THE GOOD AS SELF-DIFFUSIVE IN THOMAS AQUINAS

Bernhard-Thomas Blankenhorn, O.P.

Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
Berkeley, California

SUMMARY

This essay considers Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of the good as self-diffusive (bonum diffusivum sui) in light of W.
Norris Clarke's and Norman Kretzmann's recent work on the subject. Clarke has argued that this teaching leads to
the relationality of all being, both created and divine. Kretzmann has maintained that Thomas' adoption of the
Neoplatonic doctrine bonum diffusivum sui should have led him to posit the necessity of God's creative act. A
close reading of Thomas' writings on the good as self-diffusive confirm the first part of Clarke's interpretation,
showing the rich potential of Thomas' thought for the contemporary project that seeks to emphasize the human
person as a being-in-relation. However, Thomas' subordination of the good as self-diffusive to the notion of the
good as final cause works against Clarke's attempt to predicate the attribute "relationality" of the divine being. At
the same time, this move allows Thomas to maintain both the self-diffusive character of God's goodness
and God's creative act as a free decision.

Thomas Aquinas' notion of the good as self-diffusive received little attention in the

philosophical and theological literature of the 20th century. However, the issue has recently

resurfaced, thanks to W. Norris Clarke and the late Norman Kretzmann. It is in light of the their

work that this essay will attempt a systematic presentation and interpretation of Thomas Aquinas'

teaching on bonum diffusivum sui, showing that is leads to the relationality of all created being

(esse) but not to the relationality of the divine being, the latter being so partly because of

Thomas’ subordination of the good as self-diffusive to the good as final cause, which allows him

to consistently maintain both the self-diffusive character of the divine good and the free divine

choice to create. Since this study of bonum diffusivum sui in Thomas is guided by the arguments

that Clarke and Kretzmann raise, we will take a brief look at their work on this issue before

proceeding to a detailed analysis of Thomas Aquinas' thought.

1
I. W. NORRIS CLARKE AND NORMAN KRETZMANN ON BONUM DIFFUSIVUM SUI

Clarke raised this issue about ten years ago in an article of the American section of

Communio, one that also launched an extensive debate on relationality and receptivity in God

and created beings among Clarke, David Schindler, George Blair, and Steven Long. 1 Clarke's

article brings up a number of themes related to our own. First, he builds on Etienne Gilson's

interpretation of Thomas' esse in Thomas Aquinas as active and dynamic. Clarke sees the roots

for this view of being in Thomas' adoption of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the good as self-

diffusive, so that esse has a natural dynamism toward action and self-communication.2 Second,

Clarke maintains that the corollary of this notion of being is the network of relations that is

created as beings act and are acted upon by one another, leading to a concept of being as

relational, a relationality which has its roots in the trinitarian life of God.3 Clarke concludes with

two major problems that this raises. If being is naturally active and self-communicative, then it

seems that God necessarily communicates himself and so must create. Second, a notion of being

as relational seems to lead to a philosophical deduction of the Trinity.4 Clarke's answer to these

is highly significant. He chides Thomas for being too cautious in maintaining the free character

of God's creative act and instead holds for a kind of inevitable creation, though no one universe

is necessarily produced by God.5 As for the second objection, Clarke suggests that one might

1
Clarke, W. Norris, S.J., "Person, Being, and St. Thomas," Communio 19 (Winter 1992), 601-18, reprinted
in Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, 211-227. For the
debate, see Schindler, David L., "Norris Clarke on Person, Being, and St. Thomas," Communio 20 (Fall 1993): 580-
592; Clarke, W. Norris, S.J., "Response to David Schindler's Comments," Communio 20 (Fall 1993): 593-8; Long,
Steven, "Divine and Creaturely 'Receptivity': The Search for a Middle Term," Communio 21 (Spring 1994): 151-
161; Blair, George A., "On Esse and Relation," Communio 21 (Spring 1994): 162-4; Clarke, W. Norris, S.J.,
"Response to Long's Comment," Communio 21 (Spring 1994): 165-169; idem, "Response to Blair's Comments,"
Communio 21 (Spring 1994): 170-1; Schindler, David L., "The Person: Philosophy, Theology, and Receptivity,"
Communio 21 (Spring 1994): 172-190; Long, Steven, "Personal Receptivity and Act: A Thomistic Critique," The
Thomist 61 (January 1997): 1-31.
2
ibid., 212-5.
3
ibid., 216.
4
ibid., 222.
5
ibid., 224-6.

2
posit a philosophical deduction of some kind of interpersonal relation on the divine level, but

since one cannot deduce three persons, the Trinity is still only known by faith.6

But Clarke modified his position in the face of some sharp critique that emerged from the

above-mentioned debate, specifically from George Blair. Blair maintains that the highest level

of activity is immanent, so that the notion of esse as active does not lead to the conclusion that

esse is relational. Second, Blair argues that a divine esse that is necessarily active and therefore

necessarily creates is incomplete without creation, which contradicts divine transcendence and

the fact that the Creator-creature relationship is only real on the created end of the pole, that is is

only a one-term relation.7

Clarke tried to overcome Blair's objections with the following modifications in his

position. He admits that the necessity of God's creative act goes against Christian doctrine and

sound metaphysics. Second, he suggests that the solution to the dilemma of self-communicating

being and a free decision to create is solved in theology by turning to the internal communication

of the Trinity.8 Through his interpretation of bonum diffusivum sui, he has concluded that all

being, both created and divine, is relational. But the divine being can only be relational if it

creates or if it consists of multiple persons. Thus, Clarke's final position retains the dilemma

posited in the earlier article, that the doctrine of bonum diffusivum sui leads either to necessary

creation or philosophical knowledge of multiple divine persons. Another problem behind the

position of necessary creation the introduction of a two-term relation between God and creation,

as Blair pointed out. Clarke does not see this as a difficulty because he has elsewhere argued

precisely for such a correction of Thomistic metaphysics and theology.9 This stance is also

6
ibid., 227.
7
Blair, "On Esse and Relation," 162-3.
8
Clarke, "Response to Blair's Comment," 170.
9
See Clarke, W. Norris, S.J., "A New Look at the Immutability of God," Explorations in Metaphysics, 183-210.

3
highly significant for our topic, since the notion of the good is intimately connected to that of

fulfillment and completion, and a fully actualized, completed being apparently has nothing to

gain from a real relationship with another being.

Clarke's analysis is creative and stimulating, and it leaves us with the following questions

with which we can approach Thomas' thought on bonum diffusivum sui. How can we reconcile

the self-diffusion of goodness and the divine freedom to create? Does the doctrine of the good as

self-diffusive lead to the notion of being as relational? Does this mean that God's being is

relational? If God's being is relational, do we have to posit a philosophical deduction of multiple

divine persons? Or do we have to maintain that God is really related to creation?

Norman Kretzmann has written extensively on the doctrine of creation, especially as it is

found in Thomas Aquinas. He attempts to correct Thomas' position, maintaining that one should

hold for a God who freely and necessarily wills creation just as he freely yet necessarily wills his

own goodness. This is because Thomas leaves the following problems unresolved. The first and

main difficulty is a misappropriation of the Platonic doctrine of the good as self-diffusive.

Following the work of J. Peghaire, Kretzmann claims that Aquinas' predecessors unanimously

recognized that the principle bonum diffusivum sui expresses the productive side of goodness, so

that Aquinas' attempt to subsume it under final causality, an attempt that is so extreme that

bonum diffusivum sui ends up expressing only the attractive side of goodness, is novel, counter-

intuitive, and has nothing to recommend it. Second, Kretzmann does not think that the divinity's

internal, triune diffusion can satisfy the consequences of this principle, since it calls for an

external diffusion.10 Third, he thinks that Thomas falls into self-contradictions, so that Thomas

rejects the notion of bonum diffusivum sui in QD De Potentia (DP) q. 3, a. 15, ad 12, and

4
qualifies goodness as "suited" to God instead of recognizing that it is essential to God in Summa

Contra Gentiles (SCG) I, 37.11 Finally, Kretzmann thinks that Thomas himself suggests God's

necessary diffusion in the creative act in QD De Veritate (DV) q. 24, a. 3, SCG, I, 75 and Summa

Theologiae (ST) I, q. 19, a. 2.12

Kretzmann's work leaves us with the following questions. Is Thomas' subordination of

the good as self-diffusive to the good as final cause so counter-intuitive? Is that subordination as

exclusive as Kretzmann claims? Does it really have no basis in the Neoplatonic tradition, and

does it need such a foundation? Does Thomas contradict himself, rejecting the diffusive side of

goodness, and even hint at the necessity of creation?

We can see very similar concerns in Clarke and Kretzmann. Their questions will give us

a hermeneutic with which to approach the key passages on the good as self-diffusive in Thomas

Aquinas. We will take a three-fold approach to this problem. First, we will briefly consider the

good as an end. This will provide the necessary context for the second part, the good as self-

diffusive in general. Third, we will analyze the place of this doctrine in the outpouring of divine

goodness in the act of creation. Our aim is to show that Thomas' teaching on the good can

withstand the objections that Clarke and Kretzmann raise, while confirming Clarke's creative

insight into the relational character of all created being.

II. THE GOOD AS THE END OF ALL THINGS

We must first consider Thomas' understanding of the good as end, as final cause, because

this is his primary definition of the good.

10
Kretzmann, Norman, "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?" Being
and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. Scott MacDonald, Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1991, 219-220.
11
ibid., 217-9.

5
 The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear that a thing is
desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.13

Thomas' starting point is an axiom universally accepted in his day: the good is what all desire.

But the axiom is then expanded to "anything is desired only as a good." Not only is the good

desired by all, whatever is desired by anyone is only desired insofar as it is a real or perceived

good. Thomas then adds the notion of perfection. Each thing naturally desires its perfection.

Every being desires existence as well as the operation it was made for. Human beings desire to

understand, bees desire to make honey and pollinate flowers, etc.

He proceeds from perfection to posit actuality in the notion of the good: ". . . all desire

their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual."14 The perfection of

anything is directly tied to its actuality. The perfection of every motion is its completion. The

perfection of every potency is act. Act is perfection. Because perfection is tied to actuality, and

because anything is good insofar as it is perfect, anything is good insofar as it is actual. The

ultimate actuality is esse, to be, the substantial existence of an individual thing, or even the

existence of an accidental being: "But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is

clear that a thing is good so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual . . ."15

12
ibid., 219, 222-3; idem, The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas' Natural Theology in SUMMA CONTRA
GENTILES I, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 223-5.
13
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Allen, Texas:
Christian Classics, 1981, I, q. 5, a. 1 (Rome: Marietti, 1952: "Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit
appetibile: unde Philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit quod bonum est 'quod omnia appetunt.' Manifestum est autem quod
unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum: nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem.").
14
ibid. (". . . omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum
est actu.").
15
ibid. ("Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu: unde manifestum est quod
intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens: esse enim est actualitas omnis rei . . ."). I substituted "good" where
the English Fathers translated "perfect." My translation follows the two best Latin versions of the text, the 1952
Marietti edition and the 1962 Editiones Paulinae.

6
In the following ST article, Thomas is more emphatic: "And thus nothing can be desired except

being . . ."16

Thomas has shown how the meaning of "the good" involves desirable, perfection,

actuality, and being. He then adds the notion of finality: "Since goodness is that which all

things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect

of an end."17 If something is desired, it is desired for an end, as a final cause. Every desire has a

direction, a purpose: the joy of friendship or the pleasure of good food. Every motion is for a

purpose, its actualization, the rest of the moving object.

Thomas clearly gives the definition of the good as end primacy:

First of all and principally, therefore, a being capable of perfecting another after the
manner of an end is called good; but secondarily something is called good which leads to
an end . . .18

It is important to keep this notion of the good as final cause in the background of our

consideration of bonum diffusivum sui, since Thomas will subordinate the latter to the former.

The principle "the good is self-diffusive" will be a secondary explication of the good.

III. THE GOOD AS SELF-DIFFUSIVE IN GENERAL

We now have the necessary context to consider Thomas' general doctrine of the good as

self-diffusive. Perhaps Thomas' richest text on the good as act and as active is SCG, I, 37, which

considers the goodness of God:

Furthermore, "the good is that which all things desire." The Philosopher introduces this
remark as a "felicitous saying" in Ethics I. But all things, each according to its mode,

16
ST, I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4 ("Et sic nihil est appetibile nisi ens . . .").
17
ST, I, q. 5, a. 4 (". . . cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifestum
est quod bonum rationem finis importat.").
18
Thomas Aquinas, Truth, transl. Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1954, q. 21, a.1 (QD
de Veritate, Leonine Edition, Vol. 22.3, Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976: "Sic ergo primo et principaliter
dicitur bonum ens perfectivum alterius per modum finis; sed secundario dicitur aliquid bonum quod est ductivum in
finem . . .".

7
 desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact that each thing according to its nature resists
corruption. To be in act, therefore, constitutes the nature of the good . . .
Moreover, the communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. This
is evident from the very nature and definition of the good. By nature, the good of each
thing is its act and perfection. Now each thing acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it
diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of a being's perfection
that it "can produce its like," as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteorologica IV.
Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the end,
which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that the good is diffusive of
itself and of being.19

While this chapter of the SCG deals directly with God's goodness, it presents principles that we

can use to understand how Thomas sees the good as act in creatures as well. The act of anything

is good because it is desired as perfective of the being. The ultimate act of anything is its esse,

its substantial perfection. But esse is not simply the existence of a being. Rather esse is that by

which every living substance can and will act or operate in some way. A plant acts by existing

and living, an irrational animal by existing, living, and sensing, a human person by existing,

living, sensing, understanding and willing. In finite being esse is the substantial act, which is the

absolute existence of the thing, and esse is that by which accidental acts such as operations are

possible.

Essences that include the attribute "living" are principles of potential operators and

become principles of actual operators through the actualization of the whole essence by esse.

We may even speak of non-living substances as acting. For Thomas, an example of this would

be for a rock to fall. While the extension of action to non-living beings may seem difficult to

19
Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles), Book 1: God, transl.
Anton C. Pegis, New York: Hanover House, 1955, c. 37 ( Summa Contra Gentiles, vol. II, Rome: Marietti, 1961, I,
c. 37, §§306-7: "'Bonum est quod omnia appetunt,' ut Philosophus 'optime dictum' introducit, I Ethicorum. Omnia
autem appetunt esse actu secundum suum modum: quod patet ex hoc quod unumquodque secundum naturam suam
repugnat corruptioni. Esse igitur actu boni rationem constituit . . . Amplius. Communicatio esse et bonitatis ex
bonitate procedit. Quod quidem patet et ex ipsa natura boni, et ex eius ratione. Naturaliter enim bonum
uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio eius. Unumquodque autem ex hoc agit quod actu est. Agendo autem esse et
bonitatem in alia diffundit. Unde et signum perfectionis est alicuius quod 'simile possit producere,' ut patet per
Philosophum in IV Meteororum. Ratio vero boni est ex hoc quod est appetibile. Quod est finis. Qui etiam movet
agentem ad agendum. Propter quod dicitur bonum esse 'diffusivum sui et esse.'").

8
maintain, our understanding of the atomic structure of the universe points to an activity in all

substances. Overall, we can say that esse is a dynamic principle, and action necessarily follows

upon this substantial act of existing. In God, these are identical, so that his esse is his action.

Furthermore, something acts to the extent that it is good. God is infinitely good and

therefore acts infinitely. A finite being acts substantially through the goodness that arises from

its participation in esse. The more intensely a being participates esse, the more substantial

goodness it possesses, the more intense is its substantial act. A greater actuality of esse means a

greater ability to operate, since the extent of operation increases as one moves up the great chain

of being, a hierarchy which is determined by degrees of participation in esse. Participation in

esse determines the ability to act and operate. This is what it means to say that anything acts

insofar as it is in act. And to act means that one shares goodness and being: ". . . in acting a

being diffuses being and goodness to other things." To share being by action means to announce

one's existence, and in this (metaphorical) sense a being's substantial esse is poured out. Living

beings can also be said to share their substantial being through their generative acts, producing

new offspring which possess substantial being through that generation (though other causes are

also required to complete some generations, such as God's creation of the rational soul in human

generation). The diffusion of goodness involves imparting accidental being through operations

as well: the communication of truth, or willing the good for another person.

But in creatures, action does not necessarily diffuse only being and goodness into

another. Action can be harmful or purely selfish. Evil acts still display some goodness, since

operation is a sign of substantial being and life, which are good. Thus, something necessarily

acts substantially insofar as it is in substantial act, participating in esse. But an intelligent being

does not necessarily act accidentally to the exact degree that it possesses accidental act, does not

9
necessarily share all of the truth he/she knows or the goodness he/she possesses. Rather, the

principle "everything acts insofar as it is in act" can be applied to the ability of creatures to share

accidental being. This ability is only infinite in God.

But we can say that actuality necessitates action. Esse, which is good as perfective and

desired, can be said to be diffusive of itself in that esse necessitates action. In every finite being

esse naturally flows over into action ad extra. Each being must be active to the extent that it

possesses the actuality of esse. This claim can be made because every action is for an end, a

good. A created agent recognizes an external good, desires it, and moves toward it. This motion

is an action. But that action itself is the diffusion of goodness and being. The external good

recognized may be the actor's own perfection reached simply through acting. The created esse of

a living being necessarily pours over into action ad extra because it is an incomplete good,

recognizing and moved by exterior goods proper to it, goods which it does not yet possess or

possess fully. The desire and action that are the response to extrinsic goods mean that the agent's

own good is diffused as it moves toward another good. So when Thomas says that the good is

diffusive of itself on account of an end which moves an agent toward acting, he does not mean

that the good is diffusive simply as a final cause moves. The good is also diffusive because of an

end in that the action which responds to the end is itself a diffusion of goodness. Kretzmann's

objection, that for Thomas bonum diffusivum sui exclusively expresses the attractive side of

goodness can be overcome by a close reading of SCG, I, 37.

Thus, at least on the creaturely level, esse can be said to be relational in that it necessarily

pours over into action ad extra, putting a being into relationship with the world around it, even

though that action may be less perfect than it can be. The self-diffusiveness of esse means that

every created being necessarily affects its exterior reality in some way. This is the metaphysical

10
foundation for the great interconnectedness of the universe, of the earth's environment, of human

communities. God's esse is also in some way necessarily active, as we will see shortly.

No finite substance can isolate itself in existence, remaining within itself. Every created

substance necessarily reveals itself through action, through operation.20 But not every particular

action of a finite being must occur:

Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of
the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in
accordance with its form.21

Notice that Thomas speaks about form's inclination to action, and form's tending into what

belongs to it. Substantial form tends to overflow into operation, so that God must tend toward

his own goodness without fail, while each finite being must also tend toward the good which

belongs to it. The good that is proper to human beings is truth, since their form is that of an

intellective soul. Every human person naturally desires truth, but not all desire it with equal

intensity, nor do all human beings want to share the truth that they do possess with the same

fervor. Nor does God necessarily tend toward every good, since he is infinitely good without

finite goods. The language of the inclination of form points out that not all action is a necessary

outpouring of or tending towards goodness, meaning some action is chosen and must not occur.

All finite goods give an agent an inclination towards action but do not always necessitate it.

Thomas is creating the metaphysical "space" for moral action in intelligent finite beings and for

the freedom of God's creative act.

20
A theme beautifully developed in W. Norris Clarke's, "To Be is to Be Substance-in-Relation,"
Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994,
102-122.
21
ST, I, q. 5, a. 5 ("Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid
huiusmodi: quia unumquodque, inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam
formam").

11
 Now Thomas goes further than simply positing the necessity of some activity for every

substantial being and an inclination towards action in the pursuit of finite goods. He maintains

that activity is the very purpose of substantial being:

Every substance exists for the sake of its operation.22

. . . the purpose of everything is its operation . . . as the matter is for the sake of the form,
so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act;
and thus operation is the end of the creature.23

At first, Thomas may seem to site this as a kind of unprovable axiom. But this doctrine is really

the result of his analysis of finite being. He posits esse as the one substantial act of being, to

which essence stands as potency to act. Every being has a single substantial act, to exist as

something. As for an actualized material essence, it contains an act-potency composition beyond

the esse-essentia composition: substantial form and prime matter. Substantial form is the "first

act" of the essence or thing. The form is that by which matter receives its esse. The substantial

act is esse coming to a thing through its substantial form. A thing's first act, substantial form, is

that by which it exists. By virtue of the esse it participates, a substance acts substantially.

All actions but the one substantial act of esse exercised through the substantial form

occur on the accidental level. This distinction offers rich insights into the concrete realization of

the diffusion of goodness on the created realm. The real distinction between substantial and

accidental acts that flow from (really distinct) powers ought to be considered as a preface to

Thomas' distinction between qualified and absolute goodness on the created realm. This takes us

to the metaphysical status of the operative powers of things, especially the potencies of the

rational soul. For Thomas Aquinas, the operative powers of any created being are on the

22
SCG, I, c. 45, (§387: "Omnis substantia est propter suam operationem.").
23
ST, I, q. 105, a. 5 (". . . omnis res sit propter suam operationem . . . sicut igitur materia est propter forma,
ita forma, quae est actus primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et sic operatio est finis rei
creatae.").

12
accidental plane, while the soul's powers are assigned a category between the substantial and the

accidental, that of proper accident. This position was fiercely opposed by Thomas' Franciscan

contemporaries and other prominent medieval thinkers like Henry of Ghent.24 Thomas uses

three key arguments to show the real distinction of the human soul's operative powers from the

substantial form or the soul's essence, each of which will also allow us to distinguish the

operative power of any created being from its essence. It is fitting that we focus on the

metaphysical status of the soul's potencies, since our study of bonum diffusivum sui on the

created realm will have great significance for the metaphysical structure of the human being.

First, there is a real distinction between the existence and operation of creatures, and this

necessitates a real distinction between essence and operative potencies. Diverse acts belong to

diverse principles, and an act is always proportioned to the thing of which it is an act, meaning a

potency which it actualizes. Every agent acts insofar as it is in act and every agent produces its

like. Every actualized essence must act insofar as it is in act, must act substantially. The

actuality of essence is esse and the actuality of an operative potency is operation. Now we

cannot equate the essence of the human being with the soul's essence, since the human being is

essentially soul and body. Rather, the soul's essence is that by which a human essence receives

its esse. It is that by which the human being acts substantially. The soul's essence is in act

substantially together with the matter it informs. The soul's essence must act insofar as it is in

act, act as the principle of esse for the entire human essence as long as the matter it informs

24
Künzle,Pius, O.P., Das Verhältnis der Seele zu ihren Potenzen: Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen
von Augustin bis und mit Thomas von Aquin, Universitatsverlag, Freiburg, Schweitz, 1956; For Bonaventure, see In
Primum Librum Sententiarum, Opera Omnia: vol.1, Studia et cura pp. Collegii a S. Bonaventura, Quaracchi, 1882,
d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3; idem, In Secundum Librum Sententiarum, Opera Omnia: vol.2, Studia et cura pp. Collegii a S.
Bonaventura, Quaracchi, 1885, d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1. For the thought of the influential Bonaventurian William de la
Mare, see his Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum, ed. Hans Kraml, Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der
Wissenschaft, Muenchen, Germany, 1989, d. 3, q. 7. For Henry of Ghent on the potencies of the soul, see his
Quodlibet III, q. 14, in Quodlibeta, vol. I, Louvain, Belgium: Bibliotheque S.J., 1961; On Henry of Ghent, see

13
retains an adequate disposition to the form. Thus the soul's essence is part of the "substantial

plane." Operations occur on the "accidental plane," and if the soul's essence were the direct

principle of particular actions, it would no longer be acting insofar as it is in act. When Thomas

posits this axiom, he means that every agent must act insofar as it is in act, that it must act on the

metaphysical plane that it is on (substantial or accidental). The adoption of the axiom "every

agent produces its like" in this case means that every agent produces its metaphysical like. So

using his esse-essentia distinction and an interpretation of two Aristotelian principles, Thomas

can show that the potencies of the soul must be really distinct from the soul's essence, and the

essence of every substance must be distinct from its operative powers.

Thomas' second argument is that the soul's potencies move one another, and so their acts

cannot have one identical immediate principle. It requires that Thomas assume the unicity of

form within the soul's essence. This means that the essence cannot move itself from potency to

act as an intellect moves the will or vice versa, because there is no principle left to distinguish

one part of the essence which is actual and another which is potential, as every motion requires

act and potency. Thus, if the potencies were identical with the soul, no potency could ever move

another, which clearly goes against common experience. A similar problem would arise in any

creature with powers that move one another.

Thomas' third argument is related to the first. The soul's essence can be called an act, and

this for three reasons. First, its very nature is to be the form of a body actualizing the body. The

soul has to be in act in order to carry this out. Second, as an immaterial essence it is naturally

immortal. Given that it is indirectly actualized by the act-of-being, esse, it will always exist,

because it contains no principle of corruption. It is not an unqualified pure act, because it is still

Kelley, Francis E., "Two Early English Thomists: Thomas Sutton and Robert of Orford vs. Henry of Ghent," The
Thomist 45 (July 1981): 371-380.

14
in potency to non-existence, since it depends on God's constant gift of esse. But while that gift is

given, the soul's essence is act. Thirdly, for Thomas the essence of the soul is a form. But it is

the very nature of form not to be a potency to another act (given that the form is actualized

through the esse) but to be the act of something else. To posit the soul's essence as an immediate

potency for the operations of the soul is to make an actualized form, whose nature it is to

actualize another, a potency, which includes the potency to receive, going against the very notion

of form. This presumes not only Thomas' rejection of universal hylomorphism but also his

unicity of substantial form in the human soul. Furthermore, because the soul's essence is act, if it

were the immediate principle of operation, it would always be operating. The soul does not

sometimes actualize the body while the human person is living, but always and at every moment

until the separation of body and soul in death. The only way to escape this dilemma is to posit

intermediary potencies as the immediate principles of operations. A similar solution would be

sought for the metaphysical structures of at least some rational creatures.25

Thomas integrates this doctrine of created powers as distinct from the essence of the

beings from which they flow and in which they exist, especially his teaching on the rational

soul's powers as really distinct from the soul's essence, into his metaphysics of the good.

Operation is the end of finite substantial being. Second act is the goal of first act, the purpose of

substantial form actualizing a thing, and therefore also the purpose of the substantial act of the

esse. Thomas expounds on this topic in DV:

From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good in a certain
sense, but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification.
Thus we do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain sense--inasmuch as
he is a man. But a just man we call good without further restriction. The reason for this
difference is this. A thing is called a being inasmuch as it is considered absolutely, but
good, as has already been made clear, in relation to other things. Now it is by its

25
Thomas Aquinas, QD de Spiritualibus Creaturis,in Leonine Edition, Vol. 24.2, Paris: Edition du Cerf,
2001, q. 11; cf. ST, I, q. 77, a. 1.

15
 essential principles that a thing is fully constituted in itself so that it subsists; but it is not
so perfectly constituted as to stand as it should in relation to everything outside itself
except by means of accidents added to the essence, because the operations by which one
thing is in some sense joined to another proceed from the essence through powers distinct
from it. Consequently nothing achieves goodness absolutely unless it is complete in both
its essential and its accidental principles. Any perfection which a creature has from its
essential and accidental principles combined, God has in its entirety by his one simple act
of being.26

Everything desires its perfection, desires actualization. But the operations of all finite beings

flow from accidental potencies distinct from the being's essence. There are accidental potencies

or principles in every finite being which are actualized through operations, not the substantial act

of esse. Each created being's substantial act, esse, actualizes the essence. Their accidental

potencies or powers actualize their esse concretely through operation. The full actualization of

those powers is the difference between any finite being's qualified good (its substantial act) and

its absolute good, between its substantial act and the completion of accidental potencies. Thus,

everything exists for the sake of operation because everything naturally desires its full perfection,

because every potency is completed by act. Operation is the good of every finite being. Since its

substantial potency (essence) is actualized through esse, its imperfection lies in the accidental

powers yet to be fully actualized. In human beings, these are above all the powers of the soul.

Thus, the reception and communication of the good through the accidental powers of a finite

26
DV, q. 21, a. 5 (". . . secundum substantialem bonitatem dicitur aliquid bonum secundum quid, secundum
vero accidentalem dicitur bonum simpliciter; unde hominem iniustum non dicimus bonum simpliciter sed secundum
quid, in quantum est homo; hominem vero iustum dicimus simpliciter bonum. Cuius diversitatis ista est ratio. Nam
unumquodque dicitur esse ens in quantum absolute consideratur, bonum vero, ut ex dictis patet, secundum
respectum ad alia. In se ipso autem aliquid perficitur ut subsistat per essentialia principia, sed ut debito modo se
habeat ad omnia quae sunt extra ipsum non perficitur, nisi mediantibus accidentibus superadditis essentiae, quia
operationes quibus unum alteri quodam modo coniungitur, ab essentia mediantibus virtutibus essentiae superadditis
progrediuntur; unde absolute bonitatem non obtinet nisi quod completum est et secundum substantialia et secundum
accidentalia principia. Quicquid autem creatura perfectionis habet ex essentialibus principiis et accidentalibus simul
coniunctis, hoc totum Deus habet per unum suum esse simplex . . ."); see also idem, An Exposition of the "On the
Hebdomads" of Boethius, transl. Janice L. Schultz, Edward A. Synan, Washington D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 2001, c. 4 (Exposito Libri de Hebdomadibus, Leonine Edition, Vol. 50, Paris: Edition du Cerf, 1992,
lect. 4, lines 146-157); idem, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (Summa Contra Gentiles), Book 3: Providence,
transl. Vernon J. Bourke, New York: Hanover House, 1956, c. 20 (vol. III, Rome: Marietti, 1961, bk. III, c. 20,
§2016), c. 64 (§2394); idem, In Divinis Nominibus, Rome: Marietti, 1950, c. 4, lect. 1, §269; ST, I, q. 6, a. 3.

16
being lead to the ultimate perfection of that being. The substantial esse of creatures naturally and

necessarily overflows into operation and attains its ultimate perfection through activity and

receptivity, an outpouring which is not temporally distinct from the first instance that the essence

is actualized by its esse. Because it exists in act, every finite being necessarily desires the good

that it does not yet have and shares the good which it does, at least in some limited fashion.

We can now synthesize Thomas' language about the inclination of form in ST, I, q. 5, a.

5, his doctrine of the operative powers of created being as accidents, and his teaching in DV q.

21, a. 5 on qualified and absolute goodness through an application of his notion of substantial

form as the intrinsic principle of goodness in things as found in DV q. 21, a. 4. That article has a

solution to a problem that Boethius had raised in his de Hebdomadibus involving the apparent

contradiction between created goodness as an attribute of all created being and the doctrine that

God alone is good through himself and not through participation. Boethius could not reconcile

these doctrines since he restricted participation to participation in accidents, leaving him with the

goodness of created beings, things that must be good by their very being since they are attracted

to the good (and like attracts like), as somehow good independent of the first Good who is God.

Thomas solves the problem by expanding the doctrine of participation to all perfections, so that

created beings also participate being and goodness and not just accidents. Thomas' solution in

DV q. 21, a. 4 posits substantial form as an intrinsic form for each substance and the principle of

the whole being's substantial yet participated goodness.

We can unfold a number of implications of Thomas' thought on intrinsic form as the

principle of goodness. Form's inclination comes from its status as a principle for esse or the

ultimate act of things. Yet this inclination can also be explained by the inherent goodness of

form.

17
 If, therefore, the first goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its
likeness upon the things produced; and so each thing will be called good by reason of an
inherent form because of the likeness of the highest good implanted in it, and also
because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar and effective cause of all created
goodness.27

Of course, form's status as an inherent principle of goodness is partially due to the esse which

actualizes the form and the whole being through the form. But beyond that, form bears a

similitude of the highest good. It is a reflection of the divine wisdom bringing intelligibility,

unity, and order to the whole being. The divine goodness shines forth through these and other

characteristics that the whole being shares in through the substantial form, so that these

perfections manifest goodness far beyond what sheer existence could display on its own. And as

a principle for goodness, form is a principle of diffusion, one concretized through operations that

are moving toward an end.

The dynamism of the potencies of beings, especially the powers of the human soul,

powers that are inclined toward actualization, is explained through the diffusion of goodness that

flows through them from the substantial form. Thus, the goodness of the substantial form is the

immediate effective source or principle for the drive towards fulfillment in accidental powers.

Furthermore, even though the substantial form is distinct from the potencies of the soul, and even

though substantial form already actualizes matter, there is a drive towards actuality in the form

that pours forth necessarily through external action. The operative potencies of beings are not

actualized solely through esse and substantial form but through a synthesis of these acts and the

accidental accidents that we call operations. The goodness of the substantial form can only

manifest itself through operation, and its like can only be produced through the mediation of

accidental acts. There is a sense in which the substantial form, even as it actualizes the

27
DV, q. 21, a. 4 ("Unde si prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonorum, oportet quod similitudinem suam
imprimat in rebus effectis, et sic unumquodque dicetur bonum sicut forma inhaerente per similitudinem summi boni

18
substance, is incomplete without operation. The whole being is ordered towards a perfection that

it does not yet possess, and yet it already has being and goodness that is active. The drive for

perfection and the self-expression of act converge.

The real distinction of powers from their substance's essence and substantial form also

helps to explain the limitation on this diffusion of goodness immediately rooted in substantial

form. Goodness must pour forth in an accidental mode through certain powers in particular

modes, such as sensing or knowing. The status of accidental potencies as really distinct powers

that are unactualized without gradual and continual interaction with the world means that the

diffusion of goodness from the substantial form through operations can only take on certain

grades of intensity based on the particular status of the power through which the being operates.

A being's knowledge that can be imparted or the intellectual and sensual action a being exerts in

the acquisition of knowledge is conditioned by the status of its intellectual and sense powers, by

the current extent of their actualization. So the real distinction of powers from their substance's

essence and substantial form means that, on the created realm, the diffusion of goodness will

always be radically limited not just by the limitations of the form or the essence (as form and

essence determine esse) but by the limits of the powers without which the being cannot operate.

Goodness can only be expressed in modes proper to the species, and even within species, there

will be grades of limitation in the intensity of goodness that can be poured forth through action,

depending on the relative perfection of the operative powers of the species' members.

On the other hand, the human mode of this diffusion also gives us a glimpse of God's

diffusion of goodness. All created beings diffuse goodness by operation. All non-rational

creatures do so without the mediation of a voluntary power, while human beings perform some

operations through the mediation of a voluntary faculty and others without this intermediary.

sibi inditam, et ulterius per bonitatem primam sicut per exemplar et effectivum omnis bonitatis creatae.")

19
Thus, the summit of the material hierarchy of being reveals a new perfection, diffusion of

goodness that is freely chosen. Later, we will see how this harmonizes well with Aquinas'

teaching on the divine nature and God's free decision to create, so that God has this perfection

that is manifested by the human person. Yet this perfection is in the divinity in a more eminent

manner, so that all of his action ad extra is mediated by a free decision of his will.

Overall, this synthesis of the inclination of form, the real distinction of the potencies of

finite beings from their substantial form, the distinction between qualified and absolute

goodness, and intrinsic substantial forms as the principle of goodness for finite beings reveals the

close connection between the good as a productive outpouring and the good as a final cause. The

inclination of form is caused by its goodness, and this grants the being's unactualized potencies a

dynamism toward absolute perfection, towards the final cause of absolute goodness. The final

cause of the good and the diffusive character of the good are what underlie the great web of

activity in the universe. Without intrinsic form, we could not explain the efficient impetus in

unactualized accidental powers, and without the final cause, we would be left with operations

that have no purpose. Once again, we see a rich interplay of the good as end and the good as

diffusive, here implicit in Thomas' thought, thus overcoming Kretzmann's charge that Thomas

gives the attractive side of goodness exclusive expression.

We can further enrich our understanding of Thomas' thought on bonum diffusivum sui

through theological texts dealing with supernatural communication, with the notion of bonum

communicativum sui. Thomas first raises this doctrine in the context of his discussion on the

Trinity in his commentary on Lombard's Sentences (SS), as he asks whether there are many

persons in God:

On the contrary, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, the good is communicative
of itself. But God is the highest good. Therefore he will communicate himself in the

20
 highest way. But he does not communicate himself in the highest way with creatures,
because they do not receive his whole goodness. Therefore it must be that there is a
perfect communication, so that he may communicate his whole goodness to another. But
this cannot be in a diversity of essence. Therefore it must be that there are several
distinctions in the unity of the divine essence.28

This is not a philosophical proof for the Trinity. Thomas makes it clear that reason alone cannot

attain knowledge of the Trinity, opposing the tradition of Richard of St. Victor.29 Rather,

Thomas' faith is seeking understanding. Having attained knowledge of the Trinity through faith,

he recognizes a very fitting application of the doctrine of the good. The communication of the

divine essence from Father to Son and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit is an infinite self-

communication.

But it seems that the philosopher can also posit an infinite communication in God, since

by natural reason we know him to be the highest good and can recognize the doctrine of the good

as self-communicative as well. Philosophy can posit God's willing and understanding himself as

an infinite self-communication, one remaining within God. Thus, philosophy can accept the

doctrine of the good as communicative of itself and escape Clarke's dilemma, that the application

of bonum diffusivum sui to God leads the philosopher to posit a quasi-necessity of creation or

some knowledge of a plurality of persons in God.

Theology adds another intra-divine communication, a sharing among the divine persons

that are one identical essence. So Thomas does not think that the good as self-communicative

requires an extrinsic communication, a sharing from one being to another. This might seem to

violate the very notion of the good as self-communicative, because it seems to be a doctrine

28
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Sententiis, ed. R.P. Mandonnet, O.P., Paris, 1929, I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 4
("Contra. Sicut dicit Dionysius, De divin. nom., cap. IV, bonum est communicativum sui. Sed Deus est summe
bonus. Ergo summe se communicabit. Sed in creaturis non summe se communicat, quia non recipiunt totam
bonitatem suam. Ergo oportet quod sit communicatio perfecta, ut scilicet totam suam bonitatem alii communicet.
Hoc autem non potest esse in diversitate essentiae. Ergo oportet esse plures distinctos in unitate divinae essentiae.");
cf. idem, On the Power of God, transl. English Dominican Fathers, Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1952, q.
2, a. 1 (QD de Potentia Dei, in Quaestiones Disputatae, vol. II, Rome: Marietti, 1949).

21
about the good's communicating itself to another being. Thomas even seems to imply this when

he speaks of the necessity of a perfect communication that communicates the good with another.

But the "other" he is speaking of consists of divine persons sharing one divine essence, an

essence shared through a communication which is purely intrinsic. The procession of Son and

Holy Spirit from God is not the procession of two esses but the sharing of a single, undivided

esse. Otherwise, the Trinity would consist of three Gods.30 Thus, for God an intrinsic

communication fulfills the requirements of the doctrine of the good. Intrinsic communication

can suffice for God because he already possesses all goodness, or rather, because he is perfect

goodness. But all finite beings possess imperfect goodness, and are thus driven towards extrinsic

communication, towards sharing with and receiving from others, to attain their own perfection.

As to our overall understanding of the good as self-diffusive, this passage from the SS can

help us to recognize that the degree of communication is proportioned to the degree of goodness.

There are three aspects in this communication: the content communicated, the ability to

communicate, and the inclination to communicate. In God all of these are perfect. Notice that

God is not described as choosing to communicate himself perfectly, but simply does so. Because

he is the highest good, he must communicate all of his goodness (content). His communication

must be perfect (ability). He will communicate in the highest way (inclination). The philosopher

understands this to consist of God's perfect communication of knowledge and love in himself,

which are identical with his being, while the theologian expands this communication of being,

knowledge, and love within God to an inter-personal communication which nevertheless remains

"inside" God's single esse.

29
See SS, I d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; DV, q. 10, a. 13; ST, I, q. 32, a. 1.
30
ST, I, q. 39, a. 2, ad 3; DP, q. 2, a. 1 & a. 6; q. 9, a. 4, ad 5; q. 10, a. 1, ad 14.

22
 Our SS passage gives the general principle bonum est communicativum sui. This applies

to all beings. It is an attribute of every good, including every finite good. As one moves up the

hierarchy of being, the substantial goodness of things increases accordingly, as the good and

being are really the same. The closer one moves to the ultimate good, the more a being resembles

the first being, as the participation of esse intensifies. So the higher the being, the greater will be

the content to communicate (the being's goodness), and the more it will be able and inclined to

communicate. Since this communication is extrinsic, this means that relationality increases as

one moves up the great chain of being.

But this insight can be taken further. The substantial perfections of finite beings is the

same within a species, but there are varying accidental perfections among individuals of the same

species, a variety which occurs, among other ways, through the degree of operation. The more

perfect an individual being is through accidental perfection, the greater its sharing of goodness

will be. The more accidental perfection or goodness is possessed, the more content there will be

to share. In intelligent being, the possession of truth or the gradual perfection of a will would

increase the ability to communicate the good. Finally, the inclination to communicate will

intensify as one grows in the possession of perfection (especially as one increase in love of

neighbor), as one approaches the perfect being whose (intrinsic) communication is necessary. So

the communication of goodness will more likely be richer and more frequent as one considers the

"accidental hierarchy of beings" within each species, the hierarchy of individual beings according

to their accidental perfection. Thus, relationality varies within a species insofar as individual

beings follow their inclination to communicate the good. This means that relationality will be

intimately connected to the perfection of finite being.

23
 We can see how a passage on the trinitarian communication of the good reveals a great

deal about the philosophy of the good as communicative in Thomas. We can take similar

philosophical insights from two theological texts in Thomas' commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius'

Divine Names:

. . . it is clear in what way knowledge of the secrets of God is communicated to others.

For it would be contrary to the nature of the divine goodness if it would retain its own
knowledge for itself so that it would communicate it to no one else at all, since it is of the
nature of the good that it communicate itself to others. And therefore he [Dionysius] says
that although the knowledge of the supersubstantial God ought only be attributed to God,
nevertheless, since God is the good itself, it cannot be that he would not communicate
with other existing things.
Nor is it that he would communicate his knowledge to others just as he knows
himself. But he "gathering . . . benignly," not out of necessity but freely, "with
proportional illuminations," that is, according to proportional illuminations, "to anything
existing," as if he is saying: the nature of his goodness is such that, keeping to himself a
certain manner of knowledge which is singular to him, he freely communicates to inferior
beings some manner of knowledge . . .31

At first it would seem as if Thomas is positing God's necessary communication of his own

goodness in the action of creation, as if God must create. But a close look at this passage in its

context reveals a different meaning. Thomas is describing God's freely chosen supernatural

communication of himself to his creatures. Thomas begins the passage by speaking of God's

communication of knowledge to creatures, not the metaphysical communication of his similitude

resulting in creation. He then speaks of this sharing as free (gratia). But God necessarily

communicates knowledge of himself through the very act of creating. So given that creation

exists, God must share knowledge of himself with those creatures. Every effect has a similitude

31
DN, c.1, lectio 1, §§36-7 (. . . manifestat quomodo occultae Deitatis cognitio aliis communicatur. Esset
enim contra rationem bonitatis divinae, si cognitionem suam sibi retineret quod nulli alteri penitus communicaret,
cum de ratione boni sit quod se allis communicet. Et ideo dicit quod licet supersubstantialis Dei scientia soli Deo
attribuenda sit, tamen, cum Deus sit ipsum bonum, non potest esse quod non communicetur alicui existentium. Nec
tamen ita communicatur Eius cognitio aliis sicut Ipse seipsum cogniscit; sed Ipse 'collocans . . . benigne,' quasi non
ex necessitate sed ex gratia, 'proportionalibus illuminationibus,' idest secundum proportionales illuminationes,
'uniuscuiusque existentium,' quasi dicat: suae bonitatis ratio hoc habet ut, reservato sibi quodam cognitionis modo
qui sibi est singularis, communicet inferioribus ex sua gratia, aliquem modum cognitionis . . .). The quotes in the
text indicate that Thomas is citing Dionysius. Cf. ST, III, q. 1, a. 1.

24
of its cause. Every agent produces its like. God cannot create and not share knowledge of

himself. The passage takes the existence of creatures as a starting point, so the topic being

discussed is not creation.

God does choose to share another kind of knowledge of himself, a sharing that is free

even given that he chooses to create, and this is supernatural knowledge. It is appropriate that

Thomas should tackle this issue here, since much of this first lecture of the In Divinis Nominibus

(DN) has discussed Dionysius as a biblical theologian. Thomas is describing the fittingness of

God's supernatural revelation, probably the public revelation handed on in Scripture, but perhaps

also God's self-communication to the mystics in their contemplative experience. Thomas uses the

same explanation for the fittingness of supernatural revelation in ST, III, q. 1, a. 1. So Thomas

the theologian can point to a prime example of the first Good's freely chosen self-diffusion.

Turning to the ST, we again find a text, one both philosophical and theological, which

expounds elements of freedom in the communication of the good:

For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to
acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad
their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so
far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the
will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does
this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of
likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to
others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own
good to others as much as possible.32

This article of q. 19 considers whether God wills things other than himself. Notice that Thomas

begins by speaking of the natural inclination of things. This is a kind of umbrella under which

32
ST, I, q. 19, a. 2 (Res enim naturalis non solum habet naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut
acquirat ipsum cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut proprium bonum in alia diffundat,
secundum quod possibile est. Unde videmus quod omne agens, inquamtum est actu et perfectum, facit sibi simile.
Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationam voluntatis, ut bonum quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile
est. Et hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio.
Unde, si res naturales, inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum allis communicant, multo magis pertinet ad
voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est.).

25
he places the principle bonum diffusivum sui. A careful reading of the first sentence brings this

to the surface. Thomas says that a natural thing has a natural inclination to acquire and rest in

the good, and it has a natural inclination to diffuse the good which is has to others. This applies

not only to God but to all beings. So everything has a tendency to share the good that it has, yet

this is not always a necessary self-giving. So when Thomas says that it "pertains to the notion of

the will that it communicate the good which it has to others," one can interpret "pertain" to mean

that it is fitting for the will to communicate the good, meaning it is fitting that the choice to

communicate be made, rather than that it be the nature of the will that it must communicate the

good, that it cannot choose to act or not to act. So contra Kretzmann, it seems that ST, I, q.19,

a.2 does not suggest necessary diffusion in God's creative act.

Having seen this theme of the inclination towards sharing the good, we are in a position

to understand a crucial move that Thomas makes in his doctrine of the good. He places the

principle bonum diffusivum sui under the doctrine of the good as a final cause. This is evident in

several texts, the first of which is from the DV:

[Objection] As can be gathered from the words of Dionysius, good tends to pour out itself
and existence. A thing is good, therefore, by the fact that it is diffusive. But to pour out
or diffuse implies an action, and an action proceeds from the essence through the
mediation of a power. A thing is therefore said to be good by reason of a power added to
the essence, and so good really adds something to being.

[Reply] Though, according to the proper use of the word, to pour out seems to imply the
operation of an efficient cause, yet taken broadly it can imply the status of any cause, as
do "to influence," "to make," etc. When good is said to be of its very notion diffusive,
however, diffusion is not to be understood as implying the operation of an efficient cause
but rather the status of a final cause. Nor is such diffusion brought about through the
mediation of any added power. Good expresses the diffusion of a final cause and not that
of an agent, both because the latter, as efficient, is not the measure and perfection of the
thing caused but rather its beginning, and also because the effect participates in the
efficient cause only in an assimilation of its form, whereas a thing is dependent upon its
end in its whole existence. It is in this that the character of good was held to consist.33

33
DV, q. 21, a. 1, obj. 4 & ad 4 ([Objection 4] Praeterea, ut potest accipi ex dictis Dionysii in IV cap. De
divinis nominibus, bonum est diffusivum sui et esse, ergo per hoc est aliquid bonum per quod est diffusivum; sed

26
Thomas' restriction of bonum diffusivum sui to the final cause harmonizes well with the passages

we considered from DN c. 1, lectio 1 and ST, I, q. 19, a. 2, in which we could always find a

certain inclination to share the good, but not a necessary pouring forth of every good. Thomas'

explanation here gives those interpretations of the doctrine of the good a firmer foundation in the

theory of causality. We have already seen how Thomas gives the notion of "perfective end"

primacy in his definitions of the good. Now, he places the concept of the good as self-

communicative under this primary definition, further removing the notion of necessity from the

good's self-diffusiveness. This is because an efficient or agent cause is that whose action makes

something exist, that which produces an effect.34 If the good is identified primarily with this

kind of cause, and the good is diffusive of itself, then an efficient cause would be diffusive of

itself, would act necessarily, because communication would belong to the very nature of the

immediate principle of action. The objection only connects the good with efficient causality, and

therefore seems to negate the status of the good as a transcendental, since it cannot be predicated

of any being unless the mediating accidental powers by which finite beings act are present.

By placing the good primarily under final causality, Thomas removes the sense of

necessity in self-communication. He can cite the notions of the good that he discussed in the

body of DV q.21, a.1, a passage we have already considered. The good is perfective of the

diffundere importat actionem quandam; actio autem ab essentia procedit mediante virtute; ergo aliquid dicitur esse
bonum ratione virtutis superadditae ad essentiam: et sic bonum addit aliquid realiter super ens. [Thomas' Answer]
Ad quartum dicendum quod diffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare operationem
causae efficientis, tamen largo modo potest importare habitudinem cuiuscumque causae, sicut influere et facere et
alia huiusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod bonum sit diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda diffusio
secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et
talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita; dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis et non
causae agentis, tum quia efficiens in quantum huiusmodi non est rei mensura et perfectio sed magis initium, tum
etiam quia effectus participat causam efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum, sed finem consequitur
res secundum totum esse suum; et in hoc consistebat ratio boni.).
34
DN, c.4, lect. 5, §352; idem, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, transl. John P. Rowan, Notre
Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1995, bk. 5, lect. 2, §775 (In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria, Rome:

27
being's nature. The good is act, is being as desired. These attributes can be predicated of

efficient causality. But a being's efficient causality is not its ultimate perfection, but rather that

by which it is perfected. Operation leads to perfection, and occurs through efficient causality.

But efficient causality is not itself absolutely perfective of the subject, but the way to its highest

perfection, its highest good. The good is perfective of the whole being, while the efficient cause

is that through which the good is attained. Good is predicated of final causality before efficient

causality.

This classification of the good under final causality is crucial, a teaching to which

Thomas returns in the SCG:

. . . in acting it [a thing] diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of
a being's perfection that it "can produce its like," as may be seen from the Philosopher in
Meteorologica IV. Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something
appetible. This is the end, which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that
the good is diffusive of itself and of being.35

The good is that for which an agent acts, its end or purpose. Applying this passage about God's

goodness to creatures, we can say that the good's self-communication follows from the fact that

the end of creatures is only attained through action, and action means the outpouring of

goodness. Every action announces a substance's existence, its substantial goodness, and

communicates some kind of accidental good as well, some accidental goodness or truth.

We can understand this more deeply by looking to the principle that everything attracts

its like. If the good moves something, this means that the thing moved is itself good. Hence,

one good is moved to act in order to attain another good, to attain something like itself. Every

effect bears a likeness of its cause, and so every action of a good thing moving towards another

Marietti, 1950); Clarke, W. Norris, S.J., The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics, Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001, 187.
35
SCG, I, c. 37, (§307: " Agendo autem esse et bonitatem in alia diffundit. Unde et signum perfectionis est
alicuius quod 'simile possit producere,' ut patet per Philosophum in IV Meteororum. Ratio vero boni est ex hoc

28
good leads to effects which contain some good. Thus the (accidental) goodness of a good thing

is diffused as it acts for the sake of attaining another good. Furthermore, as the outpouring of

goodness is recognized as the way to an ultimate good, this communication itself becomes an

intermediary end. This intermediary end is unique because for creatures it is a necessary step

toward the final cause. While human beings can freely choose particular instances of sharing the

good, every creature must diffuse some goodness, as we have seen. Thus the diffusion of the

good is a necessary intermediary end for all creatures, meaning the outpouring of accidental

goodness is an intermediary end while the infinite good is the ultimate end. Every good thing

produces its like in order to attain its like.

As a final consideration of this important theme we can look at a brief passage from the

ST: "Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move."36 The

good moves as an end by drawing the subject towards perfection, towards actuality. The good

naturally attracts the subject. If the good is diffusive as an end that moves, then the good draws

the subject towards operation and perfection, moves the subject to share its good in order to

attain the actualization of its accidental powers. The end is perfective because it attracts an agent

to itself by moving it to a diffusion of its own goodness. The good as final cause and as diffusive

of itself are intimately connected, so that the principle bonum diffusivum sui is by no means

insignificant to the doctrine of the good as a perfective end. Thus a passage which at first glance

seems to empty the notion of the good as self-diffusive and swallow it up into the notion of the

good as an end really retains a rich understanding of the good, especially when interpreted in

light of DV 21 and SCG, I, 37.

quod est appetibile. Quod est finis. Qui etiam movet agentem ad agendum. Propter quod dicitur bonum esse
'diffusivum sui et esse.'").
36
ST, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2 ("Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo
finis dicitur movere.").

29
 Let us summarize our study of the good as self-diffusive in general. In considering the

good as act and active, we first saw that substantial esse requires action, so that God necessarily

acts intrinsically and creatures must act extrinsically. Second, form was posited as inclined

toward action, showing that not all action is necessary, neither for God nor for creatures. Third,

created esse is for the sake of operation. We explicated the meaning of this through a

consideration of the metaphysical status of operative potencies, especially the potencies of the

human soul. A synthesis of this doctrine with the inclination of form, the distinction between

qualified and absolute goodness in creatures, and the notion of intrinsic substantial form as the

principle of goodness for each creature led to a powerful implication in Thomas' thought, that the

inclination of form is based on its goodness that pours itself forth towards absolute perfection

that is not yet attained by the really distinct operative potencies. These points allow us to

conclude that created esse is relational, is necessarily acting upon other beings and being acted

upon by them. Looking at the good as communicative, Thomas maintained that God

communicates himself most of all, and that this is an intrinsic communication. Applying the

hierarchy of being to our SS passage, we recognized that the content communicated as well the

ability and inclination to communicate increase as we move up the great chain of being. Such

variety can also be found within the human species due to differences in accidental perfection.

Second, it was maintained that God's communication ad extra is free, while creaturely

communication ad extra is necessary to an extent and, for intelligent creatures, in some ways

free. Finally, Thomas posits the inclination of a natural thing to communicate the good so that

this communication is fitting, meaning not always necessary. In the last part, we saw that the

doctrine of the good as self-diffusive must be subordinated to the doctrine of the good as

perfective end, further removing the notion that the good must diffuse itself in every case.

30
Applying these insights to our overall question of the relationality of esse, we can say that

created esse not only is relational, necessarily pouring itself out in extrinsic action, but that this

relationality intensifies as one moves up the hierarchy of being, with an ever greater inclination

and ability to share the good and ever-greater goodness to share. However, contra Norris Clarke,

we have found no evidence to justify predicating "relationality" of the divine esse. Rather, any

outpouring of goodness from the divinity is free precisely because of the internal, infinite

diffusion of love and knowledge already recognized in philosophy, a diffusion which theology

recognizes as interpersonal. The infinite goodness of God means that any action beyond himself

is gratuitous. Still, the issue of the creative act needs to be considered more closely in order to

determine the precise meaning and application of the doctrine bonum diffusivum sui in Thomas.

IV. THE GOOD AS SELF-DIFFUSIVE AND THE CREATOR GOD

Thomas Aquinas holds that the principle bonum diffusivum sui applies to God and all to

creatures, to everything that has goodness, and uses the dictum to explain God's creative activity.

Keeping in mind the objections that Clarke and Kretzmann have raised, let us begin by returning

to Thomas' discourse on God's goodness in SCG, I, 37:

Moreover, the communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. This is
evident from the very nature and definition of the good. By nature, the good of each
thing is its act and perfection. Now each thing acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it
diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of a being's perfection
that it "can produce its like," as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteorologica IV.
Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the end,
which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that the good is diffusive of
itself and of being. But this diffusion befits God because, as we have shown above, being
through himself the necessary being, God is the cause of being for other things. God is,
therefore, truly good.37

37
SCG, I, c. 37 (§307: " Communicatio esse et bonitatis ex bonitate procedit. Quod quidem patet et ex ipsa
natura boni, et ex eius ratione. Naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus et perfectio eius. Unumquodque
autem ex hoc agit quod actu est. Agendo autem esse et bonitatem in alia diffundit. Unde et signum perfectionis est
alicuius quod 'simile possit producere,' ut patet per Philosophum in IV Meteororum. Ratio vero boni est ex hoc

31
First, let us note that the purpose of this chapter in the SCG is to prove that God is good. The

topic of creation comes up as a means to prove this truth. God's goodness is shown by pointing

to his role as cause of all being, which is to say that he is the cause of every good, of all goodness

found in creation. Thomas proved earlier that all finite being must have an infinite being as its

cause, must result from a diffusion from that unlimited being. The first sentence of our passage

posited this diffusion as belonging to goodness itself. Hence God is good.

But the diffusion of goodness through creation is not assumed as if God created

necessarily. Thomas begins by stating that the communication of being and goodness proceeds

from goodness, not that the communication of goodness in creation must proceed from God.

This is because there is (philosophically speaking) only one communication in the divinity that is

necessary, God's communicating his goodness in himself, God's willing and understanding

himself. Theology recognizes that this self-communication includes the generation of the Son

and the spiration of the Holy Spirit. It follows that the self-communication posited in philosophy

is really a communication between three divine persons, though that communication remains

within a single will and intellect, since each person possesses an identical will and intellect.

God does act insofar as he is in act by acting infinitely, and again within his own esse.

An infinite act ad extra is impossible because everything "outside" of God is finite and so unable

to receive such an act, nor can creation be the only result of such an act. God's infinite act

recognized in philosophy is the act of willing and knowing himself, God rejoicing in himself.

Theology includes the procession of divine persons in this infinite act. Thus, when a "diffusion

quod est appetibile. Quod est finis. Qui etiam movet agentem ad agendum. Propter quod dicitur bonum esse
'diffusivum sui et esse.' Haec autem diffusio Deo competit: ostensum enim est supra (cap. 13) quod aliis est causa
essendi, sicut per se ens necesse. Est igitur vere bonus.").

32
of goodness into another" is mentioned, if this is taken to mean the creation of beings outside of

God, we must understand that God has already acted insofar as he is in act by acting in himself.

Then Thomas mentions that the production of a like is the "sign of the perfection of

anything." This does not mean that God must create in order to produce a sign of his own

perfection. God needs no signs of his perfection for himself, since he knows himself infinitely.

Furthermore, if God produces such signs for creatures, we are assuming the fact of creation.

Rather, remembering the purpose of this chapter in the SCG, this principle reminds us that

creation, the production of similitudes of the divine by God, is fittingly attributed to God who is

most perfect. But God does not need to produce likenesses of himself to be perfect and good.

This language of God's manifestation as an outpouring of his goodness is similar to that

found in DV q.24, a.3, a passage that Kretzmann uses to point to the necessity of creation

because of God's necessity to manifest himself.38 However, like our passage from SCG, the DV

article only makes sense if one presumes that there is someone to manifest God's goodness to,

meaning human beings. So given that human beings are created, God's goodness ought to be

manifested to them.

Nor does the importation of the dictum bonum diffusivum sui in SCG, I, 37 lead to the

necessity of creation, a consequence which Norman Kretzmann claims to find here. Rather, as

we saw above, Thomas is placing the doctrine of the good as self-diffusive under the general

doctrine of the good as a perfective end, thus making the diffusiveness of the good primarily a

matter of final causality. By removing the primacy of efficient causality in the good, he

eliminates the need to posit the necessity of creation. Kretzmann's commentary (The

Metaphysics of Theism) quotes SCG, I, 37, but skips the section which places the good under

final causality. He then proceeds to claim that, since God is goodness essentially, a goodness

33
that is "from its nature and from its definition - diffusive of itself and of being,"39 God must

create out of necessity. Kretzmann omits the crucial passage of the chapter on final causality,

making Thomas say the opposite of what he really is saying. Nor does Kretzmann's commentary

on this chapter ever mention Thomas' integration of final causality. Thus, Thomas' own solution

to the problem that Kretzmann brings up is ignored.40

Kretzmann does deal with Thomas' decision to place the doctrine of the good as self-

diffusive under the umbrella of final causality in his earlier article "A General Problem of

Creation." He argues that this move by Thomas is counterintuitive, and "has nothing to

recommend it as an interpretation," that the Neo-Platonist doctrine of the good as self-diffusive is

clearly talking about efficient causality.41 Kretzmann's interpretation of the Neoplatonists'

understanding of the doctrine is similar to Fran O'Rourke's view of how Dionysius uses it.42 But

Kretzmann's position has been disputed by other scholars. While a thorough investigation of the

Neoplatonists' approach to this issue is well beyond the scope of this essay, it should be pointed

out that Kretzmann's claim, which accepts J. Peghaire's interpretation of the Platonists, has been

disputed by Klaus Kremer and Lawrence Dewan. Kremer insists that Dionysius does not posit

the necessary emanation of creation from God.43 Dewan argues that Peghaire misinterpreted

Plato and Thomas, that both see the good as a matter of final causality, and therefore do not posit

a necessity on God's part to create.44 Furthermore, Kretzmann's assumption that Thomas should

38
Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation," 222-3.
39
Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism, 224.
40
ibid., 223-5.
41
Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation," 220.
42
O'Rourke, Fran, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, New York/Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1992,
242-5.
43
Kremer, Klaus, Die Neoplatonistische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin, 2nd
ed., Leiden, Brill, 1971, 323, 344.
44
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas and the Causality of God's Goodness," Laval theologique et
philosophique 34 (1978), 291-304. Peghaire, Julien, C.S.SP., "L'axiome 'bonum est diffusivum sui' dans le
neoplatonisme et le thomisme, Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa 1 (1932), Section Speciale, vol.1, 5-30.

34
not change a Neoplatonic teaching that he chooses to adopt is odd. Thomas transformed many

doctrines that he inherited from the Platonists, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers. One could

argue that this trait is part of Thomas' genius. Nor does Thomas transform the Platonic axiom

into one that expressed only the attractive side of goodness, as Kretzmann holds.45 We saw

above how Thomas uses the notion of the good as a final cause to unfold the notion of the good

as pouring itself forth in action in our analysis above.46 We will return to Kretzmann's position

later in this section. For now it can be said that our SCG text places the diffusiveness of the good

under the principle of the good as an end and therefore beyond the realm of necessity.

Thomas approaches the issue of creation directly later on in the same book of the SCG.

Chapter 72 establishes that God has a will, and this for a number of reasons, the first of which is

that will follows upon intellect.47 So because God is intelligent, a fact proven through the

intelligible order of nature, God wills. This will is also one with God's essence, since there is no

composition in God.48 In at least two works, the DN and the ST, Thomas argues as if the very

fact that God is a willing being is sufficient to show that creation is a free divine action:

Therefore because God is good, he is not good as if participating goodness, but "just as"
the very "essence of goodness," and he is not the cause of things through some created
disposition, but "through his very" own "being is he the cause of all existing things." Nor
does this exclude God from acting through intellect and will, because his act-of-
understanding and his act-of-willing is his very act-of-being.49

In this lectio of the DN, Thomas has just posited the good as an end and the primacy of the final

cause among the four causes. Because of this primacy in causality, the notion of causing belongs

to the good above all. Then, Thomas proceeds with the passage just given. God is cause and

45
Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation," 220.
46
Specifically in SCG, I, c. 37 and ST, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2.
47
SCG, I, c. 72 (§618).
48
SCG I, c. 73, (§§628, 630).
49
DN, c. 1, lect. 3, §88 ("Quia igitur Deus est bonus, non quidem bonus quasi bonitatem participans, sed
'sicut' ipsa 'essentia bonitatis,' non per aliquam dispositionem creatam est causa rerum, sed 'per ipsum esse' suum 'est

35
most of all final cause of all things through his own goodness, his own essence. Furthermore,

God understands and wills, and these acts must be identical to his act-of-being, his esse, since he

is fully actual and simple. This esse is also identical with his essence, so that intellect, will, esse,

and essentia are all one in God. God's actions are also not really distinct from his esse. Thus,

God's action must be understood and willed. If to be is to act for God, and to be is to understand,

and to be is to will, then to act is to understand and to act is to will. God eternally understands

all possible things outside of himself, all creatures, and it is by willing these ideas that he creates.

Thus, God's action, meaning his action ad extra, must be a willed action. God does not will to

love himself as if he could not will this, nor does the Father choose to generate the Son and the

Holy Spirit. These are necessary attributes of his nature. And while it is also of his nature to

create, since nothing in God is outside his nature, is forced upon him, it is only so in a qualified

sense, in that creation is willed and chosen, while his self-love must be willed and is beyond the

realm of choice.50

One might object that the unity of God's esse, intelligere, and velle seems to lead to

necessary causality. If God is simple, how can we distinguish his having to will his own

goodness and not having to will creation, which is willed for the sake of his goodness? There is

no easy answer to this, but we can posit a distinction quoad nos in this case. Somehow, God's

willing himself by a kind of necessity and willing other things freely does not destroy his

simplicity. As to our own perspective of God's nature, we can say that it is legitimate to posit

such distinctions because we already must posit a distinction between what God thinks and what

he wills, even though these acts must be one. God thinks every possible being from eternity, yet

not every possible being he knows in his mind is created. Otherwise, there would be an infinite

causa omnium existentium;' nec per hoc excluditur quin agat per intellectum et voluntatem, quia intelligere Eius et
velle est ipsum esse Eius."); cf. ST, I, q. 19, a. 1.

36
number of creatures participating his goodness in an infinite number of ways, since God's mind

is infinite, and this is clearly false.51

Let us return to our passage from the DN. Thomas has posited the good as final cause

and the primacy of the final cause among the causes. God is cause of all things, as final and

efficient cause, and the primacy of the final cause means that the efficient cause is ordered to it.

This means that the ultimate reason that God creates is for the sake of his own goodness.52 This

judgement is confirmed by the realization that God's action must be intelligent and willed. This

allows us to conclude that God wills to create for the sake of his goodness. While Thomas points

towards the freedom of creation in this passage, the claim is not explicit, and it still might be

claimed that creation is necessary in that it must be willed for the sake of God's goodness. The

question is: is it an essential part of God's goodness to pour his similitude out in creating? Is

God not perfectly good without this communication? Thomas answers that, to the contrary, God

is infinitely good regardless of whether he brings other things into existence. The first reason is

that God would be imperfect if he were to create to complete his own goodness:

Therefore he first says that the beautiful "is the principle of all things just as an effective
cause" giving being, "and" just as a "moving" cause and just as a "containing" cause, that
is conserving all. For these three things seem to pertain to the nature of an efficient
cause: that it give existence, that it move, and that is conserve. But an agent cause that
acts out of a desire for an end, which is the nature of an imperfect agent, does not yet
possess what it desires. However, it is the nature of a perfect agent that is act through
love of that which it possesses, and because of this he [Dionysius] adds that the beautiful,
which is God, is the effective, motive, and containing cause, "out of the love of its own
beauty." For since he has his proper beauty, he wills to multiply this beauty, as is
possible, namely, through the communication of his own similitude.53

50
ST, I, q. 19, a. 4, ad 2.
51
SCG, I, c. 81 (§685).
52
SCG, I, c. 86 (§718).
53
DN, c.4, lect. 5, §352 ("Dicit ergo primo quod pulchrum quidem 'est principium omnium sicut causa
effectiva' dans esse; 'et' sicut causa 'movens et' sicut causa 'continens,' idest conservans omnia; haec enim tria
videntur ad rationem causae efficientis pertinere: ut det esse, moveat et conservet. Sed causa agens, quaedam agit ex
desiderio finis, quod est agentis imperfecti, nondum habentis quod desiderat; sed agentis perfecti est ut agat per
amorem eius quod habet et propter hoc subdid quod pulchrum, quod est Deus, est causa effectiva et motiva

37
Thomas posits the interchangeability of the beautiful and the good shortly after this passage in

the DN.54 The beautiful or the good are both efficient and final cause. But the subordination of

the former to the latter which was posited earlier is still maintained, because an agent cause

either acts for a desired end or out of love for what it possesses, that is, for the sake of the good

loved, out of the love of an actualized final cause. So the good as efficient cause is a cause

because of the good that is the final cause. God either acts out of the desire for the final cause or

out of love for it. To act because of desire is impossible for him, since this would introduce an

act-potency composition into the divinity. There would be an end that he does not possess.

Thus, God must act out of love for his own goodness. But again, if he must create in order to

truly love himself completely, then God's love of himself without creation would somehow be

incomplete. Infinite goodness would then not be the completion of God's own love. An infinite

object would be unsatisfactory for an infinite act, which is contradictory. God creates out of love

of himself, a love that has already been infinitely and eternally completed through the infinite

goodness of God which leaves no unfulfilled desire in him for anything else. This means that

God creates out of a purely gratuitous love, a sheer delight in creation that is a complete gift.

. . . the divine love does "not" permit "him to remain in himself without fruit," that is,
without the production of creatures, but love "moves him to operate" . . . For out of the
love of his own goodness it happens that he wills to diffuse and communicate his own
goodness to others, in so far as is possible, namely, through the mode of similitude, that
his goodness may not only remain in him, but may flow out to others.55

Creation is an act of love, and to give this the character of necessity is actually to diminish the

immensity of that love. God possesses infinite goodness without creation because he is

continens, 'amore propriae pulchritudinis.' Quia enim propriam pulchritudinem habet, vult eam multiplicare, sicut
possibile est, scilicet per communicationem suae similitudinis.").
54
DN, c. 4, lect. 5, §355.
55
DN, c. 4, lect. 9, §409 (". . . divinus amor 'non' permisit 'manere ipsum in seipso sine germine,' idest sine
productione creaturarum, sed amor 'movit ipsum ad operandum' . . . Ex amore enim bonitatis suae processit quod

38
goodness itself. "Now the will is not necessarily directed to the means, if the end is possible

without them . . ."56 The end of God's will is his own goodness. If his goodness could not be

without the good of creating, if his goodness could not be without the good of creation, then

God's infinite goodness would be incomplete, would depend on an act of creating which is not an

infinite communication of goodness, would depend on the existence of a finite good. God only

has to will his own infinite goodness. The willing of that good is an infinite, perfect act. God is

satisfied without creation, is perfect and good without diffusing his similitude. Thus, when

Thomas lists an objection in DP, that God would deny his own goodness if he would not

communicate it through creation, an argument which Kretzmann supports,57 Thomas answers:

"But this would not follow if he were not to communicate his goodness to anything: since it

[God's goodness] would suffer nothing by not being communicated."58 God's own infinite

goodness, already containing an infinite internal communication, needs no finite goods. Rather

than being a denial of his goodness, the freedom of God to create shows the immensity of his

goodness and love. Understood in this context, it becomes clear that DP q. 3, a. 15, ad 12 does

not entail the denial of the axiom bonum diffusivum sui, contra Kretzmann.

Perhaps a fitting summary of Thomas' position is his brief response to another objection

in the same DP article: "The last end is not the communication of the divine goodness, but that

goodness itself for love of which God wills to communicate it."59 God always acts for an end,

even when he acts necessarily. An infinite good is the only necessary object of his will, and in

bonitatem suam voluit diffundere et communicare aliis, secundum quod fuit possibile, scilicet per modum
similitudinis et quod eius bonitas non tantum in ipso maneret, sed ad alia efflueret.").
56
SCG, I, c. 81 (§683: "Voluntas autem non ex necessitate fertur in ea quae sunt ad finem, si finis sine his
esse possit "). I have used the older translation by the English Dominican Fathers just for this passage, as it
communicates the literal meaning more effectively.
57
Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation," 217.
58
DP, q. 3, a. 15, ad 12 ("Suae enim bonitatem nihil deperiret, si communicata non esset.").
59
DP, q. 3, a. 15, ad 14 (". . . communicatio bonitatis non est ultimus finis, sed ipsa divina bonitas, ex cuius
amore est quod Deus eam communicare vult . . .").

39
fact, the only ultimate object of his will, as only the infinite can be the ultimate end of the

infinite. For the finite communication of goodness to be the ultimate end is for the finite to be

the last end of the infinite. The good is above all an end, a final cause. Thus, if the diffusion of

goodness through communication ad extra were not ordered under the final cause of God's own

goodness, it would be another final cause, in competition with God's own goodness, which is

absurd. The diffusion of the good cannot be an end in itself. It is only an intermediate end as

part of the ultimate end of God's perfect goodness. God's goodness is already perfect without the

creation of finite beings.

We have tried to show that the freedom of the Creator God is the only position

compatible with Thomas' thought. Kretzmann is correct in pointing out a certain tension in

Thomas' texts, but a careful reading of these passages minimizes this problem. Kretzmann's own

reading of SCG, I, 37 is unfair. He gives a similar treatment to ST, I, q.19, a.2 in The

Metaphysics of Theism. We considered this article of Thomas in the section on the general

doctrine of the good as self-diffusive, and showed how it did not posit a necessity of the good's

out-pouring. Kretzmann quotes the article, but skips the first section that discusses the natural

inclination of things, a qualification that eliminates a necessitarian flavor from the passage. Like

his treatment of SCG, I, 37, Kretzmann omits Thomas' solution to the very objection posited.

Thomas' doctrine of the freedom of the Creator God is not without its problems, but his answer is

satisfying, and the only one that fits into his overall system.

Let us summarize Thomas' doctrine of the good as self-diffusive as it relates to the

Creator God. God creates freely because the good is self-diffusive as a primarily final cause.

The unity of his esse, intelligere, and velle show that every divine action is willed, so that

creation must involve the will of God. God only wills his own goodness necessarily since it is

40
infinite, leaving no desire for another good in God. God creates out of a total and completely

free love, expressing his infinite love. This diffusion of goodness ad extra is not an end in itself

for God because his own goodness is the only ultimate end, and this is true for creatures as well.

All of this means that the doctrine bonum diffusivum sui does not lead to the relationality

of God's esse. We have seen that God's actions with regards to creation are freely chosen. While

a detailed discussion of the relationality of the divine being, asking whether God is really in

relation with us, is well beyond the scope of this essay, a close reading of Thomas' texts on the

good as self-diffusive reveal that one cannot use Thomas' understanding of the good to argue for

the divine being's relationality. In fact, God's infinite and complete satisfaction in his own

goodness runs counter to the notion of a God really in relation with the world, where the world

would somehow affect an infinitely fulfilled God (since real relation by definition involves being

acted upon by another). How can eternal, infinite goodness be affected by a finite good? As for

the claim that the doctrine of the Trinity solves the dilemma between a relational divine esse and

a free divine decision to create, we can avoid Clarke's temptation to make a plurality of divine

persons a quasi-philosophical doctrine by pointing to the internal diffusion of God's love and

goodness. Philosophy can thus avoid predicating relationality of the divine esse.60

CONCLUSION

Norris Clarke was correct in maintaining that all created esse is relational, meaning its

very nature leads it to necessarily act upon and be acted upon by other creatures. However, a

detailed study of bonum diffusivum sui, especially its relation to God as Creator, does not lead to

60
It seems that the reason for Clarke's position lies not in his development of St. Thomas Aquinas but in his
adoption of process theology. See Clarke, "A New Look at the Immutability of God." For a good summary and
defense of the Thomistic position on the divine-creature relation as a one-term relation, see Michael J. Dodds, O.P.,

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the relationality of God's being, to the position that God necessarily acts beyond himself and is

acted upon by other beings.

Thomas Aquinas' teaching on the good as diffusive of itself is a rich and almost ignored

aspect of his metaphysics and philosophical theology. It is key to his understanding of the act of

creation, the interrelated nature of the universe, and theory of operation. It also highlights the

beauty of Thomas' thought and the passion for God that lies behind it. Norris Clarke's creative

work has pointed to a rich application of bonum diffusivum sui to a contemporary philosophical

issue, the relationality of the human person. Norman Kretzmann also recognized the importance

of the doctrine, though his textual analysis was inadequate. Yet both Clarke and Kretzmann

remind us of the importance of a retrieval of medieval and Thomistic thought for contemporary

philosophical and theological discussions.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Dieser Aufsatz erörtert Thomas von Aquins Lehre vom Guten als sich selbst verströmend (bonum diffusivum sui) im

Lichte von W. Norris Clarkes und Norman Kretzmanns jüngstem Werk zu diesem Thema. Clarke vertritt, diese

Lehre impliziere die Relationalität alles Seins, geschaffen und ungeschaffen. Kretzmann meint dass Thomas'

Rezeption der neoplatonischen Lehre vom bonum diffusivum sui sein Denken zu der Annahme eines notwendigen

Schöpfungsaktes hätte führen sollen. Eine sorgfältige Lektüre der Schriften des Thomas über das Gute als

diffusivum sui bestätigt den ersten Teil von Clarkes Interpretation; sie zeigt das reiche Potential, das Thomas’

Gedankengut für die gegenwärtige Sicht des Menschen als Sein-in-Beziehung bereithält. Andererseits jedoch

wiederspricht Thomas’ Unterordnung des bonum diffusivum sui unter den Begriff des Guten als Finalursache dem

Versuch Clarkes, Relationalität zu einem Attribut des göttlichen Seins zu machen. Dieser Schritt erlaubt Thomas

schliesslich auch, den sich selbst verströmenden Charakter der Güte Gottes zugleich mit dem göttlichen

Schöpfungsakt als freier Entscheidung zu vertreten.

"Ultimacy and Intimacy: Aquinas on the Relation between God and the World," Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris:
Hommage au Professeur Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, Fribourg, Suisse: Editions Universitaires, 222-227.

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