17. Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No.

80391) local governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-
Facts: reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The president exercises “general
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local not control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to exercise
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a autonomy through decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that
case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should “the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly
the petition had become "moot and academic" because of its resolution. administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.

Issues: Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be invalid. Wherefore, the
1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the Sanggunian.
academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments
of Region 9 and 12? 18. G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner,
Ruling: vs.
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of the expulsion CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to make the petition moot and
academic, it will not make it academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that the expulsion
is without force and effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an Facts:
investigation. It also does not appear that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on the civil
graft and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the
opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil
accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the petitioner. service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the
Decree No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the Presidential Decree provides that “the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information,
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions...” petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is to disclose said information.
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
1
The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of interest."
Sibonghanoy and Agas.
 ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on
behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs.
Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is  HELD :
to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the
execution of the laws. law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The
It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been
therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
"transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
19. G.R. No. 74930 which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
RICARDO VALMONTE et. al, petitioners, government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental
vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent. functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the
February 13, 1989 GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
FACTS : dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean on matters of public concern.
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First
Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents
evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do

2
 20. G.R. No. 92541 MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MTRCB 21. Bacani Vs Nacoco [G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956
November 13, 1991
Facts:  Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of
FACTS: Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Coconut Corporation, AssistantCorporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant ,requested
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the said stenographers for copies of thetranscript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the
board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their billsfor the payment of their fees. The
banned, cut or classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A.
on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to
reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion
and completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive was expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the
meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, payment of the fees in question.
seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified
documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Issue  : WON NACOCO is a Government Entity
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was
only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which Held:   They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they donot come under the
declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National CoconutCorporation.
slips of the members. While it was organized with the purpose of ³adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of
trade preferences in the United States´ and of providing ³Facilities for the better curing of copra
ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products´, a function which our government has
chosen to exercise to promote thecoconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate
HELD : and distinct from our government, for it wasmade subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or far as its corporate existence and the powers that it mayexercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private
community at large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court hasaptly said,
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created ³The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public. the
to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to term ³Government of the Republic of the Philippines´ used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative
privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of thegovernment are exercised
officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board and the as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is
individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are
functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They whatwe call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a
are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the
fundamental law of the land. Corporation Law. Their powers, dutiesand liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of

3
their corporate charters. They do not thereforecome within the exemption clause prescribed in section
16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court

22. G.R. No. L-32052 23. Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad
65 SCRA 416 G.R. No. 9959
July 25, 1975 35 PH 728, 751-753
December 13, 1916
Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration
Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer
Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila
FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess
of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 444. FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish
dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the
Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight earthquake. The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus
(8) hours daily. invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same
amount.
Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-
functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the
Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED. reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various
petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt
the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse to
from CA No. 444.
provide the money, hence, this appeal.
HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and
promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of
necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. the people deposited in respondent bank.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement
Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which
government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people.
obsolete. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.
The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED.
Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that
respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.

4
 Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and
some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits
and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for
24. G.R. No. L-5 75 Phil 113, 122 violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered
vs. that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents. Base of a foreign country.
September 17, 1945
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
petitioner’s case on the ground that the proclamation, issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court during the the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to continue jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not
pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese occupation was granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own
no de facto government. decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State
through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US
ISSUES: Naval Base.
1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain good and
valid?
2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidate all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of 26. 77 PHIL 856
said court? Laurel vs. Misa
3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts? 77 Phil. 856

HELD: FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused
It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason
forces and thus a de facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be
facto governments, which are not of political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth
that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not which was replaced already by the Republic.
invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese regime. The existence
of the courts depends upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction. Such laws, HELD: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his
not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until repealed government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the
by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either
cases, not of political complexion. subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise
of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of
government, there is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What
25. People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Facts:
5
 The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy
See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc.
27. G.R. No. L-533
75 Phil 875 When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both
August 20, 1956 were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright
Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that
Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al. respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the
Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al. agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
camps or military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner
and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and
Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.
new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign
immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed
Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As
occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law
Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and
officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic
is hereby DENIED. envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any
real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified
that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the
Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a
28. Holy See vs Rosario diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.
G.R. No. 101949
238 SCRA 524 Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in
December 1, 1994 the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act
jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot
FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic
Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). Nunciature in the Philippines.
6
 whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in over the case.
nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio
thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a
governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it
merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed 30. Caylao et. Al. vs Republic
accordingly. Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a
marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As
29. Constitutional Law. Political Law. Doctrine of State Immunity. a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of
Sanders v. Veridano conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs
GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988 of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic
FACTS: and the military/police officers involved in theincident.
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city.
Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the
Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of Issues:
NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their employment had been (1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, (2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the reinstatement of private respondents to
permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous
imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners. Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commissionto indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does
ISSUE: not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding ofthe Commission only serves as the basis
which the private respondents sued them for damages? for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case? the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

HELD: The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officerswho were
the letters, the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their
government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their claim against the
petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under

7
 dissenting: To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee
Isaias Fernando is a party inthis case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Government.
According to said pleading the defendant is"Isaias Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works."
Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint, it is alleged:4. That the defendant
as Director of the Bureau of Public Works
, is in charge of irrigation projects and systems,and the official responsible for the construction of
irrigation system in the Philippines;We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and
system reffered to in the complaint — of which thedefendant, Isaias Fernando, according to the same
31. G.R. No. L-5156 March 11, 1954CARMEN FESTEJO pleading, is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the Bureau of Public Works —
vs. are established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the Constitution, must
ISAIAS FERNANDO beappropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner in which the construction may have beenundertaken
by the Bureau of Public Works, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government.
FACTS:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained first from the
Court of FirstInstance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and
knowledge of theplaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully took possession of portions of 32. USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest
the three parcels of land andcaused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three FACTS:
parcels of land on to the damage andprejudice of the plaintiff.
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
ISSUE: The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
Whether or not this is a suit against the state? with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by
RULING: Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in
No, the evidence and conceded facts in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
committed actsoutside the scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of
way upon plaintiff's landand damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness, he must be 2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
held to have designedly departedfrom the duties imposed on him by law.Ordinarily the officer or Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center
employee committing the tort is personally liable therefore, and may be sued as any othercitizen and at Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine
held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his tortuous act.It is a general rule that an into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager
officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who actsoutside the scope of his suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable topersonal liability in guilty and recommended his dismissal.
a civil suit. If he exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by theplea that he
is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his 3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
actsthen are wholly without authority.ART. 32. Any public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed
following rights and liberties of another person shall beliable to the latter for damages:(6) The right against Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was
against deprivation of property without due process of law; dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was
Separate Opinions CONCEPCION, because of the latter’s acts that he lost his job.
J.
, 4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

8
A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not
injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
unleashed dogs on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft
but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries. In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of
a business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were
ISSUE: operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can
claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still
them in the performance of their official duties. dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the
proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating Genove’s
RULING: employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant.
we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what
one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred.The needed
the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state parties.
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed
to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity
from suit with its implied consent.

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity 33. Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. CA
for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they G.R. No. 91359, September 25, 1992
are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United Grino-Aquino, J.
States in the discharge of their official functions.
Facts:
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non- The constitutionality of the following provisions of R.A. 5487(otherwise known as the “Private
suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure Security Agency Law”), as amended, is questioned by VMPSI in its complaint:
gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental SEC. 4. Who may Organize a Security or Watchman Agency. - Any Filipino citizen or a corporation,
acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied. partnership, or association, with a minimum capital of five thousand pesos, one hundred per cent of
which is owned and controlled by Filipino citizens may organize a security or watchman agency:
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US Provided, That no person shall organize or have aninterest in, more than one such agency except those
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly which are alreadyexisting at the promulgation of this Decree: x x x.” (As amended by P.D. Nos. 11 and
resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the 100.)

9
SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine Constabulary. -The Chief of the Philippine Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constabulary, in consultation with thePhilippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the
Operators,Inc. and subject to the provision of existing laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and national government exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and
regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.” operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and
VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way,
favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00,
(PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency. exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced
Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.
Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent,
Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the
located...”. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount
legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
of trade. although it has not been formally impleaded.
On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith,
fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila. PC¬-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their official
On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut- duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their
throat competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan private capacities.
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but
rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986. the legal nature of the act.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
security agency (Annex D, Petition). differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a business contract. It does not
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
requested one. In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was
intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as the
VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function. The execution of the said agreement
PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and
membership from PADPAO operation of private detective, watchmen or security

Issue:
whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the 34. Amigable v Cuenca [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972]
State without its consent
Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Held: Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in
the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for
10
the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable’s counsel wrote the President The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow
of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor them to present their evidence.
General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued
recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action
for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent Issue:
to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government. Held:
No. A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be
Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of misinterpreted.
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the
government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the government is not being divested of any of its properties.
case at bar, since no annotation in favour of the government appears at the back of the certificate of 36. United States of America vs. Ruiz
title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, 136 SCRA 487
then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land
anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not Facts: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that
government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking. it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly
awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the
US.
35. Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court, Issue: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
respondents-appellants. functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Facts: Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another
Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are
parcel of land. constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial
rest of the property reverted to the public domain. and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental
The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision acts.
of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20
years under claim of ownership. The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state
presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
case was submitted for decision and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano. given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of
11
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a The Republic of the Philippines did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was
function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
business purposes.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the
state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily
understandable why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from
37. REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
G.R. No. L-30671, November 28 1973, 54 SCRA 84 that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Sociological jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar.
FACTS:
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter.
J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both
petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award subject of Special Proceedings. dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of
a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state
On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the liability adjudged.
aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon
City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding
Alias Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the
respondent Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several Banks, specially on 38. G.R. No. 88211
the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the 38. FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, et. al, petitioners,
amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution’; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same vs.
notice of garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, et. al, respondents.
particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are September 15, 1989
public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces Facts:
of the Philippines. After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his
deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and
Petitioner then alleged that respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners
jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty
of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the of abode because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to the
Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void." petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.

In the answer filed by respondents, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being Issue:
that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40. Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

Ruling:
ISSUE: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare
Whether or not the notices of garnishment are null and void. and advance national interest.

HELD:
12
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The president is not Whether or not respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day jurisdiction when the warrant of arrest was issued.
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. HELD:
No.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence The Court did not find any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
directed against the state and instigate more chaos. part of the respondent judge. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government. judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a What the Constitution requires is that the issuing judge must satisfy himself first with the criteria in
serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is finding probable cause. And to satisfy himself doesn't mean to he is required to personally examine the
DISMISSED. complainant and his witnesses. The Constitution mandates that he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
39. G.R. No. 82585 existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, et. al, petitioners, (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require
vs. the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, existence of probable cause.
et. al, respondents.
November 14, 1988 Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.

FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition raised by one of the petitioners, Beltran, who wants to call for an 40. G.R. No. 85468
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, Petitioner,
v. SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
The petitioner assailed that his constitutional right was violated when respondent RTC judge issued a September 7, 1989
warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause. FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally" convinced him that the judge is solely (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection
responsible to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and
ISSUE: Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).

13
An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
preliminary investigation was conducted. The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or
questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the indirectly... participate in any business.
Ombudsman. (2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his
opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.
Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also
clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the (3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor
information filed by the “Tanodbayan”. do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such investigation,
Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation
Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal may be conducted.
International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall
participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution. investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such
investigation.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had
been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is
unnecessary because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.

ISSUES: 41. G.R. No. 83815

Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both information involve the same subject vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent
matter. February 22, 1991
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary
investigation. FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C.
HELD: Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Yes, as to the first and second issues. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme
Court. EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to hold
other than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.
RATIO:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive officials of the
bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in
absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.
family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."

14
Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.
favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than July 30, 1990
two (2) positions other than his primary position.
Fact:
Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a Secretary, Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. He
Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary. was designated as general Manager by the Chairman of the PTA Board.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct contrast with In 1990, Pres. Aquino sent Garrucho, Secretary of Tourism, a memorandum stating that his designation
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against is invalid because it was not her, the President, who appointed him as what is required by PD No. 564.
holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) As such, he will remain in the position until the President appoints a person to serve in a permanent
the Vice President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The capacity.
Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.
Held:
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional. Appointment and designation are distinct from each other. The former is defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. completed, the appointment results in security of tenure. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official and is legislative in nature.
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful The implication is that he shall hold office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances the appointing authority.
under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding
multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided by the 43. G.R. No. 79974
Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor vs.
of the highest law of the land. Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, et.al
result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo December 17, 1987
Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and
employment. FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento
284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside. assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
42. G.R. No. 92008
RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner, RULING:
vs.
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Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing Salvador Mison, ISSUES:
without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full 1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.
authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto. 2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall RULING:
appoint: 1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public ministers, Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers with confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd
the consent and confirmation of the CoA. sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint; review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. has reserved to the President alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the 2. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend
only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule in interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is,
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. 45. G.R. No. 83216
44. G.R. No. 86439 MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner, TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V. MASTURA, TRINIDAD A.
vs. GOMEZ, ADUL DE LEON, JOSEFINA AZARCON-DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO, MARIA
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, MAYET T. LEDANO, LOLIT ANTONIO, ET AL., petitioners,
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents. vs.
April 13, 1989 THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES (C.A.), COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
FACTS: CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., respondents.
The President appointed Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of the Commission on Human September 4, 1989
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, without the confirmation of the CoA
because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by FACTS:
law to appoint." Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel CoA to
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. CoA disapproved Bautista's alleged ad allow Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege her duties as HoR member representing Women's Sector
interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR in view of her refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the and to restrain respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. Quintos-Deles
Commission on Appointments. ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16
p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the Constitution.
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ISSUE:
WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed
by the CoA.

RULING:
Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the “other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of
Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which gives the President ”the power
to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.” The records show that Deles’ appointment was made on April 6,
1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the
said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.

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