EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2474. June 30, 2005.]

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. , complainant, vs . ATTY. LEO J. PALMA ,

respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM : p

Providing one's children with a comfortable life and good education does not render
marriage a fait accompli. Leo J. Palma, respondent herein, may have provided well for his
children but this accomplishment is not su cient to wipe away the penalty for his
transgression. He ought to remember that before he became a father, he was a husband
first. As such, he should have loved, respected and remained faithful to his wife.
At bar is respondent's Motion to Vacate 1 our Decision dated September 15, 2004
nding him guilty of grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer and
imposing upon him the penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.
In resolving the instant motion, a brief revisit of the facts is imperative. On June 22,
1982, respondent, despite his subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima, married
Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the 22-year old daughter of complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
This prompted the latter to le with this Court, on November 8, 1982, a complaint for
disbarment against respondent.
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint.
In our Resolution 2 dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the O ce of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and recommendation. Then Assistant
Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili heard the testimonies of the complainant and his
witness in the presence of respondent's counsel.
On March 19, 1984, respondent led with the OSG an urgent motion to suspend
proceedings 3 on the ground that the nal outcome of Civil Case No. Pq-0401-P, 4 for
declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial
question to the disbarment proceeding. The motion was denied.
Respondent then led with this Court an urgent motion for issuance of a restraining
order. 5 On December 19, 1984 , we issued a Resolution enjoining the OSG from continuing
the disbarment proceedings. 6
In the interim, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court took effect. Hence, the OSG
transferred the disbarment case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On October
19, 1998, IBP Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo required the parties to manifest within ten
(10) days from notice whether they are still interested in pursuing the case. 7
In his manifestation, 8 complainant con rmed his continuing interest in prosecuting
the case.

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 For his part, respondent moved to postpone the hearing eight (8) times. In one of
those instances, particularly on August 28, 2001, complainant moved "that respondent be
deemed to have waived his right to present evidence and for the case to be deemed
submitted for resolution in view of his continuing failure to present his evidence." However,
complainant withdrew such motion upon the promise of the respondent's counsel that on
the next hearing, scheduled on October 4, 2001, he would de nitely present his client's
evidence. But even before that date, respondent already manifested that he would not be
able to return to the Philippines for his direct testimony. Instead, he promised to submit
his "direct testimony in a davit form". 9 In an Order issued that day, the IBP Commissioner
reset the hearing for the last time on January 24, 2002 and warned respondent that should
he fail to appear or present his "direct testimony in a davit form," the case will be deemed
submitted for resolution. 1 0 On January 24, 2002, respondent neither appeared nor
presented his "direct testimony in a davit form," hence, the case was deemed submitted
for resolution. 1 1
On March 20, 2003, the IBP Commissioner submitted a Report and
Recommendation nding respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of his
oath as a lawyer and recommending that he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years. cHTCaI

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and
Recommendation, but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one (1) year.
On September 15, 2004, we rendered the assailed Decision.
In his motion for reconsideration, respondent raised the following issues:
First, the complaint for disbarment was led by an improper party ,
complainant not being the offended party.

Second, he was denied due process because the case was submitted for
resolution on January 24, 2002 without his "direct testimony in affidavit form."

Third, the disbarment proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline is void because our Resolution dated December 19, 1984 restraining
the OSG from continuing such proceedings has not been lifted.

Fourth, our Decision is barred by laches because of the lapse of almost

fourteen (14) years from December 19, 1984, the date we restrained the OSG from
continuing the disbarment proceedings, until October 19, 1998, the date the IBP
Commissioner required the parties to "manifest whether or not they are still
interested in prosecuting the case."

Fifth, the Resolution dated June 21, 2003 of the IBP Board of Governors
imposing upon him the penalty of one (1) year suspension "has attained nality
and should be deemed served already."
And sixth, he acted under a " rm factual and legal conviction" in declaring
before the Hong Kong Marriage Registry that he is a "bachelor" because his rst
marriage is void even if there is no judicial declaration of nullity.
IaDcTC

In his comment, complainant countered that: first, respondent cannot claim denial of
due process because his failure to adduce evidence was due to his own fault; second, it is
now too late to invoke this Court's Resolution of December 19, 1984 restraining the OSG
from continuing the disbarment proceedings; third, laches does not apply because the 14-
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 year hiatus was brought about by the said Resolution; fourth, the penalty of one-year
suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors cannot be deemed " nal and served
already" because it is a mere recommendation to this Court; and fifth, although his
previous marriage was annulled, it can not erase the betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence he committed against complainant.
Respondent's motion is bereft of merit.
We observe that in his motion, respondent alleged new issues 1 2 which were not
considered below. Nonetheless, in view of the caveat that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, we shall resolve all these new issues.
I
Improper Party
We nd no merit in respondent's contention that the complainant, being the father of
the offended party, does not have the standing to file the instant complaint.
Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The only question
for determination is whether respondent is t to be a member of the Bar. The complainant
or the person who called the attention of this Court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct is in
no sense a party and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administration of justice. 1 3 Thus, this Court may investigate
charges against lawyers, regardless of complainant's standing. In fact, it can do so motu
proprio. Our ruling in Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos 1 4 applies four-square, thus:
". . . A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of
interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any
sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the o cial ministration of persons un t to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an o cer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration
of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be
suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal
of the charges."

II
Due Process
Neither do we nd merit in respondent's claim that the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline violated his right to due process when it considered the case submitted for
resolution on January 24, 2002 without his "direct testimony in a davit form." The records
show that the case dragged on for three (3) years after the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline resumed its investigation on October 19, 1998. Of the fteen 1 5 (15) settings
from February 2, 1999 to January 24, 2002, respondent had the hearing postponed for
eight (8) times.
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 Indisputably, it was respondent's failure to submit his "direct testimony in a davit
form" that caused delay. Since the proceedings had been dragging on a lethargic course,
the IBP Commissioner is correct in considering the case submitted for resolution. At this
juncture, it must be stressed that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's side or seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are su ciently met. 1 6 Here,
respondent was given su cient opportunity to explain his side and adduce his evidence.
Despite his sudden " ight into oblivion," the IBP Commissioner noti ed him of the
proceedings. Signi cantly, he was duly represented by a counsel who attended the
hearings and submitted manifestations and motions on his behalf, the latest of which is
the instant Motion to Vacate. In short, the active participation of his lawyer in every stage
of the proceedings rules out any badge of procedural de ciency therein. Of course, we
need not mention the fact that respondent was able to le with this Court a motion to
dismiss the complaint, as well as to confront and cross-examine the complainant and his
witness during the investigation in the OSG.

III
Restraining Order
The restraining order was anchored on the ground that the nal outcome of Civil
Case No. Pq-0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceedings. It
appears from complainant's allegation, which respondent does not deny, that Civil Case
No. Pq-0401-P was dismissed without prejudice. 1 7 Necessarily, there is no more
prejudicial question to speak of. THIcCA

IV
Laches
Respondent cannot nd solace in the principle of laches. While it is true that there
was a hiatus or delay of 14 years before the IBP Commissioner resumed the investigation,
the same was pursuant to the said restraining order of December 19, 1984.
V
Finality of the Penalty Imposed
by the IBP-Board of Governors
The penalty of one-year suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors cannot
attain finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:
"Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. —
xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,

determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its ndings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action."
Clearly, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is merely recommendatory.
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement,
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 which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is
made." 1 8 Necessarily, the "final action" on the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors still
lies with this Court. Obviously, respondents argument that we a rmed such resolution
when we "noted" it is certainly misplaced. In Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the
Sandiganbayan, 1 9 we held that the term "noted" means that the Court has merely taken
cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter. It does not imply agreement or
approval. The power to disbar belongs to the Court alone.
VI
Good Faith
Respondent's argument that he was of the " rm factual and legal conviction when he
declared before the Hong Kong authorities that he was a bachelor since his rst marriage
is void and does not need judicial declaration of nullity" cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs.
Terre, 2 0 the same defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also
sought. We held:
". . . Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known
that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which
holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract
a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the rst marriage was null and void
ab initio is essential. Even if we Were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan
Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we
are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his rst marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage
must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character."

Before we write nis to this case, we nd it necessary to stress certain points in

view of respondent's additional reason why he should be exonerated — that he loves all his
children and has always provided for them. He may have indeed provided well for his
children. But this accomplishment is not su cient to show his moral tness to continue
being a member of the noble profession of law. It has always been the duties of parents —
e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and
spiritual guidance. 2 1 But what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a
husband, he is obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and delity; and render
help and support. 2 2 And most important of all, he is obliged to remain faithful to her until
death. AaEcHC

The undeniable truth is that respondent married Lisa while his marriage with
Elizabeth Hermosisima was still subsisting. Such act constitutes grossly immoral conduct,
a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Obviously, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding
respect and dignity. In Cordova vs. Cordova, 2 3 we held that "The moral delinquency that
affects the tness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage."
We also reiterate our ruling that respondent's conduct speaks of a clear case of
betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence, thus:

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 ". . . It was respondent's closeness to the complainant's family as well as
the latter's complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship with
Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainant's legal affairs only, he
sneaked at the latter's back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in
the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of
complainant's resources by securing a plane ticket from complainant's o ce in
order to marry the latter's daughter in Hong Kong. He did this without
complainant's knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that "everything is legal." Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits
of propriety and decency.

Indeed, we are not prepared to exonerate respondent or reduce the penalty we

imposed on him as it will denigrate the standard of the law profession.
WHEREFORE, respondent's Motion to Vacate our Decision dated September 15,
2004 is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C. J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Which we treat as a motion for reconsideration.

2. Rollo, at 354.
3. Rollo at 199-201.
4. Then pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Branch 27, Pasay City, Annex "D" of the
Complaint, id. at 13-19.
5. Dated December 13, 1984.
6. OSG Records at 5. The OSG issued the Order dated December 20, 1984 suspending the
scheduled hearing until the Court orders otherwise: (OSG Records at 1)
7. Records of the Commission on Bar Discipline at 11.

8. Dated November 13, 1998, id. at 13.

9. Manifestation with Motion, Records of the Commission on Bar Discipline at 45.
10. Order dated December 4, 2001, Records of the Commission on Discipline at 51.
11. Order dated January 24, 2002, Records of the Commission on Discipline at 97.
12. Except the 5th issue mentioned earlier.

13. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Llorente, A.C. No. 4680, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 154.
14. A.C. No. 2884, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
15. Hearings set on February 2, 1999, May 7, 1999, May 16, 2000, June 15, 2000, August 24,
2000, November 21, 2000, January 18, 2001, February 20, 2001, April 24, 2001, May 17,
2001, June 28, 2001, August 28, 2001, October 4, 2001, December 4, 2001, and January
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 24, 2002.

16. Montemayor vs. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 264.
17. Comment to Respondent's Motion to Vacate, at 2.
18. Cuyegkeng vs. Cruz, No. L-16263, July 26, 1960, 108 Phil. 1147.
19. A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 339.
20. A.C. No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6.

21. Art. 220, Family Code. See also Art. 356 of the Civil Code and Art. 3 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (or PD 603).

22. Art. 68, Family Code.

23. Adm. Case No. 3249, November 29, 1989, 179 SCRA 680.

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