TELEBAP VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

FACTS

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of

lawyers of radio and broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered
voters. The other petitioner, GMA network Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations
throughout the Philippines under the franchise granted by Congress. Petitioners challenge the validity of
92 on the ground (1) it takes properties without due process of law and without just compensation and
(2) denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws and (3) it is in
excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise the operation of media of communication or
information during the period of election.

ISSUE:

WoN TELEBAP has Legal standing

WoN GMA network has legal standing

RULING:

No. Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of
Section 92 of BP Blg 881 and nor do members of petitioner TELEBAP have an interest as registered
voters since this case does not concern their right of suffrage. A party suing as a taxpayer must
specifically show that he has a enough interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute.
TELEBAP have no standing to assert the rights of radio and television companies. The mere fact that
TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not entitle them to bring this suit in
their name as representatives of the affected companies.

YES. GMA Network operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92 of BP Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide
free airtime to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.
Petitioner claims that it has suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time
in the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and it stands to suffer even more should it
required to do so again this year. Petitioner’s allegation that it will suffer losses again because it is
required to provide free airtime is sufficient to give it standing to question the validity of Section 92.
 People vs Jalosjos

G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000

FACTS:

Congressman Jalosjos (first district of Zamboanga Del Norte) was confined at the National Penitentiary
while his case for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness was pending appeal. He filed a motion that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a congressman, including attendance at sessions and
committee hearings, despite his conviction for non-bailable offense. He claims that his re-election as a
congressman proves an expression of the popular will and cannot be rendered inutile. (He claims that he
has the mandate of sovereign will)

He further argues that under Section 16(2), a congressman’s function is to attend sessions. He also relies
on the case of Aguinaldo involving the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to
his present term of office. To do otherwise would deprive other people to elect their officers.

ISSUE:

WoN Jalosjos may attend sessions despite his imprisonment for non-bailable offense

RULING:

No. Under the constitution privilege of free arrest applies only if offense is punishable by less than 6
years imprisonment. Accused has not shown why he should be exempted from this. Members of
congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason of absence is legitimate one.
The confinement of the congressman charged with a non-bailable offense (more that 6 years) is
certainly authorized by law and has constitutional foundation. The rationale for confinement is public
self defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. The
Aguinaldo case does not apply. It refers only to administrative removals and not to imprisonment arising
from the enforcement of criminal law. Election to high government does not free the accused from
common restraints from general law. What he is seeking is not temporary or emergency leaves from
imprisonment. He is seeking to attend congressional sessions and meetings for 5 days or more in a
week. This would virtually make him a free man.

Biraogo vs Philippine Truth Commission

 G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

FACTS:

President Aquiono III signed E.O. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission. PTC is a mere ad hoc
body formed under the office of the president tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption and
to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Although it
is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O.
No. 1 for it violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. It does not apply
equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous
administration” as its sole object makes the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility. They argue that the
search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not
only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where
the “same magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were reported to have been committed against
the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under
the recognized exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused
their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the
purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.”

ISSUE:

WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not
a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.

COMELEC v Conrado Cruz, et. al

 G.R. NO. 186616 November 20, 2009

FACTS:

Before the Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Election on October 29,2007. Several
incumbent officials of a number of different barangays of Caloocan City filed a petition before the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of Section 2 of Republic Act no. 9164, entitled "An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. The provision goes as follows:

Sec. 2. Term of Office. - The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the
effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position:
Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

The said officials presented the following arguments that (1) the term limit of Barangay officials should
be applied prospectively and not retroactively, (2) implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No.
9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the law and, (3) that barangay officials have always
been apolitical. The RTC agreed with the contention of the officials and granted their petition adding
that the law violated the one-act-one subject rule in the Constitution such that the non-inclusion in the
title of the act on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the term limits constituted a constitutional breach
and that the affected barangay officials were not sufficiently given notice that they were already
disqualified by a new act, when under the previous enactments no such restrictions were imposed.
Thus, the RTC declared the provision unconsttutional. However, the COMELEC assailed that the said law
is valid and constitutional, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2 of R.A. 9164 is constitutional

RULING:

YES. Section 2 of R.A. 9164, as well as the law itself, is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an
amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law;
hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC,
has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term
limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively
when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to
public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive
application of RA No. 9164. the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule. The
title states the law's general subject matter - the amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay
and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and SK elections,
the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is
necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms
for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term
limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law. To require the inclusion
of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters dealt
with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates.

Jose Miguel T. Arroyo v Department of Justice, et. al

G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012

FACTS:

The Joint Panel which includes the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team was created through the
issuance of Joint Order No. 001-2011 by the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) and Department of
Justice(DOJ)on the electoral fraud and manipualtion cases of the 2004 and 2007 National Elections. The
Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered
and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. While the Fact-Finding Team,on the other
hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can
be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee.

The Fact-Finding Team, in its intial report, found that there was a manipulation of results of the May 14,
2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of Maguindanao, and North and South Cotabato. The said
team gave recommendations to subject Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to a preliminary investigation for the
reason of electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results North and South Cotabato,
he is also subjected to another preliminary investigation but with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the same
reasons but for the election results in Maguindanao. Several others were also recommended preliminary
investigation, while the others, that including Jose Miguel Arroyo was subject for further investigation.
The case resulting from the investigation was docketed DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.

The case that was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011 resulted from Senator Pimentel filing a
Complaint Affidavit for electoral Sabotage against the petitioners.To which the latter responded with
separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.

The COMELEC en banc, after the preliminary investigation, adopted a resolution that ordered that
information on the crime of electoral sabotage is filed against Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.
Furthermore, the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo be dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:

NO. The creation of the Joint Panel did not violate the equal protection clause. The petitioners contend
that the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team were specifically organized to size out the Arroyo
administration as well as filter out such public officers who are linked to the said administration. There
were people that were subjected to preliminary investigation without any link to Arroyo, they were
recommended by the Team because of the nature of performing their official duties as public officers,
and there were even private individuals who were subjected to such investigation. The equal protection
clause is not defined by absolute equality but those which are similarly situated should be treated alike.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center
(AFPFC) v DAISY R. YAHON

G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014

FACTS:

S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt. Yahon) is an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army that retired back in
January 2006. He married a Daisy Yahon, the respondent, back in June 2008. The two did not have any
children but the latter has a daughter with her previous live-in partner. Respondent filed a petition for
the issuance of protection order under the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 against her husband for physically abusing her.
The court ordered a Temporary Protection Order to direct S/Sgt. Yahon to refrain from harassing and
contacting the respondent as well as to provide financial support. However, there was no compliance
from the side of S/Sgt. Yahon to which the court issued a Permanent Protection Order with a spousal
support of Php4,000 monthly and to automatically deduct 50% of his retirement benefits that will be
given directly to the respondent as financial support. On May 27, 2009, the petitioner in this case,
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
praying for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to
automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to
respondent as spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Reasoning that it cannot comply with the RTC's orders because the retirement benefits
cannot be given as it is from a military insitution, that such order contravenes an explicit mandate under
the law governing the retirement and separation of military personnel. Citing Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1638,15,Section 31 as well as in a similar provision in R.A. No. 8291, Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997:SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process. and Lien

ISSUE: Whether or not Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits is subject to the ruling of the court to provide for
the financial spousal support of respondent.

RULING:

YES. Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government. It bears
stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement legislation.
In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of certain
federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As
these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys
payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings,"
the law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could
issue valid orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession. This Court
has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal protection clause.
We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification under
the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.

The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts
that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary
custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.