Equity Personal Notes
Equity Personal Notes
COURSE DESCRIPTION
A. The Nature of Equity
The following Equity ideas come from Aristotle’s Ethics, and could be understood as
considering the difference between common law and equity:
“For equity, though superior to justice, is still just … justice and equity coincide,
and although both are good, equity is superior. What causes the difficulty is the
fact that equity is just, but not what is legally just: it is a rectification of legal
justice.”
So it is that equity may provide for a better form of justice than the common law
because it provides for a more specific judgment as to right and wrong in individual
cases which rectifies any errors of fairness which the common law would otherwise have
made:
“The explanation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some things about
which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where it
is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law
takes account of the majority of cases, though not unaware that in this way errors are
made. … So when the law states a general rule, and a case arises under this that is
exceptional, then it is right, where the legislator owing to the generality of his language
has erred in not covering that case, to correct the omission by a ruling such as the
legislator himself would have given if he had been present there, and as he would have
enacted if he had been aware of the circumstances.”
Thus, equity exists to rectify what would otherwise be errors in the application of the
common law to factual situations in which the judges who developed common law
principles or the legislators who passed statutes could not have intended. Equity and
Trusts introduces students to foundational principles governing the law of trusts. The
module encompasses the historical development of equity, equitable principles and
equitable remedies, and considers the social and legal contexts in which trusts arise.
Students are encouraged to fully engage with the subject matter through an analysis of
key concepts, cases and contemporary judicial/academic debate.
OVERALL, this course seeks to enable the students to: provide a sound grounding in the
concepts, principles and rules relating to equity and trusts; build on students' existing
knowledge of the inter-action between common law and equity by looking more directly
at equitable remedies, the jurisprudence of equity and the contribution equity has made,
and continues to make, to the English legal system; introduce students to aspects of the
procedure and practice of equity; place the development of equity in a social and
economic context, and in particular track the evolution of the key jurisprudential themes
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in terms of their use in specific historical and contemporary developments; engage in a
critical discussion of the problems and advantages of using equitable ideas, and evaluate
their use in the context of other legal strategies (e.g. restitution); and consider the
implications of the development of equitable principles and actions in other jurisdictions
and the potential for their development in this jurisdiction. to extend these issues into an
engagement with the orthodoxies of trusts law through a critical evaluation of the use of
the trusts model and the techniques of thinking through trusts; and to engage in a
critical evaluation of the uses of the trust model in terms of contemporary policy issues,
by a consideration of the values and benefits the model carries, and an examination of
the extent to which orthodoxies presumed as necessary to the use of trusts may
constrain future developments, and the extent to which they remain necessary or can be
lost or stretched in order to make trusts more useful as a contemporary legal tool. The
course relates to the application of fairness to both substantive and procedural law. It
seeks to justify the evolution of equity, its governing principles, the nature of equitable
interests and the remedies available to aggrieved parties. The student is introduced to
the concept of a trust, how it is set up, the different types of trusts and the principles
governing each of them.
B. Learning Aims
The aims of the module are to ensure that students understand and are able to assess
critically:
C. Learning Objectives
Knowledge
a. what a trust is and how it operates generally, but with specific application to Uganda:
b. the informal acquisition of an interest in property through a resulting or constructive
trust;
c. the formal requirements for the establishment of a valid express trust, both inter
-vivos and on death;
d. the enforceability of trusts which have not been properly constituted;
e. the nature of the fiduciary relationship and the protection of the beneficial interest;
f. powers and duties of the trustees and remedies for any breach of duty;
g. the liability of third parties in respect of trust property; and and;
These Lecture Materials provide you with a comprehensive list of your case law and
statutory reading for lectures and seminars, together with an illustrative list of key
articles and other materials for lectures and seminars. You are expected to read all
statutory material - this will be essential for an understanding of the subject. Cases
marked ** are essential reading, being leading or very important cases, and so must be
read in full in the law reports. All other cases can be read in a casebook or covered in a
textbook. You are also expected to read all cases marked with an asterisk * at the very
least in a casebook but you are advised to read them in full in the law reports.
II. TEXTBOOKS
Your recommended textbooks are:- Alastair Hudson: Equity and Trusts (7th ed.,
Routledge, 2012) & D.J Bakibinga, Equity and Trusts in Uganda, LawAfrica. There are
other textbooks available, including the following: -
a. Hanbury and Martin: Modern Equity (19th ed., by Dr J. Martin: Sweet & Maxwell,
2012): “ME”.
b. Pettit: Equity and the Law of Trusts (11th ed.: OUP, 2009): “PET”. Other textbooks
to which you might want to refer are:-
c. Virgo, The Principles of Equity and Trusts (OUP, 2012)
d. Pearce, Stevens and Barr: The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (5th ed.,
OUP, 2010).
e. Penner, The Law of Trusts (8th ed.: Core Text, OUP, 2012).
f. Watt, Trusts and Equity (4th ed, Oxford, 2010).
You are not required to have a cases and materials book, but some people find them
useful to extract some of the main principles. The best cases and materials books in this
area are:-
a. Maudsley and Burn: Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials (7th ed.: Butterworths
2008) – an excellent digest of the most significant cases.
b. Mitchell, Hayton and Marshall: Commentary and Cases on the Law of Trusts and
Equitable Remedies (13th ed.: Sweet & Maxwell 2010).
c. Moffat: Trusts Law: Text and Materials (5th ed.: CUP 2009) – a very interesting,
alternative view of the law.
Hudson’s Equity & Trusts, has a long bibliography containing a large amount of journal
and treatise literature. Journal literature is referred to in these “Lecture Materials” and in
the “further reading” sections in the Seminar Materials, although you are encouraged to
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identify journal and treatise literature, and other reading online, for yourself. In the
footnotes to your set reading there are cross references to this bibliography. This is how
you will find further reading, as well as the articles to which you are referred in these
Lecture Materials. A number of further files and web-links can be found at
www.alastairhudson.com/trustslaw in.pdf format.
WEEK ONE
6. Jill Martin, Hanbury & Martin: Modern Equity, 17th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell pp.1-14
“the office of the Chancellor is to correct men’s consciences for frauds, breach
of trusts, wrongs and oppressions … and to soften and mollify the extremity of
the law”
**Lord Dudley v Lady Dudley (1705) Prec Ch 241, 244, per Lord Cowper:
“Now equity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue, which qualifies,
moderates, and reforms the rigour, hardness, and edge of the law, and is an
universal truth; it does also assist the law where it is defective and weak in the
constitution (which is the life of the law) and defends the law from crafty
evasions, delusions, and new subtleties, invested and contrived to evade and
delude the common law, whereby such as have undoubted right are made
The conflicting approaches of various judges: e.g. Lord Nottingham and Lord Mansfield.
Judicature Act 1873 merged the two streams of courts, however the intellectual
distinction between common law and equity remains very important.
Repugnancy Doctrine
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1. Rex v. Amkeyo (1971) 7 F.A.L,R14
2. Mohammed v. R [1963] E.A.18
3. Karuru v. Njeri [1968] E.A. 361
Inevitable Conflict: Common Law Courts & Chancery Court Jurisdiction: Coke and
Ellesmere
b. Constructive Notice
1. Williamson v. Brown (1857) 15 N.Y. 354, 362 per Slden J.
2. Oliver v. Hinton (1899) 2 Ch. 264
c. Imputed Notice
1. Sharpe v. Foy (1868) 4 Ch. App. 35
2. Jared v. Clements (1903) 1 Ch. 428
Tutorial 2 hours
1. Trace the origin of equity and explain how the notions of conscience were
introduced into Uganda.
2. Explain the repugnancy doctrine and the conflicts between law and equity.
2. MAXIMS OF EQUITY
Reading
D.J Bakibinga, Equity and Trusts LawAfrica, chapter 2, Pgs 16-25, Hudson,
section 1.4; Martin 3-48; Pettit 21-29. The twelve maxims set out below are
culled, as a list, primarily from Snell’s Equity, (31st ed., 2004) by McGhee, 27.
Priorities
Election
Satisfaction
Tutorial 2 hours
Reading
Alastair Hudson: Equity and Trusts (6th ed.: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009 pp. 24-45
3. EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Grounds
a. Mistake
i. Common Mistake
1. Bell v. Lever Bros [1932] A. C. 161 H.L
2. Solle v. Butcher [1950] 1 KB. 671. C.A
Types
i. Mistake of Fact
Non Fundamental Mistake
1. Colyer v. Clay (1843) 7 Beav 188
i. Innocent
1. Derry v. Peek [1896]14 App Cas 337
2. Ajayi v. Eberu (1974) 10 ALR Comm 155
ii. Fraudulent
1. Derry v. Peek
2. Peek v. Gurner
c. Constructive Fraud
1. Johnson v. Maja (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 290.
2. Wingrove v. Wingrove (1855) 11 P.O.91
3. William v. Franklin [1961] 1 ALL. ALR. 128
c. Complete Contract
1. Bada v. The Premier Thrift Society (1938) 14 NLR 20
2. Wilde v. Gibson (1848) 1 HLC 605: 9ER
3. RECTIFICATION
1. Lavell Christmas Ltd v. Wall (1911) 104 L.T. 85
2. White v. White (1872) L.R. 15 Eq. 247 – Conveyance Documents
3. Murray v. Parker (1854) 19 Beav. 305 – Leasehold Agreements
4. Welman v Welman (1880) 15 Ch. D.570 – Marriage Settlements
5. Roberts & Co.v. LCC [1961] Ch. 555 – Building Contracts
6. In the Matter of Kasiita Estates Ltd [1982]HCB 107 – Company Register
7. Collins v Elstone (1893) P.1 and p.4 – Unrectifiable Documents (Will)
v. Burden of Proof
1. **Murray v. Parker
5. RESTITUTION
6. TRACING
Tutorial 2 hours
Examine the relevance of both cases to equitable remedies. Saloman v A Saloman & Co
Ltd [1897] AC 22 and Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] 2 All E.R. 961, 999).
WEEK FIVE
4. Doctrines of EQUITY
1) Doctrine of Election
b) Effects of Election
1. Pickersgill v. Rodger (1875) 5 Ch. D. 163
2. Re Booth [1906] 2 Ch. 321
3. Re Hancock [1905] 1 Ch. 16
2) Doctrine of Satisfaction
The doctrine of satisfaction is based on the maxim that equity imputes an intention to
fulfil an obligation. An example may help illustrate the point. Terry owes Ben £10 000,
the debt remaining outstanding at Terry’s death. In his will, Terry leaves Ben £10 000.
Can Ben claim the legacy and remain entitled to repayment of the debt from Terry’s
estate? In such a case equity may well consider that the legacy was intended by Terry to
satisfy his obligation towards Ben and so Ben will not be able to claim the repayment of
the debt and the legacy. If Ben wishes to take the legacy, he must give up his claim to
the debt.1
Satisfaction is the donation of a thing with it is to be taken in extinguishment of some
prior claim of donee. This maxim is helpful where the presumed intention of the testator
is to be found out; where the intention is express the maxim has no application.
There are a number of situations where the doctrine of satisfaction may be relevant and
each will be considered in turn.
The doctrine has a twofold operation: firstly, where a debtor bequeaths a legacy to his
creditor of a sum equal to or greater than the debt, the legacy is prima facie a
satisfaction of the debt, and secondly, when a father or a person in loco parentis has
covenanted to pay a portion
to a child and afterwards gives a Legacy o(the same or a larger amount to that child, the
legacy is prima facie a satisfaction of the portion, and, if the legacy is of a smaller
amount, it is a satisfaction pro tanto.
1
‘Richard Edwards_ Nigel Stockwell - Trusts and Equity-Longman (2011).Pdf’.
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a) Satisfaction of Debts by Legacies
I. General Rule
It is a general rule that a debt is presumed to be satisfied by a legacy of at least an equal
amount. It is presumed that the debtor does not intend the creditor to both take the
legacy and be repaid the debt.
Where a testator, who owes a person a debt, gives a legacy to that person which
is either equal to or which exceeds the amount of the debt there is a presumption
that the legacy extinguishes the debt (Talbott v. Duke of Shrewsbury (1714)).
II. Exceptions
1. **Rawlins v. Powel (1718) 1 PWms 297 - Existence of Debt before a Will
2. Horlock v. Wiggins (1888) 3 a Ch. D 142 - Existence of Debt before a Will
3. Bradshaw v Huish (1889) 43 Ch. D. 260 – Direction to Pay Debt in Will
4. Barret v. Beckford (1750) 1 Ves. Sen 519 – Legacy equal to Debt
5. *Re Hawes [1951] 2 HLL E.R. 928 - Legacy equal to Debt
3. Doctrine of Performance
4. *Sowden v. Sowden (1785) 1 Cox Eq. 165, 166
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5. *Lord Lechmere v. Lady Lechmere (1733) 3 PWms 211- Covenants in Marriage
settlements
6. Blandy v. Widmore (1716) 1 PWms 323 – Intestacy
Equitable Defences
Promissory Estoppel
Proprietary Estoppel
Tutorial 2 hours
Coursework 2
Reading
A J Oakley, Parker and Mellows: The Modern Law of Trusts, 9th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell
Chap.
WEEK SIX
3. INJUNCTIONS
Definitions:
A good answer shall define what injunctions are and also state the conditions under which they
are granted.
Judicature Act s.33 &38 (1)2 (Grants powers to the High Court to issue injunctions)
33. General provisions as to remedies.
The High Court shall, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution, this Act or
any written law, grant absolutely or on such terms and conditions as it thinks just, all such
remedies as any of the parties to a cause or matter is entitled to in respect of any legal or
equitable claim properly brought before it, so that as far as possible all matters in controversy
between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicities of legal
proceedings concerning any of those matters avoided.
Types of Injunctions
2
‘Judicature Act | Uganda Legal Information Institute’ <https://ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/13> accessed 7 October
2019.
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There are several different types of injunctions. An injunction may be ‘Prohibitory’, i.e.
forbidding the performance of a particular act; or ‘mandatory’, i.e. ordering the
defendant to do a particular act. Injunctions could also be classified as ‘perpetual’, i.e.
following the final determination of the rights of the parties or, until recently, as
‘interlocutory’ (now referred to as ‘interim’), i.e. pending the determination of rights at
the trial. In addition, a ‘quia timet’ (literally, ‘because he fears’) injunction could be
obtained where the claimant fears that damage may occur in the future.3
Injunctions, like all equitable remedies, are discretionary, but the court will exercise its
discretion according to well established equitable principles.
Prohibitory injunctions forbid the doing of a specified act, such as ordering the
defendant not to build an extension to his property.
Mandatory injunctions have the effect of ordering a defendant to take positive steps to
perform a particular act, such as the demolition of an unauthorised extension of his
property.
Since the decision in Jackson v Normandy Brick Co, however, it has been the rule that if
an injunction is mandatory in substance, it should be made in direct mandatory form
3
Mohamed Ramjohn, Unlocking Equity and Trusts (Fifth edition, Routledge 2015).
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I. Jackson v. Normandy Brick Co. (1899) 1 Ch. 438
II. A.G. v. Colchester Corporation (1955) 2 Q.B. 207
Pride of Derby Angling Association v. British Celanese Co. [1953] Ch. 149
A Prohibitory injunction
the owners of a fishery sought an injunction to stop the defendants from discharging
effluent and sewage into the river Derwent, which had killed all the fish and destroyed
the fishery.
An injunction was granted.
The primacy of the injunction was reasserted by Lord Evershed MR:
It is, I think, well settled that if A proves that his proprietary rights are being wrongfully
interfered with by B, and that B intends to continue his wrong, then A is prima facie
entitled to an injunction, and he will be deprived of that remedy only if special
circumstances exist, including the circumstance that damages are an adequate remedy
for the wrong that he has suffered.
it must be proven that a clear probability of grave damage will occur to the applicant if
such an injunction were not granted, and that, under such circumstances, damages
would be inadequate
The interlocutory injunction on the other hand “is given until the commencement of the
trial.” The rational for its application and subsequent execution is, as shown the case of
Musoke V Kezaala to be; that in the midst of the delayed trial the plaintiff may suffer
loss if the defendant dealt with the matter in dispute.
Perpetual
It is awarded to finally settle the existing dispute between the parties.
A permanent injunction would decide the whole case. It was held that a temporary
injunction which settles the dispute would not be granted.
Interlocutory
3) Ex-parte Injunctions
Ex-parte injunctions also help one who cannot wait for motions to be read. Thus, it is
applied until “when the application on motion is heard” but not after. Where something
is urgent and you can’t wait.
I. **Civil Procedure Rules (SI 71-1)
Law was ammednded under civil procedure rules,..it requires everyone to be informed.
4) Interim Injunctions
Interim injunctions on the other hand stop the defendant from acting in a certain way up
to the commencement of a given date. A perpetual injunction will be granted at the final
hearing, whereas an interim injunction is awarded at an early stage of proceedings in
order to preserve a position before the full trial.
CPR
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Fenwick v East London RY (1875) L.R. 20 Eq
General Principles
a. Injunction is a discretionary remedy and Remedy in Personam
I. Aragba v. Elegba [1986] 1 NWLR 333
II. Judicature Act
c. Government Proceedings
Its rarely issued against the government but can be awarded towards statutory bodies
like KCCA,police etc
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II. The Governmnet Proceedings Act (Cap 77) s. 14.
III. Ostraco v. AG (Court of Appeal)
IV. ULS v. AG (Const. App 7/2003)
V. James Rwanyarare & Ors v. AG (Const App 2/2002
d. Protection of Rights
Injunctions seek to protect rights.
Locus Standi
VI. CPR O.41 Rule 1
VII. Hoffman – La Roche (F) & Co. v. Sec of State for Trade & Industry [1975] A.C. 295
Mandatory
Guided by same principles but are difficult to supervise
Not given involving continuous performance
It is unnecessary to show damage or inconvenience kelsens case
Court will consider the hardship likely to be faced by the defendant.
Suspension of injuctions
When it will be hard for the defendant to comply with the injuction at once
Interlocutory injuctions
They are given to maintain the status quo.
Can be discontinued if court discovers its based on wrong application of law
Complete relief
Equity does not act in vain…will not be granted if its of no effect
Quia timet
s.38 of the judicature act
it can be any of the other forms
Redland bricks ltd v morris
Strong probability of future infrigemnt
Future infrigementis imminent
Substancial and iireparable damage
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Damage will be of a more serious nature
Exparte proceedings
Order 37 r 3 CPR
2. Defences to Injunctions
a. Delay
Equity aids the vigilant. Plaintiff must act quickly
b. Acquiescence
c. Hardship
d. Conduct of the Plaintiff
Equity will come with clean hands…related to subject matter not conduct.
e. equity will not act in vain
f. adequency of common law remedies.
WEEK SEVEN
4. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
5. Nature and Extent of the Remedy
3 Conditions to be satisfied for its grant
a. Inadequacy of Common law remedies
b. Discretionary
c. Enforceability
6. Contract must be enforceable
WEEK EIGHT
TUTORIALS
trust
This is a relationship which arises when property is vested in a person (or persons) called
the trustees, which those trustees are obliged to hold for the benefit of other persons
called the cestuis que trust or beneficiaries’
(Hanbury and Martin (2009): 49).
b. Agency
1. Bankruptcy Act, Cap 67, Companies Act, Cap 110
2. Re Hallets Estate (1880) 13 Ch. D 696
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3. Lister v. Stubbs [1890] 45 Ch. D
c. Contract
1. Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861) 1 B & s. 393
2. Fletcher v. Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare: 67; 141 L.J.C. 66
d. Debt
1. Potters v. Loppert [1973] Ch. 399
2. Morley v Morley (1678) 2 Ch. Cos 2; 22 ER 817
3. Barclays Bank Ltd v. Quistclose Investment Ltd. [1970] A.C 567
4. Re Lester (1942) Ch. 324
5. Re Cowley (1885) 53 L.T 494
f. Power of Appointment
1. Re Weeks Settlement [1897] 1 Ch. 289
2. Brown v, Higgs (1799) 4 ves 708.
Reading: Hudson, sections 2.1 and 2.2; Martin 49-78; Pettit 30-65
‘The essence of a trust is the imposition of an equitable obligation on a person who is the
legal owner of property (a trustee) which requires that person to act in good conscience
when dealing with that property in favour of any person (the beneficiary) who has a
beneficial interest recognised by equity in the property. The trustee is said to “hold the
property on trust” for the beneficiary. There are four significant elements to the trust:
1. that it is equitable,
2. that it provides the beneficiary with rights in property,
3. that it also imposes obligations on the trustee, and
4. that those obligations are fiduciary in nature.’ –
Underhill and Hayton, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, as amended by Pettit
D. Classification of trusts.
Types of trusts
i. Express trusts
An express trust can be understood as follows, comprising the “magic triangle” of settlor,
trustee and beneficiary. The core of the “trust” is the inter-action of personal rights and
claims between these persons in relation to the trust property. It is therefore vital to
distinguish between “in personam” and “in rem” rights.
v. Statutory Trusts
1. Cook v. Fountain
2. Succession Act Cap 162
Section 53(2) Law of Property Act 1925 refers to “implied, resulting and constructive
trusts”.
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**Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington [1996] 1 AC 669, per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson:-
“(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case of a
trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the purposes for which
the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or which the law imposes on
him by reason of his unconscionable conduct (constructive trust).”
E. The means by which the different forms of trusts come into existence
The three forms of trust come into existence in the following ways:
WEEK TEN
F. Creation of a Trust
a. Capacity
Minors
1. Edward v. Carter [1893] A.C. 360
Mental Abnormality
Married Women
1. Married Women Property’s Act, 1882
2. Jackson v. Hobhouse (1817) 2 Mer. 483
Companies
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1. Once a trust is created, the settlor ceases to have any property rights in the trust or
any control over the trust in her capacity as settlor.
2. The instant that the trust is declared (or deemed to have been created in the case of a
constructive or resulting trust) the legal title in the trust property is owned by the
trustee(s) and the equitable interest is owned by the beneficiary(-ies).
4. The trustee(s) owe equitable obligations to the beneficiaries to obey the terms of the
trust. The trustee(s)’ obligations are fiduciary in nature (thus requiring the utmost good
faith and prohibiting any conflict of interest).
5. The beneficiaries own equitable proprietary rights in the trust fund (each has an
“equitable interest” as a consequence).
6. There can be an infinite number of beneficiaries in theory, or there may be only one
beneficiary (a bare trust).
7. The same human being can be settlor, one of the trustees and also one of the
beneficiaries. If she is only one of the trustees or only one of the beneficiaries then some
other person will have acquired rights in relation to that property. Importantly, she will
be acting in different capacities in each context (as though she were three different
8. The beneficiaries may fall into various classes with different qualities of rights: e.g.
there may be a beneficiary entitled to the income from the trust fund during her lifetime
(a “life tenant”) with the capital being divided among the other beneficiaries after her
death (“remainder beneficiaries” or “remaindermen”).
9. Individual items of property making up the trust fund may, if the terms of the trust
permit it, be sold or exchanged for other property – that other property then becomes
part of the trust fund.
10. Significantly, then, more than one person can have property rights in the same
property at the same time: this enables settlors to create an infinite range of property
holdings to suit their circumstances.
11. The trustee(s) will be personally liable for any loss caused to the trust by her/their
breach of trust. 12. The trust, or “settlement”, is endlessly flexible (provided it is not
illegal).
Reading: Hudson, section 2.3.3; and the essay comprising chapter 14.
A trustee is an example of a fiduciary (along with, inter alia, company directors, agents,
and partners “acting in common with a view to profit”). So, it is important to understand
what the concept of fiduciary responsibility entails.
- Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18, per Millett LJ
Paul Finn, "Fiduciary Law and the Modern Commercial World", in Commercial Aspects of
Trusts and Fiduciary Relationships (ed. McKendrick, 1992), p. 9.
See also: Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977); Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle", in Equity,
Fiduciaries and Trusts (ed. Youdan, 1989); A.J. Oakley, Constructive Trusts (1997), Ch. 3;
A.J. Oakley (ed.), Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (1996) generally.
A framework for understanding change in the law of trusts: three conceptions of the trust
- moralistic, individual property, capital management: see Cotterrell, "Trusting in Law"
(1993) 46 CLP 75, 86-90. Proprietary right in the trust property for beneficiaries, not
simply a personal claim against the trustees. Provides preferential rights in an
insolvency. Important in giving priority for beneficiaries in the event of the trustee’s
bankruptcy.
A range of equitable remedies enforceable against the trustees and any third parties by
the beneficiaries in the event of loss.
A trust is a “gift over the plane of time” giving the settlor flexibility and control.
Trusts constitute the most significant players in UK securities markets in the form of
pension funds and investment funds (like unit trusts).
(H) Fundamental principles of trusts: the obligations of trustees and the rights
of beneficiaries
1. **Westdeutsche Landesbank v. Islington [1996] 2 All E.R. 961, 988. [1996] AC 669
(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest. In the case
of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry out the
purposes for which the property was vested in him (express or implied trust) or
which the law imposes on him by reason of his unconscionable conduct
(constructive trust).
(ii) (ii) Since the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the
conscience of the holder of the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a
trustee of the property if and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to
affect his conscience …
(iii) (iii) In order to establish a trust there must be identifiable trust property …
(iv) (iv) Once a trust is established, as from the date of its establishment the
beneficiary has, in equity, a proprietary interest in the trust property, which
proprietary interest will be enforceable in equity against any subsequent holder
of the property (whether the original property or substituted property into which
it can be traced) other than a purchaser for value of the legal interest without
notice.”
1. **Wright v. Atkyns (1823) Turn. & R. 143, 157, per Lord Eldon: “...first...the
words must be imperative...; secondly...the subject must be certain...; and
thirdly...the object must be as certain as the subject"
2. **Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148
a. CERTAINTY OF INTENTION.
Question: When a person seeks to create a trust (the settlor) in what ways must that
person’s intention be manifested?
(1)The core principle: an intention to create a trust can be inferred from the
circumstances
“The sender may create a trust by using appropriate words when he sends the money
(though I wonder how many do this, even if they are equity lawyers), or the company
may do it by taking suitable steps on or before receiving the money. If either is done, the
obligations in respect of the money are transformed from contract to property, from debt
to trust. Payment into a separate bank account is a useful (though by no means
conclusive) indication of an intention to create a trust, but of course there is nothing to
prevent the company from binding itself by a trust even if there are no effective banking
arrangements.”
'A settlor must, of course, possess the necessary intention to create a trust, but his
subjective intentions are irrelevant. If he enters into arrangements which have the effect
of creating a trust, it is not necessary that he should appreciate that they do so; it is
sufficient that he intends to enter into them.'
4. Don King Productions v. Warren [1998] 2 All E.R. 608 (an example of how
the court may have to infer the intention to create a trust even in complex
commercial cases)
5. Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd [2006] All ER (D) 265 (Dec) (an anomalous
decision of Mann J which was per incuriam Re Kayford and which sought to rely on
Quistclose trust)
6. *Annabel’s (Berkley Square) Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners
[2009] EWCA Civ 361, [2009] 4 All ER 55 (tronc system for restaurant wait
staff = trust in favour of staff, held by troncmaster as trustee)
7. Byrnes v Kendle [2011] HCA 26, 14 ITELR 299 (use of the word “trust” usually
suggests a trust – here husband disingenuously seeking to argue that when he had
used word “trust” it had not meant trust) 15
1. (Lambe v. Eames (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. 597 ("to be at her disposal in any way she may
think best, for the benefit of herself and her family" = merely moral obligation)).
2. Re Adams and the Kensington Vestry (1884) 27 Ch. D. 394 ("unto and to the
absolute use of my dear wife ... in full confidence that she will do what is right as to
the disposal thereof between my children" = a merely moral obligation).
3. Cf. Comiskey v. Bowring-Hanbury [1905] A.C. 84 (HL) ("in full confidence that... she
will devise it to one or more of my nieces as she may think fit..." = a trust).
4. Re Hamilton [1895] 2 Ch 370 (“take the will you have to construe and see what it
means, and if you come to the conclusion that no trust was intended you say so”,
per Lindley LJ)
1. Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd [1967] 2 QB 786, esp 802
2. *Midland Bank plc v. Wyatt [1995] 1 F.L.R. 696, [1997] 1 BCLC 256 (sham trusts).
3. Marquis-Antle Spousal Trust v R 2009 TCC 465, 12 ITELR 314 (Canadian case:
sham discretionary trust in Barbados seeking to avoid liability to tax)
Question: What is the necessity of ascertaining subject matter and extent of beneficial
interests; and what is the effect of lack of certainty of subject-matter?
1. Palmer v Simmonds (1854) 2 Drew. 221 ("bulk of my... residuary estate"; not
valid).
2. Sprange v. Barnard (1789) 2 Bro. C.C. 585 ("remaining part of what is left, that he
does not want for his own wants and use to be divided..."; not valid).
3. *Re London Wine Co. (Shippers) Ltd. (1986)
4. Palmer's Co. Cas. 121, Oliver J (wine bottles to be held on trust not separated from
other bottles):
‘I appreciate the point taken that the subject matter is a part of a homogenous
mass so that specific identity is of as little importance as it is, for instance, in the
case of money. Nevertheless, as it seems to me, to create a trust it must be
possible to ascertain with certainty not only what the interest of the beneficiary is
to be but to what property it is to attach.’
5. *MacJordan Construction Ltd v Brookmount Erostin Ltd [1992] BCLC 350
6. **Re Goldcorp [1995] 1 A.C. 74 (necessity of segregating trust property - bullion
“ex bulk”) Westdeutsche Landesbank v Islington [1996] AC 669
Summary
c. CERTAINTY OF OBJECTS
Question: how certain must the words used by the settlor be in creating a trust, and in
what way will the court measure sufficient certainty?
1. Morice v. Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves. Jr. 399 (affd. (1805) 10 Ves. Jr. 522):
there must be some person in whose favour the court can decree performance.
The need for the court to be able to police the trustees’ management of the trust
If the court cannot know with certainty, how can the trustees know and how can
the court police the trustees?
2. **Re Hay's Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 W.L.R. 202: for the most useful summary of
these principles and of the various forms of power.
1) Distinguishing between types of power and of trust The distinction between
“powers” and “trusts”:
Fixed trusts and bare trusts obligations
Discretionary trusts, (once known as “powers in the nature of a trust”)
Fiduciary powers: powers of appointment and powers of advancement (known as
“mere powers” because they are merely powers and not trusts)
Personal, non-fiduciary powers Cf. The nature of beneficial entitlements (cf. mere
powers) in general and of corresponding trustees’ duties.
Burrough v. Philcox (1840) 5 My. & Cr. 72.
*Re Hay's Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 W.L.R. 202
2) Certainty rules for fixed trusts (e. g. fixed shares within a class).
Effect of Uncertainity
Word
Subject matter
Question: when will a trust be void for want of a beneficiary, and what manner of
beneficiary will be necessary?
Reading: Hudson, section 4.1.4 Prof Geraint Thomas, Powers (2nd ed, Sweet & Maxwell,
2011), para 6-268 Thomas & Hudson, The Law of Trusts (OUP, 2004), p.184 et seq., &
p.1587 et seq.
"There can be no trust, over the exercise of which this court will not assume control
..If there be a clear trust, but for uncertain objects, the property... is undisposed of...
Every...[non-charitable] trust must have a definite object. There must be somebody in
whose favour the court can decree performance" (per Lord Grant M.R.).
2. Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 2) The strict, traditional principle
**Leahy v. Att.-Gen. for New South Wales [1959] A.C. 457 (trust for ‘such order of
nuns’ as trustees shall select) – this case is considered in detail below
This chapter of the course considers a selection of the key duties of trustees.
(1) The duties on acceptance of office relating to the need to familiarise oneself with the
terms, conditions and history of the management of the trust.
(2) The duty to obey the terms of the trust unless directed to do otherwise by the court.
(3) The duty to safeguard the trust assets, including duties to maintain the trust
property, as well as to ensure that it is applied in accordance with the directions set out
in the trust instrument.
(4) The duty to act even-handedly between beneficiaries, which means that the trustees
are required to act impartially between beneficiaries and to avoid conflicts of interest.
(5) The duty to act with reasonable care, meaning generally a duty to act as though a
prudent person of business acting on behalf of someone for whom one feels morally
bound to provide. (6) Duties in relation to trust expenses.
(7) The duties of investment, requiring prudence and the acquisition of the highest
possible rate of return in the context.
(9) The duty to avoid conflicts of interest, not to earn unauthorised profits from the
fiduciary office, not to deal on one’s own behalf with trust property on pain of such
transactions being voidable, and the obligation to deal fairly with the trust property.
(10) The duty to preserve the confidence of the beneficiaries, especially in relation to
Chinese wall arrangements.
(11) The duty to act gratuitously, without any right to payment not permitted by the
trust instrument or by the general law.
(13) The duty to take into account relevant considerations and to overlook irrelevant
considerations, failure to do so may lead to the court setting aside an exercise of the
trustees’ powers.
There are other duties considered in Hudson, section 8.1 and in chapter 9
(relating specifically to investment of the trust property); and there are also
general powers for trustees considered in Hudson, chapter 10.
Reading: Hudson, section 8.6 Trustee Act 2000 Trusts of Land and Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996, ss. 19-21. 1) What it means to be a fiduciary
Nestlé v National Westminster Bank plc (1988) [1993] 1 WLR 1260, CA (deciding
between life tenants and remainder beneficiaries)
‘the so-called duty to act impartially … is no more than the ordinary duty which the
law imposes on a person who is entrusted with the exercise of a discretionary
power: that he exercises the power for the purpose for which it is given, giving
proper consideration to the matters which are relevant and excluding from
consideration matters which are irrelevant. If pension fund trustees do that, they
cannot be criticized if they reach a decision which appears to prefer the claims of
one interest – whether that of employers, current employers or pensioners – over
others. The preference will be the result of a proper exercise of the discretionary
power.’