Case: 10-3270 Document: 61 Page: 1 12/03/2010 159637 22

10-3270-cv
10-3342-cv

d
IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

VIACOM INTERNATIONAL, INC., COMEDY PARTNERS,

COUNTRY MUSIC TELEVISION, INC., PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION,
BLACK ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
—against—

YOUTUBE, INC., YOUTUBE, LLC, GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE,

AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION,
IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY

DAVID W. HILL, PRESIDENT *PATRICK J. COYNE

AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL FINNEGAN HENDERSON FARABOW
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
241 18th Street, Suite 700 901 New York Avenue, NW
Arlington, Virginia 22202 Washington, D.C. 20001
(703) 415-0780 (202) 408-4000
*Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae
December 3, 2010
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, counsel for amicus

curiae certifies the following information:

The American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) is a not-

for-profit bar association for intellectual property law attorneys; it has no parent

corporation, and no publicly held company owns 10% or more of AIPLA’s stock.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE .................................................................1 

II.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.......................................................................1 

III.  BACKGROUND .............................................................................................2 

IV.  ARGUMENT...................................................................................................5 

A.  The District Court Correctly Held that the Requirement for
Specificity Applies to Both the “Actual Knowledge” and
“Aware of Facts or Circumstances” Prongs of the Knowledge
Standard Under Section 512..................................................................7 

B.  By Approving the Ninth Circuit’s Holding in CCBill, The

District Court Erred in Extending the Degree of Knowledge
Required for “Awareness” Beyond That Established by
Congress in Section 512(c) .................................................................11 

C.  The Supreme Court’s Grokster Decision Could Be Helpful in

Applying DMCA’s Safe Harbor Provisions in the Appropriate
Case .....................................................................................................14 

V. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................15 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
FEDERAL CASES

Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,

456 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982) ................................................................13

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,

545 U.S. 913 (2005)........................................................................................2, 14

Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,

488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................11, 12, 13

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,

600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010) cert denied 11/29/2010...........................................13

FEDERAL STATUTES
17 U.S.C. § 512..................................................................................................2, 5, 6

OTHER STATUTES
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Public Law 105-304..........................................5

REGULATIONS
House Committee on Commerce Report, H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. II
(1998) (“House Report”) .............................................................................passim

Senate Committee on the Judiciary Report, S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998)

(“Senate Report”).........................................................................................passim

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I. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The AIPLA is a national bar association of approximately 16,000 members

engaged in private and corporate practice, in government service, and in the

academic community. AIPLA represents a wide and diverse spectrum of

individuals, companies, and institutions involved directly and indirectly in the

practice of patent, trademark, copyright, and unfair competition law, as well as

other fields of law affecting intellectual property. AIPLA members represent both

owners and users of intellectual property rights.

AIPLA has no interest in any party to this litigation. Nor does AIPLA have

a stake in the outcome of this case, other than its interest in seeking a correct and

consistent interpretation of the administration of the copyright laws. This brief is

filed with the consent of the parties to this dispute.

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

AIPLA takes no position on who should prevail on the present facts.

However, AIPLA urges this Court to affirm the district court’s holding that more

than a generalized knowledge of infringement is required to deprive an Internet

1
After reasonable investigation, AIPLA believes that (a) no member of its Board or
Amicus Committee who voted to prepare this brief, or any attorney in the law firm or
corporation of such a member, represents a party to this litigation, (b) no representative of any
party to this litigation participated in the authorship of this brief, and (c) no one other than the
AIPLA, or its members who authored this brief and their law firms or employers, made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Some committee members
or attorneys in their respective law firms or corporations may represent entities which have an
interest in other matters which may be affected by the outcome of this litigation.

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service provider (“ISP”) of the protection of the safe harbor provisions of the

Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). The district court correctly held

that the DMCA requires either “actual knowledge” of specific instances of

infringement, or awareness of “facts or circumstances” from which specific

instances of infringing activity are apparent. Whether based on actual knowledge

or awareness of facts or circumstances, the level of knowledge that is sufficient to

strip the ISP of its protection under Section 512 of the Copyright Act, as amended

by the DMCA is knowledge of specific instances of infringement. The district

court’s holding is consistent with the legislative history of the DMCA and relevant

case law. AIPLA urges this Court to reject Viacom’s broad attempt to deprive

Internet service providers of the benefits of the safe harbor provisions of the

DMCA based on generalized knowledge that infringing activity is occurring on a

site.

AIPLA further urges this Court to clarify that conduct of the type that would

violate the standards set forth in Grokster, under certain circumstances, may

constitute “awareness” for purposes of Section 512(c) and result in forfeiture of the

safe harbor protection under that provision.

III. BACKGROUND
Defendant, YouTube, operates a website to which Internet users may upload

and store video files available for viewing by other Internet users. Congress

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enacted procedures in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to facilitate the

policing of copyright infringements on the Internet without unduly burdening

Internet service providers. Those procedures provide qualifying service providers

with a safe harbor from infringement liability.

Viacom followed the DMCA procedures to give YouTube notice that its

copyrighted videos had been placed on the YouTube site and to demand that they

be removed. Although YouTube promptly removed the videos contained in

Viacom’s notices, Viacom filed suit for infringement, alleging tens of thousands of

videos on YouTube and hundreds of millions of views. It argued that YouTube

was not entitled to safe harbor protection from liability because it had a generalized

knowledge that infringement was occurring on its site. Such generalized

knowledge, it contended, was sufficient to establish both YouTube’s “actual

knowledge” of the infringements and its “awareness of facts or circumstances from

which infringing activity was apparent.”

The district court granted a summary judgment for YouTube, rejecting

Viacom’s argument that “generalized knowledge” could be a basis for denying the

DCMA safe harbor protection. It held that the “actual knowledge” or “awareness”

elements in the DMCA are directed to specific instances of infringement, not to a

generalized knowledge of infringing activity.

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The district court recounted at length pertinent portions of the legislative

history of the DMCA, specifically noting that the Act creates a series of safe

harbors for Internet service providers. The district court specifically referenced

portions of the legislative history identifying that, in addition to the Internet service

providers’ subjective knowledge (“aware of facts or circumstances”), infringing

activity would have to have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under

the same or similar circumstances, an objective test. The district court noted that

the House and Senate Reports, House Committee on Commerce Report, H.R. Rep.

No. 105-551, pt. II (1998) (“House Report”), and Senate Committee on the

Judiciary Report, S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) (“Senate Report”), specifically

identified that the requisite degree of knowledge is either actual knowledge, or

circumstances constituting a “red flag,” of specific infringing activity. The district

court continued, noting that the DMCA imposed no obligation on Internet service

providers to seek out instances of copyright infringement. Rather, in order to

qualify for the safe harbor provision, the Internet service provider must not have

actual knowledge that the material is infringing and must not be aware of facts or

circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent.

Among the “red flags” that could constitute being aware of facts or

circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent, the court noted

portions of the House and Senate reports identifying as “red flags” downloads from

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pirated sites that are apparent on their face. The district court concluded that both

the “actual knowledge” and “facts or circumstances” elements of the DMCA safe

harbor provision require knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of

particular copyrighted items. Knowledge that infringing activity is prevalent on a

site is not sufficient.

The district court correctly held that either actual knowledge of specific

instances of infringement or knowledge of facts or circumstances from which

specific instances of infringement are apparent is required. The “actual

knowledge” and “awareness of facts or circumstances” elements are separate tests;

each must be satisfied in order for the Internet service provider to establish “safe

harbor” protection.

IV. ARGUMENT
AIPLA urges this Court to clarify the respective rights of Internet service

providers and copyright owners pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,

Public Law 105-304, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512. Section 512(c) provides a “safe

harbor” to Internet service providers who receive notice of infringing content being

posted on their sites and who act promptly thereafter, pursuant to the requirements

of Section 512, to remove or disable the alleged infringing content.

The issue presented in this case is important─whether generalized

knowledge that infringing activity occurs on a site is sufficient to establish either

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“actual knowledge” that the material is infringing or awareness of “facts or

circumstances” from which infringing activity is apparent. Substantial rights and

substantial monetary interests are at stake. The balance between content providers

and Internet service providers was the subject of vigorous public debate at the time

the DMCA was passed, and the DMCA embodies Congress’s decision about where

to draw this line. This specific issue has not been addressed and resolved by this or

other circuits.

This case raises the issue of whether an Internet service provider loses the

protections of the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA as a result of generalized

knowledge that infringing activity occurs on its site. Does the loss of protection

under the DMCA require merely generalized knowledge or, rather, as the district

court held, does it require either actual knowledge or awareness of facts or

circumstances regarding specific instances of infringement? And, further, whether

it requires “actual knowledge” or “awareness,” did the district court articulate the

correct standard of “knowledge” or “awareness?”

Although the district court correctly held that specific instances of

infringement are required, it erred in evaluating the “awareness” element,

essentially equating it with “actual knowledge.”

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A. The District Court Correctly Held that the Requirement

for Specificity Applies to Both the “Actual Knowledge”
and “Aware of Facts or Circumstances” Prongs of the
Knowledge Standard Under Section 512
Viacom argues that the district court erred in holding that the DMCA

requires either actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement, or awareness of

awareness of facts or circumstance from which specific instances of infringing

activity is apparent. AIPLA submits that the district court’s holding is consistent

with the DMCA and applicable case law.

The House and Senate Reports include identical language with respect to the

applicable knowledge standard. They make it clear that Congress intended that

knowledge of facts or circumstances be of specific instances of infringement and

not generalized knowledge:

Subsection (c)(1)(A)(ii) [awareness of facts or

circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent]
can best be described as a “red flag” test. As stated in
subsection (l), a service provider need not monitor its service or
affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity (except to
the extent consistent with a standard technical measure
complying with subsection (h)), in order to claim this limitation
on liability (or, indeed any other limitation provided by the
legislation). However, if the service provider becomes aware of
a “red flag” from which infringing activity is apparent, it will
lose the limitation of liability if it takes no action. The “red
flag” test has both a subjective and an objective element. In
determining whether the service provider was aware of a “red
flag,” the subjective awareness of the service provider of the
facts or circumstances in question must be determined.
However, in deciding whether those facts or circumstances
constitute a “red flag”— in other words, whether infringing

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activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person

operating under the same or similar circumstances—an
objective standard should be used.

Subsection (c)(1)(A)(iii) provides that once a service

provider obtains actual knowledge or awareness of facts or
circumstances from which infringing material or activity on the
service provider’s system or network is apparent, the service
provider does not lose the limitation of liability set forth in
subsection (c) if it acts expeditiously to remove or disable
access to the infringing material. Because the factual
circumstances and technical parameters may vary from case to
case, it is not possible to identify a uniform time limit for
expeditious action.

Senate Report at 44-45; See also House Report at 53-54.

The House and Senate Reports provide a compelling example of how

generalized knowledge, even when delivered directly to the service provider, is not

sufficient: delivery of a defective notice, i.e., one that does not substantially

comply with the formal requirements of the Act, will not deprive the provider of

the safe harbor. In this case, the service provider not only had generalized

knowledge, it also may have had enough information to identify the infringing

activity itself, with minimal additional investigation. Yet, even this level of

generalized knowledge, as the legislative history makes clear, is not sufficient:

Subsection (c)(3)(B) addresses the effect of notifications

that do not substantially comply with the requirements of
subsection (c)(3). Under this subsection, the court shall not
consider such notifications as evidence of whether the
service provider has actual knowledge, is aware of facts or
circumstances, or has received a notification for purposes of
subsection (c)(1)(A). However, a defective notice provided to

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the designated agent may be considered in evaluating the

service provider’s knowledge or awareness of facts and
circumstances, if (i) the complaining party has provided the
requisite information concerning the identification of the
copyrighted work, identification of the allegedly infringing
material, and information sufficient for the service provider to
contact the complaining party, and (ii) the service provider does
not promptly attempt to contact the person making the
notification or take other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt
of notification that substantially complies with paragraph
(3)(A). If the service provider subsequently receives a
substantially compliant notice, the provisions of paragraph
(1)(C) would then apply upon receipt of the notice.

Senate Report at 46-47 (emphasis added); See also House Report at 55-56.

Congress’s focus on both actual knowledge and awareness of facts or

circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent demonstrates that the

knowledge requirement is directed to the ability to identify specific instance of

infringement. Generalized notice to the service provider is insufficient under

Section 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).

More importantly, Congress emphasized that the service provider is under

no obligation to seek out evidence of copyright infringement. With respect to

Section 512(d), the Report states:

Like the information storage safe harbor in section

512(c), a service provider would qualify for this safe harbor if,
among other requirements, it “does not have actual knowledge
that the material or activity is infringing” or, in the absence of
such actual knowledge, it is “not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”
Under this standard, a service provider would have no
obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not

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qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to “red
flags” of obvious infringement. For instance, the copyright
owner could show that the provider was aware of facts from
which infringing activity was apparent if the copyright owner
could prove that the location was clearly, at the time the
directory provider viewed it, a “pirate” site of the type
described below, where sound recordings, software, movies or
books were available for unauthorized downloading, public
performance or public display. Absent such “red flags” or
actual knowledge, a directory provider would not be similarly
aware merely because it saw one or more well known
photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to that person.

* * *

The important intended objective of this standard is to exclude

sophisticated “pirate” directories—which refer Internet users to
other selected Internet sites where pirate software, books,
movies, and music can be downloaded or transmitted—from the
safe harbor. Such pirate directories refer Internet users to sites
that are obviously infringing because they typically use words
such as “pirate,” “bootleg,” or slang terms in their uniform
resource locator (URL) and header information to make their
illegal purpose obvious to the pirate directories and other
Internet users. Because the infringing nature of such sites
would be apparent from even a brief and casual viewing, safe
harbor status for a provider that views such a site and then
establishes a link to it would not be appropriate.

* * *

In this way, the “red flag” test in section 512(d) strikes

the right balance. The common-sense result of this “red flag”
test is that online editors and catalogers would not be required
to make discriminating judgments about potential copyright
infringement. If, however, an Internet site is obviously pirate,
then seeing it may be all that is needed for the service provider
to encounter a “red flag.” A provider proceeding in the face of
such a red flag must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor.

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Senate Report at 48-49; See also House Report at 57-58. Congress having engaged

in a full public debate and having made the policy decision that balances the

interests affected by the DMCA, this Court should not judicially revise that

balance. Although the district court correctly recognized this balance, its

implementation in this case was erroneous in two fundamental and important ways.

B. By Approving the Ninth Circuit’s Holding in CCBill, The

District Court Erred in Extending the Degree of Knowledge
Required for “Awareness” Beyond That Established by
Congress in Section 512(c)
In reviewing the case law on secondary liability, the district court noted that

the Internet service provider has no duty to investigate. The district court cited

with approval the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488

F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007). In so doing, however, the district court elevated

the holding that the service provider has no duty to investigate in a manner that

flatly contradicts the very examples of “red flags” provided by Congress in the

legislative history.

In CCBill, the sites that were alleged to have constituted “red flags” were

named: “illegal.net;” “stolencelebritypics.com;” and “password-hacking.com.” In

spite of the obvious illegal nature of these names, and the lack of imagination

required to divine their purpose, the Ninth Circuit in CCBill held that these colorful

and explicit names were not “red flags.” The holding that these names were not

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obvious enough to constitute a “red flag,” a holding that is endorsed by the district

court in this case, irreconcilably conflicts with the specific examples of “red flags”

that Congress expressly provided in the legislative history:

Such pirate directories refer Internet users to sites that are

obviously infringing because they typically use words such as
“pirate,” “bootleg,” or slang terms in their uniform resource
locator (URL) and header information to make their illegal
purpose obvious to the pirate directories and other Internet
users. Because the infringing nature of such sites would be
apparent from even a brief and casual viewing, safe harbor
status for a provider that views such a site and then establishes
a link to it would not be appropriate.

House Report at 57-58; Senate Report at 48-49. So too, in CCBill, the infringing

nature of names such as “stolencelebritypics.com” is apparent from even a brief

and casual viewing. Yet, the Ninth Circuit declined to so hold. The blatant site

names in CCBill are precisely the type of indications of illegality that Congress

expressly identified as constituting a “red flag.”

The Ninth Circuit’s erroneous holding in CCBill that such obvious examples

cannot as a matter of law constitute a “red flag” elevates the proposition that the

service provider has “no duty to investigate” to a point that encourages willful

blindness, defies common sense, and contravenes the express intent of Congress.

These are precisely the type of obvious indicators of illegality from which

“awareness of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”

under Section 512(c).

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Section 512(m) makes it clear that the availability of the safe harbor does not

depend on the service provider’s efforts to monitor its service or affirmatively seek

facts indicating infringing activity. However, by elevating the lack of a duty to

investigate to such extreme proportions, and adopting such a limited definition of

“awareness” that ignores even the explicit red flags identified by Congress, the

Ninth Circuit and the district court have effectively eliminated any viable

distinction between “awareness” and “actual knowledge.” This extreme

interpretation of Section 512(m) and corresponding overly-narrow definition of

“awareness” under Section 512(c) contravenes the express intent of Congress and

is incorrect as a matter of law. Although awareness of specific instances of

infringement are required, the service provider may not ignore the obvious.

That is precisely the point made by this Court in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay,

Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2010), cert denied, 11/29/2010, in the context of

trademark rights and online sales of counterfeit goods. “[I]f eBay had reason to

suspect that counterfeit Tiffany goods were being sold through its website, and

intentionally shielded itself from discovering the offending listings or the identity

of the sellers behind them, eBay might very well have been charged with

knowledge of those sales sufficient to satisfy Inwood’s ‘knows or has reason to

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know’ prong.”2 Ironically, although the district court erred in supporting the

CCBill holding, it also cited with approval this Court’s holding in Tiffany. The

district court’s approval of CCBill cannot be reconciled with this Court’s holding

in Tiffany. Although generalized knowledge or awareness is insufficient, the

service provider can neither ignore the obvious, nor can they act in a manner that is

willfully blind to specific instances of infringement.

C. The Supreme Court’s Grokster Decision Could Be Helpful

in Applying DMCA’s Safe Harbor Provisions in the
Appropriate Case
The district court dismissed Viacom’s attempt to use the Supreme Court’s

decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913

(2005), to disqualify YouTube from the protections of the safe harbor provisions.

It found that Grokster and its progeny involve neither Internet service providers

nor the DMCA and thus have little application here. Although there is no denying

the distinctions between Grokster and this case, the district court’s categorical

dismissal of the decision overlooks the usefulness that the Grokster Supreme Court

opinion may have in future disputes over the DMCA’s safe harbor.

While Grokster was decided under common law principles and this case

turns on statutory provisions, both involve issues of secondary liability and both

involve the policy of balancing strong copyright protection against limitations on

2
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982).

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infringement liability that are designed to promote commerce and innovation in the

digital age. While factually, Grokster is also distinguishable from this case in that

it involved much more egregious conduct that weighed heavily in favor of

providing rather than limiting copyright protection, this Court should make it clear

that the kind of active inducement of infringement that produced secondary

liability in Grokster would equally disqualify a defendant from the protections of

the DMCA safe harbor provision.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, AIPLA respectfully requests that the Second

Circuit clarify that the “actual knowledge” and “aware[ness] of facts or

circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” requirements in the

DMCA safe harbor provision both require identification of specific instances of

infringement.

/s/ Patrick J. Coyne

____________________________
David W. Hill, President PATRICK J. COYNE
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW,
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP
241 18th Street, Suite 700 901 New York Avenue, N.W.
Arlington, Virginia 22202 Washington, D.C. 20001
(703) 415-0780 (202) 408-4000

Counsel for Amicus Curiae,

American Intellectual Property Law
Association

December 3, 2010

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Certificate of Compliance with Rule 32(a)

1. As required by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C), I certify that this brief is

proportionally spaced and contains 3,623 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). I relied on my word processor,
Microsoft Office Word 2007, to obtain this count.

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this
brief has been prepared in a proportionately spaced typeface using Microsoft
Office Word 2007 in Time New Roman Style, 14 point font.

I certify that the foregoing information is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry.

Dated: December 3, 2010 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett

& Dunner, LLP

By: ____________________________
/s/ Patrick J. Coyne
Patrick J. Coyne

Counsel of Record for Amicus Curiae

The American Intellectual Property Law
Association

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE & CM/ECF FILING

10-3270-CV 10-3342-CV Viacom v. YouTube

I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing Brief of amicus curiae,

American Intellectual Property Law Association, in support of Neither Party to be
served on counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants and Defendants-Appellees via
Electronic Mail generated by the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF) with a
Notice of Docket Activity pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 25.1:
Paul M. Smith John C. Browne
William H. Hohengarten Bernstein Litowitz Berger &
Scott B. Wilkins Grossmann LLP
Jenner & Block LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas
1099 New York Avenue, N.W. New York, New York 10019
Washington, D.C. 20001 (212) 540-1400
(202) 639-6000
David H. Kramer
Susan J. Kohlmann Bart E. Volkmer
Jenner & Block LLP Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
919 Third Avenue 650 Page Mill Road
New York, New York 10022 Palo Alto, California 94304
(212) 891-1690 (650) 493-9300

Charles S. Sims Andrew H. Schapiro

Proskauer Rose LLP A. John P. Mancini
1585 Broadway Brian M. Willen
New York, New York 10036 Mayer Brown LLP
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Stuart J. Baskin (212) 506-2500
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Kirsten Nelson Cunha
Shearman & Sterling LLP
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(212) 849-4000

Theodore B. Olson
Matthew D. McGill
Gibson Dunn
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8668
 Case: 10-3270 Document: 61 Page: 22 12/03/2010 159637 22

I certify that an electronic copy was uploaded to the Court’s electronic filing
system. One Original and 5 hard copies of the foregoing Brief of amicus curiae,
American Intellectual Property Law Association were sent to the Clerk’s Office By
Hand Delivery to:
Clerk of Court
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
United States Courthouse
rd
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(212) 857-8576
rd
on this 3 day of December 2010.
Notary Public:
/s/ Nadia R. Oswald Hamid
_________________________ /s/ Samantha Collins
_________________________
Sworn to me this SAMANTHA COLLINS
Record Press, Inc.
December 3, 2010 229 West 36th Street, 8th Floor
NADIA R. OSWALD HAMID New York, New York 10018
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