The President

Macalintal vs. Comelec

FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a
voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws,
domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus,
an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a
resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow
COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To
interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was
in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT-GRANTS SWEEPING AUTHORITY TO COMELEC TO PROCLAIM ALL

WINNING CANDIDATES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT IS INCOMPATIBLE TO ARTICLE VII SEC 4 VESTING
IN THE CONGRESS THE AUTHORITY TO PROCLAIM THE WINNING CANDIDATES FOR POSITIONS OF
PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT.
The President

Lopez vs Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004

FACTS:
Before the Court is a Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13, Rule VIII
of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress, dated May 28, 2004, creating a Joint
Committee which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of the candidates for President and
Vice-President during the May 10, 2004 elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating a Joint Committee which
shall preliminary canvass the votes for candidates for President and Vice-President during
the May 10, 2004 elections.
RULING:
The Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the Petition on the ground that it failed to show that Congress
gravely abuse its discretion in creating such Joint Committee.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress “to promulgate its rules
for the cavassing of the candidates.” In Arroyo v. De Venecia, the Court ruled that it had no power
to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution.
Likewise, in Santiago v. Guingona, held that the Court – under the doctrine of separation of powers –
has “no authority to interfere” in the “exclusive realm” of a co-equal branch, absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion. The Court has no authority to restrict or limit the exercise of congressional
prerogatives granted by the Constitution.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to
have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional
prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and final report of
the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

EMPOWERS CONGRESS TO PROMULGATE ITS RULES-CREATING A COMMITTEE CAN BE

The President
 BRILLANTES V COMELEC
Facts
Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system for the
process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation the results of national
and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that the
precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted
electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila.
Petitioners in this case questioned, among others, the Constitutionality of the quick count as being
pre-emptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and
Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue WON COMELEC may conduct “unofficial” tabulation of presidential election results based
on a copy of the election returns?
Ruling: NO
No. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation of election results
based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass
the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and
Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is “unofficial,” is untenable. If the COMELEC is proscribed
from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President,
the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said
votes
Furthermore, they violated Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive
authority vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and
Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored the
misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin
Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the Constitution (section 4 of
Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a
canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the
authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."

COMELEC DESCENDS TO A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION USING PUBLIC FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE

The President

PIMENTEL V JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS

Facts:
Petition for Prohibition. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued
existence of the Joint Committee. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further
proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die(w/o date fixed)on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth
Congress of its last regular session, term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said
Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner
goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of Congress.
Issue: WON the Joint Committee performing election canvass even after the termination of congress’
session is constitutional
Ruling: Yes
Sec. 15. Art VI - The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such
number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time. Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress
did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both
Houses on June 11, 2004. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain
to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess
before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special
session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIII provides that "the term of office of the Senators shall be
six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 provides that"the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years. Consequently, there being no law to the
contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong
cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." The legislative functions of the Twelfth
Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11,
2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions. In fact, the joint public session of both
Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII to canvass the
votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and VP has not, and cannot, adjourn
sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board
of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio . Its membership may change,
but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth
Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim
the duly elected President and VP, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as
well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of
authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio.

KAHIT NA NAG ADJOURN NA CAN CONTINUE TO PERFORM CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF CANVASSING

THE PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRES RESULTS WITHOUT THE NEED TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION BY
THE PRESIDENT. THE JOINT PUBLIC SESSION OF CONGRESS CANNOT ADJOURN UNTIL IT HAS
ACCOMPLISHED ITS CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED TASKS

Term of office: Privileges

OSMENA V. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates the
Constitution:

1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized
national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;

2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent
provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their
successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provision) of the Constitution;

3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure
of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution;

4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential
and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title “Commission on
Elections” of the Constitution;

5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to
synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of
May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local
elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the
Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the
Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort
can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.

On the other hand, the Sol Gen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this petition arguing that
the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack legal standing to file the petition and
what they are asking for is an advisory opinion from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to
resolve. On the merits, the Sol Gen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of
legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the
Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.

POSTPONE DAW TO SYNCHRONIZE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS-VALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE

POWER DAW

PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the instant petition?

HELD: Yes.

What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to SolGen’s
contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within the Court’s power considering the expanded jurisdiction
conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by
any branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the challenge to the petitioner’s standing,
the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have no legal standing, the Court has the power to
brush aside technicalities considered the “transcendental importance” of the issue being raised herein.

MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?

HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987
Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local elections. The said law, on
the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating that there be
two separate elections in 1992. The term of “synchronization” in the mentioned
constitutional provision was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously
since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or
occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every
three years.

CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS IS VIOLATED

R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the local
official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of
RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall
serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. The Supreme Court,
quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states that “it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term
of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where
the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution
fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the
office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time”.

R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution which fixed the
term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If the local
election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will
be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995,
not three years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing the campaign
period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of
election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective provincial, city and
municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.

Term of office: Privileges

FORBES V. CHUOCO TIACO

Forbes, Harding, Trowbridge vs. Chuoco Tiaco, Crossfiled Presidential immunity from suit; president
is immune from civil liability and may not be sued during his tenure.
Facts: This is an original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition against the
Hon. A. S. Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, to prohibit
him from taking or continuing jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and PENDING before him in
which Chuoco Tiaco (respondent herein) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron Forbes, J. E. Harding, and C. R.
Trowbridge (petitioners herein) are defendants. The plaintiffs are W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands and CHIEF OF POLICE J. E. Harding and CHIEF OF THE SECRET SERVICE
of the city of Manila C. R. Trowbridge. Defendant A. S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila. Defendant Chuoco Tiaco is a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a
resident of the Philippine Islands for the last 35 years having a family in the country and some
properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a case for DAMAGES (monetary) alleging that defendants
forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and forcibly prevented his return for some months
in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to remain in the Philippine
Islands as established by law. Crossfield issued an INHIBITION against Forbes et al from spelling or
deporting or threatening to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco. Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for
writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was
carried out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the
Chinese government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of
War. The complaints were demurred to, but the Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the
prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined to join in the applications
for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs
have been deprived of liberty without due process of law.

Issue: WON the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action.

Ruling: The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no
authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he
will, unimpeded and restrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the
execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly
free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the
executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence.
On the contrary, it means, simply, that THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, LIKE THE JUDGES OF THE COURTS
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE, MAY NOT BE PERSONALLY MULCTED IN CIVIL
DAMAGES FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EXECUTED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
OFFICIAL DUTIES. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly
presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General
illegal and void place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived of his
liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured every person, however humble or of
whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest
authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is to mulct the Governor-General
personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a
member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it. Neither does
this principle of non-liability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation
to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he
acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have
exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. WHAT IS HELD
HERE IS THAT HE WILL BE PROTECTED FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES NOT ONLY WHEN HE
ACTS WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY, BUT ALSO WHEN HE IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY, PROVIDED HE ACTUALLY
USED DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT, THAT IS, THE JUDICIAL FACULTY, IN DETERMINING WHETHER HE
HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT OR NOT. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the
question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his
authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but
he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ
over its determination. In such a case, he acts, not as Governor-General, but as a private
individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.

Term of office: Privileges

 IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.
 
R E S O L U T IO N
PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first
paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30,
1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on
the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision “is not clear” as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court “to declare
and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of
ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to,…”
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for cause of action.
Prescinding from petitioner’s lack of personality to sue or to bring this action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43
SCRA 677), it is elementary that this Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the incumbent President of the
Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino, and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure.
The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner’s allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of
the aforequoted provision is manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to incumbent President Corazon C.
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension
of their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of elections . Hence, the second
paragraph of the cited section provides for the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first
regular elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986 Constitution. In previous cases,
the legitimacy of the government of President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned
with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The said cases were
dismissed outright by this court which held that:
Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of
the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted
the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so
that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic
under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748 [Lawyers League for a
Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.]; G.R. No. 73972 [People’s Crusade for
Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton
U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis mutandis, there
can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the
incumbent and legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Term of office: Privileges

SOLIVEN, petitioner VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, respondent

167 SCRA 393
Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by
the then president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.
Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity
from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction
and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a
president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
liable for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court’s jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President’s prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by
the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines,
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a
complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on
April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of
law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
 Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the
judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines
for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran,
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness
stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's
time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege
as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a
defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect"
on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused
their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed
for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions
Term of office: Privileges

Estrada vs Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2,
2001
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling,
and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment
proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a
result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out
and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and
local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC
declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his
post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th
President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for
prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any
further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for
judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether or not Estrada resigned as President.
3. Whether or not Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. Whether or not the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. Whether or not the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:
1. Political questions – “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:

EDSA I EDSA II
Exercise of the people power of revolution Exercise of the people power of freedom of
which overthrew the whole government. speech and freedom of assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances
which only affected the office of the President.
Extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the Intra constitutional and the resignation of the
new government that resulted from it cannot sitting President that it caused and the
be the subject of judicial review. succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review.
Presented a political question Involves legal questions

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution
require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II,
and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The
issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing

material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañang Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
 1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he
was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before,
during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR
No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is
clear is that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in
that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the
Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he
did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder
which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts
of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as
such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said
that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that
the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of
the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should
be more concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

Term of office: Privileges

 GLORIA V CA
Facts
Respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City in
1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was reassigned as
Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994
Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his
reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment is
violative of Icasiano’s right to security of tenure. No period is fixed. No objective or purpose, from
which the temporariness of the assignment may be inferred, is set. In fact, the recommendation of
respondent Secretary Gloria to the President that the position of superintendent of MIST 'will best fit
his (petitioner's) qualifications and experience.' implies that the proposed reassignment will be
indefinite."||| 
The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks an act
of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Issue: WON filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit
Ruling: NO
Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an
act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

Petitioners' contention is untenable.The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the
President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is
grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

||| Petitioners' submission that the petition of private respondent with the Court of Appeals is improper
for failing to show that petitioners constituted themselves into a "court" conducting a "proceeding" and
for failing to show that any of the petitioners acted beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of their
judicial or ministerial functions, is barren of merit.
Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears
to be indefinite." The same can be inferred from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President
Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications
and experience" being "an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that
subject reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for
the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to
show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the part of
petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration.

Term of office: Privileges

Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita

Facts:

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci
tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said
anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued
invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as
resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent
a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly
and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took
effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff
are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be
determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then
invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2
military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws.
Issue:

W/N Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

Held:

The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO
464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied.  In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.  A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with
the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry.  The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the
House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.  
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.   One specifically relates
to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may
be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.  Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under
Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.  When Congress
exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege.  They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. 
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power
of impeachment.   It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and
the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a
long-standing custom.   The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section
1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face.  For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the
question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.  Congress is not bound
in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by
the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes
which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom,
as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of
duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress
may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault
Term of office: Privileges

Neri vs. Senate Committee

Facts:

In April 2007, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the
National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16
Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed
various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joey De Venecia issued a statement
that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push
the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he
refused to answer the (3) questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita (Exec. Sec.) sent
a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that
the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.

Issue:

Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

Held:

The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential
communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before
the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,  (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it,  and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result,
the Senate cited him for contempt.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege.  It
pertains to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making
and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
foreign relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1)      The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential  and non-delegable presidential
power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.  
2)         The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself.  The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3)         The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. - there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. 

Prohibitions/Inhibitions

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN et al . 402 SCRA 84(2003)

Republic v. Sandiganbayan GR. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 EN BANC Corona, J. “The President—
Privileges and Salary”

Facts: • Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 13791. o declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M deposited
in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.
The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss
banks.
In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes
which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries2 3 4 5, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines,
now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. • Before the case
was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global
settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. o The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements
sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by
the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of
its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fiftysix Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million)
belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." •
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
Agreements. • In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion
for summary judgment. o "The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that
the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the
record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for
the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our
judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis." • The Republic filed the petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of
Sections 26 and 37 of RA 1379.

HELD: • RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired,
hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary
and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. o The following facts must be established in
order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public
officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise,
and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly
disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. (3) that the said amount is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and
the income from legitimately acquired property. • The Republic was able to establish a prima facie
case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds pursuant to RA 1379. o Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were
public officers. o Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos had acquired and owned properties during their term of
office, as evidenced by their admittance regarding the ownership of the Swiss accounts. o The Swiss
accounts of the Marcoses had balances amounting to US $356 million, a figure beyond the aggregate
legitimate income of $304,372.43. • The Petition was granted. • The Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated
aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST) •

Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure,
hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they
practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any
business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation. •

Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court
inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or Government, or any subdivision, agency, any
government owned or controlled office. He shall not intervene in any government for his pecuniary
benefit. • special privilege granted by the or instrumentality thereof including corporation during his
term of matter before any office of the Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the
Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as
counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession,
and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.

1 An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor. Paragraph 4 of the petition
for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served
without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the
Philippines from 1 December 1965 to 25 February 1986. 2 Paragraph 5 of the petition as to the
personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human
Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986. 3 4 Paragraph 11 of the petition as to the Official
Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966
to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former First
Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986
was P75,000 a year xxx. Respondent Mrs. Marcos admitted in Paragraph 10 of her answer the
allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of
Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos. That the said amount totaled to P2,319,583.33 or $304,372.43.
6 Section 2. Filing of petition. – Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. 5 7 Information that
should be included in the Petition 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Prohibitions/Inhibitions

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

Facts:

Declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.

Aquino

"SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the

Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive

Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the

government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor;

Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or

bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

"SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled

corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either

be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary."

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their

undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to

their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,

Article VII

"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants

shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during

their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,

participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or

special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,

including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid

conflict of interest in the conduct of their office."

then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez Opinion No. 73 declaring that Cabinet members, their

deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including
membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the

Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio member of the Judicial

and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by

the primary functions of their respective positions;

The disagreement betw een petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the

exception.

Issue:

petitioner’s contention: Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this

Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the

Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet

under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-

officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1)

respondents contention: Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless

otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2),

Article IX-B insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.

Held:

We rule in the negative.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under

consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind

the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or

remedied.

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under

consideration

The practice of designating mentioned members as members of the governing bodies or boards of

various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-ow ned and controlled

corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by

former President Ferdinand E. Marcos

This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by

unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment

The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the

Marcos regime.

the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and

his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is

concerned.

"(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,

unless otherw ise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their

tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in

the Government."

"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VI I cannot possibly refer to the

broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to

be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a

particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great

purposes of the instrument.

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition

The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to

refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being

appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in

those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice

beingex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. llcd

W HEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order

No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
Prohibitions/Inhibitions

Funa vs Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the
designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in
this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the
appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the
relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the
present petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is
nothing left to enjoin.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position
of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the
constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that
he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such
illegal act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In
the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President
shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office
of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the
disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is not qualified by the
phrase "in the Government" unlike in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the Government"; and when
compared with other officials and employees such as members of the armed forces and civil service
employees, we concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to
lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in
the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-
President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting
as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-
in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her
position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for
being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.

Prohibitions/Inhibitions

Funa vs Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

FACTS:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the Acting
Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of
Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when
the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform
the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent designations
were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple offices at the same
time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received
salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting Secretary
of Justice.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Agra’s designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
2. Whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the “hold-over principle”
3. Whether or not the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex officio
capacity in relation to the other

RULING:
1. No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of
the 1987 Constitution.

It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13

plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
2. No. Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by
which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the
holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.
 Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in
his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify
his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting
Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other
office was “allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.” To claim the exemption of
his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he
needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
3. No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary
functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the
DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that
the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor
General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment,
rank, prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the
Court of Appeals.

Prohibitions/Inhibitions

National Amnesty Commission vs. Commission on Audit

Facts:

Petitioner NAC is a government agency created through Proclamation No. 347 and was tasked to
receive, process, and review amnesty applications. It is composed of 7 members. Amongst them are
(3) Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.

It appeared that after personally attending the initial NAC meeting, the 3 ex officio members turned
over their responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria. NAC resident auditor
disallowed such payments. Likewise, the National Government Audit Office (NGAO) upheld the
auditor’s order and ordered the Notices of Disallowance.

Meanwhile, the NAC passed AO No. 2 (the new IRR for Proc. No. 347) which provides:
“The ex-officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives
shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by
law”

Petitioner invoked AO No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of resident auditor and the NGAO in
disallowing payment.

Issue:

1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing COA Memorandum No.
97-038 without the required notice and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code

2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion  disallowing the payment of honoraria on
the ground of lack of authority of representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex officio
members

3. Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to allowances?

Held:
1. No.  COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and effectivity, the publication
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:

[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the

exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative regulation or letter of
instruction which does not need publication to be effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or
regulation of a statute but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing
prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official
family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and
receiving double compensation.

2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance
whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.

The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but

by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.

There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is

the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a
given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.

Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not
entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to claim
the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.

In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who
hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because
their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices.
Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in
fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium,
allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld COA's disallowance of the payment
of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or alternates.
The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio
member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with equal
force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional
compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted.
3.  No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were not
appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they are not entitled to something
their own principals are prohibited from receiving. 

Prohibitions/Inhibitions

Bitonio vs. Commission on Audit

Facts:
Petitioner Bitonio was appointed the Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of
Labor and Employment.

Acting Secretary Brillantes of the DOLE designated the petitioner to be the DOLE representative in
the Board of Directors of PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone Authority). Such designation was in
pursuance to RA 7916 otherwise known as Special Economic Zone Act. RA 7916 provides that the
Board shall be composed of the Director General as ex-officio chairman and 8 members which are “the
secretaries or their representatives” of different departments of the government (DTI, DOF, DILG, etc).

RA 7916 provides that the Members of the Board shall receive per diem of not less than the amount
equivalent to the representation and transportation allowances of the members of the Board….

As representative of the DOLE, Bitonio was receiving per diem for every board meeting he attended.
After post audit of the COA, the payment of per diems to the petitioner was disallowed.

The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices of Disallowance as follows:

“Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their
primary office and to receive compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary…”

Issue:

W/N the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the
PEZA BOD meetings as representative of DOLE Secretary

Held:

Yes. COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of the Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary where the Court declared EO 284 allowing gov’t officials to hold multiple offices
in the gov’t, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Asst. Secretaries,
are prohibited to hold other officers or positions in the gov’t in addition to their primary positions and
to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Ruling
was in conformity with Section 13, Article 7.

Petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of
the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his
additional office or employment, such prohibition shall likewise apply to petitioner Bitonio who sat in
the BOD only in behalf of the Sec. of Labor.

RA 7916 was later amended by RA 8748, deleting the option for designating a representative to the
Board and the payment of per diems was likewise deleted considering that such stipulation was clearly
in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution.

Succession
ESTRADA V MACAPAGAL ARROYO
Facts
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that
he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as
“Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy
across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case
against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed,
with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA.On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television,
calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections
on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”
Issue: won Arroyo is only an acting president
Ruling: No
The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the
nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed  HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of
Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the
inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of
inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely
to Congress by constitutional fiat.  In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.