SIQUIAN VS.

PEOPLE

THE EXISTENCE OF A WRONGFUL INTENT TO INJURE A 3RD PERSON IS NOT NECESSARY WHEN THE FALSIFIED
DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT.

IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, THE CONTROLLING CONSIDERATION IS THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF A

FACTS: Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel Siquian, the municipal mayor of Isabela, to apply for a job in the office
of the mayor. Siquian then appointed her as a clerk in the office of the municipal secretary and even said that her salary
would be included in the budget. Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of
funds through a form issued by Siquian and addressed to the CSC, pursuant to the requirements of the latter. It should be
noted that the Municipal council of Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-
76. As such, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75, was deemed re-enacted. No such position existed
then. Carreon worked for five months and was supposed to receive her salary of P120. She approached the municipal
treasurer to ask for the money but the latter said that there was no money yet. She then sued Siquian for falsification of a
public document.

The RTC and CA ruled in favour of Carreon. Siquian interposed the defense of a lack of criminal intent.

Issue: WON Siquian guilty of falsification of public documents.

HELD: YES. The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by
"any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this
fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:

a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the
municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification
which he issued in connection with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued
by a public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is
immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the
document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms
prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested
with the character of a public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of
which is punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed
when the petitioner stated that funds were available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed
when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.
  Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion
of law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as
follows:

Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or
combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71
Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362].

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are
available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the position
what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if
such item exists and funds are allocated therefor.

 In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor
referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely
that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the
Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the
availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has
been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as Civil
Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in
said certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.

CONTRARY to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when
the falsified document is a public document.

 This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The
Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a
third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.

o The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private
documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the
Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth
as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48
(1924)].

o In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause
such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on
his part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to
exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the
municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the
municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a
budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the
Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the
municipal secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to
the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2",
Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the
questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already
commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by
the municipal council.

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the
document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer
requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in
committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is considered present when the
offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing or
otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); as in the case of petitioner
who was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Final Ruling: The appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.