GREGORIO V. CAPINPIN, JR. v. ATTY. ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR.

A.C. No. 6933, July 5, 2017, J. Tijam:

FACTS: In October 1973, Salandanan became a stockholder of Paces, and later became its Director,
Treasurer, Administrative Officer, VP for Finance, then its counsel. In one case, E.E. Black Ltd., through its
counsel, sent a letter to Paces regarding the latter's outstanding obligation to it. In the negotiations that
transpired thereafter, Salandanan was the one who represented Paces.

Meanwhile, disagreements on various management policies ensued among the stockholders and officers
in the corporation. Eventually, Salandanan and his group were forced to sell out their shareholdings in
the company to the group of Mr. Nicolas C. Balderama.

After said sell-out, Salandanan started handling the case between E.E. Black Ltd. and Paces, but now,
representing E.E. Black Ltd. Salandanan then filed a complaint with application for preliminary
attachment against Paces for the collection of its obligation to E.E. Black Ltd. He later succeeded in
obtaining an order of attachment, writ of attachment, and notices of garnishment to various entities
which Paces had business dealings with.

Thus, Paces filed a complaint against Salandanan. It argued that when he acted as counsel for E.E. Black
Ltd., he represented conflicting interests and utilized, to the full extent, all the information he had
acquired as its stockholder, officer, and lawyer. On the other hand, Salandanan claimed that he was never
employed nor paid as a counsel by Paces. There was no client-lawyer contract between them. He
maintained that his being a lawyer was merely coincidental to his being a stockholderofficer and did not
automatically make him a lawyer of the corporation, particularly with respect to its account with E.E.
Black Ltd. He added that whatever knowledge or information he had obtained on the operation of Paces
only took place in the regular, routinary course of business as him being an investor, stockholder, and
officer, but never as a lawyer of the company.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salandanan is administratively liable.

RULING: Yes. It is clear that his duty had been to fight a cause for Paces, but it later became his duty to
oppose the same for E.E. Black Ltd. His defense for Paces was eventually opposed by him when he argued
for E.E. Black Ltd. Thus, Salandanan had indisputably obtained knowledge of matters affecting the rights
and obligations of Paces which had been placed in him in unrestricted confidence. The same knowledge
led him to the identification of those attachable properties and business organizations that eventually
made the attachment and garnishment against Paces a success. To allow him to utilize said information
for his own personal interest or for the benefit of E.E. Black Ltd., the adverse party, would be to violate
the element of confidence which lies at the very foundation of a lawyer-client relationship.

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be
representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the
same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially
related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship
must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers, not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree.
In the absence of the express consent from Paces after full disclosure to it of the conflict of interest,
Salandanan should have either outrightly declined representing and entering his appearance as counsel
for E.E. Black Ltd., or advised E.E. Black Ltd. to simply engage the services of another lawyer.
Unfortunately, he did neither, and must necessarily suffer the dire consequences.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan from the practice of law for three (3)
years.
 RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO CALAYAN,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 8208, EN BANC, January 10, 2018, GESMUNDO, J.

FACTS: Prior to this case, an intra-corporate case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City
presided by Judge Adolfo Encomienda, but was later on re-raffled to Judge Virgilio Alpajora (Judge
Alpajora). Atty. Ronaldo Calayan (Atty. Calayan) was President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
Calayan Educational Foundation, Inc. (CEFI). He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for
himself. Thereafter, Judge Alpajora issued an Omnibus Order for the creation of a management
committee and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the administrative
case against the Judge Alpajora – order was not acceptable to Atty. Calayan because he knew in effect, he,
together with his wife and daughter, would lose their positions as Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary,
respectively, and as members of the Board of Trustees of the CEFI Judge Alpajoraasserted that
respondent committed the following: (1) serious and gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for
himself; (2) violated his oath as lawyer for: [a] his failure to observe and maintain respect to the courts
(Section 20 (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of judicial process thru maintaining actions or
proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to mislead the judge by false statements
(Section 20 (d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of procedures governing intra-corporate
cases and maliciously misused the same to defeat the ends of justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule
against the filing of multiple actions arising from the same cause of action. Atty. Calayan, on the other
hand, maintained that complainant committed the following: (1) grossly unethical and immoral conduct
by his impleading a non-party; (2) betrayal of his lawyer's oath and the CPR; (3) malicious and
intentional delay in not terminating the pre-trial, in violation of the Interim Rules because he ignored the
special summary nature of the case; and (4) misquoted provisions of law and misrepresented the facts.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that Atty. Calayan violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, Rules 8.01, 10.01 to 10.03, 11.03, 11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR. Investigating Commissioner
finally noted that as a party directly involved in the subject intracorporate controversy, it is duly noted
that Respondent was emotionally affected by the ongoing case. His direct interest in the proceedings
apparently clouded his judgment, on account of which he failed to act with circumspect in his choice of
words and legal remedies. Such facts and circumstances mitigate Respondent's liability.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Calayan violated the aforementioned Canons of the CPR.

RULING: When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the
rights of their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration of justice, appropriate
disciplinary measures and proceedings are available such as reprimand, suspension or even disbarment
to rectify their wrongful acts. In this case, Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct unbecoming of a worthy
lawyer. Atty. Calayan respondent did not deny filing several cases against opposing parties and their
counsels. He explained that the placing of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a
management committee and the continuation of the receiver's duties and responsibilities by virtue of the
Omnibus Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or motions. It was in his desperation and
earnest desire to save CEFI from further damage that he implored the aid of the courts. The Court is
mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal. However, professional rules
impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and qualifications. The filing of
cases by Atty. Calayan against the adverse parties and their counsels manifests his malice in paralyzing
the lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client's interest. As officers of the court,
lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They
are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from
attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Atty. Calayan has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his
pleadings. He also accused the complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable close ties
with the adverse counsels; and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse counsels. However,
these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece of evidence. Thus, the Court finds
respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to complainant in violation of Canon 11. Canon
11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should
insist on similar conduct by others. xxx Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. It must be remembered that all lawyers are
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair
administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. Further, as regards his
alleged misquotation, respondent argues that he should have been cited in contempt. He found
justification in Cortes vs. Bangalan, to wit: The alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in
the lettercomplaint was not directed to the respondent court. As observed by the Court Administrator,
"what respondent should have done in this particular case is that he should have given the Court
(Supreme Court) the opportunity to rule on the complaint and not simply acted precipitately in citing
complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than the
upholding of a court's honor. A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on
his impartiality even if the judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to punish in contempt
is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due
administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for
correction and preservation not for retaliation or vindication. As correctly pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted precisely cautions a judge against citing a party in
contempt, which is totally contradictory to the position of respondent. He misrepresented the text of a
decision, in violation of the CPR. Ironically, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil
and criminal cases, and even administrative cases against different trial court judges relating to
controversies involving CEFI, in fact, runs counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the
administration of justice. It degrades the dignity and integrity of the courts.

A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases. Limitations
can be inferred from the following rules: Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court; Canons 1, 10 (Rule
10.03), Canon 12 (Rule 12.04) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent justifies his filing of
administrative cases against certain judges, including complainant, by relying on In Re: Almacen
(Almacen). He claims that the mandate of the ruling laid down in Almacen was to encourage lawyers'
criticism of erring magistrates. In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right
of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges and that these criticisms are subject to a
condition – bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Indubitably, the acts of
respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers and his duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer.
 HDI HOLDINGS PHILIPPINES, INC, Complainant, -versus- ATTY. EMANUEL N. CRUZ, Respondent
AC No. 11724, EN BANC, July 31, 2018, PER CURIAM

FACTS: HDI alleged that they retained the services of Atty. Cruz as its in house corporate counsel and
corporate secretary. In the beginning, the directors and board members were pleased at his performance
and he soon gained their trust and confidence. He eventually handled confidential and important matters
of the company. However, through deceit and fraudulent machinations, he managed to misappropriate
P41, 317, 167 BY doing the following acts: (a) misappropriation of the cash bid in the total amount of
P6,000,000.00 which remains unpaid; (b) contracting unsecured personal loans with HDI in the total
amount of P8,000,000.00 which remains unpaid; (c) deceiving HDI as to the true selling price of the Q.C.
property which resulted in overpayment in the amount of P1,689,100.00 which remains unpaid; (d)
fabricating a fictitious sale by executing a fictitious contract to sell and deed of sale in order to obtain
money in the amount of P21,250,000.00 from HDI which remains unpaid; (e) collecting rental payments
amounting to P4,408,067.18, without authority, and thereafter, failed to turn over the same to HDI; and
(f) executing a fake Secretarys Certificate appointing himself as the authorized person to receive the
payments of the lease rentals.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court should adopt the recommendation of the IBP

RULING: Canon 1 provides that a lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes and Rule 1.0 says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Good moral character is necessary for a lawyer to practice the
profession. An attorney is expected not only to be professionally competent, but to also have moral
integrity. Deceit and lack of accountability and integrity reflect on his ability to perform his functions as a
lawyer, who is always expected to act and appear to act lawfully and honestly, and must uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Atty. Cruz failed in these respects as a lawyer. In the instant
case, considering all the above-cited infractions, it is beyond dispute that Atty. Cruz is guilty of engaging
in dishonest and deceitful conduct. In several occasions, he manifested a propensity to lie and deceive his
client in order to obtain money. Obviously, his misrepresentations in order to compel HDI to release
money for cash bids, fictitious purchase of a property, the overpriced purchase price of the Q.C. property
and his misrepresentation that he had authority to collect rentals in behalf of HDI and CGI, as well as his
execution of fictitious documents to give semblance of truth to his misrepresentations, constitute grave
violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These reprehensible conduct of Atty. Cruz without doubt
breached the highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients. This Court also sees it fit to note
that the CPR strongly condemns Atty. Cruz's conduct in handling the funds of HDI. Rules 16.01 and 16.02
of the Code provide that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client and lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those others
kept by him. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. When a
lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose as in cash for biddings and
purchase of properties, as in this case, he should promptly account to the client how the money was
spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client.
His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money if the intended purpose of the money
does not materialize constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 GOOGLE v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL)
Case C-507/17

FACTS: The case concerned a dispute between Google Inc. and CNIL, the French Data
Protection Act (DPA), with regards to the scale on which de-referencing is to be given effect.
In 2015, CNIL notified Google that it must apply the removal of links from all versions of its
search engine worldwide. Google refused to comply and continued to limit its de-referencing
of links only on search results conducted in the versions of its search engines with domain
extensions within the European Union (EU) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and
used geo-blocking, a measure which prevents the links from showing in searches made in
France regardless of the version used. Google appealed to the Conseil d’É tat seeking to annul
a EUR 100,000 fine imposed by CNIL. The Conseil d’É tat, noting “several serious difficulties
regarding the interpretation of the directive,” subsequently referred questions to the Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling concerning the scope of application of Articles 12(b) and 14(a)
of the Directive.

CNIL contends that for the right to be effective, Google must de-list links universally. It held
insufficient both measures implemented by Google to comply with the Directive: 1) de-listing
links from all EU and EFTA extensions, and 2) de-listing links from all searches conducted in
the French territory. CNIL argued that internet users located in France are still able to access
the other versions outside the EU (e.g. Google.com). Therefore, removing links about an
individual residing in France only from the French version (google.fr) or even from versions
in other EU member states is not enough to protect the individual’s right, violating the
Directive.

Google argues that CNIL misinterpreted the provisions of the law recognizing the right to de-
reference by explaining that the right “does not necessarily require that the links at issue are
to be removed, without geographical limitation, from all its search engine’s domain names.”
Google contended that CNIL’s misinterpretation amounted to: 1) a disregard of public
international law’s principles of courtesy and non-interference; and 2) the disproportionate
infringement of the freedoms of expression, information, communication and the press.

ISSUE: The Court addressed whether EU data protection law on de-referencing should be
interpreted to mean that a search engine operator is required to remove links:

1. On all versions of its search engine (worldwide), or

2. Only on the versions corresponding to all Member States (within the EU), or

3. Only on the version corresponding to the Member State of residence of the person
requesting the de-referencing.

RULING:  Taking the side of Google, the Court held that search engine operators are not
required under EU law to remove links on all the version of its search engine. To support its
assertion, the Court explained that the texts of the Directive and GDPR do not indicate that EU
legislature has chosen to confer a scope which would go beyond the territory of the Member
States or has intended to impose on a search engine operator a de-referencing obligation on
non-EU national versions of search engines.

In its ruling, the Court also emphasized the goal to provide a high level of protection of
personal data throughout the EU. Accordingly, it held that search engine operators are
required to remove all the links on all the versions in the EU regardless of where the request to
de-reference originates in the EU. It also held that search engine operators are required to
supplement the de-referencing through measures that would prevent or seriously discourage
an internet user located in the EU to gain access to de-referenced links when using a search
engine version outside the EU.

 However, it is important to point out that a key part of the Courts of Justice of the European
Union’s judgment appears to neutralize Google’s purported victory in this case.  Paragraph 72
of the judgment reveals the Court’s effort to establish the lawfulness of global de-referencing
as a general principle. By finding that EU law does not prohibit it and that Member States
remain competent to order search engine operators to de-reference globally after balancing
the conflicting rights of personal data protection against the right to freedom of information
under national standards of protection of fundamental rights, the Court leaves the door wide
open for the possibility of global de-referencing as determined by a national DPA or a national
court in the EU.