Admin Case Doctrines
Admin Case Doctrines
MWSS is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers Legislative Branches, therefore,
have already categorized the same in EO596.
The secretary of justice has jurisdiction to resolve disputes between psalm and npc by virtue of PD 242
which states that all disputes and claims solely between government agencies and offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the
Secretary of Justice. Since this case is a dispute solely between PSALM and NPC, both government-
owned and controlled corporations, and the BIR, a National Government office, PD 242 clearly applies
and the Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction over this case.
Legislature cannot validly enact a law· that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the
control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If
the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President.
Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over.
The undersecretary was acting on behalf of Abad, upon the instructions of the President. Under the
doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President
on matters where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective departments.
The issuances cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion for not only are they
reasonable, they were likewise issued well within the scope of authority granted to the respondents.
ALL THE CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE CIRCULAR WERE ALL DERIVED FROM IMPLEMENTED BASED ON
THE IRR
Publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in order for administrative
rules and regulations to be effective. There are, however, several exceptions, one of which are
interpretative regulations which “need nothing further than their bare issuance for they give no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.” These regulations need not be
published for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.
Soriano vs. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 184450. Jan. 24, 2017
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Purisima vs. Phil. Tobacco Institute, G.R. No. 210251, Apr. 17, 2017
It is a well-settled principle that are venue regulation cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. In
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), The Court held that a mere
administrative issuance, like a BIR regulation, cannot amend the law; the former cannot purport to do
any more than implement the latter.
CoTesCUP vs. Sec. of Education, G.R. No. 216930, etc., Oct. 09, 2018
In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the Court
has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the
law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to guide the DepEd, CHED and TESDA in carrying
out the provisions of the law, from the development of the K to 12 BEC, to the hiring and training of
teaching personnel and to the formulation of appropriate strategies in order to address the changes
during the transition period.
Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all
essential terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the DepEd,
CHED and TESDA.
Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law.
Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally The liberality of procedure in
administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the requirements of due process.
liberal construction of DAO No. 87 would serve its purpose, i.e., grant a party the right to appeal
decisions of the Regional Offices to the DENR Secretary in order for the latter to review the findings of
the former.
The petitioner does not claim that her right to due process was violated as a result of the wrong mode of
appeal. The petitioner merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No. 87
In JBC proceedings despite being sui generis in nature, petitioner is still afforded his constitutional right
to due process.
In a “hot tub” hearing, the judge can hear all the experts discussing the same issue at the same time to
explain each of their points in a discussion with a professional colleague. The objective is to achieve
greater efficiency and expedition
Miranda vs. CSC & DOH, G.R. No. 213502, February 18, 2019
Miranda was denied due process when CSC Chair Duque reviewed his own Decision while he was still
the DOH Secretary. The CSC acts as a collegial body. And as such, the chairman alone cannot issue any
decisions or resolutions without consultation and deliberations with the other members of the
commission. Duque was the very person who issued the assailed DOH Decision in his capacity as then
Secretary of Health. Hence, it is just proper that he should have inhibited himself from taking part on the
appeal proceedings.
Maynilad vs. DENR, G.R. No. 206823, August 6, 2019
The findings by the PAB, albeit not specifically labelled as a "recommendation", laying out petitioners'
accountability and calling for the imposition of fine, were all cited, adopted, and relied upon by the SENR
in penalizing them under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act. It also bears noting that petitioners
attended this technical conference before the PAB, in which all of the parties thereto were allowed to air
their respective sides.
In challenging the validity of an administrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-making
power, administrative remedies need not be exhausted. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function.
Banco de Oro vs. Republic, G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies also finds no application when the exhaustion will
result in an exercise in futility.
In this case, an appeal to the Secretary of Finance from the questioned 2011 BIR Ruling would be a futile
exercise because it was upon the request of the Secretary of Finance that the 2011 BIR Ruling was issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
United Overseas Bank vs. HLURB Board, G.R. No. 182133, June 23, 2015
The issue on whether non-compliance with the clearance requirement with the HLURB would result in
nullification of the entire mortgage contract or only a part of it is purely legal which will have to be
decided ultimately by a regular court of law.
It does not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and not as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to
be or can be done. The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience, but one that would
involve the interpretation and application of law.
Ocampo vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, etc., Nov. 8, 2016
the petitioners violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in challenging before the
Supreme Court the issue of the interment of Pres. Marcos at LNMB.
Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and
directive before the Secretary of National Defense.
. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not call for the dismissal of the case in the
court but only for its suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative
body are threshed out and determined.
While it is the general rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the findings of
fact of administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such findings of fact when there is
absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently
insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, when there is a showing that the findings or conclusions,
drawn from the same pieces of evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on
record, they may be reviewed by the courts.
Court holds that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a commission of grave
abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must exercise its duty to
ensure that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed when there is a violation of the
constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of
law." The Court's power cannot be curtailed by the FDA's invocation of its regulatory power.
Republic vs. O.G. Holdings, G.R. No. 189290, Nov. 29, 2017
Administrative remedies existed against the suspension of the subject ECC, made available via DENR by
virtue of an appeal.
O.G. Holdings thus had the opportunity to file an administrative appeal on the suspension of the beach
resort project's ECC, beginning with the Office of the EMB Director. Indeed, the administrative
machinery afforded even an appeal to the Office of the President, but O.G. Holdings did not avail of
such.
The herein assailed Orders were not issued by the PAB but by the SENR. Thus, we affirm the appellate
court's holding in CA-G.R. SP No. 112041 that the appropriate remedy from the Orders of the SENR is an
appeal to the Office of the President.
Consequently, petitioners prematurely filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals and failed
to exhaust administrative remedies.
CES Board vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017
. Nowhere in R.A. 9406, P.D. 1275, R.A. 10071 or Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129 is there a reference to
third-level eligibility and CESO rank as qualification requirements. The CESB cannot add to the
provisions of these laws, which only require the practice of law for a certain period of time and
presuppose a bar license.
Feliciano & Gonzales vs. DND, G.R. No. 199232 & 201577, Nov. 8, 2017
the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over the CESB Decisions/Order. The CSC is one of the three
Constitutional Commissions invested with adjudicative powers to render final arbitration on disputes
and personnel actions involving matters relating to the Civil Service. Although the CESB is expressly
empowered to promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of the members of the CES, the power and function to hear and
decide administrative cases on all personnel and civil service matters remained to be the duty and
function of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government.
Cerilles vs. CSC, G.R. No. 180845, Nov. 22, 2017 - Dyann
The CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the
authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if the appointee
possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum
statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the CSC.
Exception: , there is no encroachment on the discretion of the appointing authority when the CSC
revokes an appointment on the ground that the removal of the employee was done in bad faith.
It is within the power of CSC to order the reinstatement of government employees who have been
unlawfully dismissed.
CJ Sereno is de facto officer removable through quo warranto. The effect of finding that person
appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color
of title that confers on him the status of de facto officer.
For lack of Constitutional qualification, respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is
merely holding colorable right or title thereto. As such, respondent has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The
remedy, therefore, of quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the
appointive position of Chief Justice.
ARCAJI vs. Abad, G.R. No. 210204, July 10, 2018 - Jeck
Section 3-A of R.A. No. 910, as amended, buttressed by the Resolution in A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA,
prescribes a duty under the law upon the DBM to pay to the petitioners the increases in salary
granted by law during the 5-year period after date of retirement. Mandamus will lie to compel
respondent DBM to fulfil its duty under the law.
In Re: Justice Veloso, et. al., A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015
The only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is service in
the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. The COMELEC and NLRC are agencies
independent of the Judiciary; hence, service in these agencies cannot be considered as service rendered
in the Judiciary.
DBP vs. COA, G.R. No. 221706, March 13, 2018
DBP does not have the authority to grant themselves benefits other than per diems. Section 8 of the
DBP Charter only mentions per diem as the compensation of the members of its Board. It does not
declare any additional benefit, other than per diems, which the said members of the Board may receive.
employees who have not received their retirement benefits are entitled to full credit of their service.
In this regard, those similarly situated, or those who refunded their retirement benefits to the GSIS
after they re-entered government service should be allowed to include their prior years of service in
the computation of their eligibility and retirement benefits. For this reason, giving full credit to
Palmiery's years of service in the government does not contravene any existing statute or policy,
especially since it is undisputed that Palmiery refunded his previously received benefits to the GSIS.
His re-entry into government service after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291 is, therefore,
inconsequential to the present case.
Philhealth CARAGA's power to fix the compensation of its personnel as granted by its charter, does not
necessarily mean that it has unbridled discretion to issue any and all kinds of allowances and other
forms of benefits or compensation package, limited only by the provisions of its charter. The power of
GOCCs or its board to fix the salaries, allowances and bonuses must still conform to compensation and
position classification standards laid down by applicable laws.
Philhealth CARAGA officers, employees and contractors who received the contractor's gift, special
events gifts, project completion incentive, nominal gift, and birthday gifts are not required to refund.
Government officials and employees who received benefits or allowances, which were disallowed,
may keep the amounts received if there is no finding of bad faith and the disbursement was made in
good faith.
In Zamboanga City Water District v. COA, the Court held that approving officers could be absolved from
refunding the disallowed amount if there was a showing of good faith.
Good faith may be appreciated in favor of the responsible officers under the ND provided they comply
with the following requisites: (1) that they acted in good faith believing that they could disburse the
disallowed amounts based on the provisions of the law; and (2) that they lacked knowledge of facts or
circumstances which would render the disbursements illegal, such when there is no similar ruling by
this Court prohibiting a particular disbursement or when there is no clear and unequivocal law or
administrative order barring the same.
YES. Callang's choice of bringing the money home was not fraught with negligence. In fact, it is not
hard to fathom that a reasonable and diligent person would have acted the same way as Callang did
under the present circumstances.a thorough review of the records yields no other conclusion but that
Callang exercised sufficient diligence in deciding to bring the money home instead of leaving it in the
office.
Callang's decision to bring the money home was the reasonable and responsible choice given the
situation. The fact that she was robbed on her way to work the following day was beyond her control.
Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, June 19, 2018 (MR)
an impeachable official like CJ Sereno be removed via quo warranto. OSG questioned the respondent's
eligibility for appointment as Chief Justice and sought to invalidate such appointment. The OSG's
petition, therefore, is one for quo warranto over which the Court exercises original jurisdiction.
the one-year prescriptive period to file quo warranto proceedings does not warrant the dismissal of this
case. Such limitation can be applied only against private individuals claiming rights to a public office,
not against the State.
When thegovernment is the real party in interest and asserts its rights, there can be no defenseon the
ground of laches or limitation, otherwise, it would be injurious to publicinterest.
the reorganization of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur tainted with bad faith. If the abolition which is
nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reason or purposely to defeat security of
tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is
void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of
positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds
Daplas vs. Department of Finance, G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017
that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the administrative offenses of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct are lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from service.
mere non-declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such an
offense.
The Court also held that it was correctly filed with the CA because the preventive suspension order was
an incident of an administrative case.
that a disciplinary action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and executory, and
disciplinary actions are appealable only if it involves either a demotion or dismissal from the service.
The second proviso which renders disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the
service imposed by the Chief of the PNP qualifies the general statement that disciplinary actions
imposed upon a member of the PNP is final and executory. ????
Miranda vs. CSC & DOH, G.R. No. 213502, February 18, 2019
Having been found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and simple
misconduct, Miranda’s appropriate penalty is penalty of suspension for one (1) year accessory penalty
of disqualification from promotion for the entire period of the suspension. However, if the penalty of
suspension is no longer feasible, then it is just proper to impose the penalty of forfeiture of one year
of her salary, in lieu of the penalty of suspension for one year, to be deducted from whatever
retirement benefits she may be entitled to under existing laws.
CSC vs. Plopinio, G.R. No. 197571, April 3, 2017
May a public officer or employee who is AWOL can be separated from service or dropped from the rolls
of employees without prior notice. CSC Omnibus Rules states that An official or employee who is
continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on
absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls
without prior notice.
Respondent’s circumstances did not constitute a clear-cut case of AWOL. There was no proof that
respondent was actually absent or did not report for work for 30 days or more. Respondent’s AWOL was
merely presumed from the fact that his DTRs for the subject periods were not on file with the COMELEC.