FILIATION

CONDE V ABAYA
FACTS:
I.             As antecedents: chanrobles virtualawlibrary that Casiano Abaya,
unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina Labadia, died on the 6th
of April 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children Jose
and Teopista Conde, whom she states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th
of November, 1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession;
that an administrator having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th
of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said Romualdo Abaya and
Sabina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and
opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest
relative of the deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th
of January, 1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved
that, after due process of law, the court declare him to be the sole heir of
Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula
Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of
said estate, and that it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22,
1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for the declaration of heirs
and distribution of the property of the estate.
ISSUE:
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special
proceedings for the administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an
action might be brought to enforce the acknowledgment of the natural child
of the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, whether
one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child
of the deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either
voluntarily or compulsory by reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but
asking at the same time that, in the special proceeding itself, he be
recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to
be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.

RULING:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a
natural child lasts only during the life of his presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy
lasts during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed
parents, or their heirs; while the right of action to secure the
acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole
life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only
be exercised against the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
personal character and pertains exclusively to him, only the child may
exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in three
cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he died
during his minority, or while insane, or after action had been already
instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception,
be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases:
chanrobles virtualawlibrary first, in the event of the death of the latter during
the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument
of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother,
the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But as such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be
exercised by him. It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his
ascendants.

Jison vs CA
Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner,

Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the latter.  The case
was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and when she was already 39
years of age.  

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945,
he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother.  Monina alleged that
since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the
illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family.  It was
likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education
such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. 
Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.     

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco

Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established
in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. 
Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which
legitimate filiation is established.
 “To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous
and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences

offered by Monina:
1.     That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was employed by the former;
2.     That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and
conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative

father is not competence evidence as to the issue of paternity.  Francisco’s
lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates and school
records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. 
With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age
attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if
Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary
for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce
her filiation.  Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required
for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying
upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”.  Hence, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate,
Monina filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive
provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearly be inequitable and unjust.  Petition was denied.

RULING:

Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of

preliminary matters relating to the applicable law and the guiding principles
in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly, the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209) governs the present controversy. As
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco 26 served as a judicial
confirmation of Article 256 of the Family Code 27 regarding its retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not hold true
here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed
away and the former having actually resisted the latters claim below.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as

MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence
as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms
of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final

judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a

private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be

proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the
Civil Code.

For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the

second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the
evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proof 28 is
required.

Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an

illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that
they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire
to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.29cräläwvirtualibräry
By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require
any particular length of time.30
cräläwvirtualibräry

The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded

on the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the
parties, so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established
by clear and convincing evidence.31 cräläwvirtualibräry

The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules
on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance
of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply
put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However,
in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence
refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which
is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth. 32

With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant
controversy.

FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant

consideration. While it has been observed that unlawful intercourse will not
be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, 33 this
does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most
instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the sexual
act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual
intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or mothers
word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the
instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify as to the fact of
intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the
institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that
MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth and her
parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her
mother. The paramount question then is whether MONINAs evidence is
coherent, logical and natural.34cräläwvirtualibräry
We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA,
woven by her narration of circumstances and events that occurred through
the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the
testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts:

1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when
her mother was in the employ of the former;

2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and
conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains to enumerate, thus:

[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school
uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de
Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her
with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of
appellants mother, acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and
calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to
give appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for
employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his
house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls,
having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and
also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in
her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-
5)

3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout

the years publicly,35 spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted
manner.36

Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second

assigned error must fail.

There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the
probative value of some of MONINAs documentary evidence.

MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar

concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly misplaced. It is settled that a
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of
an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. 37 Simply put, if
the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying
the information himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor
or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the
signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the
latters part.38 In like manner, FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the
preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records
(Exhs. Z and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity,
the former being competent merely to prove the administration of the
sacrament of baptism on the date so specified. 39 However, despite the
inadmissibility of the school records per se to prove paternity, they may be
admitted as part of MONINAs testimony to corroborate her claim that
FRANCISCO spent for her education.

We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and the baptismal certificates
may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation. Since
they are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.

As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him

to prove the existence of its elements. However, he only succeeded in showing
MONINAs delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last
element. In any event, it must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and
injustice.60 Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
illegitimate, MONINA filed her action well within the period granted her by a positive
provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would clearly be
inequitable and unjust.

TAYAG V CA

FACTS:

On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. 3 Respondent alleged in the petition,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5994 (SP 5994), that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate
children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner
herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own.

On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of
which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers ₱100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.

Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the annotation of 5
September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to be the paraphernal
properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to the
respondent’s and her brothers’ prejudice.

Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the petition
using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las Vegas, Nevada,
USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is
presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true that she is planning to sell the properties.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit because respondent failed to state a cause of action. 4

In a Motion5 dated 31 August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to
allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.
There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father.

ISSUE:

whether respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause
of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter.

Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag,14 the Court defined an interested
party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent.

Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is
dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no longer be established, such
contingent interest does not make her an interested party. Here lies the complication in the case
which the appellate court had not discussed, although its disposition of the case is correct. 1avvphi1

Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn,
may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.

Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil register,
a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.15 The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further
court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought
during the lifetime of the putative parent. 16 Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand,
may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parents.17
Petitioner’s thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayag’s death, respondent’s
illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedent’s estate which the Rules require to
be material and direct, may no longer be established. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that
respondent’s successional rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an
illegitimate child.

In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show
whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of
petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as
yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been
foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to
maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.

We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices
even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of
the facts alleged therein.19 Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the

decedent’s illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be material and direct.
The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling that,
"respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement
proceedings."

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v.PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent. 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time
lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone
else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and
3

Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as
4

his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship,
however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May
2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of
Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of
the children.
5

On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling
that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if
they are under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]." Thus, the
6

court a quo decreed the following:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s] prayer for
recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith
issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
 a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the
name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of
Live Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said
minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;

b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over the
persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;

c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’ minor children
Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in
the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to
Sunday evening;

d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre
Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;

ISSUE:

sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the
Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

RULING:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
14

Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis
supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is
expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the
two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande
to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a
15
judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s
surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for
the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father
or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law
the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

ADOPTION

Sayson v. CA
G.R.No. 892224-25, 23 January 1992, 205 SCRA 321

FACTS:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.
Teodoro married Isabel. Upon the death of Teodoro and Isabel, their properties were in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children. The plaintiffs filed for partition of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. It was opposed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel alleging their
successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants. Subsequently, Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel filed for partition of intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are titled to inherit
Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of representation because Delia and Edmundo are
adopted children and Doribel was legitimate daughter.

The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from Elena and Rafaela by right of representation.
The CA found Delia and Edmundo disqualified from inheriting from Eleno and Rafaela.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation.

RULING:

As to Doribel, yes, for she was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel, thus granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela. She has right to represent to her deceased father in the distribution of intestate
estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.

As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers, they cannot inherit by
representation. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and
have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include right of representation. The relationship
created by the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend
to the blood relative of either party.

Sayson v. CA
G.R.No. 892224-25, 23 January 1992, 205 SCRA 321

FACTS:

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.
Teodoro married Isabel. Upon the death of Teodoro and Isabel, their properties were in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children. The plaintiffs filed for partition of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. It was opposed by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel alleging their
successional rights to the estate as the lawful descendants. Subsequently, Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel filed for partition of intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are titled to inherit
Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of representation because Delia and Edmundo are
adopted children and Doribel was legitimate daughter.

The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from Elena and Rafaela by right of representation.
The CA found Delia and Edmundo disqualified from inheriting from Eleno and Rafaela.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Delia, Edmundo and Doribel may inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation.

RULING:

As to Doribel, yes, for she was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel, thus granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela. She has right to represent to her deceased father in the distribution of intestate
estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had
he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.

As to of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers, they cannot inherit by
representation. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and
have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include right of representation. The relationship
created by the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend
to the blood relative of either party.

_______The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate
daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel
was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming the the
7

petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption
was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding
frontally addressing the issue.

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive
heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the
Civil Code:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same
manner as a legitimate child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives.
It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his
children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is
gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one who the person represented would have succeeded.
 Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno
and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the
right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting
parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel
as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are
under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals
was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of
her grandparents' intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of
the deceased Teodoro.

Tamargo vs CA
Tamargo vs CA
GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer

Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.  The
petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages
against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time
of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt

Adelberto Bundoc.  Such petition was granted on November 1982 after
the tragic incident.  
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive
effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was
lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and

responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.  In the case at bar,
during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still
lodged with the natural parents.  It follows that they are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.  “Parents and guardians are responsible
for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil code”. 

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at
the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted
child.  Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit
or advantage in favor of the adopted child.  Under Article 35 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case,
trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at
the time of the shooting incident.  Hence, actual custody was then with
the natural parents of Adelberto.
----------This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is
not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural
or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The basis for the doctrine of
5

vicarious liability

The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.

Ruling:
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages

he Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for
the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living
with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article
58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:

Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by
the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the
9

child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held
liable for the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable
for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air
rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree
of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive
affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In
the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.

HERBERT CANG VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:30 PM
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a
divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the
3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. 
Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA
affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the  consent of the
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to
pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent
of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:

NO.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption
signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for
the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that
the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was
not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send
them packages catered to their whims.
SANTOS V ARANZANSO

FACTS:
A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was filed by Simplicio Santos and
Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 4, 1949. 1 Paulina Santos was then 17
years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old. The petition, which was under oath, alleged inter alia, that
the whereabouts of the minors' nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were unknown; that since
the outbreak of the war said minors have been abandoned by their respective parents; and that for
years, since their infancy, said children have continuously been in petitioners' care and custody. A
guardian ad litem Crisanto de Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian ad litem
forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption. Paulina Santos, being over fourteen years of age,
likewise gave her written consent thereto. 2GRANTED.

The principal issue on the merits in this appeal is whether respondents-oppositors Aranzanso and
Ventura, could assail in the settlement proceedings the adoption decree in favor of Paulina and
Aurora Santos. In sustaining their right to make such a collateral attack, the respondent Court of
Appeals rested as abovementioned on the premise that failure to obtain the consent of the natural
parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio. In its view, said consent was
not properly dispensed with, not only because the evidence adduced in the adoption proceedings
was insufficient to support a finding that the parents had abandoned the children, but also since the
adoption court fatally omitted to expressly and specifically find that such abandonment in fact
occurred.

In this regard it should be stated that the Court of Appeals completely relied on American
jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental consent to the adoption is a jurisdictional
requisite (E.g., 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, Section 45[a] p. 435; Whetmore vs. Fratello, 282 P2d
667, 670). The point to remember, however, is that under our law on the matter, consent by the
parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite:

SEC. 3. Consent to adoption.—There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the
adoption signed by the child if over fourteen years of age and not incompetent, and by each
of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not
abandoned such child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian
ad litem of the child, or if the child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, children's home, or
benevolent society or person, by the proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or
society, or by such person; but if the child is illegitimate and has not been recognized, the
consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required. (Rule 100, Old Rules of Court.) 4

Stated otherwise, if the natural parents have abandoned their children, consent to the adoption by
the guardian ad litem suffices. This brings as to the question whether in the proceedings at bar the
Court of Appeals can still review the evidence in the adoption case and conclude that it was not
sufficiently established therein that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had abandoned them.

First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the adoption court made no determination of the fact of
abandonment. As quoted earlier, it is stated in the decision of the adoption court, that:

From the evidence presented at the hearing it appears that the petitioners have been
married for the past twenty-seven years and have no children of their own. They desire to
adopt the minors Paulina Santos [y] Reyes and Aurora Santos [y] Reyes, both of whom are
and for years have been living under their care and custody; that the former, since she was
barely three months old has already been taken care of by them up to the present time, and
the latter has been cared for since she was only fifteen days old. Paulina Santos [y] Reyes is
now seventeen years old. . . . Both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and
in spite of diligent efforts of the petitioners to locate them, they could not be found. The
consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the
Court. . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Abandonment — under persuasive American rulings — imports "any conduct on the part of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims
to the child". It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and
support which parents owe to their children." (2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, Sec. 32, pp. 886-887.) It can
thus readily be seen that altho the CFI judgment approving the adoption does not use the word
"abandoned", its findings sufficiently contain a set of facts and circumstances which truly constitutes
a finding of abandonment.