In re: Atty. Jose Principe, Bar Matter No.

543, 20 September 20, 1990

There is no such thing as retirement in the IBP as understood in labor law. A lawyer, however,
may terminate his bar membership after filing the required verified notice of termination with the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar.

CIRCULAR NO. 13-90.

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS AND THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR OF ATTY. JOSE
PRINCIPE.
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated September 20, 1990, in Bar Matter No. 543, Re:
Voluntary Termination of Membership in the Bar of Atty. Jose Principe, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, there being due compliance by said attorney with the IBP By-Laws on voluntary
termination of membership in the IBP, and considering his reasons therefor, the Court Resolved
to- APPROVE the request of Atty. Jose Principe and hereby ORDERS that he be dropped from
the Roll of Attorneys. xxx"
Manila, October 16, 1990.

[Sgd.] MEYNARDO A. TIRO

Court Administrator
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971 EN BANC
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &
VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, &
QUINTIN MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue
presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution,
dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo,
granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in
the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et
al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered
a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963,
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio
Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3
December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's
fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was
opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late
filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but,
considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court
admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer
to the petitioner for review.2 The case was considered submitted for decision without
respondent's brief.3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers'

Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an
agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the
absence of a contract, as in the present case.

The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be
required to be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section
adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross examine
witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court
on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled

to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of

attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship
with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties
litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons not
licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by
one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services
were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he has
been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both,8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act
or an act done in violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave
the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the
bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary
measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers)
cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an
"agent" and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's
fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the
Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of
special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was
the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for
review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as
petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to
them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization
is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the
union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-
being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order of the
Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden
of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the
Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If
true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively
pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in
issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however,
may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of
the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all
other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ. concur.
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965 EN BANC
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva
with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al.
vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining
the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December
17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal
Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27,
now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the
motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not
actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna,
presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the
pertinent portions of which read:

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a
legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice
of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was
being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant
City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City
Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a
right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal
case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without
costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did
not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily
and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by
his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar,
who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2037 June 30, 2008 SECOND DIVISION

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2540-RTJ]

ATTY. NORITO E. TORRES, ATTY. EPIFANIO G. BOLANDO, GERONIMO MEJIAS,

OSMUNDO FLORES, AMADOR LABASTIDA, ELENA ANASCO, ROSABELLA GUDES,
ALEJANDRO PAJULERAS, CELSO PETALCORIN, CARLITO LOBERTERNOS, DOLORES
ESTRADA, PELAR DUPA,* complainants,
vs.
JUDGE IRMA ZITA V. MASAMAYOR, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Talibon, Bohol, respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For resolution is a letter-complaint with Joint Affidavit1 dated August 28, 2006 by the
complainants, charging respondent Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor with grave abuse of
authority, gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, obvious bias and partiality, and gross
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The pertinent facts in this case are as follows:

Complainants were among those charged with sedition in Criminal Case No. 04-13682 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Talibon, Bohol, Branch 52, presided by respondent judge.

On July 10, 2006, complainants' lawyer, Atty. Rolindo A. Navarro, informed the branch clerk of
court, Atty. Maria Cristina P. Tecson, that he will immediately file an urgent motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and to hold in abeyance the issuance or service of warrant of
arrest. The motion was filed on July 11, 2006 at 8:10 a.m.3 When complainant Atty. Epifanio
Bolando appeared before the RTC on July 14, 2006 to argue the motion, respondent informed
him that an order finding probable cause and the corresponding warrant of arrest had already
been issued. Thus, Atty. Bolando obtained from the court a copy of the warrant of arrest. The
copy he obtained showed that the warrant was issued on July 5, 2006,4 but the Order finding
probable cause was dated July 10, 2006.5

Aggrieved, complainants filed this complaint. Complainants argue that respondent's issuance of
the warrant for their arrest five days before she found probable cause constitutes grave abuse
of authority and gross ignorance of the law, and shows respondent's bias and bad faith. They
also allege that respondent acted with questionable haste in finding probable cause on July 10,
2006 although she knew that Atty. Navarro would file a motion to seek judicial determination of
probable cause. Complainants point out that respondent released the order finding probable
cause at 4:00 p.m. on July 11, 2006 even though the motion was already filed as of 8:10 a.m.

In her comment,6 respondent avers that the clerk of court informed Atty. Navarro that
respondent had already rendered an order finding probable cause when Atty. Navarro intimated
that he will file a motion seeking judicial determination of probable cause. Nonetheless, Atty.
Navarro said that he will still file the motion.7

Respondent maintains that the warrant of arrest was prepared on July 10, 2006. In fact, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) of Inabanga, Bohol and Tagbilaran City certified8 that they
received the warrant of arrest dated July 10, 2006. She explains that the erroneously dated
warrant came about because the clerk/typist "forgot to change the date of the format-warrant
earlier entered into the word processor." Upon discovery of the error, the erroneous warrant was
"relegated to the scratch paper bin." The clerk/typist, unfortunately, gave it to Atty. Bolando
thinking that it was an extra copy since it was already signed.

Upon evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found respondent
liable for violation of Rule 3.09,9 Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires judges
to organize and supervise court personnel for prompt and efficient dispatch of business. The
OCA said that respondent failed to perform her duties when she merely relied on the document
prepared by her personnel. Respondent could have checked the details of the warrant of arrest,
particularly the date, knowing that dates are always material in legal procedure. The laxity and
inefficiency of respondent's court personnel reflect her lack of management skills. The OCA
added that respondent was not meticulous and thorough in organizing and supervising the work
of her subordinates whose mistakes are her responsibility. Thus, the OCA recommended that
respondent be fined P2,000 with a stern warning that repetition of the same offense shall be
dealt with more severely.10

On April 18, 2007 and September 14, 2007, respondent and complainants, respectively, filed
their manifestations expressing their willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.

We find respondent administratively liable.

We note the OCA's implied finding that respondent is not guilty of grave abuse of authority,
gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, obvious bias and partiality, and gross violation of
Rep. Act No. 3019. We expressly rule that indeed respondent did not commit these serious
accusations.

We recall that the charges arose from the erroneously dated warrant of arrest which made
complainants suspect that it was issued before respondent found probable cause. The facts
would show, however, that such suspicion is not true. Respondent adequately explained the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the erroneous warrant. The clerk/typist failed to
change the date of a previous warrant of arrest saved as a soft copy in the computer. Upon
discovery, the erroneous warrant was considered a scratch paper and this fact is supported by
the affidavit11 of Cesar A. Garcia, Jr., the criminal cases docket clerk and typist who prepared it
and later mistook it as an extra copy when he gave it to complainant Atty. Bolando. Moreover,
the PNP received the correct warrant of arrest dated July 10, 2006. Such receipt proves that it
was not issued before respondent's July 10, 2006 Order finding probable cause.

Accordingly, the charges of grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct, obvious bias and partiality, and gross violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 against
respondent are dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis. We fail to see any grave abuse of
authority under the circumstances. Nor is respondent grossly ignorant of the law for she did not
commit a patent, deliberate and malicious error. There is also no showing that she is unaware of
a basic law.12

Neither did respondent commit grave misconduct. She did not commit an unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated or intentional purpose.13 Moreover, nothing supports the
accusation of obvious bias and partiality there being no proof of respondent's specific acts
indicating prejudice or arbitrariness.14 And, we find that respondent did not commit any corrupt
practice of a public officer, even as we note that the corrupt practices defined under Section 3(a)
to (k) of Rep. Act No. 3019 are criminal offenses.

In addition, complainants were less than candid to this Court when they stated that the clerk of
court informed their lawyer Atty. Navarro on July 10, 2006 that there was no order yet finding
probable cause.15 Notably, Atty. Navarro gave no statement to this effect. The clerk of court
furthermore executed an affidavit16 that after verification she informed Atty. Navarro that an
order finding probable cause had already been issued. Still, Atty. Navarro insisted that he will
file a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Complainants are thus reminded that
their statements in their joint affidavit17 are under oath.

Likewise, without merit is complainants' allegation that the respondent hastily issued her order
after learning that complainants would file a motion for judicial determination of probable cause.
When Atty. Navarro said that he will immediately file the motion and before the motion was
actually filed on July 11, 2006, respondent had already issued her order finding probable cause
on July 10, 2006. Complainants' allegation fails even more when it is considered that several
days had passed since the Information was filed on June 23, 2006, and that it is not unlikely that
respondent has already reviewed the case.

The above notwithstanding, however, we affirm the OCA that respondent failed to properly
observe Rule 3.09, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The rule provides that "a judge
should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service and
fidelity." Efficient court management is a judge's responsibility.18 A judge is ultimately
responsible for ensuring that court personnel perform their tasks and that the parties are
promptly notified of his orders and decisions.19

In this particular instance, respondent was wanting in her duty to supervise properly her
personnel. She likewise failed to ensure that her court personnel perform their tasks as they
should. And she was not careful at all in signing the erroneously dated warrant of arrest. Worse,
upon the discovery of the erroneous but signed warrant, no sufficient precautionary measure
was adopted to prevent its issuance to one of those sought to be arrested, Atty. Bolando. While
we see nothing wrong in treating it as a scratch paper, it was definitely improper to issue it since
it was not obtained from the case records, but from the clerk's drawer. In fact, the warrant was
not even verified from the records.

That the error was not respondent's direct error but of the clerk/typist cannot exculpate
respondent from a finding of an administrative lapse on her part. Respondent judge cannot take
refuge behind the mistakes and inefficiency of her court personnel.20

In addition, even if the PNP was furnished the correct warrant of arrest, which shows the RTC's
immediate correction of the error, we must emphasize that because of the incident,
complainants harbored the notion that an injustice was done against them, ironically, by a court.

However, we find that in lieu of the fine recommended, an admonition to respondent to be

careful in signing orders, to be more efficient in the performance of duty, and to closely
supervise her personnel will suffice.

In Joaquin Vda. de Agregado v. Bellosillo,21 we admonished the respondent therein for failure
to observe the care and diligence required of him in the performance of his duties as a judge.
Considering that respondent is similarly liable merely for inadvertence, and considering further
that respondent acted without any intent to do wrong, this Court finds a similar admonition
appropriate.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient basis. However, respondent
Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Talibon, Bohol,
Branch 52, is ADMONISHED to be careful in signing orders, to be more efficient in the
performance of her duty, and to closely supervise her personnel. Repetition of the same or
similar incidents shall merit a more severe penalty.

Complainants are also reminded of possible adverse consequences of false statements made
under oath, hence the need for candor, accuracy and truthfulness in sworn statements.

SO ORDERED.