000, the Supreme Court promulgated Bar Matter No. 850, which implemented the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Program for all mem- bers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Lawyers are required to complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education on specified subjects. Some lawyers are exempted therefrom like Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, RTC Judges, Law Deans, some law professors, members of Congress, etcCove oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 99 The Lawyer and Socety CANON 6. THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO Law. YERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS. Rule 6.01—The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of es- tablishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for discipl- nary action. Rule 6.02—A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to Promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to in. terfere with his public duties. Rule 6.03—A lawyer shall not, after leaving government Service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. —S———.100 LecaL Etnics CANON 6. THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY To LAW. YERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS, COMMENTS: Canons Apply To Lawyers In The Service Of The Government.—The Canons and Rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated on June 21, 1988 are not intended for the private practitioners alone. They shall govern the acts of all lawyers including those in the service of the Government like the Solicitors of the OSG." A lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon his assuming public office (Report of IBP Committee, p. 30) However, lawyers who are incumbent judges and magistrates shall be governed in the performance of their official functions by the Code of Judicial Conduct which became effective on October 20, 1989. The grounds for disbarment provided in Rule 138, Section 27, of the Revised Rules of Court shall be applica- ble to all. However, since 1989, the IBP Commission On Bar Discipline could not investigate members of the bench.” Incumbent Judges may be suspended or removed by the Supreme Court on grounds other than those enume ated in Rule 138, Section 27. Complaints against Judges shall be governed mainly by Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Constitution, special laws and other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. a8 A. See Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. CA, and FP G.R. No. 130068, Oct. 1, 1998; Lim vs. Sagucio, 486 SCRA 10 * Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 dated Februa'Y 1989. 2Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ‘The Lawyer and Society tou Code Of Conduct And Ethical Standards Under R.A. 6713."—All public officials and employees, whether lawyers or non-lawyers are governed by a Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards which was approved on February 20, 1989. The term “public officials” includes elective and ap- pointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount (Section 3 [b], RA 6713) Judges, prosecutors, solicitors and other lawyers in the government service are equally governed by said Code. ‘The law requires the observance of the following norms of conduct by every public official in the discharge and exe- cution of their official duties:” {a) Commitments to public interest.—Public of- ficials and employees shall always uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All govern- ment resources and powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively. honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wast- age in public funds and revenues. (b) Professionalism.—Public officials and em- ployees shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, in- telligence and skill. They shall enter public service ™ RA 6713—An Act Establishing A Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. to uphold the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust. Sranting incentives and rewards for exemplary service, enume- ating prohibited acts and transactions and providing penalties or Violations thereof and for other purposes. 4 Public O°, 80: SECTION 1, Public office is @ pole ole 3 i officers and employees must at all times be eee leu People, serve them with utmost responsibility a ea ma and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, 4 est lives (Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)102 Lea Erxics with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue pat ronage (c) Justness and sincerity —Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from do- ing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue fa- vors on account of their office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or affinity except with re- spect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminus with theirs. (@ Political neutrality.—Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affilia tion or preference. €) Responsiveness to the public—Public offi- cials and employees shall extend prompt, courteous. and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by the public inter- est, public officials and employees shall provide in- formation on their policies and procedures in cleat and understandable language, ensure openness of in formation, public consultations and hearings when- ever appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas. (| Nationalism and patriotism.—Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the Re- Public and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods, resources and technology andCoe oF Proressiova. Responsteitiry 1 ‘The Lawyer and Society - encourage appreciation and pride of country and peo- Ple. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Phil ippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion (@ Commitment to democracy—Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the de. mocratic way of life and values, maintain the princi ple of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of civilian authority over the military They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party. th) Simple tiving—Public officials and employ- ees and their families shall lead modest lives appro- priate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form (Section 4, RA No. 6713). Government Lawyers.—Lawyers in the government service are also prohibited to engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions (Section 7, [b-2], RA No. 6713). The prohibition will continue for one year after their separation from public office, in connection with any matter pending before the Office they used to be with (Section 7 [3], RA No. 6713). Misconduct In Office As Public Official May Be A Ground For Disciplinary Action.—If the lawyer's miscon- duct in the discharge of his official duties as government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, he may be disciplined as a member of the Bar on such ground (Gon- zales Austria, et al. vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634; Collantes Vs. Renomeron, 200 SCRA 584).104 Lecat Ernics Vitriolo vs. Atty. Dasig 400 SCRA 172 Held: Government lawyer asked for money for favorable decision of administrative cases pending be- fore her. ‘A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers in- cluding those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in. the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public. Lawyer was disbarred. Rule 6.01.—The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts oF the concealment of witnesses capable of establish: ing the innocence of the accused is highly repre hensible and is cause for disciplinary action. COMMENTS: Primary Duty Of A Prosecu itor.—A prosecutor is @ aera officer and as such, he should seek equél with se Justice. He should be as much concerned Seeing that no innocent man suffers as in seeing that m8 man escapes (State vs, Platon, 40 0.G. 6th SupP U.S. vs. Barredo 32 Phil. 449, Held: we that & cane a8F€ with the contentions of counsel tigations have soe ecutng official, whose inves: peat ive Satisfied him as to the innocence of arged with the commission of crime: h>Cone oF Proressional ResPonsipitiry 105 ‘The Lawyer and Society should not institute criminal proceedings against such persons. But we are of opinion that in the event that criminal proceedings have been instituted, and the investigations of the provincial fiscal have satis- fied him that the accused person is innocent, or that evidence sufficient to secure conviction will not be forthcoming at the trial despite the exercise of due diligence to that end, it then becomes his duty to ad- vise the court wherein the proceedings are pending as to the result of his investigations, and to move the court to dismiss the proceedings, leaving it to the court to take such action as may be proper in the premises. In this jurisdiction provincial fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of court, to dismiss or nolles prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. The Power to dismiss is vested solely in the courts, that is to say in the presiding judge thereof. Interest Of A Prosecutor. —The interest of a prosecu- tor in a criminal prosecution is not to win a case but to see that justice is done (U.S. ve, Barredo, supra: Suarez en: 68 Phil. 356). He should present evidence in their true and proper significance (Costigan, Cases On Legal Ethics, Pp. 221). a He should see to it that the accused 's given a fair and impartial trial and not deprived of any of his statutory or constitutional rights (State vs. Platon, Supra: see also People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453). cutee sequently, it is highly reprehensible for a prose- ble op whether public or private—to suppress facts capa- conceay tablishing the innocence of the accused or to innocs, witnesses who can equally establish the accused's ence of the cri of th ime charged. A prosecutor who is guilty se acts is subject to disciplinary action. It is as E Os calcu’, much his duty to refrain from improper meth ed to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to SuareeY, legitimate means to bring about a just one Proofs ofS, Paton, 69 Phil. 564). He should noi present fe guilt of i seized oF acquine’ the accused which is illegally Such as those prohibited under the Bill of106 Lecat Etxics Rights particularly evidence obtained by torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate his free will, including confessions or admissions obtained under the same circumstances (Art. III, Par. 12 [2] and [3], 1987 Constitution). Facts To Be Laid Methodically And Meticulously By Prosecutor—A prosecutor should lay the pertinent facts with methodical and meticulous attention. Thus, “(In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts at their dis- posal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused and to the state” (People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 65, citing People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453) A Public Prosecutor Should Recommend The Ac: quittal Of The Accused Whose Conviction Is On Appeal. If He Finds No Legal Basis To Sustain The Conviction. Triente, Sr. vs. Sandiganbayan 145 SCRA 508 Held: Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General and in view of the reassessment made bY that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the af firmance of the decision appealed from cannot be Heghtfully Sustained. The conscientious study and Generad ienalysis made by the Office of the Solicitor its role (tls c@8e truly reflects its consciousness © Of Justice to de eee’ Advocate in the administration fended an, af ¢ end that the innocent be equally 4& the guilty pniere Just as it has the task of having Sullty punished. This Court will do no less a+ >Coe oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 107 The Lawyer and Society therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation t the decision and resolution in question of the re- eoaaeal Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a eae of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal Rule 6.02.—A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to inter- fere with his public duties. COMMENTS: The Code Is Equally Applicable To Lawyers In The Government Service.—Canon 6 states: “These Canons shall apply to lawyers in Government service in the dis- charge of their official tasks.” They have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice or nongovernment law- yers. For as held in Macoco vs. Diaz (70 Phil. 97), involving a fiscal who was disbarred for misappropriating money in breach of trust, “(W)ant of moral integrity is to be more Severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible Public office.” Government lawyers, who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service. For a public office is a public trust. They do not shed their professional obliga- tons in assuming public Positions. On the other hand. they should be more sensiti ons as their disreputable ified in the public eye.” Under Section 4 petted to uphold t Sonal interest; highest a, a of R.A. No. 6713, Public officials are he public interest over and above ust discharge their duties with the ellence, Professionalism, intelligence, egree of exc,108 Lacat Erxics commit themselves to the democratic way of life ang values; and lead modest lives. Government lawyers must comply with the above dy ties which do not contradict but largely complement the Canons of Professional Responsibility. Promotion Of Private Interests Prohibited. —A law ment service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interest. Thus, if such a lawyer is concurrently allowed to engage in the practice of law, he should not use his public position to enhance his private practice of law or a private business of his for that matter. Thus, it is unethical for a government lawyer to remain secretly connected with a Law firm and solicit cases for the said firm with referral fees or monthly retain- ers for the purpose. Misconduct In The Discharge Of Official Duties 4» Government Official; Generally Not Disciplinable: Ex ception —Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar f misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a governmet! official. However, if the misconduct of a government official i of such a character as to affect his qualification 25? lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be (Gor Eee as a member of the Bar upon such gr0l! (gone es-Austria, et al. vs. Abaya, 176 SCRA 634: Colla! Sak Renomeron, 200 SCRA 584; Dinsay vs. ioe 6 8 11996}; Lim vs. Barcelona, 425 SCRA 67): yer in govern! A . form A Det ett Lawyer Should Not Refuse 7? er is required oy en eovernment lawyer, who under the cies cr ome, present the Government, any of iS S, should not refuse to appear for the™Cove oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 109 The Lawyer and Soctety Enriquez, Sr. vs. Hon. Gimenez 107 Phil. 933" Facts: Fiscal refused to appear for the Munici pality of Bauan, Batangas in a civil case where he is not disqualified to appear. The Municipality then hired the services of a private counsel. Held: The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and, therefore. could not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. And unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to de- cline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse the perform- ance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Where he swore, among others, “that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the of fice or position upon which he is about to enter.” Rule 6.03.—A lawyer shall not, after leaving govern- ment service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had in- tervened while in said service. COMMENTS: Ler Restrictions Against Government Lawyers Who soverat®, Service —A government lawyer may leave the tion, went service in various ways: retirement, resigna- donmerPration of the term of office, dismissal or aban- Prohibit Whichever way he leaves the service, he is ted by the Rule from accepting engagement or 173, a" also: Municipality of Bocaue vs. Manotok, 93 Phil ' Rosa Mining Co. vs. Zabala, 53 SCRA 367 >110 Lecat, Emuics employment in connection with any matter In which he had intervened while in said service. Thus, a Congressman lawyer who authored a bill creating an Office which be. came a law, cannot accept a position of employment jn that Office (see also Section 6, RA No. 3019) Any public official, even if not a lawyer, Is bound by similar restrictions although more severe, under Sec. 3 (4) RA 3019 as amended, and Section 7 (b), RA No. 6713, The pertinent provisions of RA No. 3019 provide— “Section 3. Corrupt practices of public offt cers, In addition to acts or omission of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: XXX (4) Accepting or having any member of his fam ily accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one year after its termina. tion.” XXX And Section 7 (b) of RA No. 6713 prohibits public off cials from doing any of the following acts— “U) Own, control, manage or accept employ ment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, br ker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enter Prise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law; XXX These prohibitions shall continue to apply for @ Period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, of Separation trom public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional con cerned cannot practice his profession in connectton with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year ee shall likewise an Year prohibition shall likeCove oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 ‘The Lawyer and the Legal Profession a Lawyers, who are government officials or employees, must always be wary that as such they are “at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost respon- sibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives" (Art. XI, Section 1, 1987 Constitution). In the Attorney's Oath, the lawyer solemnly swears among other vows that he will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein Violation Of Restriction Is Tantamount To Repre- senting Conflicting Interests—A former PNB officer violates the Rule in accepting engagement or employment against his former employer (PNB) in transactions which he formerly handled while still an officer of the Bank (PNB vs. Cedo, AC No. 3701, March 28, 1995). Adverse-Interest Conflicts; Congruent-Interest Conflicts; Concepts.— PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. 455 SCRA 568 Held: In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. ‘The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics, In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of public respect to which the legal pro- fession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics. As early as 1924, some ABA members have Questioned the form and function of the canons Among their concems was the “revolving door” or the Process by which lawyers and others temporarily Government service from private life and112 Lecat Eruics leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence gar nered in government service. These concerns were classified as “adverse-interest conflicts” and “congru entinterest conflicts.” “Adverse -interest conflicts” exist where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is sub- stantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the in- terests of the current and former are adverse. On the other hand, “congruent-interest representation con: JSlicts” are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers. For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for “adverse-interest conflicts” and “con gruent-interest representation conflicts.” The ration- ale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer's largely discretionary actions would be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. x x x. Presidential Commission On Good Government (PCGG) vs. Sandiganbayan (5" Division), Lucio C. Tan, et al- 455 SCRA 526 Facts: Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the Solict tor General until 1986. He resumed his private prac- lice of law. He appeared as counsel for Lucio C. Tat ct. al. before the Sandiganbayan involving civil caseS of sequestration of |-gotten oes Properties allegedly ill-g _ aoe ae the Solicitor General, he advised the cmra\ Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK which became saddled with banking problems. GENBANK was later bought by the ALLIED BANK owned by Lucio C. Tan, et. al. Atty. Mendoza »Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ‘The Lawyer and the Legal Profession continues defending both the interests of the Central Bank and Lucio Tan, et al. PCGG filed a Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza anchored on Rule 6.03 reading. “A lawyer shall not, after leaving gov- emment service, accept engagement or em ployment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.” Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is dis- qualified to appear as counsel for Lucio Tan, et. al. under Rule 6.03. Held: Rule 6.08 of the sponsibility retained the graph 2, Canon 36 of the les but replaced the exp: and passed upon” with therefore, interest cor Code of Professional Re- general structure of para- Canons of Professional Eth- ansive phrase “investigated the word “intervened.” It is, Properly applicable to both “adverse- TYflicts” and “congruent-interest conflicts.” The case at bar does not involve the “adverse in- t” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is Sonceded. has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor and terest x x x We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. x X ix: not yomtlarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was will pe NCeMed with the prejudice to the client which be caused by its misapplication, It cannot be >, 113114 Lecal ErHics doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. The client with a disquali- fied lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process. XXX No less significant a consideration is the depriva tion of the former government lawyer of the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government law- yer may extend to all members of his law firm. Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession. It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Profes- sional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in govern- ment. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best which can lead to untoward results. No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restric- tions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information be- tween the government-client and its attorneys which the canons seek to protect. Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and some courts have abandoned per se disqualification based 0M Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, governme: h ‘nt, the wit in the case. and the public. nesses Atty. Mendoza was e Su mone can not disqualified by théConk oF PRoressionat. Responsteiuimy 115 ‘The Lawyer and the Legal Profession CHAPTER II—THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.01—A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making false statement or suppressing a ma. terial fact, in connection with his application for admission to the bar. Rule 7.02—A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character education, or other relevant attribute. Rule 7.03—A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or pri- vate life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession a116 ‘LecaL ErHics Rule 7.01.—A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a mate. rial fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar. COMMENTS: Requirements For All Applicants For Admission To ‘The Bar.—Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral char acter, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines (Rule 138, Sec. 2, RRC) Additional Requirements For Other Applicants— All applicants for admission before being admitted to the examination, must satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and _ successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or uni versity, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompan! by a certificate from the University or school of law. shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further eviden® may be required by the court. __ No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examin tions unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university duly recognized bY the government; civil law, commercial law, remedial ¥ criminal law, public and private international law, pollt® law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprude"* taxation and legal ethics (Rule 138, Sec. 5, RRC) Pre-Law.—No applicant for admission to the ba amination shall be admitted unless he presents a cet cate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education a before he began the study of law, he has pursued satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recoe™ adCope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7 The Lawyer and the Legal Profession university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics (Rule 138, Sec. 6. RRC) Knowingly Making A False Statement Or Suppres- sion Of A Material Fact In The Application For Admis- sion To The Bar; Consequences.—if the false statement or suppression of material fact is discovered before the candidate could take the bar examinations, he will be denied permission to take the examinations. If the false statement or suppression of material fact was discovered after the candidate had passed the exami- nations but before having taken his oath, he will not be allowed to take his oath as a lawyer. It must be stressed, the oath may only be taken before the Supreme Court by a person authorized by the Court to engage in the practice of law (People vs. de Luna, 102 Phil. 968). If the discovery was made after the candidate had taken his oath as a lawyer, his name will be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. In Re: Ramon Galang™ 66 SCRA 282 Held: By 1966, when Galang took the Bar ex- Sminations for the fourth time, the application form Debate by the Court for use of applicants required invongPcant to reveal all his criminal cases whether that nee moral turpitude or not. In Paragraph 4 of clare thay {h¢ applicant is required under oath to de- before a py t© Bas Not been charged with any offense eect Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officers: or itl or milicted foro eoreciatedl lay ange oot Gr 's there ¢y22Y Crime involving moral turpitude: nor * Pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. See ala. ; “also: Heron g, Meling case, 431 SCRA 146. >> _| 118 Lecat, Enics 1163, p. 56 rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971. All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, ts guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examina tions seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath. That the concealment of an attomey in his applica tion to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is@ ground for revocation of his license to practice law, 's well-settled. (See 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). In the case of Diao vs. Martinez (7 SCRA 478). name of Telesforo A. Diao was stricken off the Rol © Attomeys for false pretenses on his educational a ment. He misrepresented that he finished Associate int Degree when the truth is he had no such degree: Diao vs. Martinez 7 SCRA 477 Held: Plainly, therefore, ‘Telesforo A. Diao" not qualified to take the bar examinations; bt @¥¢ his false representations, he was allowed t0 @™ luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted we 7 Bar, Such admission having been obtained YT false pretenses must be, and is hereby revok be fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations 1S imma” rial. Passing such examinations is not the omyCope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY lig ‘The Lawyer and the Legal Profession fication to become an attorney-at-law; taki scribed courses of pre-legal study (A.A.) in manner is equally essential. ing the pre- the regular The Clerk is therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. In Villasanta vs. Peralta (101 Phil. 313), Peralta was a successful Bar candidate but was not admitted to the Bar because of lack of good moral character he having been finally convicted for violation of Art. 350 of the RPC (mar. riage contracted against provisions of laws) which offense involves moral turpitude. In said case, Peralta was married to Rizalina Valdez when he courted Lilian Villasanta and to have carnal knowledge with the latter, he procured the Preparation of a fake marriage contract. the commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer. When he made a concealment, he Mena ated perjury (In re: Galang, 66 SCRA 289: Heron © Meling case, 431 SCRA 146). 7 Prohibition Against Candidates.—To impose disci- Pine upon candidates for the Bar examinations, the Re- “ised Rules of Court provides: “SEC. 3. Disciplina I dat shall enc’ iplinary measures.—No candidate ae ‘or to influence any member of the com- ittee, and during examination the candidates shall on Communicate with each other Nor shall they give i ceive any assistance. The candidate who violates S Provision or any other provision of this rule, shall count n<" ftom the examination, and the same to nt as a failure against him, and further discipli- ni SY action, including Permanent disqualification. >120 Lecat, Enuics may be taken in the discretion of the court.” (Rule 138, Sec. 13, RRC). Rule 7.02.—A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, edu. cation or other relevant attribute. COMMENTS: Lawyer Shall Not Support The Application For Ad- mission To The Bar Of An Unqualified Candidate— Sections 2 and 5 of Rule 138” of the Rules of Court specify the requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. A lawyer shall make no recommendation or endorse- ment of any applicant for admission to the bar, if he knows that the applicant is not qualified to become a **Section 2. Requirements For All Applicants For Admis: sion To The Bar.—Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satis factory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed ot are pending in any court in the Philippines.” “Section 5. Additional Requirements For Other Appt cants—All applicant for admission other than those referred ° in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to tht examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied Jaw for four (4) years, and successfully completed all preset courses, in a law school or university, officially approved Tecognized by the Secretary of Education, The affidavit of ti candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university °" School of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts. and fu ther evidence may be required by the court, No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinatio™® unless he has satisfactori ang courses 1 law schol or university duly recognised gy ho encase law, commercial law, rem “ ’ Temedial law, criminal law, public Private international law, political law, labor and social legs tion, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.” luly recognized by the government: at >»Cope oF PROFESSIONAL. Responsipiity The Lawyer and the Legal Profession 121 member of the bar for lack of good moral character, lack of educational requirements or other relevant attribute. [t jg even his duty to society to do something to Prevent such applicant from taking the bar examinations. “As the Public is vitally interested in the rectitude of attorneys, any person is permitted to oppose an application for admission by urging the moral disqualification of the applicant.” (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Malcolm, 1949, p. 18). “Public policy also demands that any person seeking admission to the bar shall possess such degree of learning and profi- ciency in law as is necessary for due performance of the duties of the attorney” (Ibid). “The door of admission to the bar must swing on re- luctant hinges, and only he be permitted to pass through who has by continued and patient study fitted himself for the work of a safe counselor and the place of a leader." (Justice Brewer, XVIII Reports, ABA, p. 450 [1985)). His support to an applicant must be solely based on fitness. both intellectual and moral (Report of IBP Committee, p. 36). A lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against ad- mission to the profession of candidates unfit or unquali- fled for being deficient in either moral character or educa- tion (Canon 29, CPE). A lawyer who violates Rule 7.02 is liable for discipli- nary action. The act of supporting the application to the of any person known to him to be unqualified consti- tutes gross misconduct in office (Rule 138, Sec. 27, RRC). Rule 7.03.—A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law nor shall he, whether in public or private life, be- have in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. COMMENTS; . self Pro- Lawyer Must At All Times Conduct Him! Pe ‘ “WY As Not To Put Into Question His Fitness To Prae i ~—122 AL Ernics tice Law.—If good moral character is a qualification for the privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is tial during the continuance of the practice and the ar cise of the privilege (Quingwa vs. Armando Puno, 19 SCRA 439). Thus, he should avoid having brushes with the law: he should not assist anyone, even clients, in the commis, sion of any crime, or any unprofessional act. In fact, he may properly make disclosures as may be necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threat ened (Canon 37, CPE). A lawyer should maintain the standard of moral fit ness required of him when he applied for admission to the Bar.” In brief, he should always be faithful to his Oath which is a condensed code of legal ethics (Philips & McCoy, Conduct of Judges and Lawyers, 8, 10 [1952)). The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional ot nonprofessional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417; Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). He is therefore expected to be concerned even with matters like payment of his membership dues and special assessments in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (In Edillon, 84 SCRA 554) and payment of his privilege (Sec. 201, C.A. 46 as amended) otherwise, he my disciplined (U.S. vs. Garner, 9 Phil. 18). This conduct of nobility and uprightness should with him whether in his public or private life. A law’ who commits an unlawful act though not related in discharge of his professional duties as a member © Bar, which puts his moral character in serio a renders him unfit to continue in the practice 0. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662; Cabal il Deiparine, 60 SCRA 136; Balinon vs. De Leon. * 277). The grounds for disciplinary actions ¢nu! us erate? ® See also: Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 6 vs. Cordova, 179 SCRA 680; Zaguirre vs. Castillo. # 658.Cope oF Proressional, Respoxsteuiry The Lawyer and the Legal Profession 123 under the Rules of Court are not exclusive (Royong Oblena. 7 SCRA 859) and are so broad as to com en cally any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity (In re: Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567) A lawyer must constantly conduct himself with great propriety (Investment and Management Services Corp. vs Roxas, 256 SCRA 229). The issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and puts the erring lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his profes- sional duties as a member of the bar (Vda. de Espino vs. Presquito, 432 SCRA 610). Avoidance Of Scandalous Conduct.—As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scan dalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21). Lawyer Shall Stand “As A Shield” In Defense Of Right And In The Warding Off Wrong.—It is a fair charac- terization of the lawyer's responsibility in our society that he stands ‘as a shield’ to quote Devlin, J., in defense of right and to ward off wrong, From a profession charged with these responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite dis- Cretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibil 'ty, that have throughout the centuries, been compendi- Susly described as ‘moral character” (Report of IBP Com Mittee, Pp. 37). » Rule 138, Section 27, RRC. 1957) Schware vs. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 US 252 (124 LecaL Erxics CANON 8. A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HimsEip WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND cay. DOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL Col. LEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. Rule 8.01—A lawyer shall not, in his professional deal- ings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Rule 8.02—A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, en croach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counselCove oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 125 The Lawyer and the Legal Profession 25 CANON 8. A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CAN- DOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COL- LEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. COMMENTS: Courtesy To Fellow Lawyers, Necessary.—Lawyers are officers of the court whether they are incumbent judges, prosecutors or legal practitioners. They belong to the legal profession—a profession exclusive to those privi- leged to practice law. To maintain the dignity of the legal profession, lawyers must conduct themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other. Respect generates respect. They shall avoid resorting to harassing tactics against their opposing counsels. They must participate in the battle for justice with the armors of courtesy and fair- ness—avoiding to do those very things which they would not want to be done to them as members of the Bar. The golden rule is much more needed in the legal profession than in any other profession for a better administration of Justice. Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, fair- a candor and civility (Yap-Paras vs. Paras, 523 SCRA _ awyer who rudely interrupts his fellow lawyer while sine tter was making representations in behalf of the party is violation of the Canon (Bugaring vs. Espa- Nol, 349 SCRA 459) cangePeeific Instances of Lack of Candor.—It is not contente %, ir for the lawyer to knowingly misquote the age ee oh @ paper, the testimony of a witness. the lan- Buage of pee argument of opposing counsel, or the ae ts invaliag ‘¢ decision or a textbook; or with knowledge 7 overruled ly, to cite as authority a decision that has been or a statute that has been repealed, or in ars >126 Lecal Ethics sert as a fact that which has not been proved or in those jurisdictions where a side has the opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. rofessional and dishonorable to deal other the facts in taking the statements of ig affidavits and other documents, and ment to as: It is unp! than candidly with witnesses, in drawiny in the presentation of causes. A lawyer should not offer evidence which he knows the court should reject, in order to get the same before the jury by arguments for its admissibility, nor should he ‘address to the judge arguments upon any points not properly calling for determination by him. Neither should he introduce into an argument, addressed to the court, rks or statements intended to influence the bystan¢ remai ers.” Rule 8.01.—A lawyer shall not, in his professional deal ings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. COMMENTS: Abusive and Offensive Language Has No Place != Pleadings; Contemptuous.—Disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language, offensive personalities, unfoun' accusations or intemperate words tending to obstruct embarrass or influence the court in administering Just or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading ‘Their employment serves no useful purpose and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt or contempt 19 Jae! oe (see Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel: 31 SCRA 1; Rheem ofthe Philippines vs. Fert. 20 SCRA an BES fe vs. Argel, 70 SCRA 378; In re AlmaceD ft ; People vs. Manobo, 18 SCRA 30; Urbin@ ” faceren, 57 SCRA 403. See also Salcedo vs. Hernand® * Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics.1ONAL. RESPONSIBILITY and the Legal Profession ed 61 Phil. 724; Ferandos vs. Reyes, 64 SCRA 270; Macias vs Malig, 157 SCRA 762) A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening language betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power (Surigao Mineral vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 235; In Re: Gomez, 43 Phil. 376; Sulit vs. Tiangco, 115 SCRA 207; Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez, 166 SCRA 316). fe To Be Used.—A lawyer's language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befit- ting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1; Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441; In re: Climaco, 55 SCRA 107). The lawyer's arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to an- other (National Security Co. vs. Jarvis, 278 U.S. 610; People vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251; Torres vs. Javier, 470 SCRA 408). A lawyer shall refrain from all offensive personality and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation aa Party or witness, unless required by the justice of the ‘use with which he is charged (Surigao vs. Cloribel, Supra; Rule 138, Section 20, [f], RRC). Recor May Expunge Improper Language From The the serioac Jawver's language should be in keeping with therefore Lenes® and purpose of his calling. It should Which stag dignified and temperate. Any kind of language Counse] rns without foundation the integrity of opposing Tecords on (Ne dignity of the court may be striken off the are may subject a lawyer to disciplinary action. ‘proper janct Unknown where courts have expunged nets from, mBuage from the records, removed offending ™ the files or administered disciplinary action on > ‘ases<> 128 Lecat Ernics lawyers for using offensive language [Report of IBP Co, mittee, p. 41). mm Instances Of Disrespectful Language —The followin are instances of language considered disrespectful ani offensive— 1. The lawyer's referral to the Supreme Court as a “civilized, democratic tribunal” but the innuendo would suggest that it is not; categorizing the Supreme Cour, decision as “false, erroneous and illegal” (Surigao vs, Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1). 2. Lawyer's veiled threat that he would prosecute those concerned for “knowingly rendering unjust judg- ment” and “judgment rendered through negligence” with the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 235; In re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 422). 3. A lawyer's statement in his appeal brief that, “(The decision of the lower court if allowed to stand, affirmed by this Honorable Court, means only one thing~ that before our courts of justice a man of the reputation of Attorney Claro M. Recto can do no wrong, cannot commit any error. He has but to allow his name and signature (© be used in a case, make inexcusable excuses of his failure to attend anyway,—we repeat, he has but to allow his name and signature to be used in the case, and the cast won" (In re: Velasquez, April 29, 1965 *** LJ 548) 4. A lawyer's protest in his Memorandum deserts; the Judge's attitude as “unjust, hostile, vindictive an dangerous” (Cornejo vs. Judge Tan, 85 Phil. 772) 5. A lawyer's characterization of the Supt Court's mandatory injunction as “unjust and @ riage of justice” (Lim Se vs. Argel, 70 SCRA 378) wv 6. A lawyer's reference to a resolution of the wot preme Court as “sadistic resolution en bane.” “CON cpa honoring its own resolution” (Andres vs. Cabrera. 9% 513). —_ |Cove oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 129 ‘The Lawyer and the Legal Profession 7. Calling a decision an “outrage” and “mockery” of the popular will expressed in the polls (Salcedo vs. Her- tandez, 61 Phil. 724). 8. Labelling a judge as “corrupt” in a Motion for In- hibition (Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295). 9. Calling an adverse counsel as “bobo” or using the words “Ay, que bobo" in reference to the manner of offering evidence (Castillo vs. Padilla, Jr., 127 SCRA 743). 10. A lawyer stating that “justice is blind” and also “deaf and dumb” (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 572). 11. Attributing to the Supreme Court acts of dis- missing judges “without rhyme and reason” and disbarring lawyers “without due process” (Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez, 166 SCRA 377). 12. Calling the award of separation pay as “ill-gotten wealth,” the administrative body which granted the award as an “unknowing” one, and the sheriff's office as a “part- ner in crime” (Lubiano vs. Gordola, 115 SCRA 459) 13. The use of the adjective “insufficiently informed” is disrespectful, abusive and slanderous (Francisco, Jr. vs. UEM-MARA Philippines Corp., 536 SCRA 518). Want Of Intention Not An Excuse For The Disres- Peetfal Language Used.—Lack or want of intention is no cane for the disrespectful language employed. Counsel = ae escape responsibility by claiming that his words a8 mean" What any reader must have understood them Philip mung: At best, it extenuates lability (Rheem of the Ppines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441). the eee” Strong Language Used Is Justified —When language yooh’ language has been impelled by the same used by the Judge, the lawyer cannot be blamed Zales, oe In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 581; Zaldivar vs. Gon- Cruz, ig poe 316; In re: Laureta, 148 SCRA 382; Paragas VS- 809: Dorado vs. Pilar, 104 Phil. 743 >130 LecaL Eruics Fernandez vs. Hon. Bello 107 Phil. 1140 Held: In this Court the Judge below desires that portions of petitioner's motion for reconsidera- tion be stricken out for employing strong language We believed the said strong language must have been impelled by the same language used by the judge be- low in characterizing the act of the petitioner as “anomalous and unbecoming” and in charging peti- tioner of obtaining his fee “through manuevers of documents from the guardian-petitioner.” If any one is to blame for the language used by the petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but him. self. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm. Rule 8.02.—A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly. encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of ay lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper at- vice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. COMMENTS: Lawyer Should Not “Steal” Another's Client: highly unethical for a lawyer to exert efforts directly i indirectly, in any way, to encroach upon the profession employment of another (see Canon 7, CPE). A pest without a retained lawyer is a legitimate prospective cles for any lawyer whom he approaches for legal services: Py as soon as he had retained one, and had not dismissed!" retained counsel, efforts on the part of another law, take him as client constitutes an act of encroaching "PX the employment of another lawyer. Such efforts 7. consist of a promise of better service, lower attomey® ye or the downgrading of the qualifications or serviceS ° pe first lawyer. Any act which is calculated to ease itisCope oF PRoFEssIONaL RESPONSIBILITY 131 “The Lawyer and the Legal Profession revious lawyer with the intent to grab the case is violative of the rule against encroachment upon the employment of another lawyer. Competition among attorneys is contrary to the long established etiquette of the legal profession. No self. respecting practitioner will ever voluntarily tender his services in pending matters then being conducted by other counsel, and will not obtrude criticism on acts of a party's attorney (Canon 7, par. 3, CPE; Warvelle, Legal Ethics, 200, et seq). By constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent lawyer deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case (Dallong-Galiciano vs. Castro, 474 SCRA 1). No Encroachment When Previous Lawyer Was Al- ready Dismissed.—When the first lawyer was already dismissed or dispensed with by the client, the entry of the appearance of another lawyer in the case is not encroach- Rant upon the business of another lawyer (Laput vs. Ramontique, 6 SCRA 45). Lawyer Shall Not Negotiate With The Opposite a, Who Is Represented By A Counsel_—A lawyer contrey at 2 any way communicate upon the subject of = ey with a party represented by counsel, much ter an he undertake to negotiate or compromise the is incusn ee him, but should deal only with his counsel. It erything trator the lawyer most particularly to avoid Sented pe eat May tend to mislead a party not repre- him as 9 fCUNSel, and he should not undertake to advise © the law (Canon 9, CPE). Ne Posite fee Should the lawyer attempt to interview the op- even, 3rd question him as to the facts of the case if th July 22, tos 7 Party is willing to do so (A.B.A. Op. 75.132 LecaL Etnics Likong vs. Lim™** 235 SCRA 414 Held: There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compro: mise agreement. Neither is there any showing that re. spondent informed the trial court of the alleged aban. donment of the complainant by her counsel Lawyer May However Interview Any Witness 0: Prospective Witness For The Opposing Side—A lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action with. out the consent of opposing counsel or party. In doing so, however, he should scrupulously avoid any suggestion calculated to induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the truth, or in any degree to affect his free and untrammelled conduct when appearing at the trial ot on the witness stand (Canon 39, CPE). Advice And Assistance To Victims Of Unfaithful And Neglectful Counsel, Proper —Any person who seeks relief against an unfaithful or neglectful lawyer may proach another lawyer for proper advice and assistance Any advice or assistance extended after proper verieatin is not encroaching upon the business of another lawyer _ such act is justified under the circumstances. A Lh shall not abet activities aimed at defiance of the law me lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02. A lawyer who has acquired knowledge of the ml. tices of a member of the Bar, has the duty to the Pry and to the legal profession to inform the Supreme CO act the IBP of such malpractices to the end that the mal?! tioner be properly disciplined. vor, be Lawyers should expose without fear oF eee te the proper tribunals, corrupt or dishonest cond empl! profession, and should accept without hesitation © jn ment against the member of the Bar who has client (Canon 29, CPE). 31 * See also: Camacho vs, Pagulayan, 328 SCRA -_ |Cope OF PROFESSIONAL REsponsisiuity ‘The Lawyer and the Legal Profession 133 CANON 9. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHOR.- IZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01—A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing. Rule 9.02—A lawyer shalll not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not Ii. censed to practice law, except: a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with @ partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons Specified in the agreement: or 5) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete un- finished legal business of a deceased lawyer: or ©) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non- lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part on a Profit sharing arrangement134 Lecat Erxics CANON 9. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DIRECTLy oR DIRECTLY ASSIST IN THE UNaUTHg IZED PRACTICE OF LAW. " COMMENTS: Unauthorized Practice Of Law. —Unauthorized prac- tice of law is committed when a Person not a lawyer pre tends to be one and performs acts which are exclusive to members of the bar. The unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority consti- tutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both (Tan vs. Balajadia, 484 SCRA 659) An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions (Section 21 Rule 138). Assistance To Unauthorized Practice Of Law, re hibited —Only those licensed by the Supreme Court ma! Practice law in this country. And it is not easy to obtalt that license. It takes years of continuous study to prepa oneself for the purpose and the final hurdle is the Lae of the Bar Examinations given by the Supreme Coutt ( Rule 138, Secs. 6 and 9, Revised Rules of Court). A lawyer shall not assist anyone who is not 2 mene of the Bar to practice law in this country. Thus, he a not take as partner or associate in his law firm a Per who is not a lawyer, a lawyer who has been dis ba lawyer who has been suspended from the practice of or a foreign lawyer although knowledgeable in the unless licensed by the Supreme Court 8 Notarizing the oaths of office as lawyers of Per who failed in the Bar Examinations and announcint C8 they will practice law in all parts of the Philippines "p. gross misconduct and is contemptuous (People ¥ Luna, 102 Phil. 968)Cove oF PRorEssiona,, ResPonsipu sry The Lawyer and the Legal Profession 135 The act of Pretending or assuming to be or an officer of a court and acting as such wit! ity is punishable with contempt of court (Rule 71, Section 3{e], Revised Rules of Court). The lawyer who assists in an unauthorized practice of law whether directly or indirectly is subject to disciplinary action, an attorney thout author- Ethical Consideration For The Canon —The ethical consideration for this Canon is aptly stated in the ADA Code of Professional Responsibility: “The prohibition against the practice of law bya layman is grounded in the need of the public for in ‘egrity and competence of those who undertake to render legal services. Because of the fiduciary and Personal character of the lawyer-client relationship and the inherently complex nature of our legal sys. tem, the public can better be assured of the requisite responsibility and competence if the practice of law is confined to those who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal Profession” (Report of IBP Committee, p. 46: ABA, Code of Professional Responsibility, p. 36). Rule 9.01.—A lawyer shall not delegate to any unquali- fied person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. COMMENTS: Delegation Of Legal Work To An Unqualified Per- 0 Is Misbehavior The practice of law is limited only to indMiduals duly qualified in moral character and aes of fs who passed the Bar Examinations. The Pee Ww is just a Privilege and may be withdrawn s ji lawyer fails fe Maintain the standards of moral and pro- Sslonal condi to nduct. re: sentantPlte policy demands that legal work in the aa . thoge 2" Of parties litigant should be entrusted Own to Possessing tested qualification and who ar136 Lecat Etuics observe the rules and the ethics of the Profession, ag y, as being subject to judicial disciplinary contro] for i protection of courts, clients and the public” (PAFLU - Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302) A lawyer is prohibited from taking as partner OF asso. ciate any person who is not authorized to Practice law—tp appear in court or to sign pleadings (see Guballa vs Caguioa, 78 SCRA 207). Whether such Person is know). edgeable in the law is immaterial. A lawyer, who is under suspension from the practice of law is not a member of the Bar in good standing. More so, a lawyer whose authority to practice has been withdrawn due to a change in citizen- ship or allegiance to the country. U.S. vs. Ney & Bosque 8 Phil. 146” Held: The repeated irregular signature of pleadings by an attorney in the name of a firm im- Properly constituted, with one partner, who. by an order of this court, had been denied the right to prac- tice, and the participation by him in an act of con- tempt committed by such partner, is misbehavior which renders him guilty of contempt xxx. Beltran, Jr. vs. Abad 132 SCRA 453 Held: Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is quired to explain within ten (10) days from notice whY he should not be disciplined for collaborating and 2 sociating in the practice of the law with the resp” dent who is not a member of the bar. The A Lawyer Shall Not Allow A Non-Member one Bar To Misrepresent Himself As A Lawyer—A ni Who allows a non-member of the Bar t0 mist ing himself as a lawyer and to practice is guilty of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professi® : inst . 5g; Robi See also: Lichauco vs, Alejandrino, 21 Phil. 58: vs. Villafuerte, 18 Phil. 171,Cope OF PROFESSIONAL RE SPONSIBILITY The Lawyer and the 1 137 al Profession sponsibility (Cambaliza vs. Cristal-Tenorio, 434 SCRA 288) Lawyer Cannot Delegate His Authority Without Client's Consent Even To A Qualified Person —The suis is absolute that the authority of a lawyer to represent a client in a case cannot be delegated to an unqualified person. The reason for the rule is the dictates of public policy. It does not follow however that the retained lawyer is automatically authorized to make such delegation to a qualified person. A client-lawyer relationship is a personal one. The retained counsel cannot just get another lawyer to represent the client without the latter’s consent. “The reason is that attorneys are selected on account of their special fitness through their learning or probity for the work in hand” (Lamport vs. Aetna Life Insurance, 199 SW 1029, [1933]). An associate or assistant in a law firm may appear for the client, unless the client has contracted otherwise. Rule 9.02.—A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not li. censed to practice law, except: a) Where there is a Pre-existing agreement with a Partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, oney Shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; ») Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfin- {shed legal business of a deceased lawyer; or °) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is ed in whole or in part on a profit-sharing ar- rangement. COMMENTS; Pronjgnision Of Attorney's Fees With Non-Lawyers “@: Exceptions. —A lawyer can only divide or138 Lecal Eruics stipulate to divide fees for legal services with lawyer who had rendered legal services with him i or legal work. Nother Na Case An agreement providing for the diviston of attomeys fees, whereby a non-lawyer (union president) is allowed t, share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Bthics and is immoral and cannot be justiie (PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company. 42 SCRA 302) Rationale Of The Prohibition —If attorney's fees were allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of ne cessity and also to leave the bar in a chaotic condition aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures (Harriman vs. Straham, 33 p. 2d 1067, 47 Wyo. 208, cited in PAFLU case, supra). Exceptions To Rule 9.02: a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with 2 partner or associate that, upon the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfit ished legal business of a deceased lawyer: or c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non: rae employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement Observation: Letter (b) should not be an excePif because the person who undertakes to complete the i é ished legal business of a deceased lawyer is 2 himself who is licensed to practice law. Non-lawyers Are Not Entitled To Attorney's Fe", While it may be true that Pulia was the authorized ye sentative of private respondents in appearing a NLRC. he is not entitled to attorney's fees under ‘Tas ® of the Labor Code for not being a lawyer (Five J NLRC, 235 SCRA 556).Cove oF Pxoressional Resroxsieiiiry ‘The Lawyer and the Legal Profession 139 CHAPTER III—THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS CANON 10. AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01—A lawyer shall not do any falsehood. nor consent to the doing of any in court: nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mis- led by any artifice Rule 10.02—A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing coun- sel, or the text of, a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amend- ment, or assert as a fact that has not been proved. Rule 10.03—A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.140 Lecat Eriics CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE ¢ Sun ‘OURT, COMMENTS: Reason For Provision On Candor And The reason for requiring candor and fairness on the part a lawyer in his relation with the courts had been ea explained by the Supreme Court—"(The burden cast the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that vil have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allega tions submitted could easily be imagined. Even with dye recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth (Muioz vs People, 53 SCRA 190). Faimess_ Lawyer Is An “Officer Of The Court.”—"A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, ‘like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, ‘not to promote distrust in the at ministration of justice.’ Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.’ Thus, it has bee said of a lawyer that ‘fals an officer of the court, itis hs sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy‘ necessarily that high esteem and regard towards courts so essential to the proper administration cl laos (citations omitted). (Surigao Mineral Reservation Boar Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1; Lacson, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals: # SCRA 126) sr Example Of Lawyer's Display Of Candor.—T™° tind preme Court cited an example of candor worth-emullt by all members of the bar: 7Cope oF PROFESSIONAL Respoysiniiny The Lawyer and the Courts 11 Director of Lands vs. Adorable 77 Phil. 468 the attorney for the claim. Held: In this cas ats and appellees, acting under the highest stan dards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becom ing of a deserving member of the bar, instead of tak ing advantage of claimant and appellant's ignorance of what really happened in the Court of Appeals. in- formed this court that the case had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said effect the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent to him by said court, to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already decided. ‘This is an example worth remembering by all mem- bers of the bar. Refiling A Case Which Was Already Litigated Be- fore Is Not Forum-Shopping But Nevertheless A Viola- tion Of Canon 10.— Carlet vs. Court of Appeals 275 SCRA 110 issue of forum- Held: With respect to the shopping for which the trial court ordered counsel for petitioners, Atty. Modesto Jimenez, to explain why he should not be cited in contempt, this applies only when the two (or more) cases are still pending, Clearly, despite knowledge of final judgments in Civil Case No. B-1656, CA-G.R. CV No. 07657 and SC-G.R. No. 74505, as well as in G.R. No. 94382 (the ejectment case), counsel persisted in filing the case at bar for reconveyance. Since this case is barred by the Judgment in Civil Case No. B-1656, there was no other pending case to speak of when it was filed in July 1991. Thus, the “non-forum-shopping rule” is Not violated. ti What counsel for petitioners did, however, in fl- ng this present action to relitigate the title to and142 Lea. Ernics partition over Lot No. 981, violates Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers which states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Rule 10.01 of the same Canon states that “(a) lawyer shall not do any falsehood x x x nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.” Counsel's act of fling a new case in- volving essentially the same cause of action Is like- wise abusive of the courts’ processes and may be viewed as “Improper conduct tending to directly im. pede, obstruct and degrade the administration of jus tice.” Rule 10.01.—A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any ar- tifice. COMMENTS: No Falsehood, Nor Consent To The Doing Of The Same.—The lawyer must be truthful. He must be a minis- ter of truth. Hence, he must not mislead the court nor allow the court to be misled by an artifice. And in all his dealings, a lawyer is expected to act it good faith just as anybody (Art. 19," NCC) specially in his dealings with the court. The Attorney's Oath mandates the lawyer among other duties (a) to do no falsehood, (b) nor, consent (° the doing of the same in court, (c)_ to conduct himself as # lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discre- tion with all good fidelity to the court. ; Said Improper conduct is considered as indirect © fempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court: Heit® © or Sr. v. CA, 168 SCRA 539 citing Gabriel v. CA. 72 SC®* Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his righ and in the performance of his duties, act with justice on everyone his due, and obsey (New CW cua ve honesty and good faith (Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 143 The Lawyer and the Courts : The violation of the Attorney's Oath is a Sround for suspension or disbarment (Rule 138, Sec. 27, RRC), Duty Not To Mislead A Judge.—Canon 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics reminds the lawyer to char, acterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and Specifi- cally states that “it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote” (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 3). Attributing to the Court of Appeals as its findings of fact, the mere version of the lawyer's client of what transpired in the case, shows lack of candor (Murioz vs. People, 53 SCRA 190). A lawyer was held in contempt of court for trying to mislead the Su- preme Court by raising issues long laid to rest by final and executory judgment (Limpin, Jr. vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 83) Some Cases of Falsehoods Which Merited Discipline. 1. Lawyer falsely stating in a deed of sale that prop- erty is free from all liens and encumbrances when it is not So (Sevilla vs. Soleta, 96 Phil. 979): 2. Lawyer making it appear that a person, long dead, executed a deed of sale in his favor (Monterey vs Arayata, 61 Phil. 820): 3. Lawyer concealing the fact that he was charged Mth or convicted of a crime, in an information sheet aa by law in connection with his employment (Calo sen eame. 20 SCRA 447; see also Diao vs. Martinez, 7 ee 75) where lawyer concealed his lack of the required ‘fal education; outs plauyer, encashing a check payable to a deceased Samanie’, SUNg the latter's name on the check (in re: "80, 90 Phil. 389); 5. ‘a cole eer falsifying a power of attorney and used it ating the ve the money due to the principal and appropri- Phi 139g) NY for his own benefit (In re: Rusiana, 105144 Leca Eruics 6. Lawyer alleging in one pleadin, ig that hi: were merely lessees of the property involved, his cleats in a later pleading that the same clients were the a ned of the same property (Chavez vs. Viola, G.R. 2152, ine 1991; see also Occena vs. Marquez, 60 SCRA gq) there are false allegations in pleadings; 7 7. Lawyer uttering falsehood in a Motion to Dismiss (Martin vs. Moreno, 129 SCRA 315); 8. Lawyer denying having received the notice to file brief which denial is belied by the return card (Ragacejo vs. IAC, 153 SCRA 462); : 9. Lawyer presenting falsified documents in court which he knows to be false (Bautista vs. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151; In re: De Lara, 27 Phil. 176) or introducing false evidence (Berrenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 673):" 10. Lawyer filing false charges or groundless sui (Retuya vs. Gorduiz, 96 SCRA 526; Natan vs. Capule, 9! Phil. 640); 11. Lawyer falsifying Sheriff's Return and seeking 3 the default of the defendant (Libit vs. Oliva, 237 SCRA37® {1994)); her 12. Using in pleadings the IBP number of aes lawyer (Bongolota vs. Castillo, CBD No. 176, Jan. | tat 13. Use of fictitious residence certificate by 4" public (Roces vs. Aportadera, AC No. 2936, March 1995). _ Offering False Testimony In Evidence Is A Come Any person who shall knowingly offer in one ind witness or testimony in any judicial or official P and si shall be punished as guilty of false testimony “ss ti suffer the respective penalties provided in this s¢ 184, Revised Penal Code) —_ as 0 2 2 WI The lawyer was reprimanded even though thee nad of intent to present the false evidence. See aS Valencia, 512 SCRA 7.Cope oF PRoFEssionaL, Responsinitity 1 ‘The Lawyer and the Courts 45 Rule 10.02.—A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the lan- guage or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved, COMMENTS: Deliberate Misquotation; Deliberate Citation Of An Inoperative Provision As Law; Assertion Of Someth: As A Fact Which Has Not Been Proved; All Prohibited — This Rule is based on Canon 22 of the Canons of Profes- sional Ethics. As now provided, a lawyer is prohibited from: 1. Knowingly misquoting or misrepresent- ing— a) contents of a Paper, b) language or argument of opposing coun- sel, ©) text of a decision or authority; 2. Knowingly citing as law, a provision al- ready rendered inoperative by repeal or amend- ment; or, 3. Asserting as a fact that which has not been proved. yer ;Rule In The Quotation of A Decision.—When a law- ae ‘akes a quotation of a decision in his pleadings, he coun? ote the same verbatim to avon misleading the The Insular Life Assurance Co. Employees Association vs. Insular Life Assurance Co. 37 SCRA 244 citing “We must articulate our firm view that in cundet!® Court's decisions and rulings, it is the duce op UY of courts, judges and lawyers to repro- tion mangPY the same word-for-word and punctua- ‘ark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a146 Lecat Erxics salient and salutary reason why they should do this, Only from this Tribunal’s decisions and Tulings do al) other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants take their bearings. This is because the decision referred to in Article 8 of the Civil Code which reads “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,” are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil 1066) that “(O)nly the decisions of this Honorable Court estab- lish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction.” ‘Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verba- tim reproductions down to the last word and punc- tuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved pre- cious time in finding out whether the citations are correct. Syllabus Of A Case Is Not The Work Of The St ‘he preme Court; It Should Not Be Cited In Place Of 7 Text In The Decision. — Allied Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals 416 SCRA 65 Held: The syllabus of cases in official or ee Cial reports of Supreme Court decisions or resolutl™ is not the work of the Court, nor does it ee f Court's decision. The syllabus is simply the Wor? the reporter who gives his understanding of a sion. The reporter writes the syllabus for the ca us 5 fence of lawyers in reading the reports. A ou oul Not a part of the court's decision. A counsel © 4 not cite a syllabus in place of the carefully cons! text in the decision of the Court.Cove oF PRoFEssiona Restoxsisiuny ‘The Lawyer and the Courts. 147 However, a mere typographical error in the citation of an authority is not contemptuous Del Rosario vs. Chingcuangco 18 SCRA 1156 Held: Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's decision in Paz Ongsiako, Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957. Although he cites as docket number L-121447 instead of L-12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical mistake not sufficient to place him in contempt, especially be- cause the names of the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel's interpretation of this Court's de- cision in said case, or of what the ruling therein “in effect” created, established or confirmed, the same are mere arguments fully within the bounds of earnest debate, rather than a deception urged upon this Court. The first petition for contempt is therefore without merit. But when the misquotation is intended, the lawyer is subject to disciplinary action (see Surigao Mineral Reser- vation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1; Comelec vs. Noynay. GR No. 132365, July 9, 1998). Citing As Law, An Inoperative Provision Of A Law; Contemptuous —Knowingly citing a law or a provision of ‘aw, as if itis still effective when it was already repealed or a in order to mislead, is unethical and contemp- the L2"¥er must not intentionally misread or interpret anj2¥ t0 the point of distortion in cunning effort to say their purposes (Banogon vs. Zerna, 154 SCRA tnvait 28VEr Should not cite a decision, knowing that its Shoulg jor that it has already been overruled. Neither peated Ce @ statute knowing that it has already been 84 (see Canon 22, CPE), . P Sople vs. Felipe, 418 SCRA 146. ~~148 Lecat Eriics ‘A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepre sent the text of a decision or authority (Allied Banking Corporation vs, Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 65). It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rul- ings and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately (Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 416 SCRA 65), Asserting As Fact, Something Not Proven.—A law: yer should not assert as a fact, his version of the case, which had not yet been proven. Nor, should a lawyer assert as finding of fact by the Court, which actually is not. ‘Mufioz vs. CA & Delia Sutton 53 SCRA 190 Held: The respondent failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a find: ing of fact in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When given an opportunity to make amends, there was lacking any showing or regret for a misconduct 50 obvious and so inexcusable. Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her lability clear. Only her relative inexperience in the ways © the law did save her from a penalty graver than em" sure. Folsting A Nonexistent Rule—Foisting 2 existent rule to mislead the Court is a violation of 8 ethics (Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC, 158 SCRA 421). Adez Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 100643 October 30, 1992 Facts: The instant case originated from @ pet tion for reconstitution of title over a parcel of Section 13 of R.A. 26, in relation to Sec. 12 OF same statute, on which petitioner bases one nl adCone oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY The Lawyer and the Courts causes of action, provides among others that notice should be given to the occupants or persons in pos. session of the property. Compliance therewith is a material requirement for granting a petition for re- constitution of title. The inserted phrase ‘without no- tice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Re- alty,’ was just the right phrase intercalated at the right place, making it highly improbable to be unin- tentionally, much less innocently, committed; and by the secretary at that. All circumstances herein simply but strongly sustain Our belief. Certainly, making it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject prop- erty—when in fact it did not make such a finding—is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion of the assailed decision but a malicious at- tempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly, to deceive and mis- guide this Court, which is the final arbiter of litiga- tions. Held: Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that, save in certain instances, factual find- ings of the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court. The distortion of facts committed by counsel, with the willing assistance of his secretary, is a grave offense and should not be treated lightly, not only be- (ause it may set a dangerous precedent but, rather, because it is a clear and serious violation of one’s cath as a member of the Bar. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter Ill, of the Code of Professional Responsibility directs that ‘(a) lawyer shall not knowingly misquote me the ePresent the contents of a paper, the language . . argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a ao on or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a ameruo” already rendered inoperative by repeal or ndment, or assert as a fact that which has not ‘Nn proved’ (underscoring supplied). attisquoting or intercalating phrases in the text ‘ourt decision constitutes willful disregard of the ofa Austr; ‘82 sopra grid YS People, G.R, No, 83530, December 18, 1990: 149150 LecaL Erxics lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never ven- ture to mislead the court by false statements or quo- tations of facts or laws. Thus, in Bautista vs. Gonza- les,“* We suspended respondent for six (6) months for, among others, submitting to the lower court falsified documents, representing them to be true copies. Rule 10.03.—A lawyer shall observe the rules of proce. dure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. COMMENTS: Aim Of Lawsuit; Purpose Of Rules Of Procedure — The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice. And the rules of procedure are precisely designed to attain such objective Any lawyer who misuses the rules to frustrate the ends of justice deserves stern condemnation. Judges should not condone the deliberate abuse of the procedural rules by any member of the Bar. Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo 36 SCRA 137" Held: This appeal, moreover, should fail, predi- cated as it is on an insubstantial objection bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display inge- nuity to conjure a technicality. From Alonso vs. Vil- lamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as #0 our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a law Suit is to render justice to the parties according ' 151, Atm Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SP “Set also: Blanco vs. Bernabe, 63 Phil. 124 (1936) Ree oo ae vs. Phil. National Bank, 84 Phil. 600 (1949) Lee Manotel, ori of Appeals, 104 Phil, 156 (1958); McEntee © otek 114968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272: Urbaya " carex (Phil), L-15379, Aug’ 31, 1963, 5 SCRA 1016: Uda" Amon. L-24288, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 837; Palma vs. 0%"Cope oF ProressionaL Responsisiuiry The Lawyer and the Courts 151 law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to ac. complish such a worthy objective. Necessarily, there. fore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before, We do so again. Lawyer Not To Misuse Rules Of Procedure.—A law- yer should always bear in mind that our rules of proce- dure, like the Rules of Court, are intended to facilitate the delivery of justice to those to whom it is due without unnecessary expense and waste of time for truly justice delayed is justice denied. Rules of procedure must be used to attain such objective. Any lawyer who uses them to defeat or frustrate the ends of justice deserves condemna- tion. Canlas vs. Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 160° Held: We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas’ posi- tion—on matters of procedure—for the enlightenment solely of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the pro- ceeding, in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a “technical knockout” over his own client, of all people. Proce- dural rules, after all, have for their object assistance unto parties “in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpen- sive determination of every action and proceeding.” If Procedure were to be an impediment to such an ob- Jective, “it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy.” It oa almost eight decades ago that the Court held: . . . : tgation is not a game of technicalities in which hee More deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle the of movement and position, entraps and destroys tengether. It is, rather, a contest in which each rae facts ne Party fully and fairly lays before the court the issue and then, brushing aside as wholly triv- “s = “© also Del Mundo vs. CA, 252 SCRA 432152 Lecat Erxics ial and indecisive all imperfections of form and tech. nicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the rapier's thrust. Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. CA and Seelin G.R. No. 123698 Aug. 5, 1998 Held: A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seven- teen (17) years to the prejudice of the private respon- dents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private re- spondents, the real owners of the property. This is @ mockery of justice. We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients’ right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not. therefore. misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends o! justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Gomez Presiding Judge, 249 SCRA 432-433, October 1995). In Banogan, et al. vs. Cerna, et al., we ruled: rs have a respo™ istration of JU by filing point Joad of the J is burdens cts and is. “As officers of the court, lawye! sibility to assist in the proper admini tice. They do not discharge this duty less petitions that only add to the workl diciary, especially this Court, which i enough as it is. A judicious study of the fa law should advise them when a case such @ "oy should not be permitted to be filed to merely cM! the already congested judicial dockets. They ¢ advance the cause of law or their clients by com". ing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do 7! serve the attention of the court.”Cope oF ProFessionaL Responsipitsry ‘The Lawyer and the Courts 153 Technicalities Should Give Way To The Realities Of The Situation.—it has been held: “It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the law allows. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration. Even if the petition were impressed with a greater degree of plau sibility, it would be, considering all the circumstances, to crown with success an unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by perverting the ends procedural requisites are intended to accomplish. Not once but several times, from Alonso vs. Villamor, we have stressed that we are not to lend the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of which would be to render illusory substantive rights. We do so again. Tehnicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, ‘should give way to the realities of the situation’ " (Economic Insurance Co., Inc vs. Uy, Realty Co., 34 SCRA 749; Urbayan vs. Caltex Phil., Inc., 5 SCRA 1016). Rule 10.04—A lawyer shall, when filing a pleading, fur- nish the opposing party with a copy thereof, to- gether with all the documents annexed thereto. Unless a motion is ex parte, he should set it for hearing, with sufficient notice to the other party. COMMENTS: This is a new Rule not found in the original Code of Professional Responsibility. Reason For The Rule.—Obviously the reason for the Rule is to prevent unfairness, to avoid surprises and back- stabbing. Cards of the lawyers must be laid on the table for openness, candidness and transparency. Delay in the oppo- Judicial proceedings will be minimized because Site party having the right to be informed of the fling | G Pleadings, motions, etc., could always. ask through tions, copies of such pleadings so that they cou154 Leoat Eriics m, This process will necessarily cause som such motions though insignificant woulg hearing, The Rule will also encourage am. Sable settlement when parties are brought to realization that their cases are not worth fighting for. Pleaders Must Also Furnish Adverse Party Or Par- ties Copies Of All Documents Annexed Thereto—No fnatter how thick the annexes to the pleadings are, the pleader must simultaneously furnish copies thereof to the adverse party or parties. To disregard this directive is indulging in unfalr and vexing strategy not sanctioned by the Rules Motion Must Be Set For Hearing; Exception serene coast fe fo wig Deer! ee ee 2 court or in the course of a hearing or trial (Section 2, Rule 15). They must be set for hearing by the movant, that is on a specific date and time (on a Motion day") for their consideration by the court and generally in the presse of the adverse party unless the latter does not appes! despite the notice. ‘The adverse party must be notified Teast three {) days before the date fixed in the Motion 1° give him opportunity to be heard. Motions which do not prej verse party may be heard and considered ex parte such 3 Perse pes crotion for extension of time to file pleadl®s reset a hearing, etc. However, no written motion set ee hearing shall be acted upon by the court without prod! service thereof (Section 6, Rule 15). ment on the! delay because still be set for dice the rights of the # “* See Section 7, Rule 15.Cope oF Proressional Responsipitrry 15: The Lawyer and the Courts = ON 11. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND : CAN TAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO [ane COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CON. DUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.01—A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired Rule 11.02—A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings. Rule 11.03—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts. Rule 11.04—A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge mo- tives not supported by the record or having no materiality to the case. Rule 11.05—A lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.156 LecaL Erxics CANON 11. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE ayp TAIN THE RESPECT DUE 7 COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL oFFic AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR cow DUCT BY OTHERS. : COMMENTS: Lawyer's First Duty Is To The Courts —A lawyer an officer of the court (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil 724). He occupies a quasi-judicial office with a tripartite obligation to the courts, to the public and to his clients (Cantorne vs. Ducosin, 57 Phil. 23). The public duties of the attorney takes precedence over his private duties. His first duty is to the courts. Where duties to the courts conflict with his duties to his clients, the latter must yield to the former (Langen vs. Borkowski, 43 ALR 622) A lawyer's duty to the court is not secondary to that of his client (Wicker vs. Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444). Respect Due To The Courts And Judicial Officers Must Be Maintained.—In the case of In re: Sotto, 82 Phil 595, the Supreme Court— Held: To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately ‘so many blunders and injustices,’ that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the [34 years, would tend necessarily to undermine the ©oP fidence of the people in the honesty and integrity © the members of this court, and consequently t0 1oW or degrade the administration of justice by this Cor The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Pulpit. people may repair to obtain relief for their grieva" or protection of their rights when these are upon, and if the people lose their confidence "i honesty and integrity of the members of thisCobe oF PROFESSIONAL Responstpitiny ‘The Lawyer and the Courts = 157, and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom they might be driven to take the law into their om hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be tre result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institu. Uons, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. It is one of the bounden duties of an attorney to ob- serve and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Rule 138, Section 20 [b], RRC). The respect is not only toward the Justices and Judges but also to other officers of the Courts like Clerks of Court, Sheriffs and other judicial officers who take part in the judicial work.*” Lawyers must be respectful not only in their actions but also in their use of language whether in oral argu- ments or in pleadings. Disrespectful acts and language are contemptuous (Rule 71, Section 3 [a], RRC). Lawyers must also exert efforts that others, including their own clients and witnesses, shall deal with the courts and judicial officers with respect. If they have any complaint, it must be pursued within the bounds of the law, without in the least promoting distrust in the administration of ‘justice. : Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that Sree of the government to which they belong, as well as oe State which has instituted the judicial system (De "VS. Torres, 99 Phil. 463). A lawyer shall not destroy 1995, = Lacson, Jr. vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 113591, Feb. 6. “Soquieren vs. CA, 245 SCRA 30. ~~158 Lecat Ernics unnecessarily that high esteem and regard te Court which is essential in the administration flue e. In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 581 Held: The lawyer's duty to render Subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients’ rights, lawyers—ev en those gifted with Superior intellect—are enjoined to rein up their tem. pers. Tespectful The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the Judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army, The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering re- spectful submission (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481). We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in hee calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of rights (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967). ‘The The Highest Sign Of Respect To The Courts ee Lawyer's Obedience To Court Orders And eet However erroneous they may be, court orders s of te Tespected by lawyers who are themselves cael une” saan (De Leon vs. Torres, 99 Phil. 463). A lawyers *y, Plained failure to appear at the scheduled hearing ous tutes disrespect to the court and is guilty of contum spoil behavior (Corleto vs. Arro, 99 SCRA 121). Lawye?Cope oF PRoFEssionaL Responsisitrry The Lawyer and the Courts 159 stand foremost in complying with court orders obediently respectfully (People vs. Pascual, 28 SCRA 822)." and In People vs. Dalusag, 62 SCRA 540, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for not complying with the court’s resolution giving him ten (10) days to inform the court whether he could act as counsel for an accused.” If they want to assail court's orders, lawyers shall do so within the framework of the applicable laws and rules Criticisms Of Courts Must Not Spill Over The Walls Of Decency and Propriety.” Zaldivar vs. Gonzalez 166 SCRA 316 Held: The principal defense of respondent Gon- zalez is that he was merely exercising his constitu- tional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest. Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitu- tional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respon- dent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on oc- casion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the Tequirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning Manage’ 2180: People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 107; People vs ‘angan, 56 SCRA 817; People vs. Rosqueta, 55 SCRA 486. Where fe Marcelo vs. CA, G.R. No. 104109, March 15, 1995 0 Soe failed to file a REPLY. Suspended. logs, cy, 280! Tlongco vs. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932, Jan. 25. Aguttar a9, “S:,Chlongbian, 260 SCRA 485 (1996); Tiongco vs. 206 (206°, SCRA 589 (1995); Lacorum vs. Jacoba, 484 SCRA Soreda, a Tiongco vs. Sarello, 486 SCRA 48; In re: Atty. Noel "901 SCRA 369; Maligaya vs. Doronilla, Jr., 502 SCRA160 Lecat Erics of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the sys. tem of administering Justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the con. text, in other words, of viable independent institu. tions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: “xxx A free press is not to be preferred to an in dependent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. ‘The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the po- tent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.” XK XXK XXX Only slightly (if at all) less important is the pub- lic interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispen- sable participants in the task of rendering justice 0 every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. It ts well to recall that respondent Gonzalez apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court. is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fide! tty and respect to the Republic and to this Coutt a the embodiment and the repository of the judi! Power in the government of the Republic. The resP0" sibility of the respondent “to uphold the dignity authority of this Court" and “not to promote dist! in the administration of justice” is heavier than U2! ofa private practising lawyer, f Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and hes! to aa entitled to criticize the rulings of this COU Point out where he feels the Court may have la?Cope oF PRoressionat, REsPonsaiiiny The Lawyer and the Courte 161 into error. Once more, however, the right of crit cis is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out ici Justice Castro in In re: Almacen wh ich are worth not ing: the walls of decency and Propriety, 4 ists ‘between falr criticism, on the abuse and slander of courts and the Judges thereof. on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of Tespect to courts. It is one hand, and nary action.” The lawyer's duty to render Tespectful subordi- nation to the courts {s essential to the orderly ad- ministration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients’ rights, lawyers even those gifted with Superior intellect—are enjoined to rein up their tem- pers. WOK XK x The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is ad- dressed rather to the nature of that criticism or com- ment and the manner in which it was carried out.” xXx, Pleading Containing Derogatory, Offensive Or Ma- lcious Statements Submitted To The Court Or Judge In Which The Proceedings Are Pending, Constitutes D t Contempt — Sion eg ormMET Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales’ indefinite suspen. 1993 pm the practice of law had already been lifted on April 7 Gonzales PE Supreme Court, The suspension of Atty. Rau fom Senet® OPened the Supreme Conn to criticisms specially ator Arturo Tolenting and many leaders of the Bar.162 Lecat Ernics Wicker vs. Arcangel”™* 252 SCRA 445 Facts; Atty. Rayos filed a Motion For Inhibition of the Presiding Judge. The allegations are derogatory to the honor and integrity of the judge. Judge held lawyer and his client in direct contempt of court and orders their incarceration for five (5) days. Issue: Does a derogatory pleading filed in the proceedings being tried by the judge constitute direct contempt? Held: What is involved in this case is an in- stance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the Court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to “misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same” within the meaning of Rule 71, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and, there fore, direct contempt. It is important to point out this distinction be- cause in case of indirect or constructive contempt the contemnor may be punished only “falfter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity gWven (0 the accused to be heard by himself or counse whereas in case of direct contempt, the responses may be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover the judgment in cases of indirect contempt 18 apPet” able, whereas in cases of direct contempt only J¥éé ments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCS ba appealable. Consequently, it was unnecessary in this cast for respondent judge to hold a hearing. in (N.B) But, i the scurrilous pleading was flea” another court, the contempt is only indirect. bea A it 1s not misbehavior in the presence or $0 8 fl Sha " Adorio vs. Bersamin, 273 SCRA 223: Re: tet February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 464 SCRA 32 adCobE oF PROFESSIONAL REsponsipiuity ‘The Lawyer and the Courts 163 court or judge as to interrupt the administrati justice (Atty. Guerrero vs. Hon. Villamor, 296 SCha 88). Criticism Made In Good Faith May Be Tolerated — Malicious attacks on courts have in some cases been treated as libel, in other cases as contempt of court, and as a sufficient ground for disbarment, but mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness, or uinsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated (Soriano vs Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 725) Francisco, Jr. vs. UEM-MARA Philippines Corp. 536 SCRA 520 Held: In criticizing a judge's decision, the test is whether it is done in good faith. The use of the ad- jective “insufficiently-informed” is disrespectful, abu- sive or slanderous. Rule 11.01.—A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired. COMMENTS: Proper Attire For Counsel Appearing In Court.—To maintain the dignity and respectability of the legal profes- sion, lawyers who appear in court must be properly at- tired. The traditional attires for male lawyers in the Philip- pines are the long-sleeve Barong Tagalog and coat and tie. Female lawyers appear in semi-formal attires. Judges also appear in the same attire in addition to black robes h The Court can hold the lawyer in contempt of court if or she appears not in proper attire Rule 11.02.—A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.- 164 Lecat Etnics COMMENTS: Punctuality.—It is the duty of the la his client, but also to the courts and to the pune a : punctual in attendance and to be concise and direct a trial and disposition of cases (Canon 21, CPE). He ea delay no man for money or malice (Attorney's Oath). It has been held that even if the petition has become moot and academic, it is not proper for a counsel not to appear in court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing (De Gracia vs. Warden, 69 SCRA 4). Failure to appear in time in a pre-trial conference may result in the non-suit or the dismissal of the com. plaint for failure to prosecute or in the declaration of the defendant as in default (Rule 20, Section 1, RRC; Saulog vs. Custombuilt Manufacturing Corporation, 26 SCRA 1) Counsel may even be held in contempt of court for coming late in the hearing or trial of a case (Rule 71, Section 3 [a], RRC) or for failing to appear in a trial (People vs. Gagui, 2 SCRA 752; Corleto vs. Arro, 99 SCRA 121) Lack of punctuality interferes in the speedy admit stration of justice. Consequently, both the judge and th lawyer are in duty bound to perform their duties with punctuality (See Canon 7, CPE). A judge who is unpunctual in his example to the bar and tends to create di the administration of justice (Ibid.). habits sets @ bad issatisfaction ™ Q Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from san ot offensive or menacing language or behave! the courts. COMMENTS: iret Misbehavior In Court Is Direct ContemPtT cd contempt, or contempt in facie, is misbehaviour ce as” in the presence of or so near a court or JUd6" * ant obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the a J ae AgCope oF Prov The Lavw IONAL RESPONSHsi 1y and the Courts 165 including disrespect toward the court, and can be ished summarily without hearing (Eneinos va. yo 2 Bookstore, Inc., 464 SCRA 572) ‘atlonal Lawyer's Language Should Be Dj ified —, z yer's language should be dignified in eto. with a dignity of the legal profession. It is his duty to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or wit- ness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1; Tiongco vs. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932, Jan. 25, 1995). This rule has similar objectives as Rule 8.01 which reads, “A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise im- proper.” Rule 8.01 is general. But Rule 11.03 specifies “the courts” before whom the lawyer is directed to abstain from using the proscribed language. Under Rule 11.03, scan- dalous behaviors like unnecessary display of passion, Provocative or challenging gestures, shouting at the Judges, witnesses or opposing counsel; slapping, boxing or challenging any one in court to a fistfight or duel are not only contemptuous but also reprehensible and extremely degrading to the legal profession. Lawyers must maintain the rule of law and not the rule of the Jungle. A lawyer's language should be dignified, and in keep- ‘ng with the dignity of the legal profession (Surigao Min- tral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1) Raising One's Voice.—A lawyer's arguments, written *r oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing “unsel and be of such words as may be properly ad- Adresse by one gentleman to another (Romero vs. Valle, Jr, 147 SCRA 197). Certainly, and most specially in our julture, raising one's voice is a sign of disrespect (In re ime 31 SCRA 562; Romero vs. Valle, Jr, 147 SCRA> 166 Lecat Ernics A lawyer owes the court the du maintain a respectful attitude not ae a eee temporary incumbent of the Judicial office but fo i maintenance of its supreme importance (Canon l * the People vs. Estebia, 27 SCRA 106; Rheem of the Phitpyre vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441). The respect shown to eos helps build the high esteem and regard toward them which is essential to the proper administration of justice (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572; Borromeo ys, CA, 87 SCRA 67; Paragas vs. Cruz, 14 SCRA 809). Montecillo vs. Gica” 60 SCRA 235, Facts: Atty. del Mar lost his case in the Court of Appeals. In his Motion For Reconsideration, he made a veiled threat to the Justices who rendered the decision by citing articles of the Revised Penal Code Tegarding “knowingly rendering unjust judgment” and “judgment rendered through negligence” and making the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. He was asked to explain why he should not be disciplined. His explanation having been found unsatisfactory, he was suspended by the Court of Appeals. When the case reached the Su preme Court, the lawyer's petition for review was de- nied. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration. This time. he also made veiled threats to the members of the Di. vision of the Supreme Court which took cognizance of the case Held: Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, tum against Us when We denied on May 14, 1973, his P& tition for review on certiorari of the decision of Ue Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-36800, for on May ‘| 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration 0° wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court questing the names of the Justices of this Court F Supported the resolution denying his petition. gether with the names of the Justices favoring M 82 Gee went A 2 See also: Letter of Atty. Noel $. Sorreda, 464 SCCobe OF PROFESSIONAL ResPonstpinry The Lawyer and the Courts 167 motion for reconsideration. This Motion for recon eration We denied for lack of merit in Our resent, dated June 15, 1973. He, then, filed a manifestatne dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazene among other things, ‘I can at this time reveal to yo that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certi true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Si ipreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Jus tices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, re- warding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination’ (Italics supplied.) In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R and G.R. No. 136800. It is our manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered un just judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross {gno- Fance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client. We note with wonder and amazement the bra- %n effrontery of respondent in assuming that his per- Sonal knowledge of the law and his concept of justice ae superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to ‘tode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts Of justice and in the administration of justice. He re- [epee invoked his supposed quest for law and jus- “€ as justification for his contemptuous statements168 Lecat Etnics without realizing that, in seeking both abstract ¢ sive terms, he is merely pursuing his own persinay concept of law and justice. He seems not to compre hend that what to him may be lawful or just may no, be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another We understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broad-mindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances. For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with sup- posed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have noth ing but commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in discipli- nary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the fu ture will choose to enter this profession, We wish 10 point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it 10 himself to respect the courts of justice and its offices as a fealty for the stability of our democratic instil tions. Lawyer is suspended indefinitely Sangalang vs. IAC 177 SCRA 877" Held: The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remare tn his motion for reconsideration, disparaging, 1N' perate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions that or Court might have been guilty of graft and cor in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming ** See also Tiongco vs. Aguilar, 240 SCRA 589 19%!SIONAL RESPONSIBiLtr eSPONSIBILITY and the Courts 169 comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Courts honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment. the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the re. cords alone, and not to outside influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his suc- cess will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stabil- ity of the administration of justice in general. moO To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opin- fon, but not to a license to insult the Court with de- rogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event. it is the Court's duty to ‘act to preserve the honor and dignity .... and to safe- guard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.’ XKXX | XXXK | XXKX. Atty. Sangco himself admits that ‘{a)s a judge have learned to live with and accept with grace criti- cisms of my decisions.’ Apparently, he does not prac- tice what he preaches. Of course, the Court is not un- receptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's rebuke. (Suspended.) A Mere Disclaimer Of Any Intentional Disrespect, Not A Ground For Exoneration.—The lawyer's disavowal ¢ any offensive intent—in using defamatory words—is of 10 avail.170 Lecat Etuics Paragas vs. Cruz 14 SCRA 809" Held: A mere disclaimer of any intentional dis. respect by appellant is no ground for exoneration. His intent must be determined by a fair interpretation of the languages employed by him. He cannot escape re- sponsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning. Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. COMMENTS: A Lawyer Must Not Attribute To A Judge Motives Not Supported By The Record Or Which Are Immaterial To The Case. People vs. Carillo 77 Phil. 572°* Held: We cannot close this decision without making a reference to the defamatory remarks which counsel for appellant makes in his brief, casting 2 Persions on the trial Judge's motives and conduct These remarks have no relevancy to the case. are 0! no value to us in the decision of the issues. and feos’ Out by the record. To say that it Is unpre: attrib NoTthY of the highest rebuke for a lawyer the pant {© @ Judge motives which do not appeat &° Teassert a ie have no materiality to the case : a 905). Platitude. (Ferrer vs. De Inchausti. 38 * See also: nt the Philip”: Z4lavar vs, Gonzalez, 166 SCRA 316: Ro ogee ie Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 Calderon, A.M. yo t84 vs. Pilar, 104 Phil. 743: wyer Was disbarred RTV-90-580, April 27, 1999 at? and Guarina, 436 sca mma vs. Justices Vere! ine alae fdCope oF PROFESSIONAL ResPonsisitiry ‘The Lawyer and the Courts 71 The fact that counsel, according to a writing filed Jater with this court, has apologized to the judge and the judge has expressed satisfaction with the apology. has not written finis to the episode: for the bel transcends the confines of personalities, injured feelings or mental anguish. Its poison infects the ju diciary of which the judge is a member. In attempting to heap ridicule on the judge and bring him into dis. repute without justifiable ends and basis, in connec. tion with the performance of his official duties, coun- sel by his act put in jeopardy the good name of and confidence in the court over which the judge presides Direct Contempt.—A lawyer in her Motion for Inhibi- tion of the presiding Judge stated among others: x x x 2 shows the control of the accused over the court and court procedure.” She was held in direct contempt of court al- though the Supreme Court modified the penalty from two days imprisonment to a fine (Adorio vs. Bersamin, 273 SCRA 223). Lawyer Can Demand That The Misbehavior Of A Judge Be Placed On Record: Act Not Contemptuous.— There are times when it is the judge who misbehaved during a court Proceeding. The affected lawyer may de- mand that the incident be made of record. This act of the lawyer is not contemptuous. In re: Aguas 1 Phil. 1 Facts: It appears from the record in this matter that on the 29th of August, 1900, during the progress of tial then being held before the Court of First In- stance at Bacolor, in the Province of Pampanga, the eae had occasion to caution Angel Alberto, a wit- dee te the case, not to look at the attorney for the Was at int, Dut to fix his attention on the judge who Ness aa time examining him. It seems that the wit- ereuse not give heed to this warning, and the judge Witness” 270Se from his seat and approaching the SS. Seized him by the shoulders, and using the bh172 To A Ju Must none Not Supported By The Record: trariness An, Lecat Eruics expression “Lingon ang mucha” (“Look at me’), either shook him, as insisted by the attorney for the defen, dant, or only turned him about, as claimed by the judge and others. Whether the witness was shaken or only turned about, at all events “seizing him” brought the defendant's attorney to his feet, who, Protesting against the action of the judge as coercive of the wit. ness, demanded that a record be made of the occur- ence and that the further hearing of the case be post- poned. x x x. ‘Two days afterward the clerk entered in his re- cord a recital of the incident substantially as above, and also a statement that on other and prior occas- sions, the attorney, Marcelino Aguas, had been want ing in respect to the court by making use of “improper phrases” and by interrupting opposing counsel in their examination of witnesses. The court on this re- cord adjudged the attorney to be in contempt of court and suspended him from the practice of his profes: sion for a period of twenty days. The attorney 4p” pealed, but his appeal having been disallowed by the lower court, he asked to be heard in justification. which was granted. Held: In our opinion the action of the judge seizing the witness, Alberto Angel, by the shoulder and turning him about was unwarranted and an if terference with that freedom from unlawful perso? Violence to which every witness is entitled while giving bbe in a court of justice. Against such cone rat orale had the right to protest and to ee ta the incident be made a matter of record. MH Tran wes Ret contempt, providing protest and “or were respectfully made and with due rear the dignity of the court. x x x . ves While Lawyers Are Prohibited To Attribute mots ited wy ver Be Cy Expos? ‘ourageous Enough To d Injustices Of Courts And Judges—Cove oF PROFESSIONAL, Responstaisry ‘The Lawyer and the Courts 173 People vs. Carillo 77 Phil. 583°” Held: Counsel must be courageous enough to point out errors, arbitrariness, and injustices of courts and judges. The fear of provoking displeasure of the affected judges must not deter them from com. plying with their civil and legal duty to object to, op- pose, and protest against illegal or erroneous judicial decisions, resolutions, acts, or conduct. Judges and tribunals are not infallible. As eternal vigilance is the price of democracy and liberty, so it is in the case of justice. Its efficient administration needs the assis- tance of a vigilant bar, composed of persons who will never sacrifice any principle for the sake of personal friendship with any judge. But at the same time law- yers must avoid at all cost launching groundless and irresponsible defamatory remarks against any mem- ber of the bar who should do so must be sternly dealt with, as a cancerous excrescence in our system of Justice. To overcome cancer no less than scalpel and cautery are needed Judge Cervantez vs. Atty. Sabio A.C. No. 7828, August 11, 2008 Held: On the issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge against complainant. Tespondent violated the proscription of the Code of Professional Responsibility against “wittingly or will- ingly promot{ing] or suling] any groundless suit” in- cluding baseless administrative complaints against Judges and other court officers and employees. thar ote Investigating Commissioner thus concluded hat while the evidence on record is sufficient to show what the allegations in respondent's affidavit-com- bone against herein complainant were false, the evi- Iowan nonetheless howls] that respondent had suit rey and maliciously instituted a groundless agains; simply on his unfounded suspicions complainant; (Italics supplied) and that he ay See also: Ferrer vs. De Inchausti, 38 Phil. 905.174 Lecat Etuics violated Canons 10, 11 and 12 and Rule 11.04 of th Code of Professional Responsibility under his oath vt office. Respondent was fined with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. Rule 11.05—A lawyer shall not criticize the personal or official conduct of a judge in an insulting and in temperate language. Criticism Of Court Is Not Per Se Contemptous; Constructive And Destructive Criticisms, Concept —No man is perfect. All judges are men. So judges are not perfect. This syllogism is beyond question. Judges are ordinary mortals and not infallible people. They are sus: ceptible to commit mistakes or errors in the performance of their functions and duties. Criticism is an adverse analysis of an order, judg: ment or judicial act of a magistrate with the aim of pre: venting or avoiding an incipient injustice which may a" from the pernicious effects of the mistake, error or irregu larity committed. When mistakes, errors and irregularities are Gee ted by judges, wittingly or unwittingly, the agerie”® Le is expected to rise to call the attention of the judse * the mistake, error or irregularity. joes 10 By its nature, criticism is adverse because itd rity conform to the perceived mistake, error or Im6. , which it seeks to correct or reverse. The opposite e cism is confirmation which is the act of ratifying firming the acts of the judge. t/ nely co If the purpose of the criticism is to timely Oe rectify the mistake, error, or irregularity that UU} may be achieved, that is constructive criticis™ i” cn ini Criticism is an essential ingredient in the ce rill tion of ; Orta, Justice in all jurisdictions which adhere '° & feCont: oF PROFESSIONAL Restoxsii The Lawyer and the County ot 175 As to whether criticism is contemptuous or » depend not only upon the manner how it was reel but also on the kind or tone of the language uss se! as the apparent intention of the critic. If it was arrogantly or haughtlly presented with abusive, scurrilous and an! sive language coupled with the malicious intention to moch ridicule, demean and offend the sensibilities of the coat or the sitting Judge, it 18 unquestionably contemptuous This is destructive criticism which must not be tolerated The Constitutional freedom of free speech cannot shield the erring lawyer from the punishing hand of the court to preserve and enforce its order in its immediate presence (Section 5{a), Rule 135, NRC) when criticism is destructive. In re: Abistado, 57 Phil 674, Held: The constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press must be protected in its fullest ex- tent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in us true sense; that as important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights Qf the citizen is the maintenance of the independence Of the judiciary; The courts must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of their business in an orderly manner fee from outside interference obstructive of their con- siitutional functions. (U.S. vs. Sullens [1929]. 36 Fed. 2a}, 230), bout the criticism does not go beyond the metes and king. decency, morality and propriety, it is a healthy coneg uh criticism which is constructive must be wel- Dispenge® the Judge rather than repulsed irritatingly. feelings tO" Of Justice is more important than personal 88 Of judges, ty Motlons for reconsideration, appeals, petition for re- “tlorari and similar others are forms of judicial »,176 Lecat Ernics criticisms because the applicant is showing the my error or irregularity in the order, decision or acts of x" judge S Of the (On many occasions, reasonable Judges, upon perce ing the mistake, error or irregularity incurred, prompt reconsider their acts by making the appropriate amend ments, modification or reversal. This they can do because they have the inherent power to change thelr judgments or orders to make them conformable to law and justice (Se tion 5(@), Rule 135) Let it be emphasized, however, that when the criti cism of judges goes beyond the walls of decency and pro priety, the Supreme Court will not hesitate to punish the lawyer for his indiscretions. In Re: Almacen 31 SCRA 581 Almacen filed a “Pet! srtificate of Title.” on .at he therein asserts Facts: Atty. Vicente Raul tion to Surrender Lawyer's Ce September in protest against wh: is “a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court.” He indicts the Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal peopled by men who at 7 Joused to our pleas for Justice, who ignore witha’ reasons their own applicable decisions and cont Culpable violations of the Constitution with Im nity.” His client's he continues, who was deeply te grieved by this Court's “unjust judgment * has ; come “one of the sacrificial victims before the en hypocrisy.” In the same breath that hi wed classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the member ie this court, saying “that justice as ‘administered PY yaly present members of the Supreme Court 1s 10" ae blind, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows gue the cause of his client “in the people's for" that “the people may know of he. lent injustice? committed by this Court,” and that ‘whatever 11g takes, wrongs and injustices. that were comm must never be repeated.” He ends his petition prayer that -_ |Cobr oF ProFessionay, Respoysir The Lawyer and the Courts TY 8 177 “x XX a resolution issue 9, Court to receive the certificate of the ete | Cleri o torney and counselor-at-law IN TRUST with et tion that at any time in the future and in the = Serva regain our faith and confidence, we may reunan tile to assume the practice of the noblest BOReien Issue: Is the criticism made of th. le Si e Court malicious and contemptuous? nee Held: Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigoriously assails their actua- tions. For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of jus- tice. A citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and inidiscretions of courts and judges. Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their per- formance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democ- ratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well organized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through le- gitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The Teason is that “An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the im: portant place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts ina Jair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, 45 well as of the Judiciary has always been encouraged by the courts.” (in re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an Im- Portant part of the traditional work of the lawyer. In out the errors of the prosecution Is, he points lower courts. nes ‘initten for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronounce: Ments of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see flaws and inconsistencies of the doctrines.178 Leca Etuics Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right, No law may abridge this right. Nor ts he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal ani- madversion as a citizen.” (Case of Austin, 28 Am, Dec, 657, 665) But it is the cardinal condition of all such criti- cism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm ex ists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other hand. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disci plinary action. Atty. Almacen was suspended indefinitely Rule 11.06.—A lawyer shall submit grievances ageinst a Judge to the proper authorities only. COMMENTS: Complaints Against Judges, To Be Coursed i Proper Authorities Only—A lawyer has the ev defend a judge from unfounded criticism or ground ae personal attack. This is irrespective of whether he loses wins his cases in the sala of the judge. However, such duty does not prevent a lawyer fe : filing administrative complaints against erring JUdse" from accepting cases of clients who have legitimat® & ances against them. ith the In so doing, the complaint must be filed with proper authorities only, that is, with the Supreme Ci, (through the Office of the Court Administrator) 1, is administrative in nature, or with the Office of 1 ty budsman if the complaint is criminal and D° ett administrative in nature (see Maceda VS. bu G.R. No, 102781, April 22, 1993).Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY ‘The Lawyer and the Courts 179 Consequently, complaints should not be coursed the media, to the Military authorities.” the Prestey : Governors, Mayors, or other officers or institutions nei are not the proper forums to Investigate the judges it magistrates.” Grievances Against Justices Of The Supreme Court.—If the complaints are based on impeachable of, fenses, the complaints must be coursed through the House of Representatives and the Senate in accordance with the rules on impeachment (Art. XI, Sections 2-8 1987 Constitution). Rule 139-B, Rules Of Court, Coverage; Justices ‘And Judges Excluded.—Under this Rule which became effective on June 1, 1988, it is provided that: “(The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chap- ter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service.” (Rule 139-B, Section 1, par. 2).” Pursuant to this Rule, the disbarment cases pending Investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and disposition as provided in the Rule except those cases where the investigation has been sub- Stantially completed (Section 20, ibid). The cases trans- ferred to the IBP included cases against judges. After some Cases were filed directly with the IBP involving six (6) qeumbent justices of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme aan acting on the petition of the (CA) Justices concerned led Section 1, Rule 139-B stating that the members of 2.By, Bumanlag vs. Bumanlag, 74 SCRA 92; Re: Atty. Rogelio igabuyo, 535 SCRA 200. bansag Pe Rule is in effect an abandonment of the ruling in Ca- vs. ane’: Femandez, L-8974, Oct. 18, 1957; see also: Lualhat! “tt, 87 Phil. 86. : >180 Lecat Erxics the judiciary were excluded from the coverage of Rule 139. ph 2. Accordingly. all complaints B, Section 1, paragral against justices and judges were required to be forwarded to the Supreme Court Criminal Complaints Against Judges In Connes tion With Their Duties As Such Must Be Filed With The Supreme Court, Not With The Ombudsman. Maceda vs. Ombudsman ‘Vasquez and Atty. Abiera G.R. No. 102781 April 22, 1993 ice of the Ombudsman Issue: Whether the Offi pplaint for alleged falst- could entertain a criminal com] feation of a judge's certification submitted (0 the Su- preme Court, and assuming that it can. whether a re- ferral should be made first to the Supreme Court. Held: ‘The Court disagrees with the first pa petitioner's basic argument. There 1s nothing in the decision in Orap that ‘would restrict it only to offenses Committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties ‘A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is ad- ministratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable © the State under the Revised Penal Code for his feloniovs act. However, We agree with petitioner that in the ab- sence of any administrative action taken agai by this Court with regard to his certificates of service the investigation being conducted by the ombud: encroaches into the Court's power of a\ istrative ‘supervision over all courts and its personnel, in viola tion of the doctrine of separation of powers ution Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Const —— vests in the sien Court ‘acimunestra es over all courts and court personnel. frot ° ¢ Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals 4°" ve By virtue ° the fe lowest munteipal trial court clerk. rt of -_Cope OF PROFESSIONAL Responsisi The Lawyer and the Courts TY 181 this power, it is only the Su oversee the judges’ and court personne eat can with all laws, and take the proper administra os tion against them if they commit any iat ac- thereof. No other branch of government may neu into this power, without running afoul of the docu of separation of powers. ae The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Con- stitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise un- dermines the independence of the judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the mat- ter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its re- cords, or to allow its personnel to testify on this mat- ter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. (Ombudsman was directed to dismiss case filed against the Judge). Duty Of Lawyers When Confronted By Extorting Public Officers.—In Acejas III vs. People (493 SCRA 292), the Supreme Court reminded lawyers to report to the authorities acts of extortion of public officers for appropri- ate action and not to participate in the illegal acts. A lawyer shall not offer any bribe to any public officer Me a magistrate, prosecutor, solicitor, clerks of courts, Police, etc.) to gain an advantage for himself or for @ client. th has a double duty—to resist extortions and tempta- "s to bribe and to report to the proper authorities.182 Lecat Ernics CANON 12. A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EvgRy FORT AND CONSIDER IT His DUTY ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFIciE\y ‘ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Rule 12.01—A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself with the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he wil adduce and the order of its profference. He should also be ready with the original docu ments for comparison with the copies. Rule 12.02—A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. Rule 12.03—A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda oF briefs, let the period lapse without submi ting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. t unduly delay a ce Rule 12.04—A lawyer shall not ment oF ‘mis impede the execution of a judi use court processes his Rule 12.05—A lawyer shall refrain from talk ial witness during a break or recess IP while the witness is still under exam wites® Rule 12.06—A lawyer shall not knowingly assist 9 ona to misrepresent himself or t !™P! another. nar Rule 12.07—A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat a witness nor needlessly inconven!e™ agCove oF Proressional, Respoxsieiuny 18 ‘The Lawyer and the ‘Courts : Rule 12.08—A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of hig client, except: a) Of formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instru- ment and the like; b) “substantial matters, in cases, where his testimony is essential to the ends of Justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel. CANON 12. A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EF- FORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. COMMENTS: Speedy and Efficient Administration of Justice, Common Aim Of The Bench And The Bar.—A speedy and efficient administration of justice which is mandated by the Constitution is a joint responsibility of the judges and the lawyers. Other government officials like the police, the sheriffs, the prosecutors and even witnesses have also the responsibility to coordinate and cooperate with the Judicial officers in the administration of justice The Canon directs the lawyer to exert every effort and to consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice Acts Which Obstruct The Administration Of Jus- Are Condemned.—184 Lecat Etrics People vs. Jardin 124 SCRA 167 Held: The dilatory tactics of the defense coun sel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take effective counter measures to obviate the delay ing acts constitute obstruction of justice. As aptly stated: 12.09. Obstructing the administration of justice. ‘An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs Cloribel, G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31 SCRA 1: In re: Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J. Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107). For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the ad: ministration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him (Cantorne vs. Ducosin, 57 Phil. 23 [1932]; De Ios Santos \S Sagalongos, 69 Phil. 406 [1940)) ‘Acts which amount to obstruct ministration of justice may take many clude such acts as instructing a complaining oa ina criminal action not to appear at the schedule! hearing so that the case against the client, the ae cused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Deer i supra) asking a client to plead guilty to a crime vr the lawyer knows his client did not commit Pr vs. Santos, 58 Phil. 557 [1933)) advising a cllen" vi is detained for a crime to escape from prison. (cf. yt dina vs. Yan, GR. No. 30978, Sept. 30. 1974) My ploying dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction \o. clearly valid claims (Pajares vs. Abad Santos: G. ing 29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 748) prose clearly frivolous cases or appeals to drain Oi sources of the other party and compel him to Ol out of exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. VS- ye No. 22304, July 30, 1968) and filing multiple ee tions or complaints for a cause that has bee” Fig ously rejected in the false expectation of 8 ns tion in the ad forms. TheyCODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ‘The Lawyer and the Courts ise yorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 273; Ramos vs. Po. tenciano, G-R. No. 27104, Dec. 20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias vs. Uy Kim, G.R. No. 31174, May 30 1972, 45 SCRA 251). Acts of this or similar nature are grounds for disciplinary action. (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, U.P. Law Center, 1980 Edition, pp. 405-406) Rule 12.01.—A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has|adequately prepared| himself with the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will ad- duce and the order of its profference. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies. COMMENTS: Lawyer Must Be Ready When He Goes To Trial.—It is so depressing to witness a lawyer in a court room who is well-dressed, clasping an attache case, seated decently at the lawyer's table, awaiting the call of his case, and when called, stands up, and murmurs words begging for a post- ponement—because he is not ready. He practically tears down his dignity and creates disillusionment, unless his excuse is credible, sincere and valid to justify the defer- ment of the hearing. No less discouraging is the spectacle of a lawyer who 80es to trial unprepared or half-prepared and who bungles every inch of the way such that the trial could not proceed Smoothly thus wearing out the patience of the judge and the other counsel and parties. He glooms the day for every one. ae lawyer is not adequately prepared unless he has a apliegy of the facts of his case, the law and jurisprudence anchor le thereto and upon which he can appropriately Piece ae theory or stance. He must have collated every tial to gquitence essential to establish his case and essen: pable meush the pretenses of the opponent's theory an’ of Presenting and offering his evidence in an Orderh tions, and smooth manner without provoking valid objec:—_ 186 Lecat Ernics Duty Of A Newly Hired Counsel.—A ney), counsel who appears in a case in the midstream s hired sumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all the cedent processes and proceedings that have transpined the record prior to his takeover (Villasis vs. Court of Ap peals, 60 SCRA 120). ' A newly hired counsel who appears in a case in the midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have transpired in the record prior to his takeover (Villasis vs. Court of Appeals, 60 SCRA 120). Readiness With Admissible Evidence.—the lawyer who is presenting documentary exhibits must also be ready with the originals thereof for purposes of compar son with copies thereof—to avoid objections—which ordi- narily delay the proceedings (See Rule 130, Section 3 RRC). A counsel for any party in a mandate of the Canons of legal ethics, and with due re gard for the elementary standards of fair play. s at bound to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is applicable in @ detaine case oven if the issues therein are essentially simple uncomplicated (Javellana vs. Lutero, 20 SCRA na Keeping Abreast Of The Law And Lega! pee ments.—Ignorance of the law which prejudices # °, may be a ground for disciplinary action. All la¥ PAC out ners should be fully conversant with the Rules ° (Fajardo vs. Dela Torre, 427 SCRA 127). str The Adon Inadequate Preparation Obstructs tion of Justice —A lawyer should never come sepa unprepared. Most cases brought to court without Prin tion are cases lost. Half of the work of a lawyet " jequat the office. It is spent in study and research. IN" ev preparation obstructs the administration of JUStC 0 York Central Railroad vs. Johnson, 279 U-S- 310: Martin's Legal Ethics, p. 47, 1988 ed.). judicial controversy: yCove oF ProrEssion, IONAL Resspo, ‘The Lawyer and the Coun SBT 187 An attorney should be careful in the his pleadings so that the least doubt as to hic pean of honesty cannot be entertained (Cuaresma as intellectual SCRA 259). Daquis, 63 Rule 12.01 and Rule 18.02, Com; js reiterated briefly in Rule 18.02 anche oe 01 shall not handle any legal matter without adequate lawyer ration.” The latter rule is more comprehensive Le former. Ie Rule 12.02.—A lawyer shall not file multipl arising from the same cause. iple actions COMMENTS: Duplication Or Multiplication Of Suits, To Be Avoided.—A lawyer shall not file an action which is the subject of a similar pending action. Duplication or multipli- cation of actions arising from the same cause is trifling with our courts of justice. If the actions are coupled with peti- tions for issuance of restraining orders—the lawyer's act is one of (*forum-shopping.] That is, if he does not get the order he needs in the first case, he refiles it in the hope that in another sala, the judge will grant it. This is a contemptu- ous misbehavior of a lawyer as an officer of the court The prohibition, which is couched in general terms will include the filing of petitions for writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition when there are similar peti- tions already filed or pending. Thus, the Interim or Transi- tional Rules and Guidelines relative to the Implementation Of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (BP. Big 129) Provides— “17. Petitions for writs of certiorar etc—No Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition: habeas Corpus or quo warranto may be filed in the Interme- late Appellate Court if another similar petition i yee" filed or is still pending in the Supreme Cor i. MY such petition be filed in the Supreme ven a similar petition has been filed or still pending * Intermediate Appellate Court, unless it be to188 LecaL Erxics view the action taken by the Intermediate Appetiate Court on the petition filed with it. A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned.” Forum Shopping, Definition.—There is forum Shop. ping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another” or[when he institutes two or moze actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause. on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. J’ The most important factor in de- termining the existence of forum shopping is the “vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causts or grant the same or substantially the same relies” (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Atty. Emesto 5 Flores, AC No. 4058, March 12, 1998). _ Prevention And Sanctions Against Forum Shep ping.—To prevent forum shopping by party-litigants 2 their lawyers, the Supreme Court, in several Circulars : has issued, required the attachment to all initiatory ple" ings a sworn certification, that: (a) the initiating party has not theretofore 0” menced any action or filed any claim involving the sot issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agen’ to the best of his knowledge, no such other action OF oe is pending therein; First Philippine Intemational Bank vs. CA. 2% Bug Corti ashington Distillers, Inc. vs. CA, 260 SCRA 821 sfuction and Development Corp. vs. Laron. 171 c 95t a» Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs. CA. 251 SCRA "romeo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. i: * Now int 17 Revised Rules of Sa fogether under Section 5. RuCoe OF PROFESSIONAL Restoxsitaisy ‘The Lawyer and the Courts 7 189 (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, , e statement of the present status thereof and, a complet (o) if he should thereafter learn that the same or i claim has been filed similar action or ¢ ed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom is the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory plead. ing has been filed (Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure). Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the gismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise previded, upon motion and after hearing. The submission ofa false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administra- tive and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dis- missal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions (ibid) Effect Of Forum Shopping.—Forum shopping is condemnable and the punishment therefor is the dis- missal of all actions pending in the different courts without Prejudice to the taking of appropriate actions against the counsel or party concerned (Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34) oo Shopping Inapplicable To Disbarment Pro- 7 lings.—Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases re poccedtings, not to disbarment proceedings (Maronilla 355 a 482 SCRA 256; Gonzales vs. Alcaraz, 503 SCRA Quill ys also: Tomlin II vs. Moya II, 483 SCRA 154; Ron- y . Cezar, 491 SCRA 1)°** ton 7 And Not Counsel Should Sign The cee st Forum Shopping.—A certification agains ey an fPefia vs. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444.190 Leca. Ernics forum shopping by counsel is a defective cer must be executed by the petitioner. If Signe counsel, it is equivalent to non-compliance with e quirement of the Rules and constitutes a valiq the re. the dismissal of the petition (Far Eastern Shippi ee for CA and PPA, G.R. No. 130068, Oct. 1, 1998), PS °°" Ttification I ony by te A Lawyer Must Not Abuse His Right of To The Courts. : — Garcia vs. Francisco AC No. 3923, March 30, 1993 Held: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the admini- stration of justice. The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The respondent was aware of this fact when he willfully resorted to the gambits summarized above continuously seeking relief that was consis- tently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every move By grossly abusing his right of recourse (0 i courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that ha been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obli: gation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions proceedings as appear to him to be just and such é& fenses only as he believes to be honestly debatal ‘ under the law. By violating his oath not to delay 4° man for money or malice, he has besmurched name of an honorable profession and has proved hi: self unworthy of the trust reposed in him by 12 an officer of the Court, Vda. de Bacaling vs. Laguna 54 SCRA 251 pout! Held: There is something more to be Said the nature and apparent purpose of this 48° is ° 9; teCobE OF PROFESSIONAL Responsipiys The Lawyer and the Courts its genesis in the case for illegal det Case No. 6823) brought before the lloilo Cis Con What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a summary proceeding which was deliberately pro- tracted and made to suffer undue delay in its dis. posal. It was originally filed on September 13. 1960, 11 reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice be. fore the Court of Appeals, once before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and twice before this Court. ‘The present petition smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her counsel de- serves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, be- cause it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should only be resorted to in cases of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion by an inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that they could well devote to really meritorious cases. Cabagui vs. CA 67 SCRA 299 Held: The Court finds respondent, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado, guilty of gross negligence in not having complied with a ‘show cause’ resolution and of abusing the right of recourse to the Court by filing multiple petitions for the same cause in the false ex- Pectation of getting favorable action from one division #8 against the adverse action of the other division. or oerum Shopping Is A Reprehensible Manipulation sq find Processes And Proceedings.—Forum shopping “prehensible manipulation of court processes and Courts ee The filing of repetitious suits in different e fie the foundation for an inquiry into the liability tempt (geet'S and their counsels for constructive con- * Minister of Natural Resources vs. Heirs of Orval ‘CRA 566). Proceeds of Sughes 19]192 Lecat Etxics A party should not be allowed to pursue simu remedies in two different forums. Forum shopping mes of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as tin’ with the courts and abusing their processes (Benguet gj tric Corp., Inc. vs. NEA, 193 SCRA 250). a Essential Element Of Forum Shopping —A layye; _eould be charged with engaging in forum shopping only ~ when two (or more) cases are pending involving the same parties, causes of action and reliefs prayed for (Carlet vs, CA, 275 SCRA 110). If one case had already been litigated before (the deci sion therein having become final and executory) and it is refiled by the same party, the defense of the defendant should be res judicata and not forum shopping (Employees Compensation Commission vs. CA, 257 SCRA 723; First Philippine International Bank vs. CA, 252 SCRA 259 [1996)). Specific Instances of Forum Shopping That Mer- ited Sanction. 1. When a case is filed in court while an administra tive proceeding is pending in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of worable cout an unfar ; ruling (Earth Minerals Exploration, Inc. vs. Macaraig. SCRA 1). 2. During the pendency in t) petition for certiorari with prayer for inj Resolution of the NEA, the lawyer file damages with the RTC where same allegations © cn petition were reproduced, there is forum shopping ® he Supreme Court - junction to a i int d a compa”. » ta See analogous cases: Tan vs. Court of APPS, w= SCRA 212; Alonto vs. Memoracion, 185 SCRA 79 eect 210%, 45 SCRA 34; Heirs of Guballa. Sr. v8. Ch Mes O18: Kalllid Wood Industries vs. CA, 197 SCRA 735\ 1g sc 1 Fl ano, 232 SCRA 631 (1994); Sanchez vs. Brim = cor U loFes vs. Abesamis, 275 SCRA 302; Benguet Elect ve Vs. Flores, A.C. No. 4058, March 12, 1998:Cope OF PROFESSIONAL Response The Lawyer and the Courts my 193 act of malpractice (Benguet Electric ¢ NBA, 193 SCRA 250). Soperative, Inc, 3, There is forum shopping specially, where th in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdieto i (ew Pangasinan Review, Inc. vs. NLRC, 196 SCRA 55) - 4, Also, when counsel omits to disclose the pend- ency of an appeal, in filing a certiorari case (Collado vs Hernando, 161 SCRA 639). Lawyer Has The Duty To Disclose The Prior Dis- Of His Case By A Court Of Concurrent Juris- diction.—In one foreign case, the lawyer filed a divorce suit before the Superior Court of Cook County. Case was dismissed. The lawyer refiled the same case with the Circuit Court of Cook County—which court enjoys concur- rent jurisdiction with the Superior Court. The lawyer's act was condemned. It is his duty to dis- close the prior dismissal of the case and his failure to do so is a violation of his oath of office (Healy vs. Case, 89 NE. 638). Counsel Merits Rebuke For Being A Litigationer — Filing of several actions involving same subject matter or seeking identical relief unduly burdens courts and is reprehensible. Macias vs. Uy Kim 45 SCRA 251 Held: The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actions covering the same subject matter or seeking substan- tially identical relief, which is unduly burdening the ie Coming from a neophyte, who is still unsure imself in the practice of law, the same may be re- a with some understanding. But considering PPelant's ability and long experience at the bar, his ay identical suits for the same remedy is reprehen- and should merit rebuke.194 Lecat Eruics Foronda vs. Guerrero 436 SCRA 9 Held: Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administra. tion of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by mi using court processes. Such filing of multiple peti- tions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be pun ished as contempt of court. Needless to add, the law. yer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney ‘ act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to main tain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor: Rule 12.03.—A lawyer shall not, after obtaining aa sions of time to file pleadings, memereing ‘he r briefs, let the period lapse without submitt it, same or offering an explanation for his so. COMMENTS: ust A Lawyer Who Asked For Extension Of Time e Act In Good Faith—A lawyer who files 2 ne Extension of Time within which to file pleading set randa or briefs, must comply within the P&T! Fg, unless, for valid reasons, h thet Fea , he is granted ano! 9 which latter ease, he should comply before the !2P5°° last period so granted. at of ye In the event that son the lawyer, for one re# al pther, decided to dispense with the fing of he veel t ‘ne ‘ad announced to the court, he should s° 'Cope oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBL ty The Lawyer and the Courts 195, filing a Manifestation with an expla, : car informing the Court is necessary in olor i = a unnecessary delay in the disposition of the a - gny incident therein. The delay ts ordinarily caused by the waiting period for the arrival of the pleading, memoranda. or brief, which might be thought of as having been merely delayed in the mails. When it is found out later that the counsel did not opt to file anything, time had already been frittered away- If the Motion for Extension_ofTime is filed in bad faith from the outset, it is an @bstruction of justice. The lawyer is subject to discipline. Casals vs. Cusi, Jr. 52 SCRA 58” Held: The Court thus finds unsatisfactory the attorney's explanation for his having allowed his ex- tended period to lapse without submitting the re- quired comment nor extending to the Court the cour- tesy of any explanation or manifestation for his fail- ure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and de- layed for a considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Lawyer is suspended. Achacoso vs. Court of Appeals 51 SCRA 424 Held: The Court censures the practice of coun- sels who secure repeated extensions of time to file ra pleadings and thereafter simply let the period “pse without submitting the pleading or even an ex- Planation or manifestation of their failure to do so. yet Should File Their Pleadings On Time Or er The Consequences.— » See 1h pate, pe People vs. Compendio, Jr., 258 SCRA 254; Tan temayo, Paves 75; Pagsanjan Electric Cooperative vs. : RA 1,196 LecaL Erxics Roxas vs. Court of Appeals 156 SCRA 253 Held: Thus. the petition to review the assailed resolutions must fail. Let this serve as warning among members of the Philippine bar who take their own sweet time with their cases if not purposely delay its progress for no it does no credit to their standing in ore so, when they do not file the re- leading until their motion is acted upon. Not only should they not presume that their motion for extension of time will be granted by the court much less should they expect that the exten- sion that may be granted shall be counted from no- tice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within the extended period requested. Failing in this. they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed. cogent reason. It the profession. M' quired brief or pl unduly delay 2 case: Rule 12.04.—A lawyer shall not ‘ judgment or misuse impede the execution of a court processes. COMMENTS: Efficient Admit 2, a lawyer mus f speedy ant Assistance In The Speedy And stration Of Justice —Under Canon 1 consider it a duty to assist in the realization ©! st efficient administration of justice. Consequently. he ame not cause the undue delay of any case, or im f 2 execution of a judgment or misuse court process. should not for any corrupt motive delay any mass" (see Comments on Rule 1.03, CPR). maw erection Of Final Decision Should Not Be er eee - ee a judgment has become final. va Ly ning Party ty be not through subterfuge, dePriv®’ jain le verdict. Courts must therefore 8 i any scheme calculated to bring about that restlt © Tho vs. Sanchez, 82 Phil, 776) : 2 Co,Cobe OF PROFESSIONAL Respon ESPONSIE ‘The Lawyer and the Courts | 197 Lawyers should not resort to nor abet th ineir clients, to a series of actions and Petitions for ice purpose of thwarting the execution ofa judgment long (inal and executory (see Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin 25 song 646). A lawyer should not enter his appearance in a ok which had long been terminated by final decision diese Soriano, 33 SCRA 801). He should not appeal a decuire manifestly for delay as this is a violation of his attorney's oath and Is obstructive of the administration of justice Uypuanco vs. Equitable Banking Corporation 27 SCRA 1272" Held: The circumstances surrounding the pre- sent litigation definitely prove that the appeal is frivo- lous and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves se- vere condemnation, wasting, as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases. It is but proper therefore that appellant's counsel shall pay treble costs in all instances. A Judge Should Prevent Dilatory Tactics Of Law- yers.—A judge should be quick enough to prevent a lawyer ‘fom resorting to dilatory tactics which obstruct the ad- Tinistration of justice (see People vs. Jardin, 124 SCRA 167). A judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision (Inte: Flordeliza, 44 Phil. 608). A ll*¥¢r Should Not Misuse The Rules Of Procedure — ane should utilize the rules of procedure to attain the otjustice and not to frustrate them. Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo 36 SCRA 137 to mgt The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice Precise tes according to law. Procedural rules are _““sely designed to accomplish such a worthy ob- "Ss “ng yg 80: Gillego vs. Diaz, 39 SCRA 88; Samar Mining ado, 24 SCRA 402.198 Lecat Ernics jective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt i : t ve the ends for which they are intended deseyern demnation. — Alonso vs. Villamor 16 Phil. 318° Held: Litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and de- stroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of forms and technicalities in procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits. unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Gomez vs. Presiding Judge. RTC Br. 15, Ozamis City 249 SCRA 432 Held: Lawyers should not misuse the ike e procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly . lay a case, impede the execution of a judgmen! misuse court processes. to his 6 le Rule 12.05.—A lawyer shall refrain from talking Tle witness during a break or recess in the trial, the witness is still under examination. COMMENTS: cos Coaching Of Witness During Break or Reet a demned.—When a witness testifies on the witnes’ ye tru he is placed under oath “to tell the truth, the "and. and nothing but the truth." A lawyer on the othe ofan! sworn to do no falsehood, nor consent to the Coane de in court. Both the lawyer and the witness th common duty—to uphold the truth—that ré Se alt’ ® See also: Economic Insurance Co.. Ine: “* Company, 34 SCRA 744.Cope oF PROFESSIONAL Respon; sib ‘The Lawyer and the Courts TY 199 ndered to whom it Is due. This is the rea t ee I essence of When a witness had been called to the witness stand py the lawyer, it fs the lawyer's time to ask questions which the witness shall answer (unless validly objectec) pt the moment a break Or recess is declared during the trial and the witness ts still under examination, the lawyer must refrain from talking to the witness This is to prevent, the lawyer from coaching or teaching the witness to an- swer in a certain way, or to rectify certain statements damaging to his cause at the resumption of the trial. The rationale therefore of this rule is to uphold and maintain fair play with the other party and to prevent the examining lawyer from being tempted to coach his own witness to suit his purposes. Rule 12.06.—A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a wit- ness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate an- other. COMMENTS: Assisting In Misrepresentation Or Impersonation, Condemned.—A lawyer is sworn to do no falsehood, nor to consent to the doing of any in court. If he knowingly 4ssists, or induces a witness to misrepresent himself as an Sevitness when he is not, or to impersonate a person itoled in a case—subjects the lawyer to disciplinary Pin ie lawyer renders himself totally unfit to assist in administration of justice] Conte itt! Liability Of Witness.—The witness who tly ape Mstepresentation or impersonation is crim lige for “False Testimony” either under Arts. 181 - 183, Revised Penal Code” depending upon the Hy peat 181. Fas rhe defendants.— . € testimony favorable to t Seeing WH0 shall give false testimony in favor ofthe defen- “Itt in fg Nal case, shall suffer the penalties of arresto ™aximum period to prision correccional in its200 LecaL Eruics nature of the case. And the lawyer who induces a wit to commit false testimony is equally guilty as the Ses SS, There is nothing more fatal to justice than a co witness (People vs. Lumampao, 20 Phil. 168; People y, Ferry, 66 Phil. 310). Thusly, the Revised Penal Cock makes false testimony a crime. . The lawyer who presented a witness knowing him to be a false witness is criminally liable for “Offering False Testimony In Evidence” (Art. 184, Revised Penal Code). The lawyer who is guilty of the above is both crimi- nally and administratively liable. minimum period and a fine not to exceed 1,000 pesos, if the prosecution is for a felony punishable by an afilictive penal. and the penalty of arresto mayor in any other case ‘Art. 182. False testimony in civil cases.—Any person found guilty of false testimony in a civil case shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fre not to exceed 6,000 pesos, if the amount in controversy shall exceed 5,000 pesos, and the penalty of arresto mayor in maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed 1,000 pesos, if the amount in con versy shall not exceed said amount or cannot be estimated Art. 183, False testimony in other cases and pedits i solemn affirmation. —The penalty of arresto mayor in . er mum period to prision correccional in its minimum pent +) be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making UN" statements and not being included in the provisions of aed preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make 22 ae a upon any matter before a competent person autho administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires: ‘e! stew cad, Person who, in case of a solemn affirmation Tis tleu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehood mene ell this and the three preceding articles of this section sb © negative penalties provided therein. aye son who chen ren ering False testimony in evidence “NE; & teatime, Shall knowingly offer in evidence a fale wee ‘Salmons in any Judieial or oficial proceeding shale penalties provided Gia and shall suffer