Paper Code: LLB 304 Subject: International Law

Unit-I: Introduction
(a) Nature and Development of International Law
(b) Subject of International Law
i. Concept of Subject of Law And of Legal Personality
ii. States : Condition of Statehood, Territory And Underlying Principles,
Sovereignty iii.
iii. International Organisation: Concept, Right and Duties under International Law
iv. Status of Individual v.
v. Other Non State Actors
(c) Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law (UK, USA, India, China &
Russia)
(d) Codification of International Law
Unit-II: Sources of International Law
(a) Treaties
(b) Custom
(c) General Principles
(d) Jurist Works
(e) General Assembly Resolutions, Security Council Resolutions
(f) Other Sources
Unit-III: Recognition, Extradition and the Law of the Sea
(a) Recognition
i. Theories of Recognition
ii. Defacto, Dejure Recognition
iii. Implied Recognition
iv. Withdrawal of Recognition
v. Retroactive Effects of Recognition
(b) Extradition and Asylum
i. State Jurisdiction
ii. Customary Law Basis
iii. Treaty Law
iv. The Nature of Obligation
(c) Law of The Sea
i. Territorial Sea
ii. Contiguous Zone
iii. Exclusive Economic Zone
iv. Continental Shelf
v.High Sea

Unit - IV: Contemporary International Issues

i.Prohibition of the Use of Force
ii. Exceptions to the Prohibition: Individual and Collective Self Defence, Authorized or
Recognised Military Actions
iii. Responsibility to Protect
UNIT-1

INTRODUCTION

A) Nature and Development of International Law

According to Bentham’s classic definition, international law is a collection of rules governing

relations between states. It is a mark of how far international law has evolved that International
law, also called public international law or law of nations, the body of legal rules, norms, and
standards that apply between sovereign states and other entities that are legally recognized as
international actors. The term was coined by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–
1832).
According to Bentham’s classic definition, international law is a collection of rules governing
this original definition omits individuals and international organizations—two of the
most dynamic and vital elements of modern international law. Furthermore, it is no longer
accurate to view international law as simply a collection of rules; rather, it is a rapidly
developing complex of rules and influential—though not directly binding—principles, practices,
and assertions coupled with increasingly sophisticated structures and processes. In its broadest
sense, international law provides normative guidelines as well as methods, mechanisms, and a
common conceptual language to international actors—i.e., primarily sovereign states but also
increasingly international organizations and some individuals. The range of subjects and actors
directly concerned with international law has widened considerably, moving beyond the classical
questions of war, peace, and diplomacy to include human rights, economic
and trade issues, space law, and international organizations. Although international law is a legal
order and not an ethical one, it has been influenced significantly by ethical principles and
concerns, particularly in the sphere of human rights.
International law is distinct from international comity, which comprises legally nonbinding
practices adopted by states for reasons of courtesy (e.g., the saluting of the flags of foreign
warships at sea). In addition, the study of international law, or public international law, is
distinguished from the field of conflict of laws, or private international law, which is concerned
with the rules of municipal law—as international lawyers term the domestic law of states—of
different countries where foreign elements are involved.
International law is an independent system of law existing outside the legal orders of particular
states. It differs from domestic legal systems in a number of respects. For example, although
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, which consists of representatives of some 190
countries, has the outward appearances of a legislature, it has no power to issue binding laws.
Rather, its resolutions serve only as recommendations—except in specific cases and for certain
purposes within the UN system, such as determining the UN budget, admitting new members of
the UN, and, with the involvement of the Security Council, electing new judges to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Also, there is no system of courts
with comprehensive jurisdiction in international law. The ICJ’s jurisdiction in contentious cases
is founded upon the consent of the particular states involved. There is no international police
force or comprehensive system of law enforcement, and there also is no supreme executive
authority. The UN Security Council may authorize the use of force to compel states to comply
with its decisions, but only in specific and limited circumstances; essentially, there must be a
prior act of aggression or the threat of such an act. Moreover, any such enforcement action can
be vetoed by any of the council’s five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). Because there is no standing UN military, the forces involved
must be assembled from member states on an ad hoc basis.
International law is a distinctive part of the general structure of international relations. In
contemplating responses to a particular international situation, states usually consider relevant
international laws. Although considerable attention is invariably focused on violations of
international law, states generally are careful to ensure that their actions conform to the rules and
principles of international law, because acting otherwise would be regarded negatively by the
international community. The rules of international law are rarely enforced by military means or
even by the use of economic sanctions. Instead, the system is sustained by reciprocity or a sense
of enlightened self-interest. States that breach international rules suffer a decline in credibility
that may prejudice them in future relations with other states. Thus, a violation of a treaty by one
state to its advantage may induce other states to breach other treaties and thereby cause harm to
the original violator. Furthermore, it is generally realized that consistent rule violations would
jeopardize the value that the system brings to the community of states, international
organizations, and other actors. This value consists in the certainty, predictability, and sense of
common purpose in international affairs that derives from the existence of a set of rules accepted
by all international actors. International law also provides a framework and a set of procedures
for international interaction, as well as a common set of concepts for understanding it.
International law is a distinctive part of the general structure of international relations. In
contemplating responses to a particular international situation, states usually consider relevant
international laws. Although considerable attention is invariably focused on violations of
international law, states generally are careful to ensure that their actions conform to the rules and
principles of international law, because acting otherwise would be regarded negatively by the
international community. The rules of international law are rarely enforced by military means or
even by the use of economic sanctions. Instead, the system is sustained by reciprocity or a sense
of enlightened self-interest. States that breach international rules suffer a decline in credibility
that may prejudice them in future relations with other states. Thus, a violation of a treaty by one
state to its advantage may induce other states to breach other treaties and thereby cause harm to
the original violator. Furthermore, it is generally realized that consistent rule violations would
jeopardize the value that the system brings to the community of states, international
organizations, and other actors.
The UN Security Council may authorize the use of force to compel states to comply with its
decisions, but only in specific and limited circumstances; essentially, there must be a prior act of
aggression or the threat of such an act. Moreover, any such enforcement action can be vetoed by
any of the council’s five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States). Because there is no standing UN military, the forces involved must be
assembled from member states on an ad hoc basis. (Shaw, 2014)
Definition of terms

International law is distinct from international comity, which comprises legally nonbinding
practices adopted by states for reasons of courtesy (e.g., the saluting of the flags of foreign
warships at sea). In addition, the study of international law, or public international law, is
distinguished from the field of conflict of laws, or private international law, which is concerned
with the rules of municipal law as international lawyers term the domestic law of states of
different countries where foreign elements are involved. (Byers (2001)

EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

There was little scope for an international law in the period of ancient and medieval empires, and
its modern beginnings coincide, therefore, with the rise of national states after the Middle Ages.
Rules of maritime intercourse and rules respecting diplomatic agents (see diplomatic service)
soon came into existence. At the beginning of the 17th cent., the great multitude of small
independent states, which were finding international lawlessness intolerable, prepared the way
for the favorable reception given to the De jure belli ac pacis [concerning the law of war and
peace] (1625) of Hugo Grotius, the first comprehensive formulation of international law. Though
not formally accepted by any nation, his opinions and observations were afterward regularly
consulted, and they often served as a basis for reaching agreement in international disputes. The
most significant principle he enunciated was the notion of sovereignty and legal equality of all
states. Other important writers on international law were Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Georg F.
von Martens, Christian von Wolff, and Emerich Vattel.

Historical development
International law reflects the establishment and subsequent modification of a world system
founded almost exclusively on the notion that independent sovereign states are the only relevant
actors in the international system. The essential structure of international law was mapped out
during the European Renaissance, though its origins lay deep in history and can be traced to
cooperative agreements between peoples in the ancient Middle East. Among the earliest of these
agreements were a treaty between the rulers of Lagash and Umma (in the area of Mesopotamia)
in approximately 2100 bce and an agreement between the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II and
Hattusilis III, the king of the Hittites, concluded in 1258 bce. A number of pacts were
subsequently negotiated by various Middle Eastern empires. The long and rich cultural traditions
of ancient Israel, the Indian subcontinent, and China were also vital in the development of
international law. In addition, basic notions of governance, of political relations, and of the
interaction of independent units provided by ancient Greek political philosophy and the relations
between the Greek city-states constituted important sources for the evolution of the international
legal system.
Many of the concepts that today underpin the international legal order were established during
the Roman Empire. The jus gentium (Latin: “law of nations”), for example, was invented by the
Romans to govern the status of foreigners and the relations between foreigners and Roman
citizens. In accord with the Greek concept of natural law, which they adopted, the Romans
conceived of the jus gentium as having universal application. In the Middle Ages, the concept of
natural law, infused with religious principles through the writings of the Jewish philosopher
Moses Maimonides (1135–1204) and the theologian St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–1274),
became the intellectual foundation of the new discipline of the law of nations, regarded as that
part of natural law that applied to the relations between sovereign states. (Byers (2001)

After the collapse of the western Roman Empire in the 5th century ce, Europe suffered from
frequent warring for nearly 500 years. Eventually, a group of nation-states emerged, and a
number of supranational sets of rules were developed to govern interstate relations, including
canon law, the law merchant (which governed trade), and various codes of maritime law—e.g.,
the 12th-century Rolls of Oléron, named for an island off the west coast of France, and the Laws
of Wisby (Visby), the seat of the Hanseatic League until 1361. In the 15th century the arrival of
Greek scholars in Europe from the collapsing Byzantine Empire and the introduction of the
printing press spurred the development of scientific, humanistic, and individualist thought, while
the expansion of ocean navigation by European explorers spread European norms throughout the
world and broadened the intellectual and geographic horizons of western Europe. The
subsequent consolidation of European states with increasing wealth and ambitions, coupled with
the growth in trade, necessitated the establishment of a set of rules to regulate their relations. In
the 16th century the concept of sovereignty provided a basis for the entrenchment of power in the
person of the king and was later transformed into a principle of collective sovereignty as the
divine right of kings gave way constitutionally to parliamentary or representative forms of
government. Sovereignty also acquired an external meaning, referring to independence within a
system of competing nation-states. (Shaw, 2014)

Early writers who dealt with questions of governance and relations between nations included the
Italian lawyers Bartolo da Sassoferrato (1313/14–1357), regarded as the founder of the modern
study of private international law, and Baldo degli Ubaldi (1327–1400), a famed teacher, papal
adviser, and authority on Roman and feudal law. The essence of the new approach, however, can
be more directly traced to the philosophers of the Spanish Golden Age of the 16th and 17th
centuries. Both Francisco de Vitoria (1486–1546), who was particularly concerned with the
treatment of the indigenous peoples of South America by the conquering Spanish forces, and
Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) emphasized that international law was founded upon the law of
nature. In 1598 Italian jurist Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), considered the originator of the
secular school of thought in international law, published De jure belli libri tres (1598; Three
Books on the Law of War), which contained a comprehensive discussion of the laws of war and
treaties. Gentili’s work initiated a transformation of the law of nature from a theological concept
to a concept of secular philosophy founded on reason. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–
1645) has influenced the development of the field to an extent unequaled by any other theorist,
though his reputation as the father of international law has perhaps been exaggerated. Grotius
excised theology from international law and organized it into a comprehensive system, especially
in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625; On the Law of War and Peace). Grotius emphasized the freedom
of the high seas, a notion that rapidly gained acceptance among the northern European powers
that were embarking upon extensive missions of exploration and colonization around the world.
(Shaw, 2014)

The scholars who followed Grotius can be grouped into two schools, the naturalists and the
positivists. The former camp included the German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–94), who
stressed the supremacy of the law of nature. In contrast, positivist writers, such as Richard
Zouche (1590–1661) in England and Cornelis van Bynkershoek (1673–1743) in the Netherlands,
emphasized the actual practice of contemporary states over concepts derived from biblical
sources, Greek thought, or Roman law. These new writings also focused greater attention on the
law of peace and the conduct of interstate relations than on the law of war, as the focus of
international law shifted away from the conditions necessary to justify the resort to force in order
to deal with increasingly sophisticated interstate relations in areas such as the law of the sea and
commercial treaties. The positivist school made use of the new scientific method and was in that
respect consistent with the empiricist and inductive approach to philosophy that was then gaining
acceptance in Europe. Elements of both positivism and natural law appear in the works of the
German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754) and the Swiss jurist Emerich de Vattel (1714–
67), both of whom attempted to develop an approach that avoided the extremes of each school.
During the 18th century, the naturalist school was gradually eclipsed by the positivist tradition,
though, at the same time, the concept of natural rights which played a prominent role in the
American and French revolutions was becoming a vital element in international politics. In
international law, however, the concept of natural rights had only marginal significance until the
20th century.

Positivism’s influence peaked during the expansionist and industrial 19th century, when the
notion of state sovereignty was buttressed by the ideas of exclusive domestic jurisdiction and
nonintervention in the affairs of other states ideas that had been spread throughout the world by
the European imperial powers. In the 20th century, however, positivism’s dominance in
international law was undermined by the impact of two world wars, the resulting growth of
international organizations e.g., the League of Nations, founded in 1919, and the UN, founded in
1945 and the increasing importance of human rights. Having become geographically
international through the colonial expansion of the European powers, international law became
truly international in the first decades after World War II, when decolonization resulted in the
establishment of scores of newly independent states. The varying political and economic
interests and needs of these states, along with their diverse cultural backgrounds, infused the
hitherto European-dominated principles and practices of international law with new influences.
(Shaw, 2014)

The development of international law both its rules and its institutions is inevitably shaped by
international political events. From the end of World War II until the 1990s, most events that
threatened international peace and security were connected to the Cold War between the Soviet
Union and its allies and the U.S.-led Western alliance. The UN Security Council was unable to
function as intended, because resolutions proposed by one side were likely to be vetoed by the
other. The bipolar system of alliances prompted the development of regional organizations e.g.,
the Warsaw Pact organized by the Soviet Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) established by the United States and encouraged the proliferation of conflicts on the
peripheries of the two blocs, including in Korea, Vietnam, and Berlin. Furthermore, the
development of norms for protecting human rights proceeded unevenly, slowed by sharp
ideological divisions.
The Cold War also gave rise to the coalescence of a group of nonaligned and often newly
decolonized states, the so-called “Third World,” whose support was eagerly sought by both the
United States and the Soviet Union. The developing world’s increased prominence focused
attention upon the interests of those states, particularly as they related to decolonization, racial
discrimination, and economic aid. It also fostered greater universalism in international politics
and international law. The ICJ’s statute, for example, declared that the organization of the court
must reflect the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world.
Similarly, an informal agreement among members of the UN requires that nonpermanent seats
on the Security Council be apportioned to ensure equitable regional representation; 5 of the 10
seats have regularly gone to Africa or Asia, two to Latin America, and the remainder to Europe
or other states. Other UN organs are structured in a similar fashion.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s increased
political cooperation between the United States and Russia and their allies across the Northern
Hemisphere, but tensions also increased between states of the north and those of the south,
especially on issues such as trade, human rights, and the law of the sea. Technology and
globalization—the rapidly escalating growth in the international movement in goods, services,
currency, information, and persons—also became significant forces, spurring international
cooperation and somewhat reducing the ideological barriers that divided the world, though
globalization also led to increasing trade tensions between allies such as the United States and
the European Union (EU).

Since the 1980s, globalization has increased the number and sphere of influence of international
and regional organizations and required the expansion of international law to cover the rights and
obligations of these actors. Because of its complexity and the sheer number of actors it affects,
new international law is now frequently created through processes that require near-universal
consensus. In the area of the environment, for example, bilateral negotiations have been
supplemented and in some cases replaced by multilateral ones, transmuting the process of
individual state consent into community acceptance. Various environmental agreements and the
Law of the Sea treaty (1982) have been negotiated through this consensus-building process.
International law as a system is complex. Although in principle it is “horizontal,” in the sense of
being founded upon the concept of the equality of states one of the basic principles of
international law in reality some states continue to be more important than others in creating and
maintaining international law. (Shaw, 2014)

From World War I(Development)

The growth of international law came largely through treaties concluded among states accepted
as members of the "family of nations," which first included the states of Western Europe, then
the states of the New World, and, finally, the states of Asia and other parts of the world. The
United States contributed much to the laws of neutrality and aided in securing recognition of the
doctrine of freedom of the seas (see seas, freedom of the). The provisions of international law
were ignored in the Napoleonic period, but the Congress of Vienna (see Vienna, Congress of)
reestablished and added much, particularly in respect to international rivers and the classification
and treatment of diplomatic agents. The Declaration of Paris (see Paris, Declaration of) abolished
privateering, drew up rules of contraband, and stipulated rules of blockade. The Geneva
Convention (1864) provided for more humane treatment of the wounded. The last quarter of the
19th century saw many international conventions concerning prisoners of war, communication,
collision and salvage at sea, protection of migrating bird and sea life, and suppression of
prostitution. Resort to arbitration of disputes became more frequent. The lawmaking conventions
of the Hague Conferences represent the chief development of international law before World
War I. The Declaration of London (see London, Declaration of) contained a convention of prize
law, which, although not ratified, is usually followed. At the Pan-American Congresses, many
lawmaking agreements affecting the Western Hemisphere have been signed.
Effect of the World Wars
In World War I, no strong nations remained on the sidelines to give effective backing to
international law, and the concept of third party arbitration was again endangered; many of the
standing provisions of international law were violated. New modes of warfare presented new
problems in the laws of war, but attempts after the war to effect disarmament and to prohibit
certain types of weapons (see war, laws of) failed, as the outbreak and course of World War II
showed. The end of hostilities in 1945 saw the world again faced with grave international
problems, including rectification of boundaries, care of refugees, and administration of the
territory of the defeated enemy (see trusteeship, territorial). The inadequacy of the League of
Nations and of such idealistic renunciations of war as the Kellogg-Briand Pact led to the
formation of the United Nations as a body capable of compelling obedience to international law
and maintaining peace. After World War II, a notable advance in international law was the
definition and punishment of war crimes. Attempts at a general codification of international law,
however, proceeded slowly under the International Law Commission established in 1947 by the
United Nations.

B) Subjects of International Law

1. State
2. International organizations
3. Non State entities
4. Special case entities
5. Individual
6. Minorities
A subject of International Law is a person (entity) who possesses international legal personality,
i.e., capable of possessing international rights and obligations and having the capacity to take
certain types of action on the international level. Traditionally, States have been the only subjects
or persons of International Law. However, with the establishment of international organizations,
it has become necessary that a sort of international legal personality be granted to these
entities. Thus, international organizations become subjects or persons of International Law.
Beside States and international organizations, non-States entities such as members of federal
States, belligerents, insurgents, national liberation movements, and international territories are
granted a sort of international legal personality. Special international status was granted to the
Holly See and the Vatican City, and the Sovereign Order of Malta. Moreover, individuals,
ethnic minorities, and indigenous peoples are considered, in certain circumstances, subjects of
International Law. These persons and subjects of International Law are discussed in the
following.
1. States
States are the original and major subjects of International Law. Their legal personalities derive
from the very nature and structure of the international system. All States, by virtue of the
principle of sovereign equality, enjoy the same degree of international legal personality.
International Law is primarily concerned with the rights, duties and interests of States. Normally
the rules of conducts that International Law prescribes are rules which States are to observe.
Since a State is the primary concern of International Law, it is necessary to study it in a separate
chapter. Thus, the next chapter of this book is devoted to the study of a State as a subject of
International Law.
2. International Organizations
 An international organization is an association of States, established by a treaty between two or
more States. Its functions transcend national boundaries. It is for certain purposes a subject of
International Law.
The appearance of international organizations from the early part of the Nineteenth Century
raises a critical question of their status in the International Law. International organizations are
generally considered to be subjects of International Law, as are States, even though their
international legal personality is limited to possessing specific rights and duties. Their status is
determined be conventions among States and, therefore, the recognition of the international
personality of an international organization is limited to signatory States of the convention
creating such an organization.
International organizations include universal all purposes organizations, universal functional
organizations, and regional organizations. Generally, the treaty creating a public international
organization indicates its nature, purposes and powers. The international legal personality of an
international organization is, therefore, limited to the rights, duties, purposes and powers laid
down in the treaty creating it. The international legal personality of the United Nations, for
example, is derived from the United Nations Charter, the Headquarters Agreement between the
United Nations and the United States of America of 1947, and the 1946 Convention on the
Principles and Immunities of the United Nations. The attribution of an international legal
personality involves the capacity to perform legal acts, to have rights and duties and to enter into
relations on the international level. Actually, the legal capacity of the United Nations was a
question brought before the International Court of Justice. In its advisory opinion in
the Reparation for Injuries Case of 1949, the Court held that the United Nations was an
international person, although not a State, and therefore not having the same rights and duties as
a State. The United Nations had an international personality; its functions and powers were so
important that the Organization could not carry them out unless it had some degree of
international personality. The United Nations can perform legal acts such as entering into
agreements with member States and with other international organizations, concluding contracts
and bringing claims before a court. Such capacity to perform legal acts is a prerequisite of
international legal personality.
In reality, international organizations have exercised their legal capacity in a great variety of
ways. They have concluded treaties, created military forces, convened international conferences,
and brought claims against States.
3. Non-State Entities
There are certain entities, although they are not regarded as independent States, they are granted
a degree of personality, a definite and limited special type of personality, under International
Law. Such entities have certain rights and duties under International Law. They can participate
in international conferences and enter into treaty relation
However, the rights and duties of these entities in International Law are not the same as those of
the States. They have a sort of international personality. The capacity of each of them is more
limited than an independent State has since it is limited to the purpose it is existed for and the
powers or functions it can perform. These entities fall into the following categories:
(a) Members of composed States or federal States: The federal State has itself, of course, an
international legal personality, but the controversial question is whether the component units of
the federation have the personality on the international plane. Actually, the international
personality of such units and its extent can only be determined in the light of the constitution of
the State and State practice. The constitution of a federation may grant a component unit a
special international personality; however such personality will not be operative on the
international plane without being recognized as such by other States. State practice has granted
international personality to certain component units of the federation. For instance, the Soviet
Republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine were admitted as members of the United Nations in
1945 and to that extent possessed international personality. Moreover, these two Republics were
members of a number of international organizations and parties to a number of treaties.
(b) Insurgents and Belligerents: Insurgents are individuals who participate in an insurrection
(rebellion) against their government. Belligerents are a body of insurgents who by reason of their
temporary organized government are regarded as lawful combatants conducting lawful
hostilities, provided they observe the laws of war. For a long time, International Law has
recognized that insurgents and belligerents may in certain circumstances, primarily dependent
upon the de factoadministration of specific territory, be international subjects having certain
rights and duties under International Law, and may in due course be recognized as de
facto governments. They can enter into valid arrangements on the international plane with States,
international organizations, and other belligerents and insurgents. They are bound by the rules of
International Law with respect to the conduct of hostilities.
(c) National liberation movements: In the course of anti-colonial actions sponsored by the United
Nations and regional organizations, these organizations and the member States have conferred
international legal status upon certain national liberation movements. In 1974, the General
Assembly recognized the international legal status to the Angolan, Mozambican, Palestinian, and
Rhodesian movements (which had been recognized as such by the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) or the Arab League), and accorded them observer status in its meetings, in
meetings of various organs of the United Nations, in meetings of the United Nations specialized
agencies, and in conferences convened under the auspices of the United Nations. The Security
Council of the United Nations permitted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to
participate in its debates with the same rights of participation as conferred upon a member State
not a member of the Security Council.
International practice has accorded the political entities recognized as national liberation
movements a number of legal rights and duties. The most significant of these rights and duties
are the capacity to conclude binding international agreements with other international legal
persons, the capacity to participate in the proceedings of the United Nations, and the rights and
obligations of International Humanitarian Law.
(d) International territories: The term “International territory” refers to territories placed under a
variety of international legal regimes including those administered by the United Nations under
the trusteeship system or special arrangements. The Charter of the United Nations established
the trusteeship system, replacing the mandate system established by the League of Nations, to
enable the United Nations itself or a State to administer certain territories pending
independence. The United Nations is also able to administer territories in specific
circumstances. In several instances, The United Nations placed certain territories under its
transitional administration for a variety of purposes, such as the preparation for independence,
the administration of an election, the adoption of a new constitution, the implementation of a
peace settlement, and the performance of other civil functions. Examples of such instances are
Cambodia (1992-1993), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), and East Timor (1999-2002).
The territories (trust territories) placed under the trusteeship system have been accorded special
status under International Law. Their inhabitants have been granted the rights for advancement,
progressive development, and self-government or independence. Actually, all these territories
have attained independence as separate States, or have joined other independent States. The
territories placed by the United Nations under special systems, except Cambodia which has been
already an independent State, have been also accorded special status under International Law for
the purpose of assisting them in attaining their independence
4. Special case entities
There are two special case entities accorded a special unique status under International Law; they
are the Sovereign Order of Malta, and the Holly See and the Vatican City.
(a) The Sovereign Order of Malta: The Sovereign Order of Malta was established during the
Crusades as a military and medical association. It ruled Rhodes from 1309 to 1522. It was
entrusted to rule Malta by the treaty with King Charles V of England in 1530. It lost its rule of
Malta in 1798. In 1834 the Order established its headquarters in Rome as a humanitarian
organization. The Order already had international personality at the time of its taking control of
Malta and even when it had to leave the island it continued to exchange diplomatic legations
with most European States. Today, the Order maintains diplomatic relations with over forty
States.
(b) The Holy See and the Vatican City: The Holy See, which is sometimes used interchangeably
with the Vatican City, is the international legal person of the Roman Catholic Church, with its
physical location at the Vatican City in Rome and its sovereign the Pope. It is not a State in the
normal sense of the word. It is a unique person of International law because it combines the
feature of the personality of the Holy See as a religious entity with its territorial base in the
Vatican City. Apart of some one thousand Church functionaries, it has no permanent population
of its own. Its sovereign territory consists of only about one hundred acres granted it by Italy in
the 1929 Lateran Treaty. Nevertheless, the status of the Holy See as an international person is
accepted by a number of States. Its personality approximates to a State in functions. The Holy
See exchanges diplomatic representatives with other States, enters into bilateral treaties (called
concordats), and is a party to many multilateral treaties.

5. Individuals
The ultimate concern for the human being has always been the essence of International
Law. This concern was apparent in the Natural Law origin of the classical International
Law. The growth of the positivist theories of law, particularly in the Nineteenth Century,
obscured this concern for the human being and emphasized the centrality and even the
exclusivity of the State in International Law.
In the Twentieth Century, International Law became again concerned with individuals. In 1907,
the Hague Conventions initiated the concern in view of prisoners of war and the wounded.
During the Second World War, the trend of International Law had been towards attaching direct
responsibility to individuals for crimes committed against the peace and security. The Charter of
London of 1943 issued by the Allied Powers established the individual responsibility for
committing war crimes, crimes against humanities and crimes against peace. On this basis, after
the Second World War, the German leaders were brought to trial before the Nuremberg
International Tribunal (1945-1946) where their guilt was established. The Charter of the
Nuremberg International Tribunal of 1945 provided specifically for individual responsibility for
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg International
Tribunal pointed out that “international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as
well as upon states” and this was because “crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced”. The principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the decisions of this tribunal were affirmed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1946, thus making them to be part of the International Law. The Assembly also, in
1946, stated that genocide was a crime under International Law bearing individual
responsibility; and this was reaffirmed in the Genocide Convention of 1948.
Individual responsibility was also confirmed with regard to grave breaches of the Four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, which deal with armed
conflicts (International Humanitarian Law). On this basis, two specific international war crimes
tribunals were established, one for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and one for Rwanda in 1994,
to prosecute persons responsible for the serious violations of International Humanitarian Law
committed in the territory of each of these countries.
The events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda impelled the renewal of the international
concern for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, which had long been
under consideration. In 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted
at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference. The Statute provides that the jurisdiction of the
Court is limited to “the most serious crimes of concern of the international community as a
whole”, which are the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime
of aggression, and that “ A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”
In addition, after the Second World War, International law became also concerned with
individuals in the field of human rights and the fundamental freedoms. The Charter of the
United Nations started this trend in 1945 by calling upon member states to observe human rights
and fundamental freedoms for individuals and peoples. Since then, several conventions have
been concluded to define human rights and fundamental freedoms which individuals and peoples
are entitled to and to ensure their respect and protection. Among these conventions are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966.
Although, individuals as a general rule lack standing to assert violations of the above treaties in
the absence of the protest by the State of nationality, a wide range of other treaties have enabled
individuals to have direct access to international courts and tribunals. Examples of such treaties
are the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, the American Convention on Human
Rights of 1969, the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial
Discrimination of 1966, and the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966.
In conclusion, we can say that Contemporary International Law has recaptured the concern for
individuals, and individuals have become recognized as participants and subjects of this
law. This has occurred primarily through the evolution of Human Rights Law and Humanitarian
Law coming together with the evolution of the Traditional International Law. Individuals have a
sort of legal personality under International Law; they are granted certain rights and subjected to
certain obligations directly under International Law. International Law is applicable to relations
of States with individuals and to certain interrelations of individuals themselves where such
relations involve matters of international concern.

6. Minorities
The concern of International Law, in the Twentieth Century, for individuals was accompanied by
another concern for minorities. The problem of protecting national minorities in Europe
confronted the League of Nations after the First World War. The League assumed its
responsibilities in the field of treaty-based protection of minorities in Europe, in social matters,
such as health and fair labor standards. After the Second World War certain rights were granted
to the individual members of ethnic, linguistic and cultural minorities; they were granted the
right to have their identity and language respected by the State as part of the process of the
development of human rights in general. The rise of ethno-nationalism after the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 brought back the status of ethnic minorities and other groups in
International Law to be an important issue concerning the international community. Various
efforts have been made on the global and regional level to improve the legal protection of
minorities. On the Global level, there is “the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992”. On the
regional level, there are “the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages” adopted by
“the Council of Europe” in 1992, “the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities” adopted by “the Council of Europe” in 1995 and the creation of “the High
Commission for National Minorities” belonging to “the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe”.
Despite all these efforts that aimed to grant specific rights to minorities, the question remains,
what legal status should be accorded to minorities in International Law? Do minorities have
international legal personality?
There is no clear answer to these questions. Actually, the problem of minorities is very
complicated because it involves political and legal dimensions related to the meaning and legal
consequences of the principle of self-determination that may lead to loss of the concerned State
part of its territory and its control over part of its population and to the possible outside
intervention in its domestic affairs. For this reason, it is no accident that in the development of
International Law since the Second World War, the rights of minorities have been conceived as a
category of human rights which are to be exercised by the individual belonging to a minority,
rather than as group rights attributed to a collective entity as such.

7. Indigenous Peoples
In recent years, a special issue related to a category of the so-called “indigenous peoples” has
been raised. Examples of indigenous peoples are the Aborigines in Australia, the American
Indians, the Eskimos and the Maori in New Zealand. Despite the attempts by the United Nations
to recognize group rights to indigenous peoples, it is still regarded as a specific category of
minorities with special needs and having a particular relationship to their traditional territory.
In conclusion, we can say that minorities and indigenous peoples are not subjects of International
Law in any meaningful sense of the term and that they have not achieved an international legal
personality. They may receive guarantees of certain levels of treatment under international
treaties, but it does not follow that they as such have legal personality. International Law does
not attribute rights to minorities and indigenous peoples as an entity, but rather to individual
members of them.

C) Relationship between International law and Municipal Law

International Law is the law which governs the Relations of sovereign independent States inter se
Municipal law or State law or national law is the law of a State or a country and in that respect is
opposed to International Law which consists of rules which civilized States consider as binding
upon them in their mutual relations. Kelsen observes that national law regulates the behavior of
individuals International law the behavior of States or as it is put whereas national law is
concerned with the international relations the so called domestic affairs of the State.
International Law is concerned with the external relations of the State its foreign affairs.

Legislature and court systems are different on the international and municipal levels. Where the
municipal level uses a legislature to help enforce and test the laws, the international court system
relies on a series of treaties without a legislature which, in essence, makes all countries equal.

Enforcement is a major difference between municipal and international law. The municipal
courts have a law enforcement arm which helps require those it determines to follow the rules,
and if they do not they are required to attend court. The international court system has no
enforcement and must rely on the cooperation of other countries for enforcement.

There is a divergence of opinion on the question as to whether International Law and Municipal
Law on the various national laws can be said to form a unity being manifestations of a single
conception of law or whether International Law constitutes an independent system of law
essentially different from the Municipal Law. The former theory is called monistic and the latter
dualistic.

Monistic Theory: Monists assume that the internal and international legal systems form a unity.
Both national legal rules and international rules that a state has accepted, for example by way of
a treaty, determine whether actions are legal or illegal. In most monist states, a distinction
between international law in the form of treaties, and other international law, e.g. jus cogens is
made. International law does not need to be translated into national law. The act of ratifying the
international law immediately incorporates the law into national law. International law can be
directly applied by a national judge, and can be directly invoked by citizens, just as if it were
national law. A judge can declare a national rule invalid if it contradicts international rules
because, in some states, the latter have priority. In other states, like in Germany, treaties have the
same effect as legislation, and by the principle of lex posterior, only take precedence over
national legislation enacted prior to their ratification. In its most pure form, monism dictates that
national law that contradicts international law is null and void, even if it predates international
law, and even if it is the constitution.It maintains that the subject of the two systems of law
namely, International Law and Municipal Law are essentially one in as much as the former
regulates the conduct of States, while the latter of individuals. According to this view law is
essentially a command binding upon the subjects of the law independent of their will which is
one case is the States and in the other individuals. According to it International Law and
Municipal Law are two phases of one and the same thing. The former although directly
addressed to the States as corporate bodies is as well applicable to individuals for States are only
groups.

Dualistic theory: Dualists emphasize the difference between national and international law, and
require the translation of the latter into the former. Without this translation, international law
does not exist as law. International law has to be national law as well, or it is no law at all. If a
state accepts a treaty but does not adapt its national law in order to conform to the treaty or does
not create a national law explicitly incorporating the treaty, then it violates international law. But
one cannot claim that the treaty has become part of national law. Citizens cannot rely on it and
judges cannot apply it. National laws that contradict it remain in force. According to dualists,
national judges never apply international law, only international law that has been translated into
national law. According to the dualist view the systems of International Law and Municipal Law
are separate and self contained to the extent to which rules of the one are not expressly or tacitly
received into the other system. In the first place they differ as regards their sources. The sources
of Municipal Law are customs grown up within the boundaries of the State concerned and
statutes enacted therein while the sources of International Law are customs grown up within the
Family of Nations and law making treaties concluded by its members. In the second place
Municipal Laws regulates relations between the individuals under the sway of a State or between
the individuals and the State while International Law regulates relations between the member
States of the Family of Nations. Lastly there is a difference with regard to the substance of the
law in as much as Municipal Law is a law of the sovereign over individuals while International
Law is a law between sovereign State which is arrived at an agreement among them.

Transformation Theory: According to this theory it is the transformation of the treaty into
national legislation which alone validates the extension to individuals of the rules set out in
international agreements. The transformation is not merely a formal but a substantial
requirement. International Law according to this theory cannot find place in the national or
Municipal Law unless the latter allows its machinery to be used for that purpose.

This theory is fallacious in several respects. In the first place its premise that International Law
and Municipal Law are two distinct systems is incorrect. In the second place the second premise
that International Law binds States only whereas municipal law applies to individuals is also
incorrect for International Law is the sum of the rules which have been accepted by civilized
states as determining their conduct towards each other and towards each others subjects. In the
third place the theory regards the transformation of treaties into national law for their
enforcement. This is not true in all cases for the practice of transforming treaties into national
legislation is not uniform in all the countries. And this is certainly not true in the case of law
makingtreaties.
Delegation Theory: According to this theory there is the delegation of a right to every State to
decide for itself when the provisions of a treaty or convention are to come into effect and in what
manner they are to be incorporated in the law of the land or municipal law. There is no need of
transformation of a treaty into national law but the act is merely an extension of one single act.
The delegation theory is incomplete for it does not satisfactorily meet the main argument of the
transformation theory.
It is settled by the leading English and American decisions that International Law forms part of
the municipal law of those countries. The United States has unambiguously applied the doctrine
that International Law is part of the law of the land. All international conventions ratified by the
USA and such customary International Law as has received the assent of the United States are
binding upon American Courts even if they may be contrary to the statutory provisions. There is
a presumption in cases of conflict that the United States Congress did not intend to overrule
international law in India.

In India, SC has held in several cases such as Vishakha vs State of Rajasthan, Randhir vs Union
of India, Unnikrishnan vs State of Karnataka,that domestic laws of India, including the
constitution are not to be read as derogatory to International law. An effort must be made to read
the domestic law as being in harmony with the international law in case of any ambiguity. At the
same time, the constitution is still the supreme law of the land and in case of any directly conflict
the constitution will prevail.

D) Codification of International Law

It means the process of reducing the whole body of law into code in the form of enacted law. The
task of codifying International Law, if it is to mean anything, must be primarily one of bringing
about an agreed body of rules already covered by customary or conventional agreement of states.

History of Codification:
It dated back to the end of 18th century when the idea of codification of international law was
conceived by Bentham. Jeremy Bentham was a British philosopher, social reformer and Jurist.
Before him, an unsuccessful attempt was made by the French Convention to draw up a
declaration of the Rights of Nations, 1792.

Declaration of Paris: The Declaration of Paris occupies a place of significance in the

development of codification of International Law. The declaration was signed by France,
Britain, Austria, Russia, Turkey, Prussia, Sardinia after the end of Crimean war in 1856.

( Crime an war was a conflict in which Russia lost to an alliance of France, Britain, the
Ottoman Empire, and the Piedmont Sardinia (the kingdom of Sardinia).
This declaration laid down the principles relating to:

a) Abolition of Privateering
b) Non-capture of neutral goods except illegal imports of war under enemy flags
c) Blockade to be obligatory must be effective
d) Except smuggled goods of war, enemy goods cannot be captured under neutral flags.

UNIT 2

SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Introduction
Article 38(1) of the statutes of ICJ provides a reflection of the sources of international law,
though not accurate and Article 38 did not expressly mention ‘sources' but it is usually invoked
as sources of international law. Sources of international law can be characterized as ‘formal' and
‘material' sources, though the characterization is not by hierarchy but for clarification, therefore,
Article 38(1)(a-c),that is, conventions or treaties ,custom and general principles are formal
sources whereas Article 38(1)(d) that is, judicial decisions and juristic teachings are ‘material
sources'. Formal sources confer upon rules an ‘obligatory character', while material sources
comprise the ‘actual content of the rules' This essay will consider the accuracy of the sources and
other law making means

Article 38 (1) International Conventions

Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is generally recognized as a
definitive statement of the sources of international law. It requires the Court to apply, among
other things,
(a) International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
(b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.
International conventions can also be referred to as bilateral and multilateral treaties, that is, UN
charter, as well as other conventions and covenants thereafter. Treaty is as ‘an international
agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law whether
embodied in a single instruments or in two or more related instruments and whether in particular
designation'.
Treaties are governed by some rules under international law; First,Treaties are voluntary in the
sense that states cannot be bound by agreement without its consent. States are bound only if they
are parties to a treaty, though there are exceptions to this, i.e, delimitation of territorial
boundaries bind all states, they are ‘ergo omnes'(against the whole world) Secondly, agreement
and consent is by ratification of states, signature, and expression of consent to be bound and
states are bound only by reason of their consents Thirdly ,when parties consent to treaties that
codified existing customary law, two things happen; The states that are parties to the treaty are
bound in the normal way and states that are not parties to the treaty originally are bound by the
treaty because they are ‘rooted in customary law' and states that are not parties to a treaty that
codified existing customary law into code of conduct to order state future activities will still be
bound by the treaty .This indicates that customary law can become treaty and vice versa if there
is no sufficient ratification for such treaty, even after ratification, they can still overtake each
other in term of superseding preferences no matter which one is older. The fourth rule is that
treaties must be deposited at the secretariat of UN and published if ratified by states pursuant to
Article 80 of Vienna convention on the law of treaties and Article 102 of the UN charter;
whereas, unregistered treaty remain binding between parties but it may not be invoked before
court of Justice or any of the UN organs. Treaty is a means of creating obligations and binding
law for states and when state violates the treaty, it has violated the law.
Is Treaty therefore a law or obligation? The question whether treaty create law or impose
obligation generates debate streamlined between ‘contract treaties' and ‘law making treaties', that
is, whether treaties are contracts that impose obligation or ‘law making' leading to international
law. In consideration of treaty as a contract, Lord Templeman in Maclaine Watson v Dept. of
Trade and Industry said a ‘treaty is a contract between the governments of two or more
sovereign states' .Treaty is a product of negotiations between ‘legal equals' which has contractual
obligation between consenting parties. The rule that proposes obedience to treaties and make
them binding is embedded in customary international law and this is expressed in the maxim
‘pacta sunt servanda'. The only law in this view is customary international law but all ‘specific
detailed' in the treaty obligation are not law but ‘legal obligation'. On the other hand, considering
treaty as a source of law is plausible, trying to refer treaties as source of obligation is like
concealing the important role they assuage in international law. States coming together to ratify a
treaty is outright means of creating law. A state has created law for itself the moment it ratifies
the treaty and therefore legally bound. If it violates the law, it has violated international law.
The two legal effects are interwoven, the classification into ‘obligation' and ‘legal' are similar in
operation. if a state consent to treaty, the state is bound by the treaty either called ‘obligation' or
‘law' The distinction is therefore theoretical for the purpose of finding answer to the binding
nature of international law. A treaty of contract otherwise known as ‘bilateral treaty' may cease
when the purpose for which it was entered had been achieved or terminated. A ‘Law making
treaty' or ‘multilateral treaty', may be planned for enduring future purpose that will lead to an
important customary law like law of the sea convention of 1982 which was made general for all
states. It has been argued that treaties are binding on non-parties if they have customary law
origin. In North Sea Continental Shelf case, ICJ ruled that for such to be binding,‘ it would in the
first place be necessary that the provision concerned should at all events potentially, be of a
fundamentally norm creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a
general rule of law'.
The second procedure laid down by ICJ is that the provision in question ‘should have been
adopted in the practice of a sufficiently widespread and representative number of state including
those that are not parties to the treaty'. The third requirement is that opinio juris which form the
basis of legal character of state practice be satisfied. Opinio juris and state Practice are elements
of customary law. The sources are complementary and interrelated
but not necessarily hierarchical in the order of Article38. This seems to be the view of the court
in Nicaragua v USA and Danube Dam case where it was held that ‘some of the rules laid down
in the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties might be considered as a codification of existing
contemporary law' .Dixon and Mc Corquodale said ‘the court confirmed that in general, the law
applicable to a treaty is the law in force when the treaty itself comes into operation, even if
customary law has developed further since then'. However, the court did not recognize that the
‘treaty itself might permit evolving customary rule to be relevant to its operation, this seems to
be an attempt to introduce a coherency to the law irrespective of the source of any particular
obligation' Treaties can be invalid on many grounds inter alia, if it is in conflict with jus cogen.
Treaty can as well be withdrawn, terminated, suspended and reserved. The other formal source is
custom:

Article 38 (1) B- International Custom:

The important elements here are state practice, the tenacity and acceptance of such practice as
law, also known as ‘opinio juris.' Customary law may not be as ‘visible' as treaty.‘ it represents
the essential basis upon which modern human rights is grounded'. Custom is regarded as a form
of ‘tacit agreement', the behavior of states to each other in an acceptable way leads to tacit accent
to the acceptable behavior. The problem of this view is that if agreement kicks it on, absence of
agreement can kick it off. Customary law emanates as law from practice of states .Dixon refers
to it as the ‘foundation stones of the modern law of nations' and this was backed up in the Gulf of
Maine case that custom is the ideal right size for the general principles and always on ground to
fill the vacuum any time obligation and law of treaties are not gaining global acceptance. Can
customary law change? Customary law can change on the principle of ‘apprehension' and
‘acquiescence' but that does not mean customary law is not a strong rule of law, the process of
customary law continuously is a good omen to international law because it can meet up with the
timely needs of international law as the world and law develop, though, it may have its own
disadvantages of more relaxed and slow formation process, it lacks certainty and visibility unlike
treaty. it has advantage as regards to its variety of wide scopes in similarities with state activities.
Treaty has advantage where custom has disadvantage, they are like twin pillars ready to work
together in other to strengthen the sources of international law. Hugh said, ‘the way things have
always been done becomes the way things must be done rules, international law does not deviate
from the pattern discernible in municipal legal systems'.
State practice as one of the elements of customary law, it is a continuous and constant state
practice of international acts over a period of time, Governmental actions, rule
makings and execution of policies, governmental declaration and pronouncement, administrative
procedures and policies within states constitute good links and sources of state practice. In
Assylum case (Colombia v Peru), to form customary law, it must be ‘in accordance with a
constant and uniform usage practised by states in question'. This was stated in Fisheries
case(United Kingdom V Norway).The ‘uniformity' and ‘consistency' test is ‘general practice' and
not a ‘universal practice' and ‘practice of most influential and powerful states would carry the
greatest weight', deducing from the above, it doesn't mean all states participation in the practice.
‘Once a practice is established as forming part of customary International law', all states are
bound including states and the new states that failed to contribute to the practice initially.
Nevertheless, we can not rule out the ‘opt out' possibility for the ‘persistent objectors' at the
formative stage of the law, as Thirlway put it, ‘an attractive option' which will disallow the
imposition of specific rule by the majority over the minority., it has been deeply criticized in
international law, as a result of this, the practice is as stated earlier, states are bound as a general
rule either as ‘objectors' or not.
Consistency of state practice as another element is significant to the alteration of an existing
custom. In Lotus case, the court said customs must be ‘constant and uniform'. It must not be
‘totally uniform and constant'; it must at least be significantly constant state practice to become
customary international law. Also, it is well stated in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case that the
consistency required may vary in degree based on circumstance.
Generality of Practice as another element in customary law is about the knowledge of the
Custom, to significant number of states. It is a general adoption of practice by state, in North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, it may be difficult to determine the number of state to participate in
international law before a general practice can become law because it is not about majority of
votes cast, the degree depends on the various subject matters.
Opinio juris is the second element broadly considered necessary for the formation of customary
international law with state practice, Opinio juris which constitute ‘subjective element'(verbal
act) while state practice is the ‘objective element'(behavioral act) and this was well articulated by
Kammerhofer in his article that verbal act can form a practice with their content forming
‘expression of the subjective element', a statement of an act and that ‘subjective element may be
dominant factor in the behavioral act itself'. Dixion however holds that ‘state practice must be
accompanied by a belief that the practice is obligatory, the belief in the obligatory nature of the
practice is called the opinio juris' but ICJ on several occasion refer to opinio juris as having equal
footing with ‘state practice' in Continental shelf case(Libyan Arab Jamahinya V Malta) and
legality of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion .Also in Lotus case ,opinio juris was seen as
essential element of customary international law and this was affirmed in North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases but the judges however held that opinio juris cannot be implied from repeated
activities, this made the proof of opinio juris difficult but the dissenting judges in the case
realized the difficulty when they held otherwise in their minority judgement, its proof however
depends on the subject matter, thus attainment of rule to jus cogen status required strong
evidence of opinio juris apart from the fact of consistence state practice. In Nicaragua case where
state practice and opinio juris was alluded to arrive at a conclusion that use of force had attained
the status of customary rule of jus cogen before the advent of UN charter of 1945.The time
element and duration of customary law varies.
The comparison of treaty with customary law is important because they are the two major
sources of international law, the Nicaragua case mentioned briefly above affirmed the
complementary relationship between treaty and international custom. It also shows that treaty
may codify International custom and treaty may also revert to international custom if the treaty is
abandoned by states. They are interrelated though there may be conflict where the interrelated
part tends toward different obligations; ICJ may resolve the conflict depending on the stronger
obligation. In the Nicaragua case, customary law will not cease to bind because it has been
codified by treaty. Parties to treaty will be bound by it and the non-parties will be bound by
custom. if treaty falls away, customary law will take over but where there is conflict, if treaty is
latter than custom, it will prevail, this is based on common principle of law and more so that
treaty is a deliberate ‘act of law creation'where custom is latter than treaty, the treaty will still
prevail on parties.

Article 38 (1) (C)-General Principle Of Law:

This is unclear and controversial area of the source. Positivist earlier rejected this principle
because it did not conform to state will and consent like treaty and custom, but they latter
accepted it; provided it is accepted as part of state legal order. ‘The general principles of law
recognised by civilized nations' as a source tend towards exclusion of uncivilized nations.
Naturalist believes it tends to incorporate natural law into international law, they believe law
exist before any law whether treaty or custom, this differs from positive law. It is apparently
conspicuous that paragraph 1(c) added nothing to the sources which treaty and custom had taken
care of and due to this ICJ barely invoke it, it gradually went into oblivion and remain dormant
until it appeared that new areas of international law had gap and the rule was revitalized and
applied to area like international criminal law and international administrative law, recourse can
be made to the general principle of law common to all ‘major legal systems of members of the
community of nations', if treaty and custom had been exhausted with gap,that is, estoppels,
equity, and so on .Judge McNair in the ‘International Status of South West Africa Case said that
national law can be a pointer to the type of rules that might be of assistance in international law
like ‘the concept of limited liability' in Barcelona Traction case.Whether procedural,
administrative, or substantive rules, they can be imported to international law, it however need
no treaty or custom for its validation. it is well settled that concepts have ‘pre-existing legal
validity'.This principle tend more to dualistic doctrine.
Principle of equity is applicable to international Tribunals that is general principles of equity and
fairness within the scope of paragraph 1(c).it applies in decisions according to law and not by
abstractness outside law like ex aequo et bono in Article 38(2),example of equitable principle
applied are acquiescence and estoppels in River Meuse case. Paragraph 1(c) may include
‘general principles of International law' which are similar to principle in National legal system.In
general, treaty and custom growth and intensity have reduced the weight of general principle of
law as the source of international law.

Article 38 (1) (D) Judicial Decisions:

Article 38(1) d ‘shall apply subject to the provisions of Article 59,Judicial decisions…' and
Article 59 of the ICJ statutes states that the court decisions have ‘no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case'. Judicial decisions are material area of
Sources of law. Though, there may be no stare decisis as stated in Article 59, recourse can still
be made by court to its past decisions res judicata and advisory opinion to substantiate current
case as authoritative evidence of legal position, for example, in Nauru case, the principle of
Nicaragua case were relied upon to reach the majority decisions. Also, judicial decisions
constitute much of the source of ‘international maritime law' and ‘it is clear that the ICJ pays
great regard to both the actual decisions it has reached in previous cases and to the law it has
declared therein'. It is submitted that ICJ participates in law making process and technical
impediment on this is more in theory than in practice. Court participates in law making process
through case law, judges' rule and advisory opinion in breaking new area of international law.
Dixon confirmed this by saying ‘The attempt to protect state sovereignty by limiting the
functions of the ICJ and ICC to one of simple adjudication rather than law creation largely has
failed'. Antonio also said ‘ICJ has gone so far as, in fact , to set new international rule in spite of
its aforementioned lack of formal power to do so' Writing of Publicists which paragraph1 (d)
refers to as ‘subsidiary means'. Arbitral tribunals and national courts consult writing of publicist
while international court make little use of ‘doctrine' but where the writing of publicist is
productive is the draft article, reports and secretariat memorandum produced by the International
Law Commission and Resolution of the Institute of International Law Commission and that of
the Institute of International Law. Nowadays the opinion of writers has become less important
since states now express themselves well through organs of UN and most importantly that
writers are subjective in their writings due to opinionated reasons.
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
A United Nations Security Council resolution is a UN resolution adopted by the fifteen members
of the Security Council; the UN body charged with "primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security".
The UN Charter specifies (in Article 27) that a draft resolution on non-procedural matters is
adopted if nine or more of the fifteen Council members vote for the resolution, and if it is
not voted by any of the five permanent members. Draft resolutions on "procedural matters" can
be adopted on the basis of an affirmative vote by any nine Council members.
The five permanent members are the People's Republic of China (which replaced the Republic of
China in 1971), France, Russia(which replaced the defunct Soviet Union in 1991), the United
Kingdom, and the United States.[1]

Terms and functions mentioned in the UN Charter

The term "resolution" does not appear in the text of the United Nations Charter. It contains
numerous formulations, such as "decision" or "recommendation", which imply the adoption of
resolutions which do not specify the method to be used.
The UN Charter is a multilateral treaty. It is the constitutional document that distributes powers
and functions among the various UN organs. It authorizes the Security Council to take action on
behalf of the members, and to make decisions and recommendations. The Charter mentions
neither binding nor non-binding resolutions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory
opinion in the 1949 "Reparations" case indicated that the United Nations Organization had both
explicit and implied powers. The Court cited Articles 104 and 2(5) of the Charter, and noted that
the members had granted the Organization the necessary legal authority to exercise its functions
and fulfill its purposes as specified or implied in the Charter, and that they had agreed to give the
United Nations every assistance in any action taken in accordance with the Charter.
Article 25 of the Charter says that "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter". The Repertory
of Practice of United Nations Organs, a UN legal publication, says that during the United
Nations Conference on International Organization which met in San Francisco in 1945, attempts
to limit obligations of Members under Article 25 of the Charter to those decisions taken by the
Council in the exercise of its specific powers under Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter
failed. It was stated at the time that those obligations also flowed from the authority conferred on
the Council under Article 24(1) to act on the behalf of the members while exercising its
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 24, interpreted in
this sense, becomes a source of authority which can be drawn upon to meet situations which are
not covered by the more detailed provisions in the succeeding articles. The Repertory on Article
24 says: "The question whether Article 24 confers general powers on the Security Council
ceased to be a subject of discussion following the advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice rendered on 21 June 1971 in connection with the question of Namibia (ICJ Reports, 1971,
page 16)".
In exercising its powers the Security Council seldom bothers to cite the particular article or
articles of the UN Charter that its decisions are based upon. In cases where none are mentioned,
a constitutional interpretation is required. This sometimes presents ambiguities as to what
amounts to a decision as opposed to a recommendation, and also the relevance and interpretation
of the phrase "in accordance with the present Charter".
Resolutions by the Security Council are legally binding. If the council cannot reach consensus or
a passing vote on a resolution, they may choose to produce a non-binding presidential
statement instead of a Resolution. These are adopted by consensus. They are meant to apply
political pressure — a warning that the Council is paying attention and further action may
follow.
Press statements typically accompany both resolutions and presidential statements, carrying the
text of the document adopted by the body and also some explanatory text. They may also be
released independently, after a significant meeting.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

A United Nations General Assembly Resolution is voted on by all member states of the United
Nations in the General Assembly.
General Assembly resolutions usually require a simple majority (50 percent of all votes plus one)
to pass. However, if the General Assembly determines that the issue is an "important question"
by a simple majority vote, then a two-thirds majority is required; "important questions" are those
that deal significantly with maintenance of international peace and security, admission of new
members to the United Nations, suspension of the rights and privileges of membership,
expulsion of members, operation of the trusteeship system, or budgetary questions.
Although General Assembly resolutions are generally non-binding towards member states,
internal resolutions may be binding on the operation of the General Assembly itself, for example
with regard to budgetary and procedural matters.
General Assembly Resolutions

1946
Resolution 1: Established the United Nations Atomic Energy
Commission (UNAEC) "to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic
energy" and tasked to "make specific proposals... for the elimination from national
armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction", among other issues regarding nuclear technology.
1947
Resolution 177: International Law Commission was directed to "formulate the
principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and
in the judgment of the Tribunal." This resulted in the creation of the Nuremberg
Principles.
Resolution 181: The 1947 UNGA 'Partition resolution' regarding the British
Mandate of Palestine.
1948
Resolution 194: Recommends the "Right of return" for Palestinian refugees and
for Jewish refugees.
Resolution 217: Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Resolution 260: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
1949
Resolution 273: Admits the State of Israel to membership in the United Nations.
Resolution 289: On the Question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies:
recommending that Libya should be independent not later than January 1, 1952[1]
1950
Resolution 377 A: The "Uniting for Peace" Resolution
1951
Resolution 498: calling on the People's Republic of China to cease all hostilities
on the Korean peninsula... its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea and their
large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces there...has itself engaged in aggression in
Korea[2][3][4]
Resolution 500: Recommend general trade embargo against People's Republic of
China and North Korea for their aggression in Korea[4]
1952
Resolution 505: Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity
of China (Republic of China) and to the peace of the Far East, resulting
from Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 14 August
1945 and from Soviet violations of the Charter of the United Nations
1955
 Resolution 977(X): Establishing the United Nations Memorial
Cemetery in Busan, South Korea for United Nations Command casualties of the Korean
War.[5]
1960
Resolution 1514: Declaration on the granting of independence
to colonial countries and peoples.
Resolution 1541: United Nations definition of what a colony is, and what self-
determination is. Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not
an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 e of the
Charter.
1961
Resolution 1631: Admission of Mauritania to membership in the United Nations.
1962
Resolution 1761: Recommended sanctions against South Africa in response to the
government’s policy of apartheid.
1963
Resolution 1962: One of the earliest resolutions governing Outer space.
Resolution 1991: Amended the UN Charter, enlarging the Security Council to
fifteen members.
1971
Resolution 2758: Expelled the Republic of China and replaced it with the People's
Republic of China. It also recognized the PRC as the sole legal authority
of China. (See China and the United Nations)
1972
Resolution 3010: Adopted to make the year 1975 International Women's Year.
1973
Resolution 3068: International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid adopted and opened for signature, and ratification by Resolution
3068, 30 November 1973, and entered into force on 18 July 1976.
1974
Resolution 3275: Adopted 1975, International Women's Year, as a period of
intensified action with regards to equal rights and recognition of women.
Resolution 3314: Defined aggression.
1975
Resolution 3379: Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination; revoked
by Resolution 46/86.
Resolution 3520: Adopted the World Plan of Action and related resolutions from
the International Women's Year Conference.
1976
Resolution 31/72: Adopted the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention
Resolution 31/136: Adopted the period from 1976 to 1985 as the United Nations
Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace.
1978
 Resolution 33/75: Urges the Security Council, especially its permanent members,
to take all necessary measures for insuring UN decisions on he maintenance of
international peace and security. United States and Israel were the only no vote.
1979
Resolution 34/37: Deplored Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara and urged to
terminate it.
1981
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/3: Admission of Belize to
membership in the United Nations.[6]
1989
Resolution 44/34: The UN Mercenary Convention
1991
Resolution 46/86: revoked Resolution 3379.
1993
Resolution 47/121: condemned ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims by the
Bosnian Serbs as genocide, (fourteen years later the International Court of Justice ruled
in the Bosnian Genocide Case of 2007, that ethnic cleansing was not enough in itself to
be genocide, but that there must also be intent to kill a substantial part of the targeted
group by the perpetrators).
Resolution 48/114: Emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced
persons in Azerbaijan.
2000
Resolution 55/56: Introduced a process to certify the origin of rough diamonds
from sources that are conflict-free
2006
Resolution 60/285: The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
Resolution 61/106: Adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities.[7]
2007
Resolution 61/295: Establishes the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.
Resolution 61/255: Condemned without any reservation any denial of the
Holocaust[8]
Resolution 62/149: Called for a universal moratorium on Capital Punishment with
a view to total abolition, and in the meantime, respect for the rights of those on death
row. Calls on states which have abolished the death penalty not to reintroduce it.
Resolution 62/167: Expressed serious concern about human rights in North
Korea.[9]
2008
Resolution 62/63: Criminal Accountability of UN Officials and Experts on
Mission.
Resolution 62/243: The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.
2012
 Resolution 67/19: Recognising the State of Palestine as a non-member observer
state.
2014
Resolution 68/262: Territorial integrity of Ukraine.
2015
Resolution 69/292 - Development of an international legally-binding instrument
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and
sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.[10]
2016
Resolution 70/1 - The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on
the Internet.

UNIT-3: Recognition, Extradition and the Law of the Sea

A. Recognition
A.1) Theories of Recognition
A.2) Declaratory And Constitutive Theories Of State

A.3) Declaratory And Constitutive Theories Of State Recognition In International Law

Introduction
In international law, the two most common schools of thought for the creation of statehood are
the constitutive and declaratory theories of state creation. The constitutive theory was the
standard nineteenth-century model of statehood, and the declaratory theory was developed in the
twentieth century to address shortcomings of the constitutive theory. In the constitutive theory, a
state exists exclusively via recognition by other states. The theory splits on whether this
recognition requires "diplomatic recognition" or merely "recognition of existence". No other
state grants Sea land official recognition, but it has been argued by Bates that negotiations
carried out by Germany constituted "recognition of existence". In the declaratory theory of
statehood, an entity becomes a state as soon as it meets the minimal criteria for statehood.
Therefore recognition by other states is purely "declaratory". Neither theory of recognition
satisfactorily explains modern practice. The declaratory theory assumes that territorial entities
can readily, by virtue of their mere existence, be classified as having one particular legal status: it
thus, in a way, confuses ‘fact' with ‘law'. For, even if effectiveness is the dominant principle, it
must nonetheless be a legal principle. A State is not a fact in the sense that a chair is a fact; it is a
fact in the sense in which it may be said a treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status attaching to a
certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules or practices. And the declaratory theorist's
equation of fact with law also obscures the possibility that the creation of States might be
regulated by rules predicated on other fundamental principles—a possibility that, as we shall see,
now exists as a matter of international law. On the other hand, the constitutive theory, although it
draws attention to the need for cognition, or identification, of the subjects of international law,
and leaves open the possibility of taking into account relevant legal principles not based on ‘fact',
incorrectly identifies that cognition with diplomatic recognition, and fails to consider the
possibility that identification of new subjects may be achieved in accordance with general rules
or principles rather than on an ad hoc, discretionary basis.

Background
Recognition constitutes acceptance of a particular situation by the recognising state both in terms
of the relevant factual criteria and in terms of the consequential legal repercussions, so that, for
example, recognition of an entity as the government of a state implies not merely that this
government is deemed to have satisfied the required considerations, but also that the recognising
state will deal with the government as the governing authority of the state and accept the usual
legal consequences of such status in terms of privileges and immunities within the domestic legal
order. Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1970 held that the test employed was
whether or not the new government enjoyed: ‘with a reasonable prospect of permanence, the
obedience of the mass of the population … effective control of much of the greater part of the
territory concerned'. There is ample authority for the proposition that there is no difference for
the present purposes between a recognition of a State de facto as opposed to de jure. The non-
belligerent State which recognizes two Governments, one de jure and one de facto, will not allow
them to transfer their quarrels to the area of the jurisdiction of its municipal Courts. As in Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 HL Lord Reid, while referring
to the case of Luther v Sagor, held: ‘But the present case is essentially different.
The German Democratic Republic was set up by the USSR and it derived its authority and status
from the Government of the USSR. So the only question could be whether or not it was set up as
a sovereign state. ... If the Democratic Republic did not become a sovereign state at its inception,
there is no suggestion that it has at any subsequent time attempted to deprive the USSR of rights
which were not granted to it at its inception. ... we must regard the acts of the German
Democratic Republic, its government organs and officers as acts done with the consent of the
Government of the USSR as the government entitled to exercise governing authority. (Brownlie,
Ian, 2003 85-101) It appears to me to be impossible for any de jure sovereign governing
authority to disclaim responsibility for acts done by subordinate bodies which it has set up and
which have not attempted to usurp its sovereignty. So, in my opinion, the courts of this country
cannot treat as nullities acts done by or on behalf of the German Democratic Republic. ... [were
they to do so] the result would be far-reaching.' Lord Wilberforce: ‘... In the United States some
glimmerings can be found for the idea that non-recognition cannot be pressed to its ultimate
logical limit, and that where private rights, or acts of everyday occurrence, or perfunctory acts of
administration are concerned the courts may, in the interests of justice and common sense, where
no consideration of public policy to the contrary has to prevail, give recognition to the actual
facts or realities found to exist in the territory in question.' Gur Corporation v Trust Bank of
Africa Ltd [1987] QB 599 [Sir John Donaldson MR held: ‘We … know the constitutional history
of the territory of the Ciskei, … and we can take judicial notice of the fact that the Republic of
South Africa is a sovereign state, … and that it was entitled to exercise sovereignty over the
territory of the Ciskei until the passing of the Status of Ciskei Act 1981. … the certified fact that
“Her Majesty's Government has made representation to the South African Government in
relation to certain matters occurring in Ciskei and other of the Homelands to which South Africa
has purported to grant independence” gives rise to a clear inference that Her Majesty's
Government regards the Republic of South Africa as continuing to be entitled to exercise
sovereign authority over the territory.
The Government of the Republic of Ciskei has locus standi in the courts of this country as being
a subordinate body set up by the Republic of South Africa to act on its behalf.' Fundamentally
the question is whether international law is itself, in one of its most important aspects, a coherent
or complete system of According to predominant nineteenth-century doctrine there were no rules
determining what were ‘States' for the purposes of international law; the matter was within the
discretion of existing recognized States.” Recognition (1) The early view of recognition
Although the early writers occasionally dealt with problems of recognition, it had no separate
place in the law of nations before the middle of the eighteenth century. The reason for this was
clear: sovereignty; in its origin merely the location of supreme power within a particular
territorial unit (suprema potestas), necessarily came from within and did not require the
recognition of other States or princes. As Pufendorf stated: ‘just as a king owes his sovereignty
and majesty to no one outside his realm, so he need not obtain the consent and approval of other
kings or states, before he may carry himself like a king and be regarded as such... [lit would
entail an injury for the sovereignty of such a king to be called in question by a foreigner.' (Harris,
D.J., 1998 144-189)
The doubtful point was whether recognition by the parent State of a new State formed by
revolution from it was necessary, and that doubt related to the obligation of loyalty to a superior,
which, it was thought, might require release: the problem bore no relation to constitutive theory
in general. The position of recognition towards the end of the eighteenth century was as stated by
Alexandrowicz: ‘In the absence of any precise and formulated theory, recognition had not found
a separate place in the works of the classic writers whether of the naturalist or early positivist
period. When recognition did begin to attract more detailed consideration, about the middle of
the eighteenth century, it was in the context of recognition of monarchs, especially elective
monarchs: that is, in the context of recognition of governments. leaders that they are, or should
be, free to recognize or not to recognize on grounds of their own choosing.
If this is the case, the international status and rights of whole peoples and territories will seem to
depend on arbitrary decisions and political contingencies. (1) Recognition: the great debate
Before examining State practice on the matter, it is necessary to refer again to the underlying
conflict over the nature of recognition. A further effect of nineteenth-century practice has been to
focus attention more or less exclusively on the act of recognition itself, and its legal effects,
rather than on the problem of the elaboration of rules determining the status, competence and so
on of the various territorial governmental units. To some extent this was inevitable, as long as the
constitutive position retained its influence, for a corollary of that position was that there could be
no such rules. Examination of the constitutive theory is, therefore, first of all necessary. Legal
and Political Dimensions of Recognition Policy: Constitutive, Declaratory, and Syncretistic
Theories of State Creation Recognition is defined as, "The free act by which one or more States
acknowledge the existence on a definite territory of a human society politically organized,
independent of any other existing State, and capable of observing the obligations of international
law, and by which they manifest therefore their intention to consider it a member of the
international Community. In its first opinion, handed down on November 29th 1991, the EC
Arbitration Commission (ECAC) clearly stipulated that its own approach to recognition was to
be guided by the notion that the "existence or disappearance of a State is a question of fact; that
the effects of recognition by other States is purely declaratory." This "declaratory" interpretation
of recognition must be examined more closely given the fact that the EC's own recognition
policy effectively went a long way towards creating such "facts" by redefining the terms of
statehood.
The way in which narrow political, economic, and strategic interests served to structure the
recognition process casts doubt on the legitimacy of the EC's recognition process as a precedent
guiding public international law in the future (especially in terms of its contravention of UN
policy towards Yugoslavia at the time, which emphasized an arms embargo, the unity of the
State, mediation, and the avoidance of any unilateral moves that may destabilize the situation by
both internal and external actors involved in the crisis). Constitutive Theories According to
Thomas Grant, this theory is in tune with the 19th century conception of international law as ius
gentium voluntarium, which essentially posits that international law is nothing more than the
voluntary and consensual behavior of states within the international system. Thus according to
constitutive theory, recognition and by extension statehood are, both in theory and in practice,
the sovereign prerogative of those states that are already recognized within the international
system. If recognition is constitutive of statehood then, critics have asked, what exactly is the
status of an entity that meets the objective criteria of statehood but that goes unrecognized by the
international community (Do any laws regulate the relations between the state in question and
those that do not recognize its legitimacy (consider Israel/Palestine)? Such serious conceptual
and practical difficulties with constitutive theories of recognition have given rise to alternative
interpretations of such acts. Traditionally two theories of recognition were developed:
constitutive and declaratory. The constitutive theory perceives recognition as "a necessary act
before the recognized entity can enjoy an international personality," while the declaratory theory
perceives it as "'merely' a political act recognizing a preexisting state of affairs." In regard to the
constitutive theory of recognition, the question of "whether or not an entity has become a state
depends on the actions [i.e., recognitions] of existing states.
However, the situation in which one state may be recognized by some states, but not by others, is
an evident problem and thus a great deficiency of the constitutive theory. In the absence of a
central international authority for granting of recognition, this would mean that such an entity at
the same time has and does not have an international personality. Most writers have adopted a
view that recognition is declaratory. This means that a "state may exist without being recognized,
and if it does exist, in fact, then whether or not it has been formally recognized by other states, it
has a right to be treated by them as a state. According to this view, when recognition actually
follows, other states merely recognize a preexisting situation. However, this answer is not
entirely satisfactory, as it is not evident why the act of recognition is still important. Indeed: It is
only by recognition that the new state acquires the status of a sovereign state under international
law in its relations with the third states recognising it as such. If it were to acquire this legal
status before and independently of recognition by the existing states ... this legal consequence
under international law would occur automatically and could no longer be prevented by
withholding recognition of the entity as a state.
Declaratory Theories Declaratory theory emerged as a reaction to the unprincipled implications
and conceptual difficulties inherent in a strictly constitutive approach to recognition. Declaratory
theory argues instead that statehood is independent of recognition; that the act of recognition by
other states in the international system is purely declaratory. In terms of international public law,
therefore, it argues that a state becomes a subject of international law the moment it meets the
conditions of statehood notwithstanding its recognition by the international community. Such an
evolution of recognition theory was inspired by attempts to ensure that international law would
be universal in application to all entities that meet the objective criteria of statehood within the
system by insulating the objective achievement of statehood, from the subjective criteria of
recognition. In light of these motivations, it is natural that a key component of declaratory theory
is the establishment of objective criteria for statehood. However, as skeptics like Grant have
argued, this interpretation of recognition also runs into problems for two important reasons.
First of all, the Montevideo criteria of statehood are rather minimal in scope and even then
substantial controversy surrounds their application and interpretation. Suggestions for raising the
bar for statehood and infusing the concept with additional normative criteria along these lines
have in recent years included a widening range of requirements. These include the suggestions --
which have drawn varying degrees of support in terms of international law -- that a new state be:
self-determining; democratic; established through peaceful means, legally, and by a negotiated
settlement; independent; an observer of minority rights; be willing and able to observe
international law; and "effective" with respect to the governance of the populations it contains.
Grant argues that current projects for the elaboration of "Montevideo Plus" criteria for statehood
are -- while legitimately attempting to infuse statehood with considerations that better reflect
changing normative standards (such as the right to self-determination and independence for
colonial peoples and those suffering alien occupation) -- inherently suspect in that they again
reinsert ambiguity into the processes of establishing and confirming the juridical personality of
states within the current system.
 A.2) Defacto and Dejure Recognition

De-facto recognition.
It is extended where a govt. has not acquired sufficient stability. It is provisional (temporary
or conditional0 recognition. It is not legal recognition. However, it is recognition in principle.
Three conditions for giving de-facto recognition. (i) permanence (ii) the govt. commands popular
support (iii) the govt. fulfills international obligations.

De-Jure Recognition.
It is legal recognition. It means that the govt. recognized formally fulfills the requirement laid
down by International law. De-jure recognition is complete and full and normal relations can be
maintained.
De-facto recognition of a state is a step towards de-jure recognition. Normally the existing
states extend de-facto recognition to the new states or govts. It is after a long lapse of time when
they find that there is stability in it that they grant de-jure recognition. Such practice is common
among the states. The essential feaure of de-facto recognition is that it is provisional and liable to
be withdrawn.

A.3) Forms of Recognition

There are following two forms for the declaration of recognition.
1. Express Recognition.
2. Implied Recognition.
• Express Recognition: – The declaration or notification by an existing state which
purports the intention to recognize a newly born state, the recognition is said to
be express recognition. In other words, when a formal and express declaration or
statement is made and published or sent to the opposite party, the recognition is
said to be express recognition.
• Implied Recognition: – When the existing state shows its intention of
recognition of a newly born state by some acts, the recognition is said to be
implied recognition. In other words, in case of implied recognition no formal
statement or declaration is to be made, rather the intention of recognition is to be
collected by the acts or transactions of the existing state. So, if such acts purport
intention of recognition, it is said to be implied recognition.

Conditional Recognition: – The grant of recognition by an existing state to a newly born state
stipulated on fulfillment some conditions in addition to the requirements of statehood is said to
be conditional recognition. As for as, the recognition is concerned it is itself conditioned with the
fulfillment of the essentials of statehood, that is to say, the new state must occupy some territory,
has some population, government and sovereignty. If these requirements have been complied
with by the new state, then that should be recognized by existing states. But as for as, the
recognition is concerned it is usually based on some political considerations. So, in the pursuance
of these considerations the existing states sometimes declare recognition but stipulated with
certain other conditions for the recognized state to be fulfilled.

A.4) Withdrawal of Recognition

Withdrawal of recognition may be explained as under:

1. Withdrawal of de facto Recognition: – Withdrawal of de facto recognition is possible

under international law only on the ground that if the recognized state has been failed to
fulfill the pre requisite condition for statehood. In such a case the recognizing state may
withdraw from the recognition by communicating a declaration to the authorities of
recognized stated or by a public statement.
2. Withdrawal of de jure Recognition: – There are different views about the withdrawal of
de jure recognition. But according to the strict letters of international law and by the
virtue of some conventions in this behalf, it is evident that the withdrawal of de jure
recognition is not valid in any case. Though recognition is a political act but de jure but it
by nature and status it is a legal oriented. But some jurists think that de jure recognition
may be withdrawn, because it is a political act. But in fact it is not so. Only those de jure
recognitions may be withdrawn where a state subsequently loses any essential of
statehood. In such a case the state withdrawing from recognition shall send his express
intention to the concerned authority issue a public statement to that extent.

B.Extradition and Asylum

Extradition is the act by one jurisdiction of delivering a person who has been accused of
committing a crime in another jurisdiction or has been convicted of a crime in that other
jurisdiction into the custody of a law enforcement agency of that other jurisdiction. It is a
cooperative law enforcement process between the two jurisdictions and depends on the
arrangements made between them. Besides the legal aspects of the process, extradition also
involves the physical transfer of custody of the person being extradited to the legal authority of
the requesting jurisdiction.
Through the extradition process, one sovereign jurisdiction typically makes a formal request to
another sovereign jurisdiction ("the requested state"). If the fugitive is found within the territory
of the requested state, then the requested state may arrest the fugitive and subject him or her to
its extradition process. The extradition procedures to which the fugitive will be subjected are
dependent on the law and practice of the requested state
Between countries, extradition is normally regulated by treaties. Where extradition is compelled
by laws, such as among sub-national jurisdictions, the concept may be known more generally
as rendition. It is an ancient mechanism, dating back to at least the 13th century BC, when an
Egyptian Pharaoh, Ramesses II, negotiated an extradition treaty with Hittite King, Hattusili III.

B.1) State Jurisdiction

Definition
State jurisdiction is the capacity of a State under International Law to prescribe the rules of law,
enforce the prescribed rules of law and to adjudicate.
State Jurisdiction, also means that a state court has the right to make a legally binding decision
that affects the parties involved in the case.
It is derived from State sovereignty and constitutes its vital and central feature. It is the authority
of a State over persons, property and events which are primarily within its territories.

SCOPE & EXTENT OF STATE JURISDICTION

State jurisdiction may extend beyond its territory over persons and things which have a national
link. There are grounds or principles upon which the State can assert its jurisdiction within and
beyond its boundaries.
Nevertheless, there are certain persons, property and events within a State territory which are
immune from its jurisdiction.

Types of State Jurisdiction

It is of three types: legislative jurisdiction, executive jurisdiction and judicial jurisdiction.

Legislative jurisdiction
Legislative jurisdiction is the capacity of a State to prescribe rules of law. A State has the
supremacy to make binding laws within its territory. It has legislative exclusivity in many areas.
This supremacy is entrusted to constitutionally recognized organs.
Although legislation is primarily enforceable within a state territory, it may extend beyond its
territory in certain circumstances. International Law, for example, accepts that a State may levy
taxes against persons not within its territory as long as there is a real link between the State and
the proposed taxpayer, whether it is nationality or domicile.
The legislative supremacy of a State within its territory is well established in International Law.
However, this supremacy may be challenged in cases where a State adopts laws that are contrary
to the rules of International Law. In such cases, a State will be liable for breach of International
Law. A State may also be liable for breach of International Law if it abuses its rights to legislate
for its nationals abroad.

Executive Jurisdiction
It is the capacity of a State to act and to enforce its laws within its territory. Generally, since
States are independent of each other and possess territorial sovereignty, they have no authority to
carry out their functions on foreign territory. No state has the authority to infringe the territorial
sovereignty of another State. In this sense, a State cannot enforce its laws upon foreign territory
without the consent of the host State; otherwise it will be liable for breach of International Law.

Judicial Jurisdiction
It is the capacity of the courts of a State to try legal cases. A State has an exclusive authority to
create courts and assign their jurisdiction, and to lay down the procedures to be followed.
However, in doing so, it cannot by any means alter the way in which foreign courts operate.
There are a number of principles upon which the courts of a State can claim jurisdiction. In civil
matters, the principles range from the mere presence of the defendant in the territory of a State to
the nationality and domicile principles. In criminal matters, they range from territorial principle
to universality principle.
Principles of Jurisdiction
Generally, the exercise of civil jurisdiction by courts of a State has been claimed upon far wider
grounds than has been the case in criminal matters.
As far as criminal jurisdiction is concerned, the grounds or principles of jurisdiction mostly
invoked by States are as follows.
The Territorial Principle
This principle is derived from the concept of State sovereignty. It means that a State has the
primary jurisdiction over all events taking place in its territory regardless of the nationality of the
person responsible. It is the dominant ground of jurisdiction in International Law. All other State
must respect the supremacy of the State over its territory, and consequently must not interfere in
its internal affairs or in its territorial jurisdiction.
The territorial jurisdiction of State extends over its land, its national airspace, its internal water,
its territorial sea, its national aircrafts, and its national vessels. It encompasses not only crimes
committed on its territory but also crimes that have effects within its territory. In such a case a
concurrent jurisdiction occurs, a subjective territorial jurisdiction may be exercised by the State
in whose territory the crime was committed, and an objective territorial jurisdiction may be
exercised by the State in whose territory the crime had its effect.
Although jurisdiction is primarily and predominantly territorial, it is not exclusive. A State is free
to confer upon other States the right to exercise certain jurisdiction within its national territory.
States are free to arrange the right of each one to exercise certain jurisdiction within each
national territory. The most significant recent examples of such arrangements are:

• The 1991 France-United Kingdom Protocol Concerning Frontier Control and Policing, under
which the frontier control laws and regulations of each State are applicable and may be enforced
by its officers in the control zones of the other;

• The 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, under which the Israeli criminal laws are applicable to
Israeli nationals and the activities involving only them in the specified areas under Jordan’s
sovereignty, and measures can be taken in the areas by Israel to enforce such laws.

The Nationality Principle

The nationality principle implies that a State jurisdiction extends to its nationals and actions they
take beyond its territory. It is based upon the notion that the link between the State and its
nationals is a personal one independent of location.
Criminal jurisdiction based on the nationality principle is universally accepted. While civil law
countries make extensive use of it, the Common Law countries use it with respect to major
crimes such as murder and treason. The Common Law countries, however, do not challenge the
extensive use of this principle by other countries.
a) A State may prosecute its nationals for crimes committed anywhere in the world; the ground
of this jurisdiction is known as active nationality principle.
b) Also, it may claim jurisdiction for crimes committed by aliens against their nationals abroad;
the ground of this jurisdiction is known as passive national principle.
This last principle has been viewed as much weaker than the territorial or active nationality
principle as a basis for jurisdiction. It has been considered as a secondary basis for jurisdiction,
and a matter of considerable controversy among States. However, in recent years this principle
has come to be much acceptable by the international community in the sphere of terrorist and
other internationally condemned crimes.

B.2) Customary Law Basis

Customary international law is an aspect of international law involving the principle of

custom. Along with general principles of law and treaties, custom is considered by
the International Court of Justice, jurists, the United Nations, and its member states to be among
the primary sources of international law.
Many governments accept in principle the existence of customary international law, although
there are differing opinions as to what rules are contained in it.

Recognition of customary international law

The International Court of Justice Statute defines customary international law in Article 38(1)(b)
as "evidence of a general practice accepted as law." This is generally determined through two
factors: the general practice of states and what states have accepted as law.
There are several different kinds of customary international laws recognized by states. Some
customary international laws rise to the level of jus cogens through acceptance by the
international community as non-derogable rights, while other customary international law may
simply be followed by a small group of states. States are typically bound by customary
international law regardless of whether the states have codified these laws domestically or
through treaties.
Jus cogens
See jus cogens.
A peremptory norm (also called jus cogens, Latin for "compelling law") is a fundamental
principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a
norm from which no derogation is ever permitted. These norms rooted from Natural Law
principles, and any laws conflicting with it should be considered null and void. Examples
include various international crimes; a state which carries out or
permits slavery, torture, genocide, war of aggression, or crimes against humanity is always
violating customary international law.
Jus cogens and customary international law are not interchangeable. All jus cogens are
customary international law through their adoption by states, but not all customary international
laws rise to the level of peremptory norms. States can deviate from customary international law
by enacting treaties and conflicting laws, but jus cogens are non-derogable.

Codification of international customary law

Some international customary laws have been codified through treaties and domestic laws, while
others are recognized only as customary law.
The laws of war, also known as jus in bello, were long a matter of customary law before they
were codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Conventions, and other
treaties. However, these conventions do not purport to govern all legal matters that may arise
during war. Instead, Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I dictates that customary international
law governs legal matters concerning armed conflict not covered by other agreements.
Silence as consent
Generally, sovereign nations must consent in order to be bound by a particular treaty or legal
norm. However, international customary laws are norms that have become pervasive enough
internationally that countries need not consent in order to be bound. In these cases, all that is
needed is that the state has not objected to the law. However, states that object to customary
international law before these laws may not be bound by them unless these laws are deemed to
be jus cogens. However, in a dispute with any nation that has not affirmed the "silence implies
consent" principle, any invocation of the "silence implies consent" principle involves an appeal
to custom, such that if that nation does not espouse the broader premise of acknowledging the
existence of customary international law, such an appeal will depend on circular
reasoning ("customary international law is binding because silence implies consent, and silence
implies consent because the fact that silence implies consent is one aspect of customary
international law").

Consent and International Customary Law

It is commonly said that the international community is ‘anarchical’, in that there is no layer of
higher government with absolute power to treat states like citizens. This is in a way unsurprising,
since most states could (if pressed) rely solely on themselves for survival. States are thus in a
position, unlike individual humans, to refuse the benefits and reciprocal responsibilities of
participating in a community under law.
In recognition of this reality, it has long been a tenet of international law that a state must
expressly consent to a rule (by, for example, signing a treaty) before it can be legally bound by
the rule.Customary international law not only upsets this idea of consent, it does it by stealth.
The International Court of Justice
The Statute of the International Court of Justice acknowledges the existence of customary
international law in Article 38(1)(b), incorporated into the United Nations Charter by Article 92:
"The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply...international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law."
Customary international law " consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct
of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way."[10] It follows that
customary international law can be discerned by a "widespread repetition by States of similar
international acts over time (State practice); Acts must occur out of sense of obligation (opinio
juris); Acts must be taken by a significant number of States and not be rejected by a significant
number of States." A marker of customary international law is consensus among states exhibited
both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of obligation.
The two essential elements of customary international law are state practice and opinio juris, as
confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons.
In relation to the psychological element that is opinio juris, the International Court of Justice
further held in North Sea Continental Shelf, that "not only must the acts concerned amount to a
settle practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it... The
States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal
obligation.". The Court emphasised the need to prove a "sense of legal duty" as distinct
from "acts motivated by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition". This was
subsequently confirmed in Nicaragua v. United States of America.

Bilateral versus multilateral customary international law

The recognition of different customary laws can range from simple bilateral recognition of
customary laws to worldwide multilateral recognition. Regional customs can become customary
international law in their respective regions, but do not become customary international law for
nations outside the region. The existence of bilateral customary law was recognized by the
International Court of Justice in the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory case between
Portugal and India, in which the court found "no reason why long continued practice between the
two states accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual
rights and obligations between the two states."

Other customary international laws

Other examples accepted or claimed as customary international law include the principle of non-
refoulement and immunity of visiting foreign heads of state. United Nations Security Council in
1993 adopted Geneva conventions as customary international law because since the time being it
has transformed itself into customary international law. If any treaty or law has been called as
customary international law then parties which have not ratified said treaty will be bound to
observe its provisions in good faith.
 B.3) Treaty Law

A treaty is an agreement under international law entered into by actors in international law,
namely sovereign states and international organizations. A treaty may also be known as
an (international) agreement, protocol, covenant, convention, pact, or exchange of letters,
among other terms. Regardless of terminology, all of these forms of agreements are, under
international law, equally considered treaties and the rules are the same.
Treaties can be loosely compared to contracts: both are means of willing parties assuming
obligations among themselves, and a party to either that fails to live up to their obligations can be
held liable under international law.

Modern usage
A treaty is an official, express written agreement that states use to legally bind themselves.[3] A
treaty is the official document which expresses that agreement in words; and it is also the
objective outcome of a ceremonial occasion which acknowledges the parties and their defined
relationships.

Modern form
Since the late 19th century, most treaties have followed a fairly consistent format. A treaty
typically begins with a preamble describing the High Contracting Parties and their shared
objectives in executing the treaty, as well as summarizing any underlying events (such as the
aftermath of a war in the case of a peace treaty). Modern preambles are sometimes structured as
a single very long sentence formatted into multiple paragraphs for readability, in which each of
the paragraphs begins with a gerund (desiring, recognizing, having, and so on).
The High Contracting Parties; referred to as either the official title of the head of state (but not
including the personal name), e.g. His Majesty The King of X or His Excellency The President of
Y, or alternatively in the form of "Government of Z"; are enumerated, and along with the full
names and titles of their plenipotentiary representatives, and a boilerplate clause about how their
representatives have communicated (or exchanged) their full powers (i.e., the official documents
appointing them to act on behalf of their respective high contracting party) and found them in
good or proper form. However, under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties if the
representative is the head of state, head of government or minister of foreign affairs, no special
document is needed, as holding such high office is sufficient.
The end of the preamble and the start of the actual agreement is often signaled by the words
"have agreed as follows."
After the preamble comes numbered articles, which contain the substance of the parties' actual
agreement. Each article heading usually encompasses a paragraph. A long treaty may further
group articles under chapter headings.
Modern treaties, regardless of subject matter, usually contain articles governing where the final
authentic copies of the treaty will be deposited and how any subsequent disputes as to their
interpretation will be peacefully resolved.
The end of a treaty, the eschatocol (or closing protocol), is often signaled by a clause like "in
witness whereof" or "in faith whereof," the parties have affixed their signatures, followed by the
words "DONE at," then the site(s) of the treaty's execution and the date(s) of its execution. The
date is typically written in its most formal, longest possible form. For example, the Charter of the
United Nations was "DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one
thousand nine hundred and forty-five." If the treaty is executed in multiple copies in different
languages, that fact is always noted, and is followed by a stipulation that the versions in different
languages are equally authentic.
The signatures of the parties' representatives follow at the very end. When the text of a treaty is
later reprinted, such as in a collection of treaties currently in effect, an editor will often append
the dates on which the respective parties ratified the treaty and on which it came into effect for
each party.

Bilateral and multilateral treaties

Bilateral treaties are concluded between two states or entities. It is possible, however, for a
bilateral treaty to have more than two parties; consider for instance the bilateral treaties
between Switzerland and the European Union (EU) following the Swiss rejection of
the European Economic Area agreement. Each of these treaties has seventeen parties. These
however are still bilateral, not multilateral, treaties. The parties are divided into two groups, the
Swiss ("on the one part") and the EU and its member states ("on the other part"). The treaty
establishes rights and obligations between the Swiss and the EU and the member states
severally—it does not establish any rights and obligations amongst the EU and its member states.
A multilateral treaty is concluded among several countries. The agreement establishes rights and
obligations between each party and every other party. Multilateral treaties are often regional.
Treaties of "mutual guarantee" are international compacts, e.g., the Treaty of Locarno which
guarantees each signatory against attack from another.

Adding and amending treaty obligations

Reservations
Reservations are essentially caveats to a state's acceptance of a treaty. Reservations are unilateral
statements purporting to exclude or to modify the legal obligation and its effects on the reserving
state. These must be included at the time of signing or ratification, i.e. "a party cannot add a
reservation after it has already joined a treaty".
Originally, international law was unaccepting of treaty reservations, rejecting them unless all
parties to the treaty accepted the same reservations. However, in the interest of encouraging the
largest number of states to join treaties, a more permissive rule regarding reservations has
emerged. While some treaties still expressly forbid any reservations, they are now generally
permitted to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the goals and purposes of the treaty.
When a state limits its treaty obligations through reservations, other states party to that treaty
have the option to accept those reservations, object to them, or object and oppose them. If the
state accepts them (or fails to act at all), both the reserving state and the accepting state are
relieved of the reserved legal obligation as concerns their legal obligations to each other
(accepting the reservation does not change the accepting state's legal obligations as concerns
other parties to the treaty). If the state opposes, the parts of the treaty affected by the reservation
drop out completely and no longer create any legal obligations on the reserving and accepting
state, again only as concerns each other. Finally, if the state objects and opposes, there are no
legal obligations under that treaty between those two state parties whatsoever. The objecting and
opposing state essentially refuses to acknowledge the reserving state is a party to the treaty at all.
Amendments
There are three ways an existing treaty can be amended. First, formal amendment requires State
parties to the treaty to go through the ratification process all over again. The re-negotiation of
treaty provisions can be long and protracted, and often some parties to the original treaty will not
become parties to the amended treaty. When determining the legal obligations of states, one
party to the original treaty and one a party to the amended treaty, the states will only be bound by
the terms they both agreed upon. Treaties can also be amended informally by the treaty executive
council when the changes are only procedural, technical change in customary international law
can also amend a treaty, where state behavior evinces a new interpretation of the legal
obligations under the treaty. Minor corrections to a treaty may be adopted by a procès-verbal; but
a procès-verbal is generally reserved for changes to rectify obvious errors in the text adopted, i.e.
where the text adopted does not correctly reflect the intention of the parties adopting it.
Protocols
In international law and international relations, a protocol is generally a treaty or international
agreement that supplements a previous treaty or international agreement. A protocol can amend
the previous treaty, or add additional provisions. Parties to the earlier agreement are not required
to adopt the protocol. Sometimes this is made clearer by calling it an "optional protocol",
especially where many parties to the first agreement do not support the protocol.
Some examples: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
established a framework for the development of binding greenhouse gas emission limits, while
the Kyoto Protocol contained the specific provisions and regulations later agreed upon.

Execution and implementation

Treaties may be seen as 'self-executing', in that merely becoming a party puts the treaty and all of
its obligations in action. Other treaties may be non-self-executing and require 'implementing
legislation'—a change in the domestic law of a state party that will direct or enable it to fulfill
treaty obligations. An example of a treaty requiring such legislation would be one mandating
local prosecution by a party for particular crimes.
The division between the two is often not clear and is often politicized in disagreements within a
government over a treaty, since a non-self-executing treaty cannot be acted on without the proper
change in domestic law. If a treaty requires implementing legislation, a state may be in default of
its obligations by the failure of its legislature to pass the necessary domestic laws.
Interpretation
The language of treaties, like that of any law or contract, must be interpreted when the wording
does not seem clear or it is not immediately apparent how it should be applied in a perhaps
unforeseen circumstance. The Vienna Convention states that treaties are to be interpreted "in
good faith" according to the "ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose." International legal experts also often invoke the
'principle of maximum effectiveness,' which interprets treaty language as having the fullest force
and effect possible to establish obligations between the parties.
No one party to a treaty can impose its particular interpretation of the treaty upon the other
parties. Consent may be implied, however, if the other parties fail to explicitly disavow that
initially unilateral interpretation, particularly if that state has acted upon its view of the treaty
without complaint. Consent by all parties to the treaty to a particular interpretation has the legal
effect of adding another clause to the treaty – this is commonly called an 'authentic
interpretation'.
International tribunals and arbiters are often called upon to resolve substantial disputes over
treaty interpretations. To establish the meaning in context, these judicial bodies may review the
preparatory work from the negotiation and drafting of the treaty as well as the final, signed treaty
itself.
Consequences of terminology
One significant part of treaty making is that signing a treaty implies recognition that the other
side is a sovereign state and that the agreement being considered is enforceable under
international law. Hence, nations can be very careful about terming an agreement to be a treaty.
For example, within the United States, agreements between states are compacts and agreements
between states and the federal government or between agencies of the government
are memoranda of understanding.
Another situation can occur when one party wishes to create an obligation under international
law, but the other party does not. This factor has been at work with respect to discussions
between North Korea and the United States over security guarantees and nuclear proliferation.
The terminology can also be confusing because a treaty may and usually is named something
other than a treaty, such as a convention, protocol, or simply agreement. Conversely some legal
documents such as the Treaty of Waitangi are internationally considered to be documents under
domestic law.

Ending treaty obligations

Withdrawal
Treaties are not necessarily permanently binding upon the signatory parties. As obligations in
international law are traditionally viewed as arising only from the consent of states, many treaties
expressly allow a state to withdraw as long as it follows certain procedures of notification. For
example, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs provides that the treaty will terminate if, as a
result of denunciations, the number of parties falls below 40. Many treaties expressly forbid
withdrawal. Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that where a
treaty is silent over whether or not it can be denounced there is a rebuttable presumption that it
cannot be unilaterally denounced unless:

• it can be shown that the parties intended to admit the possibility, or

• a right of withdrawal can be inferred from the terms of the treaty.
The possibility of withdrawal depends on the terms of the treaty and its travaux preparatoire. It
has, for example, been held that it is not possible to withdraw from the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. When North Korea declared its intention to do this the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, acting as registrar, said that original signatories of the ICCPR had
not overlooked the possibility of explicitly providing for withdrawal, but rather had deliberately
intended not to provide for it. Consequently, withdrawal was not possible.
In practice, because of sovereignty, any state can purport to withdraw from any treaty at any
time, and cease to abide by its terms. The question of whether this is lawful can be regarded as
the success or failure to anticipate community acquiescence or enforcement, that is, how other
states will react; for instance, another state might impose sanctions or go to war over a treaty
violation.
If a state party's withdrawal is successful, its obligations under that treaty are considered
terminated, and withdrawal by one party from a bilateral treaty of course terminates the treaty.
When a state withdraws from a multi-lateral treaty, that treaty will still otherwise remain in force
among the other parties, unless, of course, otherwise should or could be interpreted as agreed
upon between the remaining states parties to the treaty
Suspension and termination
If a party has materially violated or breached its treaty obligations, the other parties may invoke
this breach as grounds for temporarily suspending their obligations to that party under the treaty.
A material breach may also be invoked as grounds for permanently terminating the treaty itself.
A treaty breach does not automatically suspend or terminate treaty relations, however. It depends
on how the other parties regard the breach and how they resolve to respond to it. Sometimes
treaties will provide for the seriousness of a breach to be determined by a tribunal or other
independent arbiter. An advantage of such an arbiter is that it prevents a party from prematurely
and perhaps wrongfully suspending or terminating its own obligations due to another's alleged
material breach.
Treaties sometimes include provisions for self-termination, meaning that the treaty is
automatically terminated if certain defined conditions are met. Some treaties are intended by the
parties to be only temporarily binding and are set to expire on a given date. Other treaties may
self-terminate if the treaty is meant to exist only under certain conditions.
A party may claim that a treaty should be terminated, even absent an express provision, if there
has been a fundamental change in circumstances. Such a change is sufficient if unforeseen, if it
undermined the “essential basis” of consent by a party, if it radically transforms the extent of
obligations between the parties, and if the obligations are still to be performed. A party cannot
base this claim on change brought about by its own breach of the treaty. This claim also cannot
be used to invalidate treaties that established or redrew political boundaries.
Invalid treaties
There are several reasons an otherwise valid and agreed upon treaty may be rejected as a binding
international agreement, most of which involve problems created at the formation of the
treaty. For example, the serial Japan-Korea treaties of 1905, 1907 and 1910 were protested; and
they were confirmed as "already null and void" in the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between
Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Ultra vires treaties
A party's consent to a treaty is invalid if it had been given by an agent or body without power to
do so under that state's domestic laws. States are reluctant to inquire into the internal affairs and
processes of other states, and so a "manifest violation" is required such that it would be
"objectively evident to any State dealing with the matter". A strong presumption exists
internationally that a head of state has acted within his proper authority. It seems that no treaty
has ever actually been invalidated on this provision.
Consent is also invalid if it is given by a representative who ignored restrictions he is subject to
by his sovereign during the negotiations, if the other parties to the treaty were notified of those
restrictions prior to his signing.
According to the preamble in The Law of Treaties, treaties are a source of international law. If an
act or lack thereof is condemned under international law, the act will not assume international
legality even if approved by internal law. This means that in case of a conflict with domestic law,
international law will always prevail.
Misunderstanding, fraud, corruption, coercion

Articles 46–53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties set out the only ways that
treaties can be invalidated—considered unenforceable and void under international law. A treaty
will be invalidated due to either the circumstances by which a state party joined the treaty, or due
to the content of the treaty itself. Invalidation is separate from withdrawal, suspension, or
termination (addressed above), which all involve an alteration in the consent of the parties of a
previously valid treaty rather than the invalidation of that consent in the first place.
A state's consent may be invalidated if there was an erroneous understanding of a fact or
situation at the time of conclusion, which formed the "essential basis" of the state's consent.
Consent will not be invalidated if the misunderstanding was due to the state's own conduct, or if
the truth should have been evident.
Consent will also be invalidated if it was induced by the fraudulent conduct of another party, or
by the direct or indirect "corruption" of its representative by another party to the treaty. Coercion
of either a representative, or the state itself through the threat or use of force, if used to obtain the
consent of that state to a treaty, will invalidate that consent.
Contrary to peremptory norms
A treaty is null and void if it is in violation of a peremptory norm. These norms, unlike other
principles of customary law, are recognized as permitting no violations and so cannot be altered
through treaty obligations. These are limited to such universally accepted prohibitions as those
against the aggressive use of force, genocide and other crimes against humanity, piracy,
hostilities directed at civilian population, racial discrimination and apartheid, slavery and torture,
meaning that no state can legally assume an obligation to commit or permit such acts.

Role of the United Nations

The United Nations Charter states that treaties must be registered with the UN to be invoked
before it or enforced in its judiciary organ, the International Court of Justice. This was done to
prevent the proliferation of secret treaties that occurred in the 19th and 20th century. Section 103
of the Charter also states that its members' obligations under it outweigh any competing
obligations under other treaties.
After their adoption, treaties as well as their amendments have to follow the official legal
procedures of the United Nations, as applied by the Office of Legal Affairs,
including signature, ratification and entry into force.
In function and effectiveness, the UN has been compared to the pre-Constitutional United States
Federal government by some, giving a comparison between modern treaty law and the
historical Articles of Confederation.

Relation between national law and treaties by country

Australian law
The constitution of Australia allows the executive government to enter into treaties, however the
practice is for treaties to be tabled in both houses of parliament at least 15 days before signing.
Treaties are considered a source of Australian law, however do sometimes require an act of
parliament to be passed depending on their nature. Treaties are administered and maintained by
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade who advise "The general position under Australian
law is that treaties which Australia has joined, apart from those terminating a state of war, are not
directly and automatically incorporated into Australian law. Signature and ratification do not, of
themselves, make treaties operate domestically. In the absence of legislation, treaties cannot
impose obligations on individuals nor create rights in domestic law. Nevertheless, international
law, including treaty law, is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the
common law and may be used in the interpretation of statutes."[17] Treaties can be implemented
through executive action, and often existing laws are sufficient to ensure a treaty is honoured.
Australian treaties generally fall under the following categories: extradition, postal agreements &
money orders, trade, and International conventions.

Brazilian law
The Brazilian federal constitution states that the power to enter into treaties is vested in
the president and that such treaties must be approved by Congress (articles 84, clause VIII, and
49, clause I). In practice, this has been interpreted as meaning that the executive branch is free to
negotiate and sign a treaty, but its ratification by the president is contingent upon the prior
approval of Congress. Additionally, the Federal Supreme Court has ruled that, following
ratification and entry into force, a treaty must be incorporated into domestic law by means of a
presidential decree published in the federal register in order to be valid in Brazil and applicable
by the Brazilian authorities.
The Federal Supreme Court has established that treaties are subject to constitutional review and
enjoy the same hierarchical position as ordinary legislation (leis ordinárias, or "ordinary laws",
in Portuguese). A more recent ruling by the Supreme Court in 2008 has altered that scheme
somewhat, by stating that treaties containing human rights provisions enjoy a status above that of
ordinary legislation, though they remain beneath the constitution itself. Additionally, as per the
45th amendment to the constitution, human rights treaties which are approved by Congress by
means of a special procedure enjoy the same hierarchical position as a constitutional amendment.
The hierarchical position of treaties in relation to domestic legislation is of relevance to the
discussion on whether (and how) the latter can abrogate the former and vice versa.
The Brazilian federal constitution does not have a supremacy clause with the same effects as the
one on the U.S. constitution, a fact that is of interest to the discussion on the relation between
treaties and state legislation.
United States
In the United States, the term "treaty" has a different, more restricted legal sense than exists in
international law. United States law distinguishes what it calls "treaties" from "executive
agreements", i. e. either "congressional-executive agreements" or "sole executive agreements".
All these classes are equally treaties under international law; they are distinct only from the
perspective of internal American law. The distinctions are primarily concerning their method of
approval. Whereas treaties require advice and consent by two-thirds of the Senators present, sole
executive agreements may be executed by the President acting alone. Some treaties grant the
President the authority to fill in the gaps with executive agreements, rather than additional
treaties or protocols. And finally, congressional-executive agreements require majority approval
by both the House and the Senate, either before or after the treaty is signed by the President.
Currently, international agreements are executed by executive agreement rather than treaties at a
rate of 10:1. Despite the relative ease of executive agreements, the President still often chooses
to pursue the formal treaty process over an executive agreement in order to gain congressional
support on matters that require the Congress to pass implementing legislation or appropriate
funds, and those agreements that impose long-term, complex legal obligations on the United
States. For example, the deal by the United States, Iran and other countries[clarification needed] is not a
Treaty.
See the article on the Bricker Amendment for history of the relationship between treaty powers
and Constitutional provisions.
The Supreme Court ruled in the Head Money Cases that "treaties" do not have a privileged
position over Acts of Congress and can be repealed or modified (for the purposes of U.S. law) by
any subsequent Act of Congress, just like with any other regular law. The Supreme Court also
ruled in Reid v. Covert that any treaty provision that conflicts with the Constitution are null and
void under U.S. law.
Indian law
In India, the legislation subjects are divided into 3 lists -Union List, State List and Concurrent
List . In the normal legislation process, the subjects in Union list can only be legislated upon by
central legislative body called Parliament of India, for subjects in state list only respective state
legislature can legislate. While for Concurrent subjects, both center and state can make laws. But
to implement international treaties, Parliament can legislate on any subject overriding the general
division of subject lists.

Treaties and indigenous people

Treaties formed an important part of European colonization and, in many parts of the world,
Europeans attempted to legitimize their sovereignty by signing treaties with indigenous peoples.
In most cases these treaties were in extremely disadvantageous terms to the native people, who
often did not appreciate the implications of what they were signing.
In some rare cases, such as with Ethiopia and Qing Dynasty China, the local governments were
able to use the treaties to at least mitigate the impact of European colonization. This involved
learning the intricacies of European diplomatic customs and then using the treaties to prevent a
power from overstepping their agreement or by playing different powers against each other.
In other cases, such as New Zealand and Canada, treaties allowed native peoples to maintain a
minimum amount of autonomy. In the case of indigenous Australians, unlike with the Māori of
New Zealand, no treaty was ever entered into with the indigenous peoples entitling the
Europeans to land ownership, under the doctrine of terra nullius (later overturned by Mabo v
Queensland, establishing the concept of native title well after colonization was already a fait
accompli). Such treaties between colonizers and indigenous peoples are an important part of
political discourse in the late 20th and early 21st century, the treaties being discussed have
international standing as has been stated in a treaty study by the UN.
Prior to 1871, the government of the United States regularly entered into treaties with Native
Americans but the Indian Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871 a rider (25 U.S.C. § 71) attached
that effectively ended the President’s treaty making by providing that no Indian nation or tribe
shall be acknowledged as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States
may contract by treaty. The federal government continued to provide similar contractual
relations with the Indian tribes after 1871 by agreements, statutes, and executive orders.

LAW OF THE SEA

C.1) Territorial sea

The Territorial Sea is an area extending from internal waters to the seaward side. The coastal
state enjoys its sovereignty over the area subject to the right of the ships of other states to engage
in innocent passage. According to the 1958 Convention, the breath of territorial sea has not been
stated how far from the baseline it is measured, but it could be inferred from the breadth of the
contiguous zone which was established in article 24, paragraph 2 that the territorial sea can not
exceed 12 nautical miles from the baseline. It means that the territorial sea and contiguous zone
under this convention are the same area. However, article 3 of 1982 United Nations Convention
clearly defined, every state has the rights to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to the
limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baseline determined in accordance with the
convention, and the outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at the
distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea.
According to article 12 of the 1982 United Nations Convention, the territorial sea can be
extended beyond 12 nautical miles. Roadsteads, which are normally used for the loading and
unloading and anchoring of ships and would otherwise be situated wholly or partly outside the
outer limit of the territorial sea, are included in territorial sea. The territorial sea could,
nevertheless, be less than 12 nautical miles in the situation of the two states have opposite or
adjacent coasts. The article 15 of 1982 United Nations Convention provided that, where the
coasts of the two states are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two states is entitled,
failing agreement between them to the contrary to extend its territorial sea beyond the meridian
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Moreover, states sometimes do not have their territorial
sea in case the low water line is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the
territorial sea from the mainland or an island. In practical, this provision has not applied to any
coastal states. All coastal states have their territorial sea. The said provision, however, where it is
necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas
of the two states in a way which is at variance therewith.
The Convention requires the coastal states to adopt laws and regulations which comply with the
international rules in the purpose of ensuring the innocent passage of foreign vessels, with
respect the followings:
o Safety of navigation;
o The protection of navigation and facilities
o The regulation the maritime traffic;
o The protection of cable and pipeline;
o The conservation of living resource
o The prevention of infringement of fisheries law and regulation of coastal state;
o The maritime scientific research and hydrographic survey;
o The prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary
law.

In addition, having regard the safety of navigation, the coastal states may establish sea lands and
traffic separation schemes in its territorial sea to ensure the safety of navigation especially,
tankers, nuclear power ship and ships caring nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious
substances or materials (article 22 of 1982 United Nations Convention). Besides the above
necessity, the coastal states have their rights to prevent passage in which engage in the any of the
following activities as stated in article 19 of 1982 United Nations Convention:
o any threat or us of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity of political
independence of the coastal state or in any other manner in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
o any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
o any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal
state;
 o the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
o the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device.
o the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal state;
o any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this convention;
o any fishing activities;
o the carrying out of research or survey activities
o any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal state;
o any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.

o The article 27 and 28 of 1982 United Nations Convention also provides the coastal states
with criminal and civil jurisdiction on board a foreign ship in cases:
o the sequences of the crime extend to the coastal states;
o there are request for assistance from Master of the ship or from a diplomatic agent
of the flag state or consular officer of the flag state;
o suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;
o foreign ship lying in the territorial sea or passing through the territorial sea after
leaving internal water.

Relating to the warship which does not comply with law and regulations of the coastal state
concerning the passage through the territorial sea and disregard any compliance therewith which
is made of it, the coastal state may require that warship to leave the territorial sea immediately
(article 30 of 1982 Convention). The case of innocent passage of warship through the territory of
the coastal state has been discussed during the establishment of international convention on Law
of the sea but there was not consensus. The maritime power claimed innocent passage for
warships, whereas the others, particular the developing ones, emphasized that the importance of
their coastal security necessitated imposing conditions on the passage of warships through its
territorial sea. The differences caused the Convention on Law of the Sea has no provision on
allowing or denying warships a rights of innocent passage. As practice, some coastal states
require the warships to give prior notification for innocent passage of warships through their
territorial sea. For example, China and Vietnam require foreign vessels for military use to obtain
prior permission before they transit through the Chinese territorial sea17. The requirement of
China was stipulated in Law on Maritime Traffic Safety, entered into force in January 1984,
which reads “..No military vessels of foreign nationality may enter the territorial sea of People’s
republic of China without being authorized by the Government thereof”

C.2) Contiguous Zone:

In accordance with 1982 United Nations Convention on law of the sea, the coastal states have the
rights to establish their contiguous zone which is adjacent to the territorial sea. The article 33 of
1982 Convention provides that the contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles
from baseline from which the territorial sea is measured. The establishment of contiguous zone
aimed at preventing violation of laws and regulations within its territory. The article 33
paragraphs 1 of the 1982 Convention states that in contiguous zone, the coastal state may
exercise the control necessary to:
a Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations
within its territory or territorial sea;
b Punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or
territorial sea.
Based on the spirit of the above article, a coastal state has its rights in a contiguous zone to
defend its interests by stopping foreign ship supposed to be an offender in order to search,
inspect or punish the offenders against its laws and regulations. In addition, in case the suspect
foreign ships have intention to evade the responsibility and leave the contiguous zone, the coastal
state has the rights to pursuit beyond the limit of contiguous zone. The article 111 of 1982
Convention stipulated that pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats
is within the internal water, territorial sea or contiguous zone of the pursuing states, and may be
only be continued outside the territorial sea or contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been
interrupted.
In the establishment of the contiguous zone, the coastal state has to take into account the fact of
the sea areas, which are, in some case, bordered, by two or more states whose breadth does not
exceed twice the breadth of the territorial sea. The Strait of Malacca, for example, used for
international navigation is less than 24 nautical miles wide. In this case the bordering states have
to undertake their agreement in the delimitation of maritime boundary and to cooperate in the
establishment of international sea route pass.

C.3) Continental Shelf:

The concept of the establishment of the continental shelf in the international law of the sea is a
result of the activities of exploitation natural resources in the seabed of the developed countries.
For the purpose of preventing the danger of the division of the continental shelf, the International
Law Commission was tasked to prepare the draft in the purpose of controlling such exploration
and exploitation. As a result of the work of Commission and the discussion at the conference, the
Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted in 1958 in Geneva and get into force in 1964.
The coastal states are given the sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of
the seabed and subsoil in the submarine area adjacent to the mainland or islands, but outside the
area of territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to a point where the
exploitation of such resource become impossible.
In accordance with the 1958 Convention, the outer limit of the continental shelf is not defined
precisely. It depends on the rate of scientific and technological progress in the exploitation of
resource in seabed and ocean floor. The definition of continental shelf in the convention is far
from adequate. As Gutteridge noted :
"The definition is bound to result in uncertainty; and may lead to disputes between states in cases
where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of opposite or adjacent states, or, at
the least to difficulties in fixing by agreement the boundaries of such shelves. Moreover,
exploitability is a subjective criterion. It may well be asked, as it was asked at the conference,
how is to be determined that a particular submarine area beyond the depth of 200 meters admits
of exploitation".
At the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the long discussion of the
opposite positions on delimitation of the outer limits of the continental shelf came closer together
through the a reasonable compromise which was proposed that the coastal state have the rights to
extend its jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond the exclusive economic zone on the
condition that parts of the benefits derive from the exploitation of mineral resources beyond the
200 nautical miles be shared with the international community.
According to the article 76 (1) of 1982 United Nations Convention, the continental shelf of a
coastal state comprises the seabed and subsoil thereof extending beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of it land territory up to the outer edge of the continental
margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.
Where the outer edge of the continental shelf margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from
baseline, the outer boundary of its shelf is to be delimited by the coastal state by either of the
outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rock is at least 1 percent of
the shortest distance form such point to the foot of the continental slope, or the fixed point not
more than 60 nautical miles from foot of the continental slope, and to define these points by
coordinate of longitude and latitude. However, according to the article 76(5), if the underwater
edge extends more than 200 nautical miles from coastline the outer limit may not exceed 350
nautical miles from baselines of territorial water or 100 nautical miles from 2,500 meters
isobaths (line connecting depth of 2,500 meters). On the submarine ridge, other than submarine
elevation that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateau, rise, caps,
blank and spurs, only 350 miles applies (article 76).
The information on the limits of the continental shelf where it extends beyond 200 nautical miles
is to be submitted to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf composed of experts in
geology, geophysics and hydrographic, which is formed by coastal state to the convention. The
Commission may issue recommendation to coastal state on the delimitation of the outer
boundary of continental shelf, and the limits established by a state on the basis of these
recommendations shall be final and binding. Any exploitation of non-living resources of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline is subject to make payment or
contribution in kind through the Authority in order to distribute them, on a basis of equitable
sharing criteria, to the State Parties to this Convention (article 82). However, the action of the
Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between the
States with opposite or adjacent coasts. The Commission must, therefore, avoid dealing with
submissions that may prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States.
In accordance with the rule of procedure of the Commission, there are some clauses dealing with
disputes that may arise in connection with the establishment of outer limits of the continental
shelf, such as in case where a land or maritime dispute exists, the Commission shall not examine
and qualify a submission made by any of the states concerned in the dispute. However, the
Commission may examine one or more submission in the areas under dispute with prior consent
given by all States that are parties to such a dispute.
To date, there are four states have submitted their claim of outer continental shelf to the
Commission. Those countries are Russia, Brazil, Australia, and Iceland. Of those four
submissions, only Russia’s has been subject to a full review by the Commission. The others are
currently undergoing review by the subcommissions of the Commission24.
Under the 1982 Convention, the coastal state exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf
in the exploration and exploitation of its natural resources. The coastal state has exclusive rights
in the sense that the other states may not explore or exploit in the continental shelf unless there is
express consent of the coastal state. In addition, the rights of coastal state over the continental
shelf does not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express proclamation (article
77). However, this provision indicates that the exercise of rights of the coastal state over the
continental shelf shall not infringe on freedom of navigation, or on other rights and freedom of
foreign states.
As for the rights to lay submarine cables and pipelines of the other states, the coastal states are
entitled the rights to establish conditions for cables and pipelines entering its territory or
territorial sea, or its jurisdiction over the construction of those cables and pipelines (article 79).
The Convention acknowledges that, in case this conditions or regulations are not respected, the
coastal state may refuse to allow the laying underwater cables and pipelines. The Convention
allows the coastal state to process exclusive rights to permit and regulate all types of drilling on
its continental shelf, and to take some measures to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution
(article 81). The dumping on the continental shelf of wastes or debris of destroyed ships, aircrafts
or others structures is possible with the consent of the coastal state. So, the laws and regulations
of the coastal state limit the exercises of rights of the other states on the continental shelf.
Besides the above precise limitation of and the increase the rights of the coastal state over the
continental shelf, the convention contains articles on the settlement of disputes over the
delimitation of continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coastlines. The article
83 provides that the limitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent
coastlines shall be effected by a agreement on the basis of international law as referred to the
article 38 of the statute of International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
In case there is no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the states
concerned to resort to the procedures provides for in Part XV of this convention.

C.4) Exclusive Economic Zone:

The concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone is the most important pillars of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Convention contains the articles on legal regime of the
Exclusive Economic Zone; the limitation of the Zone, the sovereign rights of the coastal state to
manage the zone in good faith; the regard for the economic interests of the third states;
regulations of the certain activities in the zone, such as marine scientific research, protection and
preservation of the marine environment, and the establishment and use of artificial islands;
freedom of navigation and over flight; the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
military and strategic use of zone; and the means of settlement of disputes.
 In accordance with the article 57 of 1982 Convention on law of the sea, the Exclusive Economic
Zone is an area adjacent to the territorial sea and it shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles
from baseline where the territorial sea is measured. The Convention gives the coastal states the
sovereign rights over natural resources and control of resources related to activities in the zone,
and preserve for the other states the freedom of navigation, over flight and the laying submarine
cables and pipelines. The coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the living resources of the exclusive economic zone (article
56). Moreover, the coastal state has exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation and use of artificial islands, installation and structures; and has
jurisdiction over such artificial islands, installation and structures.
The coastal state has broad regulatory and management power to conserve and utilize the living
resources on the Exclusive Economic Zone. With respect to the conservation, the coastal state
has to design some measures to ensure that the populations of harvested species are maintained
or restored at a levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors (article 61). With regard the utilization, the coastal state has
the obligation to promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources. The
coastal state is obliged to determine its capacity to harvest the living resources. If the coastal
state does not have capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it could, by agreement, give
access to the other states to the surplus of the allowable catch (article 62).
The land locked states and geographically disadvantaged states are given the rights to participate,
on an equitable basis, in the exploration of an appropriate part of surplus of the living resources
in conformity with the regulations and management laws designed by the coastal state. They also
have the rights to overflight, lay submarines cables and pipelines and other internationally lawful
uses of the seas on the zone (article 58).
The convention also has articles on the conservation of the Stocks such as, straddling stocks,
Anadromous stocks, catadromous species, sedentary species, and highly migratory species. With
respect to the marine mammals, the coastal states and other organizations have the rights to
prohibit, limit, or regulate the exploitation of this species more strictly. In exercising its
sovereign rights and in ensuring the sustainable conservation of living resources, the coastal state
is empowered to take some measures of law enforcement such as boarding, inspection, arrest and
judicial proceedings over the foreign fishing vessels (article 73).
As the other zones, Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes the articles on the delimitation
of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the states with opposite or adjacent coastlines.
According to the article 74, the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the states
with opposite or adjacent coastlines shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international
law. In case there is no agreement, the states concerned could follow the procedure provided in
Part XV. With regard the fisheries disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the
convention, the states concerned are to be settled by a binding form of disputes settlements
(article 273).

C.5) High Sea:

High Seas are the seawater beyond the limit of the national jurisdictions and excluded from the
state sovereignty. It is not included in the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic
zone, and archipelagic water. The high sea is open to all states, whether coastal or land locked
states and is an area reserved for peaceful purpose. All states have freedom to conduct all types
of activities with due regard for the interests of the other states. Moreover, all states have duty to
conserve and manage the living resources in the zone, and to combat and prevent the
international transnational crimes at sea. In accordance with article 87 of the 1982 United
Nations Convention, the freedom of the high seas consists of:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of overflight;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international
law;
(5) Freedom of fishing; and
(6) Freedom of scientific research.
The freedom of navigation is the most important for all merchant and naval vessels. They have
the rights to sail ships flying their flag in the high sea and participate in navigation by granting its
nationality to vessels which are registered in their territory and which fly their flag. Warships in
accordance with this Convention have on the high seas completely immunity from jurisdiction of
any state other than the flag state. At the meantime, the Convention requires the flag state to
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flag (article 94). In doing so, every state shall take some measures, which conform with
generally accepted international regulations and practice, to ensure the international order or
safety at sea, such as maintain the registration of ship; construction, equipment and
seaworthiness of ships; manning of ships, labor conditions and the training of crews; the use of
signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions.
Furthermore, the Convention calls for the cooperation of all states for the purpose of
conservation and management the living resources. The states have to take some measures to
manage the resources such as, the establishment of sub regional or regional fisheries
organizations, provide information on the fishing statistic, the effect of harvested species. In
addition, the states have duty to cooperate in combating against piracy, trafficking in illegal
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, and also against the unauthorized broadcasting from
the high sea (article 99, 100, 108 and 109).
 UNIT-4: Contemporary International Issues

4.1) Prohibition of the use of force

The provisions in the UN Charter relating to the prohibition on the use of force by States in their
relations with each other has been discussed under this topic. One of the primary goals of the
UN, according to Article 1(1) of the UN Charter, is to maintain international peace and security.
In order to achieve this aim, Article 2(4) contains a prohibition on the use of force. A system of
collective sanctions against any offending State that resorts to the use of force protects this
prohibition. These sanctions are found in Articles 39-51 of the UN Charter.

4.2) Exceptions to the prohibitions

PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE USE OF FORCE: THE PROHIBITION AND THE

EXCEPTIONS

Article 1(1) of the UN Charter says that one of the purposes of the Charter is to:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of

(1) threats to the peace, and for the

(2) suppression of acts of aggression or

(3) other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means. adjustment or settlement
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace

In order to maintain international peace and security and to prevent future wars:

(1) Article 2(3) places an obligation on member States to settle their disputes peacefully.

All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

(2) Article 2(4) prohibits member States from using force in their international relations.
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of forceagainst
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

In Nicaragua v USA, ICJ held that the prohibition on the use of force is covered
by treaty law (that is the UN Charter), by customary international law and the prohibition
was a Jus Cogens norm.
In the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations there is: (1) a general prohibition on the threat or use of force, (2) duty to
refrain from “organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory”
when these acts involve the threat or use of force against another State. What are the
other provisions in the 1970 Declaration that

(1) prohibit States from using force?

(2) prohibit States from assisting others to use force against another State?

(3) defines what is “use of force”?

(4) prohibits interference in the domestic affairs of another State?

(3) The prohibition is safeguarded by a system of collective sanctions against any offending
State that uses force. This is found in Articles 39-51 of the UN Charter.

3.1. Articles 39, 40 and 41 operate to offer sanctions against a member State that has threaten or
used force in a way that it amounts to a threat to or breach of peace or an act of aggression.
Article 39 says:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

Article 41 allows the Security Council to impose sanctions (trade and economic sanctions, arms
embargoes):

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations
to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and
the severance of diplomatic relations.

3.2. Article 42 gives the Security Council the power to authorize the use necessary force to
maintain international peace and security. Because the Security Council does not have a military
force of its own, the Security Council authorizes member States to use force.
The Security Council] may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.

3.3. Article 51 provides for a member State to use force in self defense when there is an armed
attack against that State

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security…

As discussed, the only exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter are
found in Articles 42 and 51 of the UN Charter (provisions in Article 53(1) and 107 are not
relevant and we will not discuss them). In addition to this, States have invoked customary
international law of self defense and humanitarian intervention (for example in the 11 day NATO
bombing of Kosovo) and implicit authorization under SC Resolutions (for example, NATO
bombing of Kosovo and US invasion of Iraq) as a justification to use force against another State.

The use of force has been a long standing phenomenon in international relations and has been
considered to be directly linked to the sovereignty of states-the limitless power wielded by states
to use all possible means to guard and protect their interests. However, the longer period that war
has been associated with sovereignty of state, the more the issue has turned into a legal
institution by itself. This paper looks at the prohibited and permissible use of force in
International Relations. Developed social awareness has expanded the limits (and even led) to
the right to resort to war. This indeed has abolished the use of force or any form of threats in
relation among nations, this has become a rule of law in international criminal law-its violation
comes with criminal responsibility in the eyes of the international community. However, there
are certain situations in which it is allowed to use force such as for self defense purposes,
humanitarian intervention, and preemptive power inter alia.
In the international community, force has featured as at high levels of decentralization i.e. force
has been use d for different purposes-it has been applied to previous intervention and to punish
for noncompliance according to demand. War is the hardcore form of force and is used to grab
territories or to completely suppress states. Reprisals are also considered as violence in
international relations. Kelsen, war has been considered to be permissible due to existence of
sovereignty among the states.
Prohibition to use of force and threats
The United Nations Charter in article 2(4) controls the use of force by member states. The UN
Charter states that;
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations."
This law has been ratified by all the members and is protected by the United Nations Charter
1945 to prohibit the use of force by states. This was the time when Louse Doswald-Beck was the
secretary general of the International Commission of Jurists . Most scholars have interpreted
Article 2(4) to be banning the use of force as in “territorial integrity or political independence of
states"; the most commonly held opinion is that the above factors are only to reinforce Article
2(4)-which encompasses general prohibitions with exceptions outlined in the Charter such as
self-defense and those in Chapter VII by the United Nations security council. The general
principle is to ban the use of armed forces except in cases where; there is collective action-
pursued to maintain or even enforce peace (Articles 24, 25, and Chapter VII) ; and Article
51which states that, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right to individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a state." In addition, other cited
reasons that permit the use of force include humanitarian intervention, though this is still
controversial, reprisals, and states’ protection of their nationals in other states.
The United Nations Charter and the International Military Tribunal Statute have been created
with regard to international law. These laws were created by the UN member states in order to
protect succeeding generations from scourges of war. Members resorted that the use of armed
forces was not allowed, save in the interest of all. The UN Charter even though premising on the
past is open to future amendments since the definition of the word ‘war’ has changed (and will
change) over time . One may quickly note that the word ‘war’ is not mentioned in the Charter
only “force" is mentioned together with “enforcement measures". In addition, total prohibition of
use of force is not indicated since an exemption is given, “in the interest of all". Somewhat
different is the Article 2, paragraph 4, reads:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations."
It is quite clear that the use of force is certainly prohibited in the view of territorial integrity and
independence of member states including armed forces intervention. Thus, it is certain that the
United Nations does not condone any form of reprisals, this is completely out of its purpose. The
use of the term ‘force’ clearly indicates that the traditional perception on war and the modern
definition are prohibited . On that note, one can confidently argue that the United Nations
Charter has surpassed previous international Acts that prohibited the use of force. Traditionally,
war has been the gravest form of force. However, the view of war as an institution that permitted
the attainment of state’s interests. The Charter only speaks of the use of force as legal or illegal,
it does not recognize just and unjust wars, the former is a rule while the latter is an exemption.
In the eyes of most scholars, the term ‘force’ is quickly interpreted as ‘armed force’. This is a
rejection of other types of force such as political and even economic. Sharmasanascvilly argues
that, the different forms of force which can be used by states are prohibited as outlined in Article
2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter. The armed forces disturb territorial integrity; however,
political independence is affected in various ways
The major development in international law is the prohibition of use of threat together with the
use of force itself, “threat or danger from aggression" is prohibited by the League of Nations
Council (Article 10). Thus the prohibition of threat was aimed at “"preventing and eliminating
threats to peace and suppression of aggression or other breaches of peace" (Article 1, paragraph
1" . The prohibition to use of force has been sealed by the prohibition to use threat.
Collective action
The UN Security Council is mandated to identify the existence of, and even take action to curb,
any threat to peace and security among the members’ states. However, this power has not been
used as expected since other measures such as the use of sanctions are taken short of the
traditional armed forces by some of its members. The time that the UN used force was in 1950 to
‘force’ North Korea to withdraw from South Korea. Initially it had been envisaged by the
creators of the UN Charter that the organisation would have its own forces. However, much of
the command of these forces has been from the United States. The UN Security Council for also
authorized the use of armed forces in 1960 during the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. During this
time, the Council passed Resolution 678 which requested all members to support a forceful
operation in collaboration with Kuwait to ensure Iraqi’s withdrawal from Kuwait. This very
resolution was never revoked until 2003, when the Council passed Resolution 1441 which
authorized Iraq’s invasion due to its non-compliance with the manufacture of atomic weapons-a
threat to global peace and security. The UN also authorized the use of force in countries like
Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia and currently Somalia.
Self defense
This is provided for in article 51. The inherent right to individual or collective self-defense in
case of an armed attack allowed until the UN Security Council has intervened. The steps taken
by members in the exercise of self-defense must be reported to the Security Council and must not
in any way affect the mandate of the Council under the current Charter. The article states that,
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security".
The right to self defense is still provided for in the customary international law, as seen in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the best example is the Nicaragua Case . Article 51 preserves
the right to self defense and outlines the procedures to be followed in case of an armed attack. It
has also been observed that, an irregular forceful attack can prompt the use of force as in the case
of 9/11 attacks where the Security Council allowed the US to use force against the terrorists.
Pre-emptive force
The use of self defense is limited under the international customary law. The permissibility of the
use of force in cases of self defense is hinged on the interpretation of Article 51. There is no right
to pre-emptive self defense when an armed attack has occurred, a state does not have to wait for
an armed attack to actually occur to use force. Thus, a distinction has to be drawn between,
“preventive", “anticipatory", and “interventionary" self defense. The ICJ has not ruled out the
use of pre-emptive armed force to intervene in the case of an imminent armed attack. However,
opinio juris and practice widely suggest that states have no right to preventive self-defense. This
can be explained well by the Caroline’s case.

Protection of nationals
Various states have asserted the controversial claim to protect their nationals abroad. This can be
observed by the UK in Suez (1956), the Israelis in Entebbe-Uganda (1976), and the US force in
the Dominican Republic (1965), Panama (1989), and Grenada (1983). The use of force has in
some cases been linked with other political reasons beside the protection of nationals. For
example, the intervention of the US in Grenada in 1983 was widely linked to the US opposition
to the rising socialism in the government of Grenada. The danger posed to the US nationals in
this case was not imminent and this led to strong condemnation from the United Nations General
Assembly. The examples above (except for the Mossad intervention in Entebbe (1976)), the
protection of nationals has been a used as a veil to cover other political agendas.
Humanitarian intervention
In modern times where terrorism has really increased, several countries are beginning to
advocate for the right of humanitarian intervention without the UN’s Security Council. After the
Kosovo’s crisis in 1999, countries like the UK cited the importance of the use of military force to
avert such catastrophes in the future. When NATO flexed its military muscle in Yugoslavia, it
had not acquired the UN Security Council’s permission. On the contrary this action was not
condemned since the intervention was necessary on humanitarian grounds. Many states oppose
such unauthorized intervention on legal grounds while others cite practicality-stronger nations
(military wise) could misuse or overuse such powers.

4.3) Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Responsibility to Protect(R2P) is not a legal concept; it creates no legal change as it is embedded
within the existing international law order. R2P is ‘best understood as a reaffirmation and
codification of already existing norms’ and as a political concept having political effects. This is
not criticism of R2P, but is instead its greatest strength. It allows R2P to command wider support
from the international community, especially from states suspicious of changes to the
fundamentals of international law.
R2P has ‘significantly changed the grammar of political discourse with regard to the prevention
and reaction to human rights violations’ shifting political discourse away from justifying
interventions to stop atrocities, to questioning why there has been no intervention. This gives
legitimacy to intervention for humanitarian purposes through the UN and making it harder for
UNSC members to justify veto use.
However, R2P currently faces serious challenges to its political influence, which it must
overcome. First is the perception that it does entail changes to international law, particularly
regarding the prohibition of the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This essay
will demonstrate clearly that these fears are unfounded. Second is the damage that failures in the
application of R2P have done to the concept, focusing on lack of action in Darfur and Syria, and
R2P’s use in Libya.
The essay will end with suggestions on how R2P should overcome these issues. It should not
advocate and push for military action outside of the UN framework; this would be unrealistic and
fatally damage R2P. Instead there must be a focus on developing R2P further, reacting and
responding to the lessons of Libya and Syria in order that it can realise its full potential.
Responsibility to Protect
R2P has experienced a rapid growth, moving from mere ‘passionate prose’ in the ICISS report in
2001 to quickly becoming a ‘mainstay of international public policy debates’. This support has
shown resilience in the face of a backtracking from influential states a few months after the
World Summit, as well as an attempt from avowed opponents of the concept to destroy it. As
well as the significant support shown by states, the response from civil society has been
encouraging and instrumental to this success; NGOs from all over the world have joined together
to support and develop R2P, creating the influential International Coalition for the Responsibility
to Protect. Due to these factors R2P can be seen as one of the most ‘most dramatic’
developments in international affairs and consequently there are ‘not many ideas that have the
potential to matter more for good, not only in theory but in practice’.
The reason for R2P’s rapid adoption is that it provides a satisfying response to Annan’s
challenge to reconcile sovereignty and the need for action to prevent atrocities. Overall it
achieves this by moving away from the language of a right to humanitarian intervention which
dominated the debates surrounding the Kosovo intervention to focus on the ‘perspective of the
victims of human rights violations’
R2P expresses a responsibility to protect populations from atrocities as an inherent part of state
sovereignty. Building on this the Canadian Permanent Representative at the World Summit
persuasively argued that R2P strengthens, not weakens, state sovereignty. This is because outside
non-military intervention will help states to discharge the responsibilities which sovereignty
entail. From this, a state’s failure to prevent atrocities does not fall under the ‘domaine
réservé that excludes interferences from outside’; should a state fail to exercise their sovereignty
in this way the responsibility falls to the rest of the international community. This aspect is
clearly influenced by the failure over Rwanda.
The international community’s responsibility to protect is to be achieved through primarily non-
military means, such as developing a better ‘early warning capacity’, using ‘appropriate
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means’ to protect populations with a focus on
vulnerable states ‘which are under stress’ to prevent crises from breaking out and to help them
‘build capacity to protect their populations’. This approach is more effective than military
methods; they are ‘easier to initiate and sustain’ and avoid the huge risks, costs, and destruction
which military action brings. This effectiveness was demonstrated in the response to post-
election violence in Kenya. Diplomatic efforts helped prevent the violence from escalating,
described by Annan as ‘a successful example of R2P at work’, notwithstanding the lack of
military intervention.
Furthermore this focus fits in with the Third World Approach to International Law, described by
Anghie and Chimni, which looks at international law from the perspective of those in the Third
World, aiming to develop it ‘from a language of oppression to a language of emancipation’. R2P
achieves this by focusing on the plight of those suffering and entails ‘taking Third World
development seriously’, potentially leading to significant transfers of ‘wealth, expertise and
opportunity’ from affluent to developing nations in order to build their preventative capacity.
If R2P were too heavily linked with military intervention it would be a ‘clear barrier to
consensus’ due to fears that humanitarian justifications would be abused by large and powerful
nations, as was the concern with Kosovo. There is less concern of this happening theoretically
with R2P’s primary focus being on non-military preventative measures; military intervention is a
complete last resort. Furthermore a well understood focus on non-military methods should avoid
the complicated and controversial questions about the legality of the use of force, which will be
analysed in detail below. All this together renders R2P more acceptable to the wider international
community, and is the reason why R2P has been heralded as causing a ‘significant conceptual
shift’.
Legal Status
Due to this conceptual shift R2P is seen by some as resulting in a change to international law.
Feinstein argues that R2P ‘redefines sovereignty’ from being inviolable and absolute as it was
for 350 years, to entail ‘rights as well as responsibilities’. Thus R2P is characterised as an
‘emerging norm’ of customary international law, which with acceptance is changing the
international legal order.
This is not the case. Bellamy draws on Hobbes to show that this conception of sovereignty is not
novel; Hobbes asserted that if the state could no longer perform the function it was given power
to do, then it does not qualify as sovereign and is not owed obedience. This is remarkably similar
to the idea that failure to protect a population is a failure in the exercise of sovereignty.
Furthermore this conception of limited sovereignty is seen throughout international law. In the
Island of Palmas case it was noted that ‘territorial sovereignty… has a corollary duty’ which was
to respect the sovereignty of other states. Even the largely permissive ‘Lotus Principle‘ makes it
clear that sovereignty is not absolute; states have the right to only do anything which is not
prohibited by international law.
Sovereignty’s duties were extended towards the protection of populations in the UN Charter with
Articles 1(3) and 55 including important statements regarding human rights protections, which
Annan argues shows that the Charter was not ‘a licence for governments to trample on human
rights and human dignity’. Moreover, R2P as expressed at the World Summit applies to
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, all of which are prohibited
by international law and are ius cogens norms from which no derogation is permitted. Therefore
it is possible to say that states have the existing duty and responsibility to respect them,
regardless of R2P.
Some writers contend that R2P creates a new legal duty on the wider international community to
respond to atrocities. Thus Peters writes that R2P has contributed to the evolution of a ‘legal
obligation’ on the UNSC to intervene for humanitarian purposes, and Bannon writes that a
‘clearly acknowledged duty’ to protect foreign populations was expressed at the World Summit.
This is a misunderstanding and misrepresentation of what was decided at the World Summit.
Firstly with regards to military intervention should peaceful means fail, states merely proclaimed
that they are ‘prepared’ to take action on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. This tentative language points
towards ‘a voluntary, rather than a mandatory engagement’. This analysis is supported by the
fact that the draft wording for this section stating ‘we recognise our shared responsibility to take
collective action’ was rejected, showing that states wanted to avoid assuming an obligation.
Secondly even the vocabulary of a responsibility lacks the ‘specific normative content’ that
would entail that R2P is an obligation; a mere responsibility does not legally create a
corresponding duty. Furthermore, as Stahn points out, if R2P were an obligation adopted by
states at the World Summit, surely there would be corresponding legal sanctions for
noncompliance, yet there are none.
Thus it can be clearly seen that R2P is not a legal concept which creates corresponding legal
duties. R2P’s formulations of sovereignty and responsibility expressed are a ‘rhetorical trick’
used cleverly to shift emphasis away from the intervention of the international community, to the
plight of those suffering. This way R2P is far more acceptable to a diverse and divided
international community, with smaller states concerned about abusive interventions, and with
larger states concerned that an obligation to intervene would remove discretion from decision
making.

The Prohibition of the Use of Force

The use of force is prohibited in international law by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and is
referred to as being of ‘fundamental or cardinal importance’ and at the ‘cornerstone’ of the UN
Charter. Given the ostensible strength of the prohibition, Zifcak states that ‘it is apparent that the
express terms of the Charter do not readily embrace humanitarian intervention’. There two
exceptions to this prohibition in the Charter. Article 51 permits force used in self-defence under
certain conditions, and most significantly for R2P, Chapter VII allows the UNSC to authorise
force in response to a threat to the peace. This is where R2P fits in; it was made clear at the
World Summit that under R2P authorisation for the use of force will be made ‘through the
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII’.
Contrary to Oxford’s assertion, there is ample existing legal authority under Chapter VII for the
UNSC to authorise the use of force in response to an atrocity, by classifying it as a threat to the
peace. Some, like Damrosch, contend that no authority can be found in the UN Charter to
authorise the use of force as a response to internal conflict and atrocities which do not pose a
‘transboundary threat to peace and security’. However this is inaccurate; what constitutes a threat
to the peace was ‘designed to be subjectively determined’ by the UNSC for it is an ‘open
textured’ concept. Records from both the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences
corroborate with this analysis.
Therefore one cannot say that there is no authority for a particular definition of peace and
security used by the UNSC; quite simply threats to the peace ‘are what the UNSC says they are’.
Furthermore in many situations the UNSC has deemed an internal conflict a threat to the peace
under Chapter VII before the development of R2P, such as in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and East
Timor. Therefore use of force as envisaged under R2P ‘would fit securely under Article 42’ and
consequently R2P does not do anything to change these existing competencies of the UNSC
under Chapter VII.
The Security Council and the Use of Force
Right to protect does ‘not entail revolutionary changes within the existing legal framework’ of
international law. This is seen by some as a R2P’s major flaw. Being part of the existing
international legal framework means that any authorisation of coercive military and non-
military measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and so the most drastic tools in the R2P
armoury, are subject to the veto power of the permanent five UNSC members.
There were suggestions in the ICISS Report and High-Level Panel Report that the permanent
five should refrain from using the veto in face of a large scale atrocity, but this was not taken up
at the world summit. Consequently the continuing threat of the veto means that the UNSC risks
‘policy paralysis’ due to the risk of the veto being misused for ulterior political purposes, leading
to a highly selective application of R2P which ultimately discredits its utility.
This sadly has been the case with both Darfur and Syria. In 2003 fighting broke out in Darfur
between anti-government groups and the Sudanese government, which reacted by using local
militias (known as the Janjaweed) and large scale aerial bombings of the area; both sides
committed atrocities against civilians. The result has been over 200,000 deaths and the
displacement of some 2 million people, around one third of the Sudanese population.
The response of the international community is widely held to have been a ‘conspicuous’ and
‘abject’ failure. Although the crisis broke out before the 2005 World Summit, and the UNSC had
taken measures from 2005 onwards such as targeted sanctions and an ICC referral, these
measures were ‘slowly implemented and have proven insufficient to protect vulnerable
populations’. It was not until 2007, with the consent of Sudan, that a major UN peacekeeping
force was implemented. This slowness and ineffectiveness was caused by the SC members’
‘geopolitical concerns’, such as China’s investments in Sudanese oil, the USA’s counter
terrorism assistance from Sudan and Russia’s lucrative arms contracts. These factors prevented
these states from pushing for and allowing swift and meaningful action.
The UNSC’s response to the violence in Syria has been even more disappointing. Syrian
civilians ‘have borne the brunt’ of this violence with allegations of targeting aerial bombings and
artillery attacks on civilian areas, bringing ‘immeasurable destruction and human
suffering, leading to an estimated death toll of 60,000, with a further 4 million ‘in desperate
need’. Despite the clear need for the application of R2P in this situation China and Russia have
exercised their veto over three separate resolutions designed to address the crisis. These vetoes
are suspected again to be fuelled by geopolitical concerns, such as Russian arms interests and the
strategic Tartus naval base. This situation is made more complicated by Russia and China’s
reluctance to consent to coercive action after the Libyan intervention, which they feel was taken
too far by NATO. This will be discussed below.
These case studies show that R2P ‘cannot guarantee’ action, states can still perpetrate atrocities
with impunity. Therefore the placement of R2P’s reliance on the existing legal framework
including Chapter VII could be a fatal flaw. Although its legal status is uncontroversial for it
requires no change in international law, it will not achieve its goal of protecting civilians from
atrocities if it fails in its practical application.
For this reason some advocate the use of force outside of the auspices of the UNSC. Bannon
argues that R2P as expressed at the World Summit actually ‘strengthens the legal justification’
for this type of unilateral and regional action should the UNSC fail to act. This assertion is
baseless; it was made clear at the World Summit that R2P will operate within the existing
framework of Chapter VII for the most coercive actions. To hold otherwise is a rewriting of what
was actually decided and the intentions of those states.
Williams et al make a more sensitive suggestion; while accepting that R2P at present does not
advocate the use of force outside of the UNSC, they submit that it is a ‘crucial component’ which
R2P should incorporate. In their view this is the ‘most appropriate way to develop’ R2P in order
to ensure that failures such as Darfur and Syria are not repeated. This will be achieved through a
tightly prescribed use of force outside the UNSC should it fail to act; for example it would have
to be low intensity force, authorised by a regional organisation at the request of opposition
groups.
Legal change of this sort may be possible, despite the prohibition of the use of force in Article
2(4). One method is through a wider interpretation of this Article. Reisman argues that the
precise wording of Article 2(4) allows for the use of force so long as it does not violate ‘the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state’ and is consistent with the purposes of
the UN. In his view ‘humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a challenge
to the political independence of the state involved’ and is fully consistent with the most
fundamental purposes of the UN. He summarises by stating that it is a ‘distortion’ to argue that
Article 2(4) precludes humanitarian uses of force.
Schachter dismisses this argument as it ‘demands an Orwellian construction’ of the terms
political independence and territorial integrity This appears to be backed up by the ICJ in the
Corfu Channel Case. The United Kingdom argued that its minesweeping in Albanian waters
‘threatened neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of Albania’; however
the Court held that this violated Albanian sovereignty. Later the ICJ in Nicaragua construed this
as a blanket rejection of intervention. If a mere minesweeping mission violates sovereignty in
this way so surely must humanitarian intervention.
Most significantly, a look at the UN Charter’s travaux préparatoires shows this particular
interpretation is inaccurate. The phrase ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state’ was added at the request of smaller states to emphasise protection from the use of
force, not to create an exception. From this the words ‘in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations’ are supplementary to the prohibition of the use of force to give it
a holistic coverage.
However, it is possible that this interpretation of Article 2(4) could change in the future. Legal
realists argue that the drafters’ intentions have no inherent authority; ‘legal status depends… on
the attitude of the contemporary international community towards it’. This is very similar to, and
will be considered with, the idea that customary international law can modify a treaty’s
provisions. Chesterman points to one example where the UN Charter has been modified by
subsequent practice and interpretation. Article 27(3) states that UNSC decisions must receive
‘the concurring votes of the permanent members’. However it has become practice to consider a
measure passed without all votes concurring should permanent members abstain. This
interpretation or change to Article 27(3) was affirmed by the ICJ in the Namibia advisory
opinion; however it remains unclear whether this was a modification by customary international
law, or a new interpretation.
Both lead to the same outcome, thus Williams et al’s preferred form of R2P incorporating the use
of force outside the UNSC to protect populations could develop by either reinterpreting Article
2(4), or through customary international law. For a practice to become customary international
law two criteria must be fulfilled; the actions concerned must ‘amount to a settled practice’, and
‘the states concerned must… feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal
obligation’. This is a high threshold to reach, which would be very difficult and consequently
unrealistic to achieve, for ‘the threshold of requisite practice’ would be high to modify Article
2(4) in this way, especially given its fundamental importance. Thus it would ‘require
overwhelming support by the international community’ to bring about any customary change to
the use of force.
These same problems exist for the possibility of custom allowing humanitarian intervention
outside of the UNSC to exist side by side with Article 2(4), which is possible. There is nowhere
near the requisite level of consensus for this in the international community. Previous attempts to
develop a less stringent application of Article 2(4) have been vociferously rejected; the reaction
to NATO’s unauthorised intervention in Kosovo demonstrates this perfectly. NATO and its
members relied on a mixture of the legal arguments explained above and moral arguments
relating to the human rights abuses in Kosovo to justify their intervention. Others, however, saw
it as a ‘gross violation of the Charter’.
Shortly after the intervention supporting states distanced themselves from its potential legal
implications. The USA and Germany claimed that Kosovo was not to be viewed as a precedent
for future intervention, and Slovenia and Canada welcomed the UNSC resuming its legitimate
role over the situation after passing Resolution 1244. Most opposition to such a customary rule
comes from the small and medium sized states which are crucial to R2P’s global acceptance,
concerned that it ‘would be bound to be abused, especially by the big and strong, and to pose a
threat, especially to the small and weak’.
Thus the force unauthorised by the UNSC is an incredibly divisive and controversial issue,
which has little chance of acquiring the required support to become custom. If R2P were to
incorporate Williams et al’s suggestion of force outside of the UNSC it would damage R2P’s
credibility and acceptance for states would associate R2P with the Kosovo intervention and the
legitimate concerns they had over the potential abuse of such an ability.
With these concerns in mind the ICISS’ task when developing R2P ‘was not to find alternatives
to the Security Council, but to make the Security Council work better’. This is a key part to its
promising international support which is crucial to its effectiveness as a political concept; the
more support it has the greater its political influence. This political influence manifests itself
practically by generating ‘compliance pull’, which ‘pulls actors toward larger and more effective
commitments to protecting civilians’, and by creating greater political legitimacy (not legal
authority) for R2P influenced measures under Chapter VII. These practical effects will be lost if
R2P loses its global support base. R2P must be pragmatic in what it can achieve, while
maintaining the necessary support for it to have a practical effect lest it becomes nothing more
than an idealistic theory.
This might lead to a slow and incremental development of R2P which may seem disappointing
given the need for urgent action in Syria. However, the steady development of human rights
norms since World War II, which now ‘play a transformative role in international policy’, shows
how powerful this incremental process can be. For this reason Luck writes that these experiences
of the past ‘remain relevant, reminding us of the value of both optimism and patience.’

Libya, Syria and the Future

This process of incremental development is at risk due to R2P’s application in Libya, and lack
thereof for Syria. When the UNSC, in the spirit of R2P, authorised states to take ‘all necessary
measures’ to protect civilians in Libya, it was not a unique legal development, the authority for
the UNSC to use force for civilian protection under Chapter VII is well established as shown
above. It was however a significant political development, as it was achieved due to R2P’s
influence. It also appeared to mark a departure from the apathy and inaction which characterised
the responses to Rwanda and Darfur. This is even more significant as parallels can be seen
between Libya and Rwanda; Gaddafi urged his supporters to attack the opposition
‘cockroaches’, a very similar incitement to violence to that seen in Rwanda.
These positives were short lived due to NATO’s implementation of the resolution. Force under
the resolution was only authorised for the purposes of protecting civilians; NATO acted ultra
vires as their actions were ‘less about protecting the population and more about regime change’.
NATO deliberately sided with the Libyan rebels and TNC, using its airpower to overthrow
Gaddafi. This was despite the resolution reaffirming Libya’s ‘sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and national unity’ and the 5 abstaining states voicing their concern that
military force of this kind could be abused for ulterior purposes.
This perceived abuse of the UNSC resolution in Libya led to a strong backlash from China,
South Africa and Brazil, all of whose support is crucial to R2P’s legitimacy. South Africa’s
representative explained that NATO’s actions ‘will undermine the gains made in [R2P]’ This
prediction was accurate. When the Syria crisis broke out the UNSC failed to act decisively as it
did for Libya, NATO’s abuse of the Libya resolution made Russia and China, as well as the Arab
league and other prominent emerging states sceptical about any further action under R2P, despite
the violence being perhaps worse.
R2P is facing two significant problems at present which affect both sceptical and enthusiastic
supporters, hampering its continued support and development. Important emerging states are
concerned that R2P, even if authorised through the UNSC, will be used for ulterior purposes. At
the same time, due to the UNSC’s failure to act in Syria R2P could be viewed as having no
practical utility, leading to the paradoxical situation where R2P is simultaneously attacked for
going both too far and not far enough.
Even though R2P is not to blame for NATO’s abuse of the resolution, R2P needs to develop in
light of these criticisms in order to continue its growing political influence. This can be best
achieved, not by advocating a controversial legal change such as in Williams et al’s proposal, but
with a more modest political suggestion. R2P should incorporate threshold criteria to guide the
use of force as in the ICISS and High Level Panel Reports; seriousness of threat, proper purpose,
last resort, proportionality and balance of consequences. While R2P’s primary focus should be
on preventative and capacity building mechanisms, not using military force, it must respond to
the international community’s concerns which revolve around the use of force.
These criteria would benefit both enthusiastic and cautious supporters of R2P, addressing both
the problems emerging from the Libya and Syria experiences. They will focus and guide the
UNSC’s decision making; making it ‘more responsive to the security needs of civilians’ and
giving less influence to geopolitical concerns, thereby maximising the possibility of UNSC
consensus. Criteria will also make it harder for R2P to be abused, for any decision made by the
UNSC will have a significantly higher legitimacy in the eyes of the international community,
having been made according to transparent and relevant guidelines. This is not a perfect
suggestion; the UNSC could still fail to act since these are only political criteria to guide the
UNSC’s assessment of a crisis. However it is a pragmatic solution to ensure R2P continues to
grow and have a political influence.
Prohibited And Permissible Use Of Force In International Relations

The use of force has been a long standing phenomenon in international relations and has been
considered to be directly linked to the sovereignty of states-the limitless power wielded by states
to use all possible means to guard and protect their interests. However, the longer period that war
has been associated with sovereignty of state, the more the issue has turned into a legal
institution by itself. This paper looks at the prohibited and permissible use of force in
International Relations. Developed social awareness has expanded the limits (and even led) to
the right to resort to war. This indeed has abolished the use of force or any form of threats in
relation among nations, this has become a rule of law in international criminal law-its violation
comes with criminal responsibility in the eyes of the international community. However, there
are certain situations in which it is allowed to use force such as for self defense purposes,
humanitarian intervention, and preemptive power inter alia.
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1. S.K. Kapoor, International Law, Human Rights, Central Law Agency, 2009
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law/#_ftn14
4. https://ruwanthikagunaratne.wordpress.com/2013/05/26/law-of-treaties-vienna-
convention-on-law-of-treaties-1969/
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8. https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law
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