G.R. No.

159186 June 5, 2009

JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35,
General Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City;
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and
MERGYL MIRABUENO, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to
annul and set aside the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Decision 2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68250.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business
through their company Primetown Property Group.

Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te
(Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl
Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997,
when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for
the reason that the "Account is Closed." Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and
Spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the
latter failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money,
damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6231.3 On December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and
instituted a similar action, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6238. 4

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed
several informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the
petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City. The criminal
complaints were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and
Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of
the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from
participating in the proceedings. 6 Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases
be suspended until the civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack
of merit. Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 8 relative to Criminal Case Nos.
34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order
Denying the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial
Question relative to Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent motions were denied in the
Order10 dated October 18, 2000.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction11before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order12 denying the petition.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 which was denied in an Order dated
October 18, 2001.14

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari

Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.

On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision 16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The
CA opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The CA ruled:

In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the
issue involved therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the
petitioner, but it is, whether or not the complainants therein are entitled to collect from the
petitioner the sum or the value of the checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It
behooves this Court to state that the sale and the rediscounting of the checks are two
transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so happened that in the subject civil
cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the rediscounting of the checks.
Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the
validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale
that is contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never
contested such sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or
prayed in his answer that the sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases
Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be
deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.17

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 18 which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17,
2003.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS

NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF
SUMS OF MONEY INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS
ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER, CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD
WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR
VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).
 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20

The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and
jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos.
6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the
issue as to whether private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the
lack of consideration, is an issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that there is no valid consideration for the
check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily follows that he could not also be
held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the
check should have been issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration;
otherwise, no violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the
reason for the dishonor of the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and
to close his account in order to avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order
due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the titles to the purchased properties to him.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no
prejudicial question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension
of the proceedings in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner.
The issue in the civil cases is not the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn,
but whether the complainants therein are entitled to damages arising from the checks. These
checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same
checks to private complainants. The checks were subsequently dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such issue has absolutely no
bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 21

The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question
that necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.

We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 22

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to
the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the
other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 23 Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. 24

The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22,
while in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the
petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn. lavvphil

The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that
the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.

In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of
the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense. 25

In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily
interest rate of 5% was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said
interest were likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22
will no longer prosper. In resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate
imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not
affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the
mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed before the court
hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing
check has been issued."

Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In
Lozano v. Martinez, we have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation
of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued as an
evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as
an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

xxxx

x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or

even as evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum.

To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value
of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking
communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The
mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. 28
Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a
complaint for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While
the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in
the civil case) arising from the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil
complaint. The Court ruled that there was a prejudicial question considering that the defense
in the civil case was based on the very same facts that would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the estafa case.

The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the
petitioner is liable to pay the private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will
not affect the guilt or innocence of the petitioner because the material question in the criminal
cases is whether petitioner had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of
its issuance.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues
involved in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the
trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a party’s defense and
accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought
before the court, are better ventilated during trial proper.

Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the
parties, to examine and to put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a
well designed machinery termed "trial."Thus, all the defenses available to the accused
should be invoked in the trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that
should ascertain the facts and decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the
petitioner.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the
Resolution dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO* RENATO C. CORONA**

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 646 dated
May158, 2009.

** Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 631 dated April
29, 2009.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Danilo B. Pine, concurring, rollo, pp. 30-32.

2
Id. at 33-41.

3
Id. at 97-103.

4
Id. at 90-96.

5
Id. at 68-89.

6
Id. at 219-223; 224-228.

7
Id. at 165; 166.

8
Id. at 229-235.

9
Id. at 236-238.
10
Id. at 167-168.

11
Id. at 152-164.

12
Id. at 66-67.

13
Id. at 45.

14
Id.

15
Id. at 44-65.

16
Id. at 33-41.

17
Id. at 37-38.

18
Id. at 105-107.

19
Id. at 30-32.

20
Id. at 22.

21
Id. at 298-311.

22
Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 773, 781-782,
citing Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 490, 499 (1997) and Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 (1995).

23
People v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 366, 370,
citing Sabandal v. Tongco, 366 SCRA 567 (2001), Alano v. Court of Appeals, 347
Phil. 549 (1997), Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 112 Phil. 105 (1961), Te v. Court of
Appeals, 346 SCRA 327 (2000), Beltran v. People, 334 SCRA 106 (2000), and Isip v.
Gonzales, 148-A Phil. 212 (1971).

24
Sabandal v. Tongco, supra note 23, citing Rojas v. People, 156 Phil. 224, 229
(1974).

25
Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323.

26
Supra note 22.

27
G.R. No. 154438, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 317, 330. (Emphasis supplied).

28
Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 100,
citing Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423, 431 (1997).

29
G.R. Nos. L-50441-42, September 18, 1980, 100 SCRA 125.
G.R. No. 154622 August 3, 2010

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON P. JACINTO, Respondent.

In the instant case, we find that the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line
Agreement or not is not determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

Respondent’s contention that if it be proven that the loan of FWCC had been novated and
restructured then his liability under the dishonored checks would be extinguished, fails to
persuade us. There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that
respondent is released from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-
agreements between FWCC and Land Bank expressly provide that respondent’s JSS (Joint
and Several Signatures) continue to secure the loan obligation and the postdated checks
issued continue to guaranty the obligation. In fact, as aptly pointed out by petitioner, out of
the nine (9) checks in question, eight (8) checks were dated June 8 to October 30, 1998 or
after the execution of the June 3, 1998 Restructuring Agreement. If indeed respondent’s
liability on the checks had been extinguished upon the execution of the Restructuring
Agreement, then respondent should have demanded the return of the checks. 23 However,
there was no proof that he had been released from his obligation. On the contrary, the
Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which states that "This Agreement shall not
novate or extinguish all previous security, mortgage, and other collateral agreements,
promissory notes, solidary undertaking previously executed by and between the parties and
shall continue in full force and effect modified only by the provisions of this Agreement."24

Moreover, it is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as
an accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22.25 Thus, this Court has held that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of
B.P. 22.26 The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. 27 Section
1 of B.P. 22 enumerates the following elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of
any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Thus,
even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and
petitioner, respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 for the
dishonored checks.
G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.

The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not

Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action

In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is,
still, no prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case.

To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of
Rule 111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present
controversy.

Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the
parties is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration
of such contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal
prosecution.

We find for petitioner.

It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as
follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of
the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the
elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases 21 that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of
BP 22. In Mejia v. People,22 we ruled:

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad
check. The purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance, or any agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of petitioner. To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms
and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability
and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in
banking communities. The clear intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of
issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.

Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack
of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for
insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:

G.R. No. 176795 June 30, 2008

SPS. CAROLINA and REYNALDO JOSE, petitioners,

vs.
SPS. LAUREANO and PURITA SUAREZ, respondents.

The case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question which
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCCs.

We find that there is none and thus we resolve to grant the petition.

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 24

Now the prejudicial question posed by respondents is simply this: whether the daily interest
rate of 5% is void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest are
likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer
prosper.

The prejudicial question theory advanced by respondents must fail.

In the first place, the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of
respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or
reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability
under B.P. Blg. 22.25 In several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved. 26

The nature and policy of B.P. Blg. 22 were aptly enunciated by the Court in Meriz v.
People,27 when it stated:

x x x. [B.P. Blg.] 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be
envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability
and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy
that can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are
issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate
application of the legislative enactment can be made. The gravamen of the offense
under [B.P. Blg.] 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The act effectively declares the offense
to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query then is whether the law has
been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without so much regard
as to the criminal intent of the issuer.28

Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for
being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what
will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial
question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been
breached, that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.

The issue has in fact been correctly addressed by the MTCCs when respondents’ motion to
suspend the criminal proceedings was denied upon the finding that there exists no
prejudicial question which could be the basis for the suspension of the proceedings. The
reason for the denial of the motion is that the "cases can very well proceed for the
prosecution of the accused in order to determine her criminal propensity … as a
consequence of the issuance of several checks which subsequently … bounced" for "what
the law punishes is the issuance and/or drawing of a check and upon presentment for
deposit or encashment, it was dishonored due to insufficient funds [or] account closed." 29

There being no prejudicial question, the RTC and, consequently, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred when they allowed the suspension of the proceedings in the B.P. Blg. 22
cases.
G.R. No. 124498 October 5, 2001

EDDIE B. SABANDAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIPE S. TONGCO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 42,
and PHILIPPINES TODAY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The petition has no merit.

The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11

"A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused." 12

"For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal." 13

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to
the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the
other element or characteristic is satisfied. 14 It must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that
the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.15 If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. 16 Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. 17

In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks. The issue in the civil action for
specific performance, overpayment, and damages is whether complainant Sabandal
overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc. If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is
shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the
bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is itself an offense. 18
The lower court, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages did not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil
case was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case
three years after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil
action was instituted as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.

Petitioner's claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a defense during the trial
of the cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against him. The civil action
for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action. 19 Hence,
petitioner may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. 20

G.R. No. 159823 February 18, 2013

TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
ETTORE ROSSI, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the
suspension of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks
the buyer issued in connection with the sale.

Xxx

The petition for review is without merit.

A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be
determined before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.16 The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial
question is to avoid conflicting decisions.17
Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial
question are expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 the concept of prejudicial question is explained in this wise:

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to
the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the
other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves
the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case," therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is
there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.

Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question,
Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of whether or not he
was criminally liable for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that if the
contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale would
be extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal
proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced Foundation did
not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative remedies available to a
contracting party under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of
the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation,
with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the
fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired
the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in reciprocal
obligations. The condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no corresponding
agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for this is that in reciprocal
obligations a party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his part of the
contract; hence, the party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may rescind
the obligation if the other does not perform, or is not ready and willing to perform. 19

It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory
relation as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The
rescission is equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their
status before the celebration of the contract.20 However, until the contract is rescinded, the
juridical tie and the concomitant obligations subsist.

To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the

criminal actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1)
the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 21 The issue in the criminal actions upon
the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the
dishonoured checks knowing them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other
hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment
of Advanced Foundation’s obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional sale. If, after
trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be found to have committed
material breach as to warrant the rescission of the contract, such result would not
necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the criminal responsibility for issuing the
dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned elements show, he already committed
the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the
conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to
make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the future event
of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale through rescission. Indeed,
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless check was already the
offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for the violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for
rescission of the conditional sale.

Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the rescission of
contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes. We consider the
exposition by the CA of its reasons to be appropriate enough, to wit:

xxxx

We find merit in the petition.

A careful perusal of the complaint for rescission of contract and damages reveals that the
causes of action advanced by respondent Reyes are the alleged misrepresentation
committed by the petitioner and AFCSC and their alleged failure to comply with his demand
for proofs of ownership. On one hand, he posits that his consent to the contract was vitiated
by the fraudulent act of the company in misrepresenting the condition and quality of the
dredging pump. Alternatively, he claims that the company committed a breach of contract
which is a ground for the rescission thereof. Either way, he in effect admits the validity and
the binding effect of the deed pending any adjudication which nullifies the same.

Indeed, under the Jaw on contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract
unenforceable but merely voidable, the remedy of which would be to annul the contract since
voidable contracts produce legal effects until they are annulled. On the other hand,
rescission of contracts in case of breach pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines also presupposes a valid contract unless rescinded or annulled.

As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.

It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which
must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the
proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial
question. Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid until rescinded, the
consideration and obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to have been validly made, thus
demandable. Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time when the
subject checks were dishonored. (Emphasis supplied)