NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF STUDY AND RESEARCH IN LAW

RANCHI

RESEARCH PAPER
on
CONSENT UNDER THE INDIAN RAPE LAW

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Dr. Julian Seal Pasari Yukta Ambastha
Assistant Professor Semester – III
NUSRL, Ranchi Section – A
Roll no.- 907

1
 RESEARCH PROBLEM
The concept of consent has always been in doubt. The consent has been explicitly explained in
precedents by the courts of law and also has been defined under section 901 of IPC. Consent to
sex matters, because it can transform coitus from being among the most heinous of criminal
offenses into sex that is of no concern to the criminal law. Unfortunately, the normative task of
making the law of rape more just is commonly impaired by conceptual confusion about what
consent means. Consent can be a mental state on a woman's part, an expression by her, or both; it
can consist of facts about a woman's mental state or expressive conduct that do not necessarily
constitute a defense to rape or consist only such facts as do constitute a defense to rape; and it
can consist of facts about a woman's mental state or expressive conduct or a legal fiction of such
facts. Some of the confusion created are as to whether the defense of consent ought to be deemed
to consist of a mental state on a woman's part or an expression; confusion about the relationship
between consent to sexual intercourse and resistance to it; and confusion about the relationship
between force and non-consent.

RESEARCH QUESTION
What exactly constitutes consent according to section 375 of IPC?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Doctrinal method or the Non Emperical method of research has been adopted to do research on
the topic. Books, Journals, Articles and other Research Papers have been referred to. Besides this
some websites providing information on this topic have been surfed and relevant parts have been
referred. Online resources and legal databases have been used in the research for this case. Also
the internet and web based resources have helped in an extensive way towards the completion of
this research on the particular case.

1
A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any Section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person
under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to
believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or If the consent is given by a
person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that
to which he gives his consent; or Unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person
who is under twelve years of age.

2
 INTRODUCTION

The rape laws of the country were amended in the year 2013 after the Justice J.S. Verma
Committee Report, to address the prevalent inadequacies. The provisions of the amended Section
375 of the Indian Penal Code has extended the scope of definition of rape, it discusses important
concepts like consent, will, submission, minority, misrepresentation, fraud etc.

RAPE: MEANING

The word rape is derived from the Latin term rapio, which mean ‘to seize’. Thus rape literally
means a forcible seizure. It signifies in common terminology, “as the ravishment of a woman
without her consent, by force, fear, or fraud” or “the carnal knowledge of a woman by force
against her will.” In other words, rape is violation with violence of the private person of a
woman.

In the Indian Penal Code, Section 375 defines rape.

Taking note of the inadequacy of law of rape and its failure to safeguard the rights of the
innocent victims against the heinous crime, the Parliament in 1983 and 2013 extensively
amended the law of rape so as to make the law more realistic.

OLD PROVISION

“375. Rape. A man is said to commit” rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has
sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following
descriptions:-

First.- Against her will.

Secondly.- Without her consent.

Thirdly.- With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in
whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt.

Fourthly.- With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her
consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to
be lawfully married.

Fifthly.- With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of
mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any
stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences
of that to which she gives consent.

Sixthly.- With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age.

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Explanation.- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the
offence of rape.

Exception.- Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen
years of age, is not rape.”

AFTER AMENDMENT2

A man is said to commit “rape” if he-—

penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes
her to do so with him or any other person; or

inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the
urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or

manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra,
anus or any ~ of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or

applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any
other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:—

First.— Against her will.

Secondly.— Without her consent.

Thirdly.— With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in
whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt.

Fourthly.— With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her
consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to
be lawfully married.

Fifthly.— With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness
of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any
stupefying or unwholesome Substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences
of that to which she gives consent.

Sixthly.— With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.

Seventhly.— When she is unable to communicate consent.

Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora.

2
Sec 375 Indian Penal Code.

4
Explanation 2.—Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by
words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness
to participate in the specific sexual act:

Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the
reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.

Exception I.—A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape.

Exception 2.—Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being
under fifteen years of age, is not rape.’

INGREDIENTS
This section consists of the following:

1. Sexual intercourse by a man with a woman.

2. The sexual intercourse must be under the circumstances falling under any of the seven
clauses of section 375.

Sexual Intercourse

A very important case that led to definite amendments in the section is Sakshi v. Union of India
and Ors. (the Union of India, the Ministry of Law and Justice and the New Delhi Commissioner
of Police)3 Sakshi, an NGO focusing on violence against women, petitioned the Supreme Court
of India to declare that “rape” under India’s criminal rape law (Indian Penal Code, or “IPC”,
section 375) includes all forms of forcible penetration. Sakshi claimed that the current
interpretation of the law, limited rape to forcible penile/vaginal penetration only.

The prosecution submitted that Section 375 IPC should be interpreted in the current scenario,
especially in regard to the fact that child abuse has assumed an alarming proportion in recent
times. The words ‘sexual intercourse’ in Section 375 IPC should be interpreted to mean all kinds
of sexual penetration of any type of any orifice of the body and not the intercourse understood in
the traditional sense. The words ‘sexual intercourse’ having not been defined in the Penal Code,
there was no impediment in the way of the Court to give it a wider meaning so that the various
types of child abuse may come within its ambit and the conviction of an offender may be
possible under Section 376 IPC.

Sexual abuse of children, particularly minor girl, children by means and manner other than
penile/vaginal penetration is common and may take the form of penile/anal penetration,
penile/oral penetration, finger/vaginal penetration or object/ vaginal penetration. It is submitted

3
AIR 2004 SC 3566

5
that by treating such forms of abuse as offenses falling under Section 354 IPC or 377 IPC, the
very intent of the amendment of Section 376 IPC by incorporating Sub-section 2(f) therein is
defeated. The said interpretation is also contrary to the contemporary understanding of sexual
abuse and violence all over the world.

The Court upheld the existing definition of rape as forcible penile/vaginal penetration only,
refusing to include other forms of penetration within the ambit of rape as defined under IPC.

During the Sakshi case, the Court ordered the Law Commission of India to examine and respond
to the issues that Sakshi raised and as of today, the rape law in India under Section 375 stands
amended and includes all forms of sexual assault and is not just limited to penile/vaginal
intercourse or heterosexual intercourse.

Circumstances falling under the seven clauses

A man is guilty of rape if he commits sexual intercourse with a woman either against her will or
without her consent as enumerated under clauses firstly to seventhly of Section 375 IPC.

1. Against her will:

The word ‘will’ imply the faculty of reasoning power of the mind that determines whether to do
an act or not. There is a fine distinction between an act done ‘against the will’ and ‘an act done
without consent.’ Every act done ‘against the will’ is obviously ‘without the consent.’ But every
act ‘without the consent’ is not ‘against the will.’ Clause (1) of this section applies where the
woman is in possession of her senses and therefore, capable of consenting. In State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Chottey Lal4, the Supreme Court explained that the expression ‘against her will’
would ordinarily mean that the intercourse was done by a man with a woman despite her
resistance and opposition.

In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh5, a young girl below the age of 16 years was abducted from
her school by the three accused in a car, and she was threatened with death if she raised an alarm.
Despite her refusal, she was made to drink liquor. Then she was raped by each one of them in
turn under the threat of being killed if she persisted in raising an alarm. Due to the threat, she
kept quiet. After repeatedly committing sexual assault on her, they left her the next morning near
the place from where she had been abducted.

Surprisingly, the additional judge, Ludhiana acquitted all the accused on both counts of
abduction and rape disbelieving the version of prosecutrix regarding rape and because of delay in
FIR. Allowing the State appeal, and holding the accused persons liable for rape since at no point
of time the prosecutrix willingly cooperated with the act, the Apex Court held that the sexual
intercourse was against her will for which the accused are liable for committing rape under
Section 376, IPC.

2. Without her consent:

4
(2011) 2 SCC 550
5
AIR 1996 SC 1393.

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The essence of rape is the absence of consent. Consent means an intelligent, positive concurrence
of the ‘will’ of the woman. The policy behind the exemption from liability in the case of consent
is based on the principle that a man is the best judge of his or her own interest, and if a man
(includes woman) decides to suffer harm voluntarily, he or she cannot complain of it when it
comes about.

According to Explanation 2, consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the

person by words, gestures or any form of non-verbal communication, communicates a
willingness to participate in the specific sexual act. Thus, to absolve a person of criminal
liability, consent must be given freely and it must not be obtained by fraud or by mistake or
under a misconception of fact. This clause operates where a woman is unresponsive whether
because of the influence of drink or drugs or any other cause, or is so imbecile that she is
incapable of giving any rational consent. Consent of the woman has to be obtained prior to the
act.

The burden of proof: In case of charge of rape the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove that
the sexual intercourse was without the consent or against the will of the woman. It would not be
necessary for the defence to prove that the sexual intercourse was with the consent of the
woman6.

3.Consent obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or under mistake is no consent:

Consent obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or under mistake is no consent. In Queen v.

Flattery7[viii], the accused was charged for rape upon a 19-year-old girl. The girl who had ill
health and was subject to fits, visited the accused’s clinic along with her mother and sought his
advice for treatment. The accused, after examining the girl, advised her to have a surgical
operation, to which she consented, and under pretence of performing it, had sexual intercourse
with the girl. It was held that the girl’s consent would not excuse the accused from conviction as
it was given under a mistake of fact. There was a misconception as to the nature of the act and
whatever consent was given by the girl was for the purposes of surgical operation and not for
sexual intercourse.

In Williams8, the accused was a choirmaster who had sexual intercourse with his 16-year-old
student making her believe that he is performing a surgical operation to improve her singing
voice. Consent was vitiated by fraud and it was obtained under a misconception, thus, he was
held guilty of rape.

In these cases, it is the non-consent to sexual intercourse rather than the fraud of the doctor or the
choirmaster that makes the offence rape.

Therefore, in Moti Ram9 and Linekar10, it was held that if a woman were willing to have sexual
intercourse for monetary consideration, the fact that the consideration was found to be fictitious

6
(1961) 2 GLR 251.
7
1877 QBD 410
8
(1923) 1 KB 340
9
AIR 1954 Nag. 922

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would not vitiate the consent. Since there was consent on the part of the prosecutrix for sexual
connection, the accused persons are not liable for rape. It would amount only to breach of
contract.

4. Consent to intercourse on the assumption of a false promise to marry:

Where a woman consents to sexual intercourse under the assumption of a promise to marry, the
falsity of the promise doesn’t ipso facto vitiate consent. It depends on whether the promise of the
accused was false from its inception or not.

In Dileep Singh v. State of Bihar11, the appellant was charged and convicted under Section 376,
IPC for committing rape of a minor girl. The victim alleged that the accused forcibly raped her
and later consoled her that he would marry her. Accordingly on account of the promise for
marriage made by him, she agreed to have sexual relations with him. After she became pregnant,
she revealed the matter to her parents but efforts made by the father to establish marital tie failed.
She was then constrained to file the complaint. Although the trial court and High Court convicted
the accused, the Supreme Court set it aside. It said:

“Consent given by a woman believing the man’s promise to marry her would fall within the
expression ‘without her consent’ vide clause (ii) to Section 375 IPC, only if it is established that
from the very inception the man never really intended to marry her and the promise was a mere
hoax. When prosecutrix had taken a conscious decision to participate in the sexual act only on
being impressed by the accused’s promise to marry her and the accused’s promise was not false
from its inception with the intention to seduce her to sexual act, clause (ii) to section 375, IPC is
not attracted and established.”

In Uday v. State of Karnataka12, accused expressed love and promised to marry the prosecutrix
on a later date. Prosecutrix was quite aware that they belonged to different castes and proposal of
their marriage would be opposed by their family members. Yet the prosecutrix started cohabiting
with the accused consciously and became pregnant. On the charge of rape, the Court held that the
consent given by the prosecutrix for cohabitation cannot be said to be given under a
misconception of fact.

She had freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to have sexual intercourse with the
appellant not only on behalf of the promise of marriage but because of their deep love for each
other. Hence the appellant was not held liable to be convicted for an offence of rape under
Section 376, IPC.

However, these were earlier positions. The Supreme Court has taken different views on such
situations now.

10
(1995) 3 All ER 69.
11
(2005) 1 SCC 88.
12
2003 Cri LJ 1539 SC.

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In Pradeep Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar13, it was held that in case of a representation
deliberately made by the accused with a view to eliciting the assent of the victim without having
intention to marry her, will vitiate the consent given by the victim. It was also observed that if on
the facts it is established that at the very inception of the making of the promise the accused did
not really entertain the intention of marrying the victim and the promise to marry held out by him
was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to
exculpate him from the ambit of Section 375 clause second. Such representation would only
vitiate the consent.

CONSENT AND SUBMISSION- DISTINGUISHED:

A woman is said to consent only when she freely agrees to submit herself, while in free and
unconstrained possession of her physical and moral power to act in a manner she wanted.
Consent may be either expressed or implied depending upon the nature and circumstances of the
case. However, there is a difference between consent and submission. An act of helpless
resignation in the face of inevitable compulsions is not consent in law.

In Rao Harnam Singh, Sheoji Singh v. State14, Kalu Ram, tenant of the accused was required to
provide his wife aged 19 years to satisfy the carnal lust of the accused Rao Harnam Singh and his
guests on the eve of entertainment party arranged on the occasion of transfer of Ch. Mauji Ram,
Dy. Superintendent, Jail, Gurgaon. The girl protested vehemently against this outrageous
demand, but under pressure of her husband, was induced to surrender.

Three accused persons- Rao Harnam Singh, Ch. Mauji Ram, and Balbir Singh ravished her
during the night and she died almost immediately. Her shrieks were heard by some advocate
living in the neighborhood. Refuting the defense contention, that the girl was a consenting party
and she surrendered her body to the three persons willingly and with approval of her husband,
the High Court while holding the accused liable for the offence of rape distinguished between
‘consent’ and ‘submission’:

1. A mere act of helpless resignation in the face of inevitable compulsion, quiescence, non-
resistance, passive giving in, when volitional faculty is either clouded by fear or vitiated
by duress, cannot be deemed to be ‘consent’ as understood in law.
2. Consent on the part of a woman as a defense to an allegation of rape, requires voluntary
participation, not only after the exercise of intelligence, based on the knowledge, of the
significance and moral quality of the act, but after having freely exercised a choice
between resistance and assent.
3. Submission of her body under the influence of fear or terror is no consent. Although each
consent involves a submission, the converse does not follow and a mere act of
submission does not involve consent.
4. A woman is said to consent, only when she freely agrees to submit herself, while in free
and unconstrained possession of her physical and moral power to act in the manner she

13
2007 IV Cri.LJ 4333 (SC).
14
AIE 1958 Punj 123

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 wants. Consent implies the exercise of a free and unhampered right to forbid or withhold
what is being consented to; it always is a voluntary and conscious acceptance of what is
proposed to be done by another and concurred in by the former.

5. Consent procured by putting the woman under fear of death or hurt is no consent in law:

Clause (3) to Section 375 IPC asserts that consent of the woman in order to exonerate the
accused of the charge of rape must be given freely and voluntarily without any fear of death or
injury. In such a case the consent obtained will not be a valid consent. The scope of the clause
has been widened by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1983 by the insertion of the words “or
any person in whom she is interested” after the words “putting her” in fear of death or hurt in the
clause.

Now it reads “With the other person’s consent when such consent has been obtained by putting
such other person or any person whom such other person is interested, in fear of death or of
hurt.” So now, the fear of death or hurt could be towards her children, husband or parents also.

In State of Maharashtra v. Prakash15, the Apex Court held that where a police constable and
businessman had sexual intercourse with a rustic woman by beating her husband and threatening
to put him in police remand, the act falls under clause (3) of section 375 IPC. The suggestion that
the victim had consented to intercourse willingly is ruled out for the offence of rape. It is not
necessary that there should be actual use of force; a threat to use of force is sufficient.

A criticized judgment of the Supreme Court in this regard was Tukaram v. State of
Maharashtra16 popularly known as Mathura rape case. Mathura, an 18-year-old Harijan orphan
girl was called to the police station on an abduction report filed her brother at the police station-
Desaui Ganj in Maharashtra on 26th March 1972. When they were about to leave the police
station, Mathura was kept back at the police station in the late hours of the night by one of the
constables, Ganpat, who was on duty.

She was taken to a toilet and raped. After him, another constable Tukaram tried to rape her but
being too heavily drunk, did not succeed. None of the two accused were held guilty as there were
no marks of injury on her person which show that the whole affair was a peaceful one and that
the story of stiff resistance having been put up by the girl is all false, the girl was not subject to
any fear that must have led her to submit to the act and the girl was not alone when Ganpat
ordered her to stay and she could have resisted and appealed to her brother. Her conduct in
meekly following Ganpat and allowing him to have his way with her to the extent of satisfying
his lust in full, made them feel that the consent in question was not a consent which could be
brushed aside as passive submission.

The judgment of the Supreme Court was widely criticised both inside and outside the Parliament
as an extraordinary decision sacrificing human rights and a disgrace on women under the law
and the Constitution.

15
AIR 1992 SC 1275
16
AIR 1979 SC 185

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Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court tried to atone for what it had decided in the Mathura
case.

In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab17, the victim aged 19 years was forcibly taken in a car by the
five accused persons and raped by each in a grove on the canal bank. She was found lying
unconscious under a banana tree near the canal bridge by her father. She was medically
examined and the report specified that she was raped by more than one person. It was held by the
court that the absence of injuries on the back of prosecutrix does not make the prosecution case
unbelievable. The accused were five in number and the prosecutrix was a girl of 19 years. She
was not expected to offer such resistance as would cause injuries to her.

6. Consent accorded under a misconception that the person is the husband of the woman is not a
valid consent:

Consent given by a woman to a person for intercourse believing the person to be her husband
whereas in fact, he is not her husband, is no consent in law. In such a situation the person knows
the fact of deception, and pretends to be the husband of the woman.

In Bhupinder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh18, the complainant Manjit Kaur married
the accused Bhupinder Singh, who she had met through work, in 1990 and started cohabiting
with him in Chandigarh. She became pregnant but accused got the fetus aborted in 1991. When
she was pregnant again in 1994, she met her husband’s two friends who told her that he was
already married and had children from his first wife. On being confronted her husband left her on
the pretense of work and did not turn up even after she gave birth to a daughter.

She made a complaint and he was held guilty of rape because prosecutrix married accused
without knowledge of his first marriage. The consent for cohabitation was given under the belief
that the accused was her husband. It was also held that delay in lodging complaint by prosecutrix
couldn’t, in any event, wash away the offence because there was no consent. Therefore, the
Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court.

7. Consent procured by a woman of unsound mind or under the influence of intoxication etc.:

Clause (5) of section 375 IPC was added vide the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1983 The
object of the new clause was to protect and safeguard the interest of the woman who accords
consent for sexual intercourse without knowing the nature and consequences of the act by reason
of unsoundness of mind or under the influence of stupefying or unwholesome substance or
intercourse with a defective. In such cases, it is presumed that the consent of the woman is not
free and voluntary to exonerate the accused of the charge of rape.

17
1987 Cri.LJ 971 SC
18
(2008) 3 Cri.LJ 3546 (SC)

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In Tulshidas Kanolkar v. State of Goa19, the accused had sexual intercourse, repeatedly with a
woman who was incapable of comprehending the vicissitudes of the act. Consequently, the girl
became pregnant. The additional session judge, holding the accused liable for rape under section
376 imposed a sentence of ten years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 10000.
However, the High Court in appeal reduced the sentence to seven years and the appellant went in
appeal against his conviction. The Apex Court dismissed the appeal and held that for constituting
consent there must be the exercise of intelligence based on knowledge of the significance and
moral effect of the act and criticised the High Court for reducing the sentence to seven years
where it should not have interfered.

8. Consent of a girl under 18 not valid in law:

Sexual intercourse with a woman with or without her consent when she is below 18 years of age
amounts to rape. A woman under 18 is considered incapable of giving consent for sexual
intercourse. The age of consent was raised from 16 to 18 by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act
of 2013.

The Apex Court in Harpal Singh20 held that even if the girl of 14 is a willing party and invited
the accused to have sexual intercourse with her, the accused would be liable for rape under this
clause

In Mana Ramchandra Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra21the prosecutrix left her mother’s house
and joined the accused because her mother had turned down the proposal of her marriage with
the accused on the ground that she was too young. While she was with the accused he had sexual
intercourse with her against her will. The act of intercourse with the prosecutrix will be covered
under this clause.

EXCEPTION TO SECTION 375:

“Exception 2.- Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being
under sixteen years of age, is not sexual assault.”

Since child marriage in India is not yet void and is only voidable, such a check was necessary to
restrain men from taking advantage of their marital rights prematurely. No man can be guilty of
rape on his own wife when she is over 15 years of age on account of the matrimonial consent
that she has given.

In Bishnudayal v. State of Bihar22, where the prosecutrix, a girl of 13 or 14, who was sent by her
father to accompany the relatives of his elder daughter’s husband to look after her elder sister for

19
(2003) 8 SCC 590

20
AIR 1981 SC 361

21
1984 CriLJ 852 (Bom)
22
AIR 1981 SC 39

12
some time, was forcibly ‘married’ to the appellant and had sexual intercourse with her, the
accused was held liable for rape under section 376.

However, under section 376 B, IPC sexual intercourse with one’s own wife without her consent
under a decree of judicial separation is punishable by 2 to 7 years imprisonment.

CONCLUSION
Rape is obviously a heinous crime and the consent of a woman plays a very important role in
defining any sexual activity forceful and consented. The consent of a woman according to the
rape laws in India has many facets; we see that air or doubt about the specification of the
meaning, definition and scope of consent has been clarified by the court of law and also by the
legislature with the introductions of various amendments as required by the change in time. The
consent has to be obtained without misrepresentation, fraud or under mistake, consent obtained
with false promise to marry is also not considered consent, consent procured by putting the
woman under fear of death or hurt is also no consent as per the law, consent accorded under a
misconception that the person is the husband of the woman is not a valid consent also if the
consent is procured when the woman is intoxicated and is of unsound mind, and if the girl is a
minor. Consent and will are two distinct things like consent and submission and we cannot
consider submission as consent.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

1. 2 RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 2449-2573 (33RD ED 2016)
2. SHOBHA SAXENA, CRIME AGAINST WOMEN AND PROTECTIVE LAWS (2013)
3. KD GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 519-521(6TH ED 2009)
4. PSA PILLAI, CRIMINAL LAW 861-892 (13TH ED KL VIBHUTE 2017)
5. GEETANJALI GANGOLI, INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO RAPE , 101-120 (2011)

JOURNALS:

1. Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 418-441 (2016)

2. M. P. Singh, Gender, Law and Sexual Assault, 32 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
WEEKLY 543-549 (1997)
3. K.I. Vibhute, Rape and the Indian Penal Code at the crossroads of the new
Millennium:Between Patriarchiast and Gender Neutralist Approach, 43 JOURNAL OF
THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE 25-54 (2001).
4. Stellina Jolly & M.S. Raste, Rape And Marriage: Reflections On The Past, Present And
Future, 48 JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE 227-284 (2006).
5. Rukmini Sen, Law Commission Reports on Rape, 45 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
WEEKLY 81-87 (2010)

STATUTES:

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860

ONLINE DATABASES:

1. MANUPATRA
2. SCC ONLINE

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