AIR POWER

AND
NATIONAL SECURITY
Indian Air Force: Evolution, Growth and Future
 AIR POWER
AND
NATIONAL SECURITY
Indian Air Force: Evolution, Growth and Future

Air Commodore Ramesh V. Phadke (Retd.)

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES

NEW DELHI

PENTAGON PRESS
Air Power and National Security: Indian Air Force: Evolution, Growth and Future
Air Commodore Ramesh V. Phadke (Retd.)

First Published in 2015

Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

ISBN 978-81-8274-840-8

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without first obtaining written permission of
the copyright owner.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, or the Government of
India.

Published by
PENTAGON PRESS
206, Peacock Lane, Shahpur Jat,
New Delhi-110049
Phones: 011-64706243, 26491568
Telefax: 011-26490600
email: rajan@pentagonpress.in
website: www.pentagonpress.in

Branch
Flat No.213, Athena-2,
Clover Acropolis,
Viman Nagar,
Pune-411014
Email: pentagonpresspune@gmail.com

In association with
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
No. 1, Development Enclave,
New Delhi-110010
Phone: +91-11-26717983
Website: www.idsa.in

Printed at Avantika Printers Private Limited.

 This book is dedicated to the memory of my parents,
Shri V.V. Phadke and Shrimati Vimal Phadke,
My in-laws, Brig. G.S. Sidhu, AVSM and Mrs. Pritam Sidhu,
Late Flg. Offr. Harita Deol, my niece, who died in an
Avro accident on December 24, 1996,
Late Flt. Lt. Sandeep Jain, another niece’s husband, who was shot
down by a Pakistani missile in Siachen on August 26, 1996,
To all the past and future air warriors of the Indian Air Force.
 Contents

Acknowledgements xi

1. Introduction 1
2. Nature of Air Power 8
Air Power Definitions 9
Air Power Attributes 10
Ability to Overfly Natural Obstacles 11
Flexibility/Agility 12
Ubiquity 12
Concentration of Firepower 13
Shock Effect 13
Limitations 14
Impermanence 14
Limited Weapons Load 15
Fragility 15
Weather 15
Dependence on Basing Facilities 15
High Acquisition and Life Cycle Costs 16
Terrain 16
Historical Background 17
World War I (1914-18) 18
Inter War-Years (1918-39) 21
World War II (1939-45) 22
The Indian Experience 25
Air Power Employment: Roles and Missions 27

3. Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 41

Definitions 43
Evolution of India’s National Security Thinking 45
viii Air Power and National Security
The Security Discourse 47
India’s Experience at the UN: Lessons 59
The Sino-Indian Border Conflict 65
Indo-Pak War, 1965 71
The Bangladesh War, 1971 72
Operation Blue Star, 1984 74
Exercise Brasstacks, 1986-87 74
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, July 1987-March 1990 75
Kargil Conflict, May-July 1999 76
Fighting Insurgencies and Terrorism 77
Why a National Security Strategy? 78

4. Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 89

India-Pakistan War in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-48 89
Need for Infrastructure 90
The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1962 92
Indo-Pak War, 1965 97
Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971 104
Sri Lanka, 1987-90 111
Maldives, 1988 111
Kargil, 1999 112
Air Power Lessons from Other Wars 114
Conclusion 127

5. Development of IAF Force Structures 130

Early Developments 130
IAF in Independent India 134
War Intervenes 136
Threat Assessment 137
Dependence on Outside Advice 139
New Acquisitions 141
Initial Consolidation and Reorganisation 142
More Aircraft Join the IAF 144
HF-24 Marut 147
Expansion of Capabilities 151
Search for the Advanced Jet Trainer 153
New Challenges 154
Conclusion 155

6. The Indian Air Force Today 161

The Never Ending Process of Modernisation 161
The Pakistan Threat 163
The China Threat 163
Prospects of Modernisation 164
The Challenge 166
 Contents ix
Air Defence 169
Counter Air and Deep Strike Operations 169
Counter Surface Force Operations 170
Force Multipliers 170
IAF Modernisation: Work in Progress 173

7. The Future of Air Power in India 181

Introduction 181
The Current Air Power Balance 183
Force Structures 183
Airborne Weapon Systems 185
Air Defence 186
Support Platforms 186
UAVs/UCAVs 187
Missiles 188
Aerostats 190
Use of Near Space 190
LEMVs 191
Solar and Renewable Energy Platforms 191
End of Fossil Fuel/Alternative Fuels or Energy Sources 191
Conclusion 192

8. Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air

Power Employment 194
Introduction 194
Human Resource Development or Personnel Planning 194
Recruitment and Retention 201
Maintenance 203
Trade Restructuring 204
Flight Safety 205
Understanding Defence Budgets 210
India’s Defence Industry 216
Defence Research and Development Organisation 219
Military Reforms and Civil-Military Relations 222
Ownership of Air Power 228
The Nuclear Dimension 231
Understanding Doctrine 236
Conclusion 239

9. Findings and Recommendations 244

APPENDICES
I Indian Air Force Squadrons and Units 263
II The Gnat Story 268
x Air Power and National Security

III The MiG-21 Story 272

IV Defence Budgets 276
V Air Maintaining the Indian Army and Civilians in the
Himalayan Frontier Region 280
VI Air Defence of the Srinagar Valley – 1971 284
VII Author’s Note 289
Select Bibliography 303
Index 308
 Contents xi

Acknowledgements

This book has been in the works for considerable time, delayed due to family ill
health, bereavements, my own indifferent health and other domestic issues.
Many friends, colleagues and mentors, in and outside the Indian Air Force,
have given me guidance and support. Late Air Cmde. Jasjit Singh, former Director
of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and Centre for Air Power
Studies (CAPS); late Professor Matin Zuberi and my school teacher Shri Manohar
Parnerkar continue to inspire me in the pursuit of my study of India’s security.
Late Brig. G.S. Sidhu, AVSM, my father-in-law, the Brigade Major of the
7th Brigade, from 1959 when it moved from Ambala to Bomdi La until early
1962, and an active participant in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, gave me
immense first-hand information about the real state of affairs in the army during
his long service.
AVM Kapil Kak, former Deputy Director, IDSA, Dr. Arvind Gupta, former
Director General, IDSA, Brig. Rumel Dahiya (Retd.), Deputy Director General,
IDSA and Lt. Gen. V.R. Raghavan (Retd.) have played an important role in the
publication of this book through their patience, advice and encouragement.
Air Marshals Randhir Singh, P. Rajkumar, S.G. Inamdar, Narayan Menon,
Raghu Rajan, B.K. Pande and AVM H.S. Ahluwalia provided me with valuable
guidance and information. Air Marshal M. Matheswaran assisted in enhancing
my understanding of recent developments in the Indian Air Force. Gp. Capt.
Ajit Agtey (Retd.), a friend of over four decades and a passionate flyer, continues
to be a veritable treasure trove of information and knowledge and has always
readily and generously shared it with me.
I also thank Professors Rajaram Nagappa, Chandrashekhar and Nabil
Mancheri of the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore for their
valuable advice.
Professor K.R. Singh, Dr. Rajaram Panda and senior colleagues and friends
xii Air Power and National Security

at IDSA, now professors at JNU, Drs. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Swaran Singh, and
P.R. Kumaraswamy, deserve my sincere thanks.
I thank my friends at IDSA, Gp. Capt. Vivek Kapur, Brigs. Raj Shukla,
Harinder Singh and Col. Deepak Sharma who have since returned to active duty
and Drs. Rajiv Nayan, S. Kalyanaraman, Ashok Behuria, Smruti Pattanaik,
Laxman Behera and Uttam Sinha, and many others from whom I learnt a lot
during my second stint at IDSA. Gp. Capt. (Dr.) Ajey Lele and Dr. Prashant
Kumar Singh of the IDSA took time to read through the draft and gave me very
valuable suggestions. A word of special thanks to Ms. Sumita Kumar and Mr. Vivek
Kaushik of IDSA for their editorial assistance and insightful comments that have
helped reduce inaccuracies.
I am indeed grateful to Shri Mukesh Kumar, Shri Pitamber Datt, and other
staff members of the IDSA library for their timely and cheerful assistance.
Finally, I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to my family: my son Akshay,
himself a fighter pilot; daughter Aarohi an artist and an MA in History from
Hindu College; and my wife Dr. P. Sidhu Phadke, a graduate of the Lady Harding
Medical College, New Delhi, a true healer and author of four books for their
unstinted and selfless support and encouragement.
While I have made every effort to be as accurate and impartial as possible,
I am responsible for any errors or omissions.

Ramesh V. Phadke
 1
Introduction

Air power has been around for over a century and is not new to India. India’s
first experience with aviation was when a flying display was staged at Allahabad
Polo Grounds on December 10, 1910,1 just seven years after the first flight of
the Wright Brothers’ heavier-than-air machine, at Kitty Hawk on the eastcoast
of the United States (US) on December 17, 1903.
In response to the nationalist demands for ‘Indianisation’ of the military, the
Indian Air Force (IAF) came into being on October 8, 1932 with a single flight
of eight Westland Wapiti bi-planes. It slowly but steadily grew to become the
fourth largest air force in the world in terms of number of personnel and aircraft.
Yet, the IAF is in no way as advanced as many of the smaller yet more potent air
forces of the Western world. In fact, until the 1990s, it remained largely tactical,
with limited range armaments equipped only with the first and second generation
aircraft. As a result, its capabilities were at best modest and yet it proved to be a
decisive factor in the wars that were imposed on India.2
The very limited assets of the fledgling IAF were successfully used within
weeks of India becoming independent to help evict the mujahideen (tribal raiders)
that Pakistan sent to ‘liberate’ the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
Undoubtedly the high watermark of the IAF was when, in a mere 72 hours in
December 1971, it established total command of the skies over erstwhile East
Pakistan, helping in its liberation and the creation of a new nation-state of
Bangladesh.
The IAF has also been used on numerous other occasions for providing relief
and succour when natural calamities, such as floods and cyclones hit parts of
India and its neighbourhood. It has also been used to aid civil power and for
2 Air Power and National Security

limited intervention in situations outside India. For over a decade, the IAF has
been in the process of a comprehensive modernisation programme, the results of
which will take another decade to reach fruition. It has already obtained a
formidable array of aircraft and weapons and a variety of force multipliers and
is today poised to play a much larger, even strategic role in the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR) in concert with the fast-modernising Indian Navy’s Fleet Air Arm.
Given India’s continued dependence on foreign countries for high-technology
aircraft, missiles and other armaments, the modernisation process is, however,
fraught with many uncertainties and unpredictable delays. In the meantime, parts
of the IAF fighter fleet have been showing signs of ageing and obsolescence. The
IAF leadership is thus faced with the challenge of safeguarding the nation’s air
space with rapidly dwindling combat assets.
The stark reality that characterises India’s national security scenario is the
long-running dispute it has with two major neighbours: the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). India shares a 4,000 km
long disputed border with the PRC in the high Himalayas where China illegally
occupies some 38,000 sq km of the Indian state of J&K and in addition claims
some 93,000 sq km of Indian territory in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. Pakistan,
on the other hand, occupies some 86,023 sq km of Indian territory in Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir which includes Gilgit-Baltistan (earlier referred to as Northern
Areas by the Government of Pakistan). There are reports of Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and technicians working on the Karakoram
highway in this region. Right from its inception, Pakistan has shown its hostility
by constantly and consistently challenging and undermining India’s very existence
as a secular democratic state. “India and Pakistan are locked not in a geographical
dispute but in an ideological war over the present and future of the Indian sub-
continent. Pakistan believes in the two-nation theory conceived in the conviction
that Hindus and Muslims cannot cooperate as equals.”3 This twin challenge, if
not an existential threat from its two major neighbours, demands that India does
everything in its power to deter or at least dissuade these implacable and aggressive
neighbours from harming its core national interests of sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
Just as human beings are creatures of their circumstances, so are nation states.
India gained its hard-fought independence from the British colonial masters largely
through peaceful and non-violent methods. Due to its vast geographic expanse,
large population and unique and strategically important location at the head of
the Indian Ocean, India was considered the pivot of the then British Empire but
faced few external threats. The so-called threat of imperial Russia, later the Soviet
Union, was more in the minds of the British imperialists and hence the large
British Indian Army was used mainly to secure the interests of the empire in
distant North Africa, the Middle East and even China. All decisions regarding
 Introduction 3

the defence and security of India, were made by the British Government. As a
result, until World War II, India only had a Department of Defence, that was
staffed and run exclusively by British civil servants and military officers under
the guidance of the Secretary of State for India in London, and the Viceroy and
the Commander-in-Chief in India. Indians played no part in the formulation of
its defence policies.
The Indian leadership at the time of independence was therefore, relatively
inexperienced in dealing with the myriad security problems that emerged soon
after independence. The integration of the 565 small and large princely states,
some like Hyderabad and J&K being as large as some sovereign countries of
Europe, into the Indian Union; the many challenges of an exceedingly bloody
partition; communal clashes in the north and east; and above all administering
an infant sovereign country of continental proportions, put to test the political
and administrative acumen and sagacity of the founding fathers. Mahatma Gandhi,
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, and other stalwarts of the Indian National
Congress were of the view that the most pressing and vital task for the leadership
was to ensure the welfare of the vast multitudes of poverty-stricken Indians. The
transformation of the Indian Union into a viable, pluralistic and progressive
nation-state followed its own unique model of development based on the principles
of freedom, equality and justice, in a constitutional democracy; and a foreign
policy based on Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful coexistence and non-
interference.
In the aftermath of the six-year long World War II, that witnessed millions
of casualties and worldwide destruction and only ended with the dropping of
atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, the whole world was looking
to Gandhi’s India to provide a peaceful alternative. The period, however, also saw
the beginning of the Cold War that was to soon divide the world into two rival
blocs led by the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It was
thus only natural that Nehru, the first Prime Minister, wanted to steer India clear
of this superpower rivalry and instead stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the
oppressed peoples of other European colonies in their fight for freedom.
Even though India reluctantly used force to save the princely state of J&K
from Pakistan-assisted and inspired tribal raiders, the threat was not seen as
insurmountable or long term. In the vain hope that the conflict would be resolved
peacefully, India took the dispute to the United Nations (UN) as soon as the
Kashmir Valley was cleared of the tribal raiders in January 1948. That was to
prove a costly mistake as the dispute continued to fester and soon got embroiled
in the larger Cold War calculus, with Pakistan effectively remaining in control of
a sizeable portion of the erstwhile princely state of J&K. As Gandhi had
prophesied, partition of British India had given rise to two new states in perpetual
enmity with each other.4
4 Air Power and National Security

China was just emerging from a long, bloody civil war with the victory of
the Communists over the Nationalists and the Kuomintang fleeing to Taiwan.
Nehru had earlier visited China and enjoyed excellent rapport with General Chiang
Kai-shek, the leader of the Kuomintang. He had met Chiang Kai-shek when the
latter had visited India during World War II. Chiang had fled with his followers
to the nearby island of Formosa (now Taiwan) and Mao Zedong had become the
new leader of Communist China. Nehru was quite aware of China’s claims on
Tibet and Sardar Patel had cautioned him of the new threat that Communist
China might pose to India by occupying Tibet, but Nehru had also calculated
that it would take the PRC at least 20 years to build its strength and in the
meantime it was preferable to develop friendly relations with that country. Nehru
had also organised an Asian Relations Conference to forge Asian solidarity, at
New Delhi on March 23, 1947 and had hoped that building friendly relations
with all Asian states would help to promote the cause of freedom throughout
Asia and indeed the world. India thus was one of the first few powers to recognise
Communist China. At its founding on October 1, 1949, Mao, the ‘Supreme
Leader’ declared that, “China had stood up”5 and would work towards its long
cherished goals of national reunification and fight the forces of imperialism and
colonialism. Within months, China not only attacked Tibet in October 1950,
but also entered the Korean War on the side of the North Koreans, when it sent
large numbers of Chinese National Volunteers – in reality PLA soldiers – to Korea
in November 1950 to stem the advance of the US-led UN forces.
In April 1954, India signed a trade agreement with the PRC giving up its
rights in Tibet and acknowledged Chinese suzerainty there, in the hope that the
slogan ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ or ‘India-China are Brothers’ would actually
translate into reality. This hope proved to be false and by 1957, unknown to
India, the PRC had constructed a road linking Xinjiang with Tibet through the
Aksai Chin area of Ladakh in the high mountains of Himalayas and in fact
occupied a large chunk of Indian territory. Although there had been some minor
border incidents at Bara Hoti (in Uttar Pradesh) in the central sector of the border
in the mid-fifties, it was generally believed that these could be peacefully resolved
through negotiations. India, it seems, failed to assess China’s long-term strategic
objectives and hence also failed to read Chinese signals and the dispute finally
resulted in a short but intense border war in October-November 1962 that ended
in a crushing defeat of the Indian army in North East Frontier Agency (NEFA),
now Arunachal Pradesh. Fifty years on, there are no signs of an early resolution
of the dispute even after 16 rounds of parleys between the special representatives
of the two countries. As a matter of fact, while speaking at the Council for Foreign
Relations in Washington DC, on November 23, 2009, the former Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh said, “in the recent past, the PRC has become more
assertive”, possibly alluding to Chinese PLA troops repeatedly intruding into
 Introduction 5

Indian territory in parts of Ladakh.6 Although the border or the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) has remained peaceful, repeated intrusions show the fragile nature
of the situation on the border.
In the early 1990s, Pakistan, as is its wont, began to fan the flames of what
it called an insurgency in J&K and has since launched trans-border terrorism
from terror training camps in Pakistan, first in J&K and later in many other
parts of India as an instrument of state policy. It hopes to get away with it because
it believes that it has effectively neutralised India’s conventional superiority by
declaring a ‘first or early use’ doctrine of nuclear weapons. Worse still, for some
years, both Pakistan and the PRC have worked in concert to constrain India’s
options while simultaneously enhancing Pakistan’s conventional military
capabilities. Following the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, Pakistan not only
regained its importance as a frontline state in America’s ‘Global War on Terror’
(GWOT), but also succeeded in obtaining both financial and military assistance
from the US, in return for the use of its territory as the main transit route for
military supplies to the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
fighting the Taliban and remnants of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. With the departure
of ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014-15, Pakistan is poised to play a bigger role in
Afghan affairs. This may further enhance its capability to pose a potent sub-
conventional or even a conventional threat to India.
In all probability, India will be forced to expend a much greater effort in
financial and material terms to meet this combined challenge from the north-
west and the north. In addition to the threat of cross-border terrorism, Maoists
and other separatist forces have also been posing an increasingly more potent and
lethal threat to India’s internal security. Given its rising economic profile and
rapidly increasing foreign trade, India must work to ensure a peaceful Indian
Ocean Region (IOR). In the past, India has provided timely assistance to its
neighbours in times of need (Maldives in 1988, Indonesia and Sri Lanka during
the tsunami in December 2004). The IAF and its sister services will thus have to
train for ‘stabilisation’ and ‘out-of-area’ operations on their own or in concert
with other friendly powers.
This study is aimed at assessing India’s extant security policy/strategy of
meeting these threats and the role that air power, mainly the IAF, plays in the
larger scheme of things. A caveat is, however, necessary here. While dealing with
the subjects of air power and national security, the context and emphasis is on
India and hence theories of International Relations and Western approaches to
air power deployment are discussed only when these are germane to Indian
conditions. Although the book traces the evolution and growth of the IAF, it is
not intended to be a definitive history of the IAF nor a theoretical treatise on
air power but an enquiry into the increasing relevance of air power in India’s
security.
6 Air Power and National Security

The chapter on the Nature of Air Power briefly deals with the evolution of air
power; its attributes, limitations and the all-important concept of ‘command of
the air’; and the nature of air warfare with particular stress on its employment in
Indian conditions. It also examines if employment of air power is really escalatory.
The chapter, Evolution of India’s National Security Practice, attempts to study
the evolution of and reasons for Indian security practice, its successes and failures
and the likely future course. India’s grand strategy, non-alignment, strategic
restraint and other features by which it is characterised are discussed. It also deals
with issues such as strategic autonomy, the evolution and management of India’s
Higher Defence Control Organisation (HDCO), the impact of Pakistan’s nuclear
doctrine on India’s security and related questions.
Having discussed the evolution and major lessons of air power employment
during both the world wars, an attempt is made in the chapter on Air Power
Employment: Lessons from the Past to briefly list relevant air power-related lessons
of the wars India has fought with Pakistan and the PRC and against the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. This chapter also brings out important
lessons related to air power deployment in numerous other wars and conflicts
across the world.
The chapter dealing with the Development of IAF Force Structures traces the
history of India’s attempts to build and expand the IAF’s capabilities with the
aim of establishing a balanced air force. It discusses Force Posture and doctrinal
influences.
The chapter on The Indian Air Force Today, examines the present threats that
the IAF is required to prepare for, taking into account the relative strengths of
the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Why has it reached this stage? This includes human resources, maintenance, flight
safety, exercises with other air forces and the lessons learnt.
The chapter on The Future of Air Power in India is devoted to the likely
course that the IAF’s ongoing modernisation programme might take on a 2030
timeline. What is the IAF aiming for? Is it sustainable? Where is the nascent
Indian defence industry headed?
The next chapter discusses a number of important issues such as civil military
relations, the nuclear dimension and military doctrine.
The concluding chapter presents main findings and recommendations.

NOTES
1. K.A.V. Pandalai, Fifty Golden Years of the Aeronautical Society of India (1948-1998),
Aeronautical Society of India, Bangalore, 1998, p. 10.
2. The Indian leadership has built an elaborate mythology that all wars were thrust upon India.
While largely true, it is perhaps due to India’s apparent reluctance to use force that its rivals
have taken liberties with its security.
 Introduction 7
3. M.J. Akbar, “Obama and Manmohan: A Tale of Two Second Terms”, Sunday Times of India,
Bangalore, November 23, 2013, p. 14.
4. Durga Das, India from Curzon to Nehru and After, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 1969, (Reprinted
1974), p. 239.
5. Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power”, in Muthiah
Algappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford University
Press, Stanford, 1998, p. 115.
6. See http://www.cfr.org/india/conversation-prime-minister-dr-manmohan-singh/p20840
(Accessed February 2, 2010).
8 Air Power and National Security

2
Nature of Air Power

In the century of aircraft as an instrument of war, the capabilities of air power

have grown exponentially. And we have expanded the way in which we think
of air power to include several new aspects. Today the very instruments of
power are undergoing change as a result of technological development.
—Shivshankar Menon1

The advent of the aeroplane on December 17, 1903 opened up new vistas for
human adventure in the third dimension, viz. air. These ideas gave rise to its
employment in different roles in war and peace. Although a few early air power
visionaries such as the American Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchel, the
Italian General Giulio Douhet and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Chief, Sir (later-
Lord) Trenchard had put forward revolutionary ideas about the use of the third
dimension during the inter-war years, it was only in the post-World War II period
that scholars actually began formulating theories and doctrines based on the long,
varied and extensive experience of the previous four decades.
At least in the initial period, it was seen that airmen by nature were inclined
to action rather than to devoting time and energy to conceptual thinking.
According to Winston Churchill:
Air power is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure
or even to express in precise terms. The problem is compounded by the
fact that aviation tends to attract adventurous souls, physically adept,
mentally alert and pragmatically rather than philosophically inclined.2
Even so, air power thought progressed and relevant doctrines crystallised in due
time.
 Nature of Air Power 9

Air Power Definitions

Early air power visionaries did not really know what to make of this refreshingly
new dimension of war fighting. Some simply called it ‘the ability to do something
in the air’. ‘Anything that flies’ was the shortest description of air power by one
of its early protagonists, Brigadier General Mitchel of the US Army, who was
court-martialled for propagating radical views on air power in the early decades
of the 20th century.
As early as the 1940s, General Carl Spaatz of the US Army Air Force
(USAAF)3 defined it “as the capacity of a nation to impose its will on others
through the medium of air.” He went on to say, “Further, air power is not simply
the military component but includes all aviation assets and activity, extant or
potential, civil or military; public or private.”
In its official doctrine, the RAF describes air power as the nation’s “ability to
project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people and
the course of events.”4
Understanding of air power grew with the gradual development of aviation
to include a more comprehensive form of explanation. According to the 1995
IAF Doctrine duly amended in 1997, air power in the military sense is “the ability
to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension above the
surface of the earth.” It goes on to add that air power has the capacity to “deliver
cargo, people, destructive missiles and war making potential through the air to
a desired destination to accomplish a desired purpose” and further that it is the
“ability of a nation to assert its will through the medium of the air.”5 Air power
thus includes all the military aviation assets of a nation’s air force, army and navy,
its fleets of commercial and private aircraft, and also the aviation and armament
industry that together feed all elements of air power. In other words, air power
is the use of fighter and transport aircraft, scout, attack, utility and heavy lift
helicopters and missiles and in recent times, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). Infrastructure such as airfields,
runways, air force bases, radar stations and other allied facilities including firing
ranges and space-based assets such as the Global Positioning System (GPS),
navigation and reconnaissance satellites and above all ‘Command and Control’
systems form part of the gigantic structure that normally comprises a nation’s air
power apparatus.
Air power is thus not restricted to, or circumscribed by, the colour of the
uniform or the current ownership of these resources. Air power needs a mechanism
that readily lends itself to seamless use of all its assets, not least the nation’s air
space to project the nation’s air power. It should not, and usually, does not matter
who owns or controls a specific facility or instrument. The Department of
Meteorology and Air Traffic Services are national assets usually controlled by
10 Air Power and National Security

different civilian ministries in peacetime but are also available for the use of military
aviation in peace and war and are regularly exercised to ensure proper
understanding of the requirements of the nation’s armed forces, especially the air
force.
Air power, depending on national resources and needs, will have a role in
different situations including coercion, compellence, out-of-area contingencies,
intervention and for power projection operations.
Although national air forces are the primary air power operators, air power
is inherently joint and combined or, in other words, indivisible. Experience has
shown that it must be controlled at as high a level as possible while its execution
may be decentralised and delegated to lower levels of command or control
authority. Air power clearly belongs to and comes from all three services; it includes
commercial and private aviation resources of the nation as was so brilliantly
demonstrated by the airlift of troops to Srinagar so early in India’s independence
history. The RAF Manual AP 3000 says:
It influences and is in turn influenced by land and maritime environments
and is unconstrained by national boundaries and terrain and is uniquely
pervasive and offers the prospect of access to any point on or above the
earth with the opportunity to observe and decisively influence operations
in the other environments, (that is on land and at sea).6
Control of air also therefore means control over ground or sea. If, for example,
we have our aircraft in, or over a particular area, we can easily control or at least
have the potential to control the events on the ground or sea below or keep a
discrete watch over events. This is perhaps air power’s biggest advantage and hence
makes allocation and control of air power resources so contentious across the globe.

Air Power Attributes

The first and the most remarkable attribute of air power is its ability to exploit
the third dimension. Although speed is a more easily discernible feature of air
power, it was its ability to exploit the third dimension or ‘elevation’ that initially
attracted the early thinkers and this is what so clearly distinguishes aviation forces
from their land and maritime counterparts. As aviation developed, speed and
range conferred the third attribute, namely ‘reach’. The unique ability to quickly
‘reach’ a desired destination became an important feature of air power and made
it so appealing to military commanders and national leaders.
Height, speed and reach are attributes that together give it complete freedom
of action. As would be evident from the examples cited above, the first and perhaps
the most crucial attribute of modern air power is its ability to respond
instantaneously to an emerging situation; whether in peace or war. Speed allows
for rapid projection of force; reach, the ability to strike distant targets; and height,
 Nature of Air Power 11

the unique ability to observe and dominate the activities on the surface of the
earth below. Air power, can thus also control battle-space and shape the battlefield.
National leaders or administrators often undertake aerial surveys of flood, drought,
or cyclone-affected areas at the very first opportunity as such observation gives
them a far better idea of the extent of damage and the likely effort needed to
bring succour to affected people, than if they were to travel by surface means to
the affected area. During war, aerial reconnaissance gives the military leader vital
information about the enemy.
From about the late 1970s, modern air power has developed the unique ability
to deliver Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) against a wide range of targets.
Continuous developments in target identification and acquisition, delivery
techniques and small diameter bombs, often from stand-off distances, have
conferred upon the modern aeroplane/helicopter and now also the UCAV, the
ability to reduce and many times totally avoid collateral damage. Even so, stray
incidents of civilian and non-combatant casualties invite severe criticism and place
further restrictions on the use of air power.7
Advances in aviation technology such as more efficient jet engines, improved
avionics and enhanced load-carrying capacity today allow decision-makers to
employ air power without undue delay and with greater assurance of success. For
example, India’s fledgling air force provided much-needed relief to the troops
fighting the tribesmen in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), now Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, in the 1930s. Those aircraft were, however, not equipped with
instruments and means to operate in bad weather. Sometime later, when IAF’s
No. 7 Squadron was asked to move to Gwalior from Campbellpore, it met with
unexpected bad weather in the form of thunderstorms and lost as many as three
aircraft because they had no reliable instrumentation to fly in strong winds and
severe turbulence.8 On the other hand, in 2008, eight Su-30 MKI multi-role
fighters of the IAF, successfully flew all the way across the seas to the US Air
Force (USAF) base at Nellis, with just two Il-78 tankers and two Il-76 support
aircraft that carried the men and material for the maintenance of the Su-30 MKI.9
It was an amazing achievement, considering it was the first such deployment.

Ability to Overfly Natural Obstacles

Being an airborne platform, aircraft can very easily negotiate natural terrain,
mountains and wooded/forested areas, and deliver firepower or essential supplies
without much difficulty. Such operations are of course restricted by the range
and payload of the aircraft. In 1947, India employed a large number of Dakota
transports of the IAF and commercial/private operators to fly in troops to Srinagar
when it was threatened by Pakistani forces. Similarly, the An-12, a far bigger and
commodious cargo plane with rear ramp doors, flew in three AMX-13 tanks to
12 Air Power and National Security

Ladakh in 1962. Today the Il-76 can perform the same task with considerable
ease. The C-17 Globemaster, recently inducted into the IAF, can transport 77
tonnes of payload, or more than 134 fully combat-ready troops, over a distance
of 4,400 km in one sortie, in a matter of few hours, even if the runway at the
other end is not paved.10
Modern air power can strike targets deep inside enemy territory, without
having to first engage or neutralise the enemy’s ground or naval forces, and it is
this capability that makes air power an attractive instrument for national leaders.
According to Elliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University, “Air power is an unusually
seductive form of military strength, in part because like modern courtship, it
appears to offer gratification without commitment.”11 Herein also lies the risk of
indiscriminate employment of air power. As in any other case of use of force, the
air power option is certainly fraught with the risk of retaliation by the enemy’s
air forces, and the aggressor has to be prepared to fight his way in and out and
perhaps, also incur some losses. As we shall see later, enemy air defences have to
first be neutralised or at least degraded through a Suppression of Enemy Air
Defences (SEAD) campaign. It will be instructive to remember that since the
end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the USAF has not engaged in a single air
campaign without first undertaking SEAD operations.

Flexibility/Agility
Air power by its very nature is immensely flexible. Modern multi-role aircraft,
both fighter and transport, are capable of undertaking a variety of missions with
little extra effort or change in configuration. In some cases, it is possible to redirect/
reallocate an already airborne aircraft or even a UAV without changing its
armament configuration. Transport aircraft and helicopters have routinely
answered such emergency calls in mid-air, and provided the much needed relief
to victims of natural disasters, and/or evacuated casualties from all corners of
the country.

Ubiquity
In simple terms, ubiquity means the ability to be everywhere almost
simultaneously. Ubiquity is a combination of reach and persistence. At first
somewhat difficult to visualise, this is a unique characteristic of air power. Due
to its speed and reach, air power can appear out of ‘nowhere and be everywhere’.
As Winston Churchill had said, “Air power is the most difficult of all forms of
military force to measure or even express in precise terms.”12 This attribute
becomes easy to appreciate when with aerial refuelling, almost intercontinental
ranges can be achieved. Modern fighter and transport aircraft are routinely called
upon to deliver effects at phenomenal distances. Recent application of air power
 Nature of Air Power 13

in Libya in 2011 is a good example of how fighters based in the UK operated

3,000-km return flights, until bases in Italy became available. Three decades earlier,
British V-bombers had successfully bombed targets in distant Falklands, operating
from Ascension Island on the equator. Today, High Altitude Long Endurance
(HALE) UAVs, such as the Global Hawk, have an endurance stretching to several
weeks and can remain on ‘station’, usually at heights of around 60,000-65,000
feet at great distances from their launch bases.

Concentration of Firepower
Air power can deliver concentrated firepower at a point of one’s choice without
having to physically group together or deploy the delivery platforms at a single
location on the ground. This also makes it difficult for the enemy to respond, as
attacking aircraft simply evaporate into thin air after delivering their armament.
The enemy can thus be punished, his offensive capability degraded, and his will
or behaviour influenced without having to resort to physical mobilisation of large
bodies of troops, which is usually time-consuming, expensive and cumbersome.
This is especially true when one wants to avoid unnecessary escalation, as such
missions can be launched in a measured response, and called off the moment the
primary political aim is achieved. The American bombing of Libyan targets in
Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986, the US Navy’s Tomahawk cruise missile
strikes against suspected Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in 1998, and air dropping
of the much-needed foodgrains from An-32 aircraft to the Tamil population in
Northern Jaffna in 1987, are some examples of these missions. Further, simply
announcing a change in the alert status of air assets at their home bases can send
a strong political signal.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is yet another development that has
substantially enhanced the effectiveness of modern air power. In simple terms,
RMA comprises Stealth, Reach or Range, PGMs and now ‘super cruise’, the last
being the ability to fly at supersonic speeds without using ‘reheat or after burner’
or in other words, burning too much fuel. This has added a new dimension to
air power capabilities. Stealth or low observable characteristics denote the ability
of a platform to avoid radar detection. Super cruise and enhanced ‘situational
awareness’ further add to the overall performance, versatility and invulnerability
of the platform.

Shock Effect
Combat air power by its sudden appearance from the skies, with little or no
warning, tends to cause a temporary deterioration or slowdown, sometimes even
a shutdown, of all human faculties, thus affecting a kind of paralysis amongst
the enemy or people on the ground. This is termed as shock effect. Depending
14 Air Power and National Security

on the scale and damage, the nature of the effect can be strategic or tactical.
During the second Iraq War in 2003, the USAF deliberately designed its air
operations to achieve what it termed ‘shock and awe’ on the Iraqi government
and people. This effect is further enhanced with the use of PGMs and the inherent
accuracy of such air-delivered weapons, to strike at the heart of the enemy target
with little collateral damage. Shock effect is, however temporary, and the general
population, depending on its culture, confidence in its leadership and the
country’s overall response, may get inured to aerial bombing. It is, therefore,
imperative that to be decisive, air action is concentrated and yet carefully
calibrated, or else indiscriminate bombing of the enemy, especially its civilian
population, would become counterproductive and may even help reinforce its
national resolve. When used judiciously, air power can exploit this effect to obtain
speedy political and tactical outcomes.

Limitations
Along with the many advantages, air power also has some limitations such as:
impermanence; fragility; limited weapon and other loads; relatively high unit
costs and; dependence on basing facilities which even the Short Take Off and
Landing (STOL) aircraft are subjected to.

Impermanence
Unlike ground forces, air power cannot hold ground and its presence is ephemeral.
In order to increase its staying power, it will have to be based at an air base with
at least the necessary minimum facilities for operations. Helicopters, however,
are relatively less affected by this limitation and it is possible to support the
operations of a sizeable number of helicopters from an unpaved open ground of
modest dimensions.
It is relatively expensive to keep air power in theatre without basing facilities.
For example, the US and British air forces enforced a ‘no fly zone’ south and
north of Iraq for 11 years, from the end of the Gulf War in 1991 until the
beginning of the second Gulf War in March 2003, effectively boxing in Iraq’s Air
Force. This operation proved effective, but costly, as a large number of fighters
were used to routinely and continuously fly at medium levels to deter Iraqi aircraft
from breaking the cordon, and engage them, if they did. Since such long tenures
disrupted the training schedules of the aircrews and used up precious flying hours,
both aircraft and aircrews had to be frequently rotated for rest and recuperation
and for routine aircraft servicing. Shorter duration Combat Air Patrol (CAP)
missions can and are, however, flown for the arrival and departure of VVIPs,
induction of fresh troops or emergency evacuation in the face of enemy interference
and situations where it is difficult to assure total security from ground and air
attacks.
 Nature of Air Power 15

Limited Weapons Load

Compared to a regiment of tanks, field/mountain guns, or a ship’s armoury, a
modern fighter carries a limited load. Yet, aircraft of the Su-30/Rafale/Jaguar
class can carry a heavy load of up to 8,000 kg of high explosive and incendiary
laser-guided bombs, missiles, rockets and external fuel tanks. Speed, reach and
high sortie rates can make up for this limitation – to some extent.

Fragility
Modern aircraft depend largely on avionics and micro-miniaturisation for their
performance. Modern avionics and most other airborne equipment are relatively
fragile and vulnerable to dust, air pollution, extreme temperature conditions and
hence need constant care, maintenance and even replacement. Inclement weather,
rain, sleet, snow, dust and thunderstorms can severely restrict air operations. These
factors also add to difficulties in aircraft maintenance. Since modern multi-role
combat aircraft pack a variety of delicate avionics components per unit volume,
these become extremely vulnerable to even small arms fire, especially when on
low-level strikes. The IAF lost a large number of its fighter-bombers to small
arms fire in such attacks in the 1971 war.

Weather
Although most modern aircraft are capable of operating by night and in all-
weather and low light conditions, their performance is invariably affected. Blind
flying instruments only help the crews to fly from one base to another, provided
that the destination also has the requisite navigation and landing facilities.
Operations like accurately delivering weapons in poor light or night conditions
can still pose some difficulty, especially when engaging moving targets in a rapidly
changing ground situation. In peacetime too, bad weather, especially over
mountainous terrain, can severely restrict air operations, as was evident during
the rescue missions launched following the cloudburst in Uttarakhand in June
2013.13

Dependence on Basing Facilities

As emphasised above, aircraft cannot operate without base facilities. It is the air
base that houses all maintenance facilities, spare parts, instrument calibration
laboratories, living accommodation for air and ground crews and hence plays a
vital role in keeping the aircraft airborne. Bases therefore, also need elaborate
ground and air defence protection. Earlier, when air forces operated relatively
less advanced aircraft, the facilities provided were minimal. In the IAF too, base
facilities were not very sophisticated until the arrival of the Jaguar, Mirage-2000,
Su-30 and Il-76 aircraft. One of the more expensive but inescapable facilities at
16 Air Power and National Security

every forward base is a series of bomb-proof aircraft shelters also known as ‘blast
pens’. Due mainly to ‘short legs’ or limited range of the IAF fighters, many of
the air bases are located close to the border. This proximity makes the aircraft
even more vulnerable to enemy attacks, when not parked in these ‘blast pens’.

High Acquisition and Life Cycle Costs

Air power was and continues to remain capital-and technology-intensive. High
technology raises the unit cost of aircraft, engines, radars, precision weapons and
air defence systems, satellites and communication infrastructure. Until the 1970s,
a Gnat fighter aircraft cost a mere Rs. 20-25 lakh; with Mystere IVA, Toofani
costing about the same and the Hunter a little more. When the BAe Hawk was
first offered in the mid-1980s, the cost was believed to be around $4.5-5 million,
whereas it finally cost $25 million in 2004. The Medium Multi-Role Combat
Aircraft (MMRCA), Rafale is to cost upwards of $65 million and the C-17
Globemaster much more. It is obvious that no country can thus afford to acquire
large numbers of modern aircraft.
“Between 1960 and 1990, the nominal cost of RAF combat aircraft grew by
a factor of ten, but the size of the service’s front line fell by only one-third.”14
Operators have tried to extend the life of combat aircraft by resorting to mid-life
upgrades. C-130 Hercules, B-52 and even the F-16 have now been in frontline
service with the USAF for over four decades. The IAF too has learnt this lesson
and operates many old fighters such as the MiG-21 and Jaguar. The Mirage-
2000, its frontline fighter, is now 25 years old and is being upgraded so that its
life can be extended by another 20 years. High unit costs, however, are not the
problem of aircraft alone. Frontline tanks such as the T-90 cost around $4-5
million and the army’s total tank inventory is more than 3,500. The cost of INS
Vikramaditya, the Indian Navy’s new aircraft carrier, has escalated from around
$1.3 bn to nearly $3bn.15 Andrew G.B. Vallance says, “What counts is value for
money in the broadest sense. The apparent growth in air power cost in recent
decades has been dramatic, but so has been the growth in capabilities.”16

Terrain
Mountainous terrain, especially for high altitude air operations, poses a major
challenge as the lack of oxygen places severe limitations on the fighting ability of
aircraft. The reason for low oxygen concentration in the atmosphere is the reduced
air density at higher altitudes. This also adversely affects the performance of the
piston, turboprop and turbojet engine; the first more so, than the other two. In
addition to reducing the thrust of a jet engine, low density also affects aircraft
manoeuvrability as its control surfaces do not respond the way they do at sea
level. Air-launched weapons such as rockets, bombs and missiles also behave
unpredictably at high altitudes.
 Nature of Air Power 17

During the 1999 Kargil War, for example, the shoulder-fired Stinger missile
used by the Pakistani forces proved lethal as its heat-seeking warhead could more
easily home onto the heat of a jet engine in the very cold ambient atmosphere.
High altitude is normally not an impediment to simple ‘route’ flying as most
fixed wing aircraft routinely fly at heights of 30-40,000 feet; but undertaking
offensive operations requiring the launching of air weapons or combat
manoeuvring is a different matter. Helicopters, on the other hand, are usually
restricted to lower altitudes. This is because reduced engine performance and
aerodynamic forces severely restrict manoeuvrability of the aircraft; its flying
controls become less effective with altitude, and the height lost in recovering
from a dive increases and so does the turn radius.17 All of these aerodynamic and
performance penalties make it difficult to negotiate the narrow and steep valleys
and gullies in the high mountains.
High altitude adversely affects all air breathing platforms. It is mistakenly
believed by some that dedicated ground attack aircraft like the Russian Su-25/39
or American Fairchild A-10, and attack helicopters such as Mi-25/35 would
overcome these difficulties. With altitude, the payloads of aircraft and helicopters
stand reduced. Artillery guns and even mortars have to be dismantled and carried
piecemeal to high altitude areas such as Siachen.

Historical Background
The evolution of air power since the first manned flight in December 1903,
makes a fascinating study because unlike land and maritime warfare, air power
development was far more rapid and opened many new vistas in modern warfare.
The 2011 Libyan air campaign lasted for seven and a half months from the
launch of the first weapon against the Gaddafi Government targets on March 19
to October 31. Today, few remember that it also marked the end of the first
century of air power employment. On November 1, 1911 an Italian Air Force bi-
plane had bombed Turkish positions at Ain Zara during the Tripolitan War. The
outcome of that conflict was that the three North African provinces then ruled
by the Ottoman Empire were ceded to Italy and on gaining independence in
1951 became the nation of Libya.18
Soon after the successful first flight of the aircraft by the Wright brothers,
aviation enthusiasts began to apply their minds to the military use of the aircraft.
The most remarkable feature of the aircraft was its ability to exploit the third
dimension. Until its advent, the military leaders’ most vital requirement was to
occupy high ground, so that they could get a better view of the enemy’s dispositions
from this elevated position. As a result, the first role for infant air power was
reconnaissance of the enemy. “Early air power visionaries such as Major Fullerton
and Captain Burke and eminent engineer F.W. Lancaster argued that air vehicles
18 Air Power and National Security

could revolutionise warfare.”19 As early as 1907, Lancaster also suggested that

“under the conditions of the near future, the command of the air must become
at least as important to the safety of the [British] Empire as will be our continued
supremacy of the high seas.”20 On the European continent, the Italians were at
the forefront with their aircraft being used in the Balkan Wars of 1912. By the
time World War I broke out, most European armies and many navies had built
significant fleets of military aircraft.

World War I (1914-18)

The rate of progress during the war was astonishing with aircraft capabilities
advancing enormously. Between 1914 and 1918 the speed of military aircraft
doubled, their payload increased ten-fold and their airworthiness grew beyond
compare. In 1914, the Royal Flying Corps had less than 180 aircraft on its books.
Yet, “just four years later, Britain had a true air force with nearly 300,000 men,
two hundred squadrons and over 22,000 aircraft.”21
From simple aerial reconnaissance, pilots and observers began to carry rifles,
handguns and later integral machine guns which they used against enemy aircraft
and also to harass enemy troops on the ground. In September 1914, British aircraft
bombed the Zeppelin sheds at Dusseldorf and Cologne; subsequently factories,
power stations and ammunition dumps were raided. The first air attacks against
enemy supply lines took place in early 1915. In June 1917, air power played a
decisive part in the capture of the key port of Jeddah, near Mecca, from the
Turks. Naval aircraft made an early contribution to overland operations but had
little impact on operations at sea. However, during the last two years of the war,
the use of air power at sea began to gather pace. German Zeppelins continued to
do useful scouting work, and the Allies developed seaplane carriers into proper
aircraft carriers. Allied aircraft also helped to counter the U-boat menace, and by
1918 there were over 3,000 aircraft in service with the Royal Navy alone.22
With the proliferation of own and enemy aircraft over the battlefield, “control
of the air itself came to be seen as something of great potential importance.”
According to Vallance, the first direct attacks against air bases date from August
1914, and the first air-to-air combats took place between opposing scout aircraft
soon afterwards. Both sides began to enhance their counter-air efforts dramatically.
By 1915 the first true ‘fighter’ aircraft (the Fokker Eindecker) made its
appearance.23
By the time Italy abandoned its pre-war alliance and declared war on Austria-
Hungary on May 23, 1915, several German aircraft had already been shot down
by British and French two-seaters, in which the observer was armed with a
machinegun, and the French pilot, Roland Garros24 had notable success in a
single-seater Morane monoplane, equipped with a machinegun fixed to fire
through the arc of the propeller.25
 Nature of Air Power 19

As the fledgling aircraft operators gained experience, (there were no true air
forces as yet) tactical experiments began with numerical superiority, cross-cover
and mutual support and tight formations, to get the better of the enemy in the
air while protecting own members of the fighter formations.
The final key air power capability – strategic bombing – emerged slightly
later in World War I, than other types of combat operations. On January 19,
1915 two German Zeppelins bombed the Norfolk coast in Britain and by the
standards of the time caused insignificant physical destruction but shook civilian
morale and damaged Britain’s sense of invulnerability. Twenty more raids were
launched against Britain during 1915, but by 1916, countermeasures had been
developed. Only six raids were launched against Britain in 1917 and four in
1918. Even so, some 17,340 anti-aircraft artillery troops and 12 squadrons of
fighters were tied down permanently to countering the threat, an early example
of the strategic diversion which strategic bombing can generate. Thus, within
little more than two years after the outbreak of World War I, three basic operational
applications of air power had emerged. The first was the ‘auxiliary’, ‘air support’,
or more accurately anti-surface force operations: the use of air power against the
enemy army and navy; second, ‘counter-air’ operations: the use of air power to
deter, contain or defeat the enemy air forces; and third, ‘independent’ or strategic
bombing operations: the autonomous use of air power to bomb deep in the enemy’s
heartland and undermine his will and ability to wage war. Even then, expert
opinion was divided over which of these three types of operations should be
considered the primary function of air power. All the experts felt that counter-
air was essentially an enabling operation; not an end in itself, but a means by
which either anti-surface force or strategic bombing operations could be carried
out effectively. But few experts saw the latter two types of operations as compatible,
let alone complementary. Instead, most military men – including aviators –
continued to believe that aviation forces should be used directly in support of the
surface forces. In their view, strategic bombing could only be a distraction from
the real business of war, that of defeating the enemy army and navy. The opposing
lobby argued that strategic bombing offered a short cut to victory, a way of avoiding
the costly and apparently futile trench warfare stalemate which dominated
contemporary land warfare.
The debate was brought to a critical phase when 21 Gotha bombers attacked
Folkestone on May 25, 1917, inflicting nearly 300 casualties in just 10 minutes.
During the next month, the Gotha raids were extended to London, which
thereafter was raided regularly. The Gotha bombers never numbered more than
40; often suffered heavy damage and the physical damage inflicted by them was
hardly more than that of the Zeppelins. Nevertheless, the Gotha raids induced
widespread fear and panic and war production fell.
20 Air Power and National Security

As a result, the British government withdrew a substantial force of fighters

from France to defend London; it also formed the Smuts Committee to review
not only “the defence arrangement for Home Defence against air raids” but also
“the air organisation generally and the directions of air operations”. The Smuts
Committee had only two members, Lieutenant General Jan Christian Smuts and
the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, with the former doing most of
the work. Smuts produced two reports, the second of which proved most
important as it unequivocally recommended the formation of an independent
air force.
“As far as can at present be foreseen there is absolutely no limit to the scale
of the air service’s independent war use. And the time may not be far off when
aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of
industrial and population centres on a vast scale may become the principal
operation of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may
become secondary and subordinate.”
The report was accepted by the British War Cabinet and on April 1, 1918
the RAF was born as the world’s first independent air service.26
In Europe too, air services of Austria-Hungary, France and Italy were
increasingly resorting to use of their fledgling air power assets. Both sides used
their unwieldy aircraft to bomb enemy targets such as railway lines, docks, industry
and other targets.
On February 14, 1916, 10 (Austro-Hungarian) aircraft armed with 80
kg of bombs flew from a base in Trento to attack Milan. This was 15
months before the first raid on a town in Britain by German heavier-
than-air-machines…though the Germans had already attacked London
with airships. ‘Navigating’ by the white shimmering ‘cathedral’ of Milan,
two of the attacking aircraft unloaded their bombs in the general direction
of a power station, killing 12 people and injuring 70. The other eight
aircraft apparently became lost and scattered their bombs elsewhere…On
August 9, 1916, 17 Austro-Hungarian aircraft bombed Venice killing seven
civilians and sinking a British submarine docked at the arsenal, probably
the first submarine ever to be sunk by air bombing…On November 16,
1916 a single Austro-Hungarian bomb killed 93 civilians sheltering in a
casemate in the old fortification of Padua. It was the worst incident
involving civilians taking shelter from an air raid during the entire course
of World War I although there had been an even greater toll when a French
reprisal raid on Karlsruhe (across the border in south-west Germany) had
destroyed a circus during a matinee, along with killing most of the children
in the audience…Altogether, more than 400 civilians were killed in Austro-
Hungarian raids on towns in northern Italy, 1,414 civilians were killed in
German raids on England and 746 were killed in British-French raids on
industrial centres in Western Germany.27
 Nature of Air Power 21

Inter War-Years (1918-39)

While these years saw some advances in civil and commercial aviation such as
mail and passenger services, the use of military aircraft was largely restricted to
‘police action’ or air control operations of remote and thinly populated areas in
North Africa, Iraq and NWFP in India. Air transport was used less during World
War I, but soon began to develop with the RAF, in 1921, reinforcing the British
garrison in Kirkuk (Iraq). Nearer home, in the winter of 1928-29, the RAF
evacuated nearly 600 British citizens from the besieged city of Kabul in
Afghanistan.28
The period also saw air power visionaries such Douhet, Mitchel and Trenchard
advocating the theory of strategic bombing, in which they saw large formations
of bombers overflying enemy armies and devastating the enemy’s heartland,
without having to first defeat enemy armies and navies. Brigadier General William
Mitchel, an early proponent of flexibility of air power in different roles, later
became an advocate of strategic bombing. All three had grossly over-estimated
the capabilities of the ‘bomber’ and effective air defence was judged to be
impossible. Bombers flying in close self-supporting formations protected by
defensive fire would (it was thought) break through the defences, no matter how
strong they were.29
In 1932 the British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin stated in Parliament:
I think it well also for the man in the street to realise that there is no
power on earth that can protect him from bombing, whatever people may
tell him. The bomber will always get through.30
The reality, however, was quite different. While some bombers always managed
to get through, bomber losses were prohibitively high in World War I. Given the
fast-improving performance of the contemporary fighter aircraft, bombers became
more and more vulnerable. During the Spanish Civil War, the German Condor
Legion, supporting the nationalist forces, found that it needed fighter escorts to
protect its bombers. The fighters also found that the increasing pace and
complexity of the air battle demanded larger and more flexible fighter formations,
as lone fighters were more vulnerable to the defensive fire of the bomber, as also
to the bomber escorts. All these developments led to new tactical doctrines which
profoundly challenged Douhet’s conclusions. Yet, the implications were widely
ignored. Instead, the destruction by bombing of Shanghai by the Japanese and
of Guernica by the Germans in 1937 – although unique in each war – were
cited as validation of the strategic bombing doctrine and proof of bomber
invincibility. In March 1939, the threat of an aerial ‘knock-out blow’ against
Prague induced the Czechs to concede to Hitler’s demands. The British of the
time also believed that the only way to thwart the potent threat posed by German
bombers was an immediate and overwhelming counter-attack, prompting Harold
22 Air Power and National Security

Macmillan (later British Prime Minister) to admit later: “we thought of air warfare
in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today.”31
The debate over the relative merits of ‘air defence’ and ‘offensive fighter or
fighter-bomber’ or even the ‘strategic bomber’ has often depended on the level
and credibility of current technology of the aircraft and the destructive capability
of the armament delivered. Hence, no country can take a chance with a fighter-
bomber/ bomber carrying nuclear weapons, whereas the threat of conventional
weapons, however accurate, would not give any one sleepless nights.
In the absence of ‘proper trials’, ‘controlled exercises’ or serious operational
analysis to assess the actual destructive capacity of the bomber in terms of
technology and more importantly, the strength of the civilian population to
withstand and adapt to the shock of aerial bombing, the claims of the ‘prophets’
of strategic bombing met with mixed results during World War II.

World War II (1939-45)

Although many of the early air power theorists tended to over-estimate the
capabilities of aircraft, there is no gainsaying the fact that, by the end of World
War II air power had become an essential part of modern warfare. In fact, it had
acquired a central position in military strategy. No modern army or navy could
contemplate any worthwhile surface operation without first neutralising, or at
the very least, significantly degrading enemy air power. Every tank, gun or ship
was vulnerable to enemy air power.
Wars tend to spur technological development, and in that sense World War
II proved to be no different. Aircraft speeds, performance, all-up weight,
armament, and overall weapon delivery accuracy showed remarkable progress.
The advent of the jet engine, ground-based and later airborne radar and high-
precision navigation aids, increased the overall capabilities, and as the war
progressed, new air platforms such as ballistic missiles (V1), cruise missiles (V2)
and helicopters, added to air power efficiency and efficacy.
In Europe, air power proved to be a key element in the success of the German
invasion of Poland (1939), Norway, the Benelux Countries, France (1940), the
Balkans and Russia in 1941. The first check on Nazi aggression came from air
power during the Battle of Britain in 1940. From 1942 onwards, German weakness
in the air proved to be its Achilles heel. It must however, be remembered that
relentless German aerial bombing during the Battle of Britain had at one time
brought England to the brink of defeat. It was the stupendous effort of the RAF
Fighter Command, under the able guidance of Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding,
which saved the situation. It was also the fickle and changing targeting strategy
of the German Luftwaffe, switching from bombing aircraft factories and industry
to the bombing of cities, and the diversion of its air power resources to the Eastern
Front that helped Britain to successfully defeat the threat of German invasion.
 Nature of Air Power 23

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill paid a memorable, and now famous,
tribute to these young men: “Never in the history of human conflict has so much
been owed by so many to so few.”32 Examples of success in purely defensive
counter-air operations have been relatively few, with the Battle of Britain being
the only exception in the long history of air power deployment.33
In the North African campaign, it was again the British superiority in air
power, with close coordination between its army and its Desert Air Force that
ultimately defeated Rommel’s armies. According to Rommel,
As a result of the British command of the air and hence of the seas in the
Central Mediterranean, the army’s supplies were hardly sufficient to enable
it to eke out a bare existence even on quiet days…There were days when
the British flew 800 bomber sorties and 2,500 sorties of fighters, fighter-
bombers and low-flying fighter aircraft. We, on the other hand could at
the most fly 60 dive-bomber and 100 fighter sorties. This number
moreover continually became smaller.34
Further commenting on British air superiority, Rommel said:
Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against
an enemy with complete air superiority, fights like a savage against modern
European troops, under the same operational and tactical handicaps and
with the same chances of success.35
In the Pacific, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941
nearly crippled the mighty US Pacific Fleet. It was by sheer luck that many of its
aircraft carriers escaped destruction by being away at sea on that fateful morning.
In retrospect, some analysts believe that the Japanese attack could have caused
more permanent damage to the US Navy, had they chosen to destroy the repair
and maintenance facilities at Pearl Harbour instead of targeting individual ships.
Japanese advance into the Philippines, Malaya and Singapore and the sinking of
three British ships anchored at Singapore was also largely due to air power.
When the US entered the war and launched counter attacks against the
Japanese Navy, the naval battles in the Coral Sea, Midway and later Leyte Gulf,
were won by naval air power with the opposing fleets never coming into visual
contact.
Bomber fleets of both sides suffered very heavy attrition:
During the Battle of Britain on September 15, 1940, the Germans lost
56 bombers. During the American daylight bombing raids on Schweinfurt
and Regensburg on October 17, 1943, 63 of the 280 attacking bombers
were shot down. In a night bombing raid by the British on Nuremburg
on March 30-31, 1944, 94 of the 710 bombers were lost to German
fighters and AA fire. The lessons were clear: either establish control of
the air or concede.36
24 Air Power and National Security

The US bombers had for some time, towards the end of the war, been using
incendiary bombs against Japanese cities and had successfully razed many of the
cities to the ground; but the Japanese surrender came only after the US B-29
bombers dropped atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9,
1945 respectively, killing some 100,000 people and injuring an equal number.
Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFO) were proving increasingly more
successful in both the theatres. The German invasion of Greece and Crete
employed air power in airborne assault, air transported/landed operations, but
they had to discontinue these because of extremely heavy casualties.
“During World War II, more warships were sunk by aircraft and 61 per cent
of those were sunk by land-based aircraft.” Maritime air power had come of age
with surface fleets within the strike range of aircraft proving vulnerable.
The large transport fleets also played a major role in providing strategic and
tactical mobility, and air supply. In the Allied campaign in Burma (now Myanmar),
during the 1944 siege of Kohima and Imphal, 155,000 Allied troops were entirely
supplied by air for three months. Later, during the Allied offensive, 300,000 men
received 90 per cent of their supplies from the air.37
Control of the air proved to be the war-winning factor, as without it, all air
activity was at risk of attrition or at least disruption by opposing air power. The
war also proved that the side that paid equal attention to all types of capabilities
was better and more versatile. The Germans, for example, suffered because of
their emphasis on short-range fighters. In order to make up for the lack of offensive
capability, they launched the V1 and V2 ‘flying bombs’ towards the end of the
war, the first of which was dropped on Swanscombe, in Kent on June 13, 1944,
and the last one on Orpington in Kent on March 27, 1945. A total of 6,725 V1
flying bombs were dropped. Of these, 2,340 struck London and led to 5,475
dead and 16,000 injured. Three lines of defence were used against these bombs/
missiles: RAF fighters along the English Coast; anti-aircraft batteries; and balloon
barrages which were successful in downing 3,500 V1s. The V2 ‘cruise missiles’
were launched in September 1944 and in the next few months 1,400 of these
struck London. Since they flew at the speed of sound, there was no warning and
they could not be intercepted. Although these missiles did not prove very
successful, the RAF mounted strikes against their launch sites at Peenemünde in
northern Germany in 1944. The missile threat finally ended only when the
advancing Allied troops captured the launch sites towards the end of the war.
World War II saw air power come of age. As seen earlier, by the early 1950s,
air power had become indispensable to warfare and many countries across the
globe had formed independent air arms. The USAAF soon became an independent
entity and the demands of the Cold War spurred technological developments in
all air power applications. Air power was not, however, always successful in
 Nature of Air Power 25

deterring conflict. Although nuclear weapons had proved their amazing destructive
capacity, these did not deter the Soviet-aided North Koreans from attacking South
Korea in June 1950. The veiled threat of nuclear weapons also did not deter the
Chinese from entering the Korean War. In 1948, the Soviet Union was not deterred
from imposing a 14 month long blockade on West Berlin, but the American and
British transport fleets helped the city brave the blockade by flying in 2,326,000
tons of supplies between July 1948 and September 1949. The relatively slow and
unwieldy transport aircraft had to fly in narrow air corridors in appalling weather
and were often harassed by Soviet fighters.

The Indian Experience

In just over two months after independence, India used its nascent and very
limited air power resources when a few Dakota DC-3 twin-engine transport
aircraft of the IAF and many more belonging to the few commercial and private
operators, successfully airlifted a battalion (later one full infantry brigade) of the
Indian Army to Srinagar on October 27, 1947. Since then, the IAF has seen its
employment on numerous occasions, in both combat and non-combat roles. From
the early 1950s to date, the IAF continues to supply the army and civilian
populations along the country’s mountainous borders through air maintenance.
Although in a limited way, it was also used during the liberation of Goa in
December 1961. During the Sino-Indian border conflict, the IAF did not employ
its fighter fleet but its transport aircraft and helicopters flew numerous sorties
for logistics support and casualty evacuation (Cas-Evac) operations at considerable
risk. The Canberra strategic reconnaissance aircraft flew a number of missions
to provide invaluable photographic evidence of Chinese activity, especially the
Aksai Chin road and its army positions in the mountains.
Air power was again in the forefront when on September 1, 1965 responding
to an SOS from the Army, the IAF launched 12 Vampires and 14 Mystere IVA
fighters and helped save the situation in Chhamb, the loss of which would have
threatened India’s only access to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The IAF was
employed in all its classical roles during this 22 day long war and won high praise
and appreciation of the nation. Air power played a decisive role in the 14 day
long war for the liberation of East Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in
December 1971, and achieved complete air superiority in the Eastern theatre.
The IAF supported the army by attacking Pakistan Army targets and the road
and riverine transport system in erstwhile East Pakistan and severely degraded
the mobility of the Pakistan Army. It launched a major airborne operation at
Tangail in which it dropped a battalion group, and a heliborne operation to lift
a battalion across a damaged bridge in the IV Corps sector. Simultaneously, the
IAF maintained a dominant posture in the Western Sector and prevented Pakistan
26 Air Power and National Security

from making any forays into Indian territory. In a classical offensive air support
operation, IAF Hunters decimated an entire regiment of Pakistani armour in
Longewala that was poised to overrun Indian troops on their way to a strategically
important town of Jaisalmer in the Rajasthan sector.
On June 4, 1987, the IAF was again used to drop emergency rations to the
Tamil population in the Jaffna peninsula in Northern Sri Lanka, an operation
that paved the way for the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord signed on July 29, 1987. The
IAF helicopter and transport elements were active throughout the three year long
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operation codenamed ‘Operation Pawan’.
Again in 1988, when the Government of Maldives requested Indian assistance to
thwart a coup attempt, two Il-76 heavy lift transport aircraft of the IAF air
transported a battalion of elite paratroopers from Agra across 3,000 km to Male,
the capital city and successfully restored calm. The IAF also played a major role
during the 1999 Kargil war, and helped the Indian Army to evict the Pakistan
Army intruders, and also deterred the enemy from expanding the scope of that
border conflict, even though IAF aircraft were not allowed to cross the Line of
Control (LoC). It played a major role when a devastating tsunami in the Bay of
Bengal hit the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the coast of Tamil Nadu and
Sumatra in Indonesia. Indian air power carried out the evacuation of stranded
Indians in Kuwait prior to the 1991 Gulf War, and again from Lebanon in 2006,
when war broke out between Israel and the Hezbollah fighters operating from
Southern Lebanon.
Air power can send a strong message, sometimes unintended. For instance,
in 1988, Bangladesh was struck by a devastating cyclone. An urgent request for
six helicopters was received from Dhaka through its High Commission in New
Delhi late in the day. After due clearance from the various government agencies
in New Delhi, six IAF Mi-8 helicopters were over Dhaka at dawn the next
morning. Such was the speed of response that the then President of Bangladesh,
General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, expressed his concerns, about the
exceptionally high alert status of the IAF in peacetime, to the then Prime Minister
of India, Rajiv Gandhi, during the next SAARC Summit.
The helicopter and transport forces of the IAF have on numerous occasions
rescued stranded troops and mountaineers in the Himalayas, saved people during
floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and other natural and man-made disasters. In
addition, the IAF has been called in support of civil administration in all parts
of the country, in counter-insurgency operations. The IAF Super Constellation
also known as L-1049 aircraft, transferred from Air India after the latter began
operating the Boeing 707 airliners, routinely patrolled the long coastline of the
country on maritime search and rescue missions until the Indian Navy and Coast
Guard took over this responsibility in the 1980s.
 Nature of Air Power 27

In spite of such extensive and continuous employment throughout the last

68 years in India and for over a century elsewhere, and a realisation that air power
was destined to play a decisive role in any modern conflict, even well-informed
people including civilian and military experts do not truly understand, and readily
accept the role, that air power plays in national defence. Karl Mueller of RAND
Corporation says:
Its (air power’s) use and effects are an increasingly important matter of
study in international security scholarship; although it is fair to say that
land and sea power, with their longer histories and somewhat greater
stability of characteristics, remain more familiar to most scholarly
observers.38

Air Power Employment: Roles and Missions

Command of the Air
No military operations are possible without adequate freedom of action. Just as
land or sea operations cannot take place if there is interference from the enemy,
air activity also requires a degree of freedom, and to achieve that, in a contested
airspace, the air force has to first establish control of the medium. Command or
control of the air was seen as the primary objective of an air force because without
such a condition being achieved ab initio, it was impossible to prevent enemy air
forces from interfering with own freedom of action on the surface, as well as in
the air. Depending on the degree of control, this condition is variously described
as Air Supremacy, Air Superiority or a Favourable Air Situation (FAS). In the
present context where opposing air forces are evenly matched, it is nearly
impossible to attain total air superiority for long periods of time. The three terms
are clearly indicative of the relative degree of freedom that own/friendly forces
enjoy. Air superiority or command of the air is thus a dynamic concept. An air
force has to continuously fight for air superiority, and once attained, it has to be
maintained by continuous and consistent offensive action, or else, it is lost once
enemy air forces recoup in time. The German Luftwaffe subjected Great Britain
to almost round-the-clock bombing in the first half of 1940. In what came to be
known as the Battle of Britain, the RAF put up a sustained defensive fight for
over three months, until the ability of the Luftwaffe was very significantly reduced.
At the time, because of limited radar cover and fighter range, the RAF had little
choice but to try to shoot down enemy bombers after these had come close to,
or over, Great Britain. Such examples are rarely seen now, as wars are restricted
in time and scope. In the ‘six-day war’ in June 1967, Israel’s Air Force carried
out surprise pre-emptive attacks on the Arab forces, especially the Egyptian Air
Force, and in a matter of hours destroyed it on ground.
28 Air Power and National Security

Suppression of Enemy Air Defences

SEAD operations involve specifically targeting enemy air defence by attacking its
radars, radar-controlled Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and Surface-to-Air-Missile
(SAM) assets. Radar-controlled AAA and SAMs can also be effectively neutralised
with electronic warfare (EW) or jamming. The US-led Allied air forces almost
totally neutralised Iraq’s Air Force in the first few days of the 1991 Gulf War, and
achieved almost total air superiority over the Iraqi skies. Iraq’s Air Force did not
put up a real fight and many of its aircraft even fled to neighbouring Iran, or
were trapped in damaged/destroyed bomb shelters, effectively grounding them.
The USAF and RAF also imposed a ‘no fly zone’ over Iraq from 1991 to 2003;
which was another effective way to gain air superiority over northern and southern
Iraq for 11 years. The IAF too achieved total air superiority over East Pakistan in
the first three days of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. SEAD operations were also
undertaken in Kosovo (1999); Second Gulf War (2003); and in Libya (2011).
Such examples of total air superiority are, however, rare. In most other conflicts
where the two warring sides are more evenly matched, as for example in the 1965
Indo-Pak War, it is difficult, time-consuming and costly to achieve total air
superiority. Both the IAF and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) managed to create a FAS,
at different times, over areas of immediate interest or where ground battles raged,
and at times got the better of the opponent. Both sides abandoned counter air
attacks on each other’s air bases after suffering heavy attrition in the first few
daylight raids, and switched to night attacks by the Canberra/B-57 light bombers,
since neither side possessed a really effective night air defence. The PAF through
better coordination with the ground forces, however, managed to provide better
and timely offensive air support to the Pakistan Army.
During the nearly three-month long Kargil War in 1999, the IAF combat
operations were restricted to the Indian side of the LoC. The PAF did not enter
the fray, and thus the IAF enjoyed a kind of local favourable air situation, that
prevailed on own side of the LoC. Even so, PAF F-16 fighters were often seen on
high alert on the Pakistan side. To deter the enemy, the IAF also mounted a
Combat Air Patrol (CAP) when necessary, and provided air defence escort to
most strike aircraft engaged in attacking enemy positions in the high mountains.

Counter Air Operations

The Counter Air Operations (CAO) campaign, as the name suggests, is an
offensive mounted to specifically neutralise the enemy air force’s ability to
‘effectively’ interfere with own surface and air operations by attacking enemy air
assets, such as, aircraft on the ground, operating surfaces like runways and taxi
tracks, fuel dumps and base facilities and is often given primacy39 in planning.
Defensive CAO also known as Air Defence (AD) on the other hand, are
operations undertaken to engage enemy aircraft, Surface-to-Surface Missiles and
 Nature of Air Power 29

UCAVs when these are already on their way to their targets in own territory.
The central purpose is the same: the destruction or neutralisation of the enemy’s
offensive air capability.
In limited wars however, local FAS may suffice, as establishing total air
superiority may not be desirable to restrict the scope of operations. The choice
will naturally depend on the overall military goals and national strategy. It must,
however be remembered, that the risk of enemy air forces interfering with own
ground and air would remain high. In fact, given that modern wars are essentially
limited in scope, time and purpose, air superiority or more correctly a FAS could
well be achieved for brief periods over specific areas, on multiple occasions, without
launching a full-fledged counter air campaign. AD or Defensive CAO would,
however, have to be carried out to protect own valuable assets generally categorised
as Vulnerable Areas and Vulnerable Points (VAs and VPs) from enemy attacks.
Air superiority is not an end in itself but merely an enabling condition, without
which, other important tasks and missions, such as attacks on the enemy’s sinews
of war including its ground forces cannot be undertaken safely and successfully.
As has been said, “With air superiority anything is possible, without it everything
is at risk.”40
Air power is always in great demand; everyone wants it, or more correctly
needs it, and hence CAO are often perceived as the air forces fighting their own
‘private wars’ at the cost of surface forces. Such charges originate from inadequate
understanding of air power and have no basis in fact. The paramount importance
of air superiority cannot, however, be wished away as in one form or the other,
enemy air forces will have to be neutralised/defeated or at least temporarily disabled
from effectively interfering with own air and surface operations. All air force
planning would thus have to be based on this understanding. Air superiority or
freedom from enemy interference acquires even greater salience with the on-going
modernisation of the PAF and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Both China and Pakistan have in the recent past built up their respective air force
strength and technological prowess and pose a formidable challenge. Given that
future conflicts would in all probability be limited in time and space, and hence
confined to local border skirmishes, it would be essential to employ air power
with the sole aim of gaining and retaining initiative. This would require meticulous
joint planning in peacetime and high levels of readiness.

Air Defence
Although air power is best utilised in offensive mode, AD, or the protection of
national air space against enemy attack, during peace and war, is one of the most
important missions of the air force in war and peace. The aim is to deter a
potential enemy from attacking own, or friendly centres of gravity such as: political
leadership; industry; power stations; dams and large irrigation projects; oil
30 Air Power and National Security

refineries; business districts; communication nodes and surface communications;

bridges; choke points; ports; railway yards and networks; nuclear weapon sites;
own military forces and assets and a host of other targets. Airfields, aircraft, radar
sites, army tank harbours, ammunition and fuel depots are some examples of
military targets. It is very difficult, if not impossible, for an air force to provide
adequate AD protection to each of these targets. A study to determine the inter
se priority of all important targets is carried out and VAs and VPs selected. The
selection depends on the importance of the target system, the effect of its
destruction on national morale and war effort, and above all, the degree of
vulnerability to enemy air attack, e.g. its proximity to borders. Once this is done,
a list of the selected targets requiring air defence protection is made and prioritised
and suitable resources allocated. Those in forward areas are deemed more
vulnerable and accorded a higher priority and greater resources. AD operations
comprise four major steps: Detection; Identification; Interception and
Destruction. Each of these is a complex operation and yet vital to successful AD
in war and peace.
In peacetime, there are hundreds of aircraft, mostly civilian and commercial,
that fly in a nation’s air space at any one time, with many foreign commercial and
private aircraft transiting and operating by day and night. In India, as elsewhere,
the air defence control organisation and civil aviation Air Traffic Control (ATC)
networks monitor and control these movements, with the help of static high-
powered radar sets and facilitate their operations, while at the same time, ensuring
that no hostile air activity takes place. These radar stations and civil ATC control
zones called Flight Information Regions (FIR) routinely expect commercial and
other scheduled traffic, to report their position over pre-determined reporting
points, by means of radio or for some years now through automatic ‘transponders’.
Thus, all traffic is technically always under radar surveillance or at least their
approximate position in the air is always known.
If and when a flying object – commonly referred to as ‘track’ – is reported
by the agencies concerned, as not conforming to known predetermined/assigned
routes or movement schedules, the Fighter Controllers at the Air Defence Direction
Centre (ADDC) concerned take immediate action to establish if a scheduled
airline aircraft has veered off its predetermined route, and make an attempt to
identify the ‘track’ by means of radio or Identification-Friend or Foe (IFF)
equipment or any other transponder. It is designated as unknown ‘track’ until it
is identified as friendly, and interception ordered in the event it is declared hostile.
During peacetime, the IAF maintains a number of armed fighter interceptors
on AD alert at its forward airfields and other air bases. These are controlled by
the local ADDC equipped with surveillance and early warning radar sets that
provide cover over the area of their responsibility. If, and when, a hostile ‘track’
is reported, these AD fighter interceptors on alert, are ordered to get airborne or
 Nature of Air Power 31

scrambled in a matter of minutes and vectored on to the hostile ‘track’. The pilots
of these aircraft first try to make a visual identification, ‘show’ themselves by
flying in close proximity if the aircraft is obviously a commercial airliner, establish
radio contact on a predetermined and internationally known radio frequency
and either instruct the offending aircraft to return to its allocated route, or, if it
does not follow these instructions, force it to land at the nearest civil or air force
airbase. In the event that the ‘track’ ignores or refuses to follow these instructions,
permission is sought to destroy it, if and only if, it is engaged in any hostile act.
If it is recognised as a friendly, lost, unarmed or commercial aircraft out of radio
contact or in an emergency every attempt is made to assist its safe recovery. Very
often such scrambles are initiated when scheduled traffic inadvertently strays from
allocated lanes and is assisted to return to its assigned route.
If and when all attempts to shepherd the ‘track’ to a nearby airfield fail, the
ADDC or higher authority approves its destruction, which in peacetime is a
rarity. Even during war, only enemy aircraft, positively identified as such, are
cleared for destruction lest own or friendly aircraft are endangered due to
navigational error, loss of radio contact or other emergencies. Internationally
recognised procedures such as extending landing gear immediately on seeing the
interceptor also help ensure aircraft safety. In war, however, AD alert acquires a
totally different meaning. Here too the most critical task is selection and allocation
of suitable and effective AD elements to meet the incoming threat: AD
Interceptors, SAM defences or AAA, depending on the warning time.

Weapon Release Line (WRL)

The steps enumerated above are invariably followed in peace and war but the
very purpose of maintaining an elaborate AD network would be lost if the enemy
is allowed to cause damage to or destroy own assets with impunity. It is thus
essential that a hostile enemy aircraft is intercepted and destroyed as far away as
possible from its intended target, but definitely well before it is able to release its
weapons. Normally, fighter bombers or ground attack aircraft with first/second
generation weapons have to necessarily fly over, or close to the targets before
they can release their weapons and would usually provide adequate warning if
detected in time. But those with stand-off ranges have to be intercepted at
considerable distances from own air bases or international borders.
In the 1960s and 1970s, when aircraft ranges were very short and the IAF
had very few radar stations, enemy aircraft were detected very late or not at all
and often got away unscathed. Given the far superior ranges and weapon loads
of the current generation fighters, more advanced and sophisticated ground and
airborne radars (collectively known as Air Defence Ground Environment System
or ADGES) and the availability of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control
System) aircraft in the region, forward air defence has become possible. An AWACS
32 Air Power and National Security

aircraft such as the Phalcon-equipped Il-76 can maintain effective surveillance

up to 300 km. This provides adequate early warning to own fighters to anticipate
and position themselves, so that enemy intruders are destroyed, even before they
reach the International Border (IB) or LoC. AWACS also improves detection
capabilities at night, in bad weather and to some extent over mountainous border
areas, if and when, the terrain does not mask the approaching enemy aircraft.
With both Pakistan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in possession of
AWACS aircraft, the next conflict will see a bitter contest for the control of air.

Deep or Strategic Strike

Although strategic bomber operations, as seen above, proved expensive and less
effective in undermining the enemy’s morale and resulted in wanton destruction
of cities and population centres, modern air forces often have to resort to bombing
strategic targets in the enemy hinterland. To diminish the enemy’s war potential,
in the 1971 War, the IAF Canberra medium bombers and Hunter fighter
bombers, targeted Pakistan’s oil refinery at Attock, Mangla Dam and oil depots
at Karachi. Deep or strategic strikes were also undertaken during the two Gulf
Wars (1991 and 2003) and in other wars. Compared to the Allied bombers of
World War II, the fighter bombers or multi-role aircraft of today carry far heavier
and more diverse armament loads of accurate PGM and can also defend
themselves against enemy aircraft by using Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM),
Electronic Counter Counter-Measures (ECCM), and a variety of other means.
Accuracy of bombing also assures destruction of specific targets with little or no
collateral damage, except when the enemy takes recourse to human shield tactics.
There is also much criticism about use of airpower against decapitating strikes
aimed at enemy leadership. In the 2003 Gulf War, for example, the first few air
strikes targeted the building which, according to Allied intelligence, was used by
Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein. Although the site was accurately hit, he had
providentially left the building minutes before the air strike. In the recent past,
there has also been a clamour against the use of ‘drones’ or UAVs by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces in Afghanistan and its eastern border
areas where the Taliban insurgents have routinely taken shelter. Such strikes have
been largely successful and have received tacit approval of the Pakistan government,
but have been criticised in public, for these strikes are seen to be violating the
sovereignty of Pakistan. Be that as it may, the capability of an air force to strike
deep into enemy territory also plays a major deterrent role and is unlikely to be
given up in the future. In fact, advances in technology, such as small diameter
bombs and GPS-aided navigation attack systems will further improve accuracy,
while at the same time severely restricting the area of actual destruction, and in
all probability, become more acceptable if collateral damage is further reduced.
Those inclined to view air power only in the narrow sphere of offensive
 Nature of Air Power 33

support to surface forces, may not easily accept the need to possess deep strike
capability and view such expenditure as wasteful. Today, multi-role combat aircraft,
however, confer this capability without having to maintain dedicated bomber
forces, and offer far greater flexibility to the national political leadership, which
may or may not allow deep strike missions.

Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFO)

Earlier known as Army Cooperation, Close Air Support (CAS) and Offensive
Air Support (OAS) but now called Battlefield Air Strike (BAS), these operations
are aimed at supporting the ground/surface forces (both Army and Navy) and,
therefore, are a vital part of the IAF’s role. With improvements in technology,
increasingly more sophisticated means of Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR), and improvements in target detection and identification,
it is now relatively easier to engage enemy ground targets in close proximity to
own troops.
World War II, particularly the North African campaign, saw rapid progress
in this department. New and innovative ways were found and the reaction time
considerably reduced. Own ground forces usually place pre-planned demands
on the supporting air force units, the previous evening, for execution the next
day. Demands requiring an immediate response from the air force could, however,
be placed as and when the situation so demands. An elaborate procedure was
evolved to vett these demands at the appropriate high levels of army, typically the
controlling Corps Headquarters, where an air force representative was/is always
available for necessary advice. After due vetting, these demands are prioritised
and orders sent to the Army Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) at the air force unit/
station and Forward Air Controllers (FACs) for execution. These procedures
needed secure and fool proof radio/signal communications and very often much
time was lost. When needed, ground attack fighters were maintained on airborne
alert, but this being very costly in terms of air effort and often impractical, a
system called ‘cab rank’ was devised during the Korean War, in which air force
aircraft remained at cockpit readiness and were launched as soon as army demands
were received. Such a system was nonetheless resource intensive and often tied
up precious aircraft on the ground.
The army air cooperation was at its zenith during the North African campaign.
So impressed was General Lord Montgomery, the famous British military leader
(later Field Marshal) with the performance of the RAF that he said, “If we lose
the war in the air, we lose the war and we lose it quickly.”41 The RAF and later
the USAAF successfully attacked German forces in the field, interdicted their
lines of supply and prevented their safe and organised retreat. The spectacular
offensive action of the IAF in decimating Pakistan’s armour in Longewala in 1971,
remains a permanent reminder about how vulnerable tanks or mechanised forces
34 Air Power and National Security

are to air power. Conversely, if these tanks had been supported by the PAF, the
outcome of the battle would have been less one-sided. During the Falklands
conflict in 1982, of the 24 vessels lost or damaged, all but two were destroyed by
aircraft. During the 1991 Gulf War, air-delivered weapons sank all 14 vessels lost
by the Iraqis.42

Effect on Morale
While it is true that the presence of own fighter aircraft over or in close vicinity
to friendly ground forces works as a great morale booster for own troops,
employment of air power to achieve this limited objective is very often wasteful.
History shows that the morale of own ground forces is far more adversely affected
by the presence and activity of enemy air forces over their heads, and it is thus
axiomatic that own air forces relentlessly attack the enemy air forces and prevent
their effective interference with own ground operations. This is because providing
a protective fighter CAP over own troops on a 24-hour basis, would prove
uneconomical and often impossible due to limited resources. With thorough
prior joint planning, however, it would be possible to execute a successful air-
land operation, since every move would be pre-planned and only emergencies
arising from an unexpected enemy attack would require immediate remedial
action by the air force.
To obtain best results from a CSFO campaign, both the army and air force
commanders must carefully plan their operations and regularly review the success
or failure of these plans on a daily, if not hourly, basis. Network Enabled Warfare
today provides secure and reliable communications between the ground and air
component commanders and also an up-to-the-minute battlefield situation
assessment, further easing the difficulties of joint operations. There is today a
surfeit of sensors and channels for flow of information that sometimes leads to
information overload. It is for the air and army commanders to sift the grain
from the chaff and take correct and timely decisions. CSFO, OAS or Battlefield
Air Strike (BAS) operations will continue to form a vital component of offensive
air operations against surface forces.
Some of the important conditions for air power employment in CSFO role
are:
(a) The relative importance and priority or urgency to engage the target
system. Targets that can easily, and economically, be engaged with integral
artillery fire power, should not normally be allotted for BAS by air forces
unless there is a strong reason to do so: e.g. to demonstrate the seriousness
with which the country views enemy action.
(b) Ease or difficulty of target recognition and identification. A small error
resulting in damage or casualties to own troops and equipment can wipe
off all the gains of prompt air action and adversely affect the morale of
troops.
 Nature of Air Power 35

(c) Availability of assistance on the ground, such as FACs to guide the aircraft
on to the target.
(d) Separation from troops, equipment or assets so as to avoid ‘friendly fire’
incidents or fratricide.
(e) Air defence environment and coordination with organic air defence
weapons with the surface forces. History shows that small arms fire can
be very lethal to modern fighters and hence repeated ‘copy book’ attack
patterns from predictable directions must be avoided. Presence of enemy
fighters must be taken into account and suitable escorts or ‘top cover’
provided, even when AWACS are available to give early warning. This is
essential to minimise attrition to air power resources from own and enemy
small arms and AD weapons in the tactical battle area.
(f ) Weather, light and visibility conditions prevailing in the vicinity of the
target area would continue to impinge on the success of BAS/CSFO.
Where possible, recce-pods and electro-optical sensors must be used to
locate and identify enemy targets. A wide variety of multi-purpose missiles
and small diameter bombs and PGMs, such as Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAM), are now available to improve accuracy without
coming within the envelope of Man Portable Air Defence Systems
(MANPADS), such as the lethal Stinger missile that the Pakistani
intruders used in the Kargil war.
(g) Political Direction or Rules of Engagement will finally decide the exact
tactics and weapons of air power employment.
(h) To the extent possible, air power employment should conform to a broad
strategy and knee-jerk reactions or frequent changes in target priorities
must be avoided.
Post-strike damage assessment is vital for assured success and the effect on
the enemy’s plan of operation must also be assessed at all times. Such assessments
must become routine, even during peacetime joint army-air exercises, to correctly
validate own procedures and priorities to further refine doctrine.
Regardless of the scale of conflict, national objectives and security policy/
strategy will naturally play an important role in deciding the level and scale of air
power employment in any future war. The likely enemy response, escalation
control, likely duration and the proposed end state or exit point would decide
the employment of air power. To obtain the maximum dividend, air power
employment strategy must always be aimed at creating asymmetry at the time
and place of own choosing.
The successful employment of American UAVs in what is popularly known
as ‘Drone Attacks’ against insurgents and Taliban fighters along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, has in recent times added a new and efficient dimension to BAS.
36 Air Power and National Security

Even so drone strikes have invited close scrutiny from the legal and ethical
viewpoint. In November 2011, around 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed in an
errant drone attack. Such mistakes proved extremely costly as the clamour for
banning these attacks forced the Pakistan Government to close the NATO supply
route for nearly eight months, until the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
finally rendered a public apology and the supply route opened in July 2012.43

Availability of Forces
At first glance, this might appear self-explanatory, but given the demand for air
power resources in war and peace, the availability and allocation of air effort
often becomes a contentious issue. In a vast country such as India, that regularly
faces natural calamities, civil unrest and incidents along the volatile borders with
its neighbours, the air force is always in demand. In war too, the tasks of providing
air defence, achieving at least a reasonably benign or favourable air situation and
undertaking effective CSFO can often stretch air resources to the limit. It is,
therefore, imperative that the control of air power resources is kept at the highest
practical level. Notwithstanding the pressure under which airmen may have to
work, they understand and relate to soldiers and sailors and indeed paramilitary
forces and empathise with the difficulties they face and hence are always prepared
and eager to provide all kinds of support. Be it fire power or food, heliborne
support or search and rescue, airmen will always find ways to provide it, in time,
every time and right till the job is done. Airmen inherently understand joint
warfare and always are an important and integral part of it.

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)

This operation is primarily aimed at cutting or disrupting the enemy’s lines of
supply, by directly targeting the transport systems such as railway lines, trains,
loco-sheds, road and rail bridges and military convoys. An essentially tactical
operation, its effectiveness depends on accurate intelligence and timely execution
and requires a close understanding of the army’s operational plans.

Air Space Management

In a conventional war scenario, the airspace over the battlefield is likely to be
cluttered with a variety of flying objects including army and air force helicopters,
low-flying high-speed fighters going to and returning from targets in enemy
territory, a dense barrage of long-range artillery shells, and above all, enemy fighter
bombers attacking own/friendly targets. Such dense traffic will inevitably make
the task of providing air defence and identifying hostile aircraft extremely difficult,
necessitating a highly reliable air space management system with dependable fail-
safe communications.
For effective employment, modern air power is increasingly dependent on
Space-based assets such as navigation, reconnaissance and communication satellites
 Nature of Air Power 37

and is now inseparable from Space. The current nomenclature ‘aerospace power’
is thus more appropriate. In this study, the subject is discussed in a separate chapter.

Air Transport Operations

These involve the carriage of ground troops from one theatre to another and
sometimes also within theatre. Both fixed wing transport aircraft and medium
or heavy lift helicopters are used for this task. With the recent induction of the
Hercules C-130J and Globemaster C-17 aircraft, the IAF can provide strategic
mobility over considerable distances when required. The Mi-17 V5 and the soon-
to-be-inducted Chinook troop lift helicopters will further enhance the IAF
capability to airlift troops and equipment to less accessible areas in the mountains.
The IAF has for over 50 years regularly air maintained troops and civilians
deployed/resident in the forward areas, an operation unique in its scope and reach.

Airborne Assault
These operations involve the air dropping of assault troops on the intended target
by means of parachutes. The Indian Army maintains a Parachute Brigade trained
for this task which regularly exercises with IAF transport aircrews. It is available
on call even during peacetime, in a matter of hours, as demonstrated in 1988,
when India sent a battalion plus of the assault troops, to help the Maldivian
President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, when his government was threatened by a
coup.

Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO)

Heliborne assault falls in the same category except that in this case troops are
transported by helicopters and either land on, or near the target, or slither down
a rope with the helicopter hovering above the landing site. This type of operation
is usually resorted to when commandos or Special Operation Forces are employed
to raid or capture enemy hideouts and similar targets.

Casualty Evacuation (Cas-Evac)

As the name suggests, helicopters are very frequently employed in this role in
peacetime and have on numerous occasions saved precious lives. Combat Search
and Rescue (CSAR) operations, are aimed at rescuing downed pilots and other
personnel from enemy territory, or high threat areas. The USAF has routinely
mounted these operations, usually under fighter cover, and successfully retrieved
many downed aircrews from enemy territory. These operations are obviously very
risky and demand thorough planning and close coordination with fighter and
other elements.

Air Power in Perspective

For all its ubiquity, flexibility and reach, air power should never be seen as a
38 Air Power and National Security

panacea for every situation. Air power assets will always be in great demand and
therefore, the tendency to employ them simply because these are idling on ground
must be checked. As we have seen, gaining control of the air is undoubtedly a
vital task, but it is only an enabling condition. Once achieved, the condition
must be quickly used to prosecute other military tasks and missions, or else the
effort would be wasted. Simply carrying out medium- or high-level offensive
sweeps to entice the enemy to give fight might prove, though temporarily, that
the enemy is reluctant to fight, but he may in fact, be waiting for a more
opportune moment to strike at more important and vulnerable targets.

Full Spectrum Dominance

As the name suggests, this concept aims to achieve total superiority over the enemy
in land, air, maritime, space, cyber, economic, political and strategic domains –
a somewhat ambitious objective for even the lone superpower. Most modern air
forces, including the IAF, have been trying to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance,
or are at least hoping to achieve a very high level of dominance in all spheres.
China’s 2004 Defence White Paper also specifically mentions Command of the
Air as an important objective of future wars. Galloping technological advances
are perhaps driving such thinking. While this concept, first propounded by the
USAF in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert
Storm), is essentially aimed at achieving such dominance, using all the three
branches of the military, air power is seen as being a vital enabler, if not the most
decisive player.
Air power is attractive because it can be launched, called off or withdrawn,
its intensity calibrated in order to punish, show resolve or intention, deter and
reassure allies, or quickly achieve the immediate objective. Cohesion and clarity
of thought are necessary for effective employment of air power. Its inherent
offensive nature requires that it be used with relative freedom of action. A purely
defensive approach to air power employment does not pay dividends. To derive
the maximum shock effect, it must be unleashed like a torrent and not in small
doses. In the 1999 Kargil war, IAF aircraft were not allowed to cross the LoC.
While this gave India some diplomatic dividends, it constrained air power
employment, as it was not easy to manoeuvre high-speed fighters at high altitudes,
while carrying out precision attacks. Pakistani Stingers near the targets, and PAF
F-16 fighters waiting on the other side, made the task even more difficult. In the
future too, air power might have to be used with such strict Rules of Engagement,
but in that case less than optimum results will have to be accepted.
Relentless offensive action is designed to put the enemy on the defensive and
any signs of the offensive action slowing down, will allow the enemy to recoup.
War is a contest of will between the opposing sides. It is only this will to fight
that sustains a nation’s war effort. Even when a country follows a defensive strategy,
 Nature of Air Power 39

if war becomes unavoidable, the only way an aggressor can be checked in his
tracks is by immediately going on the ‘offensive,’ without which the enemy cannot
be deterred, or prevented from launching more damaging offensive strikes by
land, sea or air. In sum, a purely defensive approach aimed at minimising the
effects of the enemy’s attacks, can never be successful, even if defensive measures
cause some attrition to enemy forces. This is simply because the initiative remains
with the enemy.
Air power is essentially offensive. Its special attributes can only be fully
exploited when used as an offensive weapon. Even in defence, the spirit of its
employment must always remain offensive. Since no air force, however powerful,
can guarantee total and complete safety and security from enemy air forces, own
VAs/VPs including ground forces in the field have to be protected. Effective air
defence thus becomes equally important. Depending on the state of its
technological capability enemy air force can in a single attack cause catastrophic
damage. It is, therefore, imperative that while strengthening air defence, our air
force mounts an offensive against enemy air forces at the first available opportunity,
and compels them to gradually go on the defensive.

NOTES
1. P.C. Lal Memorial Lecture, delivered at the Air Force Association, New Delhi on April 2,
2012.
2. RAF AP 3000 Fourth Edition, HMG, 2008, p. 13.
3. US Army Air Force (USAAF) was, at that time, not an independent service.
4. See no. 2, p. 7. As we shall see later, ‘air and space power’ or ‘aerospace power’ are more
appropriate terms to describe current and future air power thinking.
5. Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, Air HQ New Delhi, 1995, (amended 1997), p. 28.
6. See no. 2, p. 15.
7. For example, at Kunduz in Afghanistan, a marriage party was wrongly targeted by a NATO
fighter, killing a large number of innocent civilians.
8. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal, My Years with the IAF, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986,
p. 32.
9. “Red Flag at Nellis: The Indian Air Force in the Big League”, Vayu, New Delhi, (5), 2008,
pp. 40-47. The Indian contingent also maintained aircraft serviceability of 95 per cent.
10. The IAF is slated to induct some ten C-17 heavy transport aircraft for strategic mobility.
Gareth Jennings, “India receives its first C-17”, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 50, Issue 25,
p. 17.
11. Elliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of US Air Power”, Foreign Affairs, January-February 1994,
at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49442/eliot-a-cohen/the-mystique-of-us-air-
power(Accessed September 10, 2014).
12. Winston Churchill as quoted in, Andrew G.B. Vallance, The Air Weapon: Doctrines of Air
Power Strategy and Operational Art, St. Martin’s Press, London, 1996, p. 23.
13. ‘Uttarakhand faces flood fury’, Times of India, June 16, 2013 and other news reports.
14. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, p. 36.
15. Due to delivery delays and cost of refurbishing the Gorshkov, costs have escalated.
16. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12. This comment was made in 1995. Costs of air power have
further climbed in the last two decades and in India’s case the rise is likely to be much
steeper due to the falling rupee.
40 Air Power and National Security
17. For those mathematically inclined, the formula for airplane lift L produced by its movement
through the air is given as L= c1 ½ρv2 s, where c1 is the coefficient of Lift, the Greek letter
ρ (rho) denotes air density, v the true air speed and s the surface area of the aerofoil.
18. The Royal Aeronautical Society Air Power Group Paper on the issues and lessons arising
from the 2011 Libyan Air Campaign, at http://aerosociety.com/Assets/Docs/Publications/
SpecialistPapers/LibyaSpecialistPaperFinal.pdf (Accessed June 25, 2012).
19. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no.12, p. 2.
20. Ibid., p. 2.
21. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, p. 3.
22. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
23. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, p. 4.
24. After whom the famous French Open Tennis tournament and tennis courts near Paris are
named.
25. A.D. Harvey, “Air Power History”, Fall 2000, at http://weaponsandwarfare.com/
?p=2126#chitika_close_button, (Accessed July 19, 2013).
26. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, pp. 6-7. Information in this and the previous paragraphs is
from Andrew G.B. Vallance. The long quote is given intentionally to show that the debate
over the primary role of air power is nearly century old, but even today both sides seem to
stick to their stated stands with equal enthusiasm, if not ferocity. As we shall see later, most
air forces including the IAF have opted for a balance that confers on them the ability to
conduct all types of aerial operations with equal ease, depending on the situation.
27. A.D. Harvey, no. 25.
28. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no.12, p. 7.
29. Ibid., p. 11.
30. Quoted in Ibid., p. 9.
31. Ibid., p. 10.
32. Churchill’s historic address to the House of Commons on August 20, 1940.
33. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, p. 67.
34. Desmond Young, Rommel: The Desert Fox, William Collins and Sons, London, 1950, p. 303.
35. Ibid., p. 281.
36. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, p. 12.
37. Ibid., pp. 11-15. Most of the statistics provided here are from Andrew G.B. Vallance.
38. Karl Mueller, “Air Power”, RAND Corporation Report, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/reprints/2010/RAND_RP1412.pdf, (Accessed November 15, 2011)
39. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no.12, pp. 62-85. He gives CAO the status of primus inter pares or
‘first among equals’.
40. Maj. Gen. Charles D. Link, USAF, “The Role of the US Air Force in the Employment of
Air Power”, in Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds.), The Future of Air
Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,
1992, p. 83.
41. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, p. 15.
42. Andrew G.B. Vallance, no. 12, p. 87.
43. “Pakistan ends dispute over NATO supply routes after Hillary Clinton apology” at http://
www.the guardian.com/world/2012/jul/03/Pakistan-dispute-nato-hillary-clinton. (Accessed
October 4, 2012).
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 41

3
Evolution of India’s National
Security Practice

Two events that occurred almost immediately after India became independent
on August 15, 1947 – the Pakistani invasion of India in the northern state of
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 – have
shaped India’s national security discourse for over 68 years. The tragedy is, that
after all these years and all our efforts, the two problems remain unresolved. In
addition, India has also been facing challenges to its internal security in the form
of separatist movements, terrorism, insurgencies and Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)
for nearly the same length of time, and our exertions to lessen their impact have
so far met with only mixed results. The long colonial experience, the over half a
century long freedom struggle, the six year long World War II and the atomic
bombing of Japan were the other major influences that shaped India’s view of
the world and hence its security and foreign policy.
Since independence, India has fought five wars and except the 1971
Bangladesh liberation war, none was decisive. In the one with China, India was
roundly defeated. While Indian leaders have constantly made attempts to make
peace with neighbours, these have been largely unsuccessful. Despite this, India
has successfully fought many challenges to its democracy, through largely free
and fair elections and has preserved its national unity and integrity. The stark
reality of India’s security situation is that even today, there is no guarantee that
peace will prevail.
By virtue of its long civilisational history, size, geo-strategic location at the
head of the Indian Ocean, natural resources, vast population, industrial capacity
ably aided by a large pool of highly educated and experienced technologists,
42 Air Power and National Security

engineers and other professionals, India has always been an important country,
even when weak. It was for its immense potential that the British colonial masters
called India the ‘jewel in the crown’ and used its attributes and strengths to rule
and even extend their sway over large parts of Asia. Even if it did not always
enjoy a major place in the comity of nations, it could never be ignored and hence
India is not ‘recently important’ as some observers would have us believe.1
Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India at the turn of the 20th century,
had no doubts about its importance and vital place in the British Empire when
he said:
India is the pivot of Empire, by which I mean that outside the British
Isles we could, I believe, lose any portion of the Dominions of the Queen
and yet survive as an Empire; while if we lost India, I maintain that our
sun would sink to its setting.2
Addressing the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949, Nehru echoed
similar sentiments when he said:
Look at the map. If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle
East, India inevitably comes into the picture. If you have to consider any
question concerning South East Asia, you cannot do without India. So
also with the Far East…whatever regions you may have in mind, the
importance of India cannot be ignored…

…So the point I wish the House to remember is this: First of all, the
emergence of India in world affairs is something of a major consequence
in world history. We…in the Government are men of relatively small
stature. But it has been given to us to work at a time when India is growing
into a great giant again. So, because of that, in spite of our smallness, we
have to work for great causes and perhaps elevate ourselves in the process.3
K. Shankar Bajpai strategic thinker and foreign policy expert also holds similar
views:
Given that India is endowed with many advantages: We had one of the
world’s five largest armies, ranked tenth in industrial capacity, despite the
terrors and strains of partition we had a strong administrative structure,
a pool of exceptional talent – and incidentally – no foreign exchange
shortages, we were more powerful than is even now realised.4
India also had a plethora of dedicated and sagacious leaders moulded in the
crucible of the long and arduous freedom struggle. In view of this, it is perhaps
natural for us to wonder why India was not able to address its security challenges
in a more robust and decisive manner. Has India done the best that it could in
the circumstances? Could it have done better? Has it lost some opportunities?
Could things have been done differently? These are some of the questions that
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 43

this chapter attempts to answer. Here we will also try to glean possible lessons
that may help guide future generations to avoid the pitfalls of the past. Before
tracing the evolution of India’s national security narrative, however, a very brief
overview of some relevant definitions and theories related to International
Relations (IR) and security is considered useful.

Definitions
The term security can be defined in many ways. The more commonly cited
definition by Walter Lippmann is: “A nation has security when it does not have
to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to
maintain them by war.”5 Stephen M. Walt believed that, “the main focus of
security studies…is the phenomenon of war...Accordingly, security studies may
be defined as the study of the threat, use and control of military force.” According
to Patrick Morgan, “it is important to confine the concept of security to physical
safety from deliberate physical harm inflicted intentionally, i.e., across national
boundaries. Barry Buzan opined that: “[Security is] primarily about the fate of
human collectivities...about the pursuit of freedom from threat. [The] bottom
line is about survival, but it also includes a substantial range of concerns about
the conditions of existence...Security...is affected by factors in five major sectors:
military, political, economic, societal and environmental.” To Ken Booth, “the
key concept in talking about security is emancipation. Emancipation means
freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out what freely
they would choose to do, of which, war, poverty, oppression and poor education
are a few.”6
Of the definitions included above, the ones by Lippmann and Walt focus on
war and military force, whereas those by Buzan and Booth are more inclusive
and all-encompassing. In the case of a developing country like India, which was
economically weak, and even today has a large portion of population living in
poverty, Buzan’s view seems more appropriate.
Another scholar, Pierre Jacquet says: “[T]he relationship between international
economics and political and military affairs is a major determinant of the
international order” and is thus linked to the concept of security. “Security is
most commonly defined in a negative way, as a state of freedom from danger,
damage and injury (can we include want?). It represents a state or a sense of
safety.” He adds: “Many actions and policies can be justified in the name of
security. An important aspect is its double meaning semantically: the objective
sense refers to the absence of threat or the ability to successfully resist a threat; the
subjective or speculative sense refers to the degree of fear. From both these
meanings, it appears that security as a concept is linked intricately to
interdependence: both threat and fear are related to the behaviour of others, which
44 Air Power and National Security

may itself be influenced.” Further: “National security can be defined as the

protection and preservation of national core values against predatory behaviour
of other nations either by deterring aggression or by war; without having to sacrifice
one’s values or by victory should aggression occur...Security rises and falls with
the ability of a nation to deter an attack or to defeat it. Pre-emptive wars can also
be engaged for security reasons. Hence, from a national point of view, security
cannot be defined by the absence of war or by commitment to peace. Clearly,
given this definition, national security can be threatened by international inter-
interdependence. Dependency is a source of vulnerability – oil, food, strategic
commodity; dependencies always have a national security dimension. Sanctions,
embargoes, blockades are designed to exploit these vulnerabilities to punish or
influence behaviour.”7
In the early post-independence period in India, the terms defence and security
were often used interchangeably.8 These terms in a sense focus on the three main
objectives of a nation-state (since despite many threats to its primacy, the nation-
state has been and will continue to be the main entity to regulate the affairs of
mankind), the safeguarding of national sovereignty; protecting territorial integrity
and economic and political independence to pursue the national goals of social
and economic development; and in India’s case, promoting values of non-violence,
peace, equality, justice and fraternity for the well-being of all.
In fact, all these goals form part of the Preamble of the Indian Constitution
and hence K. Subrahmanyam called it the tenet of India’s ‘grand strategy’ when
he quoted the oath taken by the Members of the Constituent Assembly on August
15, 1947:
At this solemn moment when people of India, through suffering and
sacrifice have assured freedom, I, a member of the Constituent Assembly
of India, dedicate myself in all humility to the service of India and all her
people to the end that this ancient land attains her righteous place in the
world and makes her full and willing contribution to the promotion of
world peace and welfare of mankind.
This oath, he goes on to say, implied that India would work for [the]
promotion of world peace not for its own glory and aggrandisement; India would
work for the welfare of mankind, including the welfare of its own population
and it would attempt to take its rightful place in the world, by developing itself
to the standards of advanced nations of the rest of the world.9
In fact, India as a result of the success of its mostly non-violent freedom
struggle, became a beacon of hope for other colonies in the immediate aftermath
of World War II; and Nehru’s policy of remaining equidistant from the two
emerging power blocs, or non-alignment, that aimed at friendship with all
countries without joining either of the two blocs that were then coming into
being, helped India play a significant role in world affairs.
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 45

As Shivshankar Menon, former National Security Adviser (NSA), stated

during his address at the Cariappa Memorial Lecture:
There is no question that in Nehru’s time we were punching above our
weight, measured strictly in realist balance of power terms. This was
possible because of the strategic space that the Cold War opened up for
us, and because of the eminent good sense and reasonableness of what
Nehru was doing and advocating. During the fifties, India stood higher
in the world’s (and her own) estimation than her strength warranted.
During the sixties, the reverse was the case. After 1971, there has been a
greater correlation between India’s strength and prestige, and this seems
likely to continue for the foreseeable future.10
Political realists believe that the world is an anarchy where each individual
nation-state is by design always jockeying for power, in order to maximise its
interests and hence conflict is inevitable. Muthiah Alagappa citing Kenneth Waltz
also says:
Realists depict international policies as a realm of power struggle, and of
accommodation. This pessimistic view flows from another of neorealism’s11
core assumptions, ‘anarchy’, and the logic that it is deemed to imply. In
the neorealist view, the international system, populated by sovereign states,
must necessarily be decentralised and anarchic. In the absence of a central
authority, each state retains the right to judge ‘its grievances and ambitions
according to its own dictates or desire’, and to decide on the use of force.12
Security is, however, not absolute because one state’s security can be another’s
insecurity or danger. It is therefore, incumbent on each state to ensure that in
trying to guarantee its own security, it does not jeopardise its neighbour’s. The
reality of international politics is, however, very different. Without entering the
quagmire of numerous IR theories,13 for our purpose, it suffices to say that power
politics is inevitable and unavoidable. The norms of behaviour and cultural and
civilisational values no doubt play an important role in international relations,
but a nation-state cannot overlook its own well-being and interests while trying
to work with others.

Evolution of India’s National Security Thinking

Shivshankar Menon said:
Realists believe that in an anarchic international system power rules the
day. They also assume that states, like individuals, are self-interested
rational maximisers. Uncertainty is rampant, information is always
incomplete, and opportunism is always possible in international society.
As a result, states have little choice but to defend themselves…
46 Air Power and National Security

He went on to add:
[T]he only effective sanction is force or the threat of its use, and the
willingness of those who possess it to use it. In other words, while domestic
societies have evolved or are evolving towards rule of law, international
society is still much closer to primeval anarchy, where to a very great extent
‘the strong do as they will and the weak do as they must’.14
This public and candid articulation by a high ranking Indian government
functionary, on the role of force in international affairs, is a relatively new
development and a refreshingly welcome change, since in the past, Indian officials
have generally avoided such candour.
After lauding the role that India played in world affairs, for instance, Korea
(1953), Vietnam and Laos (1954), Gaza (1956) and Congo (1961), K. Shankar
Bajpai, alluding to Nehru’s views of India’s role cited above, says:
India was constantly in the lead both to reduce the possibilities of world
war and structuring of a world order. Yet, without belittling in the slightest
what we tried for and what we contributed, we must acknowledge that
we did not become of that ‘major consequence in world history’, much
less the ‘great giant’ which we expected and which our size, situation,
resources and talent ought to have made us. And the reason lies in our
difficulty in coming to terms with the role of power in world affairs.
He goes on to blame our ‘inwardness’. “Both as a people and as a state, we
have throughout history been a world unto ourselves.”15 He highlights how the
world has always sought us out, but we have hardly ever looked outwards.
From being an object of power, our British rulers made us a base of power,
which enabled them to exercise their control from Suez to Singapore,
which we opposed; and as we assumed charge of our destinies, our historic
isolationism resumed charge of our approach to the world.
He substantiates this seemingly harsh charge by recounting the story:
In the late fifties, as Britain withdrew from the Persian Gulf area, they
relinquished Gwadar which though on the coast of Baluchistan, was for
some reason administered from Muscat and Oman. The latter enquired
if we (India) would like to buy the place. We would not even think of
the possibility. We also, more famously, agreed to withdraw the Rupee as
the currency of the region; with the Gulf region’s oil development, it was
probably only a matter of time before the rupee would cease to be relevant
there, but the strategic advantage of acquiring Gwadar simply would not
enter our thinking.

Two other formative influences, reinforcing this inwardness arose from

our freedom movement: anti-imperialism and pacifism, meaning both
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 47
non-violence and an innate inclination to work for peace. I do not think
we should ever claim to be holier than others in these respects; the needs
of the state drove us to the use of force soon enough-Junagadh, Hyderabad,
Kashmir and later Goa, were cited gleefully by our critics as mocking
what we professed, but apart from justification of necessity, these cases in
no way lessened the very profound belief that power, especially military
power, was the cause of evil.16
In another case of missed opportunity, when the British withdrew from the Indian
Ocean in 1976, India also did not try to get access to the fully developed airfield,
from where Royal Air Force (RAF) V-bombers routinely operated, at Gan situated
at the extreme southern tip of the Maldives archipelago, something India could
have easily done in the more benign circumstances of the period. India now has
some kind of a security cooperation arrangement with Maldives and has gifted
the island nation a ship and a few helicopters to fight terrorism and piracy, but
it is not known if India has plans to request Maldives for the emergency use of
Gan airfield. Being situated at the southern end of the Maldivian archipelago,
Gan is like a veritable large aircraft carrier some 800 km in the Indian Ocean; a
major strategic asset.

The Security Discourse

Right from India’s independence, its political leaders and other decision-makers
have clung to the belief that India is somehow different from the rest of the
world and hence, can strike out on its own unique path. In reality, India was
every now and then, forced to accept the reality that without the willingness to
use its power, its options were severely restricted. India tried to maintain friendly
relations with established powers and even looked for their assistance when the
need arose, mostly without discarding these shibboleths of India’s eternal quest
for global peace, disarmament and non-violence – and often invited derisive
comments. Even so, because of its unique security practices, no country, barring
a few of its immediate neighbours, considers its rise as a threat to regional or
world peace.
The habit of tolerance, developed by Indian philosophy and tradition was,
and is, one such important factor that has played a major role in its security
practice. By tradition, the Indian outlook is pluralistic. Indian thought has never
insisted on one particular form of the truth. This tradition explains India’s stress
on non-alignment and peaceful negotiations. According to A. Appadorai, “This
tradition has made the Indian people react instinctively against the claim of
Communism to embody the sole truth, and likewise prevented them from
regarding Communism with as much disfavour as the anti-communists do.”17
Another belief stemming from history was the importance of means to achieve
ends. Although Kautilya, the well-known political thinker of the fourth century
48 Air Power and National Security

BC, did recommend that a policy be judged by the results it produced (he was
an early Realist!), Indians do not seem to have accepted it as a norm. Suffice it
to say that traditional ancient Hindu thought substantially influenced Indian
policy-makers. The desire to get world opinion in India’s favour is also rooted in
Indian history. Appadorai narrates a story from Mahabharata in which he attributes
a statement to Lord Krishna who said, “Even if he (Lord Krishna) did not succeed
in his mission to avert war between the warring Kauravas and Pandavas, it would
b useful to show the world that they were right and Kauravas wrong.” 18
Throughout India diplomacy of the last six-and-a-half decades, the influence of
Indian thought is clearly discernible even if it is not always acknowledged.
India’s security edifice, it seems, was built on lofty ideals, and a misplaced
notion, that its intentions to peacefully coexist with its neighbours would
automatically be reciprocated in full measure. There is thus a strong tendency to
delay the consideration of use of force until the very last moment. This has been
an enduring feature of India’s security management. Such procrastination on moral
and ethical grounds has often cost India dear, both in men and material. What
were the other reasons for India to strongly oppose the resort to force in
international relations? The experience of the two long and devastating World
Wars no doubt weighed heavily on the makers of modern India. To be fair, they
attempted to maintain peace at almost any cost and did not, and even today, do
not care if the world reads this as hypocrisy or even timidity. Nehru’s unshakeable
faith in Asian solidarity and ‘Third Worldism’ also played a role in his preference
for a pacific resolution of disputes.19
Mahatma Gandhi’s belief in finding a solution to conflict in which neither
party suffered significant lss, was also instrumental in shaping India’s policy in
Korea and later, in Indo-China. Indianleaders saw a great opportunity for a non-
aligned India to play such a mediatory role in the then developing conflict of the
Cold War situation. India might nt have always got the credit that was due to its
diplomacy and mediation because of its moral attitude, but there is no doubt
that India consistently believed that,unless an attempt was made to see that neither
party suffered a significant loss, the results of any negotiation would not be stable.20

Grand Strategy and National Power

A grand strategy and articulations of a nation’s values are not sufficient to safeguard
the country’s interests; for that the country has to formulate a national security
policy. Further, a well thouht out and formulated security strategy and the
willingness to build and use national power are also equally essential.
National Power can be termed as the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and
intangible resources, which normally include its demographic, economic,
industrial, geo-strategic, ideational and miltary strength, to influence the
behaviour of other nations, whether friendly or hostile, and to protect its own
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 49

interests when the need arises. National Power, however, is not merely the sum
of its capabilities, but becomes manifest only with strategic purpose, national
will and resolve to actually utilise these strengths to safeguard its national interests.
The nation’s self-image, often decides its behaviour and responses to different
situations inside and outside the country. It is only in recent years that Indian
officials and political leaders have begun to stress the desirability of striving for
Comprehensive National Power (CNP). 21 National interests are normally
categorised as the safeguarding of the core values of a nation and include the
physical security of its people, its territory, economic and industrial sinews and
the eneral well-being of society against both internal and external threats. National
security policy is the laying down of norms, guidelines and the framework within
which the nation-state will endeavour to safeguard its national interests. National
strategy, on the other and, is the process of harmonising ends with means. In
other words, strategy would include the ‘how’ of national security policy. National
strategy can be defined asthe art and science of developing and using the political,
economic, military and ideational power of the state to secure its national
objectives. National strategy directs the national effort in the attainment of
national goals and from it flow political, economic and military strategies, each
distinct and deliberate, yet fully synergised. Perhaps, for good reasons and despite
the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, India has not found the
need for a declaratory security policy or ‘red lines’.
In its absence, it is through the statements in and outside the Parliament and
pronouncementsof national leaders, that an ordinary citizen can get some idea of
the general direction of the nation’s progress, principles and decisions regarding
the use or threat of use of force, defence budgets and the size and state of the
armed forces. For instance, according to statements made by the former Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh: “India is interested in maintaining a peaceful
periphery; her strategic frontiers extending from the Horn of Africa in the West
to the Straits of Malacca in the East give an indication of India’s intent”. India’s
accommodative stance was indicated by him when he also said that, “there is
enough space in Asia for both China and India to grow.” In the wake of border
incursions in 2010 he said, “China has, of late, become more assertive and...wants
to maintain a low level of equilibrium with India.” India has also on many
occasions voiced concern about China’s continued support and assistance to
Pakistan in developing its nuclear, missile and defence capabilities. The former
Prime Minister has said that the major if not the sole “aim of his life was to
normalise relations with Pakistan” and also reiterated that the “destinies of the
nations of South Asia are interlinked and the future should bring common
prosperity.” On internal security, Dr. Manmohan Singh said, “The threat of Left
Wing Extremism or that posed by the Maoists/Naxals is the greatest threat to
India’s internal security.”22
50 Air Power and National Security

Shivshankar Menon as NSA, emphasised some aspects of national security.

In a sweeping review of independent India’s history, he said, “India has weight
and influence but needs to develop her power; India’s national aim is complete
transformation; what is needed is ‘jointedness’23 not only between the three services
but also with other organs and departments of the government.” He believes that
“India is as secure as can be.” The establishment of the National Security
Architecture, following the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and the
recommendations which included the establishment of the National Security
Council Secretariat (NSCS), National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Integrated
Defence Staff (IDS), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Technical
Research Organisation (NTRO), are some recent additions but according to
Menon, “this is still work in progress”.24 The question then is what, if any, was
the arrangement until the late 1990s.
In the field of self-reliance in defence, some noteworthy statements of the
former Defence Minister A.K. Antony include, “We will provide the services
with all their needs; it is shameful and dangerous that 70 per cent of India’s
defence needs are met through imports; we need to maintain absolute transparency
in the processes of our defence procurement.”25 He acknowledged that, “there
have been some incursions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) but we have
border management mechanisms that effectively take care of these problems which
arise essentially because of differing perceptions of the two sides, (of the LAC);
we are maintaining peace and tranquility along the borders with China.”26
While somewhat bold and laudable, these statements do not give any
indication about the reality on the ground. These also do not adequately explain
India’s national security policy and its long-term objectives, vis-à-vis resolution
of the outstanding issues with China and Pakistan. India’s security philosophy
and perhaps even its national objectives are at best vague and undefined.
In the absence of a White Paper or an official document, a rough security
narrative can be constructed based on these pronouncements, for further analysis
and discussion.
Despite frequent cross-border terror strikes, there is no mention of the steps
India is taking to address these threats. It is thus difficult to assess if India is
indeed taking any major initiatives or proactive steps, to address the long-term
implications of these threats and challenges. It is safe to assume that the government
departments charged with defence and security, are in fact taking action to mitigate
some or all of these threats, but it is somewhat difficult for an ordinary citizen
to find solace in these assumptions, especially when there is little visible evidence
of success. It is little wonder then that confusion abounds. Pakistan has steadfastly
refused to cooperate with India in bringing the masterminds of the 26/11 Mumbai
terror outrage to justice, in spite of the copious evidence that India has provided.
As a result, seven years after the event that shook the country, there is little chance
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 51

of closure. The lone terrorist caught alive, was hanged, while plans to enhance
coastal security are caught up in grinding bureaucracy.
While there is nothing intrinsically wrong with being a peace-loving status
quo power, inaction cannot be justified. Use of hard power may indeed be
considered with extreme caution, but the employment of legal and diplomatic
instruments alone, to address terror threats seems grossly inadequate. Such inaction
on India’s part appears to embolden the adversary to continue to cause pinpricks
and launch bigger attacks, as in Kargil, when the Indian leadership was seen to
be indecisive or preoccupied with peace overtures. Such inaction and absence of
declared red lines or ‘limits of Indian patience,’ also give rise to widespread belief
that India is indeed deterred by Pakistan’s putative low nuclear threshold.
After 18 rounds of talks between the Special Representatives of China and
India as of February 2015, there is no sign of the two countries coming any
closer to the resolution of the vexed border dispute. China has regularly created
new problems like issuing of ‘stapled’ visas to Indians belonging to J&K and
Arunachal Pradesh, denial of visas to a high-ranking army officer deputed to visit
China on a pre-planned and mutually agreed bilateral meeting, regular incursions
across the borders and provocative actions to test Indian resolve. While some
believe that such events are bound to happen when the country’s borders are
unsettled, an ordinary onlooker tends to see Indian inaction as Indian
pusillanimity. While both India and China have repeatedly voiced the urgent
need to remove mutual mistrust, there is little progress on the ground. This is
despite the rapid increase in bilateral trade, that in 2013 reached $73 billion, but
India continues to face a huge trade imbalance. Two inferences may be drawn:
first, China is in no hurry to resolve the border dispute, as it suits that country
to keep India on the back foot; second, India really has few options to address
these challenges, due mainly to the huge power asymmetry in China’s favour.
India’s defence and foreign policy options have thus been effectively constrained.
It is highly unrealistic to think that India will find quick and lasting solutions
to the inherent internal problems of regional, religious, linguistic, caste/sectarian,
urban-rural, political divides that plague Indian society. Ensuring high economic
growth is also seemingly difficult. The world is simply moving and changing too
fast, and that clearly means India no longer has the luxury of delayed decisions
or inaction. In light of the above, the military is required to constantly maintain
a very high state of alert, a condition that exacts a heavy price on its morale and
efficiency, as training and modernisation suffer.
Several wars and 68 years after independence, there remain some very serious
questions about India’s security. Late K. Subrahmanyam lists defence policy,
nuclear strategy and governance among the three most important strategic
challenges facing India.27 There are two ways in which we can assess India’s overall
performance in the national security domain. The first, could measure it as
52 Air Power and National Security

reasonably impressive. From a poor, backward country emerging from centuries

of foreign rule and colonial oppression, India has made considerable progress in
life expectancy – which has more than doubled (from a mere 27 years in 1947
to over 62 years now); indicators of infant mortality; adult literacy; provision of
power and potable water to an increasingly large section of the population, that
has quadrupled since independence; spreading health and education facilities;
increases in industrial and agricultural output; a fast-expanding and confident
service sector largely based on Communication and Information Technology
(CIT); knowledge and innovative ideas; a steady economic growth of about five
to seven per cent in the last two decades and; above all a thriving democracy,
with regular and peaceful transfer of power to elected representatives by a process
hailed as free and fair; a largely peaceful border, with a strong and modernising
military that ranks fourth in the world; and an economy that is third largest in
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms today. Widespread famine, which regularly
visited colonial India during the nearly 200 year long British rule, has been
completely eliminated even during times of severe drought. Self-sufficiency in
foodgrains to feed 1.2 billion people, in an exceedingly diverse society spread
across a sub-continental sized country, is by any standard, no mean achievement,
and hence deserves all praise.
The second, and somewhat more critical and less charitable way of looking
at India’s performance, gives a different picture. India, it seems, has consistently
under performed in various areas. Even after allowing for some fundamental
differences in their systems, India and China, as recently as in the 1970s, were
categorised as third world countries with generally similar economic indicators,
comparable growth rates and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures. Today,
China’s economy, at $7.3 trillion is four times that of India’s, which is at $1.85
trillion.28 China has rapidly modernised its military and possesses a wide variety
and range of nuclear capable missiles. China today is the second largest economy
in the world and has maintained a spectacular double-digit growth rate for over
two decades, built impressive infrastructure across its vast geographical expanse,
enjoys unprecedented influence across the globe and is now challenging the
established world order, extending its economic, political and strategic reach to
the far corners of the world. An emerging superpower, China claims that its rise
will be peaceful and non-hegemonic, but its territorial claims in the waters of
South China Sea and its ‘string of pearls’ strategy of establishing outposts at
important points of Asian strategic real estate, are already raising concerns, not
only amongst its small neighbours, but even in the US, which has had to review
and revamp its Pacific security infrastructure, in the face of a rising and increasingly
assertive China.
Comparisons, it is said, are odious. To be fair, two totally different systems
and societies with different yet long civilisational histories cannot be easily
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 53

compared.29 India firmly believes that it follows a unique value system, which
lays equal stress on ends and means, is more focused on attaining a just, equitable
and peaceful world order (China says almost exactly the same things) and does
not wish to enhance its national power with any hegemonic intentions. It has
always strongly believed in Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful coexistence
and follows a ‘live and let live’ philosophy.
Soon after its independence in 1947, by adopting non-alignment, India
maintained equal distance with the two blocs during the Cold War confrontation,
did not and still does not approve of military alliances, strives for strategic
autonomy and eschews the use of force, unless it becomes absolutely unavoidable
to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity and socialistic, secular and
democratic way of life.30 While it is one thing to fervently hope for a peaceful
world, a country has to also safeguard its interests, build its CNP, while striving
to achieve ‘just and equitable’ peace in a world that has remained largely anarchic.
India, it seems, has tended to wish away its problems. Yet, as suggested by Major
General Dipankar Banerjee, “Even while acknowledging Nehru’s dynamic global
influence we could not gloss over the reality of India’s many infirmities.”31
Viewed from this practical perch, the record of independent India’s security
practice can also be described as a story of lost opportunities, procrastination, a
complete absence of initiative and, on occasion, extreme caution bordering on
timidity. Grandiloquently founded on principles of righteousness and high-
sounding values, India’s preference for morality in stark contrast to the hyper-
realist approach of its main adversaries, Pakistan and China, appears impractical
and even utopian. Shashi Tharoor argues that, “Nehru immolated India’s interests
at the altar of his ideals: never once was there a mention of India’s national interests,
or an understanding of how they would be served by this messianic
utopianism.”32 These two neighbours have never shied away from stating their
ultimate political objectives. For China, the country’s reunification is a sacred
duty and a core objective. Although directed primarily at preventing Taiwan from
taking the path of unilateral declaration of independence, it significantly also
includes the safeguarding of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Xinjiang and its
claims over the island chains of Paracels and Spratly in the South China Sea and
Senkaku Islands in the Yellow Sea. China’s take-over of Tibet in 1950 brought
this military giant on India’s doorstep, and its policy of allowing the Dalai Lama
and his many supporters to live in India after he fled Tibet in 1959, have together
further complicated the security situation in the Himalayas.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has repeatedly declared that Kashmir runs in its
blood and that it cannot and will not rest until the Kashmir issue is resolved in
its favour. In short, Pakistan wants the whole of Kashmir. With Pakistan occupying
a large chunk of J&K, China leasing a significant part and also illegally occupying
the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, India holds just 30 per cent of the original area
54 Air Power and National Security

of the state under its control. India has not only been a status quo power, but has
consistently failed to even articulate its claims to territories that continue to remain
under illegal occupation of its two neighbours, giving an impression that it is not
serious about these issues.
Due perhaps to India’s vast geographical expanse, its long history of living
under foreign rule and the fact that it has historically faced many major security
threats, there is a general tendency to be somewhat complacent about national
security. India, like an ageing Sumo wrestler cannot be dislodged easily, but it is
agile enough to strike back only when the attacker comes in close proximity.
Whatever India’s claims, the fact is that it has often failed to prevent its neighbours,
especially Pakistan, from incessantly and audaciously staging major invasions,
terrorist strikes and other disruptions which include: hijacking aircraft; fomenting
separatism; aiding and abating insurgencies in J&K and elsewhere; drugs and
human trafficking; circulating counterfeit currency and; actively waging a proxy
war for over two decades. Pakistan has also been the cause of flagrant military
aggression in 1947, 1965 and again in 1999. China has played an equally negative
role by supporting Pakistan, transferring nuclear and missile technology and
making every attempt to strategically encircle India. It seems that by its tentative
and timid approach and often plain inaction, India has left itself open to these
regular and persistent attacks by its neighbours.
In India, the subject of national security regularly creates excitement in the
print and electronic media; where informed citizens evince some short-lived
interest in the subject. There is no dearth of highly qualified and acclaimed
academics and defence experts and analysts in the country and hence national
security comes under close scrutiny; but in the face of total silence from the
government, and an excessively secretive bureaucracy which does not permit access
to official records, there is very little meaningful discussion. Indian universities
produce a large crop of IR theorists, but are often ignored by the powers that be
simply because the political establishment shows no interest in engaging the public
in a security discourse.
The nature of the debate that followed the five nuclear tests in 1998 is
illustrative of the prevailing confusion. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) proudly
claimed that it had merely followed its declared political manifesto, while the
Congress called the tests irresponsible and even reckless, at the same time claiming
credit for keeping the nuclear option open and facilitating research and
development of nuclear science and technology, throughout the long years when
it was in power, from Nehru’s time. It thus, becomes very difficult to attribute
credit or blame to any particular party. The Congress, having ruled India for over
50 of the 68 years since India’s independence, has to take both credit and discredit
for the current state of the country’s security.
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 55

Indians in general, do not take criticism easily and bristle when outsiders,
especially Western commentators, criticise India’s overly moralistic and self-
righteous approach as being hypocritical. India’s pathetic pleading to the US to
supply a full squadron of modern jet fighters with American pilots, when faced
with the Chinese threat in 1962, is often cited as an example of its unrealistic
foreign policy. Indians are also loath to find fault with policies of past leaders,
and do not readily acknowledge even a minor deviation from the hallowed
principles on which India’s foreign and security policy is supposedly based, even
if it has in fact changed in some respects. Thus, recent attempts by India to form
strategic partnerships with multiple states, are also stoutly defended under the
same rubric of strategic autonomy and political independence, even when it is
evident that in a globalised world, even the sole super power is not really free to
do as it wishes.
It is axiomatic that a nation-state has to first clearly understand and carefully
lay down what exactly constitutes its legitimate interests. In the case of India,
these appear to be met if it is generally allowed reasonable freedom to follow its
own chosen path, without too much interference from other powers. Although
India has fought four major wars and two relatively limited conflicts (Sri Lanka
and Kargil), its unshakeable faith in a live-and-let-live mindset underpins its utmost
reluctance to resort to threat or use of force. Critics, however, cite the number of
occasions when India, did in fact use force, as in Kashmir, Hyderabad, Goa,
Nagaland, Mizoram and Sri Lanka and many times against Pakistan, even if it
was to meet an aggression. India has invariably failed to anticipate or initiate
conflict and has hurriedly reacted to an emergent threat only when left with no
other option. In that sense, it is difficult to describe in precise terms India’s
legitimate national interests. Even though, today, repeated and regular infiltration
attempts by Pakistan-based jihadis into J&K and numerous terrorist strikes claim
many innocent lives, India refuses to respond with force.
India’s military strategy also appears to be rather naïve. Right from 1947 and
again in 1950 when another aggression by Pakistan into J&K became imminent,
Prime Minister Nehru declared that any attack on Kashmir would be considered
an attack on India and that India would be free to retaliate at a time and place
of its choosing.33 During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, this became Lal Bahadur
Shastri’s strategy, under which the Indian Army opened a second front in Punjab
to relieve the Pakistan Army’s pressure on Chhamb which, being in J&K, was a
disputed area. In fact, this declaration is the only example of India declaring a
‘red line’ of sorts. It seems India tacitly and implicitly accepts the status of J&K
as disputed, even while claiming that the accession was legal. This shows a mentality
deeply set in territoriality. Statements such as India’s determination to defend
every square inch of Indian territory and launching an offensive across the
International Border (IB) to grab a piece of Pakistani territory, to compel it to
56 Air Power and National Security

accept negotiations, amply prove such a mindset. Little wonder then that
employment of air power to punish the enemy is outside this calculus. This habit
has consistently robbed India of initiative and the ability to shape circumstances
or choice of ‘time and place’ when battle was eventually joined. Kargil is the most
recent example of India fighting a war on the enemy’s terms.
The whole security discourse thus tends to become vague and confusing.
During many interactions with citizens of all ages, the author found a sense of
helplessness and even indifference when he asked about India’s options. “What
can we really do: start another war?” was the response. Not only the lay person,
even the government and regrettably even the army, fail to accept that actions
other than conventional war are possible, even desirable.
On other occasions India has sent its troops, ships and aircraft, on peace-
keeping missions, in response to United Nations’ (UN) calls. In fact, it has often
taken the lead in undertaking UN Peace Keeping Missions in the face of great
difficulties. But these engagements have given India little, besides military
experience in fighting in distant lands, something that its armies regularly did in
colonial times. In the 1950s-60s, the world looked up to India to help resolve
conflicts. Use of force or the ability to quickly respond to emergencies has been
a specialty of the Indian military. Yet, India has endured with great, and somewhat
unnatural stoicism, the almost continuous and increasingly more brazen threats
and attacks from Pakistan, and continues to show extreme reluctance to resort to
use of force, until it becomes inescapable. In short, India never takes the initiative
and is unwilling to chastise its recalcitrant neighbours.
This appropriately portrays the dilemma faced by Nehru. It was thus natural
for Nehru to find a path that would help steer India away from the fast developing
superpower confrontation, and allow it time to concentrate on nation building.
Nehru, however, hedged bets by ensuring at least the support of other countries,
notably Britain, while simultaneously extending moral support to countries that
were fighting British, Dutch and French colonialism in Asia. His somewhat benign
view of the emerging Communist China was also rooted in his strategy of
befriending as many potential rivals and opponents as possible. China’s invasion
of Tibet, so soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic, should have
warned Nehru of the emerging threat on the Tibet-India border. Sardar Patel had
also cautioned him about the Chinese threat on two occasions: first, well before
the Communists came to power and second, when they marched into Tibet.
Even if he did not show it, Nehru was also wary of China. He thought China
would take 20-30 years to fight poverty and acquire the power to become the
Asian hegemon and until that happened he was inclined to cultivate China as a
friend.34 Although the following quote refers to a later period, it is still relevant
in that it gives an idea of how Nehru’s views of China changed with time.
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 57

In his memoir the noted journalist and editor, the late B.G. Verghese wrote:
[T]hough outwardly nothing had changed, Nehru had begun to reassess
his position. According to his son Ashok Parthasarathi, his father, the late
G. Parthasarathi met Nehru on the evening of March 18, 1958, after all
concerned had briefed him prior to his departure for Peking as the new
Indian Ambassador to China. G.P. recorded what Nehru said in these
terms:

So G.P. what has the Foreign Office told you? Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai?
Don’t you believe it! I don’t trust the Chinese one bit. They are a deceitful,
opinionated, arrogant and hegemonistic lot. Eternal vigilance should be
your watch word. You should send all your Telegrams only to me – not
to the Foreign Office. Also, do not mention a word of this instruction of
mine to Krishna (Menon). He, you and I all share a common world view
and ideological approach. However, Krishna believes – erroneously – that
no Communist country can have bad relations with any Non-Aligned
country like ours.35
In a letter to Sardar Patel dated September 27, 1947, Nehru had also expressed
his fears about Pakistan attempting to seize Kashmir by force, and the possibility
that the Maharaja’s forces would be unable to stop the invaders unless a popular
resistance was organised. In a ‘perceptive assessment,’ Ambassador Chandrashekhar
Dasgupta said, Nehru apprehended that Pakistan was making preparations to
enter Kashmir in considerable numbers. “It is obvious to me from the many
reports that I have received that the situation there (Kashmir) is a dangerous and
deteriorating one.” Pakistan, he thought, would do so, when winter snows cut
off Kashmir from the rest of India. Nehru said, “The Jammu route can hardly be
used during winter and air traffic is also suspended. I understand that the Pakistani
strategy is to infiltrate into Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as
Kashmir is more or less isolated because of the coming winter.” Nehru wanted
to secure Sheikh Abdullah’s release from prison so that he could build popular
support of the Kashmiri people to fight the Pakistani infiltrators.36
Despite such premonitions, and intelligence reports, Nehru allowed himself
and India to remain ill prepared to face the Pakistani invasion that finally came
on October 22 (first in the Poonch area and later in the valley); a fortnight after
he wrote the letter to Patel. Some of the major errors of judgment that Nehru
made soon after independence were his excessive reliance on the Governor General
and the three British chiefs of the armed forces (although on occasion he strongly
disagreed with their advice as in the case of the defence of Poonch) who
manipulated India’s defence policy, and indeed the war fighting strategy, to meet
British objectives. All of them enjoyed authority, at least, to render advice based
on their vast war experience, but had no responsibility for the consequences, as
58 Air Power and National Security

none of them were involved in actual fighting. This meant that they could put
impediments in the path of the Indian Army’s offensive plans to throw out the
enemy and recover the lost territories in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). This
not only resulted in India prematurely taking the Kashmir dispute to the UN,
but in reality effectively froze the borders of the state, exactly according to British
plans.
Nehru had on many occasions suspected British designs to freeze the fighting,
when Pakistan was at an advantage and argued and fought with the British senior
officers, but could not prevail against the so-called expert military advice.
C. Dasgupta cites two studies that were done by the British Indian Chiefs of
Staff Committee in Delhi, and by the British Chiefs in London in July 1946.
Both reached the same conclusion: that the discovery of oil in the Middle East
and the advent of air power had changed the strategic picture. India’s vast
continental size, its location at the head of the Indian Ocean and on the route to
East Asia, its almost ‘inexhaustible’ manpower and its rapidly growing industrial
capacity demanded a re-assessment of its geo-strategic value. This resulted in a
notable shift from the naval to the air factor. Britain was thus hoping that India
would remain an active member of the Commonwealth at least in the defence
field, and allow Britain to use its airfields for any military eventuality. In the
event India declined to play an active role, Britain’s second option was to maintain
a presence in Pakistan, a country the Chiefs believed could play a major role in
the Muslim Middle East, and also provide bases to keep a watch on the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and ensure that it was denied air bases in
India. The fulfillment of these British objectives would be ‘improbable’ if India
demanded the withdrawal of all British personnel, including those in the service
of the Indian Government.37 The Congress’s request that Lord Louis Mountbatten
serve as independent India’s first Governor General must have been music to his
ears, as he wasted no time in recommending that in view of the inexperience of
the Indian military officers, India also retain senior British Generals, Admirals
and Air Marshals to head the three arms of the Indian Military. Although
Mountbatten and the British officers did not perhaps know of Pakistan’s plans to
send raiders into the Kashmir valley, once that had happened, the British
personages tried their utmost, and largely succeeded, in preventing India’s borders
from abutting the restive North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Afghanistan,
Xinjiang and controlling the Mangla dam on the Jhelum, that would be like the
Damocles’ sword over the safety of Pakistan, which would now depend on the
West for its defence needs.
It is for this reason, and the needs of the larger British strategy, that the
British officers obstructed every Indian military move: first, the airlifting of its
troops to help the Maharaja; second, stopping the Indian military offensive the
moment its troops reached Uri-Tithwal line; third, preventing the ‘cordon sanitaire’
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 59

from being formed for the defence of the Poonch sector; fourth, strongly protesting
when a young Air Commodore Subroto Mukherjee, permitted IAF aircraft to
chase Pakistani Dakota aircraft transporting supplies to Skardu and Gilgit; and
finally, prevailing upon Nehru to take the case to the UN, when the Indian military
was on the verge of making a breakthrough into the Western reaches of the state
of J&K.
The British Chiefs, gave multiple excuses, India running out of troops being
one of them. When the situation in Poonch became desperate, Nehru suggested
that India plan attacks on the Pakistani bases in the Sialkot sector, which were
supplying the enemy forces opposite Poonch. This suggestion was vetoed by the
British Chiefs for fear of wider escalation. The British Governor General and the
Chiefs ensured that the war between the two dominions was kept at as low a level
as possible and quickly wrapped up, with Pakistan in a distinctly advantageous
position.
The Indian Cabinet very often protested and General Robert Lockhart, the
first Army Chief, was made to resign when he disobeyed the orders of the Indian
leadership, but General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher who replaced him stayed
on for nearly two years, only retiring as an Officer on Special Duty in 1949, and
was largely successful in ensuring fruition of the larger British strategy. Dasgupta
says:
[T]he Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office speculated: If
India falls apart we may, I suppose, expect the Moslems to try and enlist
British support by offering us all sorts of military and political facilities,
to commit ourselves to what would be in effect the defence of one Indian
State against another.
Britain was certainly keeping its options open. Later, on Mountbatten’s
suggestion, Britain even transferred a modern cruiser, the HMS Achilles which
under its new name INS Delhi, joined the Indian Navy to ensure continued Indian
dependence on the services of British naval officers.38 India was thus led up the
garden path but could do little to get out of the British clutches. Later Britain,
especially Noel Baker, the Secretary of State for the Commonwealth also played
a highly negative role in the long drawn out deliberations at the UN.39

India’s Experience at the UN: Lessons

The first Indo-Pak War lasted over 14 months but ended inconclusively with a
large portion of Indian territory remaining in enemy hands. In order to
understand our collective mindset about national security, two issues related to
this conflict need to be highlighted here.
After many unsuccessful diplomatic attempts to resolve the problem, India
took the Kashmir issue to the UN on January 1, 1948. It was a strange situation.
60 Air Power and National Security

Although fighting raged in many parts of the state of J&K, India and Pakistan
were not technically at war. Some Indian army units returned to India post-Partition,
well after the attacks on J&K commenced in October 1947. The British
Commanders-in-Chief of India and Pakistan as well as the Supreme Commander,
Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, who was appointed to this post and was
made responsible to oversee the division of assets between India and Pakistan,
remained in regular contact. Talks on division of assets, funds and equipment
proceeded apace between the two governments, at different levels, and yet there
was no pressure on Pakistan to vacate its aggression in Kashmir. Gandhiji’s fast
unto death had also ensured payment of Rs. 55 crore to Pakistan and relieved that
country to some degree from undue financial hardship. According to K.P. Saksena:
As early as on December 22, 1947, Nehru had written to Liaquat Ali
Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the details of aid and support that
was being given to the raiders by his government and had warned that it
amounted to an act of aggression. Requesting the Government of Pakistan
to desist from providing bases, training and supplies to the tribal raiders,
Nehru warned that if Pakistan did not respond, India would be compelled
to take such action, consistent with the provisions of the United Nations’
Charter, as might be considered necessary to protect her interest and
discharge her obligations to the Government and people of Kashmir.40
In reality, however, these actions remained limited to taking the issue to the
UN Security Council (UNSC). India never really gave Pakistan any ultimatum
nor any threat of full-scale war.
Having failed to receive any positive response from Pakistan, the
Government of India, on January 1, 1948, brought to the notice of the
UNSC that due to the operations carried on against the Indian State of
J&K by nationals and tribesmen of Pakistan, with the assistance and
encouragement of the Government of Pakistan, a situation had arisen
which might lead to international conflict. India reported the matter under
Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter, so that measures might be taken to
end the dangerous situation. The Security Council was requested to ask
the Government of Pakistan to prevent all kinds of aid – official and non-
official – being given to the invaders.41
Pakistan in its reply to UNSC on January 15, 1948 denied that she was
giving any aid to the tribal raiders. She stated that the persecuted Muslims
in the State of J&K had risen in revolt and declared their independence.
It was possible that they had been joined by a number of independent
tribesmen from areas beyond NWFP; by persons from the contiguous
areas of Pakistan who had close relationships with the Muslims in the
State, and by Muslim refugees from East Punjab, who were nationals of
the Indian Union.42
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 61

Pakistan further argued that the invaders were from ‘Azad Kashmir’ [part of
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir] and it did not have control over them. Rather, it
accused India of genocide and getting J&K State to accede to it under duress and
threatening military action.43
On January 6, 1948, the President of the Security Council sent an urgent
appeal to India and Pakistan to maintain the status quo in Kashmir. Eleven days
later the Security Council reiterated this appeal in a resolution which called the
principal parties “to refrain from making any statement or doing…or permitting
any acts which might aggravate the situation.”44 In the four-month debate that
followed in the Security Council, the issue got lost in the miasma of dialectic,
charges and counter-charges. To make its case against India, Pakistan attempted
to widen the scope of the issue under UN consideration. In order to achieve this
and to divert the attention of the Security Council from the tribal invasion to the
communal riots, Pakistan raised many issues of conflict between the two
dominions arising from the partition of the subcontinent which, it claimed,
required UN mediation. Kashmir was portrayed merely as one of the numerous
points of such conflict.45
India on its part also added to the prevailing confusion by alternately changing
its stance. In the first place, it is noteworthy that while India laid charges of
aggression, it brought its complaint not under Article 39 (Chapter VII) but as a
dispute under Articles 34 and 35 (Chapter VI) of the Charter. While the Indian
representative argued before the Security Council that Kashmir was a part of
India, citing the Instrument of Accession as the legal basis for its claim, at the
same time, he also drew the attention of the Council to India’s ‘high-principled
statesmanship’ in proposing a plebiscite to decide the question of accession. (A
direct result of Mountbatten urging Nehru and because plebiscite had also been
considered earlier, in the case of Junagarh and Hyderabad).
Without apparently realising the legal implications involved in his statement,
the Indian representative reiterated time and again, the principle of plebiscite as
the ultimate determinant of the Kashmir issue. The representative stated:
I would invite the attention of the Members of the Security Council to
the high principled statesmanship, characteristic of the Government of
India...In accepting accession, they (The Government of India) refused
to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself
and informed the Ruler that the accession should finally be settled by a
plebiscite as soon as peace had been restored...Plebiscite being conducted,
if necessary, under international auspices.
About the scope of the plebiscite the Indian representative stated:
The question of future status of Kashmir vis-à-vis her neighbours and
the world at large, and a further question namely, whether she should
62 Air Power and National Security
withdraw her accession to India, and either accede to Pakistan or remain
independent, with a right to claim admission as a Member of the United
Nations – all this we recognise to be the unfettered decision by the people
of Kashmir, after normal life is restored.46
India failed to draw express attention to the legal character of the accession
and to stress the fact that its reference to the will of the people, was a decision of
its own government and not part of the acceptance of the ruler of Kashmir’s
accession offer. Again, while India argued that Pakistan had no locus standi vis-
à-vis Kashmir, it also stressed the unfettered right of the Kashmiri people to join
India or Pakistan or the UN as an independent nation. As will be seen later, India
had begun the habit of scoring self-goals. Having made these blunders, India had
no option but to finally stress on the point, that it had offered a plebiscite only
after normalcy had been restored and the territories of the State of J&K had been
cleared of all invaders and since Pakistan continued to illegally possess parts of Kashmir,
India was not obliged to hold a plebiscite – a much weaker argument.
N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a noted lawyer and expert in international law,
was then India’s representative at the UN. It is indeed amazing that even he did
not realise the legal implications of the use of Articles 34 and 35 instead of Article
39. India had itself diluted its case by inadvertently calling the Kashmir issue a
‘dispute’ and not an ‘armed aggression’. One wonders if this was done with a purpose
or was simply an oversight. Could Nehru, also well versed in law, have done this
to take the case to the General Assembly where India could expect a more friendly
response compared to that in the Security Council?
This was not all. India made yet another blunder that in effect gave Pakistan
the locus standi that it did not have earlier. The Security Council never concentrated
on the facts of the case, nor made a distinction between the complainant and the
defendant. On January 17, 1948, after it had heard both sides, the Security
Council, on the initiative of the British delegate, requested its president to hold
discussions with the representatives of the two parties in an effort to find some
common ground on which the structure of a settlement could be built. Three
days later, the president (Belgium) presented a draft resolution providing for a
three-member Commission – one member to be chosen by each party and the
countries so chosen, selecting the third. The principle significance of this draft
resolution lay in the scope of the Commission’s activities. In addition to the
Kashmir dispute, the commission was called upon to mediate on all other
situations raised by the Pakistani representative (note that the initiative came
from the British delegate).
Apart from the substance of the resolution, giving the Commission the right
to look into Pakistan’s complaints, on this occasion, Pakistan scored another victory
of considerable significance. The draft resolution presented by the Council
President had the title ‘Belgian Draft Resolution on the Jammu-Kashmir
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 63

Question’. Pakistan’s representative Sir Zafarulla Khan suggested that the wording
‘Jammu & Kashmir Question’ be deleted. When India’s Gopalaswami Ayyangar
was called upon to express his views, he unsuspectingly, or rather naively, agreed
to the deletion. Two days later when the Security Council met again, the agenda,
in place of ‘Jammu & Kashmir Question’ read ‘India-Pakistan Question’. It was
learnt that the Council President had made the change at the request of Pakistan.
The Indian representative objected to the change of the wording and was supported
by the United Kingdom and the USSR but failed to press home the point strongly
enough, and the Council was prevailed upon to allow the change. This is how
Pakistan managed to become a party to the dispute whereas until then it was only
an ‘aggressor’. This sorry episode clearly shows the utter ineptitude and
thoughtlessness on the part of the Indian representative and more so of the decision
makers in New Delhi.47
Two other disputes arose at about the same time: Junagarh and Hyderabad.
In the first case, Nehru and to some extent Patel too showed reluctance to use
force. Patel, however, was in favour of moving troops as a precautionary measure.
Here again, the Governor General and the British Chiefs played a negative role.
Finally, the Junagarh problem was resolved only when the Nawab of Junagarh
fled to Pakistan, and his Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto was unable to run the
administration of the small state, in the face of a popular protest by the people.
Hyderabad, however, proved a tough nut to crack, with the Nizam trying to buy
a piece of land along the Western coast (in Travancore State), to transform his
state into an independent and viable country. Congress’ K.L. Munshi, who was
sent to Hyderabad, feared widespread bloodshed and communal riots. “The
Razakars and the Communists were colluding; the Razakars ruled by day while
the Communists ruled by night.” Delhi reluctantly began contingency planning
for possible police action. Once again, Lord Mountbatten and General Bucher,
the then Chief of Army Staff, opposed any such move, since in their opinion all
the troops were already committed to other equally pressing tasks in riot-hit
Punjab. Rajmohan Gandhi’s seminal work Patel: A Life notes that Patel replied
to these objections thus:
It is not, in the final analysis, the action of an army which maintains law
and order-look at the Punjab last August when 55,000 men could not
stop the massacres. It is rather the prestige of the Government backed by
potential armed action which keeps the people in order. At the moment
this prestige is sufficiently high to take action against Hyderabad and
maintain order elsewhere at the same time. But if the Government delays
action against Hyderabad much longer, then its prestige will fall so greatly
that no amount of troops will be sufficient for internal security.
When Patel broached the subject of firm action against the Nizam, Nehru’s
reply was recorded by Mountbatten:
64 Air Power and National Security
Pandit Nehru said openly at the meeting, and subsequently assured me
privately that he would not allow any orders to be given for operations to
start unless there really was an event, such as a whole scale (sic) massacre
of Hindus within the State, which would patently justify, in the eyes of
the world, action by the Government of India.
Such response is again indicative of Nehru’s and later India’s extreme reluctance
to resort to use of force for the fear of international reaction.48 He was obviously
concerned about India’s reputation in the eyes of the world. In the event, it was
only after the departure of Mountbatten, that final preparations to move the
army began in earnest, and the so-called ‘police action’ commenced on September
13, 1948, a full 13 months after independence.
Nehru had at different times accepted the necessity to use force, but in a
real-life situation, India was always caught on the back foot. Initially Nehru
dithered and later ended up overreacting. Even when recourse to force was
reluctantly made, it was withdrawn well before the problem was fully resolved
and the consequences are there for all to see even today, especially in J&K.
First, despite a premeditated, blatant and army-supported aggression against
J&K in which Pakistan finally fielded three regular brigades, India showed utmost
reluctance to continue army operations with the same zest after the raiders had
been cleared from the Srinagar Valley, unnecessarily giving rise to speculation
that India (Nehru) was never really interested in recovering the Gilgit and Baltistan
areas of the State of J&K. Nehru took the issue to the UN on Mountbatten’s
advice but failed to correctly gauge Pakistan’s real intentions not just in Kashmir,
but towards India. Mahatma Gandhi was proved right, for he had prophesied
that Partition will give rise to two neighbours in perpetual enmity. On the other
hand, Jinnah having complained that he had got only a truncated and moth-
eaten Pakistan, never forgave India.
Soon Pakistan was again busy plotting against India. During the early 1950s,
a serious problem of a mass exodus of Hindus from East Pakistan raised tensions.
When India asked Pakistan to take urgent measures as Nehru rightly feared a
backlash against Muslims in India, Liaquat Ali Khan flatly denied that his
government was responsible, and said such reports were highly exaggerated. Nehru
visited Calcutta (now Kolkata) and saw for himself the plight of the fleeing Hindus,
and was finally forced to alert the army in the event matters went out of control.
It was only after long and tedious rounds of parleys between the two Prime
Ministers that the Nehru-Liaquat Pact on the treatment of minorities in the two
countries was signed, but that also did not really solve the refugee problem.
No sooner was this matter settled, than Pakistan again raised the bogey of an
Indian threat by resorting to rabid propaganda, this time apparently to frustrate
India’s efforts towards the formation of a separate Constituent Assembly for the
State of J&K. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into the details of this
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 65

episode, except to highlight the need that arose to again alert the Indian army.
This time too, Nehru succeeded in avoiding an armed conflict, but was extremely
reluctant to move an armoured brigade to the border in Punjab. It was only when
senior army officers told him that if the only bridge across the River Beas were
to be destroyed by the enemy, Indian armour would be caught on the wrong side
and would not be able to move to the border, that Nehru reluctantly agreed; but
again cautioned that the troops be kept at a respectable distance from the border
to avoid unnecessary provocation. Nehru said he was determined to avoid an ‘all-
out war’ with Pakistan. It is difficult to understand what exactly he meant by the
term. India, after all, had only recently fought a 14-month-long war with Pakistan
in J&K. Did he fear a war across the border in Punjab and elsewhere? Avoiding
undue provocation is understandable, but this caution was based not on military
but on moral considerations.

The Sino-Indian Border Conflict

One of the most difficult periods when India’s national security policy was put
to severe test was in 1962, when hostilities erupted on the disputed India-China
border. There were many indications of the likely strong Chinese reaction, but
Nehru on the advice of his two very close confidants and advisers – V.K. Krishna
Menon, the then Defence Minister, and B.N. Mullick, chief of the Intelligence
Bureau – convinced himself, against his own better judgement, that the Chinese
would never attack. The ill-equipped, unprepared and poorly supported army
posts on the border proved to be no match for the sudden and full-blooded
Chinese attack in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), but Indian troops in
equally difficult conditions of Aksai Chin fought with grim determination, before
finally succumbing to superior Chinese military power.
The long confrontation was marked by: a fear of Chinese superiority; inability
to decipher Chinese designs; obdurate insistence on India’s version of the legality
of the border; above all, a monumental neglect of the army’s advice and; a
lackadaisical approach to the development of infrastructure in the border areas.
As a result, the army was unprepared to face the Chinese on the border. India’s
forward policy of establishing border posts in penny packets to simply show the
flag, without concern for mutual support (between the adjacent posts) and logistics
backup, proved disastrous. Nehru was also beguiled by his own conviction that
in the event of China attacking India, the conflict would inevitably escalate to a
‘world’ war.
Although there has been much criticism of the army in recent years, not
consulting the army was a major failure. Lieutenant General Thorat’s plan for the
defence of NEFA was never given due consideration, but dismissed out of hand
by Krishna Menon. Later the army’s plans of fighting the main battle in depth,
at Sela, were not accepted, because it was thought that the Chinese troops might
66 Air Power and National Security

enter NEFA and stay put after advancing half-way to the foothills; the dispute
after all was about where the actual ‘border’ lay. While there is some substance
in this apprehension, Nehru and his advisors failed to realise that the Chinese
army could not indefinitely stay in the mountains, when faced with the constant
threat of harassment by the Indian air and ground forces. This aversion to allow
the Indian Army to set up defences in depth, was probably rooted in the grand
but mistaken or unrealistic belief of the political leadership that it had to defend
every square inch of the sacred motherland.
The public declaration to throw the Chinese out of Thagla Ridge probably
proved to be the last straw. This area – where the Chinese strongly believed that
the Indian posts were sited north of the McMahon Line and hence in Chinese
territory – also enjoyed the advantage of height and short lines of supply for the
Chinese. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was also not in the loop, even though its
Canberra strategic reconnaissance aircraft had carried out a few recce missions
and had given much information of Chinese strength and disposition. Once
rebuffed, the Indian Army/IAF leadership did not show much keenness to question
the thinking of the civilian leaders, due perhaps to the prevailing tension between
the military and civilian leadership. P.V.R. Rao, an experienced Defence Secretary,
provides a clue to this state of affairs.
The statements made by the Government on 1962 operations and the
sequence of events as unfolded in the Untold Story by Lt. Gen. Kaul, a
principal participant in those events, suggest that the Chiefs of Staff
Committee was rarely in the picture, that the Joint Intelligence Committee
and the Joint Planning Committee were either moribund or ineffective
and decisions were taken by the Prime Minister with the advice of the
Chief of Army Staff (Gen. Thapar); the other two Chiefs seem to have
been called in only when it was felt their forces may be involved.49
The IAF was not called upon to provide any offensive air support putatively
on the advice of B.C. Roy, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal50 and J.K.
Galbraith, the US Ambassador at New Delhi. Since there have been many
references to the latter’s advice, it would be instructive to briefly summarise the
overall import of Galbraith’s views on the conflict, to which he devotes nearly
three chapters in his diary, the Ambassador’s Journal.51
Galbraith in the above-mentioned book, readily admits to his dislike of
Krishna Menon, as he believed that Menon was largely instrumental in single-
handedly antagonising the US. Galbraith “was afraid that were we too forthcoming
in giving the Indians military aid, he (Menon) would take credit for it.” Although
an academic and a professor of economics, Galbraith appeared to show a markedly
intelligent appreciation of the situation. He says, “In Ladakh, the Indian defenders
fought stubbornly but their performance was blanketed by the disastrous collapse
in NEFA.” Although he was then not entirely sure, in the beginning (on October
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 67

23, 1962) he thought that, “this is not more than a border conflict but it seems
evident that the Chinese intend to take possession of territory that is anciently
their claim and establish themselves before the winter sets in. Then they will
negotiate from this position of strength. They are far superior to the Indians in
arms, manpower and possibly also in determination” (emphasis added).
Galbraith adds, “The Indian Army is without equipment, it is being said,
partly because resources have gone into his (Menon’s) highly advertised supersonic
and transport planes (MiG-21 and An-12) and other gadgets, none of which are
available to the soldiers on the frontier.” In hindsight an unfair assessment but
given the realities of the time, Galbraith can be forgiven for these jibes as he was
after all speaking in America’s interest.
On the Chinese offer to stop fighting, have a summit between Nehru and
Chou En-lai, pull the troops back 20 km from their present position and India’s
rejection of the offer, he thinks it was “rather cynical of the Chinese to take territory
and then negotiate over it.” He believes that except the British, “everybody has
been ambiguous in their support of the Indians.” According to him, “the Canadian
High Commissioner thinks that the Chinese can defend their claim to the Aksai
Chin Plateau in Ladakh; they occupied it for two years before the Indians seem
to have discovered they were there. The Indians might let them have undisturbed
possession (of Aksai Chin) in return for the McMahon Line in NEFA” and then
in a foot note adds, “This is, in effect, what has happened.”
He was also wary “of Pakistan making pro-China noises and the fact that no
fewer than three Indian divisions are being kept along this border.”
President S. Radhakrishnan tells him that proclaiming a state of emergency
is to check rumour-mongering but the actual purpose is to restrain the
Communists from peddling ‘the Pravda line’ to the effect that India and China
should agree on Chinese terms.
Radhakrishnan, was also unhappy at the (American) attempts to placate Ayub
Khan by “leaning on the Indians when they are under Chinese pressure.” (In the
end, the Americans got Nehru to open a dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir.)
Galbraith frankly tells H.M. Patel to tell Nehru that the letter requesting for
aid should “come from him as he is loved in the United States as no one else in
India. The American people would respond to a request from him as they would
not to anyone else.” This should partly explain why Nehru had to personally
write a letter to President Kennedy. The Indian Communists apparently were
carping “[t]hat the US would use the Chinese to attack nonalignment, hitch
India to a military alliance and prolong the war.”
He also speaks of a possible “Chinese threat from the Chumbi Valley,” the
obvious implication being that the eastern parts of India beyond North Bengal
might be cut off. The Chinese presented a new offer on November 8 to move
68 Air Power and National Security

back 20 km from each side of the McMahon Line, leaving the situation as it is
in Ladakh. To Galbraith’s mind, this was another indication of the Chinese wanting
a swap, but the offer was obviously put forward at such a time that there was
little chance of India accepting it.
Galbraith’s diary entries of November 20 and 21 are perhaps the most germane
to this discussion. This was when the Chinese had reportedly taken over most of
NEFA and had on the previous day (November 20) taken Walong in the East
and were shelling the airfield at Chushul in Ladakh. Galbraith while referring to
the expectations on the Indian side said, “They, (the Indians) want our Air Force
to back them up so that they can employ theirs tactically without leaving their
cities unprotected. I am not sure that there is any very useful conception at the
back of this (sic). I would think it would be unwise for them to initiate any air
action.” “Yesterday (November 20) was the day of ultimate panic in Delhi, the
first time I have ever witnessed the disintegration of public morale and for the
first time I began to wonder what the powers of resistance might be.”52
He also tells his staff to arrange a Wing of 12 C-130 Hercules that was needed
and wanted these to begin arriving immediately. It is after these developments
that he speaks of air power employment. In this context Galbraith says:
Meanwhile, on the other side, I affirmed my intention to keep the Indians
from using their Air Force with the associated expectation of our support.
Their air arm is not highly effective. The cities of the Gangetic Plain are
accessible from the airfields of (sic) Tibet. There is no chance that the Indians
could retaliate to China and there is nothing in Tibet. And there is no
technical chance that we could accord them immediately the protection
that Nehru asked. The Indian purpose in putting the Air Force was the
hope that this would stem the Chinese advance. But the Chinese walk
through the woods at night. We learned in Korea that even with complete
control of the air we could not keep them from supplying their forces or
advancing. These considerations were new to the Indians.
It is in light of this paragraph and especially the italicised text that we need
to see Galbraith’s advice.
Thus, it can be surmised that, firstly, the US military and more particularly
air force assistance was contingent on India not using its own air force. Secondly,
Galbraith is right in thinking that the Americans could not have provided any air
support immediately. Thirdly, his contention that cities in the north could be
reached from airfields in Tibet was correct, but he obviously did not know that
the Chinese did not actually have any suitable aircraft in Tibet. Fourthly, he is
right about there being no worthwhile targets in Tibet, but not about the IAF’s
ineffectiveness. It is not known how he formed this opinion, but given that India
was desperate to get substantial US air force support, India had to honour its
part of the deal by not employing air power. In any case, India should have planned
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 69

the use of air power well in advance, and not when the very airfield, at Tezpur,
from where it could have been launched was under the threat of imminent enemy
occupation. He also had talks with Y.B. Chavan, the new Defence Minister, who
he says was in “agreement that Indians keep quiet, win time and be suspicious of
the possibilities of air power. However, he (Chavan) was surprised that it would
take six months to move in American interceptors and two years to create a modern
Indian Air Force.” This, also in this author’s opinion clearly shows the level of
ignorance of the Indian political leadership of military affairs.53
Much has already been written about this sad chapter of India’s history but
it must be reaffirmed that the major, if not the only reason, for so grossly risking
and endangering India’s security was the unfortunate coming together of
important, strong-willed political leadership, Nehru and Menon and an ambitious
senior military officer Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul, who completely
overshadowed the Army Chief and the Chiefs of the other two Services. Kaul
with Menon’s help short-circuited the time-tested processes of defence decision-
making in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The mistrust so created has
unfortunately not completely evaporated even after five decades and has perhaps
got further intensified.
Of all the military actions, the dogged determination to fight the Chinese at
Namka Chu (Thagla) was perhaps the biggest miscalculation. Although Nehru
wanted the army to evict the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge, he wanted the
army to do so only when ready. But since none of the senior army officers except
Kaul had actually witnessed the first skirmish on Namka Chu at Tsenjong
onOctober 10, it was he who had belatedly advocated restraint and withdrawal
from Namka Chu which both the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Thapar and
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) Eastern Command, Sen
did not approve.54
The reluctance of the successive governments to declassify the Henderson-
Brooks Inquiry Report is understandable but has unnecessarily aggravated the
mutual suspicions between the civil and the military. R.D. Pradhan in his book
Debacle to Revival clearly states the motives behind the whole exercise (the inquiry).
Chavan’s appointment of two senior army officers, Lieutenant General Henderson
Brooks and Brigadier P.S. Bhagat to conduct an ‘in-house’ inquiry on the orders
of the then Army Chief General J.N. Chaudhuri, was intended to avoid the report
being submitted to the Indian Parliament, as it was not a Commission of Inquiry.
Chavan also told Parliament, “The enquiry was to carry out a military appraisal
of the debacle and was aimed at drawing lessons for the future. Thre would be
no witch-hunt. The terms of reference were to find out what was wrong with:
our training, our equipment, our system of command, the physical fitness of our
troops, and the capacity of our Commanders at all levels to influence the men
under them. It was also aimed at learning lessons and not to apportion blame,
70 Air Power and National Security

since the major actors, V.K. Krishna Menon, General P.N. Thapar and Lieutenant
General B.M. Kaul had by then left the scene.” According to Pradhan, Chavan
“was also conscious that his first priority was to put the Indian army back in
shape in the shortest time possible and raise its morale. It was not certain when
and where the Chinese would resume hostilities. He was also determined to defend
the Prime Minister, which he had succeeded in doing. After that debate the NEFA
debacle ceased to be a political issue.”
Chavan initially did not share the terms of reference with Parliament and
despite widespread anger of the parliamentarians, only gave a very cursory overview
of the findings of the Inquiry in the Lok Sabha. Pradhan adds, “Contrary to
general expectations, te report did not directly indict any political leaders. It was
done obliquely.” On the lack of proper ‘Higher Direction of War’, the committee
quoted Field Marshal Robert’s dictum, “The art of war teaches us not to rely on the
likelihood of the enemy not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on
the chance of not attacking but rather on the fact that we have made our position
unassailable.” “There was also a suggestion that political directions were not based
on the military means at the military’s disposal”.55 For the purpose of this study,
however, the most significant thing to note is the unfortunate disconnect between
the civilian and military leadership and their failure to even consider the use of
IAF combat aircraft already based in the Eastern theatre at Tezpur and Jorhat.
The year 1962, it is said, was a turning point in India’s military history but the
enthusiasm and excitement that it generated to strengthen national security, proved
to be short lived. While the government made immediate eforts to increase the
strength of the army and the air force it took a long time to procure the necessary
aircraft, weapons and equipment. In an effort to improve civil-military relations,
Chavan started meeting the three Chiefs and the Defence Secretary every morning
and also had records of these meetings maintained; the practice however, soon
fell into disuse, or so it seems from the events of 1965. No effort was made to
institutionalise and formalise the working of higher defence direction.
Another notable event in the immediate aftermath of 1962 was the signing
of the border agreement by Pakistan with China in March 1963 under which, it
leased some 5,000 sq km of land in PoK to China. Although the treaty has a
clause that the final settlement would be subject to the resolution of the Kashmir
dispute between India and Pakistan, for all practical purposes China was gifted
another sizeable piece of Indian territory, with India merely sending a protest
note to both parties.56
China became a nuclear power on October 16, 1964 when it tested the first
atomic bomb; in 1966 its tested the thermonuclear bomb and the necessary
delivery means. Eventually India lived with this nuclear threat for three and a
half decades.
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 71

Indo-Pak War, 1965

Soon after the trauma of 1962, India began a major programme to enhance its
military capability. The IAF received more An-12 transports and Mi-4 helicopters
but it was not before early 1965 that the first batch of 12 MiG-21 supersonic
fighters arrived in India, the licence manufacture of which was to commence at
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) only in 1967. The government announced
short and emergency commissions in the army, and the air force began recruiting
young candidates to increase the strength of its pilots by a record 1,000. Before
India could really complete its military upgrade, Pakistan launched a probing
attack in the Rann of Kutch, in March 1965. By early April, two Pakistan Army
battalions attacked Sardar Post near Kanjarkot with US-made Patton tanks and
heavy artillery. A ceasefire was declared on April 29 with British mediation, but
the crisis was resolved only when an agreement was signed on June 30, 1965.
It has been argued that the Indian Army Chief General J.N. Chaudhuri had
told the government that the terrain in Kutch did not permit widespread
employment of armour, and hence, he favoured a negotiated settlement to this
relatively minor skirmish. The IAF had some Vampires based at Jamnagar and
used them for photo reconnaissance to confirm the presence of Pakistani tanks
in Kanjarkot. This evidence was later used to tell the world that Pakistan was
once again the aggressor. The IAF did not have a base in close proximity to the
area of operations and did not commit its combat elements. Strangely, there were
also rumours of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and IAF Air Chiefs having come
to some understanding to not use their air forces. These rumours were stoutly
denied but the impression, however false – that the IAF was a reluctant onlooker
– remained.57
Even before the dust had settled on the Kutch skirmish, Pakistan began
violating the Ceasefire Line (CFL) in the Kargil sector of J&K and threatened
traffic on the Srinagar-Leh road. The Indian Army took these posts on the CFL
back after hard fighting, but these were returned when another ceasefire came
into effect in less than a month. As expected, Pakistani troops once again began
shelling the road from their positions high in the mountains. The Indian Army
again took back these posts and also the strategically important Haji Pir Pass in
the Pir Panjal mountains west of the Kashmir Valley. But by early August, Pakistan
sent in a large number of armed infiltrators into the Valley, with the hope that
a general uprising by the Kashmiri people would follow. This attempt also met
the same fate as the one in October 1947, and did not succeed.
Pakistan now launched a major thrust across the CFL in the Jammu sector
and also began shelling Tithwal, Uri and Poonch areas. With a view to cutting
off the lines of communication between Kashmir and the rest of India, Pakistan,
on September 1, 1965, attacked Chhamb. By late afternoon, the situation became
precarious and the army asked for air support. Details of this conflict are discussed
72 Air Power and National Security

elsewhere, but what is germane here is India’s readiness to repeatedly accept hastily
brokered ceasefires, and return hard-fought border posts. More astonishingly,
India was once again surprised and caught totally unprepared when Pakistan
launched this major attack in Chhamb. India, it seems, had failed to learn any
lessons from its bitter experience at the hands of the Chinese.
To relieve enemy pressure on Chhamb, India responded with its oft-
proclaimed strategy of attacking Pakistan across the International Border in Punjab,
but once again failed to make much headway. The 22-day-long war saw fierce
fighting along the length of the border; some epic tank battles were fought and
won, but the war ended in a stalemate, with both India and Pakistan claiming
victory. The Tashkent Agreement was signed in January 1966, and India once
again agreed to return Haji Pir and other posts that were captured in J&K. This
war also brought no peace. Pakistan went on to befriend China, received much
military assistance from that country and was once again breathing fire against
India.
This brief account of the 22-day war again brings out the persistent disconnect
between the army and the air force. The political leaders also did not seem to be
mentally prepared for a war, even though Pakistan had shown its hand in Kutch
in April and launched its favourite invading force of mujahideen into J&K in
August; no offensive action was planned.

The Bangladesh War, 1971

This was undoubtedly a glorious chapter in India’s recent history. It saw a resolute
Indian Prime Minister in Mrs. Indira Gandhi, deftly using diplomacy to create
world opinion in favour of India’s position that Pakistan must immediately create
conditions in East Pakistan for the 10 million refugees (mostly Hindu) who had
fled to India from Pakistani repression, to return to that country. The signing of
the Friendship Treaty with the former Soviet Union in August 1971 was a high
point of India’s diplomatic offensive. Mrs. Gandhi gave the Indian armed forces
adequate time to prepare for a military solution in case it became necessary and
more importantly, maintained regular consultations with the military without
interfering in their plans.
It is believed that India did not initially think that Dhaka would fall so easily,
but once the IAF had bombed the government house, it was only a matter of
time before General Niazi’s forces surrendered. Even so, it was Lieutenant General
J.F.R. Jacob who persuaded Niazi to agree to a public surrender, telling him that
India had already para-dropped some 5,000 troops, and the latter had little choice
but to comply. The Indian Government also ensured that Indian troops left
Bangladesh at the earliest and did not place any demands on the newly independent
country. Mrs. Gandhi, was however, not quite successful in the negotiations India
held at Shimla with Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto. India tamely gave away 93,000
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 73

Prisoners of War (POWs) and managed to get only a verbal assurance from Bhutto,
that he would make every effort to resolve the Kashmir issue bilaterally. From all
accounts, Bhutto had promised to convert the CFL into a permanent border,
which did not happen. It is noteworthy that India was also ready to accept a
virtual partition of the state of J&K. No sooner than he reached home, Bhutto
changed his tune and spoke of a 1,000-year war with India, and soon also began
Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear programme. India’s reputation had risen substantively
but it had gained little in concrete terms. Worse, India did not use the moment
to put further pressure on Pakistan.58
In May 1974, India carried out a nuclear test and dubbed it a Peaceful Nuclear
Explosion (PNE). While the major powers were quick to slap sanctions, India
did not make any vigorous attempts to actually develop a missile delivery system
or weaponise the nuclear device, but went on a decade-long futile campaign for
global nuclear disarmament. It was only in 1983, nine years after the PNE, that
India launched its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP)
and it took another six years to test the Agni missile in May 1989; showing lack
of clarity on a critically vital issue of national security, perhaps due to the absence
of a long-term strategy. A carefully formulated national security strategy and a
determined effort to quickly weaponise the nuclear deterrent, would have saved
India many anxious moments in the future. As happened, India had to finally
choose the nuclear option in 1998, but by then it had already been subjected to
nuclear blackmail in 1987 and 1990.
That the 1974 PNE was more to shore up Mrs. Gandhi’s political position,
than to give India a robust nuclear deterrent, is common knowledge. As in most
other cases related to India’s security, there was no follow up, but the test invited
the wrath of the nuclear powers and sanctions followed. The most telling of these
were related to technology denials, and as a result many of the Indian Space
Research Organisation (ISRO), Defence Research and Development Organisation
(DRDO) and other scientific programmes suffered.
This was also followed by a long period of political uncertainty and economic
difficulties. When faced with a disqualification following irregularities in the
Parliamentary election, Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of internal emergency in
June 1975 that lasted for over 15 months. In the following elections, the ruling
Congress (I) lost and a hastily cobbled combination of different opposition parties
formed the Janata Party Government, which took over the reins, with Morarji
Desai, a strong anti-nuclear leader, becoming the Prime Minister. India’s nuclear
weapons programme went into hibernation. The then Foreign Minister A.B.
Vajpayee attempted to normalise relations with China by visiting that country in
February 1979, but during the visit China invaded India’s friend Vietnam (on
February 17, 1979), and to add insult to injury, Deng Xiaoping declared that
China invaded Vietnam to teach them a lesson as it had done to India in 1962.
74 Air Power and National Security

China had been providing military aid to Pakistan from 1968, and after India’s
PNE in 1974, this assistance was expanded to the nuclear field.
The year 1979 was perhaps the most difficult for India. The Soviets invaded
Afghanistan and brought the superpower rivalry to South Asia, the Shah of Iran
was overthrown in an Islamic revolution, the Indian economy faltered under the
weight of the second oil shock and Sikh militancy began to acquire serious
proportions in Punjab. Pakistan was once again gifted another opportunity to
bleed India. With the US deciding to fight the Soviet Army with Afghan
mujahideen, Pakistan was given the role to train and arm these fighters, making
it a frontline state with US financial and other assistance, mainly military/arms.
Pakistan received some three dozen F-16 fighters in the early 1980s, as an effective
counter to the IAF Jaguar, the Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA). As usual,
India had little room for manoeuvre.

Operation Blue Star, 1984

Following the spiralling of violence in Punjab and the occupation of the Akal
Takht of the Golden Temple at Amritsar by Sikh extremists led by Sant Jarnail
Singh Bhindranwale, the central government decided to send the army to flush
them out. The assault was led by Major General K.S. Brar, himself a Sikh, with
Lieutenant General K. Sundarji as the GOC-in-C of the Army’s Western
Command. On June 3, 1984 the army first laid siege to the Golden Temple and
asked the terrorists to surrender, or at least, allow the innocent pilgrims to leave
the temple premises. The terrorists did not show any inclination to surrender,
and in fact, planned to use the presence of the pilgrims to foil any attack by the
army. The army moved in on the night of June 4-5, but grossly underestimated
the firepower of the militants. In the circumstances, the army was forced to use
tanks and artillery, which resulted in extensive damage to the Akal Takht, the
sanctum sanctorum. This further inflamed Sikh passions and some troops in the
Sikh units mutinied. This was quickly brought under control, but to avenge the
desecration of the Golden Temple, Sikh bodyguards of the Prime Minister Mrs.
Indira Gandhi assassinated her on October 31, 1984. In retaliation, some 3,000
innocent Sikhs were killed in Delhi and some other places. This further worsened
the security of the country as a whole and Sikh militancy showed no signs of
abating. Sikh militancy was finally brought under control only in the early 1990s.

Exercise Brasstacks, 1986-87

Probably to show its military might, India staged a massive army-air exercise in
the deserts of Rajasthan and mobilised a very large number of troops and
armoured regiments, that raised Pakistan’s fear of an imminent and massive Indian
thrust to cut the country into two. Pakistan in turn, mobilised its troops, armour
and aircraft and foiled India’s plans for an offensive, if indeed there were any.
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 75

Pakistani scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan told a respected Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar,
that Pakistan was only a screw’s turn away from a nuclear device. Tensions rose
with this sabre rattling, but were gradually defused.59 In the book Brasstacks and
Beyond, the authors paint a very grim picture of India and Pakistan on the brink
of a conventional war during the fourth and final phase of the exercise in which
actual mobilisation of troops took place. Exercise Brasstacks however, did not
generate half as much excitement in the IAF as this account suggests. While there
was some movement of fighter squadrons, no one really feared actual hostilities.
The Indo-Pak face-off did not seem as charged as the one following ceasefire
violations in 2013. The author was then in active service and most saw the Sikh
militancy as a far bigger problem compared to the Pakistani threat. The crisis
certainly highlighted India’s vulnerability in the nuclear arena and spurred it to
move forward to quickly begin the process to acquire a deliverable weapon.
Calculated and well-timed leaks about the possession of a nuclear weapon by
Pakistan worked to heighten Indian anxieties and deterred its leaders as India
probably did not have a reliable counter to Pakistan’s veiled threats. In December
1988, India and Pakistan signed an agreement of Non Attack on Each Other’s
Nuclear Installations and in what is termed as an important nuclear confidence-
building measure (CBM) both sides have been exchanging relevant data every
January since 1989. In spite of this CBM, there was another nuclear scare in
1990 when the US alleged that following Pakistan’s heightened interference in
the Indian State of J&K, which saw increased violence, there was the danger of
a nuclear clash in South Asia. Although there was some heightened activity, those
including this author who were then on active duty did not think that there was
any chance of war. Robert Gates, the then US Deputy National Security Adviser
visited Delhi in May 1990 and claimed that he had successfully defused the
situation. Although General K. Sundarji, the then Indian Army Chief is reported
to have remarked that Brasstacks was the last chance India had to sort out Pakistan,
it is a moot point if anything substantive was actually planned. To be sure,
according to journalist Raj Chengappa, Rajiv Gandhi was annoyed with his friend
and Minister of State for Defence, Arun Singh and roundly castigated him for
launching a major exercise without his express permission. Arun Singh maintained
that he had informed the Prime Minister and obtained the necessary permission.
Soon thereafter Arun Singh resigned.60

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka, July 1987-

March 1990
Earlier in 1987, in an already charged situation, India had also decided to send
its troops to bring peace to Sri Lanka and help it conduct elections in the vain
hope that the dreaded Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would be
amenable to a negotiated peace on the basis of autonomy to the Northern
76 Air Power and National Security

Provinces of Sri Lanka, the home of most Sri Lankan Tamils. Instead of the
promised ‘four or five days to bring the situation under control’ the operation,
codenamed Operation Pawan, took nearly three years during which the Indian
Army suffered heavy casualties. This was seen as yet another example of India’s
hubris, to ride roughshod over its smaller neighbours. It was a classic case of
delayed over-reaction. P.C. Alexander, a former Principal Secretary to Rajiv
Gandhi, blamed the then Army Chief General K. Sundarji for the army’s failure
in the June 1984 Operation Blue Star and the June 1987 Sri Lanka intervention.
Alexander quotes the late Rajiv Gandhi as saying, “senior army officers in charge
of the IPKF operations, in particular General K. Sundarji had assured him
categorically that the Indian forces would be able to bring the conflict in Sri
Lanka under full control in a matter of four to five days.” India had once again
launched its troops without adequate intelligence and preparation. In reality, there
was little coordination between the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), the
external intelligence agency which had a far better knowledge of the situation,
and the politico-military leadership.61
The IAF pressed its transport aircraft and helicopters into service in Sri Lanka
and played a major role in providing tactical mobility and logistic support. Many
of the helicopters were fired at by the LTTE rebels and sustained damage, but
such attacks were mercifully restricted to only small arms fire, although the LTTE
was known to possess small numbers of shoulder-fired missiles or Man Portable
Air Defence Systems (MANPADS).

Kargil Conflict, May-July 1999

In May 1999, India was again surprised to find that Pakistan Army regulars had
occupied a number of posts on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in
the Kargil sector of J&K that were vacated during the previous winter. As in the
past, the enemy began shelling the vital Srinagar-Leh Road that threatened to
cut off Ladakh. Pakistan initially denied that its regular troops had infiltrated
into India but following a strong Indian reaction in which sizeable elements of
both the Indian army and IAF were employed, Pakistan was forced to admit
that its army regulars were in fact the main force involved in the fighting.
Unbeknown to India, the Pakistan Army was in the process of occupying these
posts in late 1998, early 1999. It came as a shock to India, especially because on
February 19, 1999, the then Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee was visiting
Lahore in Pakistan on a ‘Bus Yatra’ to mend Indo-Pak relations. This stab in the
back utterly vitiated the peace in South Asia and cost India over 517 lives. It
became clear that India could never let its guard down while dealing with this
implacable neighbour. In an attempt to contain the scope of its response, India
restricted its air force operations to its side of the LoC but it took until the end
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 77

of July to fully throw out the enemy that was entrenched in the high mountains
and was relatively invulnerable and safe from air and ground attacks.

Fighting Insurgencies and Terrorism

From about the late 1980s, Pakistan realised that it could not effectively address
India’s conventional superiority. Smarting under the Bangladesh defeat, Pakistan
embarked on a modified strategy of using mujahideen, terrorists recently freed
from the Afghan War, against India; first in J&K where local unrest proved helpful
and later in other parts of India. India was still reeling under the Sikh militancy,
which also received all help from Pakistan. Indian aircraft were hijacked and
flown to Pakistan and sometimes further to Dubai, which housed many anti-
India elements and criminals. Such was the fury of cross-border terrorism and
support to insurgency that in 1990 the Indian Army had to raise special battalions
of infantry (dubbed as a paramilitary force under the home ministry to get around
manpower ceiling laws), the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) to tackle the terrorist menace
in J&K. Even so, India had to eventually deploy some half a million troops in
J&K. Through the 1990s, cross-border infiltration increased and terrorism spread
to other parts of the country.
In 1990, the Indian economy took a turn for the worse and India was forced
to mortgage its gold reserves with the World Bank to avoid defaulting on payments.
In May 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber.
Following the elections, the P.V. Narasimha Rao Government embarked on bold
economic reforms designed to put the economy on a path of rapid and sustained
growth. The December 6, 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya once
again fanned communal flames. Although India successfully if belatedly brought
under control the Pakistan-abetted Khalistan militancy in Punjab by the early
1990s, the menace of jihadi terrorism acquired dangerous proportions, when
terrorists targeted the cities of Mumbai and Delhi.
On December 24, 1999 a Pakistan based terror group successfully hijacked
an Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar in Afghanistan (Flight IC-814 from
Kathmandu to Delhi) and compelled the Indian Government to release five
dreaded terrorists. Jihadi terror now became the biggest threat to national security.
Numerous terror strikes were carried out, including the Mumbai carnage of
November 26, 2008 in which 10 Pakistan-based and trained terrorists mercilessly
killed 166 innocents and injured hundreds.
India’s security forces are still engaged in fighting several insurgent groups in
the North-east and Maoists/Naxal militants in Central India who aim to overthrow
the Union Government. The army and Rashtriya Rifles are also continuously
engaged in fighting Pakistan-aided militancy, often described as Low Intensity
Conflict Operations (LICO) in J&K for over 23 years. Successive Union
78 Air Power and National Security

Governments have managed to safeguard India’s unity, despite numerous internal

and external threats and challenges, but India has continued to rely on an archaic
and inefficient mechanism of security decision-making and responded only when
the enemy was at the door. If only India had adopted a somewhat different and
proactive, yet well-calibrated security strategy, some of these situations could have
been handled more competently and with less harm to the country.
The departure of the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in December
2014 is once again likely to exacerbate the security situation in South Asia and
place additional pressure on India. In such a scenario, it is imperative that India
takes urgent steps to remedy, at least, the major deficiencies in its security
management. In the absence of a public document on India’s security policy/
strategy, one can only make an informed inference about how it works.
As we have seen, until the appointment of a NSA in 1998 by the Vajpayee
government, management of the country’s security affairs was the responsibility
of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) assisted by the Defence, Foreign and Home
Ministers. The committee system – Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC),
Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS), Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
– worked, but only when the civilian political leadership took some interest and
tried to maintain direct contact with the military. India has followed a unique
system in which the three Service Chiefs and the Service Headquarters are not an
integral part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), but operate as its attached
offices.62 The Rules of Business of the Central Government, thus place the
responsibility of India’s defence, solely with the Minister of Defence or Defence
Secretary, who is a senior Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer with or
even without any experience of working in the MoD, and hence a ‘generalist’.
The MoD is charged with meeting all the needs of the three Services, and also
coordinates with other departments of the government.

Why a National Security Strategy?

While chances of a conventional war might be remote, it cannot be totally ruled
out, especially given that India shares disputed borders with two of its neighbours.
The country, thus has little option but to maintain a certain minimum level of
military capability, which would obviously depend on current and future threats.
There can, however, be a wide variation in our understanding of the worst case
scenario and the most likely scenario. It is often said that there is no such thing
as absolute security. This is what is commonly referred to as a ‘security dilemma’:
beyond a point your security will begin to impinge on the security of your
adversary or neighbour, hence, it is important that a judicious balance is
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 79

maintained between own sense of security and the genuine fears of the potential
adversary. This will, however, be tempered by past experience, own concept of
defence, and the continuously changing dynamic of mutual competition and
threat perception. This cannot be done without regularly analysing the security
situation and hence a formal or informal security policy or strategy is inescapable.
Annual Reports of the Indian MoD expressly state, “India remains fully
committed to the twin policies of (a) no territorial ambition and (b) no export
of ideology”.63 In other words, while India will defend its territorial integrity
and sovereignty, it will not invade another country. The record of its history
since independence adequately proves this. Its neighbours nevertheless continue
to have a different opinion and cite Goa (1961), Bangladesh (1971), Sri Lanka
(1987-90) and Maldives (1988) to raise the bogey of India’s hegemonic behaviour.
In simple terms, strategy is the process of harmonising ends with means.
Those charged with the defence and security of the country, must follow a certain
well-defined process to arrive at an appropriate national security strategy, which
should logically flow from the country’s Grand Strategy. Again, this is usually a
statement of the broad goals that the nation wishes to pursue and even when not
written down in a formal document, becomes evident from the statements of
national leaders, parliamentary debates, defence expenditure and the general
behaviour of the nation-state. Besides safeguarding national interests, such as
living in peace, being allowed to pursue the general development of its people,
and the freedom to make choices, a country also has to ensure that future
generations would be able to enjoy these freedoms. It is therefore essential to take
a long view of the past and current trends and project them into the future,
before a country can decide on its security goals.
Former President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam wanted India to become a developed
country by 2020. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh wanted to maintain
high levels of inclusive economic growth to liberate the vast multitudes of Indians
from poverty. The former NSA Shivshankar Menon has often said that India
aims for ‘total transformation and a peaceful periphery’ to achieve that.64 All of
these statements and a visible attempt to keep India’s defence expenditure at a
reasonable level of around 2.5 per cent of GDP, should give a good idea of the
general direction of India’s national security strategy. A tendency to demonstrate
strategic restraint, an unshakeable faith in peaceful resolution of international
disputes, and extreme reluctance to resort to use of force, may be seen as the most
important features of India’s security behaviour.
Having articulated these broad objectives, the strategy maker has to examine
the current trends and devise ways to build economic, ideational and military
capabilities to meet them. Before identifying deficiencies in the strength, numbers,
sophistication and technology levels of our weapons and equipment, the country’s
leadership must first look at the state of its economy and the social/human
80 Air Power and National Security

development index or level to make a broad assessment of the country’s financial

capacity to sustain its defence effort.
The next step would be to make a short and long-term perspective plan and
lay down inter se priorities, visualise the kind of technologies that the country
must obtain from abroad, or develop them indigenously and then regularly
monitor them, to ensure timely revisions and corrections to achieve the short
and long-term goals.
Some might argue that public articulation of defence strategy will
unnecessarily forewarn the potential adversary and give it an opportunity to devise
strategies of its own, to neutralise India’s. Any self-respecting modern nation-
state usually possesses a plethora of instruments and technical means to constantly
decipher the intent and capabilities of a competitor or adversary and hence, a
declared national security strategy does not give away any state secrets, but on the
other hand, lays down the manner in which security challenges and threats would
be handled, and reduces the chances of any miscalculation. Even when a country’s
strategy is cloaked in secrecy, its actions and responses to various situations
normally give a fairly accurate idea of its intentions.
It usually takes a long time to build military capabilities and hence, this process
cannot be neglected or left to the vagaries of democratic politics, nor can it wait
for ‘complete transformation’. Governments change but the foundations of
national security must always remain strong. All this is easier said than done,
simply because a democracy faces a faces a veritable political revolution every five
years. With new governments at the helm, the influence of interest groups changes
and so do their priorities. In India, mercifully, there is a broad consensus on
national security and barring a few exceptions, the country’s defence has received
adequate funding. As a result, the country’s defence budget has hovered around
a modest 2.5 per cent of the national GDP, but this has often meant an increase
barely enough to cater to annual inflation. Given that high-tech weapons and
equipment usually show an annual increase of 10 per cent in their prices, there
is little left for military modernisation. The fact that India continues to depend
on foreign countries for up to 70 per cent of its defence needs, further exacerbates
the problem. Inflation or upward price variation and above all, the value of the
Indian rupee against the US dollar – the benchmark currency in which most
purchases are made – further complicate the problem. Foreign exchange is always
scarce and purchasing weapons, platforms and spares from abroad puts
considerable pressure on the country’s economy and foreign exchange reserves
and hence, it becomes difficult for the government to assign a certain fixed amount
of money for defence.
The vital role of a National Security Strategy, and/or Defence Strategy, and
Long Term Integrated Procurement Plan (LTIPP) should now become evident.
India has some nine major Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and 42
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 81

Ordnance Factories (OFs), many of them operating since before independence,

and also a large DRDO staffed with world-class scientists and engineers, but
alas, India has still not been able to achieve the requisite degree of self-sufficiency,
which often constrains its choices. India’s defence industrial base is not adequately
developed and that makes technology absorption relatively difficult. India’s policy
of maintaining equal distance from any bloc, its decision to carry out a nuclear
test in 1974, lending support to countries fighting colonialism and imperialism,
its disputes with Pakistan and attempts to chart an independent course in
international relations, have together resulted in many Western powers imposing
economic and other sanctions and denying it sensitive technologies. While Indian
scientists and engineers have successfully carried out space research and exploration,
developed ballistic missile technology, launched a variety of satellites and most
importantly, given the country a credible nuclear deterrent, their record in areas
of aircraft, avionics, aero-engines, and airborne radars leaves much to be desired.
A national security or defence policy and strategy has never been articulated. In
light of the above, a national security strategy document is essential, for, without
such a clear enunciation, various organs of the government including the armed
forces, cannot make any long-term plans and are unable to anticipate and prepare
for new challenges and threats.
But this is not all. There also exists a major and profound ‘disconnect’ between
the political establishment and military leadership. As seen before, it was this gap
that was the primary cause of India’s humiliation in the 1962 Sino-Indian border
conflict. It is not as if the political bosses have not given necessary directions to
the military leadership on how India might resort to use of force, but only just.
Such interactions have been rare. There has seldom been a regular dialogue between
the military and political leadership. Government directives to the MoD were
not updated for years.65 Considering that India has faced threats of aggression
and other disruptions from across the border for most of the last 68 years, this
indifference is unfathomable.
Even an obliquely critical comment on their peace-loving nature, their deep-
rooted faith in non-violence and their lofty goal of becoming a ‘righteous nation-
state’ can raise disproportionately strong reactions amongst Indians. India, it seems,
does not mind if the world sees it as indecisive, lethargic, hypocritical, ambiguous,
unsure, timid, excessively cautious or even incompetent on matters of national
security, but any slight to its upright and honourable image of a ‘non-aligned
country committed to promoting world peace and the welfare of mankind’ is not
tolerated.
The fact that throughout recorded history, the Indian sub-continent has been
at the receiving end of numerous invasions from the north-west and also from
the sea, should normally make an average Indian sensitive about national security,
but the exact opposite is the case. Even educated and well-informed Indians are
82 Air Power and National Security

blissfully indifferent, even apathetic, to security issues. Indians often cite examples
of their southern kings like the Cheras, Cholas and Pandyas, making forays into
South East Asia and holding sway there for centuries. But they often forget that
when the Portuguese ships began bombarding Calicut in 1501, the friendly and
hospitable Zamorin was utterly stunned, because neither he nor his nobles had
ever experienced the use of gunpowder. This was in spite of the fact that the
Portuguese had already been welcomed in his kingdom and had been given
permission to trade in spices. The story in the North was not very different,
when the then mighty Indian kings faced the wrath of Babur’s artillery.66
Contrast this with China. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
emerged from a long period of internal strife, caused by a bloody civil war and
a ‘century of humiliation’, Chairman Mao only said, “China has stood up”.67 The
Chinese are equally proud and conscious of their 5,000-year-long civilisational
history and never let the world forget how far advanced that civilisation was. But
such sentiments have never been allowed to interfere with China’s core objectives
of national reunification and economic advancement, leading to development
and progress. For example, by the mid-1980s, the PRC had its own submarine-
launched ballistic missile. Although not as yet a member of the UNSC, this nuclear
status significantly enhanced its national power and also opened diplomatic
opportunities.
In February 1972, the then US President, Richard Nixon, made a historic
visit to China. Although the honeymoon did not last very long, China made full
use of the short-lived friendship with the US. Soon after the death of Mao Zedong
and Zhou En-Lai, Deng Xiaoping revitalised the ‘four modernisations’ strategy
and embarked on an ambitious programme of economic development. This China
could do, because its rudimentary nuclear capability had ensured a near threat-
free environment. The PRC did not hesitate to take all necessary steps to first
ensure its survival. Mao’s policies no doubt caused many social upheavals and
resulted in millions of deaths, but Deng Xiaoping, who also belonged to the first
generation leadership, led that same China to unprecedented and spectacular
growth. China soon became the second most powerful economy in the world
and slowly but steadfastly developed its military power in the face of sanctions.
Whether we like it or not, today China’s voice counts. Not a day passes without
a mention of China’s peaceful rise in the global media. So much so, China’s double-
digit economic growth and its rapidly-modernising military, have together
compelled the US to review its global strategy and begin rebalancing the
deployment of its military, especially the navy in the Western Pacific theatre.
India, on the other hand, has constantly been plagued by bickering and
internecine factional fighting. This has severely affected its decision-making and
unduly delayed the implementation of urgent measures necessary to consolidate
its security. The excuse is that in a democracy it takes a long time to build consensus
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 83

and a democratic government cannot ignore the demands, rights and sentiments
of the people. This is undoubtedly true, but procrastination and inaction cannot
be condoned in the vital arena of national security. The first goal of any self-
respecting national leadership must be to inspire the people to give their best and
manage the differing perceptions of competing interest groups within reasonable
limits. According to some observers, Indian democracy has certainly witnessed
free and fair elections and ensured peaceful transfer of power, but has failed to
provide effective governance. In almost all fields of national endeavour, India has
consistently delivered sub-optimal performance and worse, the governments and
people are both quite sanguine about the pace of progress. India does not lack
thinkers. Indians have earned a name for themselves when working on the frontiers
of technology in the US and other countries. In India, however, the same people
somehow find it difficult to work as a team.
A group of highly accomplished and respected intellectuals has in a recently
published report titled Non-Alignment 2.0 recommended a mixture of Nehruvian
and neo-liberal approaches to India’s foreign and security policy.68 The group
suggests that India should lead by example while simultaneously building its
economy. Ashley Tellis and Satish Chandra, two influential writers on Indian
security, have however, roundly criticised the report, albeit for different reasons.
Tellis says:
Therefore, Nonalignment 2.0’s dramatic claim that India’s ‘power has often
been the power of its example’ may be irrelevant even if true, because
there is no evidence that it has paid off concretely in the international
arena by buttressing either India’s economic development or its rise in
power.69
Former diplomat, K.S. Bajpai, also criticises the report as he feels calling it
‘Non-Alignment 2.0’ unnecessarily cloaks it in controversial terms. Briefly stated,
the first two approaches (Nehruvian and neo-liberal) suggest a strong collective
effort to ensure rapid economic growth, development and employment of India’s
vast reservoirs of ‘soft power’, while maintaining a high degree of political
autonomy, to lead the world by ‘example’. The writers of the report sincerely
believe that it is this ‘example’ (68 years of democratic freedom, secularism,
pluralism and an inclusive approach) that will ultimately triumph in this globalised
and uncertain world. The third school, the so-called Hyper-Realists, essentially
agree with all of the above, but also want India to modernise its military, reduce
dependence on foreign powers by quickly reforming and remodelling its defence
industry, and be ready in the event a situation requires the use of force. The
Hyper-Realists also want India to build partnerships with advanced countries of
the world, including the US, to access high technology in order that India’s military
modernisation comes to fruition without further delay.
84 Air Power and National Security

In a recent book Arming without Aiming,70 two American authors have

discussed India’s laudable tradition of ‘strategic restraint’ and wondered where its
recent high visibility arms purchases are leading the country. Many Indian analysts
have criticised the main theme of the book, but it is difficult to ignore its central
message that in the absence of ‘institutional and organisational reforms’, merely
procuring modern aircraft and weapons will not suffice to deter the enemy. Stephen
Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta say, “The weak response to the terrorist attack on
Mumbai is now the poster child of organisational incoherence – all of the personnel
and equipment existed, but the system did not allow for timely deployment and
coordinated use of force. India’s systemic failure to anticipate and act beforehand
is notable, but it is a price that the political leadership seems willing to pay”,71 a
damning indictment of India’s indecisiveness and the habit of living in a make-
believe world.
India urgently needs a well-thought out and validated policy and strategy for
use of military force, as reacting to every emerging situation ‘on its own merits’
by calling a meeting of senior bureaucrats cannot work, in the current atmosphere
of unprecedented uncertainty. Little wonder then that Timothy Roemer, the former
US envoy to India, blamed India’s ‘slow and grinding process of military
mobilisation’ for the absence of a military response to the November 26, 2008
terrorist attacks in Mumbai.72
Following a loud and persistent clamour for a thorough and purposeful review
of India’s Higher Defence Control Organisation, the United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) II Government constituted a Task Force of experts under the leadership
of Naresh Chandra, a veteran diplomat, bureaucrat and former Cabinet Secretary.
The resultant report says: “Many of the key recommendations of the Kargil Review
Committee (KRC), set up immediately after the 1999 conflict, have not yet been
implemented.”73 The report advises India to be prepared militarily to deal with
an “assertive” China even as it seeks to build bridges of cooperation with Beijing.
The report calls for better coordination between the foreign and defence
ministries.74 That it needed a Task Force to suggest such obvious measures,
especially after the KRC had made similar recommendations, is indeed shocking.
It is also surprising that 68 years after independence, India refuses to change its
archaic system of politico-military decision-making, but at the same time, goes
on spending huge sums of money on import of aircraft, weapons and other
equipment. It surely cannot be for lack of understanding of the seriousness of the
problem. At a minimum, the political leadership must remove this ‘disconnect’
with the top military commanders. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to
know the security policy/strategy that the government intends to adopt to address
the myriad threats to the country. Even so, given a general air of policy paralysis,
it is difficult to see India adopting a ‘declaratory defence policy’ although that
was one of the main recommendations of the KRC.75
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 85

All this should have normally caused India’s decision-makers to sit up and
take notice of these criticisms. Alas, India continues to grope for a viable and
workable national security policy, far less, strategy. Despite some very useful and
candid remarks by the former NSA Shivshankar Menon, in the many lectures he
delivered, the pace of security reforms appears to be decidedly slow. India seems
to believe that its security would be enhanced by merely raising additional infantry/
mountain divisions and by purchasing more advanced aircraft, ships and
submarines. Without a coherent security policy and strategy and a robust and
visible display of national resolve and political will, India is unwittingly getting
trapped in an arms race with its more powerful, smart and rich neighbour. In the
circumstances, India’s military modernisation attempts appear unsustainable and
perhaps even counterproductive.

NOTES
1. See for example, Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s
Military Modernisation, Viking, New Delhi, 2010.
2. Durga Das, India from Curzon to Nehru & After, Rupa & Co., Delhi, 1969 (Reprinted 1974),
pp. 44-45.
3. Cited in K. Shankar Bajpai, India Engages the World at the 11th Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture,
2006 at http://www.prembhatiatrust.com/lecture11.htm (Accessed November 27, 2011).
4. Ibid.
5. Kanti Bajpai, “India: Modified Structuralism”, in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Asian Security
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, p. 164.
6. The definitions by Walt, Morgan and Buzan and Booth are from Alagappa, Ibid. p. 27.
7. Pierre Jacquet, “From Survival to Interdependence”, Survival, Spring 1992, pp. 89-90.
8. K. Subrahmanyam, “Decision Making in Defence”, IDSA Journal, 2 (4), April-June 1970,
reprinted in N.S. Sisodia and Sujit Dutta (eds.), India and the World: Selected Articles from
IDSA Journals, Volume 1– Strategic Thought: The Formative Years, Promilla & Co., New Delhi,
2005, pp. 78-107.
9. K. Subrahmanyam, “Grand Strategy for the first half of the 21st Century,” Indian Express,
February 3, 2012.
10. Shivshankar Menon, “The Role of Militaries in International Relations”, Address by NSA at
the Cariappa Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, October 5, 2011.
11. Neo-realism is another theory of International Relations which appears to be currently popular.
12. Muthiah Alagappa, no. 5, p. 38.
13. See for example, Stephen Walt, Theory Talks, August 25, 2009, When asked, ‘What is,
according to you, the biggest challenge or principal debate in current IR? And what is your
position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?” Walt said, “For me, the biggest challenge
is making my work relevant to the general population. For many people, world politics has
an alienating effect, appearing as a product of distant, uncontrolled, and alien forces” at
http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/08/theory-talk-33.html (Accessed July 26, 2013).
14. Shivshankar Menon, no. 10.
15. K. Shankar Bajpai, “India Engages the World”, 11th Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture, 2006 at
http://www.prembhatiatrust.com/lecture11.htm (Accessed November 27, 2011).
16. Ibid.
17. A. Appadorai, Contemporary India: Essays in Domestic and Foreign Policy, Asian Publishers,
New Delhi, 1988, p. 166.
86 Air Power and National Security
18. Ibid., p. 169.
19. K. Shankar Bajpai, no. 15.
20. A. Appadorai, no. 17, p. 177.
21. P. Chidambaram, India’s finance minister, in an address at IDSA, delivered on February 6,
2013.
22. See http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/naxalism-gravest-internal-security-threat-to-nation-
pm/609303/
23. The Indian military normally uses the term ‘jointness’ which means synergy between the
three services; the former NSA, however, coined this new term. “The Role of Militaries in
International Relations”, Cariappa Memorial Lecture, October 5, 2011 at http://
indiatoday.intoday.in/story/nsa-shivshankar-menon-lecture-on-the-role-of-militaries-in-
international-relations/1/153967.htm(Accessed November 15, 2011).
24. Ibid.
25. Indian Express, July 21, 2009.
26. “Government Admits Chinese Intrusions”, Mail Today, May 17, 2012.
27. K. Subrahmanyam in a posthumously published essay, Indian Express, February 2, 2012.
28. P. Chidambaram, no. 21.
29. Although Indians do not readily accept it, countries such as Brazil and South Africa have
also done far better than India in per capita GDP terms.
30. K. Subrahmanyam said that India’s non-alignment was not a dogma but a strategy and India
reaped many dividends by remaining friendly with both superpowers.
31. Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd.), “Geo-Strategic Balance”, Defence & Security Alert,
September 2012, pp. 44-46.
32. Shashi Tharoor, cited in Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History
of the Nehru Years, Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2010, pp. 1-2.
33. S. Kalyanaraman, “The Indian Military Response to Threats From Pakistan, 1949-2010”, Paper
presented at IDSA Fellows Seminar, July 8, 2011 (Unpublished).
34. Srinath Raghavan, no. 32, p. 31.
35. B.G. Verghese, “50 Years after 1962: A Personal Memoir”, Presentation at Subbu Forum
Round Table, September 6, 2012. Verghese was the assistant editor and war correspondent
for the Times of India during the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and was stationed at Tezpur.
36. C. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy on Kashmir, 1947-48, Sage, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 36-37.
37. Ibid., pp. 12-13. This paragraph is based largely on Dasgupta’s findings.
38. Ibid, pp. 14-18.
39. C. Dasgupta, no. 36.
40. K.P. Saksena, The United Nations and Collective Security, DK Publishing House, New Delhi,
1974.
41. UN SCOR-1948, 3rd year Supplement for November 1948, p. 143, as quoted in K.P. Saksena,
Ibid., p. 71.
42. Ibid., p. 72.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 73.
45. Ibid., p. 71, emphasis added.
46. Ibid., p. 73.
47. Ibid. Emphasis added. This discussion is based on the findings of K.P. Saksena in “United
Nations and Collective Security” referred to in no. 40. Very few other books have ever made
any mention of this grave blunder. The former NSA Shivshankar Menon in one of his lectures
referred to the above lapse in passing but without any clarification. In his book, Srinath
Raghavan, has devoted two full chapters to Nehru’s handling of the Kashmir issue but for
reasons best known to him has chosen to omit these details.
48. Rajmohan Gandhi, Patel: A Life, Navjivan Press, Ahmedabad, 2008, pp. 480-83.
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 87
49. P.V.R. Rao, “Governmental Machinery for the Evolution of National Defence Policy and
the Higher Direction of War”, IDSA Journal, (1), July 1968, reprinted in N.S. Sisodia and
Sujit Dutta (eds.), India and the World: Selected Articles from IDSA Journals, Vol. 1, Promilla
& Co., New Delhi, 2005, p. 64.
50. Jasjit Singh in a private conversation with the author at CAPS New Delhi, January 20, 2011.
51. J.K. Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1969, pp. 428-530.
Galbraith focuses on the Sino-Indian Conflict on which the summary in the text is based.
He gives a good idea of the state of affairs during this crisis in New Delhi.
52. Ibid.
53. The previous two paragraphs are based on Galbraith cited above at no. 50.
54. Srinath Raghavan, no. 32, pp. 303-04. When V.K. Krishna Menon, Gen. Thapar, IB Chief
Mallik and Lt. Gen. Sen, the Eastern Army Commander flew to Tezpur on October 16,
1962, Kaul in fact “strongly argued that the Namkachu positions were unstable.”
55. R.D. Pradhan, Debacle to Revival: YB Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65, Orient Longman,
Hyderabad, 1998, pp. 171, 173, 177, 300-309. Emphasis added.
56. Jasjit Singh (ed.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under the Jackboot, Siddhi Books, New Delhi,
1995, p. 4.
57. P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, The India Pakistan War of 1965, New Delhi, Manohar,
2005 (Reprinted 2006), pp. 62-63.
58. Inder Malhotra, “Revisiting Shimla”, Indian Express, July 2, 2012.
59. See Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly,
Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, Manohar, New
Delhi, 1995 (reprinted 1997), pp. 96-113.
60. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to be a Nuclear Power,
HarperCollins India, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 321-26.
61. P.C. Alexander, Through the Corridors of Power: An Insider’s Story, HarperCollins, New Delhi,
(Second Impression 2004) pp. 296, pp. 304-06, 363-66.
62. Admiral (Retd.) Arun Prakash, “National Security Reforms: Ten Years After the Kargil
Committee Report”, USI Journal, Oct-Dec 2012, pp. 504-23.
63. India’s Ministry of Defence Annual Report for the year 2005-06, p. 12.
64. P.C. Lal Memorial Lecture, delivered by Shivshankar Menon at the Air Force Association,
New Delhi on April 2, 2012.
65. During the early 1990s, the government had not found it necessary to update its 1979
directive to the armed forces and despite many reminders from the Service HQs there was
no response from the MoD. The directive was finally revised a few years later.
66. In 1526 at Panipat, Babur actually fought and defeated Ibrahim Lodhi of Afghan descent,
then ruling from Delhi, but his grandson Akbar decimated his Rajput opponents at the
Battle of Haldi Ghati with his famous long-range gun Mallika-a-Maidan. Total disinterest in
developing war-winning technologies was the root cause of innumerable Indian defeats at
the hands of foreign armies and navies supported with long-range artillery against which
mere swords, lances, horse cavalry or bows and arrows were totally ineffective.
67. Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power,” in Muthiah
Algappa (ed), no. 5, p. 115.
68. Non-Alignment 2.0, 2012 at http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%
202.0_1. pdf (AccessedJuly 15, 2012); see also Ambassador Satish Chandra, “Why Non-
alignment 2.0 does us a Disservice?” at http://www.rediff.com/news/column/why-non-
alignment-does-us-a-disservice/20120612.htm (Accessed July 15, 2012); Ashley Tellis,
Nonalignment Redux at http//www.ceip [nonalignment_redux-ashleytellisjul 2012 pdf ]
(Accessed August 1, 2012).
69. Ibid. p. 37.
70. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, no. 1.
88 Air Power and National Security
71. Ibid., p. 150.
72. Wikileaks: “US spied on India’s military contingency plans”, Indian Express, December 1,
2010, at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/wikileaks-us-spied-on-indias-military-
contingency-plans/718517/ (Accessed June 4, 2012).
73. Josy Joseph, Times of India, July 26, 2012.
74. Ibid.
75. Report of the Kargil Review Committee at http://www.scribd.com/doc/152396717/Kargil-
Review-Committee-Report-1999 (Accessed June 30, 2014).
 Evolution of India’s National Security Practice 89

4
Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past

This chapter looks at major post-World War II conflicts in India and elsewhere
in the world to derive important lessons pertaining to the employment of air
power. This analysis first covers five significant conflicts: the four wars with
Pakistan, the Sino-Indian conflict, and the one against LTTE in Sri Lanka. It
then goes on to cover all other major wars since the end of World War II. The
analysis focuses on air power lessons with only a very brief treatment of other
relevant military lessons.

India-Pakistan War in Jammu and Kashmir, 1947-48

Pakistan’s invasion of Kashmir came as a complete surprise. It is not as if there
were no indications of things to come. As early as August 1947, Major O.S.
Kalkat, an Indian officer serving at the General Headquarters (GHQ) Rawalpindi
in Pakistan, came upon a top secret letter that gave the entire plan of Operation
Gulmarg to be launched on October 20, 1947. The plan was to send up to 10,000
tribal fighters into the Kashmir Valley to start a rebellion which would pave the
way for direct action by Pakistan. He managed to make his way back to Delhi
on October 19 and disclosed the details of the plan to Sardar Baldev Singh, the
then Defence Minister, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Kalwant Singh and
Colonel Thapar, the acting Director of Military Operations. Unfortunately, no
credence was given to this vital piece of information. Operation Gulmarg started
on October 22, 1947 as planned, and Kalkat was brought from his home and
presented to the Prime Minister. But by then the information was dated and not
of much use.1
90 Air Power and National Security

India decided to send a battalion of troops to Kashmir, but only after its
ruler signed the Instrument of Accession, as Lord Mountbatten, the new Governor
General of independent India, felt that India could not send its troops into a
sovereign princely state that was technically not part of the dominion. By that
time information was received that the raiders had reached Baramulla and were
poised to threaten Srinagar. What happened then is now history, but for a variety
of reasons the Indian response was delayed. Had it not been for the alacrity and
professionalism of the few air force and army officers then present at Delhi, the
crucial airlift could have been further delayed and the history of Kashmir and
indeed India would have been very different. It is said that some officers had
anticipated the airlift requirement and cautioned many private aircraft operators
to be ready in case of emergency.

Need for Infrastructure

The runway at Srinagar was until then used mainly for the private aeroplane of
the Maharaja and was unfit to undertake round-the-clock operations by heavily
laden DC-3 aircraft that brought in men and material in an unending stream
for weeks. The unpaved surface soon broke up and a cloud of dust was raised
every time an aircraft took off or landed. The airfield also lacked Air Traffic
Control (ATC), meteorological forecasting facilities and navigation aids so vital
for safe air operations. Although the runway was somehow maintained, its
condition continued to pose serious problems. Another major problem was lack
of fuel, oil and lubricants (FOL) at Srinagar. In desperation, the Spitfires and
Tempests of the Indian Air Force (IAF) routinely siphoned off excess fuel from
returning Dakotas, in return for a hastily scribbled receipt for the amount of
fuel received. According to Lieutenant General L.P. Sen, the audit objection for
not raising a voucher in triplicate for such informal transfer of fuel was pending
till 1965.2 IAF fighter crews were also totally short of maps. For many days, a
small portion of the situation map from the briefing room was cut out and used
for offensive missions during the day and replaced in the evening. Such was the
thoroughness with which the Pakistani leadership had planned the take-over of
Kashmir by force, that at the time of partition, the departing Pakistani civilian
and military intelligence officers had emptied out the central stores of all stocks
of Kashmir maps, and details of the disposition of the Kashmir State Forces before
they left India.3 Yet, this was neither noticed nor reported to the higher military
and political authorities in India. According to Durga Das, “(Muslim) League
leaders had in any event made plans to occupy Kashmir by force.”4 Considering
that the newly independent country was inundated with the many problems
arising from partition and an unprecedented movement of refugees from both
sides, this intelligence failure is perhaps not unusual, but it was not the last.
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 91

India was lucky to have a variety of civilian and commercial operators flying
the venerable DC-3 Dakota aircraft in different parts of the country and these
operators were alerted in the third week of October 1947 of an impending
operation to ferry troops to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Even so the motley
collection of these aircraft of mixed vintage was barely adequate to meet the task.
Such was the success of the hastily mounted operation that Pakistan and indeed
the world believed for a long time, that the airlift of Indian troops was a pre-
planned operation.
Only three fighter and one transport squadron took part during this 14-
month-long war with only 8-10 aircraft on their strength. The squadrons were
running low on spares as most of the stores and equipment depots were located
in Pakistan and the division of assets took considerable time. IAF men provided
commendable maintenance support in trying circumstances and kept the fleet
airworthy. Both the Tempest and Harvard aircraft were extensively used in the
armed reconnaissance and ground attack role. The armament used consisted of
front guns or cannons, rocket projectiles (R/Ps) and bombs. Given the
mountainous terrain, it was difficult to accurately bomb targets such as bridges
or gun emplacements tucked away in narrow valleys; bombing is difficult even
in the most ideal conditions as these heavy 500 or 1,000-pound bombs are free-
fall gravity weapons.
High altitude also adversely affected the performance of these piston engine
aircraft and restricted operations due to the reduced flight envelope. When asked,
a veteran of this war said, “We flew by the seat of our pants and did not bother
too much about these (aerodynamic) problems.” The attack on enemy positions
at the Zoji La Pass in August 1948 was noteworthy as the Pass is well over 10,500
feet high and the Tempest was not designed for operations at this altitude.5 Attacks
on Skardu, Bunji and Gilgit also presented immense difficulties due to the terrain,
bad weather and large distance from their operating bases. This meant that on
many occasions the aircraft were forced to fly with internally mounted guns, as
neither rockets nor bombs could be carried. Due to limitations on the number
and range of aircraft and lack of political direction, attacks on these targets in
Gilgit-Baltistan were not decisive.
The lone Dakota Squadron was woefully short of air crew, especially qualified
experienced captains and flying instructors. This meant that the Commanding
Officer (CO) and Flight Commander had to often undertake training sorties
after completing rigorous day-long operations in the mountains. First based at
Agra, some aircraft of this squadron were later moved to Palam near Delhi. The
DC-3 Dakota was also often used to the limit of its designed capacity. Carriage
of heavy guns, dropping of supplies and day and night landing on the hastily
prepared short runway at Poonch under enemy fire by the only transport squadron
of the IAF, was a major achievement of this war. The most noteworthy feat of the
92 Air Power and National Security

squadron was when Air Commodore ‘Baba’ Meher Singh landed the Dakota at
Leh, an unpaved runway at 11,000 feet altitude after flying over mountains
reaching 20,000-25,000 feet en route. The experience of the 1947-48 Indo-Pak
War thus clearly brought home the following important lessons. The IAF urgently
needed:
• A sizeable number of medium and heavy transport aircraft with adequate
range and load carrying capacity, suitable for operations from high altitude
airfields; a fleet of fighter and light bomber aircraft with adequate range
and armament carriage for operations in the mountains; a number of all-
weather airfields with runways of adequate length; ATC; Met forecasting
facilities; fuel, oil and armament storage; parking and manoeuvring areas
and ground handling equipment and vehicles;
• Expanded training facilities and rapid induction of pilots, navigators, flight
engineers and signallers.
In fact, the IAF had to quickly expand to at least 15 squadrons. As brought out
in the chapter on Development of IAF Force Structures, the IAF managed to get
these requirements only by the late 1950s. These shortages also seem to have
influenced the thinking and options of the national leadership when Pakistan
again held out threats of war in the 1950s.

The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1962

For nearly 14 years after the end of the first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir,
India did not face war but unfortunately this long period was not used to
strengthen its defences, especially along the Sino-Indian frontier. Sometime in
1957, to its utter horror, India discovered that the Chinese had already built a
road in the Aksai Chin sector of Ladakh, an area claimed by the Chinese. A
recently published account by Sidney Wignall – an Englishman – claims that he
had in fact travelled to Tibet and gathered vital information about the Xinjiang-
Tibet Highway and passed it on to the Indian Army, at least two years before the
Chinese announced the building of the said road, but the Indian leadership did
not take him seriously.6 It was, however, too late to do anything about it. India
nw decided to beef up its army presence in the border areas and this required an
even larger air maintenance effort on a daily basis. Many generations of aircrews
of the IAF transport fleet cut their teeth in these operations, wich became the
virtual lifeline for the troops deployed in the forward areas. Maintaining the army
and civilian population of the forward areas by air supply alone also gave rise to
the need for helicopters, as many of the posts and villages were inaccessible to
fixed wing aircraft; the dropping zones were too small and often located on
muntain tops, such that even a slight error due to strong winds resulted in the
precious loads rolling off the hill slopes. Narrow valleys that often abruptly ended
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 93

in a cul-de-sac presented serious challenges for the supply-dropping aircraft flying

at the limits of their performance. Although the Border Roads Organisation
(BRO) came up in the late 1950s, surface roads and infrastructure took a very
long time to develop, with the result that the task of air maintenance increased
with every passing year. Moreover, fixed wing aircraft could not be used for
casualty evacuation from remote posts. (Please see Appendix V).
The newly founded (October 1, 1949) People’s Republic of China (PRC)
showed its hand when it invaded Tibet in 1950, with the ostensible aim of
reunification of territories that it had allegedly lost to imperialist forces during
its period of weakness. In one stroke, India’s northern borders that had until then
seen no threat from the peaceable Tibetans, became alive to possible Chinese
expansionism. As if to add insult to injury, the PRC maps showed vast areas of
India, in fact the whole of he North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal
Pradesh) and large parts of Ladakh as Chinese territory. When India pointed out
this erroneous depiction of India-China borders Zhou En-Lai, the PRC premier
in a dubious reply said that the maps were old and needed to be revised, giving
the impression that the maps would be corrected. Soon, however, the PRC howed
its true colours and repudiated the McMahon Line that formed the border between
the two countries. India signed a trade agreement in April 1954, giving up all its
privileges in Tibet under which India had carried out trade, maintained Post and
Telegraph Department facilities and enjoyed freedom for its citizens to cross into
Tibet without any visa requirements. India surprisingly demanded nothing in
return. Such professions of good faith and good neighbourliness fell on deaf
yearsand the PRC soon began engineering border incidents with Indian border
police and guards who were invariably unarmed. The first such incident occurred
“when shortly after the 1954 agreement, the two sides began to contest the
ownership of a grazing ground called Bara Hoti in the middle sector”7 on the
Uttar Pradesh (UP)-Tibet border but was amicably resolved and perhaps lulled
India nto a false sense of security.
Four years earlier, Sardar Patel, the then Home Minister and Jawaharlal
Nehru’s deputy had, in a much-talked-about letter in October 1950, raised the
issue of a possible threat from the PRC, but it was ignored, as India was vigorously
and assiduously cultivating Chinese friendship. In another lesser-known letter to
Nehru, Patel had actually evinced his apprehensions of a Communist Chinese
military threat as early as in March 1949, seven months before the founding of
the PRC. Patel had also engaged in a discussion with the then Secretary General
in India’s External Affairs Ministry, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, an experienced
former Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer, who also had similar apprehensions
about China’ expansionist behaviour. By the end of the 1950s, relations between
the two countries had deteriorated to such an extent that there was open talk in
the Indian media of a possible military conflict, and yet the decision-makers
94 Air Power and National Security

allowed themselves to be lulled into believing that whatever India said or did, the
Chinese would never attack. India, by publishing the entire correspondence with
China as white papers in 1960-61 to meet public demand and to garner its support,
perhaps unwittingly made it even more difficult to find a mutually acceptable
solution to the border problem. The Chinese had apparently wanted the
negotiations to remain confidential.
In the absence of a clear directive from the government, the IAF was not
quick to address the problem of poor access to the remote border areas and
somehow managed to acquire in the mid-1950s, an assortment of helicopters.
The American Sikorsky S-55C in 1954, Bell 47G, S-62B and Russian Mi-4 were
inducted from 1954 to 1960. These played an important role in taking vital
supplies to our beleaguered troops when the crisis erupted. The Bell light
helicopters evacuated casualties in dangerous situations and often faced Chinese
small arms fire. For various reasons that are still not fully explained, the IAF
contribution during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 remained confined to
the use of helicopter and transport aircraft for casualty evacuation and air supply.
The IAF had moved some Toofani squadrons to reinforce the combat assets
in the East but their serviceability was poor.8 By 1962, the IAF in fact possessed
some 23 combat squadrons comprising Hunter, Mystere, Toofani and Vampire,
and Canberra light bomber aircraft suitable for air interdiction and photo
reconnaissance. (For details please see Appendix I) Air Marshal Randhir Singh
who commanded No. 106 PR Squadron and flew a Canberra PR aircraft on a
photo reconnaissance mission over Aksai Chin in Ladakh and the border areas of
NEFA, found that the Chinese were well entrenched along the McMahon Line
and could be seen living under proper but temporary huts and tin sheds.9
There are many plausible reasons for the IAF not being used in an offensive
role. The official history of the 1962 Sino-Indian Border Conflict claims that Air
Commodore H.C. Dewan, then Director of Operations at Air HQ, had said
that due to the mountainous terrain air power would not prove useful and yet
some fighter squadrons were moved to Bagdogra, Tezpur, Jorhat and possibly
Chhabua. Late Air Marshal Y.V. Malse, however, strongly refuted this claim and
categorically said that the IAF combat aircraft were ready to enter the fray. Malse,
in fact, himself flew a sortie in a Hunter trainer aircraft to recce the areas along
the McMahon Line.10
Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee, the first Indian Air Chief, had enjoyed a
good relationship with Nehru but he had passed away in November 1959. Air
Marshal A.M. Engineer, who succeeded Mukherjee, apparently did not enjoy the
same equation with the Prime Minister. According to Randhir Singh, although
Air Marshal A.M. Engineer was present in person at Jorhat to brief him (Randhir
Singh) for his photo reconnaissance mission and was obviously in the know of
developments on the ground, his advice was apparently not sought or, worse,
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 95

disregarded. He, as a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, would have

attended all meetings and frequently interacted with V.K. Krishna Menon who,
till the end, did not believe that the Chinese would actually attack. Menon was
known for his brusque and condescending ways and often dismissed the advice
of the military top brass. It seems that Engineer, who did not enjoy a good equation
with the Defence or Prime Minister, was simply sidelined. It is also well known
that when tensions rose, Menon ordered that minutes would not be recorded at
any meetings that he had with the Chiefs. As a result, there are no official records
of what exactly transpired at these meetings.
B.C. Roy, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, is also reported to have
advised Nehru to refrain from bombing Chinese positions for fear of retaliation
against Calcutta (now Kolkata). This concern about the risk of cities being
bombed, was to heavily influence the thinking that led to the decision not to use
combat air power during the war with China in 1962. As discussed in Chapter
3 another influential person to advise Nehru against the use of combat air power
was the then US envoy at Delhi, John Kenneth Galbraith, but this advice came
only three days before the ceasefire. Galbraith’s advice was based on many other
considerations, the most important of which was to avoid inadvertent escalation.11
Apparently, the Indian Army also did not brief or formulate joint plans with
the IAF but Lieutenant General S.P.P. Thorat, who relinquished his post as the
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Command (then based at
Lucknow), only in May 1961 and had been in charge of the defence of NEFA
from around 1960, claims that the Army Chief General K.S. Thimayya directed
‘Exercise: Lal Qila’. All the Principal Staff Officers at the Army Headquarters
and some very senior Air Force officers were present at Lucknow for this exercise
in March 1960, to assess, understand and devise ways to thwart a possible Chinese
attack across the northern borders. Thorat had a serious difference of opinion
with Menon on the implementation of the so-called ‘forward policy’. He stated:
“Advised by Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul, he (V.K. Krishna Menon) wanted
me to organise the defences for NEFA in very close proximity of the McMahon
Line, with which I entirely disagreed.”12 It would have been obvious to anyone
that deploying our troops in penny packets without mutual fire support and
assured logistical backup strung all along the border would be suicidal; but since
both the Prime Minister and Menon strongly believed that there would be no
war, it was impossible to convince them of the folly. Some writers have unfairly
said that senior military officers did not give adequate options or alternatives to
the political leadership even after having seen evidence to the contrary.13 Another
author candidly writes about how Y.B. Chavan, the next Defence Minister,
succeeded in saving the reputation of the Prime Minister by ensuring that all the
flak was directed at Menon and Kaul who undoubtedly deserved it. Nehru was,
however, not very happy when Chavan accepted Kaul’s resignation and tried to
96 Air Power and National Security

reinstate him in some other appointment and sacked Menon only when the
Executive Committee of the Congress demanded Menon’s head and implicitly
threatened an open rebellion against Nehru if he did not agree.14 It is also clear
that neither Menon nor Nehru paid much attention to the needs of the military
since they were hoping to avoid a clash through diplomacy; Menon said this in
so many words. There is also no evidence of the Minister of Defence or Prime
Minister ever sitting together with the top military brass to discuss the Chinese
threat.
Earlier in 1948, Nehru was quite happy to discuss details of the various
operations in J&K during the 1947-48 war, with Mountbatten and all the British
senior officers of the army and air force, along with the then Defence Minister
Baldev Singh, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel and Rajaji (C. Rajagopalachari)
in the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet, later Defence Committee of the
Cabinet. Why then did he not speak with his own Generals or Air Marshals? Was
it out of distrust? Did he think the Indian military brass was not competent to
advise the government? Was Menon the main reason for keeping vitally important
information from the Prime Minister? A year and a half after his retirement,
Thorat was called to personally brief Nehru. During this meeting, Nehru carefully
read Thorat’s recommendations for the defence of NEFA and asked why these
plans were not shown to him before the Chinese attack. To which Thorat said
that the question should be addressed to Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon.15
Two inferences can be drawn from this narrative. The political leadership
was over-confident and misread the Chinese signals by rigidly refusing
negotiations, even when India’s claims in Aksai Chin were not unassailable. Nehru
strongly and sincerely, if innocently, believed that a Chinese attack on India would
lead to immediate intervention by the Great Powers to avoid a world war.16
Secondly, there was simply no one among the senior officials to forcefully argue
against the strongly held views of Menon, Mullick and Nehru and as a result of
‘group think’17 no one else could offer any way out. It is little wonder then, that
in this air of doom and utter confusion, no one ever thought of employing air
power to thwart or at least check the Chinese advance. Given Nehru’s towering
personality and larger than life persona no Air Marshal, however courageous,
could have confronted him and invited humiliation.
Absence of communications, infrastructure, roads, readily actionable
intelligence about the actual capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF), inter-service consultations and joint planning, greatly diminished the
chance of India even giving a fair and equal fight in NEFA. Shortage of helicopters,
transport aircraft and most importantly, a complete absence of resolve on the
part of the national leadership are some of the major lessons of this war. A
dysfunctional civil-military interface, a print media baying for the blood of the
Defence Minister, and India’s inability to read Chinese signalling, made it
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 97

impossible to put up a coherent response and the poor ill-clad and ill-equipped
jawan (Hindi for soldier) paid the price for these blunders.
In spite of these glaring deficiencies, three years later, India was once again
caught on the back foot. Pradhan reports that Y.B. Chavan made a concerted
effort to raise the morale of the armed forces by first embarking on a long-term
programme for the re-equipment and modernisation of the army and the air
force. He began daily morning meetings with the three Service Chiefs and the
Defence Secretary where a number of issues were discussed, solutions found and
actions initiated. Above all, Chavan ensured that minutes of these meetings were
ready by three in the afternoon every day, which should have facilitated action on
a war footing. He was also worried that the Chinese might launch another attack
once the mountain passes opened the following summer.18 In July 1963, India
quickly reinforced its posts in Sikkim to prevent the Chinese from advancing
into North Bengal from the Chumbi Valley and cutting off Assam and the North-
eastern states. Both the army and air force were to be expanded; the army with
three mountain divisions and the air force with 20 additional squadrons.
Recruitment of officers for the two services and their training facilities were
expanded. Pakistan, it seems, kept a close watch on these developments and struck,
taking full advantage of the Indian preoccupation, before any major expansion
plans came anywhere near fruition.

Indo-Pak War, 1965

The 1965 Indo-Pak War should actually have begun in November 1964, when
both sides fought a ferocious encounter at Tithwal; or in April 1965, when
Pakistan intruded into the Kutch sector and claimed territory; or at least when
forward posts in Kargil and Haji Pir pass changed hands in August; and lastly,
when Pakistan sent in intruders under its plan codenamed Operation Gibraltar
on August 5,1965 into the Kashmir Valley, but did not because India tried its
utmost to avoid an all-out war for which it was not ready.
India’s policy to avoid war till the very last moment is indeed laudable, but
that should not have stopped its political and military leaders from preparing
contingency plans for a possible conflict if diplomacy failed, as it finally did. In
the early hours of September 1, 1965 Pakistan struck at India’s jugular, the Chhamb
salient in close proximity of the main road linking Kashmir with the rest of India;
an obvious target. The Chhamb-Jaurian salient extends north-westwards from
the bridge at Akhnoor on the road to Kashmir and this was the major objective
of the Pakistani assault. Here again, geography favoured Pakistan as it could
maintain a sizeable force in the near vicinity, whereas India under the United
Nations (UN) proposals was not allowed to keep any major army units close to
the Ceasefire Line (CFL) in J&K. Strangely enough, India again failed to anticipate
this threat.
98 Air Power and National Security

On the afternoon of September 1, 1965, Y.B. Chavan, the Defence Minister,

was discussing air force modernisation plans with Air Chief Arjan Singh, when
General J.N. Chaudhuri barged into his office and demanded immediate air
support to stabilise the situation in Chhamb, where the army was under immense
enemy pressure. Air Marshal Arjan Singh was expecting such a request and had
readied a sizeable force of fighters at Pathankot, a forward airbase close to the
scene of action. Chavan gave the go-ahead and in less than 45 minutes, some 12
Vampires and 14 Mystere IVA fighter bombers were heading to the area as the
sun was setting, and this adversely affected their visibility. The IAF succeeded in
halting the Pakistani armour, but lost three pilots and four Vampires in air
encounters with the Pakistani Sabres. While the IAF claimed some 10 enemy
tanks and a number of guns and other vehicles, it also caused damage to its own
forces. Such fratricide was inevitable, for there was little briefing and/or prior
planning. The loss of four Vampires in the very first air action was naturally a
shock, but considering that the Vampires were no match for the Pakistani Sabres,
they should not have gone without fighter escort; but that is hindsight. Pakistan
Air Force (PAF) radars had far better coverage and the Sabres used that to full
advantage. It is said that the plan was to send only the relatively faster Mystere,
but the Vampire Squadron Commander argued and won the privilege of leading
the first strike of the war. The first two Vampire formations did in fact return
unscathed.19
It is surprising that although the IAF had known of the Pakistani attack early
that morning, it still chose to await a formal request by the Army Chief, General
J.N. Chaudhuri. The two new Chiefs were both experienced professionals, yet
there were no prior consultations. As has happened again and again with disturbing
regularity, the Indian Army continues to keep its plans close to the chest, and
demands that the air force jump into the fray at the last minute, simply because
it has tended to treat air power only as a bonus. Probably because it does not fall
under its direct purview, the IAF too, is not proactive in keeping tabs on the day-
to-day developments in forward areas and offering its support, even at the risk
of being brushed off. IAF says that-safeguarding the land borders is not its mandate.
Even the official history, which remains classified, but is freely available on the
internet, is silent about why there was such total absence of army-air force
consultations, especially when the three Chiefs of Staff, according to Pradhan,
were supposedly meeting the Defence Minister every morning, unless that practice
had fallen into disuse as happens with most Indian schemes. India was once again
absolutely and completely surprised. Air action remained restricted to the Chhamb
area for the next four days during which the IAF drew its first blood, when the
tiny Gnats flown by Squadron Leader Trevor Keeler and Flight Lieutenant V.S.
Pathania, shot down a Sabre each on September 3 and 4.
To relieve Pakistani pressure, India, as per its oft-repeated threat, now decided
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 99

to open a second front across the International Border in Punjab. This, however,
did not happen for five full days. The IAF also did not mount an offensive until
the 7th morning, but only after the PAF had launched devastating strikes on IAF
airfields on the evening of the 6th. Apparently, due to heavy losses, daylight counter
air operations against each other’s airfields by both sides were discontinued after
the first day, with this task being taken over by IAF Canberra and PAF B-57 light
bombers by night. These night attacks did not prove very effective, but caused
much nuisance and in the case of the IAF, further aircraft losses on ground.
The IAF flew a total of 3,937 combat sorties of which Combat Air Patrol
(CAP) over own airfield consumed nearly a third – 1,352 sorties. Inadequate
radar cover and close proximity to the border of IAF airfields, and perhaps a
defensive mindset were the main reasons for this.
In 1965, India lost 75 aircraft with 37 of these being lost on the ground,
compared to PAF’s 19. PAF losses were perhaps far higher. Air Chief Marshal
Arjan Singh on a post-war visit to Peshawar noticed signs of severe damage, but
Pakistan was able to effectively camouflage it. The PAF destroyed 10 IAF aircraft
at Pathankot in a single attack, and 10 at Kalaikunda in two strikes, on the same
morning (September 7). The IAF committed a blunder by first striking Chittagong
in East Pakistan without any cohesive overall plan and then, not retaliating to
PAF strikes on Kalaikunda, Barrackpore, Bagdogra and Agartala, because by mid-
day September 7, Delhi had forbidden all offensive action against East Pakistan.
Not only was there little joint planning or coordination between the army and
the air force, IAF’s Offensive Air Support (OAS) to the army was also not
appreciated, as it did not seem to change the course of events or cause serious
damage to the enemy except in Khemkaran. As a veteran of this war succinctly
put it:
My impression about all air operations, whether in the East or West, was
that nobody seemed to know what to do. According to me, the level of
professionalism at all levels was extremely low and I do not exclude my
own performance. The lessons learnt in 1965 were all negative ones – in
other words, what not to do should there be another conflict. These lessons
were so numerous and cogent that they were more valuable than any
positive lessons.20
A damning indictment, if there ever was one.
The major lessons of this 22-day-long war can be summarised as follows:
Inadequate radar cover forced the IAF to devote a disproportionately large effort
to CAP sorties over its forward airfields located close to the border; Pathankot
being a mere two minutes flying time away.
Absence of covered bomb-proof shelters commonly known as Blast Pens
resulted in excessive loss of aircraft on ground. After the first few days of the war,
100 Air Power and National Security

the IAF began the practice of pulling back most of its fighters to depth airfields
like Ambala after their last sortie of the day, for night halt. Ambala had some 50
Gnats and many more Hunter and Mystere aircraft lined up on the tarmac.
According to Air Marshal Randhir Singh, the Gnats at Ambala were feeding the
three ‘active’ squadrons, Nos. 2, 9 and 23, then fighting from Pathankot and
Halwara. At one time, there were nearly 100 aircraft at this base, when the PAF
B-57 dropped bombs which fortunately skipped in the wrong direction and hit
the cathedral nearby. If the bombs had skipped in the other direction, we would
have lost a huge number of aircraft on ground in a single attack.21
The PAF B-57 night raids were a serious nuisance as the crews could not get
enough rest, but these strikes, often inaccurate, also destroyed a number of aircraft
on ground. For example, on September 12-13 night, in four raids over Jamnagar,
India lost a Hunter trainer, and a Dakota at the Repair and Servicing Unit (R&SU)
hangar. Some 23 bombs fell in residential military quarters. On 13-14 night, two
Vampires, one Dakota and a Hunter were destroyed.
At Jodhpur, which was raided frequently, the damage was little, as there were
no operational aircraft based here and the damage to runways and installations
was slight. Soon after the war, it was decided to move the Air Force Flying College
away from Jodhpur, but it took nearly five years before the Air Force Academy
at Dundigal near Hyderabad was ready for use. When the author’s course which
was terminated for a month recommenced at Jodhpur, there was no evidence of
any damage by the enemy.
At Adampur, the bombs hit a fuel dump and the fire could have been a
beacon for further strikes but none came. A Mystere, along with a refuelling
browser was destroyed at Pathankot. Thirteen of the 37 aircraft lost on ground
were bagged by B-57 night raids. At Khem Karan, the PAF Sabres took a heavy
toll on the Indian Army. Eleven Sherman tanks were destroyed and some 200
men of Mahar and Gorkha regiments were killed, captured or wounded.
IAF Mystere fighters flew so low that these aircraft sometimes came back
with overhead High Tension (HT) cables in their under-wing pylons. Such was
the apprehension of enemy fighters that all pilots were flying at ultra-low levels,
40-50 feet off the ground. Lack of radar cover added to this fear, as there was no
warning. The enemy Air Defence (AD) also took a big toll of our aircraft on
Close Air Support (CAS) missions, because the pilots also carried out multiple
passes, for example five passes by the then Flight Lieutenant Vinod Patney who
admitted to being ‘reckless’ but lucky all the same. Flight Lieutenants Micky
Jatar, P.C. Chopra, Vinod Patney and Jimmy (V.K.) Bhatia (later Air Marshal)
were members of the charmed formation that came back unscathed after every
mission.
There were some shining examples of selfless sacrifice by civilians. Chaman
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 101

Lal, a civilian fireman at Gurdaspur railway station, won the Ashok Chakra for
disconnecting the two tankers on fire from the rest of the train, but in doing so
lost his life.22
A Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is often needed for daylight activity such as own
convoy movement or advance/retreat of own ground forces, rail and road
movement of stores. Forward Air Controllers (FACs), operating with own ground
forces can then direct friendly fire and warn own troops and aircraft of the presence
of enemy fighters. This becomes critical if we have not been able to neutralise
offensive capabilities of the enemy air force or in other words, not achieved a
Favourable Air Situation (FAS). Although many offensive sweep missions were
flown by the Gnat and MiG-21 squadrons, these did not prove effective as the
enemy simply waited until these had vacated the area and then pounced on our
troops. The war also proved that to be successful, the air force must resort to
sustained offensive action.
The F-104, F-86 Sabre-Sidewinder combination initially inhibited IAF
options. Although the F-104 did not prove effective in intercepting IAF Canberra
night attacks, these remained risky because unlike the United States (US)-built
B-57 version of the English Electric Canberra, the Indian Canberra did not have
an ejection seat for the navigator, who was obliged to bail out manually; a near
impossibility in an emergency.
CAS to the army was also not effective, due mainly, to the archaic
communications and demand procedures. Each IAF forward airfield had a Ground
Liaison Officer (GLO) but his information and briefings were invariably poor,
as he was not getting updated information from his army Corps/Formation
Headquarters. Although the IAF interdicted enemy trains carrying ammunition,
vehicle convoys, armour and even troop concentrations and launched many ‘search
& destroy’ missions, the army said it was bombing the wrong targets and hence,
these strikes did not support ground action.
Soon after the war, the IAF began building blast pens at all its forward airfields
and completed this task by early 1968. More forward airfields were built at
locations, even closer to the border, and these were invariably provided a parallel
taxi track of about the same length as the runway, for landing and take-off, if and
when, the main runway became unusable due to enemy bombing or other reasons
such as landing accidents.
Another possible reason for a less than optimum relationship between the
army and the air force was that until 1965 the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was
a full four-star General whereas the Air Force and Naval Chiefs were of the rank
of Air Marshal and Vice Admiral respectively; a rank lower than the COAS. Soon
after the war, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan removed this glaring anomaly. In
the 1950s and 1960s, the age-old tradition of demanding and offering respect
102 Air Power and National Security

and deference to age, seniority and experience was in evidence across all
organisations. Born in 1908, General J.N. Chaudhuri was 11 years older than
Air Marshal Arjan Singh. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal draws a vivid pen picture
of the army chief.
Whether or not the use of the air force would have turned the Chinese
tide is difficult to say. The point to note is that the 1962 war saw our
military competence at its lowest ebb. This was largely because an over
confident Defence Minister (Menon) set out to direct the war on his own,
putting hastily assembled troops without the benefit of consultation or
advice and assistance from the Chiefs of the three Services. Air Marshal
A.M. Engineer, the Chief of the Air Staff at the time, was an extremely
frustrated man in consequence.
Except for minor variations, this story was repeated in 1965, though by
then Krishna Menon had been gone for nearly three years from the
Ministry of Defence. The Defence Minister was Mr. Y.B. Chavan, a strong
and silent man who restored constitutional rule in the Armed Forces, with
the Chiefs of Staff being given the consideration that their positions
deserved and the assistance that their Services required.
This time there was another dominant personality to reckon with: General
J.N. Chaudhuri, Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). A tall, handsome
cavalry man, educated in England, trained for the Army at Sandhurst,
with battle experience gained in World War II, well-read, much travelled,
with a highly sophisticated taste in clothes, food, music and fine living,
a witty raconteur and conversationalist, ebullient and full of confidence
in his own abilities, he had led the military operations that secured the
State of Hyderabad for India in 1948 and Goa in December 1961. By
1962 it seemed that he had been passed over by Mr. Krishna Menon for
the top job in the Army. The Chinese came to his rescue as they did to
mine! Along with Krishna Menon went General P.N. Thapar, who had
the misfortune of being the Chief of the Army Staff when the Chinese
came into India. General Chaudhuri, with his record of successes and
impressive personality, was just the man for the job of reviving the Army’s
morale and the country’s fortunes. Soon after becoming the COAS he
also succeeded to the Chairmanship of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
This came about when Air Marshal Arjan Singh succeeded Air Marshal
A.M. Engineer as the Chief of the Air Staff and Vice Admiral S. Soman
succeeded Vice Admiral R.D. Katari as the Naval Chief about the same
time.23
General J.N. Chaudhuri also did not come out of this war unscathed.
Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, the Western Army Commander, openly
defied him when he was ordered to pull back his forces to the East of the Beas
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 103

River. Chaudhuri also invited criticism when he allegedly feared low ammunition
stocks whereas in reality there was no such dearth.24
Offensive spirit and audacious action together, often pave the way to success.
To illustrate the point: During the 1965 war, East Pakistan had only one Sabre
squadron, but it played havoc by destroying a total of 12 precious aircraft of the
IAF in just four strikes; proving what a single squadron can do if the enemy is
clueless, careless, confused and disorganised. In retrospect, the IAF should not
have attacked targets in East Pakistan; but once begun, should not have stopped
but gone on relentlessly to destroy the PAF assets based there. The IAF had
adequate assets to achieve that in the Eastern theatre. By the time the ceasefire
came into effect at 3.30 am on September 23, 1965. India’s total losses were
3,621 killed and 8,444 wounded. The dead included 359 missing.25
Pakistan claimed the destruction of 104 Indian aircraft and admitted a loss
of only 19. Of these, 35 were claimed in air-to-air combat and 34 were destroyed
on ground; all, except four, to Sabres and the remainder to F-104s. Only two,
Lowe’s Canberra and Devayya’s Mystere were confirmed F-104 kills. Pakistan’s
claims were highly exaggerated. It claimed five over Halwara when in fact only
two, Pingle and Gandhi, were shot down; but not before they had shot down one
each of the attacking Sabres. Only 18 aircraft were actually lost in air-to-air combat.
There was also little army-air force coordination in assessing claims of the
anti-aircraft artillery units of the army. Army gunners often claimed a kill when
they saw Sabres dropping their external fuel tanks. Most Indians believe that
1965 was a stalemate, but the armed forces certainly succeeded in thwarting
Pakistan’s plans to wrest control of Kashmir by force, albeit at heavy cost in men
and material. The IAF and the Indian Army had also managed to blunt the
offensive capability of the enemy by destroying 250 US-made Patton tanks. Even
so, the IAF could have done much more. According to Sam Manekshaw, the
army failed to cash the blank cheque that the Indian Government had issued, by
declaring that any attack on J&K would be met by a similar attack across the
International Border (IB) in Punjab. Another army officer called it a clear case of
missed opportunities.26
In the 1965 war, the IAF fielded the only MiG-21 squadron (No. 28), five
Mystere IVAs (Nos. 1, 3, 8 31 and 32), three Hunters (No. 7, 20 and 27), two
Gnats (No. 23 & 9) and two squadrons of Vampires (45 and 220) and three
Canberras (5, 16, and 106) on the Western front. The successful Canberra strikes
on Peshawar and Badin became part of the Canberra legend. No 5 Squadron
alone flew 150 sorties. One Hunter squadron (No. 37), and one Canberra
squadron (No. 16), were moved from the Eastern theatre to the West, but were
hardly used since the war ended soon after their arrival.
This shows that the IAF used only 16 combat squadrons for actual operations
104 Air Power and National Security

whereas it possessed a total of 25 squadrons. At an average serviceability rate of

approximately 70-75 per cent, this translates into a little under one-third of the
strength of the air force. The IAF could well have caused far more damage to the
enemy if all its assets had been fully employed. The corollary is that a small, but
determined and audacious air force, (such as the single PAF Sabre Squadron at
Dacca, now Dhaka) can change the complexion of any conflict and this is true
even today.
In their book on the war, P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra write:
As part of the agreement reached at Tashkent under the auspices of the
Soviet Union, Pakistan and India agreed to the establishment of diplomatic
relations, halting of hostile propaganda, and restoration of economic and
social ties. India gained little from the Tashkent Declaration, except six
years of uneasy peace; India was forced to hand over all the captured
territory (including the strategically important Haji Pir Pass in J&K. India’s
main objective of having Pakistan labelled as the aggressor was also not
achieved. The Tashkent Declaration only ensured a return to an
unsatisfactory status quo.27
As brought out above, this 22-day war ended inconclusively but India achieved
its limited objective of stopping Pakistan from wresting Kashmir by force and its
army captured a sizeable chunk of Pakistan’s territory which had to be returned
under the Tashkent Agreement. India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri showed
firmness and resolve in dealing with Pakistan and his government withstood the
combined pressure of the Western bloc for an early ceasefire and repeated Chinese
threats on the northern border. The outcome of the war would have been different
had the Indian Government and the three Service Chiefs made detailed joint
plans to meet Pakistani aggression especially after the Kutch episode.

Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971

It is now over four decades since the 1971 India-Pakistan War that resulted in
the birth of Bangladesh. Whichever way one looks at this event, it added a glorious
chapter to India’s independence history. Every air force veteran that this author
has spoken to now, and in these over 40 years, readily agrees that it was indeed
a high watermark in the history of the IAF. Much has been written about this
surprisingly short 14-day war but the current generation of young members of
the air force and sister services, need to be told that no one really expected Pakistan
to capitulate in such a short time.
The official history records a short conversation which went something like
this:
When asked by a senior air force officer as to why he had surrendered
when his army was intact, General Niazi, the Pakistani Army Commander
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 105
in Dacca pointed at the wings on the chest of this officer and said, “because
of this, you, the Indian Air Force”. At first glance this might appear a
gross over-simplification of the events and an exaggeration of the role
played by the IAF but on deeper reflection it is an accurate description
of the short war.28
The IAF attained total air superiority or control of the skies over the country
in just 48 hours by effectively neutralising the PAF assets at Dacca, which consisted
of only a single F-86 Sabre squadron, some 20 aircraft and a few T-37 trainers.
The IAF, on the other hand, had 11 fighter-bomber squadrons in the Eastern
theatre. It was no doubt an uneven contest, but total control of the air over East
Pakistan again proved the old air power adage: ‘With air superiority anything is
possible; without it everything is at risk.’ The IAF, soon after putting the runways
at Dacca’s Tezgaon and Kurmitola airfields out of action, began to provide the
Indian Army with all kinds of support. It carried our relentless strikes on enemy
positions, destroyed bridges, river barges and boats, ammunition dumps and
generally made it extremely dangerous for the enemy to think of any concerted
counter attacks. The IAF transport fleet not only carried out a battalion-size para-
drop over Tangail, north of Dhaka, without a hitch, but its Mi-4 helicopters flew
an astonishingly large contingent of the army, some 3,000 troops across the mighty
Meghna River, to hasten the capitulation of the Pakistan Army.
So proactive, intense and whole-hearted was the IAF’s role in these operations
– codenamed Cactus Lily – that it left little room for complaints or bickering.
Such was the speed of the Indian Army’s advance that the participants themselves,
and the leaders and decision-makers in Delhi, and indeed, the world were totally
stunned. While it is difficult to single out an operation for special credit, the
hastily mounted strike by four rocket-firing MiG-21 fighters on the Government
House at Dhaka at about noon on December 14 that turned the tide of the war,
would surely be one such. Here it is in the words of Wing Commander (later
AVM) B.K. Bishnoi:
On 14th December I had just returned from a close-support mission in
the morning from Mainamati Cantonment when Group Captain Wollen
came rushing to our operations room and said, “Bhoop, a very critical
and urgent task has come from Air HQ. There is a very important meeting
going on at Circuit House, Dacca and this building needs to be attacked
at 1120 hrs.”
I told him that, first it was already 1055 and it required 21 minutes to be
at Dacca and then “Where in God’s name is the Circuit House located in
Dacca?”
He said, “If you hurry up you can just about make it. Here, I have tourist
map of Dacca and here, next to this road crossing is the Circuit House.”
106 Air Power and National Security
I looked back at him, the Circuit House was part of a densely populated
area of Dacca and from the air one could see hundreds of road crossings,
how was one to pick that one? I simply said, “Yes Sir, it shall be done.”
I borrowed that map from him to be taken along and with this, search
for that Circuit House after getting overhead Dacca.
For this mission I was taking four MiG-21s loaded with 32 high explosive
rockets each. I was strapped in the cockpit of the aircraft and started the
engine, just when I saw one of our Flight Commanders waving a paper
and run towards me. “Sir, this is for you.” It read, “Target is Government
House, repeat Government House and not Circuit House”. Confirm
understood. Best of luck and good shooting. Mally.”
“I raised my thumb to confirm that I had noted the change. I quickly
scanned the tourist map in my lap and located the Government House
and taxied out. At this stage I did not inform of the change to the other
three members of my team which consisted of Flight Lieutenant Vinod
Bhatia, Flight Lieutenant Raghavachari and Flight Lieutenant Malhi as I
did not want to announce this on R/T for the whole world to know.”
“(We got) Airborne and as we were approaching Dacca and had barely a
minute to go, I gave the new target to my numbers 2, 3 and 4. I described
the rough location of the target and asked them to look for it. Flight
Lieutenant Bhatia spotted it first, calling that the target was at 11 o’clock,
500 yards away. It was a magnificent old styled palatial building with a
high dome, situated in the middle of a lush green compound. There were
quite a few vehicles inside the entrance gate”.
“I did a “chakkar”29 around it to reconfirm its identity and then ordered
the attack taking the building from broad side. I aimed at the room below
the dome, others took on other portions. We did two passes each and
fired 128 rockets into the Government House.”
“By the second attack smoke and dust could be seen rising from many
locations from the abode of the mightiest in East Pakistan. It obviously
broke the backbone of the civilian government. Two days later General
Niazi, the Supreme Commander of the Pakistan Military in East Pakistan
was to surrender to the Indian Defence Forces along with 93,000
troops.”30

This successful strike was followed by two MiG-21s and two Hunters, to
ensure that this vitally important target was indeed fully destroyed. “This sudden
and spectacular attack carried out with pinpoint accuracy destroyed a third of
the Government House and caused severe damage to the rest of the buildings. It
so completely unnerved and demoralised the persons present at the meeting that
the Head of the East Pakistan Government Dr. A.M. Malik along with his entire
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 107

Cabinet resigned then and there.”31 This attack also proved that ‘decapitation’ of
national leadership might work in certain circumstances. Although it took three
more days for the formal surrender, the war in the East was effectively over.
India had decided to maintain a defensive posture with the sole aim of ‘holding
the front,’ simply to prevent Pakistan from gaining large chunks of Indian territory,
but that was easier said than done. Maintaining a purely defensive posture all
along the long International Border (IB) and the ceasefire line in J&K was nearly
impossible, because it meant spreading out troops along the entire length of the
IB, not knowing when and where the enemy might strike. Some contingency
actions would no doubt have been planned, but at the national level the aim was
to maintain the status quo. Pakistan started the war with a pre-emptive air strike
at 1740-45 hours on December 3, 1971 on some of the forward airfields of the
IAF. The attacks appeared to be half-hearted and failed to cause any significant
damage, to any runway or installations. The IAF had learnt its lessons from the
1965 conflict. At most bases, its aircraft were under bomb-proof shelters and/or
were widely dispersed. Improved radar cover, regular exercises, drills and close
liaison with the railways and other civilian agencies had ensured a far more efficient
and conducive air defence environment. The IAF retaliated on the same night
with Canberra strikes on some PAF air bases. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal, the
then Chief of the Air Staff had given very clear instructions that the army would
be given full support.
The main objectives of the IAF were:
(a) To defend the home base against enemy air attacks;
(b) To support the army in the field, and to take all actions to achieve a
Favourable Air Situation over the tactical area, besides carrying out
Counter Air Strikes, carry out interdiction and armed recce having a
direct bearing on the outcome of the land battle;
(c) Carry out necessary reconnaissance missions;
(d) Provide air transport support;
(e) Provide maritime air support to the navy.32

In reality, the IAF finally expended very little effort on counter air missions
and strikes on special/strategic targets such as the Karachi harbour, the Sui gas
plant, the hydro-electric power station at Mangla Dam and oil refineries at Attock,
although these attacks did not have any immediate effects in the short war. These
strikes, also did not in any way, reduce the IAF’s effort in support of the army,
a persistent complaint of the previous war. The two most noteworthy exploits on
the Western Front were the total decimation of a Pakistani armoured regiment in
Longewala, and the spectacular strikes on the Karachi complex. The experienced
and specially selected aircrews of the newly formed Tactics and Air Combat
108 Air Power and National Security

Development Establishment (TACDE), located at Ambala, carried out single

aircraft night attacks on PAF air bases with MiG-21 and S-22 aircraft. Although
they dropped only two 500-kg bombs in each attack, they caused much nuisance
and even frustration to the enemy; and except in one case, all of them returned
unscathed.

Major Lessons of the War

Although the IAF emerged with flying colours, there were some important lessons:
The Radius of Action (RoA) and armament carrying capacity of the IAF
fighter bomber fleet was extremely limited, and this constrained its freedom to
attack depth targets. Even so, Hunters and S-22s bombed rear airfields such as
Peshawar, Sargodha, Shorkot Road (Rafiqy) and others.33 This, counter air
campaign, was given up due to high attrition and negligible damage to the runways.
The Canberra could carry up to 4,000 kg (or 8×1000 lb.) bombs whereas all
the other aircraft could barely carry two 500-kg bombs. Their range restricted
their choices for evasive action and freedom of manoeuvre to engage the enemy
if needed; the limited bomb load meant insignificant damage to concrete runways
and hardened installations, except when attacks were repeated in quick succession.
Limited range also precluded ‘tactical routing’, enabling the enemy air defences
to easily pick up IAF fighters and lie in wait for them. The PAF also mounted
offset CAPs away from the airfields, giving full freedom to the anti-aircraft guns
to engage IAF attackers, and allowed the PAF interceptors to convert their height
or potential energy into speed, by diving while chasing the intruders. This once
again showed PAF’s emphasis on training with the United States Air Force (USAF).
After the war, the IAF concentrated on developing new and innovative tactics at
the TACDE and regularly conducted courses for training fighter leaders. The
PAF air defence network, especially radar and visual observers, proved quite
effective. Another shortcoming due to limited range was the inability of the IAF
to provide dedicated fighter escort to strike formations.
The newly acquired Soviet Sukhoi S-22 also called Su-7, was used both for
OAS and counter air missions. Most pilots tended to carry out multiple passes
over the targets, thus exposing their aircraft to lethal small arms and anti-aircraft
fire. As a result, the IAF lost many S-22 aircraft in these operations, especially on
the Western Front. Electronic Warfare (EW) capability was then non-existent.
The MiG-21 had a rudimentary Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) while the non-
Soviet fighters did not have even that. The K-13, the only air-to-air missile (AAM)
in the Indian inventory, was carried by the MiG-21 (Type-77) but proved totally
ineffective at low altitudes.
Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment (TACDE), then a newly
raised unit, was equipped with the MiG-21 and S-22. The highly experienced
and hand-picked pilots of this new unit, carried out low-level single aircraft
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 109

missions against Pakistani airfields by night. On reaching the enemy airfield, the
anti-aircraft batteries invariably put up a barrage and gave away the exact location,
thus facilitating the strike but since these fighters carried only two 500-kg bombs
each, the damage they caused was not very significant. These strikes, however,
had a huge nuisance value, as they kept the enemy awake and on alert every
night. Considering these single-aircraft missions were totally unprotected, their
losses were minimal. This was a bold and innovative employment of a short-
range fighter/interceptor.
In the six years since 1965, the procedures and signal communications for
army-air coordination/cooperation had improved. Radar cover was still patchy.
The Srinagar Valley and parts of Rajasthan were still without radar cover.
The Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM-II) (NATO Code Name Guideline) was
designed to engage only high-altitude threats, and while these might have forced
the enemy to fly at low levels, these missiles were not really effective; some seven
of these were fired without success. These were sited mainly for the defence of
large and important cities, such as Delhi, Agra and Chandigarh but a determined
enemy could have got through.
Use of forward airfields at Sirsa, Jaisalmer, Nal, Utarlai and Amritsar helped
mitigate, to some extent, the problems of range and time over target, but staging
through these Forward Base Support Units (FBSUs) as they came to be called,
added to maintenance and logistical difficulties. Except in a few cases, aircraft
were not regularly pulled back to rear bases.
The IAF was also forced to carry out a large number of reconnaissance sorties
as very little information was available about PAF airfields, since the IAF could
not obviously enter Pakistani air space prior to war. Recce sorties were also flown
for Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) by single unescorted fighters, mostly the
Su-7, with no self-protection except the integral guns. Although the recce
requirements of the army were invariably met, there was no feedback from the
army on its efficacy. The IAF had since the 1965 war managed to phase out some
old types such as Vampire, Toofani and Mystere. Their replacements, mainly the
MiG-21 and the S-22, although more modern and capable of very high speeds,
lacked range.
Although strategic and special operations constituted only 1.4 per cent of
the total effort, their results were often spectacular. The attacks on oil refineries
and storage tanks at Karachi and Attock, the hydro-electric power station at Mangla
Dam, and the Sui gas plant in the west and the very short notice strikes on the
Government House and the Radio Station at Dhaka were notable for their success.
The Tangail para-drop and the helicopter-lift of a brigade – 3,803 troops and
100 tons of other loads in 400 sorties – across a river in record time, are the other
examples of the IAF’s notable achievements.
110 Air Power and National Security

This ‘feint’ of a major heli-lift by night was successfully attempted when the
noise of many Mi-4 helicopters and the heli-lift of 4/5 Gorkha Rifles troops
from Kailashahar to a point north of Surma river effectively locked up two
Pakistani brigades at Sylhet and Maulavi Bazar. War is after all a game of defeating
the enemy by all means available. This was possible due mainly to smart thinking
at the local level. The IAF once again used an excessively large effort for CAP
missions. The airfield at Bareilly in western UP, was also provided CAPs to protect
aircraft movement; a totally avoidable waste of effort. Although Western Air
Command (WAC) deployed a few Gnats for the air defence of the Srinagar Valley,
their success was limited on account of poor visibility and non-availability of a
radar set.
In 1971 too, the single Sabre squadron based at Dhaka took more than two
days to be neutralised, and that too, only when the runways at Tezgaon and
Kurmitola airfields were damaged beyond repair. The IAF no doubt attained
total air superiority but against just one enemy squadron. Similarly, on December
14, 1971, a single attack on the Government House in Dhaka did not kill the
East Pakistan leadership, yet it forced the enemy to surrender in less than two
days. Although the Indian Army had only some 3,000 troops in the vicinity
while Pakistan had over 30,000, their morale was completely shattered and hence
they surrendered.
Nineteen seventy-one was indeed IAF’s finest hour. The victory showed that
in the post-1965 period, much work was done to hone our skills and streamline
inter-service relations and procedures. Most important, the nearly eight-month-
long warning period was also fruitfully used for military preparations and for
garnering political support of many friendly countries.
In the victory celebrations that followed, many deficiencies were glossed over
or simply forgotten. When this author asked the then Station Commander at
Srinagar immediately after the end of hostilities why our squadron was not given
the necessary administrative and logistical support, his laconic reply was, “There
are no courses of instructions for Station Commanders”. (All of us felt that the
planners at Headquarters WAC and Air Headquarters were unaware of the actual
conditions in the Srinagar Valley: poor visibility, poor communications; non-
availability of the Awantipura runway as a diversion, which resulted in the Gnats
having to keep extra fuel to divert to Udhampur; restriction on the total number
of Gnats that could be based at Srinagar; the total absence of radar cover in the
Valley and did not realise our frustration at our inability to successfully intercept
the PAF intruders. (Please see Appendix VI). At the strategic level, it seems no
one really knew or cared about what role the IAF elements were expected to play
in the larger scheme of things. It is often said that the national aim was to fight
a ‘holding battle’ in the Western Sector. India was more or less successful in
blocking Pakistani attempts in Baramulla, Chhamb, Sialkot and Rajasthan sectors,
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 111

but it is equally true that it did not use the opportunities that presented themselves
to strengthen or consolidate the CFL, in the critical state of J&K. Inadequate
joint planning and consultations between the army and the air force and the
general lack of interest of the political masters, were perhaps the cause for this
sub-optimal outcome on the Western front.

Sri Lanka, 1987-90

Begun with a promise of quickly ending the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in Sri Lanka,
India’s intervention proved ineffective, and extremely costly. The IAF flew a total
of 70,000 sorties mostly to provide helicopter support to the army; fixed wing
transport for airlift of stores and victuals; and only a few Mirage-2000 fighter
sorties at the very beginning of the war. This time too, the services did not find
it necessary to formulate a joint plan. The IAF was asked to provide transport
and helicopter support which it did admirably, but as in the past, the IAF learned
its lessons and continuously innovated and modified its tactics as the conflict
progressed. Besides massive fixed wing transport support for the army, the IAF
helicopter fleet played a vital role in providing tactical mobility to the army. It
also performed commendably in the casualty evacuation role. On many occasions,
the IAF helicopters came under small arms fire of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) insurgents that caused damage to the Mi-8 rotor blades. The LTTE
was rumoured to possess the deadly shoulder-fired heat-seeking anti-aircraft
missiles, but luckily this proved to be untrue. Given the thickly forested terrain,
the low-flying helicopters would have been extremely vulnerable to such weapons.
It is also possible that the LTTE did not use these missiles for fear of further
escalation.34 The major shortcoming of this military intervention, however, was
a total absence of joint planning, poor intelligence and the gung-ho attitude of
the top army and political bosses.

Maldives, 1988
India reacted with alacrity to a Save Our Souls (SOS) from the President of this
tiny island neighbour and in a matter of 15 hours, airlifted a para battalion to
Hulule, the only airfield close enough to Male – the other airfield at Gan with
a longer runway being 400 km away. While the operation was concluded quickly
without any loss as in many earlier cases, neither the IAF nor the army had any
intelligence, or even estimates of the strength of the rebels, their actual location,
or knew whether the airfield at Male was indeed in rebel hands. According to a
knowledgeable source, the operation could easily have ended in disaster, if the
rebels had simply blocked the Hulule runway with a few heavy vehicles. The
operation, in which the lumbering Il-76 planes carrying the crack troops of the
Indian Para Brigade landed in the dead of night, without any runway lights and
only limited radio contact with the ATC, could well have ended in disaster. The
112 Air Power and National Security

operation would have been much more challenging if the troops had faced major
opposition on landing. Absence of intelligence seems to be the leitmotif of all
Indian military operations but the information provided by the Indian
Ambassador to Male who happened to be in Delhi, when the emergency arose,
proved to be very useful to the aircrews of the Il-76, and the CO of the para
battalion (6 Para Commando).

Kargil, 1999
Since the end of the 1971 Bangladesh war, the IAF did not employ its combat
elements for 28 years, until the 1999 Kargil border war with Pakistan. This
localised conflict, however, went on for over two months, and threw up a number
of important lessons. The IAF lost a total of three fixed wing aircraft and one
helicopter in the first three days, and was forced to change/modify its weapon
delivery tactics. These changes were necessitated for two main reasons: the
availability of US-supplied shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles with the
enemy, and the unusually high altitude and the very small size of enemy targets.
The enemy having entrenched its troops in well protected and camouflaged
‘Sangars’ or makeshift battlements of rock, found it easy to rain fire from
dominating defensive positions, onto the Indian troops who were forced to mount
frontal attacks after first climbing near-vertical rock faces. The IAF used laser-
guided bombs and rockets and continuously modified its attack patterns to
improve accuracy. Low density, strong winds and very low temperatures together
substantively altered the trajectory of these air-delivered weapons, which in turn
affected the predictability and sighting/aiming methods for successful engagement.
Even so, in almost total white-out conditions, and often by night, the IAF fighters
delivered devastating fire on the enemy and completely destroyed the main enemy
logistics base at Munto Dhalo, which was otherwise inaccessible to Indian ground
troops. From May 26 to July 12, the IAF fighter-bombers flew a total of 1,200
missions; comprising 580 strike, 460 air defence and 160 reconnaissance missions.
In addition to a large number of fixed-wing transport sorties, flown to provide
tactical and strategic mobility, the IAF helicopters flew some 2,500 sorties,
transported 800 troops, rescued 600 casualties and airlifted 300 tons of material
for the ground forces. Army aviation helicopters also flew a large number of
sorties for communication, casualty evacuation and tactical recce. According to
one senior army officer, Kargil was mainly an artillery war, where the 155mm
Bofors howitzers played a vital role.35 The main aim of the enemy, of interdicting
the Leh-Kargil highway was effectively thwarted. India suffered a total of 517
killed and over 1,200 wounded.
The major lessons of the two-month-long border war can be summarised as
follows:
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 113

• India was once again surprised by the Pakistan Army’s audacious and, as
proved later, foolhardy attempt to infiltrate some five battalions of its
regular troops alongwith a few jihadi fighters across the Line of Control
(LoC) in the Kargil sector of J&K. All five battalions reportedly came
from the Northern Light Infantry consisting of troops recruited from
Gilgit-Baltistan (earlier called the Northern Areas) of Pakistan-occupied
Kashmir.
• The Indian Army did not detect these intruders until they were reported
by civilian nomadic ‘Gaddi’ shepherds, since all of these posts were vacated
during the winter months.
• It is claimed that Indian intelligence had reported unusually high activity
around Skardu in the winter months of 1999, but these reports were not
seriously acted upon.
• The army demanded that the IAF employ armed helicopters to engage
the well-entrenched enemy. The IAF was initially reluctant to use
helicopters as these were not suited for high-altitude offensive operations
and were vulnerable to enemy small arms fire and Man Portable Air
Defence Systems (MANPADS). In the event, 16 rocket-equipped Mi-
17 sorties were launched but these did not prove very effective and one
helicopter, not equipped with IR flares was lost to enemy MANPADS.
• The IAF also believed that use of offensive air power added a new
dimension to the conflict and that this was likely to lead to escalation
and hence needed prior approval of the government, which came only
on May 26, 1999.
• The Indian Government also restricted the air operations to our own
side of the LoC, which cramped the freedom of manoeuvre of the high
speed fighters.
• Almost all the strike missions were provided an air defence escort to
keep the PAF out of the fray. While a few PAF F-16 fighters were sighted,
there was no aerial engagement as the enemy aircraft stayed well away
from the combat zone.
• The IAF like the army, alerted almost all its units and stations located in
the Western Sector and was ready for a wider conflict if it had escalated.
Pakistan characteristically and unsurprisingly called this over-reaction
on the part of India.
• As in the past, Pakistan not only surprised India but also forced the
Indian military to fight at a place and time of its choice, thus severely
constraining India’s options.
• The IAF had not given adequate attention to air operations in the high
mountains.
114 Air Power and National Security

• Absence of prior consultations between the army and air force resulted
in avoidable bickering and heartburn.
• The IAF lost a MiG-27 to technical problems, and enemy Stingers shot
down a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 and severely damaged one engine of a
Canberra on a photo recce mission.
• While remaining on own side of the LoC certainly earned India some
diplomatic advantages, it also severely affected the efficacy of air power.
• In the future too, the IAF might be called upon to employ its offensive
air power according to such restrictive Rules of Engagement and as one
recent book has claimed, IAF performance may once again be termed as
marginal.36

Air Power Lessons from Other Wars

Arab-Israeli Wars
Since its birth in 1948, Israel has fought four major wars and numerous skirmishes
with its Arab neighbours. The Israeli Air Force has invariably been in the vanguard
of these conflicts. Israel is often criticised for overreaction and use of
disproportionate force, but its leadership insists that eternal vigilance and military
readiness are the only guarantors of its survival in the midst of hostile Arab
countries. It used the fledgling air arm in the 1948 and the 1956 Suez Crises,
but it came of age in the ‘1967 Six-Day War,’ when in just three hours on the
morning of June 5, 1967, it decimated the Egyptian Air Force in pre-emptive
strikes before it could even get airborne. Simultaneous strikes were carried out at
8.30 am when it was breakfast time for the Egyptian Air Force men and most of
its senior leadership was on its way to work. There was much tension and Egypt,
Syria, Iraq and Jordan were probably planning to attack Israel. By striking first,
the Israeli Air Force caught them napping and attained total air superiority in a
matter of hours, which finally helped bring the war to an end in a mere six days.
In the end, Israel claimed 452 Arab aircraft destroyed, of which 49 were in aerial
combat. The IAF lost only 20 of its aircraft. Only after it had achieved total air
supremacy in the first two days did it focus its attention on the enemy’s ground
forces when it effectively broke the Egyptian Army, at the Mitla and Giddi passes,
destroying seven Egyptian divisions with 1,000 vehicles (including 800 tanks).
The Arabs had apparently learned no lessons from the Indian experience of 1965
and had failed to protect their airfields against surprise air attacks. “The inability
of the Arab air forces to survive air attacks on their bases resulted in their effective
destruction within two days.”37

Yom Kippur War, 1973

Six years later, however, Egypt and Syria chose to strike when most Israelis were
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 115

celebrating Yom Kippur, a national holiday. The Israeli Air Force played a key
role in containing the Syrian Army’s surprise attack on the Golan Heights when
Israeli ground forces were still in the process of deploying for the war.38 Even so,
it soon turned the tables on its enemy. The Egyptians had, with Soviet assistance,
built a formidable air defence umbrella employing older SA-II & III, mobile
SA-VI Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and shoulder fired SA-7 Strella
MANPADS. Initially, the Israeli losses were heavy but the Israeli Air Force
overcame these defences with ingenuity and clever use of Electronic Counter
Measures (ECM) and evasive tactics. It lost five aircraft in aerial combat and
104 aircraft to anti-aircraft fire and SAMs. It claimed a staggering 334 enemy
aircraft in aerial combat, and a further 180 due to other causes. The Arabs relied
too heavily on their missile-based air defence system and lost many of their aircraft
to fratricide. The Israeli Air Force suffered heavy attrition in the opening phases
of the war, and had to stop offensive action for some time but eventually gained
air superiority.
In another surprise attack on June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force destroyed an
under-construction Iraqi nuclear reactor located a mere 20 km from Baghdad.
The strike involved flying a round trip of over 1,800 km over Saudi Arabia and
Jordan. It used eight F-16s with two Mk-84 bombs each, escorted by four F-15
fighters. Israel claimed it had carried out the attack in self-defence, as in its view
the Iraqi reactor was on the verge of becoming operational.

Lebanon War (Bekaa Valley), 1982

This time Syria had with Soviet help built up a formidable and overlapping
network of SAMs of various types in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. In a coordinated
artillery and air attack, the Israelis destroyed many Syrian SAM batteries in a
matter of minutes. In the air battles that followed, the Israeli Air Force shot down
86 Syrian aircraft for the loss of just one of its own. This unprecedented kill
ratio of 86:1 has not been achieved before or since. The secret of Israeli success,
however, was the effective use of ECM that blinded the Syrian radars and rendered
its Command and Control System, deaf and dumb. In addition, AH-1 Cobra
helicopter gunships destroyed a large number of Syrian T-72 tanks and other
armoured fighting vehicles. Again on October 1, 1985, in response to a Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) terrorist attack that killed three Israeli civilians
in Cyprus, the Israeli Air Force bombed the PLO Headquarters in Tunis, a distance
of 2,300 km using air-to-air refuelling.

Lebanon War, 2006

The Israeli Air Force again played a critical role in this conflict that lasted 34
days and was waged mostly against Hezbollah, with the aim of stopping its rocket
attacks on Israeli civilian targets. On the second day, the Israeli Air Force destroyed
116 Air Power and National Security

a large number of Hezbollah rocket sites. The air force lost two helicopters to
mid-air collision on the last day of the war.
In September 2007, in yet another surprise attack, the Israeli Air Force
destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor. A specially programmed Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV), similar to the US Suter airborne network attack system, had
apparently sent an embedded bug as part of the reflected radar echo, to one of the
Syrian air defence radars. This false echo had in turn disabled the entire Air Defence
(AD) network for a considerable period of time to allow the Israeli Air Force
strike aircraft to enter Syrian air space without detection. The Israeli Air Force
also carried out a number of surgical strikes against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
The one major lesson of all Arab-Israeli conflicts, is the decisively offensive
nature of Israeli employment of air power. The Israeli Air Force has been heavily
criticised for causing extensive collateral damage and civilian casualties, but to be
fair, Israel has also lost many civilians to terrorist and indiscriminate rocket attacks.
Even if one does not subscribe to its aggressive philosophy, Israel has shown the
grit and determination, to not just survive, but prosper in a neighbourhood that
does not acknowledge its right to exist. The Israeli Air Force with consistent
American support is probably the most experienced and potent air arm in the
world.
US Air Power in Vietnam, 1964-75
Conventional wisdom says, that the US lost this long and costly war despite the
use of sophisticated aircraft and hi-tech weaponry. There is much truth in this
statement. The war, however, has many lessons for air power operators, as it saw
the use of massive air power in every conceivable role. From aerial reconnaissance
to air cavalry, from strategic bombing to combat search and rescue, and from
strategic lift to special operations, the war saw extensive employment of air power.
Air power proved ineffective against a determined enemy bent on waging a
guerrilla war, with little concern for own well-being. The Communist regime of
North Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and its military, led by the legendary General
Vo Nguyen Giap was so well indoctrinated and motivated, that it finally forced
the US military out of Vietnam with heavy losses of men and material. US
casualties numbered a staggering 58,000 dead and wounded. The North
Vietnamese air defence based mainly on Soviet AM II Guideline first generation
missiles and MiG-21 fighter interceptors, also took a major toll of American
aircraft. Very often, US air power was micro-managed from distant Washington,
where decision-makers such as Robert McNamara, an eminent economist, often
dictated the selection of targets, go-no-go areas, and used air power in fits and
starts, giving ample opportunity to the enemy to recoup its losses and devise
new tactics. Operation Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I and II and later vertical
envelopment tactics, by using a variety of helicopters, contributed to the larger
aim even if these succeeded only at the tactical level.
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 117

In a memorable post-war conversation, Colonel Harry G. Summers told his

North Vietnamese counterpart, “In this long war, you did not win a single battle.”
The laconic reply was, “True, but it does not really matter, we won the war.”39

China-Vietnam War, 1979

The PRC began this war in March 1979, ostensibly to teach the Vietnamese a
lesson for invading Cambodia, which was then under PRC-supported Khmer
rule. The Central Military Commission (CMC) mobilised a very large number
of army formations and also a sizeable section of People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF). In the event, the PLAAF was in such poor shape, that in the
absence of adequate number of trained and experienced aircrews (pilots) many
Squadron Commanders from different regions were forced to take command of
the fighting units. The PLA army’s performance was below par and although the
Chinese managed to make incursions into the border areas of Northern Vietnam
(which had a large population of Chinese origin) they found it difficult to hold
ground and finally withdrew after an agreement was signed between the two
sides. It is generally agreed that instead of teaching the Vietnamese a lesson, the
Chinese themselves were taught a lesson. The major lesson of this otherwise short
localised war was how not to commit air power. In 1979, the Chinese military
was in poor shape – its equipment was old, training was unremarkable, conscripts
had little combat experience and the PLAAF was averaging very little flying
training, as it simply did not have enough aircraft. Almost all squadrons were
equipped with Soviet-era machines, which were plagued with spares shortages
and major maintenance difficulties. China was then producing a large number
of aircraft of old design with very limited range and armament, obsolete electronics
and above all, poor reliability. It also seems that the PRC leadership
underestimated the enemy resolve. China did not follow a very sound strategy
but soon realised its folly, and quickly withdrew while the going was good. That
the Chinese who had all along mentored the Vietnamese could not correctly
assess the strong points of the adversary is indeed surprising.40

The Falklands War, 1982

On April 2-3, 1982 Argentina invaded and occupied the South Atlantic British
Territory of Falklands (Malvinas) and South Georgia. The conflict lasted 74 days
and ended with the surrender of Argentinian forces. Casualties were heavy on
both sides. The then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the ‘Iron Lady’,
warned the Argentine leadership of war, if they did not immediately vacate the
occupation of the Falklands; but the Argentine military leadership, especially
Admiral Jorge Anaya, a member of the ruling junta, made the mistake of
convincing themselves that Britain will never attack. That Britain could pull off
an operation of this magnitude, 7,500 km away at the other end of the Atlantic,
was indeed laudable and speaks volumes for the resolve of the British Government,
118 Air Power and National Security

whatever the verdict at this distance in history. The British, under the leadership
of Margaret Thatcher, did not dither for a moment, even when it became clear
that the operation would prove extremely costly in men, material and money.
Whether or not the gains of victory outweighed the costs is – with the benefit of
hindsight – a moot point. The sheer scale and the scope of the effort, transporting
two brigades and marines across the world, and sustaining them with the necessary
logistic support, is without parallel in post-World War II military history.
The major lessons of this war are as follows:
• In a series of five single-aircraft missions, the Royal Air Force (RAF) Vulcan
strategic bombers bombed the airfield at Port Stanley and rendered it
unusable for Argentine jet fighters, thereby assisting the RAF and Royal
Navy to gain some control of the air. On the way to the Falkland Islands
on a 15,000-km round trip, the bombers conducted multiple air-to-air
refuelling operations; the Victor tankers themselves taking fuel from other
Victor tankers in a ‘buddy’ role.
• As many as 24 of 26 enemy ships were sunk or disabled, in air action. The
average distance of the Argentine airfields on the country’s mainland was
700-1,050 km and this restricted their armament load and time over target.
Due to intense anti-aircraft fire, the Argentine pilots released their bombs
at very low levels, not giving the fuses time to function properly. As a
result, many of these bombs did not explode but a live unexploded bomb
stuck in the innards of a ship, was still a serious hazard and caused casualties.
An Argentine Super Etendard of French make fired an AM-39 Exocet missile
at the HMS Sheffield and sank it. Three ship-based British helicopters also
sunk the Argentine submarine Santa Fe, that was caught on the surface.
With the sinking of the light cruiser General Belgrano by the Royal Navy’s
nuclear-powered submarine, the HMS Conqueror, 323 sailors died but 700
more were rescued in cold and stormy weather. Thus the threat posed by
the Argentine Navy was effectively eliminated.
• The British Task Force sailed out within three days of the Argentine invasion.
• This war clearly brought out the difficulties of launching a major operation
at far-off places but also proved what aircraft carrier-based air power could
achieve against heavy odds. The British had a total of 42 Harriers as against
122 Argentine fighters of various types including Mirage IIIs, IAI Dragons,
A-4A Sky Hawks and the turbo-prop-powered Pukara COIN aircraft.
• The British lost 24 helicopters and 10 Harriers, in addition to two
destroyers, two frigates, two amphibious crafts and one container ship.
Two hundred and fifty eight personnel were killed and 775 injured. The
Argentine forces lost a light cruiser, a submarine, four cargo vessels, two
patrol boats, 35 fighters, 25 helicopters, two bombers, four transport planes
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 119

and 34 COIN and lightly armed trainer aircraft. Argentina also sustained
649 casualties, 1,068 were injured and over 11,300 were captured.

Gulf War, 1991

Being the first major war after the disastrous experience of the decade-long
Vietnam War, the Americans wanted to validate the new found doctrine of air
power employment, which postulated that a relentless stream of offensive strikes
against the major ‘centres of gravity’ of the enemy would be needed to break the
will of the enemy. The US-led Allied air forces were to first mount a ‘Suppression
of Enemy Air Defences’ or SEAD campaign to reduce to the minimum, any
possibility of enemy air forces interfering with own strategic strikes/operations.
It was only after the enemy’s offensive capability both in the air and on ground
had been comprehensively degraded, that the US ground forces would be released
with full air support. Fighters and attack helicopters would be on call at a minute’s
notice or when required would provide airborne stand-by.
There was widespread condemnation when Saddam Hussein’s forces marched
into Kuwait on August 2, 1990. There soon began a massive airlift that saw a
slow but steady build-up of troops, aircraft, armament and equipment in Saudi
Arabia. By August 15, the US had sent 48 F-16 and 36 F-15 fighters to Saudi
Arabia, which immediately began patrolling the Iraq-Saudi border to prevent
Iraqi incursions into Saudi Arabia. Strangely, Saddam failed to employ Iraqi air
power to disrupt the Coalition build-up that went on for months. The United
Nations (UN) Security Council authorised a US-led Coalition of 34 countries to
oust the invading Iraqi forces from Kuwait.41 This was the first major war that
was broadcast live on TV screens across the world and the role of the electronic
media came to be known as the ‘CNN Effect’.
Coalition air strikes began on January 17, 1991 with a variety of aircraft
taking part from airbases in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Arab countries, ship-
borne aircraft from the Persian Gulf (two US Navy carrier battle groups) and
some from bases in Europe and continental US or CONUS. Two more US Navy
ships were dispatched to the region and another 48 F-16 fighters of the US Air
National Guard also moved to Saudi Arabia. By the end of the year (1990) some
540,000 US troops had been stationed in Saudi Arabia. The Coalition Air Forces
flew more than 107,000 sorties dropping 88,000 tons of bombs and other
weapons. Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) constituted only 8 per cent of all
ammunition dropped in the war. During the first 38 days of the Gulf War nearly
100,000 sorties were flown, 226,000 munitions dropped and 1,200 targets
engaged. This gives a clear idea of the size of each package,42 the number of
times the same targets were engaged and the limited efficacy of the destructive
power of free-fall bombs and unguided munitions.
120 Air Power and National Security

Although the Coalition airpower destroyed some 340 hardened bomb shelters
and rendered almost all the Iraqi airfields unusable, 200 bomb shelters and a
substantial portion of Iraqi aircraft remained undamaged. Many of the Iraqi fighter
aircraft escaped by flying out to Iranian airfields, and remained there, as the
Iranians naturally refused to return them at the end of the war. It is difficult to
understand why the Iraqi leadership permitted the country’s assets to go to Iran,
with whom Iraq had fought an inconclusive war for eight years. This once again
proves that mere acquisition of fancy aeroplanes and weapons, cannot be a
substitute for national resolve and determination.
Iraq’s tactic of employing Scud missiles in random attacks against Israel aimed
at breaking the Coalition, failed to provoke that country to action but diverted
considerable air effort to Scud hunting operations. USAF pilots in a post-war
analysis found that Air Tasking Orders (ATO) were invariably delayed, and this
entailed the aircrews working late into the night throughout the war. Another
important lesson was that all knowledge of the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses
must be gathered well before the beginning of the war, as once the shooting starts
there is little time to learn new tactics.

Kosovo, 1999
Kosovo was acclaimed as the most successful air campaign ever. “A turning point
in the history of warfare,” wrote the noted military historian John Keegan, positive
proof that “a war can be won by airpower alone.”43 In fact, the 78-day (March
24 to June 9, 1999) US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air
campaign against the Serb forces in Kosovo was largely ineffective. NATO claimed
that its fighter aircraft flew a total of 37,465 sorties of which nearly half were
strike and SEAD operations, with another 10,808, for strike and attack. NATO
fighters engaged Serb military targets and claimed the destruction of 120 tanks,
220 armoured personnel carriers and up to 450 artillery guns and mortars. Kosovo
ostensibly began to throw the Serbian military out before UN peace-keepers could
be sent. Air power it seems, offered the option of a clean and relatively bloodless
war. The air strikes were expected to achieve this aim in a short period of time,
without the need for the army to undertake any ground operations. But by
publicly announcing this strategy in the opening phases of the air campaign, the
US President Bill Clinton gave away NATO’s plans, and relieved the Serb
leadership of much anxiety and preparations for dealing with a full-fledged ground
invasion. In reality, only a fraction of Serbian armour was actually destroyed.
The Kosovo Force (KFOR) counted 250 tanks, 350 Armoured Personnel Carriers
(APCs), and 650 artillery pieces returning to Yugoslavia, or leaving Kosovo, at
the end of the war. NATO aircraft also bombed high value targets such as bridges
and power stations and power lines in Belgrade and other civilian areas. It was
when his people went without water and electricity that the Serbian leader,
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 121

Slobodan Milosevic decided to withdraw his Serb troops from Kosovo. But this
might have been counter-productive for two reasons. First, the “Serbian
population which was desperately dependent on the well-being of its infrastructure
was made to pay the price for Milosevic’s deeds”. Second, it was the European
members of the NATO that would pay to rebuild the shaken country.44
The Serbs made extensive use of camouflage, concealment and decoys (using
logs and aluminium coated card board cut-outs) which fooled the striking pilots
who, in order to remain outside the enemy SAM envelope, were carrying out
their attacks from medium levels of around 15,000 feet. A large number of PGMs
and cruise missiles were used; the latter often going haywire due to some ingenious
methods adopted by the Serb defenders. A cruise missile is pre-programmed to
fly at a height of some 20-30 metres above ground, at subsonic speeds. These
missiles depend on their temperature and altitude sensors to maintain correct
course and height and are equipped with a terrain-following radar to avoid
obstacles. By lighting small fires along their expected track, the Serbs successfully
misled many of these hi-tech missiles. NATO did not lose even a single pilot as
the crews of the F-117 stealth fighter, F-16 and two AH-64 attack helicopters,
lost to enemy action/other causes, were quickly rescued by the readily available
Combat Search and Rescue teams. Some 700 SAMs and MANPADS were fired
but proved largely ineffective against the high-flying NATO aircraft. Equally,
only a few of these SAM sites were actually destroyed. Some seven MiG-29s and
a few Galebs of the Serbian Air Force were shot down in aerial combat, with no
loss to NATO aircraft. These Russian fighters were hampered by poor serviceability
and unreliable avionics.
As was shown earlier during the Bosnian campaign, it is impossible for modern
high-speed jet fighters to target small armed groups of people, indulging in violent
activity, for example, ethnic cleansing. NATO planners should have concentrated
on targets of strategic importance rather than Serb army tanks, artillery, APCs
and mortars, which in the absence of a ground invasion could be hidden without
fear of being seen. Even so, in a TV interview, Milosevic showed no intentions
of backing down in the face of sustained bombing, until the Russians announced
the withdrawal of their support, giving rise to further criticism of air power
ineffectiveness. Unfortunately, some air power protagonists claimed that ‘modern
air power could alone win a war’. There was also much bickering among NATO
members on target selection, mainly due to fears of unduly high collateral damage
and loss of civilian life and property. In short, this air campaign proved very
costly in terms of air effort. Although the Serbs were finally forced to leave Kosovo,
it was not due entirely to the air strikes. In the words of Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, the “most decisive
moment came when the Russians stopped supporting Serbia”45 indicating that
air operations were indeed ineffective.
122 Air Power and National Security

To be fair, part of the blame must lie with the wrong strategy of placing
excessively high reliance on air power alone, and publicly declaring that NATO
did not envisage a ground invasion. In the words of Elliot Cohen, “Air power is
an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern
courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment.”46 This view
poses a major challenge to air power operators because policymakers often see air
strikes as a low risk, low commitment option. When weighing the balance of
ground and air forces, policy makers must consider not only what they seek to
accomplish through coercion, but also what they seek to prevent. Successful
coercion requires not only effective threats but also the neutralisation of adversary
responses.47 Air power contributed to pushing the Serbs out of Kosovo, but it
was a hollow victory as it did not prevent the Serb armies from forcing out and
murdering the hapless Kosovars. The activities of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA), a militia-type outfit and Russia’s diplomatic pressure forced Milosevic to
finally pull out his forces from Kosovo. This was one clear example of how air
power should not be used.

Gulf War, 2003

Unlike the first Gulf War which was somewhat open-ended, and stopped with
the surrender of the Iraqi Army, this war was waged with the specific aim of
ousting Saddam Hussein. The US and United Kingdom (UK) leadership falsely
claimed that Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which needed
to be destroyed, urgently. In the event, no such weapons were found. The absence
of post-war stabilisation plans turned a very successful military campaign led by
formidable air power elements, into a political quagmire of enormous proportions.
It also spawned Sunni insurgency and Al Qaeda-assisted terrorism that destroyed
Iraqi society, especially since the then US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld,
had refused to commit the minimum necessary ground troops to control the
situation, once the Iraqi military and the Saddam regime were defeated. It also
brought worldwide condemnation of the American policy of unilateralism and
preventive war that the neo-conservatives of the George Bush regime had
propounded. Another major air power lesson of this much-hyped campaign was
the questionable value of the ‘campaign of shock and awe’. Even the civilian
population quickly adapts to these strikes, takes measures to minimise its effects,
raises issues of collateral damage and human rights of non-combatants, and finally
flees the urban areas for sheer survival. Air power can and often does put immense
pressure on enemy governments, but unless follow-up action such as possible
negotiating strategies, alternative regime rehabilitation and above all, power
sharing options are fully thought out, a successful air power campaign can prove
to be a pyrrhic victory. In the event, the US-led NATO forces got bogged down
in a country, relentlessly devastated by internecine warfare between different ethnic
and religious groups, jockeying for power.
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 123

The American and British air forces used a highly sophisticated array of PGMs
supported by satellite-based communications and navigation (GPS) systems, that
made it a truly network enabled war and dramatically reduced casualties. Weapons
such as the then newly introduced Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and
later special measures to detect and destroy Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),
received much acclaim. The NATO air forces also made extensive use of attack
helicopters to hunt insurgents and terrorists planting IEDs. Surveillance and drone
attacks by UAVs/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) respectively, proved
both effective and economical. Last, but not least, like the first Gulf War of 1991
and the Kosovo war of 1999, US air power once again operated in a relatively
benign environment, as there was virtually no air opposition.
Another major lesson of the two Gulf Wars, fought a decade apart (1991 and
2003), was that while force multipliers such as AWACS, Air-to-Air Refuelling
(AAR) Tankers and satellite-based communication and navigation support systems,
are absolutely essential for waging a high-tech war, they do not allow for any
significant reductions to fighter inventories and to that extent, these systems
multiply the ‘effects’ and not numbers. Force multipliers have not reduced the
absolute numbers of aircraft, Su-30 vs. Hunter or even Canberra, although costs
and weapons carriage and range are vastly different. All the recent wars that the
Western allies have fought have been against very weak powers, at least in air
power capabilities.

Afghanistan, 2001
The Afghan war began in October 2001 with the United States Air Force (USAF)
bombing Taliban and Al Qaeda targets and has continued for 13 years with mixed
results. In the aftermath of 9/11, when the US began bombing Afghanistan, it
faced a whole host of questions. Sadly, many of them remain even today. First,
the Americans did not know how to obtain access to this landlocked country, and
once there, what targets to bomb. Fortunately for the US, the Northern Alliance,
that was then fighting the Taliban regime proved amenable to US assistance, and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) renewed their old contacts and sent in a
small number of agents who performed exceptionally well as Forward Air
Controllers (FACs) when the US decided to open the bombing campaign. Not
only was the bombing completely successful, despite some early setbacks, the
Northern Alliance rallied round and soon pushed the Taliban out of Kabul, and
eventually to the mountain hideouts of the Pak-Afghan border. But this did not
change the ground situation, and then began a clamour for ‘boots’ on the ground.
The US-led NATO forces have been in Afghanistan since 2006-07 with a major
‘surge’ in their numbers, beginning 2010 but success, if any, has been fleeting.
Mainly due to Pakistani support to Taliban elements and Pakistan’s persistent
refusal to engage the Haqqani and other elements operating from Pakistani soil,
124 Air Power and National Security

the NATO air forces have been rendered largely ineffective. Intermingling of
armed Taliban groups with the civilian Afghan population, makes it nearly
impossible to effectively neutralise them from the air. This, however, should not
be seen as a failure of air power, as the conflict is now apparently not amenable
to any military solution.
For the last few years, NATO air forces have increasingly been relying on
UCAVs or what are commonly called drone attacks, and have succeeded in
eliminating a substantial number of Al Qaeda and Taliban militants, sometimes
inside Pakistan’s borders. Pakistan usually registers nominal protests of breach of
sovereignty but tacitly allows the US to continue these strikes. Employment of
UCAVs in a conventional war scenario may, however, require far more careful
planning and execution, due to the presence of enemy and own air forces in
congested airspace.
Libya, 2011
Being the most recent and major air campaign, employment of air power in Libya
deserves detailed study. The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya was a success in
several important respects: it helped topple Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-old
regime without the deployment of ground forces, with very low levels of collateral
damage, and no NATO casualties.48 France opened the air campaign on March
19, 2011 on its own and the UK joined soon thereafter. After the passing of
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 others joined the
campaign but Germany stayed out. According to Adam J. Hebert, “If US and
NATO air forces had not intervened in the Libyan civil war this year, Muammar
Gaddafi would still be alive and Libya’s ruling dictator.” He says, “[T]housands
of the civilians who had protested or taken up arms against his regime, however,
would all be dead.” That is airpower’s contribution to the now-complete
operation. In March 2011 before NATO air power intervened, “Gaddafi’s forces
were in the process of routing the rebels. Resistance forces had been pushed into
an enclave at Benghazi, where many anticipated a last stand. Gaddafi himself
promised no mercy to those who had opposed him.” “NATO aircraft flew more
than 26,000 sorties. There were nearly 10,000 strike missions, 90 per cent of
them flown by nations other than the United States.” As stated earlier, some of
these were flown from RAF bases in the UK, and involved nearly 3,000 km return
flights. As a joint operation conducted by some 18 participating nations, it was
a major success for air power. Strike and other aircraft were launched from bases
in several European nations and also from ships in the Mediterranean. The US
only provided its naval forces in the Mediterranean, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Air-to-Air (AAR) support. “The operation lasted
seven months, and was a relative bargain, costing the United States $1.2 billion.”49
According to the Royal Aeronautical Society Paper on ‘Operation Unified
Protector’, on the NATO air campaign:
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 125

• Lack of boots on the ground limited NATO’s situational awareness which

had to rely totally on ISR to gain and maintain the ground picture.
• Advocating non-invasive intervention through air is more acceptable than
the presence of foreign troops on the ground. Committing ground troops
is a truly momentous decision with major implications. Such campaigns
are generally very lengthy and costly. The Iraq and Afghanistan examples
are striking.
• Policing the no-fly zone (from 1991 to 2003) in South and North Iraq was
relatively less expensive.
• Air forces should be ready to emphasise this advantage to the politicians,
the public and other services.
• In seven months (March to October 2011) some 26,000 sorties were flown.
Of these 25,000 were by fixed wing, 400 by rotary wing and 500 by
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs) or UAVs/UCAVs. A total of 7,600 PGMs,
3,600 laser-guided bombs and 3,500 GPS-guided munitions/bombs were
dropped.
• Superior training, especially on sophisticated aircraft, support infrastructure
and correct targeting is the key that achieved desired effects. Weapon
accuracy is futile without intelligence accuracy. Simply attacking and ticking
off target lists does not work as happened in the NATO’s Serbian (Kosovo)
campaign of 1999. NATO did not understand the cultural importance of
Kosovo to Serbia and it took 78 days of air power application and political
pressure and (also the threat of a ground invasion) to get Milosevic to bow
down.
• The Libyan air campaign took 227 days and hence quick results should
not be expected. Communication with ground troops is very important or
else ISR is useless.
• No plan works without amendments, tweaking, common sense and
experience.
• Air-to-air refuelling played a key role in long-range strikes.
• No single NATO member could afford the full range of capabilities.
• Situational awareness is fundamental to operational success. ISR is vital. A
clear understanding of ‘Forward Line of Own Troops’ (FLOT) or a ‘no
man’s land’ is vital to avoid fratricide. Close coordination with ground
forces, use of Ground Moving Target Indicators (GMTIs) for tracking of
regime vehicles, their movement, origin and direction and use of Litening
Targeting Pods increased air power effectiveness.
• There was only one cautionary engine change in 3,000 hours of flying and
even that engine was found undamaged. This speaks volumes for technology,
126 Air Power and National Security

tactics and maintenance especially with austere base facilities.

• The French Air Force maintains flying training currency of its aircrews
posted on staff so that they are immediately available for operations in an
emergency. Although expensive, this confers surge capability when needed.
• British Tornados flew a total of 8,000 hours and 3,000 km-long sorties
from bases in the UK.
• None of the crews had trained specifically for Libya but they were ready
for it. Being prepared for any contingency and eventuality was dependent
on good training and also on the agility of the approach and flexibility of
the mind.
• Carrier aviation has much to offer including mobility, full range of spares
support and maintenance support plus proximity but for all that air
superiority is essential. Air and naval systems are complementary and
together can offer great flexibility and capability in many cases.
• First strikes came just in time. Even a little delay and Gaddafi would have
pulverised the rebels or would have caused far more bloodshed.
• The RAF Tornado squadron had just returned from an exercise in the US
on March 14. The UNSCR was issued on March 17. The squadron
prepared for Libya on 17-18 and launched its first Storm-shadow cruise
missile strike from a UK base on March 19 that flew a 3,000-km round
trip. This speaks volumes for RAF training, flexibility and operational
readiness.
• As a result of the kinetic effects achieved, the Gaddafi regime stopped using
armour and switched to civilian SUVs. Use of inert weapons worked to
stop hostile action and kept collateral damage at low to nil level. Air weapons
were often used to persuade rather than to kill, in what came to be called
‘knocking on the door’ strikes, in which inert weapons warned the enemy.
Just four Brimstones destroyed eight regime vehicles in a single attack.50

The campaign lasted for nearly a year. This long and protracted intervention
raised logistics, and economic costs and at times, stretched the willing
contributions by NATO and other Arab countries. The air effort of over 26,000
sorties including 10,000 strike sorties was colossal and would be difficult for a
single country. Without the signal contribution of the US, in providing
surveillance, Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) tanker and
intelligence support missions, the UK and French air forces would have found it
nearly impossible to sustain a year-long commitment. Air power did not in any
way preclude the use of ground forces – in this case anti-Gaddafi rebels – and
even they had to be guided and trained by NATO Special Operations Forces
(SOF) experts. The geographical proximity of Libya to NATO countries and the
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 127

presence of coalition naval ships in the Mediterranean Sea, close to the Libyan
coast also helped. Above all, Libyan Government Air Forces were neutralised in
the first few days and NATO enjoyed complete freedom over the Libyan skies.

Conclusion
For all its ubiquity, flexibility and reach, air power should never be seen as a
panacea for every situation. Air power assets will always be in great demand and
therefore the tendency to employ them simply because these are seen to be idling
on ground must be checked. As we have seen, gaining control of the air is
undoubtedly a vital task, but it is only an enabling condition. Once achieved,
the condition must be quickly used to prosecute other military tasks and missions
or else the effort would be wasted. Simply carrying out medium or high-level
offensive sweeps to entice the enemy to provoke it to fight might prove – though
temporarily – that the enemy is reluctant to fight, but it may, in fact, be waiting
for a more opportune moment to strike at more important and vulnerable targets.
Given the availability of AWACS and longer-range air superiority fighters
with the IAF, the next conventional war might see a different and more efficient
employment of air power resources and may, in fact, stop the enemy well before
it reaches the border. The AWACS-AAR combination is also bound to dramatically
extend the range and safety and success of IAF’s strike missions deep into enemy
territory. But such bold and sustained actions are unlikely for two reasons. First,
it is still not clear if India’s political leadership has really understood the impact
of modern technologies like stealth, PGMs and/or Network Centric/Enabled
Warfare. Unless India comes to terms with the essentially offensive nature of
modern air power, there is every possibility that all the advanced combat aircraft,
and combat support elements such as AAR, AWACS, PGMs and EW would
once again be under-employed or not at all. Second, the chances of a conventional
war appear to be slim and India might once again find itself inhibited by Pakistan’s
‘low’ nuclear threshold. Even so, the IAF must train for operations other than a
classic copy book conventional war.

NOTES
1. Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, An Incredible War: Indian Air Force in Kashmir War 1947-48,
Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 203-04.
2. Lt. Gen. L.P. Sen, Slender was the Thread, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1969, p. 61.
3. Ibid., p. 19.
4. Durga Das, From Curzon to Nehru and After, Rupa & Co, New Delhi, 1969 (Reprinted
1974), p. 251.
5. Interview with Air Marshal Randhir Singh (Retd.) at Chandigarh on January 15, 2012.
6. Claude Arpi, “The Englishman who Spied for India”, June 1, 2012 at http://www.rediff.com/
news/report/the-englishman-who-spied-for-india/20120601.htm, (Accessed September 9,
2012).
128 Air Power and National Security
7. Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years,
Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2010, p. 243.
8. Interview with Air Marshal P. Rajkumar (Retd.) at Bangalore on February 12, 2011.
9. Interview with Air Marshal Randhir Singh, See no. 5.
10. Interview with Air Marshal Y.V. Malse on July 12, 2000. See also Air Cmde. Jasjit Singh,
“The Role of Airpower” in Brahma Chellaney (ed.) Securing India’s Future in the New
Millennium, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1999, pp. 99-123.
11. J.K. Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1969, pp. 428-530.
12. Lt. Gen. S.P.P. Thorat, From Reveille to Retreat, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1986, pp.
213-15.
13. Srinath Raghavan, See no. 7, pp. ix-x.
14. R.D. Pradhan, Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65, Orient Longman,
Hyderabad, 1998, pp.161-81.
15. Lt. Gen. S.P.P. Thorat, no. 12, p. 191. I have relied more on Thorat’s views simply because
Nehru called him after the debacle, patiently heard his side of the story and asked why
Thorat’s plans were not shown to him. Nehru also appointed Thorat on the National Defence
Council which was chaired by the PM himself.
16. Srinath Raghavan, no. 7, p. 279.
17. Yaaov Vertzberger, ‘Bureaucratic-Organisational Politics and Information Processing in a
Developing State’, International Studies Quarterly, 28, 1984, pp. 69-95.
18. R.D. Pradhan, no. 14, p. 25.
19. P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965, Manohar, New
Delhi, 2005 (Reprinted 2006), pp. 69-72.
20. Air Cmde. P.M. Wilson quoted in the Official History of the 1965 India-Pakistan War, p.
273 at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/
1965Chapter09.pdf, (Accessed July 14, 2012).
21. Interview with Air Marshal Randhir Singh. See no. 5.
22. P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, no. 19, pp. 234-36.
23. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal (Retd.), My Years with the IAF, Lancer International, New Delhi,
1986, p. 159. R.D. Pradhan also endorses these views, see no. 14, p. 23. Also see Lt. Gen.
Harbaksh Singh, “War Dispatches –A Soldier Remembers”, Indian Defence Review, January
30, 2014.
24. R.D. Pradhan, no. 14, p. 286-88.
25. P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, no. 19, p. 290.
26. Maj. Gen. Joginder Singh, Behind the Scene: An Analysis of India’s Military Operations, 1947-
1971, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1993, p. xi and 8.
27. P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, no. 19, p. 245.
28. Official History of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, at Bharat Rakshak.com.
29. ‘Chakkar’ is a Hindi word for orbit.
30. AVM (Retd.) B.K. Bishnoi, “Thunder Over Dacca 1971”, excerpted from Air Space, January
1997 at http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1971War/Dacca.html (Accessed July
17, 2012).
31. Official History of the 1971 War available at, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/
1971War/Dacca.html, p. 611 (Accessed July 17, 2012).
32. Ibid.
33. In an interview on June 4, 2012, Air Cmde. (Retd.) A.V. Sathaye, Vir Chakra, a veteran of
these operations questioned the usefulness of these strikes since the IAF did not persist with
these strikes nor did these fulfil any higher strategic objectives.
34. From October 1989 to July 1991, the author commanded the IAF 43 Wing at Sulur near
Coimbatore that provided the helicopter support for Operation Pawan, codename for the
Sri Lanka air operations.
 Airpower Employment: Lessons from the Past 129
35. In an email by Lt. Gen. J.F.R. Jacob (Retd.) dated December 4, 2013.
36. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation,
Viking, New Delhi, 2010, p. 79.
37. Andrew G.B. Vallance, The Air Weapon: Doctrines of Air Power Strategy and Operational Art,
St. Martin’s Press, London, 1996, pp. 18, 49, 76 and 153.
38. Ibid. p. 18.
39. Col. Summers was a military aide to Henry Kissinger when the latter negotiated peace with
Lee Duck Tho, the North Vietnamese interlocutor.
40. Air Commodore Ramesh Phadke, China’s Power Projection, Manas Publications, New Delhi,
2005, pp. 70-73.
41. The UNSC passed Resolution No. 678 giving Iraq upto January 15, 1991 to withdraw all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait and authorised a US-led coalition of 34 countries to use ‘all necessary
means’ to force Iraq out of Kuwait after the passing of the deadline.
42. A strike mission comprising several fighter-bombers, air defence and ECM escorts is termed
as a package.
43. John Barry and Evan Thomas, “The Kosovo Cover Up” at http://www.newsweek.com/kosovo-
cover-160273 (Accessed June 2. 2014); and The Daily Beast, May 14, 2000.
44. Martin Aguera, “Air Power Paradox: NATO’s ‘Misuse’ of Military Force in Kosovo and its
Consequences”, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 12 (3), Autumn 2001, pp. 115-28. The quotes
are from p. 123.
45. John Barry, no. 43.
46. Elliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of US Air Power”, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994
at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49442/eliot-a-cohen/the-mystique-of-us-air-power
(Accessed February 03, 2014).
47. Ibid.
48. Erica Borghard and Constantino Pischedda, Parameters, Strategic Studies Institute, Spring
2012, pp. 63-74 at http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/
2012spring/Borghard_Pischedda.pdf(Accessed June 25, 2013).
49. Adam J. Hebert, “Libya: Victory Through Airpower”, Air Force Magazine, Air University
Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, December 2011 at http://www.airforcemag.com/
MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/December../ (Accessed June 25, 2013).
50. “Lessons Offered from the Libya Air Campaign”, Paper by the Royal Aeronautical Society at
www.aerosociety.com, pp. 07-14. (Accessed June 25, 2013). Also see Dr. Christian F. Anrig,
“Allied Air Power over Libya: A Preliminary Assessment” at www.airpower.au.af.mil/digital/
pdf/articles/winter/2011/II-VA-Anrig.pdf (Accessed June 26, 2013).
130 Air Power and National Security

5
Development of IAF Force Structures

The IAF came into being in 1932, more to meet the demands for ‘Indianisation’
of the defence forces and to assuage the feelings of a few strong Indian nationalists,
rather than to play any specific role in the defence of British India. The only
threat to India at the time came from the restive, violent and unpredictable
tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa). The strategic threat from the Soviet Union was distant, and
handled by British diplomacy and the balance-of-power games. The Indian Army
was used mainly to fight colonial wars in China, Iraq, and Africa. Although World
War I did not come to India, India’s contribution to the war effort in military
manpower and economic terms was considerable. Upwards of a million Indians
fought under the British flag in the War. It was in the aftermath of World War
I that Indian political leaders began demanding a bigger role in the armed forces.
In 1925, the Government of India formed the Indian Sandhurst Committee,
also known as Skeen Committee, under General Sir Andrew Skeen, the then
Chief of General Staff of the British Indian Army. The Committee recommended
the induction of suitable Indians in the officer cadres of the Indian Army and
also recommended the formation of the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Early Developments
The Indian Air Force Act became effective on October 8, 1932 but the first
unit, No. 1 Squadron was formed only on April 1, 1933 and that too with just
one flight of four Westland Wapitis. At the outbreak of World War II in September
1939, the IAF had technically been in existence for seven years, but it had barely
expanded from a single flight of four Wapiti biplanes in 1932, to two flights by
 Development of IAF Force Structures 131

1938. It was initially manned by five Indian officers trained at Cranwell in Britain.
The ‘A’ Flight, in fact, the only flight, was commanded by a British officer, Flight
Lieutenant Boucher. To begin with, the flight concentrated on the intensive
training of the recently commissioned Indian pilots, Sarkar, Mukherjee,
Bhopinder Singh, Awan, Amarjit Singh and Tandon. At independence, Awan
opted for Pakistan. During flying training at Cranwell, Tandon was found to be
shorter than the prescribed height, as his feet did not reach the rudder pedals of
the aircraft and hence his training was discontinued. Later, he was commissioned
in the Equipment (now Logistics) Branch.
“In the autumn of 1936, a serious rebellion broke out in North Waziristan.
The Wazirs of Tochikhel revolted against the Government.” The flight was moved
to Miranshah in support of the army where the IAF cut its teeth, and in a mere
three-month period flew 1,400 operational hours while maintaining its aircraft
serviceability of 100 per cent. In time, the second or ‘B’ Flight of the squadron
was formed and was based at Karachi. In 1938, the two flights of No. 1 Squadron
moved to Ambala, which was then a major Royal Air Force (RAF) flying base,
and remained there until the outbreak of World War II. In order to face the
immediate threat posed by an aggressive Germany, the British Government pulled
out all RAF squadrons deployed in India back to Britain. Until the entry of Japan
in the war in December 1941, the IAF did not see any further growth or action.
The NWFP was once again in turmoil with increasing violent activities of the
rebel tribes. It was found that a single squadron was not adequate to support the
troops in the area. To augment the existing forces, No. 2 Squadron was formed
on April 1, 1941.1
With the coming of hostilities to India, five Coastal Defence Flights were
formed with a wide assortment of the remnants of RAF and civil aircraft then
operating in India and were manned by personnel of the IAF Volunteer Reserve
(IAFVR) formed at the outbreak of the war. These flights were located at Bombay
(now Mumbai), Calcutta (now Kolkata), Madras (now Chennai), Cochin (now
Kochi) and Karachi, and were tasked with surveillance of the vast coastline of
India. Later, No. 6 Coastal Defence Flight was formed at Vishakhapatnam.
Soon after their attack on Pearl Harbour in Hawaii on December 7, 1941,
the Japanese advanced at lightning speed and in quick time occupied the British
territories of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaya and were soon knocking at the
doors of Burma. With this threat developing to the Indian mainland, No. 4 Coastal
Defence Flight was moved from Karachi to Burma in December 1942, making
it the first Indian unit to operate outside India. According to Air Marshal M.S.
Chaturvedi, these Coastal Defence Flights rendered invaluable service by keeping
an alert eye on Japanese activities, especially on their submarines, in the Indian
Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. Given their vintage and limited range, this so-
132 Air Power and National Security

called maritime surveillance was of little strategic or deterrent value but it prepared
the young Indian pilots of the IAFVR for operations in Burma. With the relentless
advance of the Japanese into Burma, the IAF underwent rapid expansion and
saw operational service in the first and second Burma Campaigns. By February
1944, Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 squadrons were raised. No. 12 transport
squadron was formed on December 1, 1945 and No. 5 Squadron in November
1948.2
At the end of World War II, the IAF had grown from a single flight to some
10 squadrons, each with considerable operational experience, first with the assorted
aircraft of Coastal Defence Flights, such as Wapiti, Audax and Hudson and later
Lysander, and Vultee Vengeance dive bombers. None of these aircraft were capable
of facing the Japanese fighters and were of little use to the RAF squadrons operating
in Burma, but were allotted communication and reconnaissance tasks which they
performed with great enthusiasm.
Although unsuitable for bombing operations, Squadron Leader Jumbo
Majumdar, an illustrious pilot of the IAF, had bomb racks fitted on the lightly
armed Lysander and led No. 1 Squadron at tree top height on February 3, 1942
to a Japanese air base at Mae Hon Son. He achieved complete surprise and inflicted
heavy damage on the enemy. It was during the second Burma campaign that all
the recently raised IAF squadrons were re-equipped with Hurricane and Spitfire
fighters and quickly gathered operational experience in tactical reconnaissance,
strafing, dive bombing, photographic reconnaissance, top cover, interdiction of
enemy roads and bridges, and earned the respect of the various army formations
in support of which they were employed.
The IAF did not possess any transport aircraft squadrons at that time, but its
men were witness to the large-scale troop-lift and air supply effort which very
often proved invaluable for the beleaguered army in the long and arduous Burma
campaign. Although the IAF was essentially employed in support of the army,
the chance to work alongside RAF bomber and transport units gave the young
Indians a good understanding of airpower roles, effectiveness and limitations.
They also learned vital lessons in moving and operating their squadrons from
makeshift airfields in different parts of India and Burma. Thick jungles,
mountainous terrain, incessant rains and bad weather during the long and often
severe monsoon season tested their initiative and innovative skills. It was a truly
Indian affair with almost all of the squadrons under command of Indian officers
and with maintenance and administrative support from Indian technical officers
and men. The contribution of the fledgling service was much appreciated and its
personnel won a number of gallantry awards and more importantly the respect
of the whole nation.3
The British, who were at first reluctant to ‘Indianise’ the military in the 1930s,
 Development of IAF Force Structures 133

realised that when it came to valour and fighting skills, the ‘native’ was second
to none. Even so, many doubted their leadership abilities. General Sir Arthur
Smith, the departing Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, in 1947 expressed
serious doubts about the future of the Indian military. At a farewell dinner on the
eve of independence when asked about the future of the Indian Army he bluntly
said: “I do not give your army six months. It will crack up before that. You see,
the Jawans are like bricks and the ‘officer’ provides the mortar that holds them
together. The Indian officer will not provide the mortar because his leadership
has not been tested and the Jawan has no respect for him.” When told that
patriotism was a great force that will provide the mortar, Smith snapped back,
“No, not with the Jawans. They have loved their British officers because they
took care of them. Your boys are too selfish and snobs.”4
During the six-year long World War II, a very large number of Indians were
trained as pilots, navigators and in other support roles, such as the Technical,
Equipment and Administration branches and were employed in units and
squadrons, at the many RAF Stations that had sprung up throughout India. The
period also saw a number of ground training establishments, coming up in
different parts of the country where technical trade training was imparted.
Although its growth was driven by emerging war-time requirements and was not
well planned, by the end of the war a sizeable nucleus of trained and experienced
personnel was available to support the 10 IAF squadrons. Today, it is difficult to
visualise the colossal mobilisation that took place during World War II. It resulted
in tens of thousands of young Indians joining the defence services as civilians
and uniformed men. This offered new vistas for employment, with these young
Indians learning new skills, in hitherto unknown professions. Most of these
adventurous men became experienced engineers, administrators and pilots and
formed the backbone of the IAF, and independent India’s government and the
private sector. In a sense, World War II was a blessing in disguise, for without it,
newly independent India would have found it very difficult to train such a large
body of professionals.
Post-war demobilisation, however, resulted in many war veterans leaving for
greener pastures in civil and commercial fields. All RAF squadrons were also
soon withdrawn from the Indian theatre. At the time of independence, the IAF
had a total of 10 squadrons, but the division of assets after Partition resulted in
two fighter squadrons and one transport squadron going to Pakistan. There was
much wrangling at the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AFRC) whose
terms of reference were to divide the assets on communal ratio which was 80 per
cent non-Muslim to 20 per cent Muslim; and hence Pakistan’s share came to
only two squadrons. But some British officers opined that Pakistan’s operational
requirements in the NWFP should also be considered while dividing the assets.
This was not accepted by the Indian members who (rather disingenuously) said
134 Air Power and National Security

that the Indian Government was opposed to the use of air force against its own
people.5 But Pakistan eventually got two fighter and one transport squadrons.
The process of the actual division continued well into 1948, as most of the
Equipment Depots and Air Stores Parks were located in Pakistan, while many
important air force bases and training establishments were located in India. There
were allegations on both sides of, unfair division, delay and wilful damage to
equipment. This had an adverse effect on aircraft availability during the Kashmir
War.6 The two transport squadrons, one each for India and Pakistan, were
equipped with C-47 Dakota twin-engine aircraft. In addition, there were two
RAF transport squadrons, one based at Karachi and another at Palam (New Delhi)
that were made ‘available’ for non-operational and training tasks and remained
in India until the end of 1948.
According to Chaturvedi, 1946 was a year of confusion. Wholesale
demobilisation had rendered hundreds of thousands of skilled and experienced
Indians, jobless. The RAF squadrons were leaving India; a number of air force
bases and hastily prepared airfields had become redundant. It was a strange
situation. The IAF by then, had a total of 10 squadrons and possessed many
other assets, bases and considerable reserves, but no air headquarters or controlling
organisation. There was no ‘Command and Control’ set-up and hence it lacked
direction.7
Before independence, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) India controlled
all military activity and was next only to the Viceroy/Governor General. The C-
in-C India, an army officer, was in command of all the three Services. The recently
raised IAF squadrons and units thus came under Air Officer Commanding (AOC)
RAF India, who was part of the vast defence department in Delhi, with all decisions
about the defence of India being taken at Whitehall in London. India thus did
not have a Ministry of Defence but only a Defence Department. The first task
at independence, therefore, was to create a suitable organisation for the fledgling
units and squadrons of the IAF.

IAF in Independent India

At independence, India naturally did not have many senior and experienced
Indian military officers. (Indian members of the civilian bureaucracy, the Indian
Civil Service (ICS), were also relatively young, but had considerable administrative
experience in the government except in matters of defence.)8 As a consequence,
Nehru reluctantly agreed to the suggestion of the Governor General, Lord Louis
Mountbatten, to retain some senior British officers as heads of the three Services.
Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, until then the C-in-C India, was retained
as the Supreme Commander of the militaries of the two newly formed dominions
and was charged with overseeing the division of assets. He was also to exercise
control over the movement of units allotted to the two dominions and the British
 Development of IAF Force Structures 135

military units still in India. He, however, had no operational control over any
Indian or Pakistani units.
Once Lord Mountbatten was invited to become the First Governor General
of free India, it was only natural that he would wield considerable influence over
India’s defence decision-making.9 He presided over the Partition Council to which
the AFRC that was responsible for the division of assets, reported. Strangely,
later, he also chaired the newly formed Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC)
and selected the British officers to head each of the three services, although as the
Governor General, he was merely the constitutional head and had no executive
powers.
Air Marshal Sir Thomas Walker Elmhirst, then serving as the Chief of Inter-
Services Administration at General Headquarters (GHQ) Delhi, was
recommended for the post of the Chief of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF).
Elmhirst agreed to take on this responsibility only if the Indian Prime Minister
met two conditions; first, that the IAF would be an independent fighting service
with him as its C-in-C being subordinate only to the Minister of Defence and
second, he would be allowed to choose six officers of the RAF to assist him during
the first two years. These conditions proved to be a blessing in disguise, as without
them, the very small and young IAF would in all probability have come under
the Indian Army. Air Marshal Elmhirst, with the help of the six British officers,
quickly set about the task of putting the IAF organisation on a firm footing.10
As brought out earlier, the officers and other personnel of the RIAF had
gained considerable operational experience during the war, but were not exposed
to higher defence responsibilities, nor did they have any experience of working
at higher formations as these were invariably manned by British officers. None
of them held a rank higher than Squadron Leader with a very few Wing
Commanders and Group Captains doing ground jobs. On taking over as the C-
in-C and the Chief of the Air Staff, Elmhirst held consultations with the Defence
Ministry and appointed Air Commodore S. Mukherjee, the then seniormost
Indian, as his Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, in the rank of Air Vice Marshal;
Group Captain A.M. Engineer as Air Officer in-charge Personnel & Organisation,
in the rank of Air Commodore; and Group Captain R.H.D. Singh as Air Officer
in-charge Technical & Equipment Services, in the rank of Air Commodore.
In addition, two groups were formed: No. 1 Operational Group under
command of Air Commodore Meher Singh at Palam near Delhi; and the Training
Group under command of Air Commodore Narendra at Bangalore. These
appointments became effective on August 15, 1947. Some of the important
Sections at Air Headquarters, later re-designated ‘Directorates’ were assigned to
Group Captain P.C. Lal, Training & Plans; Group Captain K.L. Sondhi, Personnel;
but the Directorate of Operations was, however, kept under an RAF officer. The
major IAF stations and bases at the time were: Palam at Delhi; Ambala; Jodhpur;
136 Air Power and National Security

Bangalore and Tambaram near Madras (now Chennai). Group Captain Ranjan
Dutt, the first among emergency commissioned officers trained in India, was
appointed as Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO) of No. 1 Operational Group. (Opl.
Gp).11

War Intervenes
The next item on Elmhirst’s agenda was to organise the operational and training
plans of the new service but the Kashmir war intervened. While operational details
and lessons learnt from this 14-month-long war are dealt with in Chapter 2, it
should suffice to say here, that the young IAF that had gained the honorific,
‘Royal’ for its performance during World War II, rose to the occasion and
organised, in record time, the air lift of a battalion of troops from Delhi to
Srinagar. Srinagar then, only had a small infrequently used airfield with a dusty
unpaved runway unfit for sustained transport or fighter operations, a makeshift
air traffic control set-up, no meteorological centre or weather forecasting facility
and no radio telephony (R/T) or other signal communications for air traffic
control. Elmhirst and his staff successfully organised the airlift of troops,
ammunition and other warlike stores by commandeering a sizeable number of
civilian/commercial and privately run Dakota DC-3 aircraft at Palam, and by
mid-morning on October 27, 1947 the first company of No. 1 Sikh Battalion
had been airlifted to Srinagar. In fact, in the following week, one full Infantry
Brigade (No. 161) was airlifted to Srinagar. Such was the speed and efficiency of
this first ever IAF airlift, that most observers did not and even today do not
believe that the operation was not pre-planned. Three fighter squadrons Nos. 7,
8 and 10 and the only transport squadron No. 12 and an Army Air Observation
Post (AOP) Squadron took part in this war. The airfields at Srinagar, Jammu,
and later at Leh and Poonch, were developed and upgraded on a war footing for
military transport and fighter aircraft operations.
At the time, RIAF fighter squadrons were established for 16 Tempests12 and
two Harvard aircraft, and the only transport squadron (No. 12) for 10 DC-3
Dakota aircraft. But the latter was woefully short of aircrews, as very few qualified
twin-engine captains, co-pilots, navigators and signallers were available. To make
matters worse, the same squadron was also assigned the task of training fresh
aircrews. This experience spurred the efforts of the planners and catalysed the
quest for a balanced air force. In April 1949, the Air Headquarters presented a
plan to the government that envisaged an expansion of the air force to 20
squadrons.13 The government, while approving only a 10-squadron force, directed
that the training and other supporting establishments should, however, be built
up for a 20-squadron force. The logic of building the ‘training and support’
facilities for a much larger force was to provide for rapid expansion in an
emergency. But these facilities in fact, got used up by the then existing squadrons
 Development of IAF Force Structures 137

and units and support units, which after partition were woefully short of trained
manpower.

Threat Assessment
At the beginning of World War II, the IAF strength was 16 officers and 244
other ranks, which by January 1945 had swelled to 1,200 officers, including
500 pilots, 200 officer cadets, 20,000 airmen, 6,000 airmen under training and
12,000 enrolled followers; in today’s parlance, Group D employees of different
trades such as washermen, sweepers, lascars, labour, cooks and the like. The 12,000
enrolled followers recruited during the war were disbanded and sent home at the
end of the war.14 The remaining manpower became the nucleus around which
the new air force gradually expanded.
By invading the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Pakistan had
demonstrated its enmity towards India and it was quite obvious that it would
continue to pose an existential threat to India, as it remained in illegal occupation
of a large portion of Indian territory known as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
China had only recently emerged from a civil war and although it showed some
interest in controlling Tibet, it was not as yet seen as an immediate threat.
Although only one-third the size of China, India is a vast country with the
high Himalayas in the north and the sea on three other sides. While the high
Himalayas afforded a reasonable defence, a determined enemy could always come
across the numerous passes in the high mountains. At the time, there was little
or no threat from across the seas. Although India had faced many invasions from
the north-west in the past, the country is too big to be easily conquered, defeated,
subdued or occupied unless internal cohesion breaks down. There was thus, no
justification for being paranoid about imaginary threats.
In its long civilisational history, India has never invaded any country nor has
it shown irredentist or expansionist tendencies. It was thus natural, if naïve, for
its leadership to believe that independent India did not face a major external
threat, and that the world would leave it alone to pursue peaceful economic
development and emancipation of its masses. The political leadership was only
too conscious of the abject poverty, food shortages, lack of basic health, education
and civic facilities, and above all a very weak economic and industrial base, from
which to plan development. Any expenditure on a large standing army, air force
or navy was, therefore, seen as wasteful and even counter-productive. By the early
1950s, it was also becoming clear that a newly independent People’s Republic of
China (PRC), now under Communist control, would pose a variety of security
challenges to India, especially after its invasion of Tibet.
Although somewhat less experienced, the senior officers of the IAF were fully
aware of present and future threats to India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
138 Air Power and National Security

The proposal for expanding the air force to 20 squadrons was thus based on a
thorough understanding and analysis of the events in India’s neighbourhood.
They visualised and planned for a ‘balanced air force’; an air force capable of
carrying out all its roles and missions. There being many outstanding problems
with Pakistan, Indian planners saw a ‘short-term’ threat of limited war with
Pakistan and it was to meet this threat that they now devoted their energies.
Since India wished to follow a defensive policy, it was clear that the initiative
would always remain with the enemy. An aggressor can focus on a relatively small
area, but a defender has to necessarily remain alert along the entire length of the
border, until the attack actually materialises. This not only requires a constant
vigil but also the ability to stop the aggressor without losing too much ground.
In the case of the air force, a defensive posture does not allow a pre-emptive
strike nor any other action until the enemy has already struck. Air Defence (AD)
thus became a vital component of the IAF’s capability. It was thus imperative for
the air force planners to develop an all-round capability, so that the enemy was
deterred in the first place or appropriately dealt with if and when deterrence
failed.
All of the air force senior officers had just recently participated in the long-
drawn-out World War II and learnt important lessons. They did not want India
to make the mistake of emphasising one capability at the expense of another. The
first ever plan of air force expansion, therefore, envisaged a 20-squadron force.
Its composition was as under:
• 8 fighter/bomber squadrons
• 1 night fighter squadron
• 1 photo reconnaissance squadron
• 2 light bomber squadrons
• 1 maritime reconnaissance squadron
• 2 transport squadrons
• Other ancillary and supporting formations and training units15
Even a cursory glance at the above composition will show the general trend
in the thinking of the time. The number of fighter/bomber squadrons appears to
have been decided, both by the length of the borders with Pakistan and the
requirements of air defence, as no separate air defence squadron was planned.
The two light bomber squadrons signify a limited offensive capability. The choice
of a night fighter squadron may, at first glance, seem a little strange, as at that
time there were very few radar stations. The aircraft of the period also did not
have airborne interceptor radar. In the absence of these two vital capabilities, the
night fighter would have been quite useless. The IAF in fact actually raised a
night fighter squadron and equipped it with two-seat Vampire fighters, which
had very rudimentary air interception radars operated by a radar operator
 Development of IAF Force Structures 139

occupying the second seat, but their exact role was never quite understood as
these fighters were never really used in this role. Neither Pakistan nor any other
adversary then possessed a bomber or fighter capable of night operations, and
hence this particular capability somehow did not make sense. Here, a brief
digression is necessary to understand the thinking behind this ambitious if unusual
air force expansion plan.

Dependence on Outside Advice

The reason for this decision on the strength and composition of the air force is
to be found in the recommendations made by Professor P.M.S. Blackett, a famous
British physicist and a Nobel laureate, who was invited by Nehru to assist India
in planning its defence forces. He was requested to make a report outlining the
measures necessary for India to become near self-sufficient in defence production
over a period of seven years but at the same time retain adequate defence and
security.16 This, according to Chris Smith, was due mainly to the inexperience
of the Indian leadership.
Neither he (Nehru) nor his civilian advisers understood sufficiently the
intricacies of military technology and strategy, and the advice of the service
chiefs alone would have been inappropriate and insufficient. In addition,
there existed gaping holes in the decision-making process. It was only
during World War II that the Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers were
deputed into South Block (of the Ministry of Defence)...Moreover, it took
a long time to change the Department of Defence into anything more
than a post office.17
Blackett submitted his report in the latter half of 1948 which followed an
earlier report by another British adviser, Wansborough Jones, which was
commissioned by the Interim Government prior to independence and formed
the basis for the defence science organisation in India. His (Jones’s) terms of
reference were to outline four central roles for the armed forces: (a) to secure the
land frontier against raids from border tribes or from attack by a second-class
army, (b) to support civil power; (this role was later dropped and ignored by
Blackett), (c) to provide a small expeditionary force capable of protecting India’s
regional interests; and (d) within available financial resources to develop a force
capable of taking the field in a first-class war. With the exception of the second
element Blackett followed these guide-lines.18
There was, however, a significant difference. The Jones’ report was prepared
at a time when India was not partitioned and hence only the threat from border
tribes, with which the British were only too familiar, was taken into account. But
now as a British dominion, India was also expected to look to the Commonwealth
for its external security needs and hence the omission of the second clause relating to
140 Air Power and National Security

support to civil power. The Blackett report, on the other hand, was commissioned
by the Prime Minister of an independent country that was only a member of the
Commonwealth. It was thus made keeping in mind Nehru’s basic requirements
of self-sufficiency in defence, and more importantly its affordability. The obvious
focus was on what India could afford given the high priority for the process of
planned development of the country. Keeping in mind ‘India’s extreme economic
weakness’, Blackett, therefore, suggested a modest capability that centred on
defensive or what he called non-competitive weapons, rather than on competitive
weapons such as modern fighter aircraft, heavy tanks and aircraft carrier task
forces. In this scheme, the army was to play a major role as it could well provide
a reasonable assurance of defence without too much expenditure on modernisation.
The navy’s role was: (a) to provide protection of coastal shipping; (b) to escort
a small number of ocean convoys between Aden (now Yemen) and Singapore19;
(c) co-operation with the army and the air force in repelling enemy landing
operations; advance along coastlines and to be able to undertake similar operations
against the enemy. Blackett found cruisers both expensive and vulnerable but
while opting for small cost-effective and non-prestigious systems, he nevertheless
recommended the acquisition of a small escort carrier for convoy protection. In all
fairness, he also pointed out that India’s assumed enemy, Pakistan, was unlikely
to acquire the capability to threaten Indian convoys for the foreseeable future.20
His recommendations for the air force were similarly modest. While ruling
out strategic bombing on humanitarian grounds, he also vetoed a ‘long-range
bombing’ role on the basis of cost and efficacy. He thought that India could not
hope to acquire a precision bombing capability and hence, it would have to go
for counter-value targets, i.e. civilian population centres which for obvious reasons,
was not advisable. He therefore, recommended smaller single-engine fighters with
adequate strike capability. He did not think India needed jet fighters as these
were too fast to be able to identify and attack the enemy’s army. He also believed
that jet operations in the dusty and high ambient temperatures of the arid and
semi-arid north of India would require careful evaluation. Blackett, however,
accepted the procurement of light bombers, night fighters, photo reconnaissance
aircraft and trainers and recommended a major boost to the Hindustan Aircraft
Factory (later Hindustan Aeronautics Limited or HAL).21 These recommendations
seem to be the basis for the composition of the proposed 15-squadron force given
above. This brief analysis still does not give a convincing answer, for the need for
a single night fighter squadron, which appears to be an aberration. But according
Robert Anderson22 – who cites Blackett’s interviews of 1967 – Blackett held a
number of discussions and briefings, with the senior serving officers of the Indian
army, navy and the air force, and hence they would have been fully aware of the
reasoning behind his recommendations. Blackett, in fact, was the official defence
consultant and visited India on a dozen occasions from 1947 to 1972, had access
 Development of IAF Force Structures 141

to Nehru and was friends with noted scientists like Sir Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar,
Dr. D.S. Kothari, the first Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, Homi J.
Bhabha and P.C. Mahalanobis – all in the inner circle of the Prime Minister and
influential decision-makers in the field of defence science policy. He also vigorously
supported the decision to manufacture the Gnat in India. In hindsight, it is possible
and perhaps even likely that Blackett had a good idea of the real threats India
faced in the early 1950s, the state of the Indian economy, and hence advocated
a modest defence capability.

New Acquisitions
Notwithstanding economic constraints, India soon acquired a sizeable number
of Vampire jet fighters and trainers from Great Britain. This was possible because:
…[w]hen India gained independence in 1947, its foreign exchange reserves
were substantial. These were held chiefly in the form of sterling securities,
an IOU from Great Britain to the Government of India, its colony for
the unrequited exports which India had supplied to England during the
war, which in 1948 amounted to British £1,200 million.23
Britain would have gone bankrupt if it had attempted to pay back this debt
in one lump sum. An agreement was therefore reached, whereby India could
draw a maximum of £40 million every year for 30 years, until the total debt
amount was liquidated. India, however, purchased considerable defence equipment
including several aircraft, tanks, ships and many other items for civilian use from
Britain, and exhausted these sterling assets in the first few years after independence.
According to the Anderson Report cited above, India’s sterling reserves were still
healthy at £542 million in 1955.24
Although the Kashmir issue had been referred to the United Nations (UN)
in 1948, Pakistan’s hostility showed no signs of abating but in fact increased, and
hence it now posed a long-term threat. By the early 1950s, on the recommendation
of the three Chiefs of Staff, the government formed a high-powered Armed Forces
Re-organisation Committee. In 1952, it accepted in principle the Committee’s
recommendations, one of which was that the air force should be expanded to a
15-squadron force. In fact, during the 1950s there were three force structure
reviews. The first, an internal review at Air Headquarters, proposed a ‘20-squadron-
force’ but the government accepted only 10 squadrons. The second committee
recommended a 15-squadron force, while the third review conducted by another
committee suggested 20 squadrons. Finally in 1963, the third, the Tata Committee,
under the chairmanship of the noted industrialist J.R.D. Tata that went into the
question of the size of the Indian military, recommended a 45-squadron air force
to be gradually built up over a period of time. No time frame was, however, specified
and as will be seen, this ambitious level was never really achieved.25
142 Air Power and National Security

Initial Consolidation and Reorganisation

The experience of the 1947-48 Kashmir operations had raised many questions
about the operational readiness of the IAF, which had fought the war with available
equipment of World War II vintage. Many deficiencies such as shortage of suitable
aircraft, equipment, logistics and maintenance support and Command and
Control were addressed. The year 1949, thus proved to be one of consolidation
and reorganisation in almost all the major departments based on the primary
roles of the IAF, Air Defence, Strategic Offensive Operations and support to the
army and navy. In April 1949, the Directorate of Policy and Plans at Air
Headquarters submitted a paper to the DCC through the Chiefs of Staff
Committee (CoSC) for a minimum of 20 squadrons with necessary support units.
Due to financial constraints, the DCC accepted for immediate implementation
the expansion to only 10 squadrons but allowed the IAF to raise support and
administrative establishments to cater for an eventual expansion to 20 squadrons.
Some of the important decisions were:
• The flying schools at Jodhpur and Ambala were renamed Nos. 1 and 2 Air
Force Academies with the former doing initial flying training; and the latter
advanced training. The training establishment at Coimbatore was renamed
No. 3 Air Force Academy to carry out ground training of officers.
• The No. 1 Operational Group at Palam was upgraded to Operational
Command and the Training Group at Bangalore to Training Command.
• Air Force Technical College (AFTC) was established at Jalahalli, Bangalore
for training officers of the Technical Engine, Electrical, Signals and
Armament branches. Until then, technical officers promoted from ranks
were trained at the No. 2 Ground Training School (GTS) Tambaram
Madras, (now Chennai) and direct entry candidates were sent to the United
Kingdom (UK) for training. Indian instructors began to gradually replace
British instructors at AFTC with the last British Commandant of the college
leaving India only in 1956.
• Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Ground Training Schools for airmen were established for
non-technical, airframe and aero-engine, electrical, signals and radar trades
at Jalahalli and Tambaram.
• An Air Mission was established at London to assist in procurement of spares
which were mainly of British origin and also to keep IAF informed of
developments in the field of aviation in the UK.
• An RAF Transport Command Team was invited in May 1951, to properly
standardise and categorise IAF transport aircrews.
• Another team from the Examination Wing of the RAF Central Flying
School also assessed the standard of flying training imparted at IAF schools.
 Development of IAF Force Structures 143

• In September 1950, steps were taken to establish the Armament Training

Wing (ATW) at Jamnagar for live air armament training.26
As we have seen above, IAF expansion and modernisation was aimed at
meeting the challenge posed by Pakistan, and hence it will be instructive to briefly
study Pakistan’s military strategy. It was evident from the early 1950s that Pakistan
had learnt some vital air power lessons from the 14-month-long Kashmir War in
1947-48. While it had succeeded in diplomatically and militarily pressurising
India, to avoid being called the ‘aggressor’ and in fact, a legitimate ‘party’ to the
dispute, it did not have the air power capability to take on the IAF and face the
Indian military threat. India certainly enjoyed superiority in conventional arms.
Faced with a far bigger country and a stronger economy, Pakistan had to co-opt
friends and allies to meet the Indian threat. Pakistan began making efforts to
address this perceived inferiority in right earnest. As early as 1950, Pakistan’s
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had begun asking the United States (US)
Administration for military assistance, including modern fighter aircraft ostensibly
to fight the Communist threat.27
In 1950, during one of the many crises between India and Pakistan, when
India moved an armoured division to the west of Beas River in the Amritsar area
as a precautionary step, Liaquat Ali Khan visited Washington and asked the
Americans for arms aid. “He met the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff and stressed his desire to obtain arms and equipment. He
also privately met the US Navy Chief Admiral Chester Nimitz and re-emphasised
Pakistan’s need for arms. Pakistan, he assured Nimitz, would act as a bulwark
against pro-Communist India...both American and British diplomats felt that he
made it clear where Pakistan stood in the Cold War.” When asked how big an
army Pakistan wanted to maintain, he replied, “If your country will guarantee
our territorial integrity, I will not keep any army at all.28 It then became clear that
the arms sought by Pakistan would eventually be used against India. India expressed
its concern to the US and the US decided not to supply arms to Pakistan ‘at this
stage’. A worried India began a renewed search for modern arms and equipment
from other sources.
In March 1955, Nehru made a very successful high profile visit to the Soviet
Union during which he invited the Soviet leadership to visit India. While
remaining non-aligned, India wanted Soviet arms. In November 1955, Nikita
Khrushchev and his deputy Marshal Nikolai Bulganin visited India to cement
the friendship, and promised all assistance to India’s planned development; the
steel plant at Bhilai was one such example.
By 1955, Pakistan had joined the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)
and soon thereafter the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO); it began
receiving considerable arms aid from the US including some 120 F-86 Sabre
144 Air Power and National Security

fighter jets and 28 Canberra B-57 medium bombers and a little later (in 1961)
a dozen F-104 supersonic Starfighter aircraft. The entry of a supersonic fighter
into South Asia changed the overall military balance between India and Pakistan
and there arose a clamour in India for a supersonic fighter to match the F-104.
Pakistan had in one stroke changed the qualitative air power balance in its
favour. Both the F-104 and Sabre F-86 were equipped with the heat-seeking
Sidewinder missile that had by then acquired a reputation for high lethality.
Pakistan also managed to obtain two high-powered static radar stations, one of
which was located at Badin in Sindh, and the other at Sakesar in Punjab. In
addition, it also received some early warning radar sets which together strengthened
Pakistan’s AD network and provided its aircraft considerable warning when these
were on an offensive mission.29
This advantage was only partly neutralised when India received the first batch
of MiG-21 fighter interceptors from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. By the
time the 1965 Indo-Pak War began, India had only a handful of MiG fighters,
but managed to exert some psychological pressure on the Pakistan Air Force (PAF);
but only just. Although Pakistan’s strategy was essentially defensive, it adopted
an ‘offensive’ rhetoric and kept needling India whenever an opportunity arose;
American and Chinese help was always at hand to restrain India.

More Aircraft Join the IAF

The next major purchase in 1953 was the 71 MD-450 Ouragan (Toofani) fighter
from Dassault of France, followed by a batch of another 33 of these fighters in
1957. The aim was to diversify the sources of arms and to reduce dependence
on one foreign power. The Toofani was neither tested in battle, nor extensively
used for operational training and had by the 1960s become obsolete. By the end
of 1959, the IAF had also acquired 110 Mystere IVA fighters from Dassault
France, 182 Hunter F-56 fighters and T-66 trainers, 74 Canberra light bombers
and strategic reconnaissance aircraft from the UK. The proposal to manufacture
the Gnat fighter under licence at Hindustan Aircraft (later Aeronautics) Limited
(HAL) was vigorously pursued and the first of these fighters had begun to fly in
1958.30 (Please see Appendix II – The Gnat Story). The transport fleet was
augmented with a sizeable number of twin-engine C-119 Packet medium lift
aircraft from Fairchild Company of the US, and more DC-3 Dakotas. In addition,
about 20 IL-14 light transports, and in 1961 a squadron of An-12 heavy lift
transports were acquired from the Soviet Union. The IAF strength had rapidly
expanded to 23 squadrons by 1960 (Please see Appendix I).
It is often claimed that India’s decision to purchase these fighters and light
bombers was in response to Pakistan joining the Western Alliance (CENTO and
SEATO) in 1954-55 but according to Chris Smith many of these purchase
 Development of IAF Force Structures 145

decisions were made well before that happened. This author, however, feels that
these decisions were necessitated by Pakistan’s renewed hostility and the efforts
of its leadership in the early 1950s, to convince the US to supply arms for defence
against the Soviet Union.
The most amazing part of this acquisition is that such formidable capability
was not employed during the Chinese aggression of 1962. The PAF had almost
no offensive capability until it began to receive military assistance from the US
in the mid-1950s. The PAF acquisition was quite well thought out and was
designed to thwart a perceived Indian threat. Some 120 Sabre F-86 fighter/
bombers, 24 B-57 US-manufactured Canberra light bombers were followed by
14 F-104 Starfighters in 1961-62. The F-86 was known for its manoeuvrability
since its turning radius in air combat was quite small, but was inferior to the
Gnat in its climbing performance. It carried six nose-mounted guns of 0.5 inch
calibre with a good rate of fire, so that an enemy in the range of about 400-600
metres was a sure kill. PAF Sabre kills in 1965 and 1971 were, however, from
much closer ranges. The PAF soon obtained from the US the Sidewinder AIM-
7 air-to-air heat-seeking missile, which when mounted on the Sabre, made it
even more lethal. The F-104 being a supersonic fighter interceptor raised much
anxiety among Indians. Like the early models of the MiG-21, it was also specifically
designed to intercept enemy (Warsaw Pact) strategic bombers at high altitude,
well before the bombers reached their weapon release line. Both the MiG-21 and
F-104 fighters were equipped with an ‘after burner’ which helped the engine to
produce extra thrust by burning more fuel, thereby giving the fighter a very high
rate of climb, acceleration and supersonic speeds. But both these aircraft had
limited endurance, a 25-30 minute duration flight being the norm. With a reliable
Ground Controlled Interception (GCI), high-powered, long-range radar, well-
trained radar controllers, a dependable air-to-air missile and finally an alert pilot,
the F-104 posed a major threat. For trans-sonic fighters flying at low altitude, the
F-104 or the MiG-21 were not much of a threat as these possessed better turning
performance and the Sidewinder and the Soviet K-13 missiles usually missed the
target, when fired on an enemy flying at very low altitudes; proximity to the
ground would simply cause the heat-seeking missile to hit the ground. The F-
104 had one advantage; the 20mm Gatling rotary gun with a very high rate of
fire fitted to the side of the front part of its fuselage, while the early models of the
MiG-21 had none. In hindsight, the clamour in India for a supersonic aircraft
to match the PAF F-104 was, therefore, justified, if a little, overestimated. The
performance of the F-104 in the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars was below
expectation, but it nevertheless posed a threat due to its generally better
performance (higher speed, acceleration), airborne radar, and a rotary cannon, to
Indian fighters and especially to Canberra night bombing operations. The night-
fighting capability of the F-104 also caused some psychological inhibition,
146 Air Power and National Security

although most Indian Canberra crew learnt to make a quick bombing pass and
exit the target area at low levels and high speed.
In the early 1950s, a committee had calculated the IAF strength on the basis
of one fighter squadron per division. India then had about nine active divisions,
so besides these nine squadrons, the air force was to have six to eight squadrons
for air defence, two/three light bomber squadrons and a photoreconnaissance
unit.31 This probably explains the magic figure of 15 combat squadrons in the
1950s and also the traditional view, that the IAF was essentially a tactical air
force, a supporting organisation in the service of the army. Once the planners
had focused on Pakistan as the major threat, it was only natural that the range,
or more correctly, Radius of Action (RoA) of the proposed fighter-bombers did
not receive much attention. As a result, most IAF fighters, until recently, had
very limited range or ‘short legs’ and barely managed to reach Pakistani airfields,
like Sargodha. To be fair, India was not able to buy long range fighter-bombers,
as none was really available. At the time, fighter interceptor and Fighter Ground
Attack (FGA) aircraft the world over had a short range, as these were essentially
designed to intercept incoming enemy bombers near, or over a country’s own
borders, and for tactical operations in support of surface forces. The only aircraft
with relatively longer ranges were the bombers. The Canberra had adequate range
and was relatively slow, but nevertheless made up for its speed by flying at night
and thus avoiding enemy reaction, except the PAF F-104 Starfighter, that was
really the only fighter capable of night interception.
For several reasons, the acquisition of the MiG-21 turned out to be a blessing
in disguise. First, the Soviets allowed India to manufacture the aircraft under
licence. Second, in due course they also provided three different versions, the
MiG-21 M, MF and ‘bis,’ with marginally higher thrust, better avionics, especially
the Airborne Interception (AI) radar, and additional under-wing stations to carry
a modest variety of armament stores. It still lacked range, but with two/three
external drop tanks it could reach some enemy targets, albeit with limited weapon
loads. (Please see Appendix III – The MiG-21 Story). The first MiG-21 squadron
was just about entering service when the 1965 Indo-Pak war broke out in
September 1965. Most of these fighters were used only as ‘top cover,’ or as escorts,
to Mystere IVA fighter-bombers, attacking enemy positions in support of the
army, in areas close to the Pakistani border. In one such encounter, a MiG-21
fired its missiles but these missed the enemy fighter due to the aircraft flying in
very close proximity of the ground.32
By early 1965, the Gnat fleet was also gradually overcoming its teething
problems and the IAF was able to raise a total of three squadrons (Nos. 2, 9 and
23) of this tiny fighter, which not only had the advantage of very good
manoeuvrability, but also of size, as it could not easily be ‘spotted’ by the enemy.
It also presented a very small radar signature, and hence to some extent possessed
 Development of IAF Force Structures 147

‘stealth’ attributes. One of the most serious drawbacks of this indigenously

produced fighter, however, was that its 30 mm Aden Guns were prone to frequent
jamming or stoppages. As a result, many an opportunity was lost, with the enemy
fighter in cross-hairs and within firing range.33 Similar disappointments were
also faced during the 1971 war.
Fleet serviceability and availability were also a matter of concern with most
of the Mystere IVA, Gnat, and even Hunter aircraft although these were relatively
new. Even so, during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, the IAF employed a total of just
about 16 fighter squadrons in the Western theatre. This seriously curtailed sortie
rates during the war, and severely reduced their availability despite the hard work
of the maintenance crews. In the post-1965 period, non-availability of aircraft
also delayed peacetime training schedules. Many young pilots found themselves
languishing in ground jobs, when in fact, they should have been flying to get
their Fully Operational (F/Ops) status. In times of such shortage, some of the
forward bases had to be given fighters on loan, so that they could at least maintain
a Live Air Defence alert on the Operational Readiness Platform (ORP).

HF-24 Marut
Even though this Indian fighter aircraft lacked a suitable engine and had to make
do with two Orpheus engines, already being licence-produced for the Gnat, it
was inducted into the IAF only in 1967, when its first squadron was formed.
Nos. 10 and 220 were the only two units that were equipped with this aircraft.
The HF-24 was to be fitted with a Rolls Royce engine, made for the Egyptian
Air Force, but Cold War sanctions came in the way and the aircraft remained
underpowered. Being markedly underpowered, the HF-24, like the Mystere IVA,
used to get airborne nearly at the end of the 3,000-yard runway, with both the
onlooker and the pilot missing a heartbeat. HAL also manufactured a trainer
version of the HF-24 Marut but could not really overcome all the teething
problems. Two of its illustrious test pilots, the legendary Group Captain Suranjan
Das (killed January 10, 1970) and Squadron Leader Arun Keshav Sapre (killed
November 21, 1971), were lost in HF-24 accidents. The HF-24 performed well
during the 1971 war and even bagged a Sabre in an air-to-air encounter, but
limited armament and RoA, came in the way of further development. HF-24
serviceability was also generally poor, and in any case the IAF decision-makers
were already looking at Soviet fighters, such as the MiG-21 and S-22 aka Sukhoi-
7. India was then subject to a stringent technology denial regime imposed by the
West, because of the 1971 Friendship Treaty with the Soviets, which gave the
impression that India was ‘firmly in the Communist Camp’ and had to finally
phase out this promising fighter by 1985. In hindsight, the IAF and HAL should
not have abandoned this indigenous programme, but put it on hold and then
revived it when the Western markets opened up, soon after the disintegration of
148 Air Power and National Security

the Soviet Union in 1991. Some believe the HF-24 could have at least filled the
Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) need of the IAF, at a fraction of the cost and could
well have avoided the delays that eventually saw the British Aerospace (BAe) Hawk
AJT enter IAF service only in 2004, some 18 years after the search for the AJT
began.
Soon after the 1965 war, Pakistan also came under US sanctions, but
succeeded in diversifying its arms suppliers by obtaining a sizeable number of
F-6s (MiG-19s) from the PRC, and Mirage III and V fighters from France, once
again attempting to balance IAF’s quantitative superiority. Experience of the 1965
conflict clearly showed that IAF airfields were highly vulnerable to PAF strikes,
due to their close proximity to the International Border (IB). PAF airfields on
the other hand, were located relatively deep inside Pakistan and were invulnerable
to IAF fighter/bombers which were woefully short of range. This was to become
abundantly clear in the 1971 war, when India decided to maintain only a defensive
posture in the west. The IAF used Hunters for attacks on Peshawar and other
depth airfields, while the Canberra light bombers were used for night attacks, as
these were too vulnerable by day.
The IAF had inducted only one new type of aircraft during the inter-war
years. The S-22 also known as Sukhoi-7 was capable of carrying more armament,
but its range was limited. The MiG-21 fleet was also growing fast, and together
the availability of these fighters, boosted the confidence of the IAF pilots. In just
two years from 1968, the IAF raised or re-equipped some six-and-a-half squadrons
with the S-22 and eight-and-a-half squadrons with the MiG-21.34 The IAF thus
had 15 squadrons of supersonic fighters. During the 1971 war, both S-22 and
MiG-21 aircraft were also used for single aircraft night attacks on PAF airfields.
While innovative and daring, the value of these night raids could not be fully
assessed. Some daylight attacks on PAF airfields were fairly successful, but IAF
losses to Pakistan’s AD fighters and anti-aircraft guns were heavy. The newly
acquired S-22 fleet was used extensively in the Offensive Air Support (OAS) and
Interdiction roles, and proved very effective, but the losses to anti-aircraft and
enemy small arms fire were once again very high. This attrition was mainly due
to IAF pilots carrying out multiple or repeat dive attacks in the S-22 aircraft,
giving ample time to the enemy to anticipate and properly aim anti-aircraft fire.
Its large size made it easier to visually spot the S-22 and this added to its
vulnerability.
The IAF once again, found itself incapable of inflicting serious damage to
the Pakistani assets in the west, even though some important strategic targets
such as the Mangla Dam, the Sui gas plant and railway communication systems
were effectively struck and damaged. Limited range or RoA of the IAF fighter-
bombers was seen as the main cause of its reduced effectiveness. Thus began the
search for a Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA) capable of reaching the
 Development of IAF Force Structures 149

farthest PAF airfield in Pakistan. Many fighters such as the SAAB Viggen and
French Dassault Mirage F-1 were also in contention, but in 1978, India finally
selected the Jaguar aircraft that was manufactured by an Anglo-French consortium,
some 10 years after it was first offered to India.35 Deliveries of the Jaguar began
in 1979, with the first batch of 18 aircraft given on loan from the RAF, followed
by 40 more built in the UK and another 45 being manufactured at HAL Bangalore,
with the kits provided by the manufacturer. HAL went on to produce over 100
of these aircraft and also participated in an extensive electronic upgrade. The IAF
equipped a total of five squadrons with this fighter-bomber: Nos. 5, 14, 16, 20
and 27. Sometime later, No. 6 Squadron was equipped with the shipping-strike
version of the Jaguar. One other role for the DPSA was nuclear weapon delivery,
if and when, India decided to weaponise its nascent nuclear capability. To be
sure, the 1974 nuclear test was officially termed a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’
(PNE), and India did not follow it up with any major weapons programme, but
the long overdue induction of the Anglo-French Jaguar ensured a delivery system
when needed. India began its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme
(IGMDP) only in 1983, nearly a decade after the 1974 PNE Test and finally
tested its nuclear deliverable devices or weapons only in May 1998. According to
Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, “After three decades of focusing on air defence
interception, the IAF acquired a modern two-engine strike aircraft; the Anglo-
French Jaguar, supplanting the slower and more vulnerable Canberra. British
Aerospace, the Jaguar manufacturer, had offered the plane to India as early as
1968, but New Delhi had rejected it for fear of accepting another orphan aircraft
such as the Gnat.”36
The IAF and indeed the Indian Government have shown marked reluctance
to choose an aircraft under development, perhaps because Indian aviation industry
was not confident of maintaining an unproven aircraft. Costs and distrust of
Western vendors in the Cold War climate might also have been two other major
factors. Except for the few Gnat and Jaguar squadrons, the IAF during this period
was largely equipped with Soviet fighters.
Just when India felt confident of deterring Pakistan by acquiring a deep
penetration strike capability, the latter once again managed to upset the qualitative
balance by inducting the formidable F-16 ‘Fighting Falcon’ from the US in the
early 1980s. Today, even after 30 long years, the F-16 remains a formidable
opponent for the third and fourth generation fighters of the IAF, a tribute to
American technology and Pakistan’s farsighted approach to aircraft procurement.
Pakistan became the so-called ‘frontline’ state when the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan in late December 1979, and extracted a high price for its cooperation.
The US did not want the Soviet Union to come close to the oil-rich region of the
Arabian Sea and decided to raise a force of Islamic mujahideen fighters to evict
the Russians. In this scheme, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) worked
150 Air Power and National Security

closely with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), providing training and
logistical support while Saudi Arabia provided the finances. Such total dependence
on Pakistan meant that for almost a decade, the US had little option but to go
along with Pakistan’s demands. Pakistan received massive economic aid and 40
F-16 fighters. Pakistan also got round the US to ignore its clandestine nuclear
weapons programme, that finally fructified in the late 1980s, but was kept under
wraps until 1998, when it overtly tested its nuclear weapons. Pakistan also received
generous technological and other help from the PRC. The Chinese not only
provided Pakistan with the design of a fission bomb but also gave it the use of
their nuclear firing range, to test it on 26 June 1990.37 In the F-16, the PAF had
found an antidote to the IAF’s Jaguar. Although only a relatively small number
of F-16s – 36 fighters plus four trainers – were procured, the purchase gave the
PAF the confidence to face the IAF. Pakistan also, thus got a fighter that was
capable of nuclear delivery.
India almost immediately reacted to this new Pakistani threat and ordered,
in a great hurry, 49 Mirage-2000 air superiority fighters from France, followed
by some 60 MiG-29 fighters from the Soviet Union. These two types were finally
inducted into the IAF, only in 1985 and 1987 respectively. But such was the
urgency to find an answer to the PAF’s F-16, that India once again turned to its
old and reliable supplier, and purchased a limited number of MiG-23 BN and
MF, fighter-interceptor and fighter-bomber versions, as an interim measure. Both
these types also had only limited range, but carried a bigger armament load than
the MiG-21.38 The MiG-23 had the advantage of being quite cheap in the early
1980s. For example, the MiG-23 MS was priced between $3.6 million and $6.6
million, depending on the customer; on the other hand in 1980, the F-16 Fighting
Falcon was priced at $14 million, and the Flogger’s closest Western competitor
was the Israeli Kfir C2 at $4.5 million.
From about the early 1980s, the IAF saw slow but gradual expansion, and
improvements in all major departments. By the second half the 1970s, it had also
inducted some 30 squadrons of Soviet SAM III Pechora AD missiles. These were
deployed mostly at forward airfields and other important Vulnerable Areas (VAs)
and Vulnerable Points (VPs). The army also soon purchased the mobile self-
propelled Quadrat SAM System to give protection to its armour, and in addition
both the army and the air force also received a modest number of Igla shoulder-
fired quick reaction Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), also known as Man Portable
Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). The Il-76 heavy transport and An-32 Medium
Tactical transport or METAC, Mi-17 helicopters, Mi-25 and later Mi-35 attack
helicopters, were also inducted in 1984-85. In fact, the 1979-89 decade saw major
expansion and modernisation of the IAF. Except for the Jaguar and Mirage-2000,
all the armament and equipment came from the Soviet Union. One noticeable
fact about India’s efforts at modernisation was – and to some extent still is – that
 Development of IAF Force Structures 151

both Russian and Western sources invariably offered aircraft and equipment on
temptingly attractive terms, just when Indian defence industry appeared close to
a breakthrough. Given the ever-present threat from Pakistan, India had little option
and showed little enthusiasm for its indigenous defence programmes.
The PAF had by then acquired the French Crotale SAM, RBS-70 Quick
Reaction Missiles (QRMs) and the Mirage III and the Mirage V fighters and
FGA aircraft respectively, and as we have seen in the early 1980s, some 40 American
F-16 fighters, that fundamentally changed the air power balance in the sub-
continent, to the extent that Pakistan could not be treated casually. The Pechora
SAMs were inducted to free a larger number of fighters from AD duties. The IAF
also tried to develop and integrate this missile system and the accompanying
mobile radars to strengthen India’s AD. The PAF had also modernised its AD by
deploying a very large number, some say up to 40, German Mobile Pulse Doppler
Radars (MPDRs) along the IB and automated its Control and Reporting System
(C&R) to frustrate the low-level fighter threat from India.
By the 1990s, the remaining few Hunter, HF-24 and Gnat fighters were
phased out. The S-22 had also been phased out rather early, as its flight safety
record was not exactly noteworthy, and the fleet also faced an acute shortage of
spares, coupled with maintenance problems. The IAF was thus again faced with
fast-dwindling numbers of its fighters, but this time there was no easy solution,
as unit costs of aircraft had skyrocketed and the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft
(LCA) programme was languishing for want of an engine, multi-mode radar and
suitable and reliable digital fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system and was
unlikely to reach fruition before the turn of the century. In fact, the LCA made
its first flight only in February 2001. The Indian economy was in dire straits and
it seemed the 1990s would prove to be a very difficult decade, which it was. The
Narasimha Rao government decided to liberalise the economy and succeeded in
showing some early gains. The buzz in the Defence and External Affairs Ministries
was to avoid war at almost any cost.39

Expansion of Capabilities
By the late 1980s, the IAF possessed some six squadrons of the DPSA Jaguar,
two each of Mirage-2000 and MiG-29 and some 30 squadrons of MiG-21, when
another Russian fighter-bomber, the MiG-27 began entering service. This aircraft
had greater armament payload and range but once again posed serious and
recurring maintenance problems. The R-29 engine often suffered from fourth-
stage compressor blade failure and the decision to use a de-rated engine caused
engine surge at the most critical times, such as on the take-off run. This aircraft
is currently undergoing mid-life upgrade, but it is not clear if its maintenance
problems have been resolved.
152 Air Power and National Security

The Mirage-2000 is seen as being one of the most versatile and reliable multi-
role fighters, with adequate range and armament, but according to some
knowledgeable sources its maintenance and lifecycle costs have been prohibitively
high. In 1993, when foreign exchange was in short supply, routine maintenance
of the Mirage fleet alone used up more than half of the Rs. 90 crore worth foreign
exchange allocated to the Directorate of Air Staff Requirements (DASR) for minor
expenses.40 At the time of its induction in the early 1980s, the Mirage-2000 was
also an expensive and unproven fighter with few export customers, but proved to
be a good buy despite its high cost. It also reinforced the widely held notion that
Western equipment was decidedly better than its Soviet/Russian counterparts.
The current plans to upgrade, mainly the avionics and radar, of the 52 strong
Mirage-2000 aircraft fleet are estimated to cost a whopping $2.3 billion.
Dependence on foreign suppliers for aircraft, armament and avionics puts an
unduly heavy burden on the exchequer, and raises serious doubts about the
operational preparedness of the air force. To be fair, the initial cost of the Russian
equipment was invariably much lower than its Western counterparts, and the
terms of payment were also generally favourable, but their lifecycle costs were
invariably high and difficult to calculate.
The Soviet Union offered the MiG-23 in the 1970s, when India was in search
of a DPSA as a replacement for the ageing Canberra. The IAF rejected it because
of inadequate range and performance. India then purchased the Jaguar from the
UK, which was also quite costly. The Russians again made a better offer and said,
“Take the aircraft now, start payment only after two years, complete the payment
in 17 years at two per cent rate of interest.” The Indian government told the IAF
to accept the aircraft even if it did not fully meet its requirements. The Air Staff
Requirements (ASRs) for the MiG-23 were allegedly written after the deal was
already finalised.41
Despite all out efforts, the strength of the IAF fighter fleets was fast dwindling
on account of ageing, technological obsolescence and maintainability issues.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, while pilots of the Jaguar and some of the
new types of Russian aircraft were flying 120-150 hours a year, those of Sukhoi
S-22, HF-24, Hunter and Gnat were barely managing to get 80 hours a year.
Many of the units were thus struggling to maintain the operational status of their
pilots. The IAF is normally expected to maintain a daily serviceability and
availability of around 50-60 per cent of the authorised strength of 16 fighters
and two trainers in a squadron; but this was often not possible. Some believe that
the IAF over-maintains its aircraft. The Americans say, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix
it.” In other words, a machine is likely to start giving trouble if one unnecessarily
tinkers with it, when it is working perfectly well. Every aircraft has to follow a
servicing schedule laid down by the manufacturer – check, change and replace
parts such as filters, seals at regular intervals. But when a fleet faces shortage of
 Development of IAF Force Structures 153

spares, users are prone to ‘cannibalise’, that is, take out a part from an already
unserviceable aircraft that is on ground for scheduled servicing or snag rectification
and use it to fix a problem on another aircraft. Very soon the subject aircraft
becomes a ‘Christmas tree’ because repeated demands reduce it to a mere skeleton.
At the root of this problem is the low MTBF or (Mean Time Between Failure),
poor forecast of spares requirements, procurement delays in the pipeline, especially
when it stretches to an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) in another
country and lastly the inability of the local industry Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited (HAL) or IAF Base Repair Depots (BRDs) to repair/service it in time.
Earlier the Russian aero-engines, for example, were designed for a service life of
just 200-300 hours as against some 600-800 hours for their Western counterparts.
Tropical conditions, where dust, high humidity and temperatures and corrosion
are routinely experienced, add to the difficulty of aircraft maintenance. This subject
will be discussed in a later section, but suffice it to say that for decades poor
serviceability and reliability have plagued the IAF.

Search for the Advanced Jet Trainer

A committee under Air Marshal D.A. Lafontaine was set up in the early 1980s to
enquire into causes of fighter accidents in the IAF. The committee held ‘pilot
error’ as one of the main causes and attributed it to poor training due to the
non-availability of the AJT. The Kiran was considered too slow for a direct
transition to MiG-21 aircraft, the mainstay of the IAF. The BAe Hawk and the
French Alpha Jet were shortlisted and extensively tested. The IAF wanted a
minimum of 99-106 aircraft but the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was prepared
to sanction only 66. The differences arose because until then a trainer was expected
to fly 30 hours per month, but given its experience, the IAF wanted that
calculations be made on the basis of only 20 hours per month and to this, the
Finance Ministry officials naturally did not agree. The Alpha Jet had two engines,
a better thrust-to-weight ratio and an equally good avionics suite, with the French
offering to transfer the entire manufacturing line with all the jigs and fixtures to
India. The IAF however, wanted only the Hawk, because the spinning
characteristics of the Alpha Jet were seen as ‘disconcertingly oscillatory’. The
deadlock was resolved only after a lapse of 18 years (because in the early 1990s
the Indian economy experienced a downturn that effectively delayed all defence
procurement decisions) when the BAe Hawk finally arrived in India in 2004.
Only 66 trainers were allowed, with the first 18 being shipped directly from the
UK, while the remaining 48 were assembled at HAL. The HAL has reportedly
handed over the last of the Hawks only in 2012, effectively stretching the AJT
acquisition process to a mind-boggling 26 years. It is difficult to say if the timely
availability of the AJT would have automatically reduced accidents, but this long-
drawn selection process does not augur well for defence decision-making. As we
154 Air Power and National Security

shall see later, this appears to be a direct result of poor teamwork and general
absence of accountability. The PAF, on the other hand, has used the American
T-33 and T-37 trainers for over four decades and successfully trained its pilots to
fly a variety of fighters, such as F-7P and F-7MG, the Chinese versions of the
MiG-21, Chinese J-6 and J-5, Mirage III and V, and the F-16 and more recently
the JF-17 without much apparent difficulty.42

New Challenges
Although India had spent considerable sums of money on the modernisation of
the IAF during the 1980s, by the early 1990s, the writing was on the wall. Almost
all aircraft, helicopters, missiles and other equipment like radar, airfield
infrastructure and even armament were reaching the end of their useful life. The
An-32s and IL-76s, the mainstay of the transport fleets, had no respite, as air
maintenance of forward troops, tactical and strategic lift and humanitarian
assistance missions together, constituted a colossal task even during peace-time.
The Mi-8 and Chetak helicopters were showing signs of ageing. The Pechora
squadrons and their radars were short of spares. The five different types of MiGs,
21, 23, 25, 27 and 29 were in a similar state, mainly due to supply chain
disruptions in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, with different
sovereign states manufacturing different spare parts. Although neither the Indian
nor the Russian governments admitted these problems, serviceability plummeted
across the IAF. It took considerable diplomatic effort and worldwide searches to
obtain the urgently needed spares. It took some time before the supply chains
were re-established. The MiG-21 upgrade to Bison was delayed and so were many
other projects. The Narasimha Rao government had only recently embarked on
an ambitious economic liberalisation drive and the Indian economy was only
just taking off.
The 1991 Gulf War in which the US-led Allied air power played a decisive
role, came as a wake-up call for China, India and many other countries whose air
forces needed modern technology. The IAF and more importantly the Government
of India (GoI) also realised that air power capabilities could not be ignored. In
1992, the PRC signed a major deal with the then cash-strapped Russia for the
purchase of some 36 Sukhoi-27 air superiority fighters and licence production of
another 200 units of this modern multi-role fighter. In addition, the Chinese
also, soon employed a very large number of jobless Russian aviation experts,
designers and engineers following the disruption of the Russian economy.
The IAF too saw merit in bidding for a similar type, since Russia appeared
to be loosening its control on the sale of such high technology aircraft. The IAF
wanted the Su-30, an improved and more capable multi-role version of the Su-
27, which was roughly in the same class as the US F-15 Strike Eagle. Sometime
 Development of IAF Force Structures 155

in the mid-1990s, India approached Russia for the purchase of the Su-30 and the
request was quickly accepted. The IAF was to first receive some 20 aircraft of a
slightly older version of the fighter in a flyaway condition. The deal was that
these aircraft would be returned to Russia once the India-specific models became
ready. After the Bison experience, which saw a very successful mating of Western
avionics with Russian platforms, the Indians wanted the Su-30 to be extensively
modified with a host of Western avionics suites. The IAF also demanded that the
Al-31F engine be fitted with a thrust vectoring nozzle, to further enhance the
manoeuvrability of the already impressive fighter. The Su-30 has an RoA, much
in excess of any other aircraft in the IAF inventory and can carry up to 8,000 kg
of weapon load, including advanced Air-to-Air-Missiles (AAMs) and other stand-
off weapons. India, it seemed, had finally obtained a capable fighter to effectively
meet the needs of a truly multi-role fighter. The induction of the Su-30 was a
windfall of sorts, as its licence manufacture with Western avionics would give
India an option to quickly replace the rapidly ageing MiG fleets.43 But as with
other aircraft, this also took its own time and could not arrest the rapid decline
of the IAF fighter inventory.

Conclusion
By the end of World War II, the IAF had barely expanded to a 10-squadron
force, when the division of assets following the partition of the country, again
brought down its strength to six-and-a-half squadrons. In October 1947, when
Pakistan launched its aggression in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) the IAF had only
one transport squadron and six-and-a-half under-strength fighter squadrons
equipped with obsolete aircraft such as the Spitfire, Tempest and others.
In the next 15 years or so, the IAF revived/raised 10 more fighter squadrons,
11 transport squadrons and four helicopter units, with the result that by the time
of the Sino-Indian border war, the IAF had some 25 fighter squadrons, 12 transport
squadrons and four helicopter units. India’s air defence was weak, as it had only
a few World War II vintage Marconi radars.
Between 1962 and 1971, the IAF raised some 10 fighter, three transport
squadrons and three more helicopter units. As a consequence, in December 1971,
the IAF had a total of 37 fighter squadrons composed of six Hunters, eight Gnats,
five Canberras (including 106 Strategic Recce Squadron and Jet Bomber
Conversion Unit (JBCU), six S-22s, eight MiG-21s and two HF-24s and two
Mystere IVA squadrons. In addition, it had raised the Tactics and Air Combat
Development Establishment (TACDE) equipped with an equal number of S-22
and MiG-21 fighters. The IAF had also operationalised all six high-powered radar
units of American origin and received some four Soviet P-30 radar units,
considerably strengthening its air defence capabilities.
156 Air Power and National Security

Its transport fleet comprised two An-12s, four C-119 Packets, three Dakota
DC-3s, one Caribou, one Il-14, two Otters making a total of 14 squadrons and
an assortment of other light communication aircraft such as Devon, AVRO HS-
748 and a mixed squadron of L-1049 Super Constellation airliners discarded by
Air India, and a few surviving Liberator B-17 bombers, used mainly for maritime
surveillance duties. The IAF also had 10 helicopter units equipped with Mi-4,
Alouette and Bell. The 1980s saw major re-equipment and modernisation, with
five new squadrons being raised with MiG-21, 23, 25 and 29 aircraft.
In 1947, India began with the hope of diversifying foreign sources of aircraft
and equipment, but until the entry of the former Soviet Union, Britain and France
remained the only exclusive foreign vendors. Although India purchased many C-
119 Packet and a few Sikorsky S-62 helicopters from the US, Cold War politics
did not permit this relationship to flourish further.
India began its experiment in self-reliance by developing the Gnat and HF-
24 fighters, but both these programmes were constantly plagued with major
uncertainties and maintenance problems and hence, were not pursued with vigour
or necessary perseverance. In the case of the HF-24, it was the non-availability
of a suitable engine that killed the programme. When the Cold War ended, the
IAF could have revived this promising twin-engine fighter, had it carefully
preserved it, but as in many other cases, retired fighter aircraft were sent off for
decoration and ‘motivation’ displays to schools, city squares and small towns,
with little or no benefits.
The choice of the MiG-21 and the subsequent modification of this aircraft
to a ground attack role made the IAF somewhat complacent. Easy availability of
a reasonably modern fighter in the 1960s, at low prices, in Indian currency (against
rupee payment), influenced all procurement decisions. The choice of the MiG-
23 BN and MF was based on political considerations. India’s aviation industry
faithfully licence-produced the MiG-21 with little or no modification or
improvements. The Chinese, as we shall see in a later chapter, followed a totally
different philosophy for their military modernisation and made many
improvements to this Soviet fighter.
The delayed entry of the DPSA Jaguar affected the overall operational
preparedness of the IAF but once the six squadrons became operational, flying
training picked up. The IAF and HAL successfully collaborated to develop an
indigenous solution to improve the Nav-Attack system of the Jaguar, and the
DARIN Jaguar was the result. Further work has now delivered the more advanced
DARIN III version of the DPSA. Plans to replace the Jaguar Rolls Royce Adour
engine with a more powerful Honeywell engine are in the pipeline, but as with
other projects, this is also delayed. Considering that the Jaguar is over 33 years
old, the decision to replace the Adour with a more powerful engine should have
come much earlier.
 Development of IAF Force Structures 157

By the early 1980s, except for the Mirage-2000, all other purchases, Il-76,
An-32, Mi-17, Mi-26 heavy-lift, Mi-25/35 attack helicopters, MiG-29, 25, and
27, a variety of AAMs and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) were of Soviet origin.
Changing over to Western arms suppliers is therefore, not as easy as some observers
appear to suggest. The Russians have also readily given India considerable assistance
in the nuclear field, submarines, and surface ships and missiles. The Russian
contribution to India’s military preparedness is thus varied and pervasive, and for
those who favour Western equipment, this umbilical cord cannot be severed easily.
Foreign vendors have always kept a close watch on India’s defence
modernisation and offered it aircraft and equipment at throwaway prices, when
it appeared that India was on the threshold of developing its own indigenous
option. This has sometimes influenced India’s commitment to indigenisation.
It is a truism that an aviation industry has to first satisfy its major customer
– in this case the IAF – and only then can it rely on the customer placing further
orders. Despite the consistent support from the Ministry of Defence (MoD),
HAL has not always kept this requirement in mind. As a result, the IAF is often
criticised for always demanding ‘top-of-the-line’ foreign (read Western) aircraft
and equipment, while HAL is praised for producing aircraft under licence.
Last but not least, Indian decision-makers have always linked the development
of indigenous aircraft with IAF force structures. The MoD and Defence Research
and Development Organisation (DRDO) somehow fail to understand that the
IAF cannot but ask for immediate replacements, if and when, its strength and
operational preparedness are lower than acceptable levels vis-à-vis the threat. Unless
a programme becomes mature, viable and truly reliable, the government must
not order the service to await the outcome of any indigenous effort. The IAF, for
example, has been asked to place orders for some 40 LCA Tejas fighters when in
fact the grossly underpowered LCA, now weighing over eight tons, will not meet
IAF needs and worse, might not be available before the end of 2017, a full 30
years after its development commenced.
Since Russian aircraft and equipment constitute a major share, their
serviceability and availability also need closer attention. The author believes that
if India were to give to the Russians, even a small fraction of the money that it
lavishes on Western OEMs for spares and maintenance, the IL-76 and Su-30MKI
serviceability will show dramatic improvement. There are, however, others who
disagree, because they believe that the cause of poor serviceability lies in Russian
technology and not better coordination with Russian manufacturers. The IAF
and HAL will, however, also have to put in sustained hard work, especially now
that the IAF has decided to purchase an additional 42 Su-30MKI from Russia.
It is time India asked Russia to accelerate the plans for establishing a joint venture
company for aircraft maintenance and logistics support in India.
158 Air Power and National Security

Finally, there has also been excessive emphasis on the numbers of fighter
squadrons and insistence on hi-tech equipment, rather than on new and innovative
tactics and strategies, and suitable organisation for their employment. The army’s
insistence on Close Air Support (CAS)/Offensive Air Support (OAS) demands
and the IAF’s supporting role in conventional war scenarios, and the IAF’s stress
on air superiority, instead of a truly innovative joint strategy, is unlikely to help
enhance India’s ability to deter its adversaries.
Despite these never-ending arguments, it is also equally true, that a nation-
state such as India needs a modern air force and its own military aviation industry.

NOTES
1. The quotes and details are taken from Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi’s, History of the Indian
Air Force, Vikas, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 1-15. While Chaturvedi gives March 1941 as the
date, the official history of the squadron gives April 1, 1941 as its date of birth.
2. Details of the dates and types of aircraft of these squadrons are given in Appendix I.
3. Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, no. 1, pp. 49-51.
4. Durga Das, India: From Curzon to Nehru & After, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 1969 (Reprinted
1974), pp. 250-251. This is an extract of a conversation that Durga Das had with General
Smith at a farewell party hosted by General Sir Claude Auchinleck on August 14, 1947.
Durga Das, then editor of Hindustan Times, thought that there was an element of truth in
the General’s statement and that the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir came as a godsend, as it
provided the mortar to build a cohesive army and gave the opportunity to the officers
belonging to the so-called non-martial races to provide inspiring leadership.
5. Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (Retd.), An Incredible War: Indian Air Force in Kashmir War 1947-
48, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2007, pp. 10-20. India, however, used fighters to bomb
the Mizo rebels in 1966.
6. Ibid., p. 21.
7. Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, no. 1, p. 53.
8. Today we look at ‘age and experience’ of our leaders in a totally different light. At the time
it was quite normal and indeed common to have relatively young people filling important
positions. Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, was only 47 years old, Nehru 58, and most of
the senior military officers were in their late thirties and some in the early forties. It was in
fact the towering personality of Pandit Nehru and the aura of greatness attached to his persona
that made others look inexperienced, even when many of them had over 15 years of military
service, command experience in fighting a five-year-long war, and managing sizeable numbers
of troops and military assets.
9. Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, no. 5, p. 13.
10. Ibid. p. 13.
11. Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, no. 1, pp. 59-60.
12. Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? SIPRI, Oxford
University Press, 1994, p. 68 gives 1948 as the year in which the RIAF received 100 Spitfire
and Tempest fighters. But this seems incorrect as these aircraft took part in the Kashmir
Operations from October 1947 onwards.
13. Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, no. 1, p. 99.
14. Ibid., p. 54., The figures given by Chaturvedi at page 187 are somewhat different.
15. Ibid., p. 107.
16. Chris Smith, no. 12, p. 48.
17. Ibid.; Also see Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, no. 5.
 Development of IAF Force Structures 159
18. Ibid., p. 49. There was, however, no clarity on which the second-class army might be and
which first-class war India might be faced with. Blackett probably meant Pakistan.
19. Also see Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947-1965, EBD Publishing
& Distributing Co., University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1967, pp. 51-
57.
20. Ibid., p. 51.
21. Ibid., p. 52.
22. Robert S. Anderson, Patrick Blackett in India: Military Consultant and Scientific Intervenor,
1947-72. Part One, The Royal Society at http://www.jstor,org/stable/532210, pp. 263-69.
(Accessed June 19, 2013). Also see Ramdas P. Shenoy, Defence Research and Development
Organisation 1956-1982, DRDO Monograph Series, DESIDOC, Ministry of Defence, New
Delhi, 2006, pp. 16-22 at http://drdo.gov.in/drdo/pub/monographs/Introduction/
defence_hod.pdf, (Accessed June 20, 2013.)
23. Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World, Penguin Books, London, 1974,
p. 167.
24. Robert S. Anderson, no. 22, p. 269.
25. Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, no. 1, pp. 99, 107-109; Chris Smith, no. 12, pp. 53-54.
26. Ibid., pp. 100-109.
27. Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years,
Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2010, p. 186.
28. Ibid., p. 187.
29. With active American assistance, Pakistan once again achieved the same effect when in
response to India acquiring the Jaguar, it managed to get some 40 F-16 air superiority fighters
in the early 1980s. The entry of the F-16 radically changed the very complexion of the air
power balance in South Asia.
30. Chris Smith, no. 12, pp. 68-69.
31. In an interview Air Marshal Y.V. Malse also confirmed this as the basis of rough calculations.
32. Wg. Cdr. M.S.D. Wollen, an experienced pilot, was at the controls of the MiG-21 aircraft.
See P.V.S. Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965, Manohar,
New Delhi, 2005 (Reprint 2006), pp. 85-86.
33. Ibid., Wg. Cdr. M.R. Murdheshwar had an enemy Sabre in his gunsights at very close range,
but his Gnat guns failed him on September 4, 1965 over Chhamb. p. 84.
34. Nos. 1, 4, 8, 28, 29, 39 45, 47 and one flight of TACDE were equipped with the MiG-21
(Type 77) and Nos. 26, 32, 101, 108, 221, 222 and one flight of TACDE were equipped
with the S-22 aka Sukhoi-7 fighters.
35. The British had asked India to join them in the Jaguar development programme, but lack
of foresight or inherent aversion to risks, resulted in loss of an excellent opportunity to get
a modern aircraft as well as invaluable experience in its development.
36. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation,
Viking, New Delhi, 2010, pp. 77-78. Their comment that the IAF is wary of purchasing
aircraft that are not in the inventory of the country that manufactures them does not give
the full picture. The IAF declined the American offer of Northrop F-20 in 1986 simply
because the US had already supplied 40 F-16, a far superior fighter, to Pakistan. India naturally
did not want to be weighed down by this obligation and get stuck with an inferior aircraft.
37. K. Subrahmanyam, “India’s Grand Strategy”, Indian Express, February 3, 2012.
38. According to Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd.), the purchase of the MiG-23 was not
based on any serious evaluation but simply because the Soviets had offered it at a low price
to the Indian Government. According to Chris Smith, around the same time, India’s Defence
Minister R. Venkataraman also approved the purchase of a sizeable number of MiG-27 aircraft
from the USSR, without ascertaining if the IAF really wanted or needed these.
39. The author was then posted on the Joint Planning Staff of the Cabinet Secretariat that was
160 Air Power and National Security
in the process of being transferred to the MoD, and saw at close quarters the goings-on in
the higher echelons of the military, and indeed the MoD.
40. Interview with Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd.) at Bangalore in February 2012.
41. Interview with Air Cmde. S.P. Tyagi on September 29, 1999 at New Delhi. He later rose to
become the CAS.
42. According to media reports, the PAF accident rate has also been a cause of concern, but it
is not as alarming as that in the IAF.
43. A story then doing the rounds of the Delhi circuit went something like this: In order to
prop up the Yeltsin government, the US allegedly told P.V. Narasimha Rao that it (the US)
would look the other way if India pledged $300-400 million to Russia. Rao then called
A.B. Vajpayee and said, “Let us help our old friend with whom we have a long defence
relationship. In case the Congress does not win the next election, the money can always be
adjusted against any other defence purchase.” So came the Su-30 in 1996 for Rs. 6,000
crore or $1.8 billion as per Jane’s World Aircraft. This was confirmed later in Shekhar Gupta’s
column, “The Mulayam Touch”, National Interest, Indian Express, September 22, 2012.
 The Indian Air Force Today 161

6
The Indian Air Force Today

The Never Ending Process of Modernisation

Before assessing the current status of the Indian Air Force (IAF), it is essential to
examine what mission it is likely to be used for. Will it be: (a) conventional war;
(b) limited border skirmish; (c) nuclear delivery or; (d) limited punishment/
compellence strikes? The last appears the most likely but the Indian military seems
to always prepare for a set-piece, copy-book conventional war. With China
assisting Pakistan in the military and nuclear fields for decades, a strong possibility
of collusion and hence a combined threat has always existed. But by raising the
two-front threat, the military, especially the army, appears to ensure that its
numbers are not slashed. This also seems to serve the government’s purpose as it
generates employment and keeps the armed forces, especially the army, happy.
After all, it is the army on which the government depends for tackling numerous
internal security challenges and threats. The insistence of the IAF to prepare for
‘Full Spectrum Dominance’, however distant its possibility, also follows the same
line of thinking, i.e. preparing for a worst case scenario of an all-out conventional
war. In light of the above one wonders if the Indian military is trying to bite off
more than it can chew. Given the slow speed of decision making it may be
increasingly difficult to sustain this kind of military modernisation and
incremental expansion.
Ever since independence Indian security thinking has been rooted in ‘loss of
territory’. The Pakistan-sponsored tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947, and the
1962 border war with China have only reinforced this deep-rooted apprehension.
Separatist elements in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the North-east and the
162 Air Power and National Security

Maoist or Left-Wing Extremist challenge continue to add to these fears. The

result is a huge infantry-heavy army, suited to holding every square inch of ground
and a stunted navy and air force.1 Suggesting that national security has to look
‘beyond’ frontiers, Rear Admiral Raja Menon says that merely making political
statements that our armed forces are employed in some kind of ‘chowkidari’
(watchman’s role) or ‘border defence’ tasks to keep out trespassers cannot obviously
substitute for national security planning.2 Such a defensive and outmoded
approach not only encourages the tendency to look inward but also fails to derive
the most out of the inherent strength of air power. Once again, the result is its
sub-optimal utilisation.3 That air power is essentially offensive but flexible, and
hence can be employed in multiple ways is routinely forgotten. With the result,
India’s response to multiple cross-border threats fluctuates from total inaction at
one extreme, to full-scale conventional war at the other. This shows a markedly
narrow, unimaginative and inadequate understanding of air power and also a
general lack of innovative thinking. Simply stating that India does not covet
territory and wishes to live in peace with others does not automatically guarantee
that others will not covet Indian territory. An oft-repeated vow to defend every
square inch of Indian territory is also impractical and very often works against
the basic tenets of military strategy, as India realised in the 1962 border war. To
ensure optimal utilisation, the IAF must, as far as possible, be used to prevent or
pre-empt aggression/intrusion at the first available opportunity.
The first and most important task of the air force, is the defence of the nation’s
skies. It is also equally important to ensure air dominance; i.e. dominance of the
air and dominance from the air of the events on the surface below. Not only does
air power influence events on ground and sea but if employed in time, very often
prevents their occurrence without firing a shot in anger. The ‘flour bombing’ or
dropping of food to the Tamil population of Jaffna in Sri Lanka by IAF An-32
transport planes on June 5, 1987, is perhaps the best example of such benign but
effective use of air power. To achieve this the IAF has to maintain a constant alert
to ensure immediate response; and it goes without saying, that it must be suitably
equipped for a variety of tasks during peace and war. It is in this department that
the IAF has been facing major challenges for some time. Although it embarked
on a massive and comprehensive modernisation programme over a decade ago,
it has not as yet completed this process, due to India’s total dependence on foreign
countries for modern arms and aircraft. While modernisation is a time consuming
and continuous process and some delays are often inevitable, but today this is
beginning to weaken India’s military preparedness.
While it is true that the chances of a conventional war in the sub-continent
are somewhat low, but military preparedness continues to be crucial for effective
 The Indian Air Force Today 163

deterrence. The IAF aims for full spectrum dominance, which in other words
means that it must be ready to meet all kinds of threats – from a sub-conventional
conflict to nuclear war. This appears to be somewhat ambitious or even unrealistic,
because preparing for a ‘worst case scenario’ might diminish its ability to respond
to the ‘most likely scenario,’ which in India’s case might well be another 26/11
type of terrorist attack or Kargil-type intrusion. The two-front threat therefore,
needs to be seen in the correct perspective. China has an able and willing partner
in Pakistan to play the role of its ‘cat’s paw,’ and hence all threats are essentially
combined. It is thus clear that to be an effective deterrent the acquisition of high
tech equipment or modernisation must be a time-bound process.

The Pakistan Threat

How does India implement its policy to ‘deter’ Pakistan and ‘dissuade’ China
from launching a conventional war? In reality, it seems Pakistan has effectively
neutralised India’s perceived conventional superiority. By adopting a policy of
cross-border terrorism or proxy war under a thinly veiled nuclear threat, Pakistan
does not need to launch a conventional war. Simply deterring Pakistan from
launching a conventional war is, therefore, not the right strategy because Pakistan
does not have to resort to open conventional war, if India is effectively prevented
from taking even limited retaliatory military action. Such deterrence is useless,
since Pakistan neither has the capability to challenge India in a conventional war
nor does it need to. India must devise ways to effectively neutralise Pakistan’s
‘nuclear strategy’, for a calibrated military response in which the IAF can play a
major role.

The China Threat

China, on the other hand, appears to be satisfied so long as it can keep India on
the back foot, for which it adopts a smart strategy. First, it maintains that the
resolution of the vexed border issue will take a long time. Second, it provides a
variety of assistance – military, economic, nuclear and above all political – to
encourage Pakistan to keep India unbalanced, fully occupied and yet
diplomatically engaged. Third, it administers its own kind of pinpricks: water-
use threats, occasional intrusions across th Line of Actual Control (LAC), denial
of visas and other such actions across the whole spectrum of relations. Fourth, it
encourages India’s smaller neighbours to up the ante, when possible, and finally
provides economic and other assistance to India’s neighbours. China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) troops have maintained an active presence in
infrastructure development activities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), so that
India gets a clear message, but cannot really resort to any retaliatory measures.
164 Air Power and National Security

China also cleverly shows readiness to take limited palliative measures to prevent
a major rupture in bilateral relations; or in other words, uses ‘smart’ power to
constrain India’s options.
A very sophisticated politico-military strategy is therefore needed to address
these challenges. Without such a strategy expressly tailored to meet Pakistani
adventurism and frequent Chinese pin pricks, mere military modernisation or
selective additions, such as the reported raising of a mountain strike corps4 for
the Eastern Front may not ensure effective deterrence against the calibrated yet
unfriendly, behaviour of the two neighbours. IAF’s current capabilities and its
future modernisation programmes, need to be assessed in light of these realities.
Merely acquiring new aircraft and weapon systems without developing specific
strategies to meet the above challenges may prove costly, and even unsustainable.
India must guard against an unintended arms race with China. It is thus axiomatic
that the IAF maintain its readiness, by maximising and further sharpening the
power of its existing assets, so as to enlarge the available options. The political
leadership must be assured of this capability, so that it can exercise the option of
instantly resorting to use of force in a future contingency.

Prospects of Modernisation
Irrespective of what India does, however, it cannot quickly arrest the dwindling
numbers of IAF fighter squadrons. It is not as if this situation was not anticipated.
Sometime in the early 1990s, the IAF had begun to take a hard look at its true
combat strength. With the prospect of the majority of its fleets coming up for
gradual but certain retirement, the IAF began searching for alternatives. The
induction of the Su-30MKI in the late 1990s was aimed at enhancing the quality
and reach of the IAF and not a mere quantitative replacement of its second-
generation fighters. The indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, it was
hoped, would gradually fill the void created by the phasing out of the numerous
MiG variants. Although the LCA made its first flight in February 2001, it
achieved Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) only in December 2013, a full
12 years down the line. The LCA Tejas Limited Series Production (LSP-8) carried
out its maiden flight sometime in early April 2013.5 Full Operational Clearance
(FOC) is, however, due only by the end of 2015 or early 2016. Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is in the process of manufacturing the 40 LCA Tejas
fighters ordered by the IAF.
It was in these circumstances that the search for the Medium Multi-Role
Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) began in early 2004. Given the slow and grinding
processes of defence procurement the selection of the Dassault Rafale was
announced on February 1, 2012 with the hope that price negotiations would
 The Indian Air Force Today 165

be completed and the contract signed in fiscal year 2012-13. But that has not
happened and current indications are that it will not be signed before March
31, 2015. A marked economic slowdown in 2011-13 forced the Indian
Government to make significant cuts in the 2012-13 defence budget. This was
followed by only a marginal increase in the budget for 2013-14. It is therefore
likely that the MMRCA induction schedule would have to be revised with the
Rafale entering service only by 2017-18 or even later. Some pessimists believe
that the deal might unravel if economic difficulties continue.6
Just as the IAF was forced to extend the operational life of its oldest MiG-
21 (Type-77) fleet due to procurement delays, it would once again have to find
similar options. Presently the MiG-29, Mirage-2000 and Jaguar fleets are all
slated for extensive upgrades which leaves only the Su-30MKI, as the IAF’s
mainstay. The already upgraded but ageing MiG-27, MiG-21 Bison and its M
and MF variants will have to continue being used, in relatively low-threat areas
or in combination with the Su-30MKI. The IAF is thus faced with a stark choice
of serious depletion in its offensive capabilities, at least in terms of numbers.
While the government and IAF must already be conscious of these difficulties,
it is not clear how they would address this problem.
The induction of six Hercules C-130J has been completed and a contract
for six more signed.7 Three C-17 heavy lift aircraft have also been inducted in
the service. The fourth C-17 was inducted in September 2013. The Military
Balance 2015 brought out by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London reports
that C-17A are now on the IAF inventory.8 The IAF has ordered six more of
these and they are expected to enter service by the end of 2015. The IAF C-17
fleet will thus comprise 16 aircraft, giving the country a major strategic airlift
capability. The Il-76 fleet is showing signs of ageing; and the An-32 fleet is also
equally old.
While the new Mi-17-V5 medium helicopters are in the process of
induction, a majority of the Mi-8, Cheetah and Chetak light helicopter fleets
are fast reaching the end of their useful life. The IAF has only a small number
of air-to-air refuelling tankers and just three Airborne Warning And Control
System (AWACS). It is reasonable to assume that it would take some time before
these new systems and technologies are fully absorbed. The contract for 75 Swiss
Pilatus PC-22s was signed but these only began to join service in mid-2013,
with the ‘basic’ and ‘advanced’ training continuing on the Kiran Mk.1, 1A and
Mk.2 trainers of 1970s vintage. A total of 49 Pilatus PC-22s are now in IAF
service for basic training.9 All of the 66 BAe Hawks have been inducted, but it
is not known if their supply chain and maintenance schedules are working
smoothly, and if HAL is able to provide the necessary spares and maintenance
166 Air Power and National Security

backup. Any shortfalls in this area may have an adverse impact on both basic
and operational training.
The 25-odd Pechora Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)-III squadrons have already
become obsolete, and two squadrons of the indigenous Akash SAM system have
joined service only in 2014. There is also no guarantee of the Short and Medium
Range SAM (SR/MR SAM) systems being developed with Israel, becoming
available in the near future.

The Challenge
Let us now briefly examine the state of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and People’s
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the two main challengers of the IAF. China
and Pakistan are continuing to build their strategic partnership, with the PAF
fast reaping its benefits. Three JF-17 squadrons have been already formed, with
Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra reportedly producing at least
one JF-17 fighter per month. According to the Chief of Air Staff PAF, “With
the capability of carrying a variety of weapons, it is a true multi-role aircraft
and in time would become the PAF’s mainstay.”10 The Russians have not only
reconciled to China selling the Russian origin RD-93 aero-engine to Pakistan
but Russia, in fact, is showing clear signs of mending diplomatic and economic
relations with Pakistan, in the run-up to the departure of North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO) forces from Afghanistan.
China has already demonstrated two new prototypes of its indigenous fifth
generation fighter aircraft (FGFA), the CAC J-20 and SAC J-31. Production of
the J-10 and J-10B is also proceeding apace. Thus, the number of fully ready
and operational fourth generation fighters in the PLAAF inventory is steadily
increasing. Both these countries are also collaborating in other areas. Pakistan is
already fielding the Swedish SAAB-2000 Erieye and the Chinese Y-8 ZDK03
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft. China is also providing
the PAF with a variety of modern missiles. The United States (US) has also
supplied the PAF with BVR missiles such as the AMRAAM AIM-120 Sparrow,
and has also completed the upgrade of all PAF F-16 Fighting Falcons, of which
it now possesses 76 units. The PLAAF is regularly exercising/training/deploying
its modern fighters from airfields in Tibet and Xinjiang, further sharpening the
combined challenge from across the borders. The challenge to the IAF is thus
rapidly acquiring a serious dimension.11
Despite frequent changes and modifications in India’s defence procurement
policy and efforts to galvanise its defence aviation industry, the military, especially
the IAF, continues to depend on foreign vendors for close to 70 per cent of its
needs. The government has also introduced many changes and further liberalised
 The Indian Air Force Today 167

its defence offset policy, but this has not as yet attracted much foreign direct
investment. In the circumstances, India has little choice but to reinvigorate its
own defence industry, however slow the process may be. The United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) Defence Minister A.K. Antony had repeatedly said that continued
dependence on outside/foreign sources for India’s defence needs is, ‘dangerous
and shameful’ but to no avail. What with rapidly increasing costs of high tech
weapons, a falling rupee and the current economic/budgetary constraints, the
habit of simply purchasing ever more costly weapons and aircraft is neither
affordable nor sustainable.
To further illustrate this point, in the first 20 years after independence, from
1947 to 1967, India purchased a large number of Vampires, Toofanis, Mysteres,
Hunters, Canberras, C-119 Packets, DC-3 Dakotas, Canadian Caribous, An-
12s, Il-14s, Mi-4s, Sikorsky, Bell helicopters, SAM-II Guideline missiles and
MiG-21 and S-22 fighter bombers from various sources. During the next 10
years, 1968-78 it obtained as aid, an array of static high powered radar sets, and
some transport aircraft from the US and Canada. India also purchased a large
number of Pechora SAM-III missiles and Mi-8 helicopters from erstwhile USSR.
In 1979, India purchased the Jaguar Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA)
or long-range strike aircraft from the UK. Although it had licence-produced a
large number of Vampire, Gnat Mk.1, HT-2 basic trainers and HS-748 AVRO
medium transport aircraft, and most notably numerous MiG-21 variants during
the period, by the end of the 1970s it had to once again look to foreign suppliers
for its modernisation programme.
Beginning in 1980, India purchased: the MiG-23 MF/BN; MiG-25; Mirage-
2000; MiG-29; Il-76; An-32; Mi-17; Mi-25; 35 attack and Mi-26 heavy lift
helicopters; Igla MANPADS; OSA-AK SAM and a host of radar sets, air
delivered weapons and Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs) and other equipment. The
process of licence production of some of these aircraft and systems, and their
maintenance was not yet fully over, when India had to once again start searching
for a suitable replacement for its large fleet of MiG-21 variants. As a result,
aircraft serviceability and availability, adversely affected sortie rates, training
schedules, maintenance load and practices, servicing schedules and spares
procurements. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, further adversely
affected the availability of spares and thus, aircraft serviceability. In 2015, the
IAF is once again, at nearly the same decision point, with little hope of an early
solution. Fortunately, with a sizeable number of Su-30MKIs, Il-76s, Il-78s, C-
17s, C-130Js and Mi-17s, the IAF is in a much better state compared to the
early 1980s.
168 Air Power and National Security

According to The Military Balance 2015,12 the IAF has the following assets:
Name Strength Remarks
Su-30MKI 215 A total of 272 fighters planned
MiG-29 74 Being upgraded
Mirage-2000 50 To be upgraded
MiG-27 126 Some 40 upgraded
Jaguar (includes 10 aircraft of 105 Under DARIN III and
maritime strike version) Re-engining upgrade
Bison (Upgraded MiG-21bis variant) 116 Strength reducing
MiG-21 bis 31 Due for phase-out by 2017
MiG-21 M 54 Due for phase-out by 2017
MiG-21 MF 16 Due for phase-out by 2017
MiG-21 UB 40 Two seat trainers fast ageing
BAe Hawk 66 Mk. 132, AJT
Kiran Mk I 120 Trainers
Kiran Mk. II 55 Trainers
Total 1,068 Including Kiran trainers

Transports
Name Strength Remarks
Il-76 24 Heavy Transport
Il-78 06 Tankers
Il-76 03 AWACS
EMB-145 02 AEW&C, two more on order
C-130J 05 Six more may be added later
An-32 103 Medium Tact Transport
HS-748 56 Due for early replacement
DO-228 35 Light Transport
Gulfstream 03 ISR Duties
Boeings, 707, 737, & EMB-135 08 For VVIP duties
Total 245 All types

Helicopters
Name Strength Remarks
Mi-25/35 20 Attack
Mi-17 179 Including Mi-17 V5
Mi-8 94 Including 4 Mi-26
Chetak 60 Lama SA-315B
Alouette 40 SA-316
Dhruv 40 150 on order
Total 433 All types
Note: In addition, the army has 232 Dhruv and Chetak/Cheetah helicopters while the navy operates
94 fixed wing aircraft including 11 MiG-29K; 11 Sea Harriers; 05 Il-38; 04 Tu-142; 14 Do-228;
37 BN-2 Islanders light communication aircraft; 12 Kiran HJT-16 trainers; and a variety of Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Maritime Reconnaissance (MR)
helicopters, totalling 127 units.
 The Indian Air Force Today 169

Let us now take stock of how the IAF can meet its primary responsibilities,
in the near future.

Air Defence
The air defence (AD) capability of the IAF has received a big boost with the
arrival of three AWACS in the recent past. In close coordination with the six Il-
78 Air Refuelling Tankers, and the already long range of Su-30MKI, it is now
possible to actualise the concept of ‘forward defence’ in which own AD fighter-
interceptors, can theoretically intercept the enemy aircraft well before they reach
their targets. Although the 250 odd MiG-21 variants have a relatively short range,
these can now be more effectively utilised for airfield defence, and defence of
important Vulnerable Areas (VAs) and Vulnerable Points (VPs) in depth. These
can also be utilised for providing AD cover or ‘top cover’ in areas not covered by
the AWACS. AWACS and the Air Force Net (AFNET), the recently inaugurated
digital communication network of the IAF, will also facilitate air space
management and help reduce ‘friendly-fire’ incidents. The absence of a dedicated
secure link for air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, however, is a major
deficiency and will be filled up only when indigenous efforts to build a link on
the lines of NATO Link 16, fructify. This is vital, as without secure
communications, air operations can face major disruptions and jamming
problems. It is not known, but assumed, that the IAF would have ordered or
already possesses the required numbers of AAMs since it is the Beyond Visual
Range (BVR) missiles, that are needed to really exploit the advantage conferred
by the long range surveillance capability of the AWACS. Peacetime AD is thus
adequate and wartime requirements are gradually, but steadily improving.

Counter Air and Deep Strike Operations

As previously discussed in Chapter 1, depending on the type of conflict, the IAF
may have to allocate considerable effort for these two vital tasks. In a border
skirmish restricted in time and space, and hence mission objectives, it might not
be necessary to launch deep strikes. In a larger conflict, however, the IAF will
have to undertake Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) operations on a
scale commensurate with the military objectives. As is well known, the
establishment of air superiority over a defined geographical area, is always
necessary. During Kargil operations, the MiG-29 provided air defence cover and
ensured non-interference of the PAF F-16 fighters based at Skardu, even when
the Rules of Engagement (RoE) dictated that the IAF not cross the Line of Control
(LoC). With the gradual build-up of the Su-30MKI fleet to its proposed strength
of 272 aircraft, this long range offensive capability of the IAF is well taken care
of.
170 Air Power and National Security

Counter Surface Force Operations

Availability of the Jaguar and MiG-27, capable of delivering a much larger
armament load than the MiG-21 or Hunter class of Fighter Ground Attack (FGA)
aircraft will make the task of Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFO) much
easier, more effective, and hopefully less contentious. The IAF has already assured
the army and navy that it will not be found wanting in this department, provided
that such operations form an integral part of overall plans and detailed prior
consultations, to avoid delays and misunderstandings at the eleventh hour. Some
army analysts have often argued for a dedicated ground attack fighter like the
American Fairchild A-10 or Russian Sukhoi Su-25/39 for Close Air Support
(CAS)/Offensive Air Support (OAS) Operations in a conventional war. This they
believe is necessary because the MMRCA are often too fast and costly which
makes it difficult for them to be utilised in larger numbers and high speeds also
make target identification difficult.13 This comparison is not valid for various
reasons. First, MMRCA are capable of switching roles without any difficulty
and that is precisely why these replaced the dedicated Air Defence or Ground
Attack fighters. Second, a relatively slow moving ground attack fighter would be
vulnerable to enemy fighters (as happened on September 01, 1965 in the Chhamb
sector in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) and would have to be provided air
superiority fighters as escorts. Third, use of dedicated aircraft goes against the
grain of air power employment as it restricts the inherent flexibility of air power.
The IAF already has a sizeable number of BAe Hawk and MiG-27 aircraft that
can be utilised for CAS/OAS missions. Finally, the A-10 and Su-25/39 would
not be more effective than other multi role fighters in the high mountains and
may in fact suffer a more marked drop in their performance at high altitudes.

Force Multipliers
A force multiplier as the term suggests, is the capability that when added to and
employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that
force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.
AWACS, Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) Systems, Precision Guided Munitions
(PGMs), Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), Surveillance, Communication and Reconnaissance Satellites, Operational
Data Link (ODL), and AFNET, are traditionally known as force multipliers.
Together these give invaluable support for the success of combat operations.

AWACS
In March 2004, India placed an order with Israel for three Phalcon radar systems
for $1.1 billion and another for three, Beriev A-50 (Il-76) heavy transport aircraft
at the cost of $500 million. The IAF received the first of its three A-50 AWACS
 The Indian Air Force Today 171

equipped with the Israeli Phalcon radars on May 25, 2009.14 The radar uses the
fuselage mounted ‘rotodome’ but the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
radar, does not actually require a rotating antenna that was used by older systems.
A typical AWACS carries a mixed crew of some 16, that includes two/three
aircrews to fly the aircraft and a dozen or so fighter controllers, who man the
multiple radar screens in separate cubicles in the large fuselage. With an assured
coverage of some 300 km, the AWACS can provide early warning, as it can,
depending on its position, detect enemy aircraft on the ground at their bases, or
soon after they get airborne, well before they pose a threat to own VAs and VPs.
The AWACS is thus capable of performing the task of many ground radars.
Although vulnerable to enemy action, it can be protected by dedicated fighters
under its close control. A typical AWACS has a range of 6,000 km and can remain
on station for considerably longer periods of time, its efficiency limited only by
the endurance of the crew and total fuel carried.

Air-to-Air Refuelling
In-flight refuelling system is not a new concept but has only recently entered the
Indian skies. AAR can significantly extend the range of fighters and strike aircraft.
The last time the IAF sent a Su-30 squadron to an American air base, the only
support aircraft that accompanied them, was one Il-78 tanker and another Il-76
heavy transport that carried the maintenance crews and ground equipment.
Typically, when on a long ferry, the tanker follows a ‘trail’ procedure, which means
that it gets airborne earlier to meet with the main fighter elements on the way,
refuels these and then lands at a predetermined airfield enroute, and the process
is repeated until both reach the final destination. Another method is to set up a
tow line, usually a race course pattern with several fighters receiving fuel from
the tanker, when needed. Weather, visibility, light conditions, turbulence and
enemy activity during hostilities are some of the important factors that affect
these operations. Given the fact that in the past IAF fighters typically had
extremely limitedRadii of Action (RoA), the addition of six tankers is a boon to
the service.

Precision Guided Munitions

Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) are not a recent addition to air power
arsenals, but are nevertheless a major force multiplier. A Laser Guided Bomb
(LGB); Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM); Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM); and a whole host of anti-ship, anti-radiation, AAMs both close combat
and Beyond Visual Range (BVR), have vastly improved and enhanced the safety,
lethality and cost effectiveness of modern combat aircraft. The small diameter
bomb; Bunker Buster; Brimstone; Javelin; Hellfire; and other such multi-purpose
missiles, have in the recent past reuced the chances of collateral damage through
172 Air Power and National Security

better accuracy and a reduced spread.15 The IAF, however, reportedly possesses a
limited number of PGMs.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

At present, the IAF has only the Heron and Searcher Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) and a few Harpy ant-radar UAVs. All three are of Israeli origin, and are
used maily for surveillance, with the Harpy providing limited anti-radar strike
capability. Following its huge success in the Af-Pak region, the Hellfire equipped
Predator or Reaper UAVs, are now popularly known as ‘drones’. The IAF must
also acquire these, as they have more than proved their worth in the operations
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents, in the mountainous areas of
Afghanistan. Both armed and surveillance UAVs can be of immense help against
Maoists and other insurgents. These can also be useful in weather forecasting,
disaster relief, counter terror, anti-narcotics, anti-smuggling and coastal defence
duties. The UAV/UCAV must, however, not be seen as a substitute for manned
aircraft. High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) type of UAVs may become the
preferred option for strategic reconnaissance missions. UAVs have yet to prove
their reliability in operations in congested and contested airspaces. Producing an
indigenous UAV/UCAV should not pose a major problem and this option must
be pursued with far greater vigour. India’s Nishant and Rustam UAVs, the vehicle
and rail-launched and parachute-recovered types, are still at the trial stage and a
few more have reportedly been under development, for some years. The
Government of India must give these projects the necessary impetus on a war
footing.

Helicopters
India has not really used the 20-odd Mi-25/35 attack helicopters that it obtained
from the ormer Soviet Union in the 1980s. An excellent platform for counter
insurgency operations, attack helicopters have yet to prove their immense potential
in India. There is some reluctance to use them, perhaps due to their inherent
offensive character. Inter-service issues also need to be addressed before these
assets can be optimally utilised. The purchase of the AH-64 Apache and the
CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopters is on the anvil, but the doctrine for their
employment is not yet clear. Inter-service consultations are urgently required to
formulate the necessary Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for their effective
employment, in peace and war, especially in the mountains.

Other Force Multipliers

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been making
Radar Warning Receivers (RWRs), Electronic Counter Measures/Electronic
Counter-Counter Measures (ECM/ECCM) and Electronic Support Measure
(ESM) suites for some years, but these are now reaching obsolescence. The IAF
 The Indian Air Force Today 173

has also bid for a dedicated satellite for its exclusive use. A dedicated satellite for
the navy was launched in September 2013. Three joint or inter-Service commands,
viz. Space, Cyber and Special Forces have also been announced. The recent
induction of six C-130J Hercules aircraft with grealy improved performance and
the projected purchase of 10 C-17 strategic-lift heavy transports, add to India’s
force projection capability. ‘Persistent’ surveillance from ‘near space’ (20-100 km)
is yet another possibility. A European aviation major has also recently announced
that its ‘passive radar’ is undergoing trials. Although this concept is not new,
advances in computing have made it possible to use it. The radar reportedly
analyses television and radio transmissions and fixes the position of a flying object,
as it crosses these waves; hence it can detect even stealthy aircraft. It is bound to
pose a major challenge as and when it becomes operational.16

IAF Modernisation: Work in Progress

IAF’s modernisation is characterised by production and procurement deadlines
that are frequently missed. While some of the big-ticket purchases have fructified
in the recent past, many more are stuck at various levels. The MMRCA contract
continues with little clarity on its approval and delivery time lines. This time the
reasons are a budgetary crunch and the apparent disagreement on whether the
HAL should be the lead integrator or the recently floated Dassault-Reliance JV.
Dassault is reportedly insisting that the latter be given the responsibility to ensure
smooth and timely induction, and local production of the remaining 108 Rafale
fighters, but the Ministry of Defence (MoD) favours the HAL for this task. In
any event, the delivery of the first 18 Rafale fighters is expected to begin, only
after a minimum of three years, from the date of signing of the final contract
which as per the revised schedule, was due by the end of 2014. But this has not
happened and may in fact be delayed further to the middle or late 2015. This
means that the first batch of Rafale will begin arriving only in 2018-19 and local
production will start thereafter. There is a big question mark on whether the
offset, and other negotiations, will be successfully completed in the following
three years. Given the present economic difficulties, some doubts have been
expressed about the government approving this major purchase. Some believe
that India might be forced to abandon the MMRCA deal and simply choose to
buy additional Su-30MKI aircraft. The new Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar
has reportedly said that IAF may have to make do with the Su-30MKI.17 If all
goes well, the Rafale induction will be over only by 2030.18
In an interview to a defence journal, the former Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief
Marshal N.A.K. Browne said, “The induction of Rafale in the IAF along with
associated weaponry will indeed prove to be a game changer in the IAF’s combat
capability.” He also noted that, “At present the IAF has 34 fighter squadrons
174 Air Power and National Security

against the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons and will have to live with this
situation until the XIIth Plan.”19
The LCA story is not very encouraging either. Although a preliminary (also
called notional) IOC was awarded on January 10, 2011, in reality the IOC was
awarded only in December 2013. The FOC was due in end 2014 but that has
not happened, instead two LCA Tejas fighters of Limited Series Production were
handed over to the IAF on January 17, 2015.20 In December 2012, the LCA was
sent to Leh for ‘very low-temperature conditions’ trials but these could not be
completed as the engines failed to start. Earlier, the testing process was delayed
due to insufficient space between the top of the pilot’s helmet and the canopy
and the canopy had to be modified to ensure minimum safe clearance. The LCA
took part in the IAF’s Iron-Fist Fire Power Display in February 2013 and also
delivered some weapons, but that has not helped to remove the doubts about its
timely induction. The first 40 LCA Tejas’ will be fitted with GE-F404 engines,
as the more powerful GE-F414 is not due for some time. The LCA currently
does not have the latest Electronic Warfare suite, mid-air refuelling and long
range missile capabilities, due only when FOC is awarded by the end of 2015.
What with the LCA weighing more than its designed weight of 5.5 tons, these
fighters will be underpowered, and may not actually meet IAF requirements. The
trainer version of the LCA will also have to be readied in time to ensure smooth
induction and conversion of new pilots. The IAF plans to raise a total of six LCA
squadrons by 2021-22 but at the present pace, this goal appears to be ambitious.
The DARIN III (avionics upgrade) version of the Jaguar flew in November
2012. “This will result in major operational improvements with regard to all-
weather, air-to-ground, air-to-sea and air-to-air capabilities through the
incorporation of the multi-mode radar.”21 According to a HAL report, however,
much work including some structural modification to the airframe would be
required to accommodate the new equipment.22 The Request for Proposals (RfP)
for a new and more powerful engine for the Jaguar has also been issued, but this
upgrade, though planned for some time, will also take at least three to four years
to fructify.
During the visit of the Russian President Vladimir Putin to India in December
2012, a contract for additional 42 Su-30MKIs was signed. According to one
report, the total cost of these 42 fighters is estimated to be around $4.3 billion,
as these are expected to have better specifications. Rumour has it that these
additional aircraft were specially configured for nuclear delivery and were to cost
less than those produced by HAL. Whatever the truth, it is clear that the IAF is
placing a higher degree of reliance on the SU-30 to maintain the minimum desired
levels of operational readiness. The IAF presently has eight squadrons equipped
with the Su-30MKI and plans to increase the strength to 15 squadrons, or
 The Indian Air Force Today 175

according to some reports 272 aircraft. It is thus evident that the Su-30MKI will
in all probability remain the mainstay of the IAF for the foreseeable future and
these fighters will in fact fill the gaps that the gradual if delayed, phasing out of
the remaining MiG-21s will create from 2017 onwards.23
The IAF’s transport fleet of 24 Il-76s and 105 An-32s is also now nearly 30
years old and would require careful nurturing, with generous spares and
maintenance support, as these two aircraft along with the Mi-8 and Mi-17
helicopters form the backbone of its air maintenance capability, on which depends
the very survival of the troops and civilians in forward areas. The IAF has already
received six special purpose C-130J Hercules transports from the US, and six
more are likely to be added in the future. Although these aircraft are meant
primarily for special forces operations, these may eventually be used for air
maintenance and routine airlift tasks.

Infrastructure
MAFI or Modernisation of Airfield Infrastructure and GAGAN, Global
Positioning System (GPS)-Aided GEO-Augmented Navigation programmes are
two important projects that the IAF is now pursuing. MAFI is slated to upgrade
30 IAF airfields while GAGAN will provide satellite based navigation and digital
communications.24 There are also reports of the IAF fast acquiring a variety of
light weight mobile radars for use in the mountainous regions of the North and
North-east.
As previously noted, the large 25-squadron-strong, Pechora SAM force of
the IAF is overdue for replacement, but only two squadrons of the indigenously
produced Akash missile squadrons, have so far been inducted. Reports indicate
that the IAF has placed orders for Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (MR
SAMs) with DRDO, which is planning to make these in collaboration with Israel,
but there is no clarity on when these would be inducted.25

The Sukhoi-HAL FGFA or T-50 PAK-FA26

Another ambitious project on the horizon is the joint development of the T-50
PAK-FA fifth generation Russian fighter, the first prototype of which was expected
to come to India sometime in 2013 but is currently delayed by at least three
years. This project envisages the joint development and manufacture of up to
250 of these highly advanced fifth generation fighters in India.
On December 21, 2010 India and Russia signed a landmark deal to co-
develop the T-50 PAK-FA (Perspektivny Aviatsionny Kompleks-Frontovoy
Aviatsii), or Perspective Airborne Complex-Frontline Aviation aka the Fifth
Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), in India. Signed during the visit of the
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, the MoD described it as the ‘biggest
defence programme ever in the history of India’. Depending on who looks at it
176 Air Power and National Security

and how, it can be called ‘unnecessary splurging’ or ‘calculated risk-taking’ in this

exceedingly complex game of defence acquisitions.
India is slated to get a work share of some 25 per cent in the development
of the FGFA and finally purchase 50 single-seat and 250 two-seat versions for
the IAF. The deal is reportedly worth $30 billion and the unit cost of the fighter
is likely to be around $100 million. The fighter flew for the first time on January
29, 2010 and had completed over 40 flights by the end of 2010. The second
prototype began flight-testing in early 2011, but the design has actually been
under development for over 10 years. The fourth prototype of the T-50 flew on
December 12, 2012 from Komsomolask-on-Amur. Flight testing on three earlier
prototypes has already crossed 200 flights. Its Western counterparts, the American
F-22 and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or JSF are already flying and the Chinese J-
XX or J-20 flew for the first time on January 11, 2011. On October 31, 2012
China also flight-tested another fighter, the SAC J-31, to build internal
competition and improve its prospects of exports.
The FGFA is stealthy (uses ‘very low observable’ technology) that makes it
nearly invisible to a radar. It has: an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
airborne radar with ‘artificial intelligence’; super-cruise or the ability to fly at
supersonic speeds without after-burners, i.e., without consuming too much fuel;
a long operational range of over 2,100-2,500 km and a ferry range of some 5,500
km; the ability to carry next generation air-to-air, anti-ship and air-to-surface
missiles; and thrust vector control (TVC) that gives it incredible agility. All these
features make it a truly advanced FGFA, capable of performing a variety of
offensive and defensive tasks in the future.
The relentless march of technology sometimes makes it extremely difficult
to choose the right option, because of the prohibitively high costs of modern
weapon systems and aircraft and the attendant uncertainty, due to time delays
and cost escalations. A quick reminder from history should, however, be of help.
Had the British not quickly developed and operationalised the radar and the AD
communication network, that helped detect the direction, distance, speed, height
and numbers of German bombers early on in World War II (the Battle of Britain
for example), the Germans would certainly have retained the upper hand for a
long time. At the time, the Germans were also well ahead in the development of
their own radar system, but were late in operationalising it. Soon thereafter, began
the effort to further improve the radar by making it less bulky, smart, jamming-
resistant and mobile.
Along with these efforts the scientists also started looking for ways to make
the aircraft less visible to the radar, by reducing the radar cross section (RCS) or
reflectivity of the fighter aircraft and soon, the stealth fighter was born. The
discovery of the radar had put major constraints on strike fighters by forcing
them to fly low to avoid radar detection, which in turn reduced the range and
 The Indian Air Force Today 177

weapons-carrying capacity of these aircraft, due to the very high fuel consumption
at low levels. The so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), at least in
combat aviation, is in fact nothing but a combination of stealth, long range,
highly accurate fire power (PGM) with airborne radar, that is capable of detecting
threats and directing BVR missiles, to the targets. In the meantime, AWACS,
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and Aerostat also have dramatically improved
radar detection capabilities, further increasing the need for a truly stealthy aircraft.
India’s decision to buy the FGFA must, therefore, be seen as an important step
towards obtaining the most advanced technology available, even if the costs appear
to be very high and its delivery schedules uncertain.
Not surprisingly, the American, Russian and the Chinese versions of the FGFA
look strikingly similar, although the Chinese J-20 is somewhat larger. The most
noteworthy feature of the T-50 is the absence of a traditional rudder with the
vertical twin-tail providing control surfaces. With a pair of Saturn 117S engines
producing 142kN (~15,000 kg, 32,000 lb.) of thrust, the thrust-to-weight ratio
is 1:1.19, which makes the fighter truly agile. Both the engines would be capable
of individually vectoring their exhaust/thrust nozzles, to provide superior
manoeuvrability to the aircraft. The T-50 also sports an extended leading edge,
blended into the jet engine air intake, to meet the needs of super-cruise and
relaxed stability.
The FGFA will carry all armament internally, so that airframe drag and radar
reflectivity will be kept to a minimum. In theory, the FGFA will be capable of
climbing to 60,000 feet in under two minutes, and reconnoitring the entire length
of the border detecting any enemy air activity, neutralising threats if any, landing
at distant airfields without air refuelling, and remaining invisible to enemy radar,
and above all without any external assistance or AWACS guidance.
Some believe that India’s contribution to its development would be quite
low since the fighter is already flying. It is said that the Russians had offered the
deal in early 2002, and again in 2004, but India was reluctant as it did not know
enough about the programme, and had wanted to post its own scientists and
engineers at the Sukhoi laboratories, which the Russians naturally did not approve.
Another reason for India dragging its feet over the deal could have been the
uncertainty of such high-tech and high-cost programmes, which makes it difficult
to commit funds, especially when resources are limited. A 25 per cent work share
is something HAL may be able to deliver on time. It is reported that HAL would
be tasked to produce advanced avionics, including mission computer, critical
software, cockpit displays, Counter Measure Dispensing Systems (CMDS) and
perhaps composite materials, as its part of the share. It must be noted that the
LCA and even the Su-30 MKI are already flying with HAL avionics and
composites. Besides, HAL would get valuable experience of working on the
development of a truly modern platform.
178 Air Power and National Security

As part of the deal, the Russians are also allowing India access to the Global
Navigational Satellite System (GLONASS) global positioning system, a navigation
system that is reportedly more accurate than the non-military grade American
GPS. The US allows access to military grade GPS to its allies only and perhaps
friends that sign CISMOA and other-end user agreements.
Given that the Chinese military aviation industry will likely produce its own
FGFA, the J-20 by 2020, it is prudent for the IAF to also become familiar with
such advanced fighter designs. While there is an urgent need to reduce dependence
on foreign suppliers for India’s defence needs, especially modern combat aircraft,
it would be unwise to unduly delay acquisition of technology simply because
India’s efforts at self-reliance have not fructified. Ten years from now, the aircraft
might be even more expensive or worse, might not be available and hence, India
has little option but to grab this opportunity. Analysts would remember the
criticism that was levelled at the Su-30 purchase in 1996, but no other country
would then have given India a fighter in the same class as the US F-15. Needless
to add, the Su-30 MKI is now the backbone of the IAF along with the MiG-29
and Mirage-2000.
The IAF is sometimes criticised for buying every new toy in the latest glossy
defence magazine, or chasing high-tech weapons, simply for the sake of technology,
without linking its employment and utility to the national defence policy. Given
the capital-intensive nature of airpower, such criticism is sometimes justified but
it is equally true that India cannot afford to lag too far behind its likely adversaries
in technology. Since India’s own defence industry has not progressed as yet to a
level where it can build such advanced aircraft on its own, India has little choice
but to depend on its old friends. If all goes well, by 2020 the IAF may possess
a reasonable number and suitable mix of high-end and medium-performance
fighters.
While the 2013-14 economic indicators are not encouraging, and budgetary
allocation for defence might come under stress, as the 2013-14 figures have shown,
the government would have to find funds for these modern machines. Interestingly,
both the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II programmes have also faced
major funding cuts. Although the unit cost of the Sukhoi-HAL FGFA is expected
to be around $100 million, it would not be surprising if the programme also
faces reduced orders in the future. India has probably ordered 48 single-seat and
166 twin-seat units to derive the benefits of economies of scale, but whether or
not, such large numbers finally materialise, would depend largely on the state of
the Indian economy and the capacity to spend large sums on defence procurement.
According to a recent report, the IAF has already cut down the number of FGFA
to 144 single-seat fighters, down from the original 214 aircraft.27 According to
another media report, the IAF is unhappy with the FGFA because (a) the Russians
are reluctant to share critical design information with India (b) the fighter’s current
 The Indian Air Force Today 179

AL-41F engines are inadequate, being mere upgrades of Su-30MKI’s AL-31

engines; and (c) it is too expensive – with India paying $ 6 billion for co-
development of the FGFA, a large percentage of IAF’s capital budget will be
locked up.28 In order to preclude the spares/re-supply problems that the IAF
faced after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a need to include in the
contract agreement, maintenance and upgrade support ab initio. The IAF must
also have considered lifecycle costs. Russian aircraft, airframe and aero-engine
servicing cycles and total technical life are usually much lower than their Western
counterparts and this adds to overall lifecycle costs. India must now ensure that
it quickly establishes a local servicing facility and where possible, encourages Indian
Small and Medium Industries (SMEs) to manufacture spares for the new aircraft.
The IAF would also have to seriously and quickly re-assess its manpower
requirements. Both the Su-30 MKI and the FGFA are two-seat fighters, the rear
cockpit being occupied by either a pilot or a Weapon Systems Operator (WSO).
As is well known, basic and operational training takes time and requires resources
in qualified flying instructors and suitable trainer aircraft. Currently, the IAF
faces a shortage of basic trainers, and delays in the HAL Intermediate Jet Trainer
(IJT) Sitara programme would further add to training woes. The IAF has already
ordered an additional 57 BAe Hawk trainers and may also get more PC-7 basic
trainers.
The foregoing clearly shows that the present scenario is fraught with
uncertainties; but there is also hope that some of the on-going programmes will
bear fruit by the end of the current decade.

NOTES
1. Raja Menon, “Components of National Security and Synergising them for Envisaged Security
Threats in 2025”, National Security Paper 2011, USI Journal, January-March 2012, pp.
104-43.
2. Ibid., p. 105.
3. Basic Doctrine of the IAF, Directorate of Operations (Space), Air Headquarters, September
2012, p. 4.
4. Rahul Bedi, “India approves mountain strike corps”, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 50 (23), June
5, 2013, p. 14.
5. Rahul Bedi, “Antony sets December deadline for Tejas IOC”, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly,
50(27), July 3, 2013, p. 14; also see SP’s Military Aerospace and Internal Security (MAI), 3
(8), April 16-30, 2013, p. 15.
6. M.K. Bhadrakumar, “India’s MMRCA Deal Unravels” at http://blogs.rediff.com/
ymkbhadrakumar/2012/03/13/indias-mmrca-deal-unravels/ (Accessed June 4, 2013).
7. One C-130J was lost in an unfortunate accident on 28 March 2014. See http://
indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pilot-error-led-to-c-130j-hercules-crash-iaf-
sources/
8. The Military Balance 2015, International Institute of Strategic Studies, Routledge, London,
2015, p. 251.
9. Ibid.
180 Air Power and National Security
10. Interview with Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 50 (31),
July 31, 2013, p. 34.
11. Mohan Guruswamy, “Will India and China fight a war again?” SME Times, September 26,
2012 at http://www.smetimes.in/smetimes/in-depth/2012/Sep/26/will-india-and-china-fight-
a-war-again74911.html (Accessed on July 2, 2014).
12. The Military Balance 2015, no. 8.
13. Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Air Power and Future Battlefields: India’s Needs’, at http://www.ipcs.org/
article/india/air-power-and-future-battlefields-indias-needs-4833.html (Accessed on February
28, 2015).
14. The IAF may eventually field ten AWACS aircraft. See Gulshan Luthra, “IAF to go in for
10 more AWACS: Rafale Deal hopefully by July”, athttp://www.indiastrategic.in/
topstories1910_IAF_to_go_in_for_10_more_AWACS_Rafale_deal.htm. (Accessed March 5,
2015).
15. Caitlin Harrington, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 47, March 31, 2010, pp. 24-31.
16. ‘“Passive Radar’ from Cassidian remains invisible”, Airbus Defence and Space, July 19, 2012,
at http://www.cassidian.com/en_US/web/guest/Passive%20radar%20from%20CASSIDIAN
%20remains%20invisible (Accessed on July 20, 2012).
17. “Rafale in Storm Clouds, Parrikar says IAF can make do with Sukhoi-30”, at http://
www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/rafale-in-storm-clouds-parrikar-says-iaf-can-
make-do-with-sukhoi-30s-114123100706_1.html (Accessed March 5, 2015).
18. Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne in an interview to a Delhi-based defence journal India
Strategic in October 2013, opined that the signing of the Rafale contract was likely to be
delayed. The first 18 Rafale would join the IAF three years after that, and the delivery of
the remaining 118 would be completed only in the 4th to the 11th year. See http://
indiastrategic.in/topstories3054_IAF_transformation_happening_but_delay_on_MMRCA_
is_worrying.htm (Accessed March 5, 2015).
19. SP’s Aviation, October 2012, p. 20.
20. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 49 (21), August 31, 2012; Also see http://
www.financialexpress.com/article/economy/32-years-after-tejas-light-combat-aircraft-to-be-
handed-over-to-indian-air-force/31144/ (Accessed March 05, 2015).
21. SP’s Aviation, 12, December 2012, p. 32.
22. See http://www.hal-india.com/futureproducts/products.asp (Accessed March 20, 2013).
23. Interview with Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne, no. 18.
24. See http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indian-air-force-projects-mafi-gagan-to-benefit-pune-
airport/778566, (Accessed March 21, 2013).
25. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/mr-sam.htm (Accessed March 21,
2013).
26. The next few paragraphs related to T-50 FGFA are based on the author’s article in Force
magazine, December 2011. In an interview on October 8, 2013 the Chief of the Air Staff
admitted to delays in the procurement of the FGFA, at http://www.janes.com/article/28125/
iaf-chief-plans-more-c-17s-admits-fgfa-delays (Accessed February 3, 2014); also see Gulshan
Luthra, “IAF decides on 144 Fifth Generation Fighters”, India Strategic, October 2012, at
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories1766_IAF_decides_144_fifth_generation_fighters.htm;
“Pak-FA/FGFA/T50: India, Russia Cooperate on 5th-Gen Fighters”, Defence Industry Daily,
June 11, 2014 at http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/india-russia-in-negotiations-re-
nextgeneration-fighter-03133/#more-3133 (Accessed on July 2, 2014).
27. See http://aviationweek.com/defense/india-cuts-orders-fifth-generation-fighter-aircraft
(Accessed March 5, 2015).
28. See http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/ajai-shukla-how-rafale-is-killing-the-air-
force-s-future-115021601822_1.html (Accessed on March 5, 2015).
 The Indian Air Force Today 181

7
The Future of Air Power in India

Introduction
Late 2014 witnessed a noticeable spurt in ceasefire violations by Pakistan along
the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border (IB) in Jammu &
Kashmir (J&K) adjoining areas of Punjab.1 India’s response to these was seen as
prompt and measured, yet robust. The comprehensive dialogue between the two
neighbours had remained stalled since the cancellation of Foreign Secretary level
talks in August 2014. In early March 2015, India’s Foreign Secretary visited
Pakistan as part of his interactions with all members of South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and media reports indicated that talks with
Pakistan may resume in the near future.2
Chinese army intrusions in Ladakh during the visit of the Chinese President
Xi Jinping to India in September 2014 also became a cause of concern, especially
since the Chinese army personnel returned to their side of the disputed border
only after the departure of the Chinese President from India.3
As is its wont, China again objected to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s
visit to Arunachal Pradesh on February 20, 2015 but this time its tone and language
was harsher. While China has regularly protested against visits of Indian Prime
Ministers to Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that it is a disputed area, it did
not bother about India’s sensitivity when its troops intruded into India, during
its President’s visit to India. Such behaviour does not help build mutual trust and
makes it difficult to understand Chinese intentions.4
The United States (US)-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
forces in Afghanistan known as the International Security Assistance Force officially
ended their mission on December 31, 2014 and were replaced by another NATO
182 Air Power and National Security

force named the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) comprising 13,195 military
personnel from 42 NATO member countries, with effect from January 1, 2015.
The RSM will provide advice, assistance and training to the Afghanistan National
Army. At least as of March 2015, there are no indications that the RSM or any
other part of NATO will participate in actual combat operations. The possibility
of the US increasing the number of its soldiers cannot be ruled out. Pakistan has
all along sought to play a major role in Afghan affairs to achieve what it calls
‘strategic depth’ and may once again become more active in its support to elements
of the Afghan Taliban. With the withdrawal of NATO’s combat forces from
Afghanistan, sub-conventional threats across the border may become more
widespread and sophisticated if the situation in Afghanistan worsens.5
In early March 2015, a People’s Democratic Party – Bharatiya Janata Party
coalition government came to power in J&K. Its Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed
Sayeed thanked Pakistan, the Hurriyat leadership and the Kashmiri militants for
allowing smooth conduct of elections in the state and also announced an amnesty
for political prisoners in the state of J&K. While these may be viewed as normal
populist measures that many political leaders resort to, such statements may
nevertheless embolden forces inimical to India to create trouble with renewed
vigour.6
On November 20, 2014 the Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu visited
Pakistan and the two countries signed a landmark defence deal. Although its
details were not available, Russia had reportedly made an offer to consider the
sale of Mi-35 attack helicopters to Pakistan. Pakistan and Russia also signed a
US$ 1.7 billion worth energy deal. During his visit to Russia in November 2014,
the Pakistani Finance Minister also evinced his country’s interest in grabbing a
maximum share in Russian markets. Pakistan may also be able to purchase the
RD-93 aero-engine that powers the JF-17 fighter, currently being produced at
Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) Kamra, with Chinese collaboration.
Pakistan presently obtains these engines via the China route. Although Indo-
Russian relations remain vibrant, it is clear that with the changing strategic
situation in Afghanistan, Russia is keen on mending its relations with Pakistan,
a country that was responsible for training the Afghan mujahideen and finally
ending its occupation of Afghanistan in 1988. Although it is too early to assess
its impact, Russia’s eagerness to build a defence relationship with India’s implacable
neighbour will only further embolden Pakistan to harden its stand against India.7
In light of the above it can be safely assumed that India’s borders with Pakistan
and China will remain live and their relations problematic for the foreseeable
future. India’s armed forces cannot therefore lower their guard. The modernisation
of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and its operational preparedness thus acquire added
urgency and salience.
 The Future of Air Power in India 183

The Current Air Power Balance

The Military Balance 2015 shows the IAF fighter squadron strength as 37, whereas
the Chief of Air Staff, IAF had put this number at 34. To avoid confusion,
therefore, we will rely on the number of aircraft rather than on number of
squadrons. As shown in the previous chapter, the current strength of the IAF is
1068 fighters, including 66 BAe Hawk AJT and 175 Kiran trainers, which are
essentially advanced jet trainers but are also capable of limited strike operations.
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has some 450 fighters, including 76 F-16s and 49
JF-17s, while the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) possesses some
2239 combat capable aircraft. In the last decade alone, its J-10 fleet has shwn an
impressive growth to 270 and the JH-7 to over 240, including 120 with the
PLA Navy.8 Numbers alone do not necessarily signify the real combat strength
of any air force, which depends on many factors such as training, combat
experience, doctrine, synergy with surface forces and comprehensive national
power. But numbers nevertheless, give a good indication of current and future
trends. These numbers or the numerical strength of the PAF and PLAAF clealy
highlight the combined challenge posed by these two adversaries.

Force Structures
Force sructures are invariably constructed on the basis of affordability, access to
technology, current and future threats and above all, service doctrine. In the case
of the IAF, however, doctrine seems to have played onlya marginal role. This is
so because India continues to depend on other countries for its military hardware.
With the economy showing a marked upward trend in the last decade, India’s
options widened and the result was the introduction of a number of aircraft and
systems that were unaffordable until then. India’s quest for modern weapons is
unlikely to end in the near future. With demand slackening in the West, India
became a major customer for arms imports. India, it is widely believed, is planning
to spend a minimum of $100 billion in the next 10 years. The 30 per cent
mandatory offset clause in all major purchases, it is hoped, would also make
India an attractive investment destination. Some major Indian companies such
as Reliance, Larsen & Toubro (L&T), Mahindra and Tata have already formed
joint ventures with Western defence industry majors and it is hoped that these
will play an increasingly important role in India’s defence industry.
The likely development of aerospace power in the next two decades would
depend on many of these factors. Given the high cost of research, progress of the
Indian defence industry is likely to be incremental rather than dramatic.
While it is too early to write off the future of manned fighters, there is a
possibility that unmanned aerial systems and missiles will probably play an
increasingly bigger role. While the US and its Western allies will continue to
184 Air Power and National Security

dominate the air power arena, there is a possibility of some of the developing
countries of Asia, especially China, becoming more self-reliant in this field. India’s
indigenous military aviation industry may also grow at a faster pace, if the
government gives it the right support and encouragement. Its past record does
not, however, raise high hopes. The IAF is also likely to continue giving greater
importance to advanced manned fighters rather than to missiles and UAVs/
UCAVs.
Of the 1,042 combat capable aircraft of the IAF, as many as 259 are the old
and ageing MiG-21 and 241 trainers. This leaves only 194 Su-30MKIs, 63 MiG-
29s and 52 Mirage-2000s, clearly highlighting its ‘air defence orientation’. The
100-odd recently upgraded MiG-27s and the 106 Jaguar Deep Penetration Strike
Aircraft (DPSA) would be on their way out by 2030, unless the Jaguar re-engining
programme fructifies in time. The Request for Proposal (RfP) for the same was
withdrawn in March 2011, because of a ‘single vendor situation’, anathema to
India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD). It is believed that a new RfP has now been
issued again with Honeywell’s F-125 engine being the only contender.9 The
contract to upgrade the 52 Mirage-2000H to Mirage-2000-5 level has also been
signed, but that will take another two to three years up to 2016-17. There is
already some criticism about the very high cost of these projects.10 The Tejas
Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) and the Rafale Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
(MMRCA) will be available only by the end of the current decade, or perhaps
even later.
Given India’s expanding strategic horizons, the emphasis would be on long-
range multi-role capability. In 2030, the IAF can hope to possess some 272 Su-
30MKIs, 100 Tejas LCA, 60 MiG-29s and about 50 Mirage-2000s and if all goes
as per plan, at least 126 Rafale fighters that are currently on order. A sizeable
number of Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) Indo-Russian fighters may
also form part of the IAF inventory by 2030.
Given that the PLAAF has already inducted 249 J-10 fighters, it can safely
be assumed that China will produce 40-50 fighters every year. This trend is likely
to continue for the next two decades. With the Chinese fighters becoming more
and more sophisticated and reliable these may also gain a sizeable export market.
There are already reports of Egypt’s interest in locally manufacturing the JF-17,
jointly produced by China and Pakistan. Given the current levels of defence
cooperation between China and Pakistan, it is likely that a majority of PAF aircraft
will be of Chinese origin and this will place added stress on the IAF.11
The high cost and restricted availability of the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) make it difficult for these to enter the region by 2030, except
possibly for a few US allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore.
It must, however, be remembered that in 1980 Pakistan was the first country in
 The Future of Air Power in India 185

the region to get F-16 fighters, and may possibly get advanced American aircraft
in the future.
But in the meantime, “under its Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD)
programme, Boeing has unveiled its design concepts for a sixth-generation fighter
to replace the US Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet after 2025, and to succeed the
US Air Force’s F-22 Raptor two or three years later. These are said to be stealthy,
tailless, and super-cruise capable and would include optionally manned cockpits.”
One of the defining characteristics of the programme is likely to be its
affordability.12 In sum, the prohibitively high costs of the modern fighter platforms
may compel India to look for other options such as mid-life upgrades, and life
extension/refurbishing of the available fleets.

Airborne Weapon Systems

The quest for accurate delivery of bombs and munitions gained added urgency
in the Vietnam War and the Laser Guided Bomb (LGB) soon became the most
sought after weapon. The LGB can, however, go awry due to smoke, clouds and
other atmospheric obscurities. The LGB’s popularity was due to the simplicity
with which a ‘dumb’ bomb was converted into a ‘smart’ weapon. This was done
simply by adding a kit that included the laser seeker and fins to guide the bomb
to the target illuminated by the laser designator, which was carried either by the
fighter bomber in ‘autonomous’ mode or by a ‘buddy’ fighter. Where possible, a
Forward Air Controller (FAC) was also used for laser designation. In Operation
Desert Storm (1990-91), only 229 US aircraft were capable of delivering laser-
guided munitions. By 1996, the expanded installation of Low-Altitude Navigation
and Targeting Infrared by Night (LANTIRN) pods on F-15Es and block 40 F-
16s had increased this capability, within the air force, to approximately 500
platforms. These weapons known as Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) became
increasingly popular, as they promised reduced collateral damage. It is noteworthy
that the IAF used its MiG-27 and Mirage-2000 fighters in ‘buddy’ mode, to
target camouflaged enemy positions with LGBs, in the high mountainous terrain
during the 1999 Kargil operations. Most if not all IAF Jaguars, MiG-27s, MiG-
29s, Mirage-2000s and Su-30MKIs either already possess the capability to deliver
PGMs, or will soon acquire it.
In the West, the limitations of the LGB resulted in the development of Joint
Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and later the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)
family of air launched ordnance, that rely on the Inertial Navigation System/
Global Positioning System (INS)/(GPS) for guidance, and make it possible for
these weapons to be delivered even in bad weather, so long as the correct
geographical position of the target is available. Although countries other than the
US have also produced such weapons, they remain expensive and are not easily
186 Air Power and National Security

available to developing countries of the region. It is likely India will try to

indigenously produce more advanced weapons. A new family of the Sensor Fused
Weapons capable of firing small ‘bomblets’ at specific targets, such as the hot
engine of tanks and vehicles is also being used, but their efficacy in operations
other than conventional wars is questionable, since these ‘smart’ weapons still
cannot differentiate between the engine exhaust heat of an armoured vehicle, and
that of a school bus.13 A family of anti-tank weapons such as the Milan, TOW,
Eryx, FGN-148 Javelin, and AGM-114R Hellfire are once again in demand and
are increasingly being used in counter-insurgency operations both from ground
and airborne platforms. “Raytheon has delivered more than 30,000 Javelins and
about 3,300 have been fired in combat, with production running at between
1,300 and 2,000 per year.14
The air-to-air missile has also seen major improvements with the All-Aspect-
Missile and Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Missile entering service, with most air
forces of the region. India is also reportedly testing its first air-to-air missile, the
Astra. It is said to be a BVR with a range of 44 km that may be increased to 80
km in the future. This is another area where self-reliance will become even more
important for cost and access considerations. These missiles will become even
more effective with the introduction of Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) in the region.

Air Defence
The region has seen the induction of more sophisticated surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) in the recent past, with China receiving a large number of Russian S-
300 PMU SAMs, with ranges exceeding 150-200 km. These are also effective
against enemy missiles. India too has obtained a few of these missiles and has
inducted two batteries of locally produced Akash SAM systems. With the
gradually increasing reach of modern fighters and the induction of the air-to-air
refuelling tankers and AWACS in Pakistan, China and India, the air defence
envelope has expanded with the fighter/interceptor set to engage the enemy at
far off ranges. This trend is likely to continue. Ranges may further increase with
new BVR missiles entering service with some of these air arms. Operations with
these force multipliers are, however, very complicated with the tanker and the
AWACS platforms themselves needing protection.

Support Platforms
Fixed wing transport aircraft and helicopters have proved their usefulness in peace
and war and have been regularly employed for strategic mobility, troop lift, disaster
relief, evacuation of own citizens from troubled areas, providing support to the
civilian authority and in Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN). In India, the
 The Future of Air Power in India 187

task of air-maintenance of troops and also civilians in the high altitude frontier
areas, will remain a major responsibility, even after the ongoing development of
surface infrastructure in forward areas is accomplished. In the absence of
infrastructure in the mountains, these aircraft of the IAF have proved to be the
lifeline of the inhabitants of these remote regions of the country. The IAF has
been using the Il-76 and An-32 as the main platforms for over two decades. The
Hercules C-130J that entered service with the IAF in 2012, would likely continue
well beyond 2030, but the Il-76, An-32 and HS-748 will need replacements or
midlife upgrades much earlier. India is currently planning to produce its own
Medium Tactical Aircraft (MTA) with Russian collaboration, which may enter
service by the end of the next decade.
India received all three of its AWACS aircraft in 2012. Pakistan has ordered
six SAAB Erieye AEW&C aircraft from Sweden, the first of which rolled out on
March 26, 2008.15 India and Pakistan may add to their existing assets of tankers
and AWACS. India has plans to purchase ten AWACS aircraft. China has already
inducted its locally developed AWACS, the KJ-2000. This aircraft led the flypast
at the 60th Anniversary Parade of the PLAAF in 2009.
Helicopters have proved their versatility both in war and peace and hence,
are likely to remain in great demand in the foreseeable future. India’s Advanced
Light Helicopter (ALH) ‘Dhruv’ is already flying with the army, navy and the air
force, and is also available on the export market. China has produced the Z-8
support and Z-9 attack helicopter and both of these are also likely to be exported
in the future. India’s order for 197 Light Observation Helicopters (LOH) for its
army is delayed once again, but the IAF may get its Mi-17V5s on schedule. India
has reportedly finalised the contract for 22 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and
Chinook heavy helicopters. The Indian Army is also expected to receive some 22
Apache helicopters. Given the mountainous nature of India’s northern borders,
the helicopter would continue to remain important in all its roles: armed/attack,
scout/reconnaissance, support, tactical troop lift, medical casualty evacuation,
combat search and rescue, even if its effectiveness in the attack/combat role is
restricted to about 10,000 feet Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL).

UAVs/UCAVs
The Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) as also High/Medium Altitude
Long Endurance (HALE, MALE), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) are now
fast becoming more popular with all armed forces. The success of the US in the
October 2001 Afghanistan Air War, in the early and effective targeting of the
Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters with the Predator MQ-1 launching Hellfire anti-
tank missiles, made this modified UAV a legend. This kindled renewed interest
in the UAVs with many countries developing their own. Small UAVs that can be
188 Air Power and National Security

launched by an infantryman are also becoming more and more commonplace.

A variety of UAVs, UCAVs and Man-portable and Micro-UAVs will see a
resurgence in the near future because of their low cost, relative ease of import
and local manufacturing. Presently, the market is expanding, but fully autonomous
types are not being fielded, for reasons of safety to other users of airspace, and
the need to first confirm that the target is indeed hostile, before its engagement.
Unmanned Autonomous System or UAS operations are not as yet commonplace,
though much work is being done in this area.
Some low-cost UCAVs, such as the Harpy, designed to home in on the
radiations of a radar set and destroy the radar by diving into it, are already in use
in the region. According to the Aviation Week & Space Technology (AWST), the
US remains the dominant producer and operator of the UAV and from a mere
1,000 flight hours in 1987, the figure went up to 600,000 in 2008.16 Northrop
Grumman, the manufacturer of the famed Global Hawk HALE UAV, has recently
offered for trials the X-45 that will display stealth characteristics, and carry
Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) such as the JDAM and the small diameter
bomb. The X-47B technology demonstrator capable of carrier operations is
currently undergoing trials. With the rapidly increasing costs of manned fighters,
there is a strong possibility of the UAV/UCAV combination becoming more
popular with the armed forces in India, but whether these would replace the
manned fighter is still uncertain. There is greater uncertainty about their being
available in the Western arms markets, as also about their affordability.

Missiles
For some years now, more and more countries in the region have been producing
conventionally armed surface-to-surface missiles of the Prithvi, M-9, and M-11
variety. India has recently unveiled its solid fuel version of the Prithvi with a
conventional warhead. In the recent past, rudimentary short-range missiles and
rockets have caused two major conflagrations in West Asia: the 2006 Lebanon
War and the 2008 Gaza conflict. A variety of ship and air launched missiles for
use against ships and ground targets already fill the inventories of many countries,
with the People’s Republic of China laying considerable stress on this ‘easy-to-
produce’ simple weapon system. Both Iran and Pakistan are also busy producing
different types of missiles, including the cruise missile. The reason for such interest
is perhaps their relatively low cost and ease of manufacture, high accuracy and
their usefulness in the initial stages of a conventional war, when air superiority
is not attained.
According to a recent report:
In 1970 there were only two countries developing cruise missiles with
ranges of more than 150 km, but by 2009 this figure had increased to
 The Future of Air Power in India 189
17. Cruise missiles cost between 10 per cent and 25 per cent of the price
of a ballistic missile; they use general aircraft technologies and tend to be
more accurate.17
Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO’s) Nirbhay cruise
missile was tested in March 2013, but the test was not fully successful as the
missile had to be destroyed, when it veered off course in flight. It was once again
tested on October 17, 2014 and this time the test was termed successful. It is
reported to be stealthy and has a nominal range of 1000 km. Pakistan, on the
other hand has already developed a nuclear capable cruise missile Babur with a
range of 700 km and is testing an Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the
Ra’ad (Hatf VIII) with a range of 350 km.18
It is quite possible that the next two decades will see more and more of these
missiles in the region. As seen during the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the missile
may also become the weapon of choice to signal the intentions of a country.
Selectively targeting the enemy’s military assets such as fuel dumps, ammunition
storage depots, forward airfields, command posts, regional headquarters and
communication nodes can prove a very ‘safe’, cost effective and decisive option
in the opening days of the war, with low risk of attrition to own aircraft and
collateral damage to enemy civilians. This may thus become the preferred tool
for the developing countries of the region. As Iran has shown, the poor man’s
weapon will be the missile. The American Stinger man-portable SAM or Man
Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) has over time acquired a high
reputation for accuracy and lethality. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, the IAF
lost a helicopter and a fighter aircraft, and sustained damage to a Canberra, due
to Stingers. It must, therefore, be remembered that a low cost MANPAD SAM
can be a major deterrent to offensive air operations and a major force multiplier
for the defender.
The Brahmos supersonic missile, jointly developed by India and Russia, is
another example of effective long-range engagement of the enemy with relative
safety. The Brahmos was successfully tested from an underwater platform in the
Bay of Bengal on March 20, 2013. An air-delivered version is also under
development for carriage on the Su-30MKI. The next two decades may see a
proliferation of missiles of all types, as manned fighters/bombers become costlier
and out of reach of the developing countries. The aircraft and the helicopter lose
their overall effectiveness, due to reduced aerodynamic lift and engine thrust at
high altitudes. The ballistics of the shell and bomb also become more unpredictable
at higher altitudes. Interdiction of enemy supply lines is, therefore, a preferred
strategy, relative to attacks on enemy targets, in close proximity of own troops.
Future air operations in the mountains would have to allow for these limitations
of the aircraft and helicopters. Man-portable Anti-Tank (MANPAT) and anti-
190 Air Power and National Security

aircraft missiles and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) may be more
effective in the mountains. In fact, the intelligent use of the UCAV-missile
combination might prove a winning future strategy and enhance their
attractiveness in the future, as has already been proved by the success of ‘drone’
attacks in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Aerostats
The IAF began experimenting with tethered balloons in the early 1990s, but the
two barrage balloon units were designed as a passive air defence measure on
forward airbases. These were designed for deployment at different heights, over
or in close proximity to the airbase or a Vulnerable Area (VA), to deter low-level
attacks by the enemy. Later, the IAF purchased two Aerostat systems from Israel,
for deployment in areas close to the border. The aerostats are balloon-mounted,
low-looking radars, for the detection of ultra-low level enemy attacks. By raising
the aerostats to a few hundred feet, the radar is able to pick up targets at
considerable distances. One of these was unfortunately lost while it was being
lowered in strong wind conditions. The Aerial Delivery Research and
Development Establishment (ADRDE) a DRDO laboratory at Agra, is reported
to have successfully tested and indigenously designed and built Akashdeep, a
medium-sized aerostat system in late 2012. If successful, the IAF could vastly
improve its low-level radar cover and make its air defence more effective. The
IAF needs 20 of these high endurance surveillance systems, developed by the
DRDO. The high-performance PU-coated nylon fabric, aerostat balloon, electro-
optical tether, electro-hydraulic control system and helium gas management
system developed by DRDO were successfully tested.19

Use of Near Space

Officially designated as extending from 75,000 feet to 62 miles, ‘near space’ has
been attracting the attention of aerospace research scientists for a variety of reasons.
Deployment of airships and tethered balloons or ‘aerostats’ at very high altitudes,
on the fringes of the earth’s atmosphere, is likely to prove very useful for
reconnaissance, long duration continuous surveillance and Electronic Intelligence
(ELINT) gathering, and has been evolving for some time. Absence of severe
weather, strong winds, and above all, the low cost of manufacturing and operation
of these air ships/balloons are the main points in favour of such efforts. The
major advantage is that such platforms could remain on station for weeks, if not
months, and would be much cheaper than satellites and provide a continuous
picture of activities in the ‘footprint’ of the platform and may prove very useful
in the future.20
 The Future of Air Power in India 191

LEMVs
The old airships are likely to come back in vogue not for carriage of passengers,
but for long endurance surveillance. The US Army Space and Missile Defence
Command conducted a test of a Long Endurance Multi-intelligence Vehicle
(LEMV) on August 7, 2012. An airship not unlike the old ‘blimp’, the LEMV
is designed for long-term Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and
‘persistent stare’ type missions. The LEMV can operate at altitudes greater than
22,000 feet and has a radius of action of over 3,600 km; it carries an ISR payload
of 1,300 kg, can stay aloft for more than 21 days, and is reputed to have very
low fuel consumption.21

Solar and Renewable Energy Platforms

Much work is under way to develop solar and hydrogen cell powered aeroplanes
and UAVs. Initial difficulties in obtaining/generating more usable power and
hence limitations of all-up weight, might restrict these technologies to UAVs
and light reconnaissance platforms, but the potential is as yet not fully realised.
For example, the solar-powered Zephyr flew for 82 hours in a test flight in 2008.22

End of Fossil Fuel/Alternative Fuels or Energy Sources

Availability and desirability of using fossil fuel for aviation may soon become a
hotly debated issue, if fears of climate change come true. Military aircraft would
be most vulnerable to these pressures by environment and climate change
advocates. According to one estimate, the US Air Force (USAF) alone uses 2.5
billion gallons (approximately 10 billion litres) of fossil fuel each year. In 2008,
it cost the US Government nearly US$7 billion, slightly more than half the total
fuel bill of the entire US Government, to fuel its air force. It is also said that
aircraft release about 600 million tons of carbon dioxide each year, but have a
greater impact on the environment than other sources of combustion products,
because the aircraft deliver it directly into the atmosphere. Thus, even though
aviation accounts for just eight per cent of the total use of refined oil, and only
three per cent of greenhouse emissions, the overall climate effect is about 13
per cent. Military aviation would have to search for alternative sources and types
of fuel.23 Many alternative fuels and even solar energy is being considered but
which of these, if any, would suit the requirements of military aviation is difficult
to say at this time. In the near future, fuel may thus become a major constraint
for military aviation and may even adversely affect the production of some of
the fighters and other platforms. The USAF has already demonstrated successful
use of bio-fuels in military aircraft. India is yet to begin looking at these
alternatives.
192 Air Power and National Security

Conclusion
From the present indications, the IAF is unlikely to reach its target of 42 combat
squadrons in the foreseeable future, for that would translate into about 900
fighters and is unlikely to be achieved, even if all ongoing procurement
programmes reach their fruition on schedule. With a maximum of 272 Su-
30MKIs, 126 and possibly 200 Rafales, 150 LCA Tejas’, and all other combat
aircraft that are available in 2015, the IAF cannot hope to get 900 modern fighters,
as more than 30 per cent or approximately 300 (MiG-21s and MiG-27s) of these
would be phased out well before 2030. The IAF Air Chief also said the MiG-21
bis could be used until 2025, instead of the projected phase-out in 2017.24 The
Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme is also behind schedule, with the Initial
Operational Clearance (IOC) awarded in December 2013 and the Full
Operational Clearance (FOC) likely in end 2015 or early 2016. Although the
IAF has ordered 40 LCA Tejas’ (fitted with the GE F-404 engine) these are also
unlikely to be available before 2020. The Tejas Mk. II with the more powerful
GE F-414 would also be delayed further to at least 2025 or beyond. The IAF
will thus have to be content with about 33-35 squadrons for the next 10 years
and modify its strategy to meet future threats with the available numbers.
Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons and its dependable friends China and
the US, will ensure that a rough strategic balance is maintained with India, so
that the latter is unable to take any major retaliatory military action. Unless India
fine-tunes its retaliatory options, declares its red lines and also issues clear warnings,
it would be impossible to check Pakistan’s adventurism. The modernisation of
the IAF must be aimed at achieving and maintaining this capability to deter
Pakistan and defeat its ‘nuclear threat’ strategy since air power is the best – probably
the only—instrument for instantaneous, yet calibrated response, with a high degree
of escalation control.
As referred to in this and previous chapters, the present ‘hardware’ or in
other words aircraft, equipment, and weapons shortages, would most probably
be made up through outright purchases and indigenous solutions, but other
‘software’ issues—such as civil-military relations, jointness, common strategies
for joint missions, greater synergies with the sister Services and with the civilian
government, the DRDO/scientific community and industry—will require much
more diligent, sincere and careful handling.

NOTES
1. “2014 Records 562 Ceasefire Violations in J&K, Highest in 11 Years”, Times of India,
December 28, 2014 at http://www.timesnow.tv/2014-records-562-ceasefire-violations-in-JK-
highest-in-11-yrs/articlesho (Accessed March 5, 2015).
2. “Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar Breaks Pak Ice to Clear Way for Talks”, Indian Express, March
4, 2015 at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/saarc-yatra-jaishankar-meets-
 The Future of Air Power in India 193
paks-foreign-secretary-aizaz-chaudhary (Accessed March 5, 2015).
3. “China Tests India in Ladakh”, The New Indian Express, September 25, 2014 at http://
www.newindianexpress.com/columns/China-Tests-India-in-Ladakh/2014/09/26/
article2449159.ece (Accessed March 5, 2015).
4. Inder Malhotra, ‘Border in the Middle’, Indian Express, March 6, 2015 at http://
indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/border-in-the-middle/ (Accessed March 6, 2015).
5. “Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan”, February 27, 2015 at http://www.nato.int/cps/
in/natohq/topics_113694.htm (Accessed March 5, 2015).
6. “Historic PDP-BJP Government in Kashmir Gets Off to a Controversial Start”, Times of
India, March 2, 2015 at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Historic-PDP-BJP-govt-
in-Kashmir-gets-off-to-a-controversial-start/articleshow/46424404.cms (Accessed March 5,
2015).
7. See http://www.claws.in/1340/russia-pakistan-engagement-concerns-for-india-ramya-
panuganty.html, February 23, 2015 (Accessed March 6, 2015). Also see “Russia Pakistan
Defence Accord signals shifting Regional Alignments”, World Politics Review, November 23,
2014 at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14526/russia-pakistan-defense-accord-
signals-shifting-regional-alignments (Accessed March 6, 2015).
8. The Military Balance 2015, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, London,
p. 251.
9. “Re-engining Jaguar”, SP’s Aviation, (10), October 2011, p. 56.
10. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 50 (11), March 13, 2013. A.K. Antony, India’s Defence Minister,
justified the cost of US$ 30 million per aircraft as being reasonable, on the basis of 3.4 per
cent annual escalation, since the Mirage-2000 was first purchased in 1985.
11. Interview with PAF Chief, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 50 (31), July 31, 2013, p. 34.
12. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 47 (20), p. 5.
13. David R. Mets, Airpower and Technology: Smart and Unmanned Weapons, Praeger Security
International, Westport, 2009, pp. 128-29.
14. Caitlin Harrington, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 47(13), March 31, 2010, pp. 24-31.
15. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 26, 2009, p. 19.
16. Larry Dickerson, “New Respect for UAVs”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 26,
2009, pp. 94-97.
17. Duncan Lennox, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 47 (13), March 31, 2010, p. 22.
18. “India Successfully Test-Fires Cruise Missile ‘Nirbhay’”, The Hindu, October 17, 2014 at
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indigenously-developed-cruise-missile-nirbhay-
testfired/article6509942.ece (Accessed March 6, 2015); Also see “Pakistan Conducts Flight
Test of Ra’ad”, The Dawn, February 2, 2015 at http://www.dawn.com/news/1161034
(Accessed on March 6, 2015).
19. SP’s Aviation, (12), December 2012, p. 32.
20. See http://www.gaerospace.com/press-releases/pdfs/Near_Space_SpaceToys.pdf.
21. “LEMV takes to the skies”, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 49 (33), August 15, 2012, p. 4, and
SP’s Aviation, (9), September 2012.
22. Hue Williams, Jane’s International Defence Review, 43, June 2010, pp. 82-87.
23. Mark J. Lewis, “Military Aviation”, Aerospace America, September 2009, pp. 24-31.
24. Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne in an interview to a defence journal on October 7, 2013
at http://indiastrategic.in/topstories3054_IAF_transformation_happening_but_delay_
on_MMRCA_is_worrying.htm (Accessed November 2, 2013).
194 Air Power and National Security

8
Perspectives on Some Important Issues
Influencing Air Power Employment

Introduction
As we have seen in previous chapters air power employment depends wholly on
its ground-based infrastructure and organisational strength. To be effective, every
modern hi-tech machine is required, after all, to be operated by a well-trained
and motivated human being fully supported with a responsive logistics and
maintenance organisation. This in turn is built on a firm foundation of air strategy
and doctrine that is derived from past experience and is aimed at fulfilling future
national political objectives. Further, air power employment, like any use of force,
must also consider the overall threat environment. The 1998 nuclear tests by
India and Pakistan have added a new dimension to warfare in the subcontinent
and raised the risks and complexities of conflict. This makes it necessary to briefly
touch upon the nuclear dimension. This chapter attempts to deal with some of
these important issues.

Human Resource Development or Personnel Planning

Although Human Resource Development (HRD) is the more widely used term
in the business world, the Indian Air Force (IAF) continues to call its HR
department the Directorate of Personnel. This is headed by the Air Officer-in-
Charge Personnel or AOP, who holds the rank of Air Marshal and is also one of
the Principal Staff Officers (PSO) at Air Headquarters, and looks after the
recruitment, retention, retirement and promotion, of all air force personnel. The
IAF’s current strength is over 127,000 and includes some 5,000 officers, 110,000
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 195

airmen and 15,000 enrolled non-combatants and civilians. Like its sister Services,
the IAF has also seen considerable growth in the last four decades.
Until the late 1960s, besides the General Duties Pilot GD (P) and Navigator
or GD (N) Branches to which pilots and navigators belonged, other branches of
the IAF comprised Administration and Special Duties (A&SD), Technical Engine
(Tech. Eng.), Technical Armament (Tech. Armt.), Signals, Equipment and
Medical. During a service-wide reorganisation in the early 1970s, these branches
were renamed and rationalised. The two main and ‘executive’ branches the GD
(P) and (N) were renamed the Flying Pilot and Navigator or F (P) and F (N) for
short. The A&SD Branch was renamed Admin. or Administration, with technical
branches being merged into Aeronautical Engineering – Mechanical and
Electronics or AE (M) and (L). The Equipment Branch was now called Logistics
Branch. Air Marshal Y.V. Malse, and some other PSOs at Air Headquarters, were
opposed to Air Chief Marshal I.H. Latif’s plan to change the branch nomenclature
from GD (P) to Flying Branch. They felt that in a service whose raison d’etre was
flying, it was essential for the executive branch to gain experience in jobs, other
than pure flying appointments. It was therefore incorrect to keep the pilots and
navigators out of the vacancies in other branches, especially Administration which
also included the special element of Air Traffic and Fighter Controllers, and who
also held important portfolios in administrative fields such as, works, discipline
and morale, human resource development or personnel and related fields.1
Earlier, the A&SD Branch comprised directly recruited officers of the
Administration Branch as well as the pilots and navigators who were found unfit
to continue flying, for one reason or another, as until then most of the
Administration Branch vacancies could be filled by either an A&SD or GD Branch
Officer. Many of the personnel serving in Administration and Logistics branches
who were known as A&SD and Equipment Officers respectively until the early
1970s also came with some flying experience, as they were recalled to join ground
duties after being suspended from flying training. This arrangement ensured that
a very large proportion of the IAF officers had personal experience of the flying
environment and this facilitated their understanding of air power issues. Fighter
Controller (FC) and Air Traffic Controller (ATC) duties were, and are today
carried out by Administration Branch Officers, both of which require a sound
understanding of flying, airmanship, fighter tactics and employment. According
to a very senior Air Marshal, even during World War II, the rejection rate for
trainees in the GD (P) Branch was invariably as high as 75-80 per cent and this
ensured that a large pool of cadets with some flying experience was invariably
available for induction into other branches.2 In the recent past the IAF has relaxed
the stringent standards somewhat, and hence the number of suspensions are now
relatively small.
196 Air Power and National Security

Until the 1980s, a Pilot Officer of the General Duties (GD) Branch became
eligible to be promoted to the rank of Flying Officer after one year of service; and
to the rank of Flight Lieutenant after five years. For all other branches except the
medical, the period was two and six years respectively. The rank of Squadron
Leader was conferred after nine and 11 years for flying and ground duties branches,
respectively. The objective was to keep the fighting force as young as possible and
to give incentive to officers to remain fit for flying. This difference in eligibility
to promotion, was done away with in the late 1980s with corresponding
adjustments to the retirement age, in the rank of Wing Commander and above.
As a result, the Flying Branch, considered as being the only executive branch, lost
some of its sheen. One privilege or advantage to the aircrews, pilots and navigators,
as also flight engineers and signallers was the payment of a flying allowance, earlier
known as ‘flying bounty’ (FB). This was later renamed ‘flying pay’ although it
was never considered a part of the basic pay, and hence officers of the Flying
Branch never became eligible for perks associated with, or based purely on pay
scales. Flying pay was reduced on attainment of the rank of Air Commodore,
and as a result the total emoluments of a newly promoted Air Commodore of the
Flying Branch, strangely, were less than when he was a Group Captain.
In the 1950s, the FB was Rs. 150 or some 30 per cent of the basic pay of a
Pilot Officer and this went up to Rs. 250 in the 1960s. FB was an allowance and
had to be claimed separately after completing a minimum of six hours of flying
in a month. In the late 1960s, fighter aircraft serviceability was so dismal that
many young fighter pilots had to fly as ‘Second Pilot’ in transport aircraft to
claim FB. Perhaps as a reward for our victory in the 1971 war, FB became part
of the pay in January 1972 and was also raised to Rs. 350, and in January 1975
to Rs. 375. In September 1981, it was further raised to Rs. 750. When the pay
scales were revised upwards as a result of the recommendations of the Fourth Pay
Commission, it was raised to Rs. 1,250 and remained at that level until it was
raised to Rs. 7,500 in 2006, by which time the overall pay scales had been raised
quite considerably. Flying Pay as percentage of basic pay thus remained
insignificant.
Doctors or Officers of the Medical Branch were the only other branch entitled
to additional allowance, called the Non-Practising Allowance or (NPA). The Sixth
Pay Commission granted a substantial increase in pay and allowances to all
branches and removed this difference, but as a result, the incentive to join the
Flying Branch also disappeared. It is well known that the numbers opting to join
the three wings of the armed forces, especially the combatant branches are
continuously dwindling, with a majority of promising young students invariably
preferring civilian or corporate/business sectors to the armed forces. Today, few
young men in their teens are ready to commit 20 years of their life to service with
the armed forces. Although the government has opened short service commissions
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 197

in some branches, the response is reportedly less than expected. Lack of service
accommodation and schooling facilities for children in far-flung airbases and
frequent transfers are said to be the other major obstacles to joining the armed
forces.
As previously noted, following the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, the
IAF embarked on a massive expansion programme to induct over 1,000 additional
pilots. In the early 1960s, the IAF was in the throes of a major upheaval due to
the induction of a large number of pilots and other branch trainees. Training
establishments were overflowing with new trainees and there was much chaos, as
the sole purpose was to quickly train as many pilots as possible, in the shortest
possible time. Some 10 pilots’ courses or batches had already commenced training
or passed out in the two years after the 1962 Chinese aggression. Five flying
clubs, one each at Tambaram in Madras (now Chennai), Nagpur, Kanpur, New
Delhi and Patiala were chosen to give 25-30 hours of flying experience to ab initio
or new cadets. Thereafter, the cadets went through three more stages of training
namely: Basic Stage on HT-2 at Allahabad; Intermediate Stage at Air Force Flying
College (AFFC) Jodhpur on Harvard/Texan T6G trainers; and Advanced Stage
on Vampire Mk. 55 and 52 fighters at Hakimpet, near Secunderabad, where the
cadets were commissioned. The arrangement and sequence of flying training had
undergone many changes in the previous two years. Those of the fighter stream
were then sent to the two Vampire squadrons Nos. 220 and 221 at Pune, for
what was then known as the Applied Phase of flying training, during which pilots
learnt tactical flying that included live firing of cannons or front guns and rockets,
at the firing range nearby.
The aim of the first stage was to weed out at the least expense, those trainees
unlikely to make the grade for military flying, safely and economically. The Basic
Stage, where this was normally done, was used for consolidation; the Intermediate
Stage was for learning military flying; and the Advanced Stage was the one in
which the cadets were trifurcated to fighter, transport and helicopter streams.
The Applied Phase, as the name suggests, was meant to introduce the newly
commissioned pilot to the basics of fighter, twin-engine transport and helicopter
flying. The Hunter fighter on which most cadets of the 1960s-70s courses were
thereafter trained, was then used both as Lead-in-Fighter-Trainer (LIFT), or
Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) as well as an operational aircraft. An Operational
Training Unit (OTU) equipped with Hunter fighters and trainers was formed
at Armament Training Wing (ATW), Jamnagar in late 1966 because it was felt
that operational squadrons could not train such a large number of new pilots,
and also simultaneously prepare for their operational tasks. The OTU was,
however, disbanded in 1969 due to shortage of Hunter trainers. The intake into
pilots’ courses was reduced in 1968. The Hunter OTU was reformed a few years
later.
198 Air Power and National Security

The post-1962 emergency inductions came to a halt by the end of 1968-69,

when the IAF went back to a peacetime training routine. The induction of
approximately 1,000 additional pilots in a short span of five to six years, generally
called the ‘bulge’, later posed great difficulty in career management as they could
not be given the necessary operational flying training in the squadrons in time,
because the IAF simply did not have enough aircraft. Both the Toofani and Mystere
IVA were due for retirement and the MiG-21 fighters were not as yet available
in large numbers, i.e., until the early 1970s. Some of the Hunter squadrons in
the Eastern sector had as many as 40-45 newly commissioned Pilot Officers waiting
to commence their operational training.
The situation in transport squadrons flying the Russian Il-14, the Canadian
Caribou and the American Packet and Dakota aircraft, was equally bad, with a
huge number of newly commissioned pilots cooling their heels. Many of them
were sent on ground duties, such as Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCOs) and
Base Operations Officers or were transferred to helicopters; but all this took time
and many of them were unnecessarily wasted out or prematurely left the IAF.
The civil/commercial aviation scenario was then equally bad, with only two
commercial airlines, Air India and Indian Airlines operating in the country. Many
flying clubs were also languishing, due to poor demand and lack of funds. As the
‘bulge’ began to progress towards the rank of Flight Lieutenant and then Squadron
Leader, it faced increasingly tight bottlenecks. There was little increase in the
number of squadrons but aircraft availability and serviceability had started to
slowly improve, at least in the MiG-21 and S-22 squadrons.
The main reason for the bottlenecks, however, was that too many cadets had
passed out between 1963 and 1966 with just 10-15 months of training. Later
courses, e.g. the author’s course, 97th GD(P), took much longer (30 months), to
complete its training due to the delays caused by the 1965 Indo-Pak war and
poor resource availability. The Pilots’ Training Establishment (PTE), that had
begun training IAF pilots in 1964, at the Civil Aviation Training Centre (CATC)
at Bamrauli, Allahabad, presented a picture of total chaos, with even the instructors
often unaware of who and where their cadets/wards were. It was a miracle that
the cadets passed out or graduated from PTE in just over six months without any
major accident. The IAF had called up some 15-20 flying instructors from the
Auxiliary Air Force who were often found to be unfamiliar with air force life, but
nevertheless imparted flying training with reasonable success. Some instructors
for example, did not have much experience on the HT-2, and hence found it
difficult to teach aerobatics to their pupils. This fact was, however, known to the
Chief Flying Instructors (CFI) who gave necessary guidance when they flew a
check sortie with the cadets.
By the time the ‘bulge’ members began reaching operational squadrons in
1968, both Hunter and Gnat serviceability hit rock bottom, which meant a very
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 199

long wait to get the coveted Fully Operational (F/Ops) Status, which required at
least 80-100 hours of flying. It was with difficulty that they became F/Ops before
the 1971 Bangladesh War. There was no urgency to train more pilots because
there was no real shortage, and as a result many younger pilots sat out the 14-day
war, performing the duties of Forward Air Controllers (FAC), Combat Air Patrol
or CAP Controllers, Base Operations Officers or sundry other jobs such as Mess
Secretary and Security Officer.
With the induction of more MiG-21 aircraft in the early 1970s, the situation
began easing but pilots posted to Hunter, Mystere and Gnat squadrons continued
to struggle to maintain their operational status. They also found themselves out
of the selection process for professional courses such as Qualified Flying Instructor
(QFI), Pilot Attack Instructor (PAI) and the newly started Fighter Combat Leader
(FCL) Course. Not surprisingly, the pilots commissioned before or after the 1962-
68 period found themselves well placed for career progression. Pilots in transport
squadrons also faced a bleak future till the arrival of An-32 and Il-76 aircraft in
the mid-eighties. Such was the imbalance between rank, expertise and experience
that it was a common sight in 1986-88, to see two Flying Officers flying the An-
32 as Captain and Co-pilot while a senior Wing Commander Navigator kept a
watchful eye on them!
By the late 1970s, the Personnel Staff or P Staff (as it is popularly known) in
Air Headquarters managed to get government sanctions for a Cadre Review, under
which some additional vacancies of Group Captain and above were sanctioned,
but these were invariably used up in the very first year, with the result that the
bottleneck did not clear. Once when the author congratulated a newly promoted
Group Captain, the Chief Operations Officer (COO) of a fighter base in 1980,
the latter laughed out loud and said it was not a great achievement as ten out of
the eleven officers considered for promotion were in fact promoted. With the
entry of Pechora SAM III missiles in the second half of the 1970s, many of the
overlooked Squadron Leaders and Wing Commanders found some respectable
jobs, but little upward movement. The post-‘bulge’ officers posted to S-22 and
MiG-21 squadrons were, however, far better placed. It must be said to the credit
of the much-maligned ‘bulge’ officers, that they held important and often thankless
posts, in the air and ground jobs, across the Indian Air Force (IAF), and acquitted
themselves well even when there was little chance of promotion.
Another major reason for poor career management in the officer cadres of
the IAF was that sometime in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the policy makers
at Air Headquarters managed to abolish the ‘tenure system’ under which a Group
Captain, Air Commodore or Air Vice Marshal (AVM) was allowed to remain in
that rank for a maximum period three or four years and was expected to retire in
case not promoted, even if he had not reached the age of superannuation. As a
result of the abolition of the tenure system some senior air force officers enjoyed
200 Air Power and National Security

two or three star ranks for as many as 8-10 years. The army and the navy also
faced these problems, but with less severity, because their officers were permitted
to leave the service prematurely, usually at Commander level and found job
opportunities in the civilian sector. The air force or the government argument
was that pilots could not be released because of the large sums of money spent
on their training, a specious argument, but powerful nonetheless.
The 1975 Emergency bred sycophancy across all government departments;
the armed forces did not remain unscathed. The result was that it encouraged
‘yes’ men and the so-called zero error syndrome and work culture. This soon
stifled initiative and those close to their ‘Godfathers’ prospered. Until then frugal
and spartan living, or at least living within one’s means, was the norm, if not the
hallmark of a young service officer, but the gradual increase in pay and allowances
gave birth to what came to be known as ‘five-star culture’ and adversely affected
professionalism in the service. Soon MiG, Jaguar, and Sukhoi lobbies became all-
pervasive and powerful with the result that ‘blue-eyed’ boys prospered. In a well-
known case, an officer was on the personal staff of two Air Chiefs, commanded
two stations, wangled a diplomatic post abroad and became an Air Marshal
without ever leaving the vicinity of Delhi.
In his 1995 essay on the IAF, George Tanham commented that the IAF is
dominated by fighter pilots.3 This is to some extent true, and the reasons for this
perception are not far to seek. Unlike the other two Services, in the air force it
is the fighter pilots who actually do the fighting and have to be trained to be
ready for war at all times. This requirement, from the very beginning of their
career, results in the young fighter pilots being groomed as ‘gladiators’ and in
order to nurture this gladiatorial spirit, they seem to enjoy greater importance at
work, but not any additional power in the military fraternity. In the Indian
environment, transport and helicopter pilots also perform the equally risky and
challenging task of flying, to and from high altitude runways, and Advanced
Landing Ground (ALG) in the mountains. Attack helicopter and transport pilots
flying specialised aircraft, such as the C-130J are undoubtedly engaged in equally
important and risky tasks and this distinction or special place, that the fighter
pilot enjoyed until recently, is changing as time goes by. What is, however, vital
is that the IAF spend adequate time and resources to build true leaders and not
merely ‘stick & throttle’ pilots or managers.
Until April 2007, all Air Chiefs had flown fighter aircraft – some of the
World War II era – and began as fighter pilots, but later switched to transport
flying. In April 2007, a helicopter pilot was chosen for the top job of the Air
Chief, which speaks volumes for the way the IAF is changing. Another marked
feature of IAF personnel or HR policies was that almost every Air Chief invariably
changed the existing promotion policy. It is not as if those promoted were
incompetent, but when competition is tight, even a small change such as increased
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 201

emphasis on one or the other trait or qualification, can change the entire equation.
The Air Force Staff Course at Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington,
for example, has been given more or less importance depending on the views of
the Air Chief. For some time, it was said that only those Flying Branch Officers
with a ‘Directing Staff ’ or instructor grading, were eligible for the command of
a squadron, but that policy was soon abandoned. For many decades, only pilots
and navigators or Flying Branch Officers were eligible for a posting on ‘staff ’ of
the DSSC, but this practice has thankfully been changed with almost all branches
being given an opportunity to serve as Directing Staff, at this prestigious inter-
service institution. This is of great significance for ground duty officers, as this
and other instructional assignments at the Air Force Administrative College
(AFAC) at Coimbatore and the Air Force Technical College (AFTC) at Jalhalli,
Bangalore and a few other training units and establishments, are the only
opportunities provided to them, where their service accomplishments can be
recognised and rewarded.
With changes at the helm, that is, at the level of the Chief of the Air Staff
(CAS), the QFI and PAI/FCL courses have likewise been given more or less
importance, as a prerequisite for promotion. Given the ever-dwindling assets,
the prime appointment of the ‘Commanding Officer’ of a frontline flying
squadron, has also become even more valuable and extremely competitive,
unleashing all kinds of undesirable characteristics of one-upmanship. Further,
due to pressure of competition, some commanders are only interested in somehow
completing fault-free command tenures, at a squadron or flying station. This
tendency further reinforces the zero error syndrome and robs young leaders of
initiative and opportunities to gain confidence from their own experience.4
Frequent postings to meet the requirements of a ‘desirable’ career profile also
adversely affect the work output, quality and overall efficiency of the Service.
Recognising the vital role that HR plays, the IAF under the leadership of Air
Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne coined a new motto: ‘People First, Mission Always’
clearly emphasising the vital role that humans play in the country’s defence. With
the entry of more complex and high-tech aircraft and equipment, HR will become
increasingly critical to the success of the IAF. Many of the current and future
fighter aircraft have two cockpits, and hence will need two aircrews. This
requirement will place additional training burden on the IAF. Inspirational
leadership and command challenges will be essential to keep the men and women
of the IAF fully motivated and committed to organisational goals.

Recruitment and Retention

In today’s globalised world, competition is becoming increasingly intense, with
more and more young people aspiring to higher levels of job satisfaction, as also
financial security. While India might boast of the so-called demographic dividend,
202 Air Power and National Security

finding the right candidates for the IAF might prove increasingly more difficult,
as with the country’s economic progress more avenues and options open.
Recruitment and retention of experienced and skilled technicians, pilots, engineers
and administrators is already posing a big challenge. Lateral movement at the
right age into other government departments, paramilitary forces, Defence Public
Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and the burgeoning private sector would have to
be considered with imagination and sensitivity. Given our large population, we
often tend to show scant regard for the desires and genuine aspirations of our
people. The best way to ensure high morale is to shift one’s loyalties to our
subordinates rather than to superiors.
As seen above, for some time now, armed forces and particularly the air force
have not been an attractive career option for young Indians. The IAF, to be sure,
gets a large number of applicants but they are apparently, not the best available.
IAF maintains that it has not experienced much difficulty on this count, yet it
is a widespread belief that a young 18-year-old is not ready to spend three years
at the National Defence Academy (NDA) and another year at the Air Force
Academy (AFA) and then make a commitment for a minimum of 20 years – and
this is the main reason for the disinclination of the young generation to join the
armed forces. Risk to life in aircraft accidents also dampens the spirit of the wards
and their parents alike.
The IAF has for some time now opened short service commissions for some
of the branches, yet these have not proved very attractive. Like in the United
Kingdom (UK), the IAF could offer three options for release at 10, 15 and 20
years of service, with suitable incentives. Another option is to grant release after
20 years of service, and/or offer lateral separation to paramilitary organisations
and other departments of the government. The government could also consider
creating a separate cadre of ex-Service officers for employment in the Ministry of
Defence (MoD), Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) to encourage better understanding of security and closer
cooperation with the defence services.5
The Indian National Defence University (INDU) proposal has been on the
anvil for over a decade but has for some reason not progressed, although the
government has reportedly allocated suitable land for it in Haryana. The
foundation stone for the university building was laid by Dr. Manmohan Singh,
the then Prime Minister, on May 23, 20136 Like the national defence universities
in many advanced countries, INDU will help train leaders in national security.
Military officers will benefit by pursuing post-graduate and doctoral studies
between 10-15 years of service or once the officer has completed his/her command
assignment. INDU graduates can then fill a larger proportion of vacancies in the
MoD, MHA and MEA, and/or join the private sector, especially the defence
industry. INDU will meet the prime requirement of Professional Military
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 203

Education (PME), and fill the existing gap in the field of security and defence
studies. There are unconfirmed reports, however, that INDU may in fact play
only a limited role of managing the award of degrees to the graduates of NDA,
DSSC, Institute of Defence Management (IDM), National Defence College
(NDC) and other training establishments of the three Services.

Maintenance
In 1978, the IAF adopted the so-called ‘C’ Flight concept by which the third or
‘C’ flight of a flying squadron that had until then provided second-line servicing
support, was placed under and pooled as part of the airbase or wing engineering
organisation. The Chief Technical Officer (CTO) was renamed Chief Engineering
Officer or C Eng. O and upgraded to the rank of Group Captain. The aim of
this exercise was to pool the human resources of two or more flying units based
at a Wing. The Station Logistics Officer who had been independent until then,
now reported to the C Eng. O. In one stroke, a third of each squadron’s personnel
began working directly under the C Eng. O while remaining on the posted
strength and establishment of the squadron.
This arrangement, according to many veterans, diluted the authority and
responsibility of the Squadron Commander, and increased the dependence of
the squadron on the parent wing. With the raising of a large number of radar,
Tropospheric Communication or ‘Tropo’ communication units and other
supporting units in the 1980s and 1990s from within existing manpower resources,
there was also considerable strain due to widespread manpower shortages, which
on occasion caused avoidable difficulties and misunderstandings in the flying
wings. Diffusion of responsibility also added to already existing problems of spares
shortages, and aircraft and equipment serviceability dwindled. In one case, in the
1970s the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) of a Command was
known to routinely visit equipment depots in search of spares for the squadrons
under his command. While this unusual practice invariably improved the
serviceability and availability of aircraft in his Command, it short-circuited the
normal logistics procedures and adversely affected the serviceability in other
Commands.
It is often said that the IAF over-maintains its aircraft. In many cases, the
Jaguar being one example, the IAF engineers added their own additional checks
and revised servicing schedules laid down by the manufacturers. The result was
poor availability, without any attendant increase in safety. When on deputation
to the Iraqi Air Force in the early 1980s, the author found that the Iraqis did not
unnecessarily tinker with the MiG-21s, L-29s and L-39s that were based at the
Iraqi Flying College in Tikrit. Consequently, the reliability and serviceability of
these aircraft was quite high, even though the flying environment was dry, hot
204 Air Power and National Security

and subject to regular sandstorms. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese origin MiG-
21 aircraft of the Iraqi Air Force had already undergone the modifications that
the IAF was still struggling to incorporate, and according to Indian instructors
deputed to Iraq, were a delight to fly. Aircraft serviceability and availability has
thus been a subject of much contentious discussion in the IAF. Delays in
procurement decisions may further exacerbate this problem in the future.

Trade Restructuring
In the 1990s, the IAF suddenly decided to change and merge the six groups in
which airmen trades were organised. At around the same time, it was rumoured
that a proposal to raise the flying pay was submitted to the Fifth Pay Commission.
These two proposed changes caused a near mutiny in the IAF. Between December
1997 and January 1998, there were many instances of airmen and their families
openly protesting at a number of air force stations and disrupting their daily
routine. In one case, the airmen picketed the gates of an air force base and
successfully blocked the entry of an AOC-in-C. In another, young airmens’ wives
blocked a railway track just outside a major air force base, which resulted in the
stoppage of a long-distance express train. This serious ‘law and order’ situation
was brought under control with persuasion and by tactful handling by the local
commander. Many engineering officers also wanted to proceed on leave en masse
and some even submitted resignations. While the situation was slowly brought
under control, the incident dealt a big blow to inter-branch relationships in the
IAF, which have not fully recovered even after 19 years. Many promising careers
were unnecessarily ruined and the reputation of the IAF came under a cloud at
a time when the security situation in the country was already delicate. Needless
to add, the originators of these hare-brained ideas got away unscathed. According
to some senior members of the service, this was undoubtedly a low point in the
otherwise glorious and blemish-free record of the IAF.
Militaries work on faith and comradeship. A pilot has implicit faith in the
integrity of the technical personnel that repair, service and maintain the flying
machine, for in the ultimate analysis, his or her life, and above all national security,
depend on their honesty and dedication. He cheerfully accepts to fly the machine,
with only a minimal visual inspection, before flight and is ever ready to face any
challenge or threat. Such relationships take a long time to build and nurture and
hence Commanders need to remain particularly vigilant with regard to any fissures
among the various branches and trades that make up this great service. Human
resource management thus acquires critical importance in the armed forces. Recent
reports of fragging and violence between officers and men, in some army units,
only highlight the delicate nature of these relationships and the paramount need
to maintain morale, especially when faced with an ever-present external and
internal threat.
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 205

Flight Safety
The IAF has often been severely criticised on account of its flight safety record
but at least outwardly, neither the MoD nor the air force seems particularly
exercised about it. Accident rates are normally calculated per 10,000 or 100,000
hours of flying, with the IAF choosing the former method. As per the MoD Annual
Report of 2011-12, the accident rate dropped from 1.48 per cent in 1972 to
0.40 per cent in 2007-08 – a significant decrease – but as always, there is scope
for further reduction. The print and electronic media also takes an episodic interest
in the subject, but rarely informs the general public about the true nature and
causes of aircraft accidents. This results in avoidable misgivings about an already
risky career in military aviation.
The IAF does not release all the data on accidents but in June 2012, A.K.
Antony, the then Defence Minister, while answering a question in the Rajya Sabha
(Upper House of the Indian Parliament) declared that the IAF had lost 482 of
the 872 MiGs that it had procured in the previous 40 years. Such statistics
unfortunately do not give enough information for a comprehensive analysis and
are very often confusing and even misleading. In another instance reported in the
media, the CAS, Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne was apparently of the view
that inexperience was the root cause of IAF accidents, but the then Minister of
State for Defence, Pallam Raju publicly contradicted him, and said that it was
pilot error that was in fact one of the major causes of accidents and not
inexperience.
According to a media report quoting a statement of March 21, 2013 by the
then Defence Minister, in the Rajya Sabha, “In the last five financial years, i.e.
from 2008-09 to 2012-13 the IAF has lost a total of 37 fighters and 13 helicopters
in which 17 pilots, 18 other service personnel and 06 civilians were killed.”
Breaking this down year-wise, the MoD says eight fighters and two helicopters
crashed in 2008-09; 10 fighters and two helicopters crashed in 2009-10; six fighters
and six helicopters crashed in 2010-11; nine fighters and one helicopter crashed
in 2011-12; and four fighters and two helicopters crashed in 2012-13. “In the
above accidents, a total of 17 pilots and 18 Service personnel were killed. Also,
six civilians were killed and 25 injured.”7 The same report goes on to say that the
IAF has been losing the equivalent of one fighter squadron every two years.
The flight safety record of the MiG-21 seems to be particularly worrisome
since many of the mishaps were on this type. In the 1960s, Luftwaffe (German
Air Force) flew only two major types of fighters, the Fiat G-91 and the F-104
Starfighter, with the latter being more accident prone. The Luftwaffe, however,
said that because most of the flying was done on the F-104, the accidents were
also on that type. Similarly, the MiG-21 has been the maistay of the IAF since
the late 1960s and has had its share of accidents. Opinions on the safety and
206 Air Power and National Security

reliability of the MiG-21 have, however, been divided with some pilots swearing
by its robust and reliable construction, with others taking a somewhat contrary
view. The fact is that both are only partly correct. As we have seen before, the
MiG-21 was designed essentially as a high-level interceptor but the IAF requested
and received modified versions that could carry a modest armament load for
ground attack missions. By the 1970s, more than half the IAF squadrons were
equipped with various marks of this fighter. (See Appendix III for details).
From about the late 1960s, the Hunter fleet had begun receiving a large
number of young pilots, fresh from training institutes, as the Toofani and Mystere
fleets became due for retirement. A Hunter Operational Training/Conversion
Unit (OCU) was formed in 1966 to give pilots coming from Vampire squadrons,
a minimum of 40 hours of experience on the Hunter. The IAF then had a two-
seat trainer version of the Hunter in fairly large numbers. Hunter serviceability,
however, did not prove very encouraging, and hence by the late 1970s many of
the Hunter squadrons were re-equipped with the Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft
(DPSA) Jaguar. Hunter was a relatively benign aircraft to fly, and hence its accident
rate was not very high. In the early 1970s, the Gnat squadrons also began facing
spares shortages, and were plagued with poor serviceability and as a result the
IAF did not possess a reliable LFT or the AJT for many years. As a consequence,
from the early 1970s, many young and relatively inexperienced pilots were sent
direct to MiG-21 units. Most of them coped well and soon became competent,
and ably led by their experienced seniors, effectively carried the main burden of
IAF’s air defence and strike effort.
The MiG-21, however, is not an easy aircraft to fly and in the 1970s and
1980s when young pilots began going directly to MiG Operational Flying Training
Unit (MOFTU), it took them time to master the aircraft. Type-77, the earliest
mark of the MiG-21, used at the MOFTU suffered from poor forward visibility,
high landing speeds and high rates of descent on final approach. It also had a
marked tendency to enter ‘super stall’, a condition in which unlike other
conventional fighters, the aircraft nose continues to remain high at low speeds,
when in fact, the aircraft is rapidly losing height, thus confusing the inexperienced
pilot. Despite many specific changes and added emphasis on recovery from such
stalled flight conditions, the IAF lost many MiG-21s, effectively increasing the
share of Pilot Error (PE) accidents.
Strangely, in the 1980s, young pilots were first trained on a difficult aircraft
like the MiG-21 and then moved to relatively easier, more modern and reliable
aircraft like the Mirage-2000 and Jaguar. The Gnat, which was used as a lead-in,
or intermediate fighter trainer, also had its share of accidents, because of
longitudinal control, the hydraulic system and engine problems. The Gnat did
not have a two-seat trainer version. Pilots were given two-three dual sorties on
the Hunter trainer before being sent ‘solo’ on the Gnat; not exactly a perfect
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 207

solution but most pilots coped well. The Gnat was thus, not considered a suitable
LIFT.
The Air Marshal D.A. Lafontaine Committee set up in the 1980s to investigate
the causes of IAF accidents, squarely blamed the absence of a suitable trainer and
recommended the Type-69 or MiG-21 trainer. The logic was sound, since the
IAF then had a very large number of MiG-21 and other Soviet origin aircraft.
The T-69 advantages included an identical cockpit, instrumentation, markings,
cockpit layout, and handling characteristics similar to other MiG types. India
was already licence-producing the MiGs in large numbers and there were good
prospects of export as the type was no longer produced in the USSR.8 The MiG-
21 with its ‘after burner’ and very limited internal fuel was, however, a more
difficult and less forgiving aircraft but was nevertheless used as an operational
trainer.
The IAF already had many of these trainers, but accepted the Committee’s
recommendation only as a temporary solution, probably because the T-69 was
essentially a MiG-21 trainer and was not exactly the ideal choice for a LIFT or
AJT. This spurred the search for the AJT. The Air Staff Requirement (ASR) for
the AJT was ready in 1986. Two aircraft, the French Alpha Jet and the BAe Hawk
were extensively tested and their performance exceeded the ASR. The French
offered to sell the used Alpha Jets of the West German Air Force with ‘zero’ life
and all help in setting up the manufacturing line in India. First the Bofors scandal
and later foreign exchange shortages, however, delayed decisions. The air force
test pilots rejected the Alpha Jet for its ‘disconcerting’ oscillatory spin
characteristics. With only the BAe Hawk remaining in the fray, it became a ‘single
vendor situation’. The IAF then raised the requirement of these trainers to 99
from the earlier 66, because it was felt that the utilisation rate of trainer aircraft
should have been calculated at the rate of 20 instead of 30 hours per month. In
the prevailing climate of economic difficulties, the government did not accept
this change and the BAe Hawk deal was, once again postponed. Finally, the IAF
grudgingly accepted the lower number but it was another 18 years before the
Hawk deal was finally signed, and the BAe Hawk AJT actually reached India
only in 2004. All these developments adversely affected IAF training schedules
and flight safety record.
Bird hits have also taken a big toll of IAF fighters, as single-engine fighters
are particularly vulnerable to bird ingestion. In India, rapid urbanisation and
congestion have resulted in the unplanned expansion of cities, with the IAF
airfields having to coexist in close proximity to heavily populated areas. Inefficient
systems of garbage disposal and the absence of arrangements for speedy removal
of animal carcasses, attract birds in large numbers. In spite of continuous efforts,
including close liaison with civic authorities, the IAF has unfortunately not fully
succeeded in reducing this menace.
208 Air Power and National Security

The fact that the IAF has a plethora of aircraft types of Western and Russian
origin, also adds to its maintenance difficulties, with trained and experienced
technicians frequently moving to newly received aircraft, and thus depleting
expertise at the units operating older aircraft.
For a variety of reasons, the IAF has always faced severe challenges in managing
its logistics and aircraft maintenance activities. The end of the Cold War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, further aggravated these problems, although
these were not publicly acknowledged. Russian technology was relatively less
developed when compared to its Western counterpart, and hence a Russian engine
had to be sent for major overhaul after 200-300 hours of flying; whereas its
American, British or French counterparts could fly more than twice as many
hours.
Foreign Object Damage (FOD) or ingestion of small pebbles or other such
objects, when sucked into the powerful jet engine intakes of fighters also damage
IAF aircraft, with poorly maintained runways, contributing their fair share of
such cases. Indian climatic conditions often give rise to wide diurnal variation of
temperatures, which affects the coal tar-based joint filling material used to fill the
gaps between concrete slabs of the runway; loose pieces of which get sucked into
jet engines on take-off.
Poor supervision, both flying and technical, has also been seen as contributing
to IAF accidents. When the author asked a former Air Chief to give his view on
the high rate of IAF accidents, he blamed poor supervision and advocated stringent
punishment for those found responsible. He strongly believed that culpability
had to be fixed and corrective action taken in time. Another retired Air Marshal
firmly believed that due to poor aircraft serviceability, the IAF fighter squadrons
have never really been able to fly the government-authorised monthly flying task
and this has sometimes resulted in operators resorting to short cuts. In addition,
the skewed and constantly changing personnel and promotion policies have further
added to these woes.9
As seen before, the introduction of the C Flight concept of centralised servicing
at IAF flying stations, also contributed to difficulties. According to some observers,
this system of divided responsibility has resulted in neither the Commanding
Officer nor Chief Engineering Officer being held to account. Although many
senior officers do not accept this to be the cause of poor aircraft serviceability,
this nevertheless continues to be a widely held view. Inter- and intra-branch
understanding, or the lack of it, is perhaps the primary cause of this problem.
The second generation fighter aircraft such as the MiG-21, 27 and 29 have limited
endurance, with routine sortie profiles lasting just 30-45 minutes. This increases
the number of landings and take-offs for every hour flown when compared to the
Jaguar, Mirage-2000 and Su-30MKI. In addition, the Mirage fleet maintenance
is even today, very largely dependent on direct support of the Original Equipment
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 209

Manufacturer (OEM), with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) producing

only a very small percentage of spares under licence. As a result, the Mirage fleet
serviceability has always been very high.
Poor serviceability, susceptibility to repeated failures or malfunctioning of
subsystems, or in other words a low Mean-Time-Between-Failure (MTBF) rate
also increases the chances of in-flight emergencies, in turn reducing the margin
for aircrew error. According to some, this contributes to a high percentage of
pilot error accidents. While pilots are undoubtedly trained to handle emergency
situations, they can sometimes make mistakes, if the aircraft experiences multiple
system failure more frequently.
Despite its best efforts, the IAF accident rate continues to be a source of
serious concern, especially since, between 2011-2014 it lost three Mirage-2000
and five Su-30MKI aircraft, both with excellent safety records. The IAF also lost
a C-130J Hercules transport aircraft (March 27, 2014) and three Mi-17 helicopters
(August 30, 2012 and June 25, 2013) during the same period. With the ever-
increasing cost of modern aircraft, the country cannot afford to lose costly aircraft
and precious lives. The IAF and the MoD must together find ways to improve
its flight safety record.
At an Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) seminar in 2013,
the Chair, discussants and other experienced active duty officers were of the view
that the IAF must improve its aircraft serviceability and availability, simply because
smaller numbers (34 squadrons) would demand a much higher sortie rate and
operational tempo in any future conflict. It must be noted that the flight safety
record of types other than the MiG-21, has also been quite poor. According to
one privately maintained website, by the 1990s, the IAF had lost a total of 315
MiG-21s, 23 MiG-23s, four MiG-25s, 21 MiG-27s, seven MiG-29s, 23 Jaguars
and three Mirage-2000 fighters.10 These numbers, however, cannot be confirmed.
The case of the HPT-32, the basic trainer locally produced by HAL, is also
a curious one. In the early 1970s, when the IAF was thinking of a replacement
for the HT-2, the Italian SIAI Marchetti basic trainer was freely available, at a
very reasonable price of just Rs. 12 lakh per unit. India did not choose this trainer
since the HPT-32 was likely to be available for just Rs. 4 lakh each. Eventually,
the HPT entered service only some 15 years later, in 1988, and cost more than
Rs. 60 lakh, with Rs. 48 out of 60 lakh in foreign exchange.11 The Lycoming
540-D-485 engine fitted in the HPT-32, experienced frequent failures, allegedly
due to fuel starvation which made it unsafe to fly. Strangely, more than half the
general aviation fleet of the world uses over 580 different models of the same
Lycoming 540-D-485 piston engine, cleared for all aerobatic manoeuvres
including spinning, without any apparent difficulties. Sadly, neither the IAF nor
HAL have been able to rectify this apparently simple problem of fuel starvation/
vapour lock. The result: frequent crashes; 114 HPT-32 aircraft were prematurely
210 Air Power and National Security

withdrawn from service in August 2009. The IAF was forced to switch to all-jet
training. Basic and even operational training has often been subjected to such
shocks and disruptions. It is an irony that a country that boasts of building
complicated and complex high-technology aircraft such as the Tejas LCA and
Su-30MKI, has been unable to produce a reliable basic trainer. The IAF was then
compelled to purchase the Pilatus PC-7 turboprop trainer from Switzerland. Some
75 PC-7s have been ordered at the cost of Rs. 3,000 crore.12 The MoD has
rejected the HAL proposal for a locally manufactured Basis Turbo Trainer (BTT)
as its cost is said to be Rs. 40 crore, double that of the imported PC-7.
According to some observers, the IAF and the MoD do not seem to take a
serious view of the high accident rate. Air Chief Marshals Moolgaonkar13 and
Dilbagh Singh were two Chiefs who flew regularly and took great interest in
flight safety and ensured a low accident rate during their time and were widely
seen as very strict about flying discipline.
The IAF has traditionally been somewhat indifferent to the use of flight
simulators. The HAL-made Gnat/Ajeet simulator became available for use only
a year or so before the Ajeet aircraft was phased out in the late 1980s. Although
the Hunter and MiG-21 simulators were installed at Ambala and Chandigarh
respectively, in the 1960s, few if any insisted on deriving real benefit from these
useful aids to flying training. The very modern and advanced Jaguar and Jaguar-
Darin simulators at Ambala and Gorakhpur respectively, have also not been
regularly utilised to their capacity. Even today, when simulators of various types
are widely available, this remains a low priority area in the IAF. In a recent interview
to a defence journal, the then Director General Flight Safety and Inspection (DG
FS&I) Air Marshal A.P. Garud said, “With regard to human error, increased and
mandatory use of simulators by aircrew to practise procedures, develop skills and
handling emergencies is being ensured”.14 While simulators alone cannot arrest
accidents, if their use is made mandatory and accurately recorded, as is the practice
with commercial airlines, it may prove very beneficial.

Understanding Defence Budgets

India’s defence budget was only Rs. 2,868 crore in 1978-79 when it went on a
shopping spree but ballooned to a staggering Rs. 1,14,223 crore, three decades
later in 2008-09, an increase of over 40 times. The value of one dollar in 1978-
79 was approximately Rs. 8 which increased to about Rs. 60 by 2014, an increase
of over seven times. Even if we go by the devalued rupee, the increase in India’s
defence budget has been colossal. Worse, since India’s defence industry has not
made any significant advances, except routine licenced production of old models
of aircraft and equipment at Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and
ordnance factories, a big chunk of the capital budget is spent in foreign exchange
and adds to the current account deficit. In the seven years since 2008-09, the
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 211

budget again swelled to Rs. 2, 47,000 crore in 2015-16. The encouraging sign,
however, is that despite such huge increases, it has remained at around 2.5 per
cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); the current budget is even less, at
1.79 per cent; no small achievement.15
In 2013, the government slashed the current capital budget by Rs. 10,000
crore, further adding to the 10 per cent cut in revenue budget that was imposed
on all government expenditure, except salaries and allowances in June 2012. The
GDP growth has slowed to about 5.8 per cent, the Indian rupee has lost more
than 20 per cent of its value, and the budget deficit is unlikely to come down
below five per cent of the GDP. Given these adverse economic conditions and
the ever-increasing prices of foreign arms, the government was not able to maintain
the nominal 10 per cent increase in the defence budget for 2015-16 and this will
undoubtedly affect new acquisitions and modernisation.
In the nine years since 2001-02 to 2009-10, the IAF alone had spent a
whopping Rs. 1,00, 681 crore or US$ 21.8 billion on aircraft and aero-engines,
heavy and medium vehicles and other equipment, on modernisation, but this
has not arrested the dwindling of its fighter assets. As was widely expected, the
Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal for 126 Rafale aircraft
was not concluded before March 31, 2014, as this would have entailed a minimum
payment of 10 per cent of the total contract amount, which is close to Rs. 10,000
crore.
This brief overview clearly shows that India’s military modernisation efforts
are at serious risk if the economy does not pick up in the next few years. The IAF
has only inducted six C-130J Hercules, three Il-76 PHALCON AWACS and six
Il-78 Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft. It has signed contracts for the upgrade of the
Mirage-2000, MiG-27 (since completed) and MiG-29 aircraft and for Akash
and Medium Range (MR) SAM Air Defence missiles in the last 10 years. The
first two of the modified Mirage-2000 aircraft were handed over to the IAF only
on March 23, 2015 at the Dassault facility at Istress France. It is said that it
would take at least seven years to complete the modification of all the 50 Mirage-
2000 aircraft in the IAF’s inventory. It is not known if the government has already
paid for the recently concluded contract for the purchase of 42 additional Su-
30MKIs, 77 Mi-17 V5s and for the co-development of the Fifth Generation
Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) or PAK-FA. At first glance, this expenditure of Rs.
100,681 crore ($21.8 billion) under the capital/acquisition head appears to be
disproportionately high, since it has not made any material difference to the IAF
inventory and military preparedness of the country.
The budgetary process, which is the responsibility of the MoD and the
Ministry of Finance, Government of India (GoI), usually begins in the month of
September every year. Although critically important for the operational
preparedness of the armed forces, it is essentially a routine bureaucratic activity
212 Air Power and National Security

that is subject to constant changes until it is finally presented in the end of February
every year. The Indian Parliament can approve or reject the budget or any of the
demands but cannot modify them.16 The Defence Finance Wing of the Finance
Ministry attached to the MoD plays a vital role in the budget preparation, which
is invariably dictated by the nominal amount allocated by the Finance
Commission, and except in a national emergency it has hovered around 2.5 per
cent of the GDP for most of the past 68 years, since the founding of the Indian
Republic.
The three Service Headquarters begin the annual exercise by first accounting
the expenditure already incurred in the first two quarters of the current financial
year. They then calculate the funding requirements for the remaining year and
assess current expenditure trends. To avoid bunching of expenditure in the last
quarter or excessively hasty purchases to exhaust sanctioned amounts, the Defence
Finance Wing only sanctions a maximum of 80 per cent of the funds expended
up to the end of the third quarter, for the last quarter, which means that if the
Service Headquarter has not maintained an even outflow of funds, the Finance
Ministry would invariably not allow it to spend the budgeted amount or Budget
Estimate (BE). It is for this reason that a Revised Estimate or (RE) is presented
to the Finance Ministry in the month of September and the budget is finalised
by the end of December. Service budgets are made as per GoI guidelines which
lay down instructions for economy, rationalisation of expenditure, savings,
avoidance of duplication, unnecessary or excessive expenditure; and since 2006
also a Modified Cash Management System to ensure greater evenness in expenses,
so that the last quarter expenditure does not exceed 33 per cent of the BE.
The defence budget comprises revenue and capital heads and relates to the
requirements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO), Department of Defence Production and the MoD. For
some years now, expenditure on pensions is not included in the defence budget
but indicated separately. The three Service Headquarters make their projections
based on the expenditure patterns of the past years, current trends and inflation,
committed liabilities, anticipated requirements of stores, annual acquisition plan,
annual works programme and planned new raisings.
As would be evident, the revenue element of the budget is relatively simple
as it comprises salaries and allowances, and routine expenditure incurred mainly
on maintenance and running of the armed forces and includes fuel, oil and
lubricants, rations, stores, clothing and the like. Expenditure under the capital
head, which includes expenditure on land, construction of capital works, plants
and machinery, equipment, tanks, ships, aircraft and aero-engines, and dockyards
however, presents a different set of difficulties. This is because in most cases aircraft
and equipment are purchased from foreign vendors, for which contracts have to
be signed in time and funds released, based on delivery schedules and quality
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 213

assurance. Very often, planned purchases are delayed for a variety of reasons,
such as delayed trial reports or deficiencies in the performance of the equipment.
Funds under the capital head are surrendered at the end of the year. For example,
in the nine years from 2001-02 to 2009-10, in only three years, the average
utilisation under the capital head was 97-100 per cent, while during the remaining
six years, it fluctuated between 65 and 92 per cent; and yet the IAF alone spent
Rs. 100,681 crore on the purchase of aircraft and aero-engines and other major
equipment.
The GoI appears to follow a pattern: at first it declares a respectable figure
for new acquisitions, and then delays the process, so that the air force and the
two sister Services are forced to surrender substantial amounts every year. On
rare occasions, the government has also spent much in excess of sanctioned budgets
but only to meet contractual obligations and committed liabilities. This is only
the ‘mechanical’ part of budget making. The truly vital part of allocation of funds
to individual services is concerned with what the country really expects of the
armed forces. In the absence of a declared strategy or national security policy
document, or any serious joint consultations on national defence strategy, the
three Service Headquarters are often left groping for direction, or perhaps they
are now quite used to making their demands based on ‘their’ perception of India’s
security needs and finally haggling for every rupee, during the numerous rounds
of meetings for budget approvals. Being the specialists, it is the Services that
carry out detailed studies of the trends in technology, the changing balance of
military capabilities of potential adversaries, newly emerging threats and
responsibilities. These assessments are based on available intelligence and are often
gleaned from the addresses and statements of the Prime Minister, Defence Minister
and directives and instructions received from the Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS), the highest decision-making body of the government.
As stated elsewhere, foreign policy imperatives also play a crucial role in the
selection of weapons and equipment. India has all along been trying to diversify
its sources of aircraft, weapons and equipment, but has not fully succeeded due
to a weak defence industrial base. Inter-Service rivalry also plays a negative role
as each Service wants a bigger portion of the budgetary cake. The air force, being
inherently capital intensive, requires a much larger slice of capital/acquisition
funding, but the army which is nearly 10 times the size of the air force, also
cannot reduce its revenue expenditure on account of salaries and allowances and
rations, Fuel, Oil and Lubricants (FOL) and other stores. With rising prices of
imported oil and the urgent need to protect the environment, the IAF as also the
army and the navy would have to find ways to reduce their consumption of
aviation fuel, diesel and other hydrocarbon fuels.
As has been suggested before, the Indian military must focus on its
organisational efficiency rather than on equipment modernisation and technology
214 Air Power and National Security

infusion. While the Services no doubt have to constantly enhance their fighting
ability, it is a moot point whether technology alone provides all answers. Although
India has an unresolved border dispute with its two major neighbours, neither
India nor its adversaries are likely to fight a conventional war. What the Indian
military therefore, needs to achieve is, the capacity to positively deter any
adventurism. This may be possible only if India displays a stubborn resolve to
give a befitting yet, proportionate and timely reply, to any mischief. At present,
each Service makes its own assessments of the extant threat and somehow manages
to convince the government, that to maintain its current size, it needs a certain
minimum amount of money. The government then finds ways to provide the
necessary funds. Since it is difficult to assess true intentions of the likely enemy
and since no one wants to run the risk of losing a war, the Indian military continues
to prepare for a major conventional war, while hoping that it can automatically
tackle all other smaller threats. Although essentially localised, the 1999 Kargil
intrusions, the more than a quarter century of proxy war and cross-border
terrorism, have engendered a sense of general insecurity and hence, various
decision-makers think that there exists the potential for sudden and unprovoked
escalation. It is time India examined whether its current unimaginative approach
to national security is the only way to deter potential threats. The Indian decision-
maker claims to know that India cannot afford to get drawn into an open-ended
arms race with China, but in reality its defence expenditure goes on spiralling
upwards without really enhancing its security.
If current difficulties are anything to go by, the Indian military’s planned
modernisation is difficult to sustain in the long run. The Services must take the
initiative to get out of the old ‘conventional war’ ‘any time any where’ mindset
and find innovative ways to enhance security and yet avoid profligate expenditure.
One reason for this is the oft-repeated statement that India faces the threat of a
‘full spectrum’ conflict. This means that the military has to be prepared to face
any challenge; from a nuclear war to sub-conventional conflicts. This is ridiculous
as no country can ever be ready for the worst-case scenario. In trying to do
everything, India’s armed forces end up doing nothing. The constant refrain that
“we will fight with what we have” and undue emphasis on high technology are
at the root of this problem. If we do not change our approach, we will never be
able to meet our needs, whatever the budget. The other main reason is that there
is little interest among the country’s political leadership to evolve an efficient yet
economical way to address India’s security challenges because that would require
sitting down with the military, which the politicians rarely do.
Many other departments of the government are equally inefficient and also
indulge in wasteful expenditure but that cannot justify the ever-increasing defence
budgets. The upshot of all this is, there is no system to assess the basic efficiency
of the budgetary process, or what it actually delivers, in terms of military capability
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 215

and operational readiness. So long as the demands of the Services appear reasonable,
the government grants them. The Ministry of Finance is keen to ensure that the
Services do not pay a high price for particular equipment and get value for money,
but never questions why the particular weapon or equipment is needed in the first
place. Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) is the most important step in the acquisition
process and it is here that multi-disciplinary consultations are required. It is not
known if any specific effort is made to determine if the IAF indeed needs 45
fighter squadrons, or the army actually requires 5,000 tanks. In the absence of a
joint mission statement, it is not known how the three Services together would
fight a future war and hence, the tendency is to never question the prevailing size
and shape of the military.
The Tables in Appendix IV provide details of defence expenditure since 1950-
51 when the process first began, but do not give any clear idea of the thinking
behind the increases. It appears that the government, after much bargaining, finally
succumbs to the wish-lists of the Service Headquarters. Most analyses of the
budgetary allocations also appear to get bogged down in the nitty-gritty of BE,
RE, surrenders and percentage shares of various services and departments. Most
observers conveniently forget that the actual expenditure on India’s defence and
internal security is in fact much higher than that seen in the annual defence
budgets. For example, in 2008-09, the defence budget was only Rs. 1,05,600
crore while the total expenditure on defence was 1,34,133 crore, which included
Rs. 1,300 crore on nuclear forces; Rs. 7,632 crore on paramilitary forces; Rs. 555
crore on paramilitary housing; Rs. 608 on border fencing; Rs. 504 crore on border
infrastructure; Rs. 15,564 crore on defence pensions and Rs. 2,307 crore on MoD
(civil estimates).17 According to the same source, close to one-third of the budget
of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) is spent on nuclear warhead
production and research. A sizeable amount is also spent by DRDO on missile
tests and research. It is, therefore, safe to assume that over 30 per cent more than
the publicly declared amount, is spent on defence and security. While some analysts
and experts have expressed the need for performance or outcome budgeting, in
place of input budgets, there is no movement in that direction. In any case,
measuring the performance of the military is not easy since ‘security’ cannot be
measured. The Kelkar Committee had recommended that defence expenditure
be gradually reduced to no more than 1.6 per cent of the GDP.18 The budget for
2013-14 brought it down to 1.79 per cent but it is not clear if this trend will
continue. India has placed so many big-ticket orders and made such huge
commitments, that it will be difficult to actually effect the necessary cuts, to keep
the defence expenditure at 1.6 per cent of the GDP, unless the latter shows good
growth. It is time the armed forces themselves came up with innovative ideas to
right-size their strength, and revisit the existing force structures to bring them in
216 Air Power and National Security

closer congruence with the threat and current doctrine, and examine ways to
keep the defence expenditure from spiralling out of control.

India’s Defence Industry

At the time of independence, India had 26 Ordnance Factories (OFs) which
made a variety of arms, guns and bombs including air delivered weapons. In the
last 68 years, the number of these factories has gone up to 39. In addition, India
has nine DPSUs capable of manufacturing a variety of tanks, guns, ships and
aircraft but the Indian military continues to depend on foreign sources for nearly
70 per cent of its needs. The OFs and DPSUs function under the MoD where
the Secretary, Defence Production, a senior Indian Administrative Service (IAS)
officer is responsible for their smooth operation. An Ordnance Factory Board
oversees the functioning all OFs and reports to the Secretary, Defence Production.
Even a cursory glance shows two main characteristics of the indigenous defence
industry. First, although India liberalised its economy in 1991, its defence industry
remains under government control and is unlikely to be privatised. Second, India
has been spending increasingly large sums of money in foreign exchange on arms
imports, but strangely has put a cap of 26 per cent on Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) in defence, which is also likely to remain relatively small. The MoD in its
Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) that has been regularly updated since it was
first announced in 2001, has laid down a mandatory offset clause of up to 50 per
cent in all defence purchases exceeding Rs. 300 crore. The government had also
opened up the defence sector to Indian private players but demand uncertainties
and high initial investments have resulted in very few players entering the field.
Some companies such as Larsen & Toubro (L&T), Mahindra and Tata have on
occasion manufactured some defence equipment, but their participation has by
and large been only a fraction of the huge defence requirement. Some of them
such as Tata Advanced Systems (TAS), Mahindra Defence, and Reliance have
recently entered into joint ventures with foreign defence companies, probably to
derive some benefits from future offsets arrangements, but this is too recent to
show any trends. Following the hike in FDI in defence from 26 per cent to 49
per cent, TAS has shown heightened interest in defence and had domestic orders
worth Rs. 8,000 crore.19 The development of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)
had spawned some 300 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) during its active
phase but many of these have now ended their defence collaboration and moved
on to other areas, and a few have been taken over by bigger companies. Some
experts believe that consequently much valuable expertise might have been lost.
Another major reason for the slow and halting development of the defence
industry is that the DRDO, under the control of the Scientific Adviser (SA) to
the Defence Minister, until late 2014 wielded a virtual veto over buy/make
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 217

decisions of the MoD and this often resulted in the private sector industry not
enjoying a level playing field. The newly appointed Defence Minister Manohar
Parrikar (November 2014) has, however, asked the DRDO and DPSUs to focus
on core areas of defence and promised a new direction to the defence industry.
Despite its size and long experience, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), the
only aviation giant in India, has not succeeded in winning the trust of its main
customer, the IAF. Though it has been manufacturing a wide variety of aircraft
under licence, its record of building its own aircraft is not encouraging. To be
fair, the HT-2 and Kiran HJT-16 proved quite successful, but the Marut HF-24
and Ajeet did not, and for a variety of reasons, were prematurely withdrawn from
service.
Although the IAF has been the recipient of a very large number of locally
licence-produced aircraft such as the Vampire, Gnat, MiG-21, HJT-16 Kiran,
Alouette SA-316, Cheetah and Chetak helicopters and the HS-748 AVRO, it has
not been fully satisfied with HAL’s performance. The armed forces, especially the
IAF, have been ready and willing to support indigenisation of various arms and
aircraft, but rightly feel that these programmes must not be linked with the ‘current’
requirements of the IAF, until these have reached a level of certainty. Issues related
to quality assurance and long delays in production directly affect its operational
readiness – the AJT and LCA are two cases in point.
The Intermediate Jet Trainer, Sitara, developed as a replacement for the Kiran,
successfully completed its first flight in March 200320 but nearly 12 years later,
it is nowhere near ready for entry into service, although it is only a modest subsonic
low technology trainer aircraft. The LCA made its first flight on January 4, 2001,
but over 14 years later it has barely received Initial Operational Clearance (IOC).
Local products also do not always meet all the Air Staff Requirements (ASR).
Very often, the product is delayed so long that the very requirements of the IAF
change, because in the meantime technological advances have altered the very
nature of the threat. The LCA, for example, was designed as a replacement for
the Ajeet and MiG-21, a first/second generation fighter, but the LCA obviously
cannot be accepted if its performance is well below that laid down in the ASR.
According to knowledgeable sources, this is simply because in the changed and
enhanced threat environment, the LCA might become a liability instead of an
asset. Instead of its original planned weight of 5.5 tons, it now weighs 8.5 tons,
and is powered by the same low thrust GE F-404 engine.
Although the DRDO has successfully – if somewhat belatedly – produced a
variety of missiles including the Agni V, and tested an Anti-Ballistic Missile
Defence System, its prowess in the design and development of modern aircraft
is yet to be proved. A modern fighter involves millions of spares and moving
parts, milled to exacting standards and tolerances and these have to perform
millions of flawless cycles of operations with assured safety; not a simple ‘one off ’
218 Air Power and National Security

activity as in a missile. Aircraft and engine manufactures also require mastery

over high-end metallurgy and alloy manufacture and unless strenuous efforts are
made to develop such capacity, indigenisation cannot be successful. The Kaveri
engine, whose production by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE)
began at about the same time as the LCA, in the early 1980s, has proved a failure.
As a result, the first 40 LCA aircraft would be compelled to fly with the American
GE F-404 engines for the next ten years or so. The proposed purchase of GE-
414 engines is also likely to take time. Due to its lower performance, the
indigenously produced Kaveri engine, is being considered only for possible marine
applications, since its thrust is totally inadequate for the LCA.
Instead of trying to make everything, the defence industry must prioritise
the essential products that the armed forces need. This is perhaps possible if the
Defence Ministry consults with all major private sector players, along with
representatives of the DRDO, the three Services and the scientific community,
to decide exactly which technologies can easily and quickly be developed in-
house; the equipment and products that the military needs in a specific timeframe;
the likely financial outlay; an honest assessment of available expertise in skilled
manpower; the possibility of joint ventures with foreign companies under various
offset provisions; their export potential; and finally, a realistic assessment of success.
Based on the outcome of such detailed consultations, selected private players can
then be offered financial assurances, if not actual guarantees, that their products
will in fact be purchased in the quantities and numbers envisaged, provided these
meet quality requirements. It is equally important to examine the cost-benefit
ratios and the minimum numbers/quantities necessary for ensuring economies
of scale. The Indian politician also needs to be disabused of his inherent opposition
to arms exports. Some minimal cooperation with one or possibly two technology
partners would also be inescapable.21 It may be noted that, S. Krishnaswamy, a
former member of the Aeronautics Committee, had in 1969, concluded that,
“the primary aircraft requirements of the Indian Air Force should be met by
indigenous development and production.” He also believed that the habit of
importing complete aircraft was not a good policy, as with long-term planning,
with the availability of skilled manpower, and teamwork with a common goal,
technical assistance in selected fields and hard work, it should be possible for the
country to build a self-supporting aircraft industry. Circumstances have no doubt
radically changed in the last 45 years but the principle of self-reliance remains
valid.22
The MoD would then have to devise mechanisms and project management
teams that would continuously monitor and supervise the progress of these
programmes. To begin with, the Stinger class of MANPADS, Night Vision Goggles
(NVGs), UAVs/UCAVs (Drones), aerostats, light transportable radars,
multipurpose missiles for use from a variety of platforms, such as helicopters,
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 219

fighter aircraft and even tanks and vehicles, basic dual use trainer aircraft for the
civilian and military sectors, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and Precision
Guided Munitions (PGMs) with the associated avionics, could be attempted.
The MoD and the Services must also lay down a firm time schedule by which
all of these items would have to be indigenised. Without such a stringent time-
table, there is every chance that projects would slow down, or even derail, at the
first sign of trouble. It is also vital to groom and nurture leaders and project
managers for such a programme, or else they will be tempted to leave prematurely
if interest flags, or when the programme no longer presents opportunities,
challenges and the necessary sense of accomplishment.
It is also essential to form a high-level national aviation policy-making body,
presided over by a senior union minister, that can promote civil, commercial and
military aviation activity in complete synergy, since air power and national air
space, after all, are indivisible and must not be divided along parochial lines. In
fact, there is an urgent need for joint planning of all aviation activity to avoid
costly duplication of effort. It is often said that India need not reinvent the wheel,
but such banal statements must not result in a product with such high foreign
content, that the very purpose of indigenisation is defeated. Finally, the designated
competent authority must know when to terminate a project, so that more
resources are not committed to a programme that has all but failed.
The FDI limit was increased from 26 per cent to 49 per cent only in 2014.
This could be further raised to 60 or even 100 per cent in selected sectors such
as aero-engine development and manufacture, as it might prove the long needed
catalyst to jump-start this overdue activity. It should be possible to firmly lay
down timelines by which selected/designated foreign equipment must be
substituted with local products. Unless we steadfastly lay down a timeframe, there
is every possibility that 15-20 years from now, the Indian military would once
again find itself exactly where it is today: helplessly and totally dependent on
foreign sources.

Defence Research and Development Organisation

No discussion on India’s defence industry can be complete without assessing the
capabilities and role of the DRDO, spread across the length of India. The DRDO,
as it is known today, came into being in 1958 with the merger of the Technical
Development Establishment (TDE) of the Indian Army, and the Directorate of
Technical Development and Production (DTD&P) with the Defence Science
Organisation. It had only about 10 laboratories and scientific establishments at
the time, but has now grown into a country-wide network of 52 laboratories
engaged in Research and Development (R&D) in the fields of armaments,
aeronautics, avionics, electronics, missile technology and a host of associated
220 Air Power and National Security

technologies. It employs some 5,000 scientists and 25,000 other staff and is
headed by the Secretary, Department of DRDO who is also the SA to the Defence
Minister. “But according to a MoD audit, only 29 per cent of DRDO developed
products have entered the defence services in the last 17 years.”23
The DRDO’s primary responsibility is to develop defence products, for
production by other agencies in the country. The Aeronautical Development
Establishment (ADE) was instrumental in developing the LCA with the help of
HAL, and many other private and public sector companies, laboratories and
academic institutions. Some 500 engineers from the HAL design bureau were
deputed to the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) which was formed in
1985, for the Project Definition Phase of the LCA, to provide project management
for the LCA programme. The immense complexity of the programme, intended
to develop a state-of-the-art multi-role fighter, was well known to all participants.
Knowing the difficulties involved, the IAF had wanted only a low-cost replacement
for its Ajeet (which was also a locally developed version of the Folland Gnat but
had not met the expectations of the IAF) and the MiG-21 by the mid-1990s.
The decision to incorporate high technologies such as the Fly-by-Wire (FBW)
Flight Control System, Multi-Mode Radar, composite materials for aircraft
structures and microprocessor-controlled general systems, resulted in inordinate
delays. According to Air Marshal P. Rajkumar (Retd.), the leader of the LCA
Flight Test Programme for a decade, “The seeds for protracted programme delays
and cost overruns were sown by these decisions.”24
From the very beginning, the DRDO Directors, as SAs were closely associated
with the country’s Science and Technology (S&T) R&D programmes and enjoyed
unique proximity and access to the highest levels of decision-making. Dr. Kothari’s
association with Nehru and later Dr. Raja Ramanna’s with Mrs. Indira Gandhi,
followed by Dr. V.S. Arunachalam’s with Rajiv Gandhi and Dr. A.P.J. Abdul
Kalam’s with A.B. Vajpayee, and their close association with India’s nuclear and
missile delivery programme, are well known. Such close proximity gave them
immense influence at the highest political levels. Whenever the government
decided to indigenise a defence system, the DRDO was invariably given the right
of first refusal, which meant that if DRDO agreed to develop and produce a
particular piece of equipment, it would do so at its own pace, without any
interference from the government, or competition from the private industry.
It is noteworthy that India took nearly a decade, after the first nuclear test
in 1974, to start the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme
(IGMDP) in 1983, and fired the first Prithvi missile only in 1988, and the Agni
in 1989. Compared to Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, which have all produced
a variety of capable missiles (albeit with Chinese assistance) in a relatively short
period of time, the achievements of the DRDO seem less remarkable. Another
upshot of this association has also been the unduly excessive emphasis that the
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 221

scientific community, and on their advice, the political leadership, places on the
deterrent value of India’s nuclear and missile capability, at the cost of conventional
weapons. This misplaced dependence on nuclear weapons has apparently induced
a kind of a lethargy and complacency in the minds of the defence and security
elite, about India’s conventional capabilities.25
This is perhaps one of the reasons for the painfully slow progress on both the
procurement/acquisition and indigenisation front. The SA has so far been a
scientist and not an engineer, and it is natural for him to take more interest in the
development of India’s missile technology. Recent successes such as the firing of
a Brahmos from a submerged platform, Agni-V, plans to test a Multiple
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) missile, Ballistic Missile
Defence and the like, easily hide the very poor and dismal progress in other fields
such as aircraft, tanks and other usable technologies. The DRDO is presently
developing no less than eight types of low to high-end UAVs/UCAVs, Air-to-
Air-Missiles (AAMs), Beyond Visual Range Missiles (BVRMs) and the Akash
SAM, but none of these barring the Akash, have actually reached the military
and/or become fully operational. The Rustam UAV is said to be in the initial
stage of induction. It is not clear why the DRDO needs Israeli help to produce
the Short Range (SR)/Medium Range (MR) Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM), when
it has already operationalised the Akash SAM. Electronic Counter Measures
(ECM) and Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) suites such as the
RWR, Tranquil, Tarang and Tempest have also been around for nearly two decades,
but have been used only on the MiG-21 and 27 aircraft.
The DARIN III modified Jaguar completed its first flight in 2014, but if
this modification involves structural changes to the nose of the aircraft, the IAF
cannot expect such work to be done quickly. In other words, with the re-engine
upgrade looming, the Jaguar fleet will be out of action for a considerable length
of time. However laudable the DARIN III upgrade may be, it is certainly too late
in the life cycle of the Jaguar, which entered the IAF in 1979.
One possible solution to accelerate the indigenisation of aircraft, armament
and equipment for the IAF – the leader in technology among the three Services
– could be to create a separate aircraft division, distinct from the missile division,
under a separate Director General (DG) or General Manager (GM), to spur the
manufacture of locally produced aircraft, armament and equipment that is urgently
needed by the IAF. Such a GM or DG must be placed directly under a minister
of aircraft production, a modern-day Lord Beaverbrook. On January 14, 2015,
the Defence Minister terminated the three-year extension to the incumbent
Director General, DRDO in order to appoint a relatively younger person,
ostensibly to ensure focused and dynamic thinking. This move might also
ultimately result in the separation of his/her responsibilities.26
222 Air Power and National Security

Following widespread criticism in the print and electronic media, the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) II Government had appointed a DRDO Review
Committee to ‘suggest measures to improve the functioning of the DRDO’ which
submitted its report on March 5, 2008. The report has been under the scrutiny
of the government for over five years, without being implemented. The then
Defence Minister A.K. Antony in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha on April 23,
2008 said, “There had been delays due to genuine difficulties but despite many
constraints DRDO had equipped the services with state-of-the-art technologies
in many fields.”27 Such statements clearly show how the government routinely
shields the DRDO. Given such a cosy arrangement, the DRDO is unlikely to
deliver on its promises.

Military Reforms and Civil-Military Relations

The fragile state of civil-military relations (CMR) is perhaps the most enervating
infirmity that afflicts India’s national security and the armed forces. Despite
numerous articles, comments, debates and discussions in think-tanks and TV,
there is little progress.28 For reasons which are by now well known, CMR in
India have been strained for most of the 68 years since independence. Suggestions
and recommendations offered on this vexed and intractable subject and the pleas
of the military officers, mostly veterans, seem to have fallen on deaf ears. The
recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by the
respected K. Subrahmanyam were also not implemented in entirety, and the issues
of appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the merger of the three
Service Headquarters with the MoD, have been kept in abeyance. There were
reports that although the government of the day had circulated the KRC
recommendations to all political parties, it had found that there was no consensus
with regard to the appointment of the CDS. The more recently concluded Naresh
Chandra-led Task Force on Military Reforms has also made many
recommendations. Although the report is still not available in the public domain,
one of its members has already declared that its outcome was disappointing. Other
than recommending a Permanent Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee,
the task force achieved little. According to this member a radical change such as
the appointment of a CDS, the creation of theatre commands, and the merger
of the three Service Headquarters with the MoD as part of the Government of
India, rather than remaining only as ‘attached offices’ would pose major problems,
since at present we lack the necessary experience and trained and educated
manpower for the job. The Service Chiefs themselves are also not particularly
enthusiastic about all the recommendations.29
One of the main complaints of the military appears to be the lack of direct
access to the highest levels of political leadership. There are, however, many
instances of Generals Cariappa, Thimayya, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee and
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 223

others meeting Nehru at a more informal level. Generals Manekshaw and K.V.
Krishna Rao also did not seem to have much difficulty in meeting with, and
putting across their views to Indira Gandhi when such a need arose.30 General K.
Sundarji also apparently enjoyed a friendly relationship with Arun Singh and
Rajiv Gandhi at least up to the time of Exercise Brasstacks and Chequerboard.31
During the Narasimha Rao Government, the Service Chiefs appeared somewhat
unhappy with the way the government was dealing with the Pakistan-aided
insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, and for inadequate defence funding, which
was needed to make up the shortfalls in ammunition and equipment, perhaps
because they did not really know the dire straits in which the Indian economy
was at that time.32
The year 1986-87 may have been a turning point of sorts in CMR in India,
when Exercise Brasstacks, followed closely by Indian military intervention in Sri
Lanka, apparently vitiated the equation between the military brass and the political
leadership. Although the demand for a CDS, theatre commands and better access
to the political leadership – particularly the Prime Minister – was also heard
during the Vajpayee regime, it was not as shrill as in the recent past. The armed
forces appear to be more concerned and hurt by this distant, if not strained
relationship than the civilians.
There is a widely held belief that the bureaucrat rules the roost, while the
politician is generally disinterested, or simply does not care until the chips are
down. The political leaders are more comfortable with, and depend on, the civil
servant on a daily basis and hence, prefer to take his advice on almost all matters.
India’s political leadership tends to avoid direct interaction with the armed forces,
including the Service Chiefs, except on formal and ceremonial occasions. Jaswant
Singh, K.C. Pant and Arun Singh, who held the defence portfolio at different
times, may have been the only exceptions. Jaswant Singh, a former army officer,
may have had a special bond with the Services. He has also written three highly
readable books, in which he has cogently discussed the various problems related
to India’s security, but his contribution has been more intellectual than political.
According to some unconfirmed reports this interaction has improved since the
installation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) Government in May 2014.
It is also believed that IAS officers do not like to work in the MoD; some
even call it a punishment posting. They prefer other Ministries such as Finance,
Commerce and the like. They take little interest in equipping themselves with
specialist knowledge about national security, strategy or the defence services, and
treat the services exactly as any other department of the government. It is widely
accepted that generalists are ill-equipped to deal with issues of defence and national
security.
To be fair, the Heads of Departments like All India Radio, Doordarshan,
224 Air Power and National Security

Coal India, Air India, Director-General Civil Aviation (DGCA), Central Reserve
Police Force, Border Security Force and other corporations, are also rarely allowed
direct access to the Minister. Every request, suggestion or decision, invariably
goes through the Secretary of the Department, and only then to the Minister, if
need be. So why should the armed forces expect different treatment? The answer
is simple. First, the three Service Chiefs enjoy the status and salaries equivalent
to the Cabinet Secretary, but are placed above him in the Warrant of Precedence
and hence, cannot be expected to report to the Defence Secretary, who is junior
to them. Depending on the personality of the individuals concerned, the Service
Chief, Defence Secretary and the Defence Minister usually work out a modus
vivendi. It is not difficult for the civilian bureaucrat to get round a ‘difficult’
Service Chief by leveraging his position and proximity to the political leadership,
and by virtue of him being the number one in the MoD.
In the January 8, 2013 incident of serious border violation, for example, the
Defence Secretary and the National Security Adviser (NSA), and not the
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC) reportedly briefed the Prime
Minister. This was duly noted by the Services. In another incident of ceasefire
violations, the GoI once again summoned the Army Chief and the Defence
Secretary and not the Chairman, CoSC Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne, clearly
indicating the way the government undermines service institutions.
India’s vast geographical expanse with long mountainous borders and equally
long coastlines appear to confer on the country, a unique sense of security. Every
Indian knows that it is not easy for any power to conquer India, nor is it easy to
subdue the spirit of its people. Salami slicing or limited incursions across the
borders might take place, but given the massive presence of the army along the
frontier, the chances of such enemy action going unnoticed for long are rather
remote, and hence no political leader loses his or her sleep over India’s defence
preparedness.
India’s defence policy rests on a long-held and unshakeable belief that since
India does not covet territory, nor wishes to export ideology, and will not be the
first to initiate a war, there is little chance of a major conflict. Its armed forces
have been charged with the task of defending every inch of its territory, an
impossible and impractical demand; it is the military that will once again have
to shoulder the blame should things go wrong. This raises many serious problems
and severely restricts the options available to the armed forces. As seen during the
1999 Kargil War, the then government laid down that IAF aircraft will not cross
the Line of Control (LoC). This restriction not only took away the initiative
from the armed forces, but also cost India more lives, since the army had to
resort to suicidal frontal assaults on entrenched enemy positions in the high
mountains, where the enemy was nearly invulnerable to air or even artillery strikes.
In hindsight, it is possible that the situation could have been handled differently,
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 225

if the government had held detailed consultations about Standard Operating

Procedures (SOPs) and Rules of Engagement, well in advance of the actual conflict.
According to MoD annual reports, while the armed forces are primarily
responsible for ensuring the territorial integrity of the nation, under the relevant
rules of procedure, it is the Defence Ministry that is charged with the responsibility
of the ‘Defence of India and every part thereof ’. By virtue of being the seniormost
civil servant in the MoD, in reality it is the Defence Secretary who exercises this
function. The Defence Secretary neither commands any forces, nor is he even
familiar with defence and security matters, except the cursory knowledge he gains
by virtue of his short and often truncated tenure with the MoD. But he is virtually
the master of all that goes on in the MoD.
The defence portfolio is typically held by a senior cabinet minister, who is
usually too busy with parliamentary, party or constituency responsibilities, and
in addition his/her own political survival. Worse, he need not necessarily be well
informed or even interested in equipping himself with the knowledge and
information necessary to exercise effective control, and to provide meaningful
guidance and direction to the military. He is unavailable to the three Service
Chiefs for regular and timely consultation; he does not hear the advice or
apprehensions of the Service Chiefs first hand, and hence, is dependent on the
civil servant for all advice. The Prime Minister likewise is too busy, and meets the
military commanders only during the Annual Commanders’ Conference, and
on Independence Day and Republic Day, in a very formal and ceremonial
atmosphere, where no serious discussion can obviously take place. In effect,
therefore, the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister only receive the Defence
Secretary’s version of the military’s views. Many former Chiefs have openly
complained that a ‘one-on-one meeting’ with the Prime Minister is nearly
impossible.33 (Manohar Parrikar an Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) graduate
is the first technologically qualified Indian Defence Minister in 68 years.) The
military and the civilians also have differing perception of military threats, with
the latter showing a strong tendency to underestimate or underplay it.
Sometime in 1991-92, the MoD unilaterally announced a downward revision
of the Warrant of Precedence, which resulted in the three-star officers holding
the post of a Principal Staff Officer (PSO) at the Service Headquarters, or the
Commander-in-Chief being equated with full Secretaries to the GoI, but when
in Delhi, the Secretary would take precedence. Although the author was then
posted to the MoD Military Wing, the reason behind such a revision could never
be ascertained. As a result, at the Annual Commanders’ Conference, the first two
rows are occupied mostly by civilians of all denominations. Such treatment irks
the senior Service officer and he naturally sees it as blatant demonstration of
civilian arrogance.
226 Air Power and National Security

Another situation in which the Service member, mostly a soldier, relates with
civilian government functionaries, is at the district and lower levels. The soldier,
who is invariably away at far-off locations, comes home on leave or after retirement
to find a plethora of problems: land grab, school admissions, intimidation by
local thugs or politically connected anti-social elements. He then goes to the
District Collector or Divisional Commissioner for help, where he is usually
directed to the Secretary or even President of the Zilla Sainik Board, who pacifies
him and sends him away with platitudes. The author has not known of a single
civilian government functionary ever giving a patient hearing to a soldier’s woes.
Little wonder then, that the retired soldier is forced to fend for himself, by means
fair and foul. The apathy and indifference of the local governments is so
monumental, that it is hard to fully visualise the problems of a serving or retired
Jawan. Such apathy is widespread in society, although the soldier commands
genuine respect when the country is faced with a crisis.
The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is another bone of contention
between the civil and the military. It is often forgotten that when the army is
called in aid of the civil administration, its personnel need special legal protection
to conduct searches, arrest suspects, and take action to capture or stop anti-national
elements from killing innocents. The police by the nature of their duties, and
constitutional and legal provisions, already enjoy such legal protection, and hence,
the provisions of the AFSPA can be diluted only at the cost of undermining the
morale of the armed forces, especially the army. The army is, after all, employed
at the express sanction of the Central Government, and to aid civil power under
constitutional provisions and other provisions of the law, and hence, it is for the
government to protect the interests of the soldier in such special circumstances.
Of late, there is growing demand from civil society that all cases of rape, sexual
assault and other crimes against women must be dealt with expeditiously, and
the offending soldier handed over to civilian authority, without waiting for
sanction from the central government. Although at first glance this appears a fair
and justified demand, the armed forces would obviously like to protect their
members from undue harassment caused by false cases and baseless allegations,
by the kith and kin of militants and insurgents, especially in deeply alienated
sections of our society. There is no gainsaying that it is also equally important for
the military to expeditiously punish the guilty.
The main points of friction between the military and the government may
be summarised as:
• The absence of an institutionalised mechanism for the Service Chiefs to
candidly express their views to the highest civilian leadership.
• Need for clear and regularly updated operational directives and realistic
threat assessments, and regular briefings and consultations, whenever new
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 227

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) or diplomatic initiatives are

planned.
• Expeditious clearance of modernisation and procurement projects, without
undue delays in decision-making.
• If foreign policy is indeed intimately linked to defence and domestic policy,
then a regular personal briefing by the Foreign Secretary and NSA to the
three Chiefs is absolutely inescapable.
It is argued that the appointment of a CDS will automatically ensure greater
synergy, greater jointness and integration, and a single point of advice to the
civilian leadership. The CDS will be responsible for operations and look after
the functioning of the Andaman and Nicobar tri-Service command, Strategic
Forces Command (SFC), Cyber, Space and Special Forces Command when
formed. The three Chiefs would be left only with training, discipline, morale,
and recruitment and retention – largely administrative functions. The Chiefs are
unlikely to accept this greatly diminished role, as they are after all, the role models
for the soldier and officer. They are responsible for planning and executing a
successful war, whereby the authority to send men to war, and the responsibility
of winning it is not divided. The Chiefs may be burdened with far too many
peacetime functions such as procurement, modernisation, budgeting and strategic
plans, but they have a large enough staff to help them fulfil these tasks.
Lack of respect, and not being allowed to play a bigger role in the government’s
decision-making, are actually at the root of the problem of strained civil-military
relations, but merely appointing a CDS may not solve these problems. The United
States (US) or UK models have not eliminated all points of friction between the
civil and the military. While the US has a separate Secretary (Minister) for each
Service, the UK also has a Chief Scientific Adviser and a permanent Under-
Secretary – a civil servant – at the same level as the CDS. It is thus incorrect to
think that the CDS will automatically help diminish the role and importance of
the civil servant. What if the politicians do not want the advice of a single
uniformed person? What if they prefer more broad-based and multi-disciplinary
advice? Collegiate advice might be preferable to single point advice. In any case,
whether the Cabinet, Group of Ministers (GoM), Committee of Secretaries or
Crisis Management Group actually perform their duties on the principle of
collective responsibility and collegiate decision-making, is not known. These
questions need serious consideration before imposing another tier, in the already
slow defence decision-making process. The Naresh Chandra-led Task Force has
reportedly recommended the appointment of a permanent Chairman Chiefs of
Staff, which appears to be a compromise solution to the controversial CDS issue.34
There is widespread belief that the IAF does not favour a CDS and theatre
commands because:
228 Air Power and National Security

• It wants to retain its independence in decisions regarding effective

employment and efficient use of air power.
• The assets of the IAF are too small to be divided up into penny packets.
The IAF believes in the indivisibility of air power, and is always ready and
willing to provide support to the army and navy, but prefers that its quantum
and timing be decided through prior consultations and joint planning in
peacetime.
• It expects that a joint mission plan be prepared, and that each Service
understands and respects its special attributes, strengths and weaknesses.
• The IAF believes that three highly intelligent, experienced, mature and
knowledgeable Service Chiefs do not need a supervisor or ‘head-master’ to
ensure that they work together.
• The IAF, while believing that future wars need a joint approach, is of the
opinion that every situation may not need equal contribution of each
Service. Very often, air power will be the chosen instrument for immediate
retaliation, since use of air power may be sufficient.
In these circumstances, there is a need to devise a mechanism that would
address the above complaints of the Services, without radically changing and
fundamentally disrupting the present set-up. India could opt for a mix of the
systems currently prevailing in the US and UK.
This would require the appointment of a separate Minister of State (MoS)
for the army, navy and the air force, assisted and supported by a civil servant of
suitable seniority and other staff. Each Chief of Staff will be required to report
to the MoS, but continue to attend CoSC meetings as at present. Each MoS may
also be given additional responsibility such as aircraft production, procurement
committee, approval, planning and overall supervision of exercises with friendly
militaries and the like. This will give each Chief day-to-day access to the ‘political
authority’, albeit at a junior level. In addition, the Defence Minister’s Committee
may be revived so that the Defence Minister, three MoS, the Service Chiefs,
Defence Secretary, Secretary Defence Production, the SA to the Defence Minister,
the three Secretary-level officers attached to each MoS and the Financial Advisor
Defence Services (FADS) could meet every month, to review the progress since
the last such meeting. While there is an urgent need to remove the existing
disconnect between the military and civilian leadership, this must be achieved
with the least disruption to the present system.

Ownership of Air Power

Compared to the army, the IAF is rather small and gets only about half the
funding, but remains the most critical and agile instrument of national security.
The IAF has since its formation in 1932, employed air power as an independent
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 229

Service, and has been the principal operator of national air power. Stemming
from its long experience and participation, air power is its primary strength and
not a part-time activity like in the other two Services. The navy and the army
certainly have sizeable aviation assets, the former much more varied than the
latter, but that only meets each Service’s niche requirements, and works in concert
with the IAF when such a need arises. Just as seafaring is the primary activity of
the navy, and providing ground fighting prowess that of the army, flying is the
core activity of the air force. Given that the IAF is charged with the primary
responsibility of safeguarding the country’s air space, it is imperative that aviation
assets of both the army and navy come under control of the IAF when needed.
Air space management will always be the responsibility of the IAF. It must also
be made clear that the IAF has a role other than supporting surface operations.
The army has all along expressed a desire to have the air force under command
and not merely in support, and that appears to be the fundamental reason for the
army’s demand for the control of attack helicopters. The IAF has maintained and
manned the nearly two-squadron worth of attack helicopters, the Mi-25 and
Mi-35 for over three decades, but that arrangement has not been found to be
effective, as the army has not found it necessary to employ these potent combat
assets in India’s fight against cross-border terrorism and armed infiltration. The
recent debate on the ownership of attack helicopters needs to be seen in light of
these observations. It is for the reasons of economy and expertise that the IAF has
opposed the handing over of assets other than those used for artillery observation
and light communication duties. To be fair, the navy has a sizeable force of fixed
as well as rotary wing assets, but barring a few communication aircraft like the
AVRO HS-748 and Do-238, others are specialist aircraft and helicopters that
carry out specific maritime duties.
It is said that in the early 1960s, the IAF purchased the An-12 transport
aircraft from the army budget, since the aircraft was to be used mainly for air
maintenance of troops in the forward areas. In the 1980s, the Mi-25 and later
Mi-35 were also reportedly purchased from army funds, but were maintained
and operated by the IAF. These units were manned by IAF personnel and the
attack helicopters flown by IAF pilots. The arrangement was apparently to avoid
duplication and to effect economies, but was not acceptable to the army due to
the perceived reluctance of the IAF to use these helicopters for each and every
minor border management operation. This arrangement continued even after
November 1987, when Air Observation Post (Air OP) Squadrons equipped with
Cheetah and Chetak helicopters and a few fixed-wing aircraft were handed over
to the army.
The IAF also had serious reservations about the army’s understanding of the
need for airspace management to protect own assets from friendly fire and other
accidents, since the army did not like the idea of the IAF controlling airspace.
230 Air Power and National Security

IAF’s argument is that, as the primary operator of the nation’s air power assets,
and more importantly due to its role in providing air defence to the country, it
was logical for the IAF to control airspace. In September 1984 the author, then
a Wing Commander, was deputed to attend an army seminar on Air Space
Management at I Corps Headquarters at Mathura. Even after a long and detailed
presentation by the then AD Artillery Brigade Commander, the Generals,
especially those belonging to the Armoured Corps, refused to accept any
restrictions on the movement of their helicopters in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA),
because the helicopters were used primarily as flying staff cars. It is pertinent to
note that the then Corps Commander and his Chief of Staff, an Air OP pilot,
later rose to the position of Chief of the Army Staff.
When told that in a congested battlefield, with a plethora of organic Air
Defence (AD) weapons such as the Soviet self-propelled (SP) AD missiles
(inducted in 1979-80), long-range artillery gun-fire, and transiting air force fighters
at ultra-low levels, it would be suicidal to venture into the air without proper
permission from and in coordination with the local AD Commander, the Generals
simply shrugged their shoulders, and said they were prepared to accept the risks
involved. The IAF obviously did not want to jeopardise the safety of friendly
aircraft. This discussion went on for many years without any conclusion, until a
temporary arrangement was worked out to keep all airspace users, informed of
each other’s presence in the TBA.
India has mercifully not fought a major conventional war since 1971, and it
can only be hoped that modern telecommunications and the so-called network-
enabled operations would resolve this issue of airspace control in the near future.
Even so, some restrictions on air movement will have to be accepted by all users.
In light of this, the army would once again expect total operational control of its
attack helicopters in peace and war. In the past there were also some demands
that the country acquire special close air support (CAS) fixed wing aircraft, like
the Soviet SU-25/39 or the American Fairchild A-10, for exclusive use in Offensive
Air Support (OAS) and under the army’s control. If acceded, the safety, control,
efficiency and economy of air operations would be severely jeopardised.
Significantly, the army has not asked for the control of the IAF’s fixed and rotary
wing transport assets that are routinely employed for air maintenance duties,
perhaps because air maintenance remains a non-glamorous but back-breaking
and thankless task, that the air force has cheerfully performed for over 60 years.
Although it is patently inefficient, unsafe and uneconomical to distribute
costly combat assets to different arms of the military for niche activity, one good
fallout of the ownership shifting to the army would perhaps be that the army
would not ask the IAF to provide CAS, OAS or even Casualty-Evacuation (Cas-
Evac). With this, the IAF would be left only with the task of providing tactical
and strategic airlift to the army in war and peace. This will amount to additional
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 231

expenditure and avoidable duplication, as logistics and maintenance activity would

then have to be managed by the army. The US military has four separate aviation
wings, viz. air force, army, navy and marine corps. These are often seen as a
wasteful arrangement, and the arrangement has recently come under pressure to
reduce these divisions to possibly two: the air force and the naval aviation.35
For the present, the MoD seems to have placated the army and has accepted
that the 28 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters would be under army control, but
has obviously not thought through the long-term implications of its decision.
The most undesirable outcome of yielding to the demands of the senior Service
would be a fundamental rupture in the fragile jointness that is now under slow
and difficult construction. A fragmented and duplicated approach to air power
employment would be damaging to military effectiveness and the overall economy.
In 1986-87, when in command of a fighter squadron in the Eastern sector,
the author found that the army was not ready to temporarily stop or even restrict
its helicopter movement in the narrow Himalayan valleys, during an army-air
force joint exercise that was ironically planned by the army. Repeated pleas to the
BGS and Chief Of Staff (COS) of the corps failed to convince the army of the
risks involved in air force fighters and army helicopters criss-crossing through
the narrow valleys. A solution was, nevertheless, found through a quiet
arrangement of time-sharing with the Air OP aviators of the army, without the
BGS ever coming to know of it. Such issues are likely to become even more
critical with the army and air force buying more and more UAVs and UCAVs
without prior consultations on sharing of airspace. This will add to the confusion
and the risk of ‘friendly fire’ accidents. It is time the army and the air force leaders
sorted out these differences for the larger good of the country’s security.

The Nuclear Dimension

Refuting H.J. Mackinder’s theory of geopolitics that control of the Asian and
European heartland meant world domination, Nehru says:
But civilisation is no longer confined to oceanic fringes and tends to
become universal in its scope and content. The growth of the Americas
also does not fit in with a European heartland dominating the world.
And air power has brought a new factor which has upset the balance
between sea-power and land-power.36
Nehru wrote this while in prison in 1944, but air power became even more
important after the atomic bombing of Japan in August 1945. Little wonder,
then, that in 1948 he said, “The future belongs to those who produce atomic
energy. That is going to be the chief national power of the future. Of course,
defence is intimately concerned with this. Even political consequences are
worthwhile,” thus clearly indicating that it was worthwhile having nuclear
232 Air Power and National Security

weapons, even if it meant facing the wrath of the world. Later, however, he changed
his mind. Writing after the 1962 border war with China, B.K. Nehru, the then
Indian ambassador to the US says, “Nehru was an idealist removed in many ways
from reality. He looked upon the Chinese aggression as a wicked, cruel and selfish
act and it would break him.” Nehru himself admitted in Parliament that he had
“lived in an artificial world of our own creation.” Yet, when the then Director of
the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) Homi J. Bhabha pressed Nehru for
clearance to go ahead with India’s nuclear weapon, he did not give his approval.
“Nehru almost threw me out of his room” says Bhabha. While Nehru was
vehemently against a test, he did tell Bhabha in that meeting to speed up efforts
to develop the capability for a peaceful nuclear explosion.”37 Nehru encouraged
nuclear research, held the DAE under his charge, and kept India’s options open;
perhaps for too long. He was in no hurry to develop a nuclear weapon. In 1962,
sensing the imminence of a Chinese nuclear test, the US offered India an option
to get nukes under the Senator McGhee Plan, but India refused. China carried
out its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964. India complained, but did not
accelerate its own nuclear programme. It was Indira Gandhi, who finally authorised
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974. As was to be expected, the US
imposed sanctions and India almost totally stopped work on nuclear weapons.
The reasons for the reluctance to quickly weaponise this nascent capability, might
have included political turmoil resulting in the imposition of Emergency, Indira
Gandhi losing elections, and the strong opposition of Morarji Desai, who became
the next Prime Minister in 1977, and only reluctantly allowed the continuation
of nuclear research.
The Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) began
only in 1983, a full nine years after the first ‘peaceful’ nuclear test. The liquid-
fuelled Prithvi was first tested in 1988 and the Agni on May 5, 1989, but Indira
Gandhi did not live to see the tests. Although successive Prime Ministers kept
the programme going and provided the necessary funding, there was little urgency.
Events and incidents such as the 1987 Exercise Brasstacks and the 1990 nuclear
scare caused by the thinly veiled nuclear threats from Pakistan, followed by Exercise
Chequer Board and the Sumdorong Chu incident on the Chinese border, should
have rekindled India’s quest, but nothing of the sort happened. It is alleged that
General K. Sundarji, the then Chief of Army Staff, thought that it was the last
chance to sort out Pakistan before it acquired nuclear weapons, but India lost it,
and in fact became even more concerned about Pakistan’s possible irrational
behaviour.
It is a moot point if Indian armour making 50-100-km-deep forays into
Pakistan, as per Sundarji’s plan, was a realistic option. No one seemed clear about
the political aim, if any of Sundarji’s offensive plans. The Indian Army had always
thought, and continues to think even today, that capturing chunks of Pakistan’s
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 233

territory would be a major bargaining counter, little realising that such a strategy
is not possible in today’s nuclearised and globalised world. It is also debatable if
Pakistan would have actually used a nuclear weapon in retaliation to the Indian
Army’s aggression, when in close proximity of its own ground forces. It is also
not clear if Pakistan really possessed an air or missile deliverable atomic weapon
in 1987. But it is safe to surmise that these events compelled India to take a
harder and more serious view of the nuclear option.
It is generally believed that by the early 1990s, India had a rudimentary device
ready for aircraft delivery. The IAF came into the loop because the Mirage-2000
was selected as the delivery aircraft but only the Chief of Air Staff knew. Pakistan
already had the F-16 for nuclear delivery. In December 1988, the Rajiv Gandhi
Government signed an agreement with Pakistan, prohibiting attacks on each other’s
nuclear sites. Strangely, there has been little discussion on this agreement and no
one really knows why this step was taken in such haste. Did India fear a Pakistani
air attack on its nuclear sites along the coastline in Maharashtra, targets well
within the range of PAF F-16 aircraft? In 1990 again, there were widespread
rumours of a nuclear face-off with Pakistan, when the US sent Robert Gates, the
then Deputy National Security Adviser to diffuse the situation, but no one in
India has ever acknowledged that a threat of war indeed existed. The IAF did
make some efforts to update its ‘arms and ammunition status’ but little else
happened. There was little commotion or activity in the IAF.
The Narasimha Rao Government also planned a test, but had to postpone
its decision when the US came to know of it. The 1998 Shakti tests came only
when India was being cornered into signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), and faced the daunting prospect of losing its long-cherished option.
The thermonuclear test was reportedly unsuccessful as per most scientists, but
again and for obvious reasons, there is no official confirmation. Following the
tests, India voluntarily gave up testing by declaring a self-imposed moratorium.
There were angry reactions from the P-5, except France; P-5 members imposed
economic and other sanctions. It was said that the Indian tests legitimised Pakistani
nuclear weapons – strange logic, especially since the US knew that Pakistan already
had nuclear capability. While India assured the world that its nuclear weapons
were not aimed at any country, the then Defence Minister George Fernandes
called China, India’s enemy No. 1, and the then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s
letter to the US President, allegedly naming China as the basic cause for the test,
was leaked to the press.
In August 1999, India announced the ‘draft’ nuclear doctrine in which it
clearly indicated its ambivalent attitude to nuclear weapons by adopting a ‘No
First Use’ or NFU doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence. During the 1999
Kargil hostilities, Pakistan once again held out a nuclear threat. Although it is
now widely believed that the Kargil intrusions were aimed at interdicting the
234 Air Power and National Security

Srinagar-Leh highway, to force the Indian Army to vacate the Siachen heights,
and to internationalise the Kashmir issue, a subsidiary unstated Pakistani aim
might have been to assess the Indian reaction to Pakistan’s highly advertised low
nuclear threshold. By restricting the IAF on own side of the LoC, India perhaps
unwittingly validated Pakistan’s nuclear strategy of defeating India’s conventional
superiority.
The Indian nuclear doctrine rightly believes that nuclear weapons are not for
war fighting, but only for deterrence against nuclear blackmail, and that a credible
nuclear deterrent does not require the accumulation of a large stockpile of nuclear
warheads and missiles. In 2003, India revised its ‘draft’ doctrine to include chemical
and biological attacks on ‘Indian troops anywhere’, as one of the reasons for
nuclear retaliation. There is no clarity on what forced the Indian decision-makers
to make these amendments, which in fact were seen by many as a dilution of its
NFU pledge.38 There has been no public debate and the 2003 Nuclear Doctrine
continues to be the guiding document for its nuclear strategy.
India formed the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in 2003, but its ambit
is restricted to management of India’s nuclear arsenal, with the civilian government
keeping a tight control (justifiably so) over the warheads and missiles, which are
kept separately and away from each other, as a measure of safety against
unauthorised and/or accidental use.
The DRDO has registered slow but steady progress, and built a variety of
missiles such as Prithvi I and II, Agni I to V with impressively larger ranges and
improved accuracy. The Agni V tested in June 2012, claims a 5,000-km range
and the DRDO is also stated to be working on MIRVs.
India has leased a nuclear submarine from Russia to train the navy for
operations of a nuclear submarine. On January 27, 2013, India’s DRDO
announced the successful launch of a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
(SLBM), the B-15.39 This was supposedly the 14th successive such launch in
which “everything went as per plan” and India inched closer to operationalising
the third leg of its nuclear triad. The B-15 or K-4 SLBM tested in January 2013,
was rumoured to have received Russian assistance. On March 20, 2013, India
also successfully test-fired the Brahmos cruise missile from a submerged platform
in the Bay of Bengal, while the indigenous Arihant nuclear-powered submarine
continues to be tested.
Of the three Services, the army is the most vulnerable to nuclear strikes,
especially if during a future conventional conflict it advances into Pakistani
territory. The army regularly exercises its troops for fighting in a nuclear, biological
and chemical (NBC) environment. The IAF faces a medium threat, but a Chemical
and Biological Warfare (CBW) attack can easily and quite comprehensively disrupt
air operations. The Indian Navy is relatively safe and will soon fulfil the
responsibility of activating the third leg of the nuclear triad.
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 235

There is little clarity on what India’s political aims are, but India appears to
rely on its rudimentary nuclear capability to deter the threat of nuclear blackmail.
While India routinely declares its concern about Pakistani nuclear weapons, the
Chinese nuclear threat appears to be of less concern, although China possesses a
far bigger and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal, including tactical nuclear
weapons. According to Bharat Karnad, a self-confessed nuclear hawk, India should
quickly build a sizeable arsenal of megaton fusion bombs and Inter Continental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering these to all corners of the earth,
but there is no clarity on what that minimum number should be.40
It is thus difficult to predict the size of India’s arsenal in 2030. Indian weapons
are apparently safe, and there is little chance of their unauthorised, accidental
use. Widely prevalent nuclear theories and jargon are not applicable, even if some
theorists continue to use them to describe Kashmir as the nuclear flashpoint in
South Asia. Indian and foreign scholars can keep writing on the size of India’s
nuclear deterrent and try to provoke a response, but the government does not
oblige. Paradoxically, the Indian nuclear elite somehow seem to readily accept
the argument that Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is indeed low, and shape their own
‘use of force’ options to this reality. India’s non-retaliation to 26/11, and oft-
repeated attempts at reconciliation with Pakistan, even when the latter refuses to
initiate action against the perpetrators of the ghastly Mumbai attack, are a clear
indication of this apprehension.
It is now a well-established fact that India will always be a reluctant nuclear
power. The political leadership was always divided over the issue of nuclear testing
and generally favoured an ambiguous stance even after the first test in 1974, but
now that India has possessed a rudimentary deterrent since 1998, the government
seems to be excessively sanguine about its rudimentary nuclear capability actually
deterring its enemies. While it is difficult to prove this, in all probability, India
is satisfied with the slow and steady pace at which its nuclear deterrent is being
developed. This excessive dependence on nuclear weapons is perhaps the reason
why the government is not unduly concerned with routine delays in the timely
development of conventional weapons and platforms. India is slowly reaching a
‘triad’, but at least for the present and foreseeable future, it is based on borrowed
technology, since the Arihant is yet to become fully operational.
While advocating total disarmament and the total abolition of nuclear
weapons, India is unlikely to give up or roll back its programme or sign the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the CTBT or the Fissile Material Cut-
off Treaty (FMCT). The nuclear liability bill is likely to remain a major
impediment for trade in civil nuclear technology and purchase of nuclear power
reactors from other countries, especially the US. India is also unlikely to accept
international inspections and may even accept delays in nuclear power production.
India’s credible minimum deterrent is meant to deter nuclear weapons, but
236 Air Power and National Security

implicitly also a conventional war. There is much pragmatism in this policy. With
the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) always enhancing Pakistan’s
power to balance India, it is impossible to push Pakistan into spending large
amounts on its defence. Its benefactors will always bail it out and maintain a
strategic balance in South Asia, so that India is never assured of an outright military
victory over Pakistan. This, it seems, is at the root of India’s self-imposed ‘strategic
restraint’ strategy. But this hypothesis is difficult to prove in the absence of any
open source material. There is as yet no consensus on how India should deal with
Pakistan or China, or what it should do with its nuclear weapons, but a slow and
steady increase in missile ranges and payloads seems to be under way, the Agni-
V being the latest such example.
Barring a handful of IAF personnel trained for the purpose, no one really
knows how and when India will be required to consider an aircraft-launched
nuclear response, and why. While the advantages and vulnerabilities of aircraft
over missiles are only too well known, there has been no public discussion on the
size of the nuclear arsenal and delivery platforms. It is also rumoured that some
of the 42 additional Su-30MKIs ordered in December 2012 are actually for nuclear
weapons delivery. Some commentators have even referred to these as Super Sukhoi.
In March 2010, the cost of this deal was reported to be US$ 2.73 billion, but in
August 2010, it had gone up to US$ 4.3 billion, raising the unit cost of each
aircraft to $102 million, which is comparable to the American F-35 JSF, the fifth
generation stealth fighter.
All these issues must, however, be seen in light of India’s undeclared national
security posture, which has generally been characterised by a marked reluctance
to use force. India will always try its utmost to find a peaceful and negotiated
solution to every issue and problem, will avoid violence at almost any cost, and
only if it becomes unavoidable and inevitable will India consider resort to use of
force. If in the bargain, Indian armed forces have to fight a defensive war from
a position of disadvantage, then that would have to be accepted. This, in fact,
means that the national leadership may impose increasingly more restrictive rules
of engagement, even when these militate against correct and time-tested military
tactics. The armed forces continue to be totally clueless about India’s nuclear
policy and strategy, and play no role in the development of nuclear strategy, but
simply remain loyal custodians of the missiles under their charge.

Understanding Doctrine
In his Foreword to the 2012 edition of the Basic Doctrine of the IAF, Air Chief
Marshal N.A.K. Browne says:
Recording the collective memory of core beliefs in the form of a doctrine
enforces a discipline and clarity of thought that helps sustain this dynamic
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 237
process. Once recorded and periodically updated, the doctrine provides a
common baseline for education and the dissemination of collective
thought.
Doctrine it is said, is a set of fundamental principles and beliefs by which
military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is also defined as
the codification of beliefs or a body of teachings or instructions, even principles.
It is a guide to action and a frame of reference, rather than strict rules or dogma.
It is constantly refined and updated with time, and is authoritative, but does not
bind its practitioner. The Basic Doctrine of the IAF states, “A doctrine provides a
military commander with the framework to prepare and fight a war in a
coordinated and controlled manner.”41
The IAF is often seen as an open, democratic and forward-looking
organisation and acknowledged as the least rigid among the three Services. It
participated in the international Exercise Shiksha with the US and UK air forces
in 1963. The IAF was also the first to publish its doctrine in 1995. This edition
of the doctrine borrowed heavily from the American experience of the first Gulf
War of 1991. In fact, it was widely seen as the endorsement of the US Air Force’s
role in that war, and an indication of how the IAF intended to fight its future
wars.
As was expected, the publication provoked the army to publish its own
doctrine, and once again highlighted the issue of the role of the ‘air’ in support
of the army. Some unpleasant correspondence was exchanged between the two,
on the question of ‘time-critical targets’, with the army insisting that the IAF
must be available to it from day one, and not after a week of Counter Air
Operations, as the IAF doctrine had indicated. As usually happens, there was no
major war and no further discussion, but there was also no reaction or comment
from the government. After the establishment of Headquarters Integrated Defence
Staff, a number of doctrines on specific roles such as counter-insurgency, joint
forces actions, out-of-area contingencies, anti-piracy and amphibious operations
have been published, but remain classified, and hence are not available for
comment. The Tri-Service Joint Command at Andaman and Nicobar Islands
had also conducted a number of Tri-Shakti exercises in which all three Services
took part. The Integrated Defence Staff also published a tri-Service joint doctrine,
but it is not known if a joint army-air force mission doctrine exists.
The IAF again published an unclassified version of the Basic Doctrine of the
IAF in September 2012, in an attempt to obtain the views of a larger cross-section
of the public, academia, government departments, the two sister Services and
paramilitary organisations. Not surprisingly, there has been no public discussion
or debate, and one wonders if any senior government official in the MoD has
even read it. None of these doctrines have been endorsed by the MoD or the
238 Air Power and National Security

GoI, and hence remain, at best, a declaration of intent of the Services. In the
absence of a government-declared national security strategy, the Basic Doctrine of
the IAF relies on the relevant portions of the Indian Constitution, to lay down
basic objectives of freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity, reiterates India’s
desire for peaceful coexistence and emphasises that India does not have any extra-
territorial ambitions.
Regarding the employment of air power, it restricts itself to the classical and
traditional approach based mostly on wars fought by other countries and of course
World War II. While it mentions the role of the IAF during Kargil operations,
it does not make any specific reference to the future of war in high-altitude border
areas of the country. It also does not offer innovative ideas on how the IAF can
prosecute a Compellence, Punishment or Containment campaign, or operation
in a limited war scenario, especially when the main adversary frequently holds
out nuclear threats. To be fair, it mentions punitive action in passing but generally
adheres to the traditional roles. It is after all only the Basic Doctrine of the IAF,
and details of employment of air power in specific situations might be covered
in Part II, the Operational Doctrine, which naturally remains classified. As
suggested in a paper by the author published in 2003 titled “Air Power and
Escalation Control”,42 it is essential to employ combat air power, comprising
both manned and unmanned aircraft, in the way the Mongols, and later the
Marathas used their cavalry to harass their enemy. After the attack, their cavalry
disappeared before the enemy could even wake up to the raid.
Although the IAF published its doctrine in 1995, there was no effort to shape
the thinking in the Service, nor was there any major effort to train its so-called
‘Air Warriors’ for specific situations that might arise in a future war. In short, the
emphasis was once again on the employment of air power in a conventional war
scenario or a traditional approach.
A doctrine normally plays a vital role in the force structure planning of a
military organisation. As brought out earlier, the IAF structure was not influenced
by its doctrine. Instead, it appears to have been shaped by (a) the perception of
the threat, (b) affordability, and (c) a vague notion of a ‘balanced air force’. Total
dependence on arms imports, limited access to technology and more importantly,
paucity of resources, seems to have been the reason for ad hoc planning. For
example, the IAF obtained two Mirage-2000 squadrons in 1985, which remained
a generation ahead of all its other combat aircraft for over a decade, until the
entry of the Su-30MKI in the early years of the 21st century. There is no direct
linkage of this choice of the Mirage-2000 to India’s need for an assured nuclear
weapon delivery platform.
In terms of doctrinal development, the IAF has maintained a close watch on
air power trends in other countries. From 2004 onwards, making use of positive
changes in the international political climate, IAF began its participation in many
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 239

international exercises with the French, American, British and Singapore Air
Forces, and derived much useful experience. But it is not clear if the lessons
learnt through these exercises with the leading air forces of the world, were
disseminated to personnel who had not taken part in the exercises, and if the
relatively less advanced aircraft such as the MiG-21, 23, 27 and Jaguar were indeed
able to adapt to the level of these fourth-generation aircraft. The IAF, no doubt,
must make all efforts to expose as large and wide a cross-section of its personnel
to best practices followed by the air forces of advanced countries.

Conclusion
Air power continues to be a very potent instrument of national power, especially
suited to close control and finely calibrated application of force. It can also be
useful when employed for political signalling, to indicate national intention and
resolve, or to convey the limits of patience without even firing a shot, or actually
causing any damage. It, therefore, makes escalation control easy yet positive.
Being offensive by its very nature, air power calls for mature and careful
handling, with necessary tenacity and fortitude, and its application cannot be
given up at the first sign of attrition, or international public outcry for caution
and restraint. India’s policy of utmost restraint is well known and highly
appreciated across the globe. Its commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes
is probably beyond doubt. The world, however, shows a marked tendency to take
for granted India’s demonstrated reluctance to use of force. India on its part also
gives mixed signals through delayed reaction, and is sometimes blamed for over-
reaction, as during Kargil, and again in the aftermath of the December 13, 2001
terrorist attack on its Parliament. It is time India devised a more calibrated response
to these frequent provocations by its recalcitrant neighbours, instead of an
overwhelming reaction such as the total mobilisation of its armed forces.
The former NSA, Shivshankar Menon in his tribute to K. Subrahmanyam,
called the KRC the origin of modern Indian national security structure, and also
said it was ‘still work in progress’. He also alluded to the need for true ‘jointness’,
not simply between the three branches of the military, but one that includes the
various organs of the Indian State, its academia, intelligentsia, industry, in short,
all elements of national power. 43 He also clearly warned the military to
fundamentally change its thinking, to ensure its continued relevance to national
security.
Such advice is equally applicable to the numerous civilian agencies and
departments who show scant regard for, and utmost reluctance to engage the
armed forces in a regular, formal and well-structured dialogue or consultative
process, to throw up new and workable initiatives. The tendency to treat the
military as ‘security guards’ to be called only when the threat has already
materialised, must now be replaced with a more nuanced and thoroughly discussed
240 Air Power and National Security

and refined response mechanism. Whether or not it wants it, India is too important
a power to be seen as somehow muddling through and must develop the necessary
strategic poise and posture to address the multifarious security challenges that are
likely to become even more complex. India has always placed a high value on
strategic autonomy, but it must also show its readiness to exercise it when the
need arises. For, as President Pranab Mukherjee said, when he was the External
Affairs Minister, “The biggest challenge for our foreign policy, however, lies in
changing our mindsets.” These remarks were made at the Shangri La symposium
on January 16, 2007.44 The reader can judge if Indian policy has actually shown
any significant change in the handling of its security challenges since then.
For some time now, India has absorbed the so-called peaceful rise of China
with utmost forbearance and finesse. China, however, seems to show little concern
for India’s sensitivities and there is as yet no indication of how its new leadership
will view its relations with a slowly rising India. China’s all-round assistance to
Pakistan emboldens it to continue its policy of cross-border terrorism to destabilise
India. One wonders if India can go on bearing the economic, societal and political
costs of this one-sided relationship, in which India makes all the concessions,
while the other side makes no effort at accommodation. India’s deep and sincere
desire to normalise its relations with all its neighbours, especially Pakistan, is
indeed laudable, but it will bear fruit only when Pakistan is made to realise that
there will be costs to its wayward behaviour.
Merely increasing military assets and personnel strength has the inherent
danger of entering an unsustainable arms race with powerful and prosperous
neighbours and hence must be avoided, and yet, India must maintain a credible
nuclear and conventional deterrent. In November 2003, the Centre for Air Power
Studies, based in New Delhi, held an important seminar on Joint Warfare during
which many air power experts including former Air Chiefs, propounded their
views and offered some very important ideas that are valid and valuable even
today. Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh was of the view that there were some
serious problems with the way India handles its security. He also felt that
cooperation between the Services was inadequate. Air Chief Marshal O.P. Mehra
(Retd.) opined that each Service must learn to respect the other’s strengths and
special attributes, while at the same time being cognisant of inherent weaknesses.
He felt that we can never achieve true ‘jointmanship’, unless we develop mutual
trust in each other.
Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy, the then CAS, was the most forthright
of all, when he said that he was simply too busy running the air force and had
no time to find faults with others. He was of the firm opinion that his duty was
to ensure that each of the air force members knew exactly what his duty and
specific job was in the larger scheme of things, so that he as the Air Chief could
assure the government of the readiness of his service for action. He said it was
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 241

important to convince the government that the air force was capable of providing
desired and timely outcomes, with the greatest economy of effort. He felt that
without such an assurance, the government would hesitate to give the air force
or the armed forces the task at hand, and would instead be forced to look for
other less efficient alternatives, and that such an option would undermine our
national security. His was a hands-on approach that concentrated on the job at
hand. He indirectly said that the armed forces needed to introspect on their
individual strengths and weaknesses and find new ways to offer the best joint
options possible, and if that was not forthcoming, he would as the CAS, continue
to work to enhance the efficiency and output of the IAF.45 India’s national security
leadership must take note of these points and initiate urgent measures to close
the existing gaps in perception of the various players and stakeholders in the
military and civilian decision-makers, to provide comprehensive security to the
country.
The foregoing clearly shows that India’s military weakness lies not in numbers
or sophistication of its weapons, but in its inability to send out clear and timely
signals to pre-empt and prevent surprises. It is noteworthy that both the US and
UK put in place necessary instrumentalities following catastrophic terror strikes,
and have successfully prevented their repetition since September 9, 2001 and
July 5, 2005 respectively, without resorting to unduly harsh measures or excessively
draconian anti-terror laws.

NOTES
1. Air Marshal Y.V. Malse, interview with the author, July 12, 2000.
2. Interview with Air Marshal Randhir Singh (Retd.), January 5, 2012.
3. George Tanham and Marcy Agmon, The Indian Air Force: Trends and Prospects, RAND
Monograph, Santa Monica, CA, 1995, p. 94.
4. Interview with a serving officer who prefers to remain anonymous.
5. The suggestions are based on the author’s informal discussions with some serving and retired
officers.
6. See http://www.pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=96129 (Accessed March 12, 2015). Also
see, http://www.rediff.com/news/column/needed-urgently-the-indian-national-defence-
university/20150119.htm (Accessed March 12, 2015).
7. Ajai Shukla, Business Standard, March 22, 2013.
8. Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy?, SIPRI, Oxford
University Press, 1994, p. 166.
9. Interview with Air Chief Marshal H. Moolgaonkar, July 12, 2000. Also see no. 2.
10. Indian Warbirds at Bharat Rakshak.com
11. Interview with Air Marshal S.G. Inamdar (Retd.) on January 4, 2001.
12. Rajat Pandit, Times of India, May 7, 2012.
13. Interview with Air Chief Marshal H. Moolgaonkar, no. 9.
14. Interview with Air Marshal A.P. Garud, DG, FS&I, IAF, SP’s Aviation, (12), December 2012,
emphasis added.
15. See http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/28/india-budget-defence-idINKBN0LW0
BB20150228 (Accessed March 15, 2015).
242 Air Power and National Security
16. Amiya Kumar Ghosh, “Review of the Defence Budget”, Air Power Journal, 4 (3), July-
September 2009, pp. 143-64.
17. Ajai Shukla, “How much is the defence budget?”, Business Standard, March 11, 2008 as
quoted in Laxman Behera, “Defence Budget Trend in the Past Two Decades”, Paper presented
at National Seminar on Defence Budget, IDSA, New Delhi, November 20, 2008.
18. See http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=8386 (Accessed November 15, 2014).
19. See http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/cnbc-tv18-comments/tata-bets-bigdefence-jvsfms-
fdi-boost_1129397.html (Accessed March 26, 2015).
20. Ministry of Defence, Government of India at http://mod.nic.in/product&supp/welcome.html
(Accessed March 20, 2013). Not surprisingly, some of the data on this official website of
the MoD has been updated only to 2003-04.
21. On the lines of meetings held to discuss Air Staff Targets (AST) which are issued when a
new product like an aircraft is to be produced in India or purchased from a foreign vendor.
22. S. Krishnaswamy, “Policy for Aircraft Production”, IDSA Journal, 5, January-March 1969,
pp. 75-81.
23. “India as a Great Power – Know Yourself ”, Economist, March 30, 2013, Delhi Print Edition.
24. Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar (Retd.), The Tejas Story: The Light Combat Aircraft Project,
Manohar, New Delhi, 2008, p. 28.
25. This at first might appear as an unsubstantiated assertion, but the author’s interactions with
a large number of bureaucrats and scientists have been pretty convincing, with most of them
dismissing the fact that there is any major military threat which India cannot take care of
easily.
26. See http://www.telegraphindia.com/1150115/jsp/nation/story_8534.jsp#.VRZTXG2j IU
(Accessed March 26, 2015).
27. Press Information Bureau, Recommendations of the P. Rama Rao Committee on DRDO, at
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=37794 (Accessed November 14, 2013).
28. A few samples are: P.V.R. Rao, “Government Machinery for the Evolution of National Defence
Policy and the Higher Direction of War”, IDSA Journal, 1 (1), July 1, 1968, pp. 1-11;
K. Subrahmanyam, “Decision Making In Defence”, IDSA Journal, 2 (4), April-June 1970,
pp. 424-44; Air Cmde. R.V. Phadke (Retd.), “Tinkering with India’s Higher Defence Control
Organisation”, IDSA Journal, July, 2000, at idsa.in/archives; Gen. V.P. Malik (Retd.) and
Anit Mukherjee, “Do we need a chief of defence staff?”, Indian Express, July 11, 2011; Anit
Mukherjee, “The Future Is Now”, Times of India, June 17, 2011; Air Marshal R.S. Bedi
(Retd.), “Redefine civil-military relations”, Tribune, Chandigarh, October 22, 2012.
29. Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd.), “National Security Reforms: Ten Years After the Kargil
Committee Report”, USI Journal, October-December 2012, pp. 504-23.
30. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to be a Nuclear Power,
HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2000, p. 253.
31. Ibid, pp. 321-25.
32. During 1991-94, the author was posted to the Military Wing of the MoD and saw at first
hand the frustration of the Service Chiefs and the strong tendency on the part of the civilian
bureaucrat to maintain a cold and almost condescending attitude towards the Services.
33. Interview with Gen. V.P. Malik, Chandigarh, January 12, 2012.
34. Rajneesh Singh, “Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee: A Midway Solution”, IDSA
Comment, August 7, 2012 at http://www.idsa.in/node/9986/5744#comment-5744 (Accessed
November 23, 2013).
35. Col. Chet Richards (USAF, ret), “Shattering Illusions: A National Security Strategy for 2009-
2017”, in Winslow T. Wheeler (ed.) America’s Defense Meltdown, Stanford Security Studies,
2009, p. 30.
36. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, First published Signet Press, Calcutta 1946 (Reprint
2004, Penguin, New Delhi), p. 601.
 Perspectives on Some Important Issues Influencing Air Power Employment 243
37. Raj Chengappa, no. 30, pp. 71 and 86-89.
38. At the time of signing the Chemical Weapons Convention, in 1993, India had surprised the
world by promising to destroy its existing stocks of chemical weapons, another well-kept
secret. Many believed that these were actually left over from the World War II era. Whatever
the truth, a peace-loving country had kept these under safe custody for decades in total
secrecy.
39. Pallav Bagla, Outlook, February 11, 2013, pp. 10-11.
40. Bharat Karnad, “Nuclear Effects of Agni V”, Security Wise, Bharat Karnad Blog, at http://
bharatkarnad.com/2013/10/04/nuclear-effects-of-agni-v/, (Accessed October 10, 2013).
41. Basic Doctrine of the IAF, Unclassified version published on September 17, 2012, p. 25.
42. Air Cmde. R.V. Phadke (Retd.), “Air Power and Escalation Control” at www.stimson.org
(Accessed March 2003).
43. Shivshankar Menon at the General K.M. Cariappa Memorial Lecture, October 5, 2011.
44. Prakash Nanda (ed.), Rising India: Friends and Foes, Lancer, New Delhi, 2007, p. xvii.
45. Jasjit Singh (ed.), Air Power and Joint Operations, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi,
2003, pp. 269-72.
244 Air Power and National Security

9
Findings and Recommendations

The last 68 years of India’s security practice present a mixed picture of lost
opportunities as well as bold moves. India’s security decision-making has
fluctuated between a strong urge to operate from a high moral position and the
imperatives, and the immediacy of a looming crisis. In effect, India has responded
to its security threats and challenges based on the ‘merits of each case’ or the
prevailing circumstances and not according to any well-planned defence strategy.
India has shunned the option of adopting a publicly declared security strategy
and has reportedly followed a vague and woolly strategy of defensive defence to
‘deter’ Pakistan and ‘dissuade’ China. To be fair, some commentators have also
termed India’s overall approach to national security as one of ‘strategic restraint’.1
Although successive governments have been spending large sums of money
on defence, much of it in precious foreign exchange, India’s armed forces have
often complained about inordinate delays and the questionable quality of arms,
especially when received from indigenous sources.
According to Lorne J. Kavic:
The raison d‘etre of this defence programme was never made clear by the
government on the grounds that it was not considered to be in the national
interest to reveal information about such matters. The Indian public and
the press were, in any case, generally apathetic and Parliament consistently
passed by unanimous vote whatever defence estimates were placed before
it.2
This was written in 1967 but is generally valid even today. In fact, with the
parliamentary committee system in place since the late 1990s, there has been
little open discussion on the demands for defence, with bills getting passed without
 Findings and Recommendations 245

much debate. Not more than a handful of Members of Parliament have any idea
of what exactly the country’s defence needs are, and even fewer bother to find out
what the government plans to do, to meet various external and internal threats.
Discussion on the adequacy or otherwise of defence is thus restricted to and
monopolised by a very small elite comprising the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO),
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) bureaucracy
and lately the National Security Council (NSC). The so-called strategic
community comprising retired government officials, some academics and military
veterans continue to debate defence and security issues in the few think tanks
and journals, but without any policy inputs from the government of the day. In
fact, government officials rarely discuss defence issues with the think tanks and
worse, never give their opinion on current or even past policies, nor share lessons
with the general public. Never criticise past leaders and never admit past mistakes,
seems to be the general rule.
A brief review of India’s responses to the many security crises since its
independence shows a strong tendency to wish away problems and failure to take
defence and security programmes to their logical conclusion. The study has shown
that when used with determination, even in cases where a crisis developed without
much warning, air power, particularly the Indian Air Force (IAF), proved effective.
In 1947, it saved the Kashmir Valley from the Pakistani hordes and thwarted
strong and concerted Pakistani attempts to gain control of Ladakh and Poonch.
In October 1947, India sent troops to evict Pakistani raiders from Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K) and used its nascent air power when the IAF possessed very limited
air assets – a mere six and a half fighter squadrons of World War II vintage – but
failed to fully resolve the Kashmir issue, by prematurely approaching the United
Nations (UN). Indian leadership also permitted the British Governor General
and his three British Service Chief appointees to unduly influence strategic and
even tactical decision-making to Pakistan’s advantage. India also failed to appreciate
growing British interests in retaining a toehold in South Asia, based on the changed
circumstances in the immediate aftermath of World War I, the fast-increasing
salience of West Asia as the new supplier of oil, and the reach of air power. To be
sure, India also learnt its lesson and did not take any other issue to the United
Nations.
Based on this experience, India soon expanded its air force to some 15
squadrons, and in spite of serious economic constraints, purchased aircraft and
equipment from Britain and France to raise the IAF strength to 25 squadrons by
1962. India, however, failed to use this potent and valuable asset in the short
border war with China, and once again allowed outside advice, in this case the
United States (US) Ambassador (J.K. Galbraith), to influence its decisions. Not
using the IAF was a monumental blunder. At the time, the IAF had some two
squadrons or nearly 40 Hunter Mk.56 fighter ground attack aircraft stationed in
246 Air Power and National Security

the Punjab. These aircraft were almost brand new with No. 7 squadron already
practising ‘nine-aircraft formation aerobatics’ which shows that it had an adequate
number of experienced pilots. The Aksai Chin area of Ladakh where fierce battles
were fought with the Chinese, was well within the striking range of these Hunters
at medium and high levels. Almost all battles from October 20 to 28, 1962 and
again from November 18 to 21, were fought during daylight hours over barren
hills with unlimited visibility.3 Neither the attacking Chinese troops nor their
logistics facilities had the advantage of natural forest cover or camouflage as in
the Eastern theatre and could easily be engaged from the air, especially since the
IAF had already deployed a few Forward Air Controllers (FACs) with the army.
Galbraith’s advice was based on his knowledge of Chinese tactics in the Korean
war, which clearly did not apply in Aksai Chin. “At the highest level, Jawaharlal
Nehru chose to appeal to the US President for aerial support without first ordering
the Indian Air Force into battle.”4 The war left a lasting psychological scar on the
country’s psyche and seriously affected civil-military relations. It must, however,
be reiterated that it was not a humiliating defeat for the Indian Army since only
a fraction of its strength was actually deployed, and that too in a tactically unsound
manner, in section and platoon strength, without mutual fire support. In
retrospect, it is clear that employment of air power against the Chinese during
October 20-28, 1962, would in all probability have ended the local skirmishes
with radically different outcomes, and the enemy would not have repeated its
attacks in November of that year. The bitter truth is that India failed to employ
its sizeable air and ground forces in a systematic and well-thought-out fashion.
The reasons for this historic blunder are not far to seek. It was the unhealthy
civil-military relationship that was largely responsible for it. Had Menon and
Nehru given a patient hearing to the views of the Service Chiefs, instead of
depending entirely on their intuition, which was reinforced with the Intelligence
Bureau Chief B.N. Mullick’s advice, India’s history would be different.
In North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), a handful of IAF helicopters,
nevertheless saved a large number of hapless troops, by carrying out timely casualty
evacuation and supply drops in the face of the enemy. In the aftermath of the
Chinese aggression, India embarked on an ambitious defence expansion and
modernisation programme, but allowed it to drag on and lose momentum. In an
effort to deflect blame, India continued to harp on Chinese perfidy and not on
its own inability to read Chinese political and diplomatic signalling. Mainly due
to poor intelligence, both at the strategic and tactical level, India overestimated
China’s military, especially air power capabilities. Due mainly to a misplaced
faith in India’s importance in the international system (no doubt because of its
role in Korea, Indochina, Congo and Gaza), Nehru continued to believe that a
war with China would inevitably lead to a general world war. Although he later
said, “We were living in an artificial world of our own creation”, that did not
 Findings and Recommendations 247

fundamentally change India’s thinking, which it seems was based on the belief
that both the US and erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) needed
India more than it needed either, and that it could easily play one against the
other.
The February 2012 Nonalignment 2.0 report prepared by a group of influential
writers and tacitly endorsed by the former National Security Adviser (NSA) shows
that we have not really overcome our hubris. That “India’s strength lies in its
example,” a conclusion drawn in the report, is a clear indication of how we
continue to live in an artificial world of our own making. In a conference of
South Asian countries held on October 29-30, 2013 at the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, all of India’s neighbours unanimously
expressed the view that India was a bully.
The Indian Army has traditionally played a dominant role in India’s defence,
while expanding from a strength of a mere 220,000 in 1947, to 550,000 personnel
in 1962, and 1.13 million in 2013. With the proposed raising of an additional
mountain strike corps, the strength would rise by another 65,000. The IAF has
also expanded to nearly 127,000 personnel but has seldom reached the sanctioned
strength of 45 squadrons. The current sanctioned strength of the IAF is reportedly
39 and a half combat squadrons. After the 1962 debacle, the IAF was allowed to
increase its trained manpower through accelerated recruitment but it took almost
a decade for it to get adequate numbers of the much-publicised MiG-21 supersonic
fighter. This sudden and ill-planned expansion resulted in what was popularly
called the ‘bulge’, that skewed the career prospects of many capable officers and
led to premature and avoidable in-service wastage.
In 1965, India had to face another aggression from Pakistan. Seeing India’s
slow pace of military build-up in the post-1962 era, Pakistan quickly launched
an attack to gain control of Kashmir, but only after a probing attack to assess the
Indian reaction in Kutch in April, and infiltrating tribal raiders into the Kashmir
Valley in August 1965. This time again, India failed to read Pakistani intentions
and woke up only when the Pakistan Army launched a concerted infantry thrust,
supported with artillery and armour into Chhamb, with the aim of cutting off
India’s land access to Kashmir. Even though the new Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan
had been holding ‘daily meetings’5 with the Chiefs of Staff and senior civilians in
the MoD, India found itself ill-prepared, in fact, surprised by Pakistan’s audacious
action. This was not just an intelligence failure but also a failure of the army to
take the IAF into confidence about the fast-emerging threat of war from across
the western borders.
Mainly due to poor coordination between the army and the IAF and a general
lack of firm guidance from the civilian government, the short, if intense 22-day
war ended in a stalemate, with the Cabinet mostly busy trying to stave off a UN-
248 Air Power and National Security

sponsored (and supported by major powers) ceasefire. The aim of the exercise, it
seems, was to stop the invader in its tracks and bring the hostilities to a quick
conclusion but without any clear idea of the desirable outcomes. As a result, the
few chunks of enemy land won at heavy cost in men and material were returned,
and Pakistan’s military potential and its capacity to cause nuisance, was allowed
to remain more or less intact.
The IAF wasted precious time before launching its first air offensive against
the Sargodha airfield complex on September 7, and stopped it as abruptly as it
began due to high attrition. Sadly, the support the IAF provided to the army
remained unplanned, with more and more IAF fighters being sent out on ‘search
and destroy’ missions and ‘opportunity strikes’ rather than against well-planned
and briefed offensive air strikes. The result: More often than not, the Indian
soldier saw more enemy fighter aircraft over his head than his own. The mighty
Indian Army failed to gain a decisive victory over a relatively weak enemy. The
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) destroyed many fighter aircraft on ground in a single
raid at Pathankot. The IAF saw how a single F-86 Sabre PAF squadron based at
Dhaka, could wreak havoc on its poorly defended bases at Kalaikunda, Barrackpore
and Bagdogra.
In 1965, Indian air power again helped to stop the Pakistani Army from
taking Akhnoor, even though the IAF was called only at the eleventh hour. Later,
the IAF carried out some bold forays into Pakistan and could have done much
better, if only it had been used as an integral part of the overall strategy. Lack of
planning and consultation with the army and absence of a joint plan resulted in
sub-optimal employment of air power.
The IAF certainly learned many lessons from this war and quickly built new
forward airfields with concrete bomb shelters to avoid losing precious aircraft on
ground. There was, however, no attempt to develop a more effective joint strategy
to meet future challenges. India’s military strategy could be summarised in a single
sentence: Any attack on Kashmir will be considered an attack on India and India
will be free to retaliate across the International Border in Punjab. India’s preference
to use only its army or ground forces and at the same time to restrict the scope
of operations to avoid a ‘full-scale war’ is so deep rooted, that even today doctrines
such as ‘Cold Start’ continue to enjoy pride of place in its ‘conventional’ or ‘limited
war’ thinking.
The PAF was able to make full use of its marginal technological superiority,
realistic training and aggressive spirit to take a heavy toll of IAF aircraft on ground,
especially at Pathankot and Kalaikunda, due to poor air defence, absence of early
warning, lack of bomb shelters and inadequate preparation. In spite of many
examples of personal courage and ingenuity, the IAF was not successful in
capitalising on its numerical superiority.
 Findings and Recommendations 249

In the 1971 Bangladesh War, the IAF had learnt its lessons and quickly
achieved complete air superiority over the Eastern theatre, took a heavy toll of
the enemy and virtually crippled its mobility. The execution of a helicopter-lift
to move a large body of troops across a river, a well-planned and executed drop
of the para battalion and finally a four-aircraft fighter strike on the Government
House in Dhaka on December 14, ensured the surrender of Lieutenant General
A.A.K. Niazi’s forces in a mere 14 days. It was probably the best example of
army-air force joint operations.
In the west, the battle of Longewala, where a handful of Hunters stopped a
regiment of Pakistani tanks and prevented the enemy from threatening the
strategically important town of Jaisalmer, will forever remain a shining example
of air power effectiveness. IAF attacks on Karachi, Sui Gas Plant and the Power
House at Mangla Dam, and on the PAF airbase at Peshawar, caused considerable
damage to the Pakistan economy and helped maintain pressure on the enemy, by
forcing the PAF on the defensive, but the war ended well before these strikes had
any real effect on the outcome of the war. On the western front, the Indian
military’s performance was not commensurate with its potential. India could not
exploit its numerical superiority, even though its army had captured some 5,000
sq. km. of enemy territory probably due to international pressure to quickly stop
hostilities.
India gained little from the Simla (now Shimla) Agreement reached in July
1972, but Pakistan’s Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, managed to ecure the release
of 90,000 Prisoners of War (POWs) on a verbal promise of working on the
proposal to convert the Ceasefire Line (CFL) in J&K into a permanent
international border. Implicit in this was the understanding that the Kashmir
issue would be closed, maintaining the current status quo, but this was not to be.
Bhutto changed his tune after the return of the POWs and threatened India with
a thousand-year-long war and also began Pakistan’s clandestine programme to
acquire the atom bomb.
In 1971, the armed forces fared much better because Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi gave General (later Field Marshal) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw, the necessary
time of over six months, to prepare for the war which eventually came in December
of that year. The IAF played a stellar role in the east. By quickly establishing total
air superiority, it could devote all its air effort in support of the Indian Army’s
rapid advance to Dhaka. The December 14 air strike on the Government House
at Dhaka proved a masterstroke of timely intelligence, combined with
instantaneous yet accurate armament delivery, that culminated in Lieutenant
General A.A.K. Niazi surrendering with his 90,000 strong army intact. Air power
proved decisive in the east, but in the west the IAF and the army’s performance
could have been better. Here, the strategy of resorting to a mainly defensive posture
and making limited forays into enemy territory proved costly yet ineffective. The
250 Air Power and National Security

PAF generally remained on the defensive but took a heavy toll on IAF aircraft
engaged in sporadic daylight counter air operations over PAF airfields. The
Canberra proved far more effective in night attacks against the PAF airfields.
Single aircraft night strikes by IAF Sukhoi (S-22) and MiG-21 fighters were a
bold and innovative tactic and proved of some nuisance value but the IAF could
not ascertain the degree of damage these strikes caused to PAF airfields and
installations. The IAF lost a large number of Sukhoi (S-22) fighters in ground
attacks to small arms fire, mainly due to the aircraft carrying out repeat dive
attacks following a predictable pattern. Pakistani air defence (AD), including its
anti-aircraft artillery with Chinese Quad Air Defence guns, seemed better
organised and more lethal than its Indian counterpart. The IAF flew a number
of ‘offensive sweep’ missions to entice the PAF into aerial combat but the enemy
did not oblige. Instead, the IAF could have provided more intimate air defence
cover for the ground battle. According to Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob, the
Chief of Staff of the Indian Eastern Army Command, liberation of East Pakistan
was not India’s war objective from the start but became possible due to the
audacious offensive strategy of the army, ably supported by the air force. The
demoralised Pakistani Army was forced to retreat and to finally surrender to the
Indian army.
Following the 1965 war, the only discussions in the IAF remained focused
on improving its prowess in aerial combat. The addition of some six squadrons
of S-22 Sukhoi fighter ground-attack aircraft in 1967-68, had undoubtedly
increased the offensive potential of the IAF, but the programme for strengthening
the country’s AD by commissioning the string of six US-supplied high-powered
radars took its own time and was only completed years later.6 The IAF’s re-
equipment programme with the locally licence-produced MiG-21s also took a
long time and by the time the 1971 war came, the IAF had managed to raise just
eight squadrons with very limited ground attack capability.7 This war again
underscored the urgent need for a long-range fighter bomber capable of reaching
Pakistan’s depth areas, if meaningful deterrence was to be achieved. Accordingly,
after much debate and delay, India acquired the Jaguar Deep Penetration Strike
Aircraft (DPSA) only in 1979-80. There was, however, little change in India’s
overall military strategy with respect to its adversaries. In the much-publicised
Simla Agreement which Pakistan refused to honour, India had tacitly accepted
the status quo in J&K, implicitly ‘abandoning’ Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)
and Gilgit-Baltistan areas under Pakistan’s illegal occupation.
During the 1980s, the Indian leadership was preoccupied with the Punjab
militancy and other domestic issues. The Government of India (GoI), however,
embarked on a massive modernisation programme for the IAF. In 1987, Exercise
Brasstacks nearly brought India and Pakistan to war, which also added for the
first time, the nuclear dimension to the Indo-Pak confrontation. Pakistan had
 Findings and Recommendations 251

apparently succeeded in convincing India that it (Pakistan) already possessed an

atom bomb. This spurred the effort to mate India’s nuclear ‘device’ with a delivery
platform; first a Jaguar and later the Mirage-2000 and the Prithvi missile. The
exact date when India actually built a usable air-launched atomic bomb continues
to be in the realm of conjecture. According to journalist Raj Chengappa, however,
it was only with the successful test of the 2,000-km Agni II on April 11, 1999
that India for the first time possessed a fail-safe nuclear deterrent. The experience
of Exercise Brasstacks in 1986-87 and the 1990 nuclear scare, clearly demonstrated
India’s vulnerability in the face of a nuclear-armed Pakistan.
This once again shows the slow and grinding pace of India’s security decision-
making. The 1987 crisis also highlighted the tenuous relationship between the
civilian political masters and the military leadership and the yawning
communication gap between the two. No effort, however, was made to bridge
this chasm. In fact, the two became even more distant. Pakistan had during the
period, raised the bogey of India planning to bomb the Kahuta nuclear facility
with Israeli assistance, but there was little to substantiate such rumours. India
was not able to exert enough pressure on the US and other influential members
of the P-5 to prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear capability.
During the 1987-90 Sri Lanka operations, the IAF once again provided the
badly needed mobility and logistics support to the Indian Peace Keeping Force
(IPKF) but India’s overall politico-military strategy remained tentative and
confused. There was much avoidable bickering between the three Services. The
political leadership was not in sync with the armed forces, even though the Army
Chief and the Minister of State (MoS) for Defence enjoyed an unprecedented
level of mutual trust and understanding.
In 1988, the IAF again flew troops of the Indian Army’s parachute brigade
to Male, when the Maldivian Presidency was threatened by a coup. The action
of the Il-76 squadron and India’s para brigade at Agra was commendable, but
India was once again surprised by the sudden turn of events in its backyard.
The Pakistani intrusions in Kargil in 1999 once again came as a total surprise
to the army, and indeed the central government in Delhi. The unnecessary delay
in committing the combat elements of the IAF was again due to the absence of
a joint politico-military strategy and not because of any inherent reluctance on
the part of the IAF. Its belated entry, however, provided invaluable support to the
troops in the high Himalayas. Although asked to restrict its operations to own
side of the Line of Control, the IAF improvised its armament delivery techniques,
effectively engaged the enemy and hastened its withdrawal. The commitment of
the IAF also helped convey India’s determination to evict the enemy at any cost.
In this case too, India’s defence policy-making apparatus moved into action at a
grinding slow pace and remained reactive, with no attempt to shape the outcome
or to wrest the initiative. Although India finally managed to win diplomatic
252 Air Power and National Security

support of major powers, it also had to go along with the American President’s
effort to allow a face-saver to Nawaz Sharif by halting offensive air operations in
early July, and a safe passage to withdrawing Pakistani intruders.
The IAF was also used on numerous occasions to provide succour to the
civilian population in times of natural calamity and other contingencies, in aid
to civil power. Air power was successfully used to evacuate a very large number
of stranded Indians from Kuwait in 1990 and from Lebanon in 2006. Its role in
conjunction with the army, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and other
government agencies during the June 2013 cloudburst over Kedarnath in north
Uttarakhand was truly outstanding. Although less visible and hence, almost
unknown to the general public, the IAF has also been continuously air maintaining
civilians and army troops in the high Himalayan frontier areas for over 60 years.
Following the border incidents in 1986-87, India made concerted efforts to
mend ties with China that culminated in the historic visit of the then Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing from December 19 to 23, 1988. India
also granted full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh, sending a clear signal to China
that it was indeed an integral part of India. Sino-Indian relations went through
some incremental improvements with the visit of P.V. Narasimha Rao and the
signing of the accords in 1993 and 1996, for the maintenance of peace and
tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The Confidence Building
Measures (CBMs) indeed brought a sense of stability, but 20 years on, the LAC
remains un-demarcated, with the Chinese becoming progressively more active
and assertive. The October 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA)
is expected to prevent unnecessary confrontation, but is also likely to severely
constrain India’s attempts to build its infrastructure and defence works along the
LAC. Some Chinese troops again intruded into Indian areas in Ladakh during
the visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2014. This matter was
peacefully resolved but only after the departure of the Chinese leader from India.8
India has for the first time since 1962, permanently based some truly offensive
air power capability in the form of two Su-30MKI squadrons in the North-east,
as a deterrent to Chinese adventurism. The army plans to raise a mountain strike
corps to meet the Chinese threat. It is difficult to see how a force of some 65,000
personnel with its heavy artillery and armour will launch an offensive or defensive
operation in the high Himalayas, with non-existent infrastructure, and extremely
difficult logistics largely dependent on air supply, against an enemy enjoying the
advantage of height. India, it seems, has once again failed to understand the
importance of a joint air-army strategy based on lightly equipped forces, capable
of instantaneous response. This emphasis on the ‘army option’ could be due to
any or all of the following reasons:
• The strong if incorrect belief that air power is escalatory.
 Findings and Recommendations 253

• The difficulty of executing precision air strikes in bad weather and at high
altitude in the mountains.
• The dominant role of the army in almost routinely assisting the government
fighting the numerous separatist, insurgent and terrorist threats.
• Raising of a mountain strike corps seen as an avenue for generating
additional employment to a larger number of Indians from the backward
regions of the North-east.
• The choice of Panagarh in West Bengal as the Headquarters of the proposed
mountain strike corps, to create a countervailing force to the increasing
Maoist challenge in the region, at a time when the army is justifiably
reluctant to get involved in yet another counter-insurgency operation.
It is, however, still not too late to reconsider the decision to raise the mountain
strike corps, simply because it will be prohibitively expensive to maintain over
the long term, and will not be usable. Most countries, including China, are
reducing the size of their ground forces. Unlike Israel, the US, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) (and indeed recently even Pakistan), who use air
power with impunity, the Indian policy-maker continues to fight shy of relying
on this eminently suitable and effective military instrument, especially now that
the IAF has an array of sophisticated aircraft, Precision Guided Munitions
(PGMs), support platforms like the Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) and Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) with modern avionics and
communications.
In India’s neighbourhood, both the PAF and People’s Liberation Army Air
Force (PLAAF) are fast developing into two truly modern air arms in sync with
each other and hence, pose a formidable combined challenge. Pakistan is already
reaping the benefits of its close all-weather relationship with China and its role
as the prime non-NATO ally of the US. The PAF has already raised three squadrons
equipped with JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighters. The PLAAF is currently adding
a full regiment (70 aircraft) of J-10 type to its strength annually and is well on
its way to field two ‘fifth generation’ fighters, such as the J-20 (First Flight on
January 11, 2011) and J-31 in the near future. China’s defence industry is at the
threshold of building its own modern turbofan jet engine and is exporting a
sizeable number of modern machines to many third world countries at competitive
prices. The Chinese defence industry has derived immense benefits from its close
collaboration with Moscow and made full use of its exposure to Western arms
and equipment through a highly developed network of friends and business
partners. The recent addition of an indigenously built aircraft carrier clearly shows
the extent of self-sufficiency that China has achieved. Its forays into the military
use of space, the Anti-Satellite Test (ASAT) (January 2007) and missile defence
demonstration (January 2010) along with its prowess in the use of space for
254 Air Power and National Security

communication, navigation, surveillance and targeting have clearly demonstrated

the trajectory of China’s progress. Given its robust economic growth, its power
differential with India is growing at a spectacular pace and demands a suitable
yet calibrated and well-thought-out Indian response.
The foregoing clearly shows that air power continues to be the instrument
of first choice in any crisis situation in war and peace. In the last six decades, the
IAF has learnt many lessons and also enhanced its effectiveness in all its roles.
Exercising with many foreign air forces since the turn of the century has given it
added confidence to handle high technology. While it has won the respect of
these advanced air forces, it still has a long way to go before becoming a truly
modern air force as almost half its assets are nearing obsolescence. Its current
motto of ‘preserve, upgrade and acquire’ can well be modified to read preserve,
maintain, economise and innovate and finally, improve its flight safety record, as
it has little option but to live with dwindling numbers, for at least 10-15 years.
The IAF also needs to make renewed efforts to develop a far closer and deeper
understanding of the needs of the sister Services and engage with them to enhance
their understanding of the strengths and limitations of India’s air power, while
assuring them of total and unconditional support at all times. The ground and
maritime elements must also make a concerted effort to forge a truly joint solution
to the country’s security challenges, without falling prey to turf battles and budget
wars.
A glaring anomaly with defence funding has been the persistent attempt to
make an equitable or pro rata allocation between the three Services, with the
army usually receiving the lion’s share (about 50-60 per cent) mainly due to its
enormous size and the role it plays in internal security operations, and not in
conformity with the actual role that each Service would play in a future war. In
the absence of a joint strategy, each Service continuously tries to get a bigger
portion of the defence pie and promptly makes its private plans to fight a future
war.
Today, the IAF has a mix of fourth generation fighters and modified second
generation aircraft such as the Jaguar and even older MiG-21 but until the
induction of the Rafale Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) and
the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), the IAF cannot become a truly
modern air force. Given the current economic difficulties, that might not happen
for the next decade or more. Until then the IAF must make plans to fight a
limited war with available resources and more importantly be ready to take
instantaneous punitive air action, if and when needed.
India must however, remember that a modern air force is both technology
and capital-intensive and hence, demands frequent injections of heavy funding
for regular technology upgrades. To reduce dependence on foreign sources India
has no option but to quickly build a true indigenous capability to design, develop,
 Findings and Recommendations 255

build and maintain modern fighter, transport aircraft and helicopters, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) and the
variety of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) and air-delivered weapons. This
is simply because such sophisticated armament and delivery systems have already
entered India’s neighbourhood.
Finally, despite an ever-increasing defence budget, the Indian military has
not found an answer to Pakistan’s strategy of inflicting repeated terrorist attacks
under the so called nuclear shield. It is possible, even likely that another 26/11
type of catastrophic terror attack in the future, will again go unpunished. India
also does not have an answer to the increasingly strong Sino-Pak joint strategy to
keep India unbalanced.
Without restarting the guns versus ploughshare debate, it should suffice to
say that a minimum level of security from internal and external threats is the first
duty of the nation-state. India’s self-image of a centuries-old civilisation, as a
champion of peace, non-violence and mutual cooperation, has often come into
conflict with the imperative of building its hard power or national military
strength. As a result, the latter often fails to get single-minded and focused
attention.
India’s policy of non-alignment was designed to derive economic and other
aid from all quarters without getting embroiled in an East-West confrontation;
a policy that paid handsome dividends during the Cold War. According to K.
Subrahmanyam and Shivshankar Menon, the former National Security Adviser
(NSA), “Nonalignment was a strategy and never an ideology.”9 Yet, it was couched
in highly moralistic and ideological terms, at least during the Nehru era. Nehru
resisted attempts to form a non-aligned bloc during his lifetime, as he was against
joining or forming any bloc. Nonalignment is perhaps valid and unexceptionable
even today, but the habit of always cloaking India’s security decisions in moral
terms, robs it of its inherent strength. Despite its policy of maintaining equal
distance from the two blocs, India has made few genuine and trusted friends and
continues to shy away from forging a truly close relationship, even with smaller
powers like Vietnam, Bangladesh, Myanmar and its smaller neighbours.
As K. Subrahmanyam has so clearly said, “Among the strategic challenges
facing India are those relating to (1) defence policy, (2) nuclear strategy and (3)
governance.”10 Although a relatively mild rebuke, he has clearly warned all Indians
that many of India’s security challenges are of their own making.
The civil-military disconnect, due perhaps to a highly exaggerated fear of
militarism, continues to be the biggest stumbling block to devising a suitable,
workable and universally acceptable defence policy for the 21st century. Although
India’s decision-makers claim that they are determined to avoid an arms race
with China, the ever-rising defence spending, due mainly to the cost of
maintaining a huge standing army, is simply prohibitive and unsustainable and
256 Air Power and National Security

therefore, a new and innovative approach is needed. The one-size-fits-all approach

to meet every challenge from the sub-conventional to nuclear war, displays a lack
of imagination.
The currently unhealthy civil-military equation and inter and intra-Service
turf wars need to be addressed immediately. The Indian defence industry’s
indifferent performance continues to be a huge drain on the exchequer and without
a firm direction from the GoI, and exemplary punishment for those responsible
for failures, it will be difficult to expect major improvements. Modern air power
is most affected by these policy failures, because to be effective, it requires tenacious
thinking and dogged determination. While the chance of a conventional war
may indeed be remote, it is not clear how India would respond to an unexpected
major and combined border intrusion by its powerful adversaries, especially since
Pakistan’s doctrine of first or early use of nuclear weapons appears to inhibit
Indian thinking.
As we saw, even after the 1962 politico-military debacle, national security
did not become an electoral issue. Excessive secrecy and highly elitist close-circuit
decision-making processes leave most educated and interested Indians totally
ignorant, yet deeply worried about India’s ability to face diverse security challenges.
The decision-makers need to correct the impression that air power employment
is costly or escalatory, if the government wishes to marshal true and wholehearted
public support for a robust joint defence strategy.

Recommendations
Before making any specific recommendations, it might be useful to revisit some
of the current thinking on the subject of defence and security and there is no
better example than statements of the former Indian NSA and the former Indian
Prime Minister. We will recall that the NSA had said:
In other words, while domestic societies have evolved or are evolving
towards rule of law, international society is still much closer to primeval
anarchy, where to a very great extent the strong do as they will and the
weak do as they must.11
He added elsewhere:
[W]e have all heard the statement that ‘war is diplomacy by other means’
attributed to Clausewitz. The actual statement was more nuanced but
this will serve for our present purpose. We are also familiar with the
corollary that diplomacy is war by other means. Each contains enough
truth to justify the cliché. That truth is that war and diplomacy, military
force and international relations, are Siamese twins, joined together at
birth for life.
Militaries have always provided states with an instrument for effective
 Findings and Recommendations 257
diplomacy, mainly through the threat of the use of force or, in the case of
a militarily weaker state, the ability to withstand military attack or engage
in attrition. The actual use of force in most, if not all cases demonstrates
the failure of diplomacy.
[I]n today’s age of technology and media, small powers and groups can
create effects disproportionate to their physical scale or ostensible material
power. In other words, we have to reckon with the changing nature of
global power, as power itself is becoming much more diffused and
fragmented. We need to develop the power to deal with weak states,
terrorists and small groups and post-modern forms of power, a capability
which is different from the conventional tasks that the military has been
configured to achieve in the past.12
The above clearly demonstrates that there is no ambiguity in India’s understanding
of the real world challenges and the role that the military plays in international
relations or in national security. In spite of such a clear-headed approach to this
vital subject on which the very survival of the country depends, there are many
gaps between theory and practice. To add to the inherent difficulties, India also
faces renewed challenges to maintain high rates of economic growth.
Probably for the first time in recent years, even the former Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh sounded a warning on this count. Addressing the Combined
Commanders’ Conference on November 22, 2013 at New Delhi, he directly
referred to the US strategy of ‘pivot’ or rebalancing in Asia and the uncertainty
attached to it. He also spoke of the global surveillance operation mounted by the
US National Security Agency, the need to stop the interminable debate between
private and public sector contribution to building India’s defence industrial base,
the current difficulties in maintaining a robust economic growth and finally, voiced
his concerns about civil-military relations clearly and directly, cautioning military
commanders and other decision-makers to urgently address these critical issues,
without further waste of time. Above all, and in a welcome change, the former
Prime Minister actually spoke of the need to build India’s Comprehensive National
Power. It is in light of these statements that the following recommendations are
made. In an oblique way, the former Prime Minister told the commanders that
the ongoing military modernisation programme would have to be reviewed and
adjusted to make it sustainable.13
Some salient recommendations are given below:
• Civil-Military relations form the very basis on which the national security
edifice is constructed and hence, India’s Higher Defence Organisation
(HDO) needs the most urgent and serious attention. The government must
implement the relevant recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee,
Group of Ministers and the Naresh Chandra-led Task Force on the subject.
258 Air Power and National Security

The appointment of a permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee

may be seen as a half measure but is still better than the current status quo.
As suggested in the previous chapter, the appointment of a MoS for each
of the three Services in the MoD, to look after modernisation and day-to-
day needs of the Service, and additionally, a specifically selected area such
as aircraft production, may be considered. This would provide the long
felt need for the Service Chiefs and Service Headquarters to become part
of national security and defence decision-making. It will also address the
critical issue of urgently developing India’s defence industrial capacity, to
reduce the country’s dependence on foreign countries for aircraft, armament
and other defence equipment, by direct and personal guidance and
intervention. The three MoS will also provide the interface between the
civilian political leadership and the military commanders, on whose
shoulders rests the onerous responsibility of maintaining a high level of
military readiness, to meet any contingency. Such close and daily interaction
will also help in developing a truly joint strategy for use of force in a variety
of complex security scenarios and avoid surprises and knee-jerk reactions.
• The establishment of the Indian National Defence University (INDU) has
been under consideration by the GoI for over a decade, but its foundation
stone was laid only in 2013. To ensure a steady supply of young, bright,
knowledgeable and confident individuals to occupy important posts in
the vital security areas of cyber security, high technology, MEA, MoD,
Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) and other related areas, the
government must operationalise the INDU on a war footing. The INDU
graduates after studying a wide variety of subjects related to military strategy,
doctrine, modern warfare, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and ‘stabilisation operations’, military
and international law, economics and the like, with synergies obtained from
a truly joint approach, rooted in deep respect for and understanding of
every relevant discipline, will obviously be intellectually and emotionally
better equipped to meet the challenges of the new millennium.
• The government must consider establishing an apex national aviation
council to oversee, anticipate and absorb emerging technologies to ensure
their seamless adoption and operationalisation of civil, commercial and
military aviation in a transparent, economical and efficient manner. Because
air power is indivisible.
• Defence procurement must be given the importance it deserves, and dealt
with as an independent charge by a senior and experienced minister, and
not left to the vagaries of bureaucratic wrangling and financial audit. If
need be, the GoI could form a holding company to handle the increasingly
 Findings and Recommendations 259

complex issues of defence offsets, transfer of technology, price negotiation

and value for money, but with a watchful eye on the timely delivery of the
subject item to the user.
• It is high time India overhauled its career management and promotion
policies for the defence services to ensure high morale, job satisfaction and
a regular flow of high quality experienced and motivated leadership to
meet future challenges. The world over, militaries are treated with immense
respect for their commitment and readiness to make the supreme sacrifice
in the service of the nation; without such intrinsic respect, there is a danger
of the soldier losing confidence in his/her superiors and indeed the
government. For some years, the IAF has been facing difficulties in getting
the right kind of young and motivated professionals to handle the
increasingly complex technologies related to modern aircraft, missiles and
allied equipment.
• The government and the senior leadership of the IAF, army and navy must
devote urgent attention to restructuring the basic organisation of the armed
forces to effectively reduce expenditure, get value for money, reduce
duplication, and ensure higher levels of efficiency and interoperability to
make the armed forces more lean, agile, mobile and ready for rapid response
to face emerging situations. A uniform, pro-rata distribution of government
funding to keep each Service happy is neither sustainable nor efficient,
and will also not meet the needs of future warfare.
• There must be a regular, sincere, structured and institutionalised
consultation between the civilian and military leadership at fixed intervals,
to further improve all-round understanding.
• At the Service level, the IAF needs to pay renewed and regular attention to
conserving its precious assets, while simultaneously maintaining optimum
training patterns and schedules at basic, advanced and operational levels.
• In the interest of flight safety – care, maintenance and upgrade of ageing
aircraft and equipment must also get high priority, along with absorption
of new technologies.
• The government must encourage innovative ideas to curtail expenditure in
every field of activity. The routine and pro-forma promises of meeting the
needs of the military sound hollow in the current climate of economic
difficulties.
• Finally, India must formulate a national security strategy that is effective in
peace and war. For it to be effective, it must be capable of generating
asymmetry in our favour, shaping the strategic environment and creating
opportunities for India to use its conventional military superiority and
greater economic power, to defeat Pakistan’s strategy of using jihadi terrorism
260 Air Power and National Security

under the nuclear shield. Air power must be given the necessary freedom
to gain command of the air, at the earliest opportunity. With the proposed
induction of the Rafale and the T-50 FGFA, the IAF will be endowed with
extraordinary capabilities in air superiority and AD roles. The recent
acquisition of the C-17, C-130J, AWACS and AAR tankers and the soon
to be acquired AH-64 Apache and CH-47 Chinook will transform the
IAF and offer amazing possibilities in strategic lift and power projection.
While the IAF must make every effort to quickly absorb and operationalise
these new technologies, the country must formulate effective strategies for
their timely and intelligent utilisation.
To be able to achieve all these ambitious objectives, the government must show
its readiness to include the military, especially the IAF, in all its security planning.
As discussed earlier, the experience of exploiting the third dimension gives the
air warrior a unique multi-dimensional situational awareness, which few other
professions can match. The country must learn to use this outstanding attribute
in the fulfilment of national security objectives, by constantly innovating and
refining its air power employment doctrines and strategies.

NOTES
1. Shekhar Gupta, “The Man Who Got It Right: Poet Pragmatist, Always Political”, India Today,
April 6, 2015, pp. 20-21.
2. Lorne J. Kavic, “India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947-65”, EBD Publishers&
Distributing Co., Dehradun, 1967, p. 4.
3. P.J.S. Sandhu, “1962-War in the Western Sector (Ladakh): A View from Other Side of the
Hill”, USI Journal, July-September 2013, pp. 444-65.
4. K. Subrahmanyam, “That Night of November 19: On Nehru’s Correspondence with JFK
during the Chinese Aggression 18 November 2010”, Indian Express, online version, February
3, 2011.
5. R.D. Pradhan, “Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65,” Orient
Longman, Hyderabad, 1998, p.18.
6. The 500 series of static high power radar units were established at Amritsar, Delhi, Lucknow
in Uttar Pradesh, Singharsi in Bihar, Shillong in Meghalaya and Dinjan in Assam.
7. Nos. 1, 8, 29, 45, 47, and TACDE in the West and Nos. 4, 28 and 30 Squadrons in the
East.
8. See http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericrmeyer/2014/09/23/who-sabotaged-xi-jinpings-india-
visit/ (Accessed April 2, 2015).
9. Shivshankar Menon quoted in “China Playing a Waiting Game on Border Dispute: Former
NSA”, The Hindu, February 29, 2012.
10. K. Subrahmanyam, “India’s Strategic Challenges”, Indian Express, February 4, 2012.
11. Extracted from two lectures delivered by the NSA–first the K.M. Cariappa Memorial Lecture
on the “Role of Militaries in International Relations”, on October 5, 2011 and the Prem
Bhatia Memorial Lecture on “India and the Global Scene”, in New Delhi, in July 2011.
12. Ibid.
13. The Prime Minister’s Address to the Combined Commanders’ Conference in New Delhi on
November 22, 2013 at http://pmindia.nic.in/speech-details.php?nodeid=1396 (Accessed
November 25, 2013).
Findings and Recommendations 261

APPENDICES
 Appendix I

Indian Air Force Squadrons and Units

Table 1: IAF Squadrons (Fighter, Bomber and Transport)

S. No. Sqn. No. Date Formed Type Remarks
1 1 April 1, 1933 Wapiti Mk IIA First IAF Squadron.
2 2 April 1, 1941 First Squadron. of World War II
3 3 October 1, 1941
4 4 February 1, 1942
5 6 December 1, 1942
6 8 December 7, 1942
7 7 December 8, 1942
8 9 November 13, 1943
9 10 February 20, 1944
10 12 December 1, 1945 Dakota DC-3 First Transport Squadron.
Notes 1: To avoid confusion with the Royal Air Force (RAF) No. 5 Squadron then operating in
India, number ‘5’ was not allotted to an IAF squadron. There were no further additions
during World War II.
2: Air Headquarters Communication Squadron was formed on January 1, 1947 and
Headquarters Western Air Command Communication Flight (HQ WAC COM Flight)
on November 1, 1947.
3: Flying Instructors School (FIS) was formed in April 1948, at Tambaram near Madras
(now Chennai).
 Table 2: New IAF Squadrons formed between 1947 and 1962 264
S. No Sqn. No. Date Formed Type Remarks Remarks
11 5 November 2, 1948
12 101 May 1, 1949 Vampire Mk 55 Night Fighter
13 14 August 15, 1951
14 15 August 20, 1951 Second Transport Sqn.
15 17 October 1, 1951
16 11 November 1, 1951
17 32 October 15, 1953
18 16 September 15, 1954 Canberra B-58 Bomber/Interdictor
19 42 1955 see note below Il-14 Communication &Light Transport USSR gifted the first Il-14 to India; IAF
later acquired 29 Il-14 aircraft.
20 20 June 1, 1956 Hunter Mk 56
21 23 October1, 1956
22 27 February 15, 1957 Hunter Mk 56
Air Power and National Security

23 ASTE April 15, 1957 Various Types Earlier formed as Aircraft & Later moved to Bangalore
Armament Testing Unit
23 37 December 23, 1957 Hunter Mk 56
24 43 January 1, 1958 Otter DHC-3
25 41 March 1, 1958 Toofani French Ouragon
26 29 March 10, 1958 Dakota DC-3
27 35 August 1, 1958 Canberra B-58
28 45 November 20, 1959 Otter DHC-3
29 59 December 1, 1959 Vampire Mk 52
30 47 December 18, 1959 Toofani
31 JBCU 1959 (See Note 3 below Jet Bomber Conversion Unit At Agra
32 106 1959 (See Note 3 below) Canberra PR Strategic Recce At Agra
33 49 February 2, 1960 Packet C-119 Transport
34 48 February 5, 1960 Transport
35 19 July 4, 1960
36 PTS Early 1950s Packet C-119 Paratroopers Training School At Agra
(See Note 4 below)
37 44 March 31, 1961 An-12 Heavy Transport Chandigarh
38 24 February 1962 Vampire Mk 52
Notes 1: The exact date of the formation of No. 42 Squadron is not available. The IAF operated the Il-14 till 1979. No. 42 Squadron was later disbanded.
2: Transport Training Wing formed at Begumpet, Hyderabad on May 1, 1963, Navigation & Signal School on May 1, 1963.
3: Both the JBCU and 106 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron were formed after the IAF inducted the three versions (medium bomber, interdictor
and photo reconnaissance), of the English Electric Canberra between 1958 and 1960.
4: During World War II the Indian Army formed several Air Landing Schools for training Indian soldiers in para-trooping operations. One of
these schools operated at Ambala and was later shifted to Agra in the early 1950s and renamed the Paratroopers Training School (PTS).
Appendix I: Indian Air Force Squadrons and Units
265
266 Air Power and National Security
Table 3: Post 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict Expansion: IAF Squadrons formed
between 1963 and 2012
S. No. Sqn. No. Date Formed Type Remarks
39 33 January 2, 1963 Canadair Caribou
40 220 January 9, 1963 Vampire Mk 52
41 221 February 2, 1963 Vampire Mk 52
42 25 March 1, 1963 An-12 At Chandigarh
43 28 March 3, 1963 MiG-21 Type 74 First supersonic squadron
44 31 September 1, 1963 Mystere IVA
45 18 April 15, 1965 Gnat Mk 1
46
47 21 October 16, 1965 Gnat Mk 1
48 22 October 15, 1966 Gnat Mk 1
49 26 January 1, 1968 S-22
50 222 September 15, 1969 S-22
51 30 November 1, 1969 MiG-21
52 AFA May 8, 1970 Harvard Mk II At Dundigal.
Vampire Mk 55/52 Later Kiran HJT-16 replaced
Vampire Mk 55/52
53 TACDE January 2, 1971 MiG-21 & S-22 Ambala, later moved to Jamnagar
and Gwalior
54 102 August 17, 1981 MiG-25 Trisonic Strategic Recce
55 223 May 10, 1982 MiG-23 MF
56 224 July 4, 1983 MiG-23 BN
57 51 February 1, 1985 MiG-21
58 52 January 1, 1986 MiG-21
Notes 1: Thus the IAF has raised some 46 fighter/bomber and 12 transport squadrons and 25
helicopter units/squadrons in addition to training units/establishments for all types. Some
30 plus BAe Hawk trainers are now divided into two training squadrons at Air Force
Station Bidar. Similarly TACDE and ASTE have fighters on their establishment.
2: In addition, the IAF raised a few squadrons of NATO codename ‘Guideline’ Sam II air
defence missiles in 1963-64 and some 24 SAM-III Pechora missile units and still later,
acquired a few OSA AK tracked/mobile missile batteries and shoulder fired Igla missiles.
 Appendix I: Indian Air Force Squadrons and Units 267
Table 4: IAF Helicopter Units (HU)
S. No. HU No. Date Formed Type Remarks
1 104 HU March 25, 1954 Sikorsky S55-C First HU
2 105 HU November 23, 1959
3 107 HU January 1, 1960
4 109 HU August 26, 1961
5 110 HU September 11, 1962

Table 5: Post 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict Expansion

S. No Sqn. No. Date Formed Type Remarks
ˆ

6 LSTU See May 25, 1962 Bell-47G Later Helicopter Training School
Note 1 (HTS)
7 111 HU January 3, 1963
8 112 HU Alouette-III
9 114 HU April 1, 1964 Alouette-III
10 115 HU April 1, 1967
116 HU July 27, 1967
11 117 HU February 1, 1971 Mi-8
12 118 HU November 14, 1971 Mi-8
13 119 HU March 3, 1972
14 121 HF December 15, 1972
15 131 HU August 1, 1974
16 141 HU August 1, 1974
17 142 HU August 1, 1974
18 122 HF December 12,1981 Bombay High
19 125 Hel November 1, 1983 Mi-25 Armed/Attack
Sqn.
20 127 HU June 10, 1985 Mi-17 Hindan
21 128 HU December 30, 1985 Mi-17 Hindan
22 132 HU February 20, 1986 Mi-17
23 133 HU March 23, 1986 Mi-17
24 126 HU May 15, 1986 Mi-26 Heavy Lift Chandigarh
25 152 HU June 27, 1988 Mi-17 During Op. Pawan
26 151 HU June 1, 1989 Mi-17 During Op. Pawan
Notes 1: LSTU or Logistics Support Training Unit was re-christened as HTS or Helicopter Training
School in the 1970s.
2: Mi-35 Improved Attack helicopter was inducted in 1990.
268 Air Power and National Security

Appendix II

The Gnat Story

In the early 1950s, India set out on many exploratory missions to Britain and
other European countries in search of a suitable fighter-bomber. As we have seen,
the Indian Air Force (IAF) had already finalised the purchase of the British Hunter,
Canberra and the French Mystere IVA but none of these could be licence-
produced in India. By then, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was
producing the Vampire under licence but it was no match to other contemporary
fighters and was soon relegated to purely training tasks.
When a team led by Air Commodore P.C. Lal (later Chief of the Air Staff
[CAS]), went to Britain, it noticed a very small fighter flying around at Chilbolten,
the same airfield the Indian team was visiting. When the team found that the
Supermarine Swift, then under development, was unsuitable for India’s needs,
Air Commodore Lal enquired about this unusually small fighter. Earlier called
the Midge, it had been developed as a highly manoeuvrable but small and
economical aircraft for Britain and its Western allies. At first, its designer, Professor
W.E.W. Petter, was unwilling to sell it to India, which he thought was a
Communist country. At lunch, he asked Lal if Indians played cricket and got an
emphatically affirmative reply that clinched the deal. Two days later, he again
called Lal and agreed to let him fly the Gnat. Lal and other members of the team
were impressed with this ‘excellent little aeroplane’ and immediately recommended
its manufacture at HAL. Lal writes, “The Gnat has been described as a single-
seat fighter or fighter-bomber about one-third the size and about half the weight
of a conventional jet fighter and in its time, was capable of out-climbing, out-
turning and out-accelerating contemporary fighters.”1
The Indian Government soon signed a contract with Folland for the airframe
and with Bristol Aero-engines Ltd. for the manufacture of Orpheus engines in
September 1956. Chris Smith talks of some reports of commission and other
malpractices, with the French offering their expertise in quickly concluding
negotiations, but that did not seem to influence IAF decisions.2 The IAF received
 Appendix II: The Gnat Story 269

the first batch of 15 aircraft in knocked-down kit form for local assembly at
HAL. The Gnat began to enter service with the IAF in 1959. A Gnat Handling
Flight was formed at HAL Kanpur but the little aircraft had many teething
troubles. Its hydraulic system that operated the undercarriage and flight controls
and the Hobson Unit part of the longitudinal control were the main culprits. In
trying to keep it light and small, the designer had resorted to many a novel
arrangement. The undercarriage could be partially extended to work as air brake
or speed brake, the aileron control surfaces automatically drooped by 22 degrees
to act as landing flaps when the under carriage was fully extended.
With a wing span of just 22 feet and 1inch and length of 28 feet and 8
inches, the Gnat had very little space to accommodate a jet engine, other accessories
and ammunition for the two fuselage-mounted 30mm Aden guns. As a result,
access for maintenance was severely restricted. At just 4,500 pounds when empty,
the aircraft was very light and could easily be turned around when a technician
sat on its tail plane and another lifted the nose on his shoulder. The fuselage
could be ‘split’ in just under an hour and the jet engine could then be worked
upon. As mentioned earlier, the Aden guns suffered frequent stoppages as these
were mounted ‘upside down’ to save space, and this entailed pulling the
ammunition links against gravity. It had a small, almost primitive Radio Telephony
(R/T) set with just 10 voice channels and a miniature standby with just two
channels; no navigational aids worth the name and only a mechanically operated
tail-chute (also called drag-chute) used to quickly arrest speed on the landing
run.
In the ‘clean’, configuration, that is, without externally mounted under-wing
fuel tanks, each with a capacity of 66 gallons, the Gnat enjoyed a thrust-to-weight
ratio of almost one; rarely seen in any modern jet fighter of that period. The
Gnat, however, was a transonic fighter – it could cross the speed of sound, but
only in a steep dive at high altitudes. Its maximum speed was also limited to
about 600 knots and although fast, it could not match the supersonic fighters
such as the MiG-21 in their rate of climb, top speed and acceleration, and as a
result, the F-104 class of fighters invariably managed to get away in combat.
Without the external drop tanks, the Gnat could barely fly for 30 minutes at
low/medium levels.
By 1965, the IAF had barely equipped three squadrons, Nos. 23, 2 and 9.
The Gnat earned a name during the 1965 Indo-Pak war by shooting down many
enemy Sabre F-86 fighters. Innovative tactics were developed to overcome its
limited endurance and top speed, by initially flying at 10,000-15,000 feet and
swooping down on the enemy. Soon after the war, the IAF raised four more Gnat
squadrons and used them effectively during the 1971 Bangladesh war, when the
Gnat again scored three victories against the Sabre over the eastern skies on
270 Air Power and National Security

November 22, before the war actually started. The Gnats were used to provide
offensive air support to the army in the Eastern theatre, once the IAF had attained
complete air superiority. The Gnat was also used in the air defence role in the
Western theatre. For defending the Srinagar airfield in the Kashmir Valley in a
Gnat, Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon posthumously earned India’s highest
gallantry award, the Param Vir Chakra (PVC).
In the 1970s, the Gnat also played an important role as an undeclared
advanced jet trainer and was used as a lead-in fighter before young pilots were
sent to more advanced aircraft such as the MiG-21, S-22, and in the 1980s,
Jaguar and MiG-27. The Gnat was a delightful little aircraft to fly but had its
own share of idiosyncrasies. Its hydraulic system, fuel transfer, electrical trimmer,
flight controls and a host of other problems adversely affected its serviceability
and sortie rate. Some 215 of these fighters were produced at HAL, which in the
late 1970s also embarked on the manufacture of the Ajeet, of which some 50
units were produced. HAL also produced a two-seater trainer version of the Ajeet
but it did not prove very successful due to the inherent limitations of its forerunner.
The Ajeet was similar in its external dimensions to the Gnat Mk1 since the
only major change (the HAL called it an ‘improvement’), was that the Ajeet had
additional internal fuel tanks located in its wings. This, however, curtailed the
size of the external drop tanks by almost half. There was thus no real increase in
its Radius of Action (RoA). The aircraft became heavier and less manoeuvrable
than the Gnat; suffered from endemic fuel leaks and poor serviceability and above
all the gun-stoppage problem remained. The Gnat Mk. 1A, a modified version
of the original was far superior to the Ajeet, and could well have met the operational
training needs of the IAF, without it opting for the expense of producing the
Ajeet. In early 1977, when the modified and more reliable Gnat Mk IA version
was becoming available to the IAF, the author was attached to Air Headquarters
to rework the RoA calculations of the proposed Ajeet but found that there was
no increase. The then CAS Air Chief Marshal H. Moolgaonkar was very unhappy
with HAL for pushing the IAF to accept the Ajeet, but did not succeed in stopping
this wasteful venture, although it was once again touted as an indigenous design
and hence, a feather in the cap of the Indian defence industry. Its operational
usefulness had considerably diminished by about the late 1980s and it was finally
phased out in 1991.3 The IAF had at all times looked only at Pakistan as the
major threat and its modernisation was therefore Pakistan Air Force-oriented.
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (or the Chinese Air Force) posed no
threat as most of its fighters and medium bombers (Il-28) at that time were
antiquated and did not have the necessary range to reach Indian targets. There
was not much interest or intelligence on its actual capability.
 Appendix II: The Gnat Story 271
NOTES
1. P.C. Lal, My Years with the IAF, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 79-80.
2. Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy?, SIPRI, Oxford
University Press, 1994, pp. 159-69. Smith also mentions that the IAF seemed to favour the
French Ouragan, probably because of ‘consideration money’ and even quotes Nehru’s dismay
at Indian officials and ministers wanting India to remain dependent on foreign sources for
its defence needs, but there was no such talk about these allegations in later years in the IAF.
3. The author flew the Gnat from 1968 to 1975 and commanded an Ajeet squadron from
1986 to 1988.
272 Air Power and National Security

Appendix III

The MiG-21 Story

Not unlike the venerable Dakota (DC-3) that proved to be a uniquely long lasting
design, serving various air forces and civil/commercial organisations around the
world, the MiG-21 was and is also without parallel in sheer longevity. It entered
Indian Air Force (IAF) service in early 1965 and for over three decades, remained
its mainstay, even though its flight safety record left much to be desired. In
hindsight it seems clear that India would not have searched desperately for a
supersonic fighter platform if Pakistan had not received a squadron of the
‘supersonic’ F-104 Starfighter from the United States (US) in 1960-61. The
prospective entry of the F-104, then a frontline high-level interceptor designed
specifically to meet the threat of the long range Soviet nuclear bomber, and
equipped with the deadly Sidewinder air-to-air missile (AAM), caused a
commotion of sorts in the Indian defence community. Thus began a clamour
for India to acquire a supersonic fighter of its own to meet this emerging Pakistani
threat. India was then negotiating a defence supply arrangement with the Soviets
to meet the Chinese threat, and had already managed to get a squadron of An-
12 transport and a few Mi-4 helicopters that were urgently needed for air supply
operations in the mountains. In the politically charged atmosphere where the
Soviet leadership was still trying to calm the Communist Chinese brothers and
their non-aligned Indian friends, the offer of the MiG-21 to India was seen as a
major Indian victory, since until then, the Soviets had not offered it even to the
Chinese. To maintain a rough military balance or to appear even handed, however,
the Soviets did not actually allow the export of MiG-21s until well after the
1962 Sino-Indian border war. The more notable advantage of the MiG-21 deal
was that the Soviets also allowed its licensed production in India. Soon the Indians
got busy selecting locations for MiG factories. The Indian Government decided
that the engine factory would be located at Koraput in the tribal part of Orissa
(now Odisha) and Ozar near Nashik in Maharashtra was chosen as the location
for the aircraft/airframe factory. The instruments and avionics for the MiG-21
were to be manufactured at Hyderabad, and later at Korwa near Lucknow. These
 Appendix III: The MiG-21 Story 273

widely dispersed geographic locations also added to the difficulties in the

manufacture of the MiG-21. HAL soon began the assembly of these aircraft and
the IAF began equipping the Vampire, Toofani, Mystere and later the Gnat
squadrons with first the MiG-21 FL (Type 77), followed by MiG-21M & MF
(Type 96) and in 1976-77 the ‘bis’ which in the Russian language means the
latest/last version, with almost half the IAF fighter fleet converting to these four
versions of the MiG-21. While the Type 77 was generally used for air defence
duties, the other types with more under-wing stations and hence greater armament
carriage capacity were earmarked for Offensive Air Support (OAS) and armed
recce tasks.
The earliest version of the MiG-21 to enter IAF inventory in 1963, was the
MiG-21F-13, also called the Type 74, with two K13 AAMs, a single 37 mm NR-
37 cannon, and a gyro gunsight (GGS) with radar ranging, to facilitate range
estimation of the enemy target aircraft. It was not until early 1965 that the first
IAF squadron, No. 28 Squadron was formed, and by that time, the Type 74 had
been replaced by the MiG-21PF (Type 76), the first aircraft to be equipped with
the R1L airborne radar. It was this version that saw action during the 1965 Indo-
Pak War, during which the integral gun was sorely missed. The MiG-21 FL
(Type 77) came in 1966 with the R2L radar which was only a slight improvement
over the R1L, but the Type 76 and 77 had only the AAM, but no guns. These
small numbers of Type 74 and 76 aircraft were phased out by 1968. A podded
gun carried on the ventral station was provided by the Soviets before the 1971
war, but had only a PKI or fixed gunsight1 in place of the earlier GGS. This fixed
gunsight affected the accuracy of its guns, both in the air-to-air and air-to-ground
mode. The plan to fit a modified gunsight, the GGS Mk 4, was given up, as it
had to be fitted upside down, due to lack of space in the cockpit.
“The experience of 1971 convinced the decision makers at Air HQ that the
MiG-21 had to have a gun with a predictor GGS, so a request was made for a
gun armed version. In 1973, the Soviets made an offer of a MiG-21 M (Type 96)
with GsH-23, a 23 mm integral gun with 300 rounds of ammunition, a GGS
and an improved RP-21 AA Radar, and an improved ejection seat with 0/90
capability2. With a new engine R13-300 which was tested but rejected, as it gave
little advantage, it also had a Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) and could carry
2x490 ltr. external drop tanks under wing and a 1×800 ltr. drop tank on the
ventral station. The R13 engine certainly gave the MF version a slight advantage
in the Supersonic regime over the M version, but since the R11 was already being
manufactured at Koraput, the R13 was dropped on techno-economic grounds”.3
Numbers 7 and 37 squadrons were the only two units equipped with the Mig-
21 MF. “In 1975, after many attempts to persuade us to buy the R13 engine, the
Soviets offered us the MiG-21 ‘bis’, fitted with the R25-300 engine with a second
after-burner, and an improved AA Radar – the Almaz, which entered IAF service
274 Air Power and National Security

in mid-1976”4 (Nos. 21, 23, 4, 15 and many other squadrons were equipped
with the ‘bis’. But Nos. 7, 8, 37, 29, and 30 squadrons continued with the older
versions).
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) also launched the MiG ‘bis’
modernisation project which included a vortex generator, a blown flap that went
up at 700 kmph for manoeuvring, an enlarged saddle tank with additional 200
ltr. of fuel and Western avionics in place of Soviet instruments. The biggest
drawback was that the ‘bis’ did not have a Nav-Attack system and navigation was
done only with a map and stopwatch. Only dive attacks were possible for weapon
delivery. Low Level Lay Down attacks with retarder weapons used mainly to
avoid exposure to enemy anti-aircraft defences were equally difficult. In 1986,
the IAF launched a serious search for a suitable Nav-Attack system but the effort
did not fructify for a variety of reasons. The Russians offered the Kopyo AA
radar, a Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile and also the latest Close Combat
missiles. In 1993, the MiG ‘bis’ upgrade programme was approved, which was
officially called the Bison. Most of the flight test programmes were completed at
Nizhny Novgorod in Russia during 1999-2002, at the end of which the Bison
began entering service. The Bison was now equipped with Western avionics and
lethal AA Missiles, but its airframe and engine did not see any modification and
hence, some old problems of maintenance remained.
The MiG-21 FL (Type 77) did not have ‘blown flaps’ and this meant that
the rate of descent on the landing approach, of nearly 1,000 metres per minute,
which was nearly three times that of the Western aircraft like the Hunter and
Gnat, caused considerable difficulty for inexperienced pilots. Air Chief Marshal
A.Y. Tipnis, a highly experienced and respected MiG-21 pilot, readily
acknowledges that the aircraft suffered from a large number of serious problems:
limited range and endurance, simple instrumentation requiring careful engine
handling, poor forward visibility, primitive weapon systems and above all, relatively
difficult flying characteristics.5 The IAF did not, however, have much choice,
and this resulted in three squadrons of MiG-21FL or Type-77 aircraft being used
for operational training of young pilots at MiG Flying Training Units (MOFTU),
when the Hunter serviceability started to drop with age. The upshot of this decision
was that the IAF was forced to use a difficult fighter for operational training, and
a relatively easy-to-fly fighter such as the Jaguar and Mirage-200 for operational
flying. For over three decades, from the 1970s to 2000 and even later, the MiG-
21 remained the mainstay of the air force fighter fleet. Delayed decision-making,
absence of a suitable indigenous aircraft, non-availability of suitable and affordable
Western fighters, seriously constrained air force choices, contributed to accidents,
and worse, their limited range, armament and obsolescent avionics affected military
preparedness and deterrence. The army with its ever-increasing demands for
 Appendix III: The MiG-21 Story 275

immediate close air support was also unhappy because the air force simply could
not assure the necessary combat punch.

NOTES
1. The fixed gun sight nevertheless served the purpose as proved by the successful rocket attack
on the Government House at Dhaka.
2. 0/90 signifies a capability that allows the pilot to eject on ground at 0 altitude so long as the
aircraft speed is more than 90 kmph.
3. These few paragraphs are based on Air Marshal Philip Rajkumar, “The MiG-21 Upgrade
Story”, Vayu Aerospace & Defence Review, 1, 2012, pp. 76-81, as well as the author’s own
experience.
4. Ibid.
5. Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis (Retd.), in an article he wrote when the MiG-21 was often
referred to as the ‘flying coffin’ in the Indian media. See http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/
IAF/Aircraft/Current/606-MiG-Tipnis.html (Accessed July 31, 2012). Also see, Air Marshal
Philip Rajkumar, The Tejas Story: The Light Combat Aircraft Project, Manohar, New Delhi,
2008, pp. 55-56.
276 Air Power and National Security

Appendix IV

Defence Budgets
Defence Budget (in Rs. Crores)
S.No. Year Army Navy AF AF Revenue AF Capital Total Def.
Share Share Share Share Share Exp.
&% &% &% in % in % Actual
+ or –
A B C D E F G H
1 1950-51 138 09 15 10 05 168
82% 05% 09% 66% 33% -16
2 1951-52 145 11 16 15 01 180
80% 06% 09% 94% 06% -17
3 1952-53 148 15 17 15 02 222
67% 07% 08% 87% 13% +20
4 1953-54 141 15 29 27 02 196
71% 07% 15% 93% 07% -14
5 1954-55 138 19 30 28 02 195
72% 09% 15% 94% 06% -16
6 1955-56 127 23 31 28 03 189
67% 10% 16% 91% 09% -16
7 1956-57 135 26 41 37 04 211
64% 11% 19% 91% 09% -12
8 1957-58 165 25 72 70 02 277
60% 09% 26% 97% 03% -13
9 1958-59 154 29 78 75 03 277
56% 10% 28% 98% 02% -16
10 1959-60 151 34 62 59 03 266
57% 12% 23% 96% 04% -13
11 1960-61 174 32 55 51 04 281
62% 11% 19% 93% 07% -19
12 1961-62 211 24 58 53 05 309
68% 08% 19% 92% 08% -19
13 1962-63 365 25 95 78 17 474
77% 05% 20% 82% 18% -00
 Appendix IV: Defence Budgets 277

A B C D E F G H
14 1963-64 606 27 169 134 35 816
74% 03% 20% 79% 21% -08
15 1964-65 600 28 151 126 25 806
74% 03% 19% 83% 17% -03
16 1965-66 645 34 171 144 27 888
73% 04% 19% 19% 21% -03
17 1966-67 674 40 175 147 28 942
74% 04% 19% 18% 25% -33
18 1967-68 691 47 175 151 24 970
71% 05% 18% 18% 23% -02
19 1968-69 733 57 189 169 20 1,033
71% 06% 18% 18% 19% -18
20 1969-70 745 73 212 195 17 1,104
67% 07% 19% 20% 13% -03
21 1970-71 790 95 239 222 17 1,199
66% 08% 20% 19% 12% +16
22 1971-72 1030 113 295 271 24 1525
68% 07% 19% 18% 13% +114
23 1972-73 1110 127 321 295 26 1652
67% 08% 19% 18% 11% +52
24 1973-74 1070 149 353 327 26 1681
64% 09% 21% 19% 13% -72
25 1974-75 1374 169 437 406 31 2,112
65% 08% 21% 19% 16% -45
26 1975-76 1603 215 496 470 26 2,472
65% 09% 20% 19% 12% +62
27 1976-77 1644 226 525 504 21 2,563
64% 09% 20% 20% 10% -52
28 1977-78 1663 251 535 510 25 2,634
63% 10% 20% 19% 10% -117
29 1978-79 1746 263 644 617 27 2,868
61% 09% 22% 22% 11% +23
30 1979-80 1953 294 866 839 27 4,200
58% 09% 26% 25% 10% +927
31 1980-81 2234 342 953 919 34 3,867
58% 09% 25% 26% 10% +67
32 1981-82 2,671 530 1,052 1,005 47 4652
59% 12% 23% 24% 10% +52
33 1982-83 3,103 566 1,278 1,226 52 5409
57% 10% 24% 25% 10% +59
34 1983-84 3,605 750 1,357 1,295 62 6309
55% 11% 21% 22% 11% -41
278 Air Power and National Security

A B C D E F G H
35 1984-85 4,210 813 1,508 1,437 71 6661
66% 13% 24% 25% 10% -514
36 1985-86 4,872 1000 1,860 1,772 88 7987
61% 13% 23% 25% 09% +125
37 1986-87 6,527 1311 2,244 2,141 103 10477
62% 13% 21% 23% 08% +284
38 1987-88 7,285 1537 2,764 1,592 1,172 11967
61% 13% 23% 18% 38% -33
39 1988-89 8,060 1799 3,002 1,735 1,267 13341
60% 13% 23% 18% 34% +141
40 1989-90 8,594 1953 3,325 1,879 1,446 14416
59% 14% 23% 18% 34% -86
41 1990-91 9,273 1963 3,711 2,078 1,633 15426
60% 13% 24% 19% 36% -313
42 1991-92 9,687 2091 4,107 2,335 1,772 16347
59% 13% 25% 20% 36% -03
43 1992-93 10,040 2,021 5,174 2,759 2,415 17,582
57% 11% 29% 23% 44% +82
44 1993-94 12,656 2,705 5,996 3,364 2,632 21,844
58% 13% 27% 22% 38% +344
45 1994-95 13,346 2,999 6,430 3,695 2,735 23,245
57% 13% 28% 22% 38% +01
46 1995-96 15,377 3,800 6,930 3,907 3,023 26,856
57% 14% 26% 21% 38% -13
47 1996-97 16,916 3,975 7,490 4,327 3,163 29,505
57% 13% 25% 21% 37% +33
48 1997-98 19895 4,794 9,126 5164 3,962 35,278
56% 14% 25% 57.0% 43.0% -342
49 1998-99 24,169 6,016 9,046 5388 3658 39,898
61.0 % 15.0% 23.0% 60.0% 40.0% -2102
50 1999-00 30014 6,837 10,243 6019 4,224 47,071
64.0% 14.0% 22.0% 59.0% 41.0% +1,377
51 2000-01 30,650 7,384 10,611 7,265 3,346 49,622
62.00% 15.0% 21.0% 68.0% 32.0% -8,965
52 2001-02 33,795 8369 11,784 6,836 4,948 54,266
62.0% 15.0% 22.0% 58.0% 41.0% -7734
53 2002-03 32,482 8156 12,386 7,369 5,017 55662
58.0% 15.0% 22.0% 59.0% 41.0% -9338
54 2003-04 33,521 10109 13,187 7732 5,455 60,066
56.0% 17.0% 22.0% 68.0% 42.0% -5234
55 2004-05 35,603 13,529 23,036 8,252 14,784 75,856
47.0% 18.0% 30.0% 36.0% 64.0% -1144
 Appendix IV: Defence Budgets 279

A B C D E F G H
56 2005-06 39,792 13,967 21,704 9,173 12,531 80,549
49.0% 17.0% 27.0% 42.0% 54.0% -2451
57 2006-07 39,903 16,201 24,275 9,648 14,627 85,495
47.0% 19.0% 30.0% 40.0% 60.0% -3505
58 2007-08 46,128 15,885 23,594 10,102 13,492 91,680
50.0% 17.0% 26.0% 43.0% 57.0% -4320
59 2008-09 58,142 17,248 29,271 12,673 16,598 114,223
50.0% 15.0% 26.0% 43.0% 57.0% +8623
60 2009-10 77,540 22,935 33,259 14,708 18,551 141,781
55.0% 16% 23.0% 44.0% 56.0% +78
61 2010-11 78,730 27,119 38,155 14,551 23,604 154,117
51.0% 18.0% 25.0% 38.0% 63.0% +6783
62 2011-12 84740 31,116 45,585 16,773 28,812 170913
50% 18 .0 % 27.0% 37.0% 63.0% +6498
63 2012-13 92,139 29,594 50,509 17,529 32,980 181,776
50.0% 19.2% 24.9% 35.0% 65.0% -11631
64 2013-14 99,708 36,343 57,502 20,455 37,048 203,499
49% 18% 28% BE BE -173
Notes 1: For no apparent reason, except in 1952-53, the actual expenditure was less than RE.
Although the IAF strength had increased from 10 to about 25 squadrons by this time, this
is not reflected in revenue/capital expenditure figures.
2: Once again, except in 1970-71, the actual expenditure was less than RE.
3: During six of the 10 years, the actual expenditure was well above the RE and in the remaining
four years it was below RE, thus showing erratic utilisation probably due to uncertainty
regarding acquisitions from abroad/delayed contracts.
4: In column H plus or minus sign indicates the under/over spent amount with respect to BE.
All figures denote ‘actual expenditure’. Until FY 1986-87 purchase of aircraft and aero-engines
was under Revenue head.
5: This data is taken from various official publications; Dr. Laxman Kumar Behera’s comments
on annual defence budgets at the IDSA website; and also from the IDSA Statistical Digest
compiled by Gp. Capt. Vinay Kaushal (Retd.) and Dr. Pankaj Jha; ‘International Seminar
on Defence Acquisition, July12-14, 2011’. Also see Vinod Misra, (ed.) Core Concerns in Indian
Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2015, at idsa.in/book/
CoreConcernsinIndianDefence_vmisra.html (Accessed April 15, 2015).
6: The data on defence budgets from 1950 to 1997 was compiled and analysed by Late Shri
Sreedhar Rao, former Senior Research Associate, IDSA who had kindly given me a copy in
2001. To the best of my knowledge this data has remained unpublished.
280 Air Power and National Security

Appendix V

Air Maintaining the Indian Army and Civilians in the

Himalayan Frontier Region

For over 50 years, every morning at the crack of dawn, a transport aircraft of the
Indian Air Force (IAF) gets airborne from a forward airfield like Chandigarh,
Jammu, Mohanbari, Dinjan and others, for what is known as ‘weather recce’.
Once in the air, its aircrews assess the weather en route and at the destination,
and give a signal for others to follow. Each aircraft does at least two round trips
of two-three hours each, every day. Indian air power is quietly at work, while the
rest of the country goes about its daily routine. According to some estimates, the
IAF airlifts some 40,000-60,000 tons of supplies every year for the troops and
civilians living in the mountainous border area of the North and North-east.
From the early 1950s, the IAF and before that, some intrepid civilian pilots of
a few aviation companies, have been providing the necessary victuals to the tribals,
civilians, army and border security forces and helping them survive harsh winter
conditions.
Air supply or maintenance is done by either landing the aircraft or by para-
dropping the supplies on open ground known as ‘Dropping Zones’ (DZs) that
often look like the size of a postage stamp from the air. Strong winds, clouds and
the rare atmosphere at heights above 12,000-15,000 feet increase the difficulties
because even a slight error in the allowance for cross-wind can send the loads
into the adjoining valley. Such is the unpredictability of weather in the high
Himalayas that very often conditions become extremely difficult if not dangerous,
in a matter of minutes. Some DZs have only one access route and others very
narrow valleys, making it extremely difficult to turn the aircraft around. All air
maintenance operations thus have to be completed by the early afternoon, as
cloud build-up in the latter part of the day shuts down the valleys. Most landing
sorties also carry passengers – soldiers proceeding to and from leave both ways –
and are a vital link for them, especially in emergency situations.
Appendix V: Air Maintaining the Indian Army and Civilians in Himalayan Frontier 281

Landing the aircraft poses its own problems as the Advanced Landing Grounds
(ALGs) are usually a fraction of the length of normal runways, and are very often
unpaved or covered with only a carpet of metal sheets or what are called Perforated
Steel Plate (PSP) sheets. The ALGs are situated in remote valleys, where only a
small contingent of air force personnel can be stationed. The same person sends
out signals, carries out air traffic control duties, clears the aircraft for landing and
also gives weather and other reports.
Even after 68 years, there are hardly any roads in the forward areas comprising
all of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. The Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway that came
under Pakistani artillery threat during the 1999 Kargil conflict is veritably the
lifeline for our troops along the border. The relatively new Manali-Rohtang
highway is another important road in the northern sector. These and roads are
subject to landslides and heavy snowfall during winter, and are continuously
maintained and cleared by the untiring efforts of the Border Roads Organisation
(BRO), but very often prove to be inadequate.
Arunachal Pradesh is divided into five administrative sub-divisions – Kameng,
Subansiri, Lohit, Siang and Tirap – and many more districts since it attained
statehood in 1987 but there are no lateral roads between these sub-divisions.
This means that if one wants to go from the north of Kameng to the adjoining
Subansari division, one has to first travel all the way south to the Assam plains,
and then once again enter the hills further east. These roads are still primitive. An
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) scholar on a road trip to the
origin of the Siang River records that their SUV had to be ferried in a boat across
the Siang, at the foot hills, before they could begin their journey along the mostly
unpaved narrow road northwards.
As far back as 1951, a large contingent of the Indian Army was successfully
para-dropped in Walong, at almost the extreme eastern edge of the NEFA (North-
East Frontier Agency) border. Even today, road connectivity remains poor. Of
late, a number of new road projects have been started but it will take a long time
before reliable all-weather surface communications are established.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the IAF had to rely mostly on the DC-3 Dakota
which barely carried 3,500 lb of load or about 20-22 passengers. The Fairchild
C-119 Packet could carry more passengers and with its rear door, could also off
load them or the loads more quickly. The Packet, a piston engine aircraft, was
later fitted with a ‘jet pack’ or an additional jet engine that considerably improved
its ability to fly over high altitudes. The IAF received the Soviet An-12, almost
the same size as the US C-130 Hercules in 1961. Two squadrons, Nos. 25 and
44 were raised at Chandigarh and became the mainstay of IAF transport operations
for over four decades, until being phased out in the 1990s.
282 Air Power and National Security

Typical air supply loads included wheat flour, rice, tinned food, construction
material, PSP sheets, meat-on-hoof or live goats and kerosene in jerry cans. Today,
most of the work is done by the turbo-prop An-32 or the Il-76 transport aircraft
which can carry far bigger loads than the venerable Dakota of the 1950s.
The IAF received the Canadian Caribou, capable of take-off and landing
from short runways, as also the Otter that was used mostly for carrying 8-10
passengers. The induction of the C-130J Hercules transport is designed specifically
for Special Operation Forces, but the IAF may be tempted to employ these aircraft
in the traditional air maintenance role.
It is said that the An-32 costs some Rs. 2 lakh per hour in fuel alone. A two-
ton load of kerosene from Chandigarh or Jammu to Leh; after a three-hour round
flight, would cost Rs. 2 lakh when delivered at Leh. A litre of kerosene at Leh
would thus cost a prohibitive Rs. 600. Both the IAF and the Ministry of Defence
(MoD) know well, the prohibitively high costs of air maintaining our troops and
civilians, but are unable to do very much in the absence of road connectivity to
these remote areas. Some analysts believe that the Indian Government did not
want to provoke the Chinese and hence, delayed road building. Others say that
they feared giving easy access to an invading enemy if more roads were built.
Both these arguments are fallacious and the true reason for such delays is probably
our indifference, indecision and procrastination.
A major portion of all transport flying in the IAF is devoted to the task of
air maintenance and hence, almost every young transport pilot begins his flying
career in these forward air bases and learns from his seniors, the intricacies of
flying over high mountains. They learn to interpret weather forecasts and the
unpredictability of nature; learn to recognise safe and dangerous areas and navigate
their unwieldy and difficult-to-manoeuvre heavily loaded aircraft to inaccessible
areas of the frontier. Until the arrival of the pressurised An-32 in 1984, the aircrews
and army supply corps loaders routinely operated in freezing conditions, with
only a puff or two from oxygen cylinders. These aircraft often had to negotiate
narrow valleys under extensive cloud cover when weather suddenly ‘packed up’.
The induction of the An-32 in the early 1980s eased the situation as these could
now carry nearly six tons of load or 40 passengers.
Such was the pressure of demand that in the 1980s it was a common sight
to see two young Flying Officers as Captain and Co-pilot of a spanking new An-
32 being supervised by an experienced Wing Commander navigator. Personnel
policies, recruitment, training, postings or regular rotation of these air and ground
crews and availability of suitable aircraft together play a vital role in ensuring safe
and efficient air maintenance operations. In addition, the IAF has also been flying
weekly ‘courier’ flights from remote airfields in Ladakh and Assam to New Delhi
Appendix V: Air Maintaining the Indian Army and Civilians in Himalayan Frontier 283

and Bangalore, and other cities and railway stations in the plains, to help jawans
posted in forward areas to visit their home towns. Without such regular courier
flights it would become impossible for those posted in forward areas to attend to
family emergencies or avail short casual leave.
284 Air Power and National Security

Appendix VI

Air Defence of the Srinagar Valley – 1971

Number 18 Squadron was raised on April 15, 1965 at Ambala and equipped
with Gnat Mk1 fighters. Many of its pilots took part in the 1965 Indo-Pak war,
but with other squadrons based at Pathankot and Halwara, as the squadron was
still in the process of raising when the war started. Located at Ambala, the oldest
air force station in India, the squadron’s operational task in any future war was
to provide air defence to Srinagar airfield. Since on account of United Nations
(UN) restrictions, India had not until then permanently stationed any fighter
squadrons in the Valley, the squadron ran a detachment of six Gnats at Srinagar
in October 1968 to assess its operational needs. Thereafter, the squadron operated
three such detachments at Srinagar. By the time tensions began to rise in March
1971, the squadron was stationed more at Srinagar than at Ambala. It also
operated a short detachment at Amritsar in Punjab in May-June 1971. All pilots
were thus fully familiar with the air defence environment at Srinagar and Amritsar.
Although the Srinagar air base had by then a 3,500-yard-long runway and a
parallel taxi track, it had only a few hardened concrete aircraft shelters called
Blast Pens in the Indian Air Force (IAF). Consequently, a maximum of only four
Gnats were allowed to be stationed at that base. Therefore, one or two aircraft
would have to be flown and replacements brought back from Ambala, whenever
an aircraft developed a problem or became due for servicing. Since the task was
air defence (AD), the Gnats were parked at the southern end of the only runway
near the 31 dumbbell. The Gnats being small fighters, these were housed in two
open but well-camouflaged pens on the Operational Readiness Platform (ORP).
So effective was this simple arrangement that not once did the enemy detect or
specifically target the two Gnats in these open and totally unprotected pens. Being
a mere 30 metres from a very small and often cramped underground aircrew
room where we sat waiting for action, it took little time to run to the aircraft and
start it. Once the war began, the squadron went on a two-minute standby alert
which entailed that the pilot remain strapped inside the Gnat cockpit. Srinagar
can get pretty cold in December and our feet used to become numb if we sat
 Appendix VI: Air Defence of the Srinagar Valley – 1971 285

strapped for more than about three hours. So pilots did three-hour shifts, everyone
hoping for action during the shift. Depending on the orders of the Station
Commander or higher authorities, which were mainly based on ‘hunch and
intuition’, a pair of Gnats would be scrambled to set up a Combat Air Patrol
(CAP) overhead.
The base did not have any AD radar and hence, we had to depend on our
eyes to spot an enemy aircraft. During winter months, visibility in the Valley is
extremely poor due to mist/fog or smog. A chain of observation posts (OP) was
set up along the crest of the hills on the western side of the Valley where a soldier,
usually from the local Ack-Ack regiment (anti-aircraft gun regiment), was given
a battery-operated radio communication set to report enemy aircraft sightings. A
board in the Base Operations room depicted the exact location of these operations
and gave an approximate direction and flying time to Srinagar airfield. We had
all flown a number of practice missions to perfect this local warning system but
finally it was only marginally useful. Very low temperatures on the top of the
hills, frequently discharged batteries, poor visibility and above all close proximity
to the airfield meant that very often the enemy would arrive with little or no
warning. Two or three under-training operational (U/T ops) pilots were deputed
as observers and CAP Controllers, and were located near the Air Traffic Control
(ATC) dug-out on the eastern side of the runway. We used to live in the Badami
Bagh Officers Mess located some 20 km from the airfield, where living conditions
were also very primitive, due mainly to very low voltage, and small, dingy and
very cold rooms. Every morning, a pair of two pilots used to come to the airfield
at about 4:30 to 5:00 am as we were expected to be ready at least 30 minutes
before sunrise. The big bus, called a coach in the air force language had most of
its glass window panes missing, and we were almost frozen by the end of the 45-
minute long trip.
Srinagar airfield was subjected to a total of 14 daylight attacks by the Pakistan
Air Force (PAF). Given the easy access that the enemy enjoyed to the Valley,
Pakistan intelligence had infiltrated an agent who used to inform the incoming
PAF fighters on his radio, if the Gnats were airborne. On at least two or three
occasions, the PAF attackers went back from near Baramulla or Pir Panjal Pass,
two of the preferred entry points of the PAF. We had thought of mounting CAPs
at a distance from the airfield to fool this agent but with total absence of radar
cover and very poor in-flight visibility, it was well-nigh impossible to spot enemy
intruders till they had come very close to the airfield. As a result of these constraints,
only on three out of the 14 raids were the Gnats in fact airborne. The first time,
on December 6, at about sunset, Flight Commander, Squadron Leader ‘Pat’ V.S.
Pathania VrC, VM, a veteran of the 1965 Indo-Pak war, who had shot down a
PAF Sabre, and Flight Lieutenant ‘Bops’ B.N. Bopaya were burning extra fuel
prior to landing, when the PAF struck with four Sabres carrying two 500-lb
286 Air Power and National Security

bombs each and were spotted by Pat. Local Ack-Ack guns opened up even though
their instructions were to hold fire when the Gnats were overhead, and this forced
‘Bops’ to abandon his attack, by which time the Sabres had dropped their bombs;
some of which fell on or near the runway and caused some damage.
Here a slight digression is necessary. Strangely, the full-fledged 3,000-yard
runway at Awantipura airfield just 15 km away to the south had been blocked
with used oil drums to ‘prevent’ the enemy from landing para-troops. Our pleas
to clear the drums and make that runway available as a diversionary airfield in
case of emergency fell on deaf ears. The result was that we had to keep a larger
emergency reserve of fuel to go all the way to Udhampur, the designated diversion
for Srinagar. Given that the Gnat already had very little internal fuel, this was a
huge penalty.
On spotting the enemy, Pat called Bops to retract his airbrakes and look out
for the enemy ahead while he pursued another. Soon Pat got behind the now
returning Sabre and opened fire from about 500 metres, but his aircraft guns
jammed/suffered a gun-stoppage, an old and persistent problem with the Gnat.
Pat followed the enemy and tried to call Bops for help but with low fuel and no
radar the chase had to be abandoned. It was a lucky PAF pilot.
It was already getting dark and some portions of the runway were damaged.
Wing Commander Parmarthi (Prince) Raina, the Commanding Officer (CO),
made a quick trip in his jeep and guided the two pilots so that they could land
on the undamaged side and slowly veer off to avoid the bomb craters. To add to
the confusion, a bomb fell on a pile of runway repair material consisting mainly
of large boulders that were neatly arranged a short distance from the runway
edge; these were now randomly scattered on the runway. Landing a high-speed
jet in darkness on such a runway became difficult. All aircrews and some
technicians scrambled to light up the kerosene lamps, called ‘goose necks’ placed
along the runway edge. Just when I was bent over a lamp, Bopaya’s Gnat went
over me, thankfully missing my head by a few inches. He had abandoned landing
as he was not properly aligned with the runway. I still remember my thoughts,
“Dying on the runway edge after a hit from a Gnat undercarriage would be the
worst fate a fighter pilot could bargain for.” We managed to light up a few more
goose necks and Bopaya made a safe landing on his second attempt. It was my
task to tow the Gnat that he had switched off in the middle of the runway. I
connected the towing rod to a jeep and began the slow drive back, wondering
how the Gnat had remained totally unscathed with so many large boulders strewn
around on the runway. Fortunately, there were no casualties and the thought that
there might have been an unexploded bomb in the near vicinity never crossed my
mind.
Another big if sad event now awaited us in Srinagar. December 14, 1971 was
to prove a fateful day. G’man’, Flight Lieutenant Ghuman and ‘Brother,’ Flying
 Appendix VI: Air Defence of the Srinagar Valley – 1971 287

Officer N.J.S. Sekhon were on the ORP for the morning CAP mission. Inflight
visibility was as usual very bad. They were scrambled but the warning was short.
A six-aircraft Sabre formation, four plus two for top cover, was already arriving
overhead. The ATC was asked to cancel the scramble orders but the CAP aircraft
were on a different frequency. G’man’ got airborne and turned left to set up CAP.
Sekhon had barely got airborne when bombs fell behind him on the runway.
Sabre Nos. 1 and 2 overshot Sekhon. Sekhon immediately followed them but
when the Sabre leader saw the Gnat gaining on his No. 2, he warned him and
both broke left, but by then Sabre Nos. 3 & 4 were ideally placed to sandwich
Sekhon. All this was happening out of sight of the CAP controllers and other
onlookers on the airfield. Sekhon first got into a circle of ‘joy’ or more correctly
‘no joy’ with two Sabres (a situation when neither pilot gains any advantage); it
was at this stage that another Sabre watching these developments from the top
swooped down and positioned itself behind Sekhon. Sekhon had called, “I am
behind two Sabres. I won’t let them get away.” Sekhon had one Sabre ahead of
him while another was apparently gaining an edge. A little later, a burst of 30 mm
Gnat gunfire could be clearly heard. Flight Lieutenants Bopaya and Naliyan of
18 Squadron say they saw a Sabre with its right wing on fire. This was followed
by a long burst from Sabre guns which sounded distinctly different from those
of the Gnat. Then came the last Radio/Telephone call from Sekhon, “I think I
am hit, G’man come.” Sekhon had ejected but his parachute failed to open as he
was too close to the ground. Sekhon lost his life fighting valiantly till the very
end. He was killed but his memory will always remain alive.
Sekhon belonged to the 97th General Duties (Pilots’) Course and was posted
to 18 Squadron at Ambala in October 1968. He was affectionately called ‘Brother’
by his course mates and friends because he used to invariably start all his
conversations with the word ‘Brother’. Sekhon was rightly and most deservedly
awarded the ParamVir Chakra, the nation’s highest gallantry award, posthumously.
He was a simple rustic, unaffected man who was determined to leave his mark
on history; a mission he performed admirably.
A few days later, on December 15 at about lunchtime, we were caught again.
We had just returned from Brother’s funeral parade, the cremation having been
carried out with full military honours on the edge of the airfield. This time most
of us were out in the open chatting a few feet from the underground crew room
next to the 31 ORP. We saw a formation of four plus two Sabres coming up from
the shallow valley that ran along the western side of the airfield. Probably on
being told by the ATC, a helicopter of the local unit had taken shelter in a narrow
ravine; unknown to the crew, the Sabres saw it. One of the attacking Sabres then
turned by just a few degrees to the left, fired a short burst with its six guns and
quickly got back in the formation. The helicopter was severely damaged. One of
the attackers came up from the left in a dive, all guns blazing. It is not very often
288 Air Power and National Security

that one sees the blue flashes of aircraft guns from up front. We jumped in the
shallow drain that had been dug up for some pipe-laying work, hardly any
protection. Some 50 shots were fired in our close vicinity with a few getting
lodged in the doorframe of the crew room but miraculously none were injured.
While on the ground, I had felt a heavy but blunt object hitting my neck and
back of the head. I thought I was hit and the pain would follow soon, but when
I looked up after the Sabre had passed, I saw a huge sheep dog crouching right
behind, obviously a stray, scared of the din of strafing, but apparently also unhurt.
A similar thing had happened some years earlier when one had gone with a
friend to a firing range as understudies to the Range Safety Officer (RSO). Standing
one level lower than the top floor, we were watching four Hunters in a low-level
front-gun strike. The one on the right had unfortunately misjudged the line of
attack and opened fire from an angle to the actual dive direction, showering us
with no less than 79 empties of a 30 mm round, each weighing almost half a kg.
That time too we had come through ‘unscathed’.
By then, i.e. the 14th of December 1971, we were angry and frustrated.
What with the primitive AD warning set up and poor visibility, the enemy was
elusive. To relieve the anger, we began flying a few strike and escort missions with
the Vampires based at Srinagar. Two Gnats escorted a mission beyond Kargil but
saw little action. With Flight Lieutenant Ghuman a.k.a. G’man I went on a mission
to strike a Brigade Headquarters (Bde HQ) near Hajira not too far away, but on
reaching there found little evidence of any army presence. Just as I was pulling
out of the dive, I noticed the shining brass cover of a fire extinguisher that had
been kept close to the entrance of a hut. No villager would keep a fire extinguisher
outside his hut. I fired, but one of the guns stopped and the nose swerved viciously
to the side. On coming back, one got a scolding from Pat because I had lost
visual contact with G’man who was a few km ahead. More CAPs followed but
with little gain.
 Appendix VI: Air Defence of the Srinagar Valley – 1971 289

Appendix VII

Author’s Note

When I joined the Indian Air Force (IAF) on November 16, 1964, I was a little
over 18 years old and the IAF 32. Following the drubbing India received at the
hands of the Chinese in October 1962, the Indian leadership had embarked on
a massive expansion of the armed forces. The Indian Army had begun a scheme
of granting ‘Emergency Commissions’ to eligible candidates with a college degree.
The IAF due to high costs of flying training, decided to grant only ‘permanent’
commissions to eligible males who had passed their Higher Secondary exams
with physics and maths. The IAF had also begun a scholarship of 25 hours of
free flying training at the various flying clubs, for identifying potential candidates
for entry into the General Duties (Pilots) branch of the IAF. I was selected for
the grant of the scholarship and was to begin my flying at the Madhya Pradesh
Flying Club, Indore, but did not actually start flying as I was also selected to
join the 97th Pilots’ Course (PC).
Some 150 of us Direct Entry cadets reached Coimbatore on the morning of
November 16, 1964 and were quickly bundled off the railway station by a stern-
looking Warrant Officer, Coutinho, to the Initial Training Wing (ITW) of the
Air Force Administrative College (AFAC) at Red Fields, Coimbatore, where our
training began in right earnest. There were lectures on General Service Training
(GST), Air Force Law, Administration, IAF History, Principles of Flight (P of F)
or Aerodynamics, Airmanship, Navigation, Meteorology, and the like. In addition
to daily drill, physical training and games, the cadets were also ‘broken’ into the
Service way of life. We had to attend Dining-in-Nights on a weekly basis where
we were taught how to eat ‘properly’ and drink a toast to the health of the President;
the toast was drunk in special wine glasses but contained plain water. We were
also taken on visits to some industries and saw for the first time a few fighter
aircraft that were stored at No. 5 Base Repair Depot (BRD) at Sulur airfield,
some 25 km from Coimbatore. Here we witnessed the French Mystere IVA single-
seat, single-engine fly a demonstration sortie. The speed and sound of the fighter
were truly awe-inspiring and not a cadet present that day at the top of the Air
290 Air Power and National Security

Traffic Control (ATC) tower could have dreamt of becoming anything but a
fighter pilot.
On completion of ground training in March 1965, we were divided into five
lots and sent to the Civil Flying Clubs at Tambaram near Chennai, Nagpur,
Kanpur, Delhi and Patiala where we were to do some 25 hours of basic flying on
the Cessna, Piper Cub, Sentinel L-5 or the Pushpak made at Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bangalore.
At the time, entry to the flying branch of the IAF was through the National
Defence Academy (NDA), which took three years of training after class X or
Matriculation; National Cadet Corps (NCC) cadets who had successfully
completed their C certificate exam; and also to a number of specially selected
young airmen. Some 40 air force cadets of the 28th NDA course joined us in July
1965 at the various flying clubs. The civilian instructors at the flying clubs were
assisted by a Wing Commander of the IAF who, besides being the Commanding
Officer (CO) of the Elementary Flying Training Unit (EFTU), checked our
progress regularly. Number 5 EFTU at Nagpur had Pushpak and L-5 aircraft but
the air force cadets flew only the L-5 which was a tandem two-seat arrangement
with a speaking tube for the instructor, who shouted his instructions above the
din of the engine; very often such instructions could be heard on the ground
when the aircraft came on the final approach to landing. The IAF had devised
this simple training scheme to overcome the shortage of flying instructors and
aircraft. It must be noted that the main aim was to dramatically increase the
number of pilots available to man the 45 squadrons that the IAF was now
authorised. The IAF however, took over ten years to get the additional aircraft,
mostly MiG-21 and S-22 by which time many of these young pilots were wasted
out. The civilian flying instructors were usually very sincere and conservative in
their approach to flying training and did not take many short cuts. In the 25 or
so hours allotted to each cadet, solo flying comprised just about three hours. I
did my first solo in July 1965 and the sorties comprised only a circuit, approach,
overshoot another circuit approach and landing, but it was a great feeling. For
the first time ever, I flew alone. Later, when I became a flying instructor and sent
numerous cadets on their first ‘solo’ trips, I used to tell them to savour every
moment that they spent in the air alone.
The aim of putting the cadets through EFTUs was to weed out those who
could not make the grade as military pilots, at relatively low costs and high safety,
and in that the EFTUs were fairly successful. The IAF was in the throes of a
major transition. Some of the early Pilots’ Courses (85th to 89th) had managed to
complete their flying training in as little as nine months, while others like mine
took over 30 months.
We completed our initial flying training sometime in August 1965 when the
Indo-Pak war intervened, and we were sent off on indefinite leave. Some of us
 Appendix VII: Author’s Note 291

who had already reached the next stage of training at the Pilot Training
Establishment (PTE), Allahabad, were unable to commence our flying due to
the huge backlog of flying training, and were asked to guard the airfield with
lathis (bamboo sticks). Soon after the war ended in September 1965, we were
recalled from leave and reached PTE, Allahabad, which was in shambles as there
were many cadets from the previous courses. The train journey, however, was
memorable as at every station ordinary people were enthusiastically distributing
sweets and other goodies to ‘soldiers and airmen’ for having successfully fought
a war. For the first time, we got a taste of adulation by a grateful nation and it
was exhilarating.
The PTE at the time also had a helicopter training unit called the Logistics
Support Training Unit (LSTU), which was then training some 15-20 cadets from
the 94th Pilots’ Course. The PTE was then housed in two buildings built for
training civilians; it was the Civil Aviation Training Centre (CATC) premises
that the IAF had taken over at Bamrauli air field that can truly be called one of
the oldest in India. A railway line passed through the airfield neatly dividing it
into two. The administrative wing, cadets mess, and playing fields were on one
side, while the runway, dispersals and flying training squadrons were on the other
side, with cadets cycling from one to the other end at all times of the day. So
chaotic were the conditions at the PTE that very often cadets lived only on chicken
or pudding. Missing classes was common and the NDA cadets who were more
experienced and hardened compared to the Direct Entry variety had a good time,
but to be fair, so did we.
Most instructors had five to six or even seven pupils, and that meant a long
wait for the sorties, but it was fun too. This phase saw many cadets being suspended
from flying and every day some cadet or the other was on the dreaded ‘review
board’ for extension or suspension. It was tough as being sent home at the age of
18-19 was bad enough, but finding no place in the flying fraternity was even
more painful. Many of those suspended were, however, recalled for navigation
training and became outstanding navigators and logistics or administrative officers
of the IAF.
At the PTE which was called the basic stage of training, cadets flew around
25-30 hours on the HT-2, an indigenously designed tail-wheeled trainer that was
prone to ‘swinging’ on landing, especially after it had decelerated on the landing
run, when the natural tendency for the cadet was to relax, and it was precisely at
this time that the HT-2 would suddenly swing and veer off the runway. Mercifully,
there were no injuries nor much damage to the aircraft but you could not be sent
solo until you learnt to control the swing. The HT-2 was the first aircraft on
which the cadets were taught aerobatics and ‘spinning’ or more correctly ‘spin
and recovery’ which sometimes was a hair-raising experience if the aircraft proved
reluctant to recover. The wild gyrations and rapid loss of height was somewhat
292 Air Power and National Security

discomfiting but we soon got used to it. If I remember right, some 20-25 per
cent of the original lot of cadets had gone home by the time we finished this
stage. The phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ had acquired a new meaning by the time
our course left the PTE, Allahabad, in early 1966.
Next we went to the Air Force Flying College (AFFC) at Jodhpur by a special
train in March 1966, which was a unique experience in itself. The train stopped
at some unknown stations and had a schedule of its own, with food being served
on the platform. Jodhpur had been on the Indian aviation map for a long time.
Here, the erstwhile Maharaja had donated one of his sprawling properties to the
air force, in which the officers’/cadets’ mess was housed. The airfield has two
parallel runways, one long and the other short, each supporting the flying training
of two squadrons, a decidedly large station. Here, we flew the Harvard 2B or
Texan T6G, with very little difference between the two. Like the Sentinel L-5 at
the Nagpur Flying Club which was of World War II vintage, the ambulance and
training aircraft, the Harvard/Texan were also American, and had been procured
just after independence. The Texan as well as its twin the Harvard were delightful
trainers, very easy to fly, although the big radial engine in the nose used to restrict
forward view (visibility) on the ground. So confident did all of us become on this
aircraft that very often cadets used to intentionally spin it to lose height, not a
safe practice at the best of times. Here, we flew a total of 80 hours, some 30 of
which were solo. We also learnt to fly by night. For the first time, the flying
syllabus included a triangular cross-country route in which the cadet flew a solo
trip to Jaipur. To civilian pilots who routinely fly to different places at a relatively
early stage of their training, this might not be a big event, but for us in the air
force, it was our first experience of landing at a new base and gave us immense
confidence. Flying in close formation was another interesting exercise. Here, we
also saw Vampire Mk. 52 aircraft of the Control and Reporting (C&R) School
on routine flying sorties, which proved a great motivator and morale booster, as
we were to fly the same aircraft during the final stage of our training at Hakimpet,
Secunderabad.
At Jodhpur too, the suspension rate was very high, with one or two cadets
packing their bags on an almost daily basis. It was disconcerting as no one was
certain about his future. Jodhpur can get extremely hot in summer and we saw
really frightening sandstorms that could envelope the airfield and the city in a
matter of minutes. A visit to Mandor Gardens, specially maintained by the
Maharaja, still stays in memory because the variety of lush green plants and trees
was truly remarkable, especially in the middle of a desert. We were also taken to
the Umaid Bhawan Palace, a beautiful and imposing structure in sandstone that
the local king had made during a famine in the previous century, to create
employment for his hapless subjects.
 Appendix VII: Author’s Note 293

At the end of the ‘Intermediate Stage’ training at Jodhpur, the course was
trifurcated into fighter, transport and helicopter streams with those selected for
fighter training proceeding to Hakimpet at Secunderabad; those for transport to
Begumpet at Hyderabad; and also to Yelahanka at Bangalore and the helicopter
cadets to LSTU at Allahabad. (LSTU was later moved to Hakimpet and renamed
Helicopter Training School (HTS). Secunderabad was a major city with many
distractions. For small town boys like me, it was a new experience. We now had
a choice of continental or Chinese cuisine, if only we could save some money for
a weekend treat. Given that we were allowed an allowance of only Rs. 40 per
month for our incidental expenses, we had to carefully plan these trips. Now the
cadet gets a stipend of several thousand rupees during his training and so is
relatively independent.
The Vampire Mk52 and its two-seat version, the Vampire Mk55, were in
fact both in operational service when we began our training at Jet Training Wing
(JTW), Hakimpet. The first jet that entered service with the Indian Air Force in
1948, it was relatively fast and it took us all some time to get used to the higher
speed, thrust and agility. The first solo on the Mk52 was again a memorable
experience, as for the first time we were flying a single-seat version that was quite
different from the two-seat trainer. By the time one realised that the aircraft was
airborne, the diminutive fighter had already reached 4,500 feet. Flying training
in the ‘Advanced Stage’ progressed much faster at JTW, as we were by now more
experienced, and the instructor/pupil/aircraft ratio was good. Until now my own
flying training had proceeded without much difficulty and I had experienced
only minor flight emergencies.
April 11, 1967 dawned as a normal day. Little did I know that the day was
to prove very exciting. Our course was divided into two training squadrons of
about 25 cadets each, and flying was in two shifts: first beginning at 0530 hours
and the second at about 1130 hours. That day, our squadron was in the afternoon
shift and I got airborne on a solo general handling sortie after lunch. Everything
was fine until at about 7,500 feet, the engine just stopped. As per the procedure,
I gained some height with the extra speed and put the aircraft in a gentle glide.
I was facing away from the airfield after take-off and the first thing to do was to
turn towards the base. At first, I thought that I might have to turn 180° and land
on the opposite runway as my height was only about 6,000 feet Above Ground
Level (AGL), but the aircraft was not losing as much height as we had been
briefed during ‘practice forced landing’ procedures, which we had all regularly
practised. Attempts at relight-restarting the engine were unsuccessful, and after
consulting the ATC I decided to carry out a normal descending circuit, and land
on the easterly runway from where I had taken off. I was still high when I came
abeam the landing dumbbell, also known as ‘low key’ point in aviation training
parlance, so I extended my downwind leg to lose a little more height, but that
294 Air Power and National Security

was not enough. It is after all not easy to deliberately lose more height, when
gliding away from the runway with a dead engine. I was, therefore, high on the
final approach and try as I might, the aircraft refused to lose height quickly enough,
and hence, I touched down ahead of the first half of the runway. Fortunately for
me, a new arrester barrier had been installed only a few weeks earlier, and I was
the first to engage it. The aircraft came to a stop on the ‘overshoot’ area and I
managed to jump out of it in a jiffy. Within seconds, the Station Commander’s
car, a black Ambassador with its flag fluttering, was alongside my aircraft, and I
hitched a ride back to the squadron. Although I had not realised it in the air, the
jet engine had in fact ceased and hence, it was not wind milling. That should
normally have caused much drag and made gliding difficult. The hydraulic system
had also shut down and the undercarriage came down, but the landing flaps did
not, and hence, the overshooting approach. In my excitement, I had forgotten to
check ‘hand pump solid’ – to ensure that the flaps had come down fully and
locked with the available hydraulic fluid. Luckily the authorities did not take too
serious a view of this lapse and I was allowed to continue my flying training.
All my course-mates were of course delighted to see me safe and sound and
in one piece. After all, it is not often that one does a dead-stick landing with a
‘seized’ engine. I thanked the Lord for looking after my interests and sparing my
life. I did not realise at the time that I had chosen a career where I would need
‘His’ assistance on many occasions throughout my life. Once while flying a Gnat
I had a flame-out or engine failure at 7,000 feet but the engine relit in no time.
The result was that no one would believe that the engine had in fact failed, until
I proved it on ground after I had safely landed.
We were commissioned on June 4, 1967. The then Defence Minister Swaran
Singh took the salute and pinned the wings on our chests swollen with pride, and
we marched to the haunting melody of Auld Lang Syne. My parents witnessed
the ceremony and I was justifiably proud and happy and so were they. Our first
posting was to a Vampire Squadron at Poona (now Pune). Half of us went to No.
220 Squadron and the other half to No. 221 Squadron. Here we went through
the ‘Applied Phase’ during which we were introduced to tactical flying and
armament delivery. Although we barely flew 20-25 hours in six months, we were
able to learn tactical flying and also carried out live firing of guns, rockets and
bombs; we were getting there, though not yet ‘Fully Operational’ on any type of
fighter. This short tenure was also most enjoyable as we were often sent on week-
long Temporary Duty’ or T/D moves to Bombay (now Mumbai). Since most of
us had never been to this most famous metropolis, we looked forward to these
moves. We also made new friends, since at the time, there were two Canberra
light bomber squadrons, and a Super Constellation heavy transport squadron
based at Pune; the latter with a small complement of World War II fame Liberator
four-engine bombers, which were now also used for maritime reconnaissance
 Appendix VII: Author’s Note 295

duties. The Super Constellations had been with Air India, and flying these even
as passengers was great fun. For the first time, we saw many veterans of the recent
conflict with Pakistan and were both impressed and inspired by their stories of
valour.
The next posting was to Operational Training Unit (OTU) at Jamnagar on
the Gujarat coast. Course-mates who took longer to complete their Applied Phase
training syllabus at Pune, were sent direct to Hunter Squadrons, mostly in the
east. At that time, we did not know how lucky we were to be posted to OTU
Jamnagar. Before starting our flying on the Hunter aircraft, we had to undergo
a short theory course called Mobile Conversion Flight (MCF). As the name
suggests, the Flight should normally have come to us, but in reality it did not
move from its permanent location at 28 Wing, Hindon. This was once again a
highly informative and educative trip as we were learning a lot about the aircraft,
flying and the Service in general. Visiting the national capital in early 1968 was
also an added bonus. We soon realised, that the Hunter was a complex aircraft
compared to the Vampire, and also much faster. Its flying controls were
hydraulically operated and hence, were very light and sensitive to the touch. Until
he gained some proficiency, it was common to see a novice unintentionally
waggling his wings after take-off.
The IAF station at Jamnagar was and is still called Armament Training Wing
(ATW), where all fighter squadrons of the IAF carried out annual live air-to-air
firing over the sea. There was and still is a major IAF Air-to-Ground Firing Range
at Jamnagar. As a result, it is an extremely busy station with squadrons coming
and going all the time. The officers’ mess, especially the bar, was always over-
crowded. On Saturday afternoons when officers are allowed to have beer, the
crowd used to be six-deep around the bar counter and getting to the barman was
well-nigh impossible. It was nearly the end of August by the time we completed
our training syllabus of some 35 hours. Unfortunately, the minimum experience
on a power-controlled aircraft needed to fly the Gnat Mk1 was then 40 hours,
but we did not know about this requirement, and had to cool our heels for a few
months when we were posted to our first operational squadrons in the north. We
also did not know then that the IAF was fast entering a phase of low aircraft
serviceability and it was difficult to train the extra pilots commissioned in the
post-1962 expansion. The fighter squadrons in the east were worse off compared
to those in the west. Transport and helicopter units that routinely carried out air-
maintenance tasks for our troops in the high Himalayas were always busy, but
could not spare aircraft and instructors to convert the newly commissioned pilots.
There were rumours that the COs of some of these squadrons did not even know
the names of their pilots and navigators. Many of our course-mates languished
in these units in the first four or five years of their service, when in fact they
should have flown the maximum in the prime of their service life. Little did we
296 Air Power and National Security

know that the conditions would get worse before they eventually got better. Poor
serviceability was, however, a very uneven phenomenon, with some squadrons
flying far more than the others. A lot depended on personalities, squadron ethos
and reputation of the CO and one’s luck.
Before long, I had somehow managed to do the ‘five’ hours on a Hunter and
had begun flying the Gnat Mk1 at Ambala, which at the time had two Gnat and
two Mystere IVA Squadrons. The first few sorties on the Gnat were also very
challenging because there was no two-seat Gnat trainer. We were shown an
‘approximate’ glide path on a Hunter Trainer and as in the Vampire Mk 52, once
again, someone sat on the tail of the Gnat to raise the nose to show the correct
take-off ‘attitude’ or angle. The student was expected to remember it. Primitive
as it might sound, the arrangement worked quite well, and I do not know of a
case where a pilot had difficulty landing the really fast and diminutive Gnat on
his first solo flight. So small was the aircraft that the pilot simply raised himself
with his arms on the side of the cockpit and jumped into it. The Gnat also held
a record of getting airborne in less than a minute, when on air defence alert.
Those who saw the little fighter for the first time did not believe that it was the
real aircraft they were looking at and not a model. The Gnat had already gained
much fame during the 1965 Indo-Pak war and was known as the Sabre Slayer for
having shot down a number of enemy fighters by that name.
Soon we were to learn that keeping this aircraft in the air was not easy as
maintenance and spares support from its manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics
Limited (HAL) were often well short of expected. It was also prone to many
problems such as engine surge, hydraulic system and control malfunctions, Radio
Telephony (R/T) failure and very frequent gun stoppages. Most of these problems
arose from the miniaturisation of the components fitted in the Gnat. The Orpheus
engine, a de-rated version of which still powers the Kiran Mk2 aircraft, had a
very narrow surge boundary and often misbehaved, or even failed, if and when
the pilot was a little harsh with throttle opening, especially at heights above 20,000
feet.
These regular ‘snags’, however, made all Gnat pilots very cautious and alert
and greatly improved their situational awareness. I think we genuinely respected
the machine and allowed for its idiosyncrasies. One felt part of it. As an old pilot
appropriately put it, “Flying the Gnat was like strapping it on your back.” A
somewhat plump pilot was asked how he got into the little Gnat. The answer
was, “With a shoe-horn!” He also had the presence of mind to say, “But I do not
need a can opener to get out of it.” In spite of the best efforts, it took over two
years to become Fully Operational (F/Ops) on the Gnat. Almost the first course
that a fighter pilot then did and does even today, is the locally run ‘cadre’ for
Forward Air Controller (FAC) where he is trained to direct fighter strikes on
ground targets that the army wants destroyed. This is the first time that a pilot
 Appendix VII: Author’s Note 297

learns about the army’s philosophy of war fighting. From early on, this kind of
training was termed army co-operation, and contrary to popular belief, supporting
the army has always been and will continue to be one of the most important
tasks that the IAF performs. Some of us also got the opportunity to spend a few
days with the army units and in turn, invited the young counterparts to visit our
air force stations to familiarise themselves with our daily routine. Those of us
who flew as supernumerary crew in transport aircraft to ‘earn’ flying bounty, also
got an opportunity to visit forward areas in Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir,
and actually saw for the first time that there was so much more of India beyond
Leh or Srinagar. We were also impressed by the difficult flying environment in
which our transport counterparts routinely flew.
By the early part of 1970, the situation in the region had begun deteriorating,
and by the end of the year, it was widely believed that the probability of another
war with Pakistan was very high. Number 18 Squadron to which I was posted,
was earmarked for the air defence of Srinagar, and we had begun visiting the
Kashmir Valley from late 1968 onwards. Srinagar was far more beautiful, quiet
and peaceful than one imagined, even if the locals sometimes let us know that
we, the visitors, were from India.
Well before the third Indo-Pak war began in December 1971, the squadron
was in place at Srinagar. Due to there being no aircraft shelters at the Srinagar
airfield, the squadron was allowed to keep a maximum of only four Gnats with
only one more stand-by, for the air defence of the Valley. Frequent
‘unserviceabilities’ or technical snags meant many trips to Ambala to get a
replacement. The visibility in winters used to be pretty bad sometimes, making
it impossible to spot another aircraft in the air. The absence of an air defence or
airfield surveillance radar meant that we had to rely on our eyes. Some ‘observer
posts’ were located on the mountain tops on the western side of the Valley, for
giving us warning about the approach of enemy fighters. This was far from a
reliable procedure, as very often, the observer only heard the sound of a jet but
could/did not see it. At other times, the batteries of his R/T set ran low and
could not be recharged. To add to the difficulties, some Pakistani spies or
sympathisers in the Valley warned the approaching PAF aircraft in advance, if a
Gnat patrol was already in the air. In spite of these difficulties, the squadron saw
some 14 daylight air attacks but only three encounters in the air, in one of which
Flying Officer N.J.S. Sekhon went down fighting the enemy, and was awarded
the highest gallantry award, the Param Vir Chakra.
Soon after the War, I was posted to another Gnat squadron at Bagdogra near
Siliguri in West Bengal. I spent a total of seven years in Gnat, and two more years
in Ajeet Squadrons. In 1980, I was posted to a MiG-21MF Squadron, by which
time I had completed the Air Staff Course at Defence Services Staff College
(DSSC),Wellington, the Qualified Flying Instructors (QFI) Course at Tambaram,
298 Air Power and National Security

Madras (now Chennai) and a two-year tenure as a flying instructor at the Air
Force Academy (AFA) Dundigal near Secunderabad. After about two years in
No. 7 Squadron then based at Chandigarh, I was selected for deputation to the
Government of Iraq, as India had been sending QFIs to that country from the
late 1960s. As one wit put it, “Mao and Zhou gave us a job, and Saddam Hussein
pulled us above the poverty line.” This is how he described those of us recruited
in the post-1962 air force expansion. Later, the IAF found it difficult to manage
the careers and promotions of these officers and called it the ‘bulge’ in the pyramid,
conveniently forgetting that for over a decade in the late 1970s and 1980s, most
of the ‘appointments’ where real work was done, were manned by these officers.
A very large number of these pilots did not get a fair deal and lost out on
promotions for no fault of theirs and were prematurely wasted out despite some
efforts by Air Headquarters such as ‘deep selection’ promotion policy to allow
officers a fair chance of promotion to the rank of Wing Commander.
The Iraq experience was unique and an eye-opener for those of us brought
up in a free-for-all democracy, where the citizen could get away with almost
anything. The long Iran-Iraq war was on when we reached Baghdad in June 1982,
but there was neither any blackout, anxiety nor any other indication that the
country was at war. Our base, the Air Force College at Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s
home town, in fact, a small village, was equally quiet. Only when we started
flying to the east of the river Tigris were we sometimes called back to land. The
Iraqi authorities never told us that an air defence alert was underway or that an
enemy attack was imminent. The Indian Embassy library was well stocked, and
one read some memorable books. Most of us were busy shopping, as Iraq’s import-
oriented economy was full of foreign white goods. Very often, items of daily
consumption like butter, onions and chicken became ‘makoo’ or Arabic for
unavailable, if imports were delayed. For an Indian used to plenty at the worst
of times, this was a major shock. Iraqi paranoia for their leader’s safety and the
workings of a dictatorship, albeit a popular one, were some of the other shocks
to our Indian minds. Back home in India, Khalistani separatists had been creating
serious problems for the Central Government. Operation Blue Star of June 1984,
had its backlash in Indira Gandhi’s assassination at the hands of her bodyguards
in October 1984, that was followed by mayhem in Delhi and elsewhere, in which
over 3,000 Sikhs were massacred.
Soon after my return from Iraq in August 1984, with a brand new Volkswagen
Passat hatch-back, which was the cynosure of friends and foes alike, I found
myself on the faculty of the DSSC at Wellington, in the salubrious Nilgiri hills
of Tamil Nadu. This was considered a prestigious appointment and a necessary
step in the promotion ladder, or so it was generally thought. After a nearly two-
year-long tenure, during which I broke my back in a horse-riding accident, but
miraculously regained A1G1,the medical category essential to fly any fighter
 Appendix VII: Author’s Note 299

aircraft, thanks to help from some highly qualified aviation medicine specialists,
I was posted to take over command of a fighter squadron, a goal that every self-
respecting pilot has in his mind. Number 22 Squadron, then equipped with the
Ajeet, was based at Bagdogra. Since this was my second tour of Bagdogra, the
landscape was familiar, the job demanding but professionally immensely satisfying.
There were the usual trips for firing practice to another station in West Bengal,
at Kalai Kunda near Kharagpur. Given the limited endurance of the Ajeet – like
all fighters of that generation, and poor serviceability – it was extremely difficult
to complete the government authorised task of 240 hours per month, but during
the two years, the squadron made a record of sorts, by regularly flying 250-300
sorties every month. So busy was the routine, that before I realised it, the two-
year tenure was over, with almost every young pilot of the squadron achieving his
F/Ops status and night flying qualification, so that all of them could be posted
out to either Jaguar or MiG-27 units. The squadron also won the Flight Safety
Trophy for that year.
I soon found myself, much against my wishes, on the personal staff of the
Air-Officer-Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) Eastern Air Command (EAC)
at its Headquarters at Shillong in Meghalaya, further east. In fact, I was very keen
to go to Gwalior, Pune, Jodhpur or Ambala where some of the new fighters like
the Mirage-2000, MiG-29, MiG-27 and Jaguar were based. I had spent too many
years with the Gnat, Hunter and MiG-21. It took me some time to come to
terms with my new job, which I must admit, proved very interesting, educative
and demanding. I got to see how a senior Air Marshal thought and worked.
During this period Rajiv Gandhi, the young Prime Minister, made a landmark
visit to China, to bring about a thaw in Sino-Indian relations, and calm the
atmosphere that had got tense following the Sum Durong Chu incident of 1986,
in which Chinese and Indian troops had nearly clashed on the border. I remember
a case of a Chinese fighter violating Indian airspace that India did not openly
protest about.
At the end of a year and a half, I became a Group Captain and left
Headquarters EAC, to command the newly raised mini-wing No. 43 co-located
with No. 5 BRD at Sulur, near Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu. This too was an
interesting stint, as I first had two Mi-8 helicopter units under me with a Mi-17
and a Mi-25 unit on long attachment, for operations in Sri Lanka. Later an An-32
Squadron joined us. Funnily, the CO of this squadron was at least four courses
senior to me, and it is to his credit that we got along very well. Not once did he
let me feel the difference in our seniority. I visited my units at Jaffna, Vavunia,
and Trincomalee in Sri Lanka and learnt of their problems and needs first-hand.
This was my second command assignment.
About a year and nine months later, I was posted to Delhi as part of the Joint
Planning Staff (JPS) in the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat. Our offices
300 Air Power and National Security

were located on the ground floor of the imposing and majestic South Block, but
were as dusty and unkempt as any sarkari office. Since the JPS was part of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), we used to attend the CoSC meetings every
Monday afternoon. This was a great opportunity to see the highest commanders
of our armed forces at close quarters.
In 1993, I took command of a Forward Base Support Unit (FBSU) at Uttarlai,
near Barmer in Rajasthan. Known as a punishment posting in the IAF, I found
that the people in small remote bases form a far more cohesive group and work
better. Uttarlai was notorious for brackish water, very high temperatures in
summer, poor drainage due to a sub-soil layer of gypsum and rock, malaria and
fluorosis. Health issues affected other areas too. There was an acute shortage of
qualified teachers in our Central School as most of those posted to Uttarlai, simply
used to take leave without pay and not report for duty. This tenure was both
challenging and satisfying, as we were able to do some useful work for the uplift
of the villagers of Uttarlai.
After a short stint of just over a year at Air Headquarters, as the Director,
Personnel Planning (DPP), I was once again transferred, this time to take over
command of a very large and busy airbase at Kalai Kunda near Kharagpur in
West Bengal. This base like ATW, Jamnagar, was used for air-to-air firing practice
over the sea, off the coast of Odisha. At any time, there was at least one visiting
squadron (in addition to the two MiG-27 and one Hunter Target Towing Unit
permanently based at Kalai Kunda) which meant an extremely busy schedule for
all station personnel. At the end of 1997, the IAF went through very serious
turmoil, due to unprecedented protests by a section of disaffected technical
personnel, unhappy about changes made to the then prevailing grade structure
of airmen. Some engineering officers also were affected by rumours of
disproportionate pay rise recommended for the Flying Branch personnel, to the
Fifth Pay Commission. Visiting squadrons from all over India brought with them
all kind of news, and at times unfounded rumours, that were to play a major role
during those unfortunate and troubled times that affected the normal working
of many air force bases. It was a harrowing time, and it was only with tact and
sincere persuasion that the situation was brought under control. In retrospect,
the real reason for this widespread unhappiness was that the higher authorities at
Delhi, had planned to make changes to the trade structure, without first consulting
people in the field. Incidents of tool-down strikes and other such disruptions
were widely reported in the national print and electronic media, further alienating
large sections of air force personnel. A few culprits and rabble rousers were
ultimately brought to book but the damage was done. In my personal opinion,
the agitation severely affected inter- and intra-branch relations in the air force,
and it will be a long time before the wounds are completely healed.
At the end of one year, I was posted out to Pune as AOC Advance
 Appendix VII: Author’s Note 301

Headquarters, South Western Air Command. It seemed that I had paid the price
for someone else’s mistakes.
Each of the Army Commanders in India is responsible for conducting army/
ground operations in the area of his responsibility. To do this job effectively, an
air force officer of the rank of Air Commodore is established to command a
small element of air force personnel that is co-located with the army command.
The AOC Advance Headquarters is essentially meant to advise the Army
Commander on all issues related to employment of air power, to assist him in
executing his army’s plans and also to direct the Tactical Air Centre (TAC)
Commanders co-located with the Army’s Corps Headquarters, under the control
of the Army Command. At the time, the jurisdiction of the Southern Army
Command, based at Pune, extended from Jodhpur in the north to the
southernmost limits of the Indian Peninsula. The Army Commander was thus
required to liaise with Headquarters South-Western Air Command (SWAC) and
Southern Air Command (SAC) IAF, and also with the Western and Southern
Commands of the Navy.
Soon after reaching Pune, I visited the Tactical Air Centres (TACs) at Bhopal
and Jodhpur and familiarised myself with their operational plans. In late
November-December 1998, a huge Command-level army-air force exercise was
planned in the Rajasthan desert, in which more than 30,000 troops participated.
The tasks allotted to the IAF were executed in time and the army elements were
provided with adequate air support. The exercise was a complete success.
I feel that while the contribution of the IAF was laudable, the effects of air
power were not adequately factored into the overall assessment by the umpires;
as such, the lessons drawn from such a massive exercise were incomplete. A more
thorough process of joint planning from the very conception of the exercise would
have been far more beneficial. As brought out before, from its very inception in
1932, when its strength was a few handful of aircraft, and also during World War
II, when its strength gradually increased to 10 squadrons, and again, immediately
after independence in the nearly 14-month war in Jammu and Kashmir, the IAF
did little else but to act in direct support of the army. Despite this record, the
army has always complained that the IAF did not adequately support land
operations. Instead of planning an operation with the IAF, the army tends to use
air power as a bonus, and is loath to discuss the details, and the army’s concept
of operations and objectives. The army simply demands that a particular minimum
number of aircraft/sorties be allocated to it, and that the army then be allowed
to use the earmarked assets as it pleases. The IAF on the other hand, wants to be
included in the planning of the operation from the very beginning, and expects
to be allowed to suggest ways to use available air power to achieve a certain ‘effect’.
The IAF is then ready to employ even larger numbers of aircraft if need be, to
achieve the stated objective. It is unfair to simply expect the IAF to be ready at
302 Air Power and National Security

the army’s beck and call without including it in joint planning. Worse, the army
very often draws wrong lessons from an exercise or actual operation, when it fails
to critically evaluate IAF’s contribution.
At the end of a short period of eight months, I was posted as Member, Air
Force and Senior Fellow, on deputation to the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA), a Ministry of Defence-funded think tank in Delhi. I retired
from the IAF after spending a little over three years in this position on August
31, 2002, thus bringing to a close a 35-year fruitful yet challenging and enjoyable
career with the IAF.
 Appendix VII: Author’s Note 303

Select Bibliography

Primary Sources – Official Publications

Annual Report 2011-2012, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.
Basic Doctrine of the IAF, Air Headquarters, New Delhi, September 7, 2012.
Basic Doctrine of the Indian Army, Air Headquarters, New Delhi, 1999.
British Air and Space Doctrine, AP 3000, Fourth Edition, Air Staff, Ministry of
Defence, Government of the United Kingdom, London.
British Defence Doctrine, Fourth Edition, Headquarters, Royal Air Force, UK,
2006.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board, (Released
by Government of India on August 7, 1999 and amended January 2003).

Interviews with Retired and Serving Military Officers

Air Vice Marshal H.S. Ahluwalia (Retd.)
Air Marshal S.G. Inamdar (Retd.)
Air Marshal Bharat Kumar (Retd.)
General V.P. Malik (Retd.)
Air Marshal Y.V. Malse (Retd.)
Air Marshal M. Matheswaran
Air Marshal N. Menon (Retd.)
Air Chief Marshal H. Moolgaonkar (Retd.)
Air Marshal S.C. Mukul (Retd.)
Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd.)
Air Marshal R. Raghu Rajan (Retd.)
Air Marshal P. Rajkumar (Retd.)
Air Marshal Randhir Singh (Retd.)
304 Air Power and National Security

Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi (Retd.)

Several Unnamed Serving Officers

Secondary Sources
Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography, Viking,
New Delhi, 1993.
Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998.
Alexander, P.C., Through the Corridors of Power: An Insider’s Story, HarperCollins,
New Delhi, 2004.
Burles, Mark and Abram N. Shulsky, Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence
from History and Doctrinal Writings, RAND, Santa Monica, 2000.
Campbell-Johnson, Alan, Mission with Mountbatten, Robert Hale, London, 1951.
Chaturvedi, M.S., History of the Indian Air Force, Vikas, New Delhi, 1978.
Chengappa, Raj, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to be a Nuclear
Power, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2000.
Cohen, Stephen P. and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military
Modernisation, Viking, New Delhi, 2010.
Dahiya, Rumel, Namrata Goswami, Ajey Lele, (eds.), Asia 2030: The Unfolding
Future, Lancer, New Delhi, 2010.
Dalvi, J.P., Himalayan Blunder, Thacker & Company Limited, Bombay, 1969.
Das, Durga, India from Curzon to Nehru and After, Rupa & Co., Delhi, 1969
(Reprinted 1974).
Dasgupta, C., War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48, Sage, New Delhi, 2002.
Fischer, Louis, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi, Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Mumbai,
1995.
Galbraith, John Kenneth, Ambassador’s Journal, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1969.
Gandhi, Rajmohan, Patel: A Life, Navjivan Press, Ahmedabad, 1991 (Reprint
2008).
Garver, John W., Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century,
University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, 2001.
Hodson, H.V., The Great Indian Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan, Hutchinson,
London, 1969.
Jalan, Bimal, The Future of India, Viking, New Delhi, 2005.
Jha, Prem Shankar. The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947, Oxford University
Press, New Delhi, 2003.
Kalyanaraman, S., “The Indian Military Response to Threats from Pakistan, 1949-
 Select Bibliography 305

2010”, Paper presented at the IDSA Fellows Seminar, July 8, 2011

(Unpublished).
Kaul, B.M., The Untold Story, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1967.
Kavic, Lorne J., India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies 1947-1965, EBD
Publishing and Distributing Co., Dehradun, 1967. Also, University of
California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1967.
Khan, M. Akbar, Raiders in Kashmir, Second Edition, National Book Foundation,
Islamabad, 1975.
Khilnani, Sunil, The Idea of India, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1997.
____, Kumar, Rajiv, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani,
Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran, Siddharth Vardarajan, Non-alignment 2.0:
A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, New Delhi,
Centre for Policy Research, February 28, 2012.
Khullar, Darshan, When Generals Failed: The Chinese Invasion, Manas Publications,
New Delhi, 1999.
Kumar, Bharat, An Incredible War: Indian Air Force in Kashmir War 1947-48,
Knowledge World, New Delhi, 2007.
Lal, P.C., My Years with the IAF, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986.
Lele, Ajey, Strategic Technologies for the Military, Sage, New Delhi, 2009.
Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai, China’s Strategic Sea Power: The Politics of
Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford University Press, Stanford,
1994.
____ and Xue Litai, ‘China’s Search for a Modern Air Force’, International Security,
Summer 1999, 24 (1), pp. 64-94.
Malik, S.K., The Quranic Concept of War, Associate Printers, Lahore, 1979.
Malik, V.P., Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, Harper Collins, New Delhi, 2006.
Mankekar, D.R., The Guilty Men of 1962, Tulsi Shah, Mumbai, 1968.
____, Twenty Two Fateful Days: Pakistan Cut to Size, Maniktalas, Mumbai,1966.
Maxwell, Neville, India’s China War, Jonathan Cape, London, 1970.
Mac Farquhar, Roderick, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume 3, The
Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966, Columbia University Press, 1987.
Menon, V.P., The Story of the Integration of Indian States, Longman Green, London,
1956.
Mullik, B.N., My Years with Nehru: The Chinese Betrayal, Allied Publishers, New
Delhi, 1971.
Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
(Third Edition), Scientific Book Agency, Kolkata, 1966.
Nanda, Prakash (ed.) Rising India: Friends and Foes, Lancer, New Delhi, 2007.
306 Air Power and National Security

Nehru, Jawaharlal, The Discovery of India (First published Signet Press, Calcutta
1946, Reprint 2004, Penguin, New Delhi).
Palit, D.K., War in the High Himalayas: Indian Army in Crisis, 1962, Hurst &
Co., London, 1991.
Pape, Robert A., “The True Worth of Air Power”, Foreign Affairs 83 (2), March-
April 2004, pp. 116-27.
Paret, Peter (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Modern Age,
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1986.
Phadke, R.V., PLAAF: Shifting Air Power Balance, Occasional Paper, CISAC,
Stanford, February 2002.
____, Air Power and Escalation Control, Stimson Center, Washington DC, May
2003.
____, China’s Power Projection, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2005.
Prasad, S.N. and Dharm Pal, Operations in Jammu & Kashmir, 1947-48, History
Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi, 2005.
Pradhan, R.D., Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister, 1962-65,
Orient Longman, Hyderabad, 1998.
____, The 1965 War: The Inside Story, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan’s Diary of
India-Pakistan War, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 2007.
Raghavan, Srinath, War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru
Years, Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2010.
Rajkumar, Philip, The Tejas Story: The Light Combat Aircraft Project, Manohar,
New Delhi, 2008.
Rashid, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos, Viking, London, 2008.
Saigal A.L. (ed.), Birth of an Air Force: The Memoirs of Air Vice-Marshal Harjinder
Singh, Palit and Palit Publishers, New Delhi, 1977.
Sachdev, A.K., Space Age Gladiators, Knowledge World, New Delhi, December
2000.
Saksena, K.P., The United Nations and Collective Security, D.K. Publishing House,
New Delhi, 1974.
Sarila, Narendra Singh, The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s
Partition, Constable, London, 2006.
Singh, Jasjit (ed.) Nuclear India, Knowledge World, New Delhi, July 1998.
____ (ed.) Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under the Jackboot, Siddhi Books, New
Delhi, 1995.
Sisodia, N.S. and Kalyanaraman, S. (eds.), The Future of War and Peace in Asia,
Magnum Books, New Delhi, 2010.
Sisodia, N.S. and Sujit Dutta, (eds.) India and the World, Vol. 1 – Strategic Thought:
The Formative Years, Promilla and Co., New Delhi, 2005.
 Select Bibliography 307

Smith, Chris, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy?, SIPRI,
Oxford University Press, 1994.
Smith, David, The Dragon and the Elephant: China, India and the New World
Order, Profile Books, London, 2007.
Swaine, Michael D. and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past,
Present and Future, Project Air Force, RAND, Santa Monica, 2000.
Tanham, George K. and Marcy Agmon, The Indian Air Force: Trends and Prospects,
RAND Monograph, Santa Monica, 1995.
Thorat, S.P.P., From Reveille to Retreat, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1986.
Vallance, Andrew G.B., The Air Weapon: Doctrines of Air Power Strategy and
Operational Art, St. Martin’s Press, London, 1996.

Magazines and Journals

Air Power Journal, USAF Air University, Alabama, USA.
Journal of Defence Studies, Bloomsbury, New Delhi.
Jane’s Defence Weekly, IHS, UK.
Strategic Analysis, Routledge, UK.
308 Air Power and National Security

Index

26/11 Mumbai terror, 50 Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C),

9/11 terrorist strikes, 5 203-4, 299
Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel, 194
Abdullah, Sheikh, 57 Air Power and Escalation Control, 238
Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL), 187 Air Power
Acceptance of Necessity (AoN), 215 Definition, 9-10
Ack-Ack regiment, 285 Attribute, 10-11
Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), Air Space Management, 36, 230
171, 176 Air Staff Requirement (ASR), 207, 217
Administration and Special Duties (A&SD), 195 Air Superiority, 27
Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT), 148, 153, 168, 183, Air Supremacy, 27
197, 206-7, 217 Air Tasking Orders (ATO), 120
Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), 200, 281 Air Traffic Control (ATC), 30, 90, 92, 111, 195,
Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), 187 285, 287, 290, 293
Aerial Delivery Research and Development Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCOs), 198
Establishment (ADRDE), 198 Air Transport Operations, 37
Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), 220 Airborne Early Warning and Control
Aeronautical Development Establishment (AEW&C), 166, 168, 187
(ADE), 220 Airborne Interception (AI) radar, 146
Afghan War, 77 Airborne Warning and Control System
Afghanistan, 5, 13, 21, 58, 74, 77-78, 123-24, (AWACS), 31-32, 35, 123, 126-27, 165,
125, 166, 172, 181-82 168-71, 177, 186-87, 253, 260
Agni, 73, 217, 220-21, 232, 234, 236, 251 Air-to-Air Missile (AAM), 108, 272-73
Air Defence Direction Centre (ADDC), 30-31 Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), 123-24, 127, 170-
Air Defence Ground Environment System 71, 253, 260
(ADGES), 31 Air-to-Ground Firing Range, 295
Air Force Academy (AFA), 100, 142, 202 Air-to-ground missiles, 219
Air Force Administrative College (AFAC), 201, Akal Takht, 74
289 Akash SAM, 166, 186, 221
Air Force Flying College (AFFC), 100, 197, 292 Aksai Chin, 4, 25, 53, 65, 67, 92, 94, 96, 246
Air Force Law, 289 Alagappa, Muthiah, 45
Air Force Net (AFNET), 169-70 Alexander, P.C., 76
Air Force Technical College (AFTC), 142, 201 All India Radio, 223
Air India, 26, 156, 198, 224, 295 All-Aspect-Missile, 186
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), 171, 189 Ambassador’s Journal, 66
Air Observation Post (Air OP), 229-31 American Fairchild A-10, 17, 170, 230
 Index 309
Anglo-French consortium, 149 British War Cabinet, 20
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), 19, 28, 103, 250 Browne, N.A.K., Air Chief Marshal, 173, 201,
Appadorai, A., 47-48 205, 224, 236
Arab-Israeli Bucher, General Sir Francis Robert Roy, 59
conflicts, 116, Budget Estimate (BE), 212
Wars, 114
Armament Training Wing (ATW), 143, 197, ‘C’ Flight, 203
295 Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA),
Armed aggression, 62 78
Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), 78, 213
(AFRC), 133, 135 Cariappa Memorial Lecture, 45
Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 226 Casualty-Evacuation (Cas-Evac), 230
Arming Without Aiming, 84 Ceasefire Line (CFL), 71, 73, 97, 111, 249
Army-air force joint exercise, 231 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 123, 150
Auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude, 60, 134 Central Military Commission (CMC), 117
Auxiliary Air Force, 198 Central Reserve Police Force, 224
Aviation Week & Space Technology (AWST), 188 Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), 143-44
AWACS-AAR combination, 127 Chaturvedi, Air Marshal M.S., 131, 134
Ayyangar, N. Gopalaswami, 62 Chaudhuri, General J.N., 69, 71, 98, 102-3
Chavan, Y.B., 69-70, 95, 97-98, 101-2, 247
Bajpai, K. Shankar, 42, 46, 83 Cheetah, 165, 217, 229
Baker, Noel, 59 Chetak, 154, 165, 168, 217, 229
Baldwin, Stanley, 21 Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW), 234
Banerjee, Major General Dipankar, 53 Chengappa, Raj, 75
Bangladesh Liberation War, 41, 104-8 Chief Engineering Officer (C Eng), 203, 208
Bangladesh War, 112, 199, 249, 269 Chief Flying Instructors (CFI), 198
Base Repair Depot (BRD), 153, 289 Chief of Army Staff (COAS), 69, 101-2
Basis Turbo Trainer (BTT), 210 Chief of the Air Staff, 102, 107
Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), 36 Chief Operations Officer (COO), 199
Battlefield Air Strike (BAS), 33-35 Chief Technical Officer (CTO), 203
Bekaa Valley, 115 Chiefs of Staff Committee (CoSC), 78, 142,
Bell 47G, 94, 267 224, 228, 300
Beyond Visual Range (BVR) Missile, 166, 169, China, 2, 4, 29, 41, 49-54, 56-57, 65, 67, 70,
171, 177, 186, 221, 274 72-73, 82, 95, 117, 130, 137, 154, 161,
Bhabha, Homi J., 141, 232 163-64, 166, 176, 181-82, 184, 186-87,
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 54, 182, 223 192, 214, 232-33, 235, 240, 252-53, 255,
Bhatia, Flight Lieutenant Jimmy (V.K.) (later Air 299
Marshal), 100 China’s 2004 Defence White Paper, 38
Bhatnagar, Sir Shanti Swarup, 141 China-Vietnam War, 117
Bhutto, Z.A., 72-73, 249 Chinese
Bishnoi, Wing Commander (later AVM) B.K., aggression, 145
105 military aviation industry, 178
Blackett, Professor P.M.S., 139-41 nuclear threat, 235
Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA), 109 threat, 55-56, 96, 104, 252
Booth, Ken, 43 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 2, 4,
Border Roads Organisation (BRO), 93, 281 117, 163,
Border Security Force, 224 Navy, 183
Brahmos supersonic missile, 189, 221, 234 Chopra, Flight Lieutenant P.C., 100
Brar, Major General K.S., 74 Chopra, Samir, 104
British Aerospace (BAe) Hawk AJT, 148 Chou En-lai, 67
British Indian Army, 2, 130 Chumbi Valley, 67, 97
310 Air Power and National Security
Churchill, Winston, 8, 12, 23 Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), 78,
Civil Aviation Training Centre (CATC), 198, 135, 142
291 Defence Finance Wing, 212
Civil-Military Relations (CMR), 222-23 Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), 50
Clark, General Wesley, 121 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs),
Close Air Support (CAS), 33, 100-1, 158, 170, 80, 202, 210, 216-17, 258
230 Defence Research and Development
CNN Effect, 119 Organisation (DRDO), 73, 81, 157, 172,
Coal India, 224 175, 189-90, 192, 212, 215-22, 234
Cohen, Elliot , 12, 122 Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), 201, 297
Cohen, Stephen, 84, 149 Defensive Counter Air Operations, 23
Cold War, 3, 24, 45, 48, 53, 143, 147, 149, Deng Xiaoping, 73, 82
156, 208, 255 Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), 215, 232
Colonel Thapar, 89 Desert Air Force, 23
Combat Air Patrol (CAP), 14, 28, 34, 99, 101, Dewan, Air Commodore H.C., 63, 94
110, 199, 285, 287 Director General Flight Safety and Inspection
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), 37 (DGFS&I), 220
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), 134-35 Directorate of Air Staff Requirements (DASR),
Commanding Officer (CO), 91, 201, 208, 286, 152
290 Director-General Civil Aviation (DGCA), 224
Committee of Secretaries, 227 Doordarshan, 223
Communication and Information Technology Dowding, Sir Hugh, Air Marshal, 22
(CIT), 52 Dropping Zones (DZs), 280
Comprehensive National Power (CNP), 49, 53
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 233, Egyptian Air Force, 27, 114, 147
235 Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM),
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), 75, 227 32, 172, 221
Congo, 46, 246 Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), 32, 115,
Control and Reporting System (C&R), 151 170, 172, 221
Conventional war, 36, 56, 75, 78, 124, 127, Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), 190
158, 161-63, 170, 188, 214, 230, 236, 238, Electronic Warfare (EW), 28, 108, 127
256 Elementary Flying Training Unit (EFTU),
Coral Sea, 23 290
Counter Air Operations (CAO), 28-29 Engineer, A.M., Air Marshal, 94-95, 102, 135
Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN), 118-
19, 186 Fairchild A-10, 17, 170, 230
Counter Measure Dispensing Systems (CMDS), Falklands War, 117-18,
177 Favourable Air Situation (FAS), 27-29, 101
Counter Surface Force Operations (CSFO), 24, Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), 166,
33-36, 170 175-79, 184, 211, 254
Crisis Management Group, 227
Cyber, 38, 173, 227 Fighter Combat Leader (FCL) Course, 199, 201
Fighter Controller (FC), 30, 195
Dalai Lama, 53 Fighter Ground Attack (FGA) aircraft, 146, 170,
Das, Durga, 90 245, 250
Das, Group Captain Suranjan, 147 Financial Advisor Defence Services (FADS), 228
Dasgupta, Ambassador Chandrashekhar, 57- Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), 235
59 Flight Information Regions (FIR), 30
Dasgupta, Sunil, 84, 149 Flight safety, 205-10
Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA), 74, Fly-by-Wire (FBW) Flight Control System, 151,
48-49, 152, 156, 167, 184, 206, 250 220
 Index 311
Flying Bounty (FB), 196 HAL Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT) Sitara
Flying pay, 196, 204 programme, 179
Foreign Object Damage (FOD), 208 Hebert, Adam J., 124
Forward Air Controllers (FACs), 33-35, 101, Helicopter Training School (HTS), 267, 293
123, 185, 199, 246, 296 Hercules C-130J, 37, 165, 187
Forward Base Support Units (FBSUs), 109, 300 High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE), 13,
Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT), 125 172, 187
Fossil Fuel, 191 High Tension (HT) cables, 100
France, 20, 22, 124, 148, 150, 156, 233, 245 Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai, 4
French Dassault Mirage F-1, 149 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), 71, 140,
Fuel, Oil and Lubricants (FOL), 90, 213 144, 147, 149, 153, 156-57, 164-65, 173-
Full Operational Clearance (FOC), 164, 174, 74, 177, 209, 217, 220, 268-70, 273-74,
192 290, 296
Full Spectrum Dominance, 38-39 HMS Achilles, 62
Fully Operational (F/Ops), 147, 199, 294, 296 Human Resource Development (HRD), 194
Hunter OTU, 197
Galbraith, J.K., 66-68 Hussein, Saddam, 32, 119, 122
Gandhi, Mahatma, 3, 48, 64
Gandhi, Mrs. Indira, 72, 73, 220, 223, 232, IAF Volunteer Reserve (IAFVR), 131-32
249, 298 Identification-Friend or Foe (IFF), 30
Gandhi, Rajiv, 26, 75-77, 220, 223, 233, 252, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 123
299 India, 1-6, 41,
Gandhi, Rajmohan defence budget, 80, 210-15, 276-79
Patel: A Life, 63 defence policy, 224
Garros, Roland, 18 military strategy, 55, 248
Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), vast geographical expanse, 54, 224
218 India-China Border, 65
Gates, Robert, 75 Indian
Gaza conflict, 188 Army, 25, 26, 37, 55, 58, 66, 71, 76, 77,
General Cariappa, 222 92, 95, 98, 100, 103, 105, 110, 113, 130,
General Chiang Kai-shek, 4 133, 135, 219, 232, 234, 246-48, 281, 289
General Service Training (GST), 289 military, 56, 58
George, David Lloyd, 20 Navy, 16, 26, 59, 234
Global Navigational Satellite System Nuclear Doctrine, 234
(GLONASS), 178 Indian Administrative Service (IAS), 78, 216
Global Positioning System (GPS), 9, 32, 175, Indian Air Force (IAF), 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 11-12, 15-
178, 185 16, 25-26, 28, 30-32, 37, 59, 66, 71, 76,
Global War on Terror (GWOT), 5 90-92, 94, 99-101, 103-5, 107-14, 127,
Globemaster C-17, 37 130-38, 142-44, 146-58, 161-76, 178-79,
Golden Temple, 74 182-85, 187, 189-90, 192, 194-95, 197-
Grand strategy, 44, 48, 79 200-11, 217, 221, 228-30, 233-4, 237-8,
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 52, 79, 80, 241, 245-54, 260, 264-70, 272-4, 280-2,
211, 215 284, 289-91, 295, 297-98, 300-2
Ground Controlled Interception (GCI), 145 Indian Civil Service (ICS), 93, 134, 139
Ground Liaison Officer (GLO), 33, 101 Indian National Congress, 3
Ground Moving Target Indicators (GMTIs), Indian National Defence University (INDU),
125 202-3, 258
Ground Training School (GTS), 142 Indian Ocean Region (IOR), 2, 5
Group of Ministers (GoM), 227 Indian Ocean, 2, 41, 47, 58, 131
Gulf War, 14, 26, 28, 32, 34, 119-20, 122-23, Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), 26, 75-76,
154, 237 251
312 Air Power and National Security
Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), 73 Kargil Conflict, 76, 189, 281
Indo-Pak War, 28, 59, 71-2, 92, 97-104, 144, Kargil Review Committee (KRC), 50, 84, 222,
273 239
Inertial Navigation System (INS), 185 Kargil, 51, 55-56, 71, 97, 112-4
Initial Operational Clearance (IOC), 164, 174, War, 17, 26, 28, 35, 38, 224
192, 217 Karnad, Bharat, 235
Initial Training Wing (ITW), 289 Kashmir Valley, 3, 58, 71, 89, 97, 245, 247,
INS Delhi, 59 270, 297
INS Vikramaditya, 16 Kashmir War, 134, 136, 143
Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), 50 Katari, Vice Admiral R.D., 102
Integrated Guided Missile Development Kaul, Lieutenant General B.M., 66, 69, 70, 95
Programme (IGMDP), 73, 149, 220, 232 Kautilya, 47
Intelligence Bureau, 65 Kavic, Lorne J., 244
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Keeler, Squadron Leader Trevor, 98
(ISR), 33, 124-25, 168, 191 Khan, Ayub, 67
Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Khan, Dr. A.Q., 75
235 Khan, Liaquat Ali, 60, 64, 143
International Border (IB), 32, 55, 103, 107, 148, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 11, 130
151, 181 Korea, 4, 46, 48, 68, 246
International Relations (IR), 43, 45, 54, 113 Korean War, 4, 25, 33, 246
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 122
5, 78 Kosovo, 28, 120-22, 125
Iran-Iraq War, 298, Kothari, Dr. D.S., 141
Iran, 28, 120, 188-89, 220 Krishnaswamy, S., Air Chief Marshal, 218,
Iraq, 14, 21, 28, 114, 120, 122, 125, 130, 204, 240
298
Iraq-Saudi border, 119 Ladakh, 4-5, 12, 53, 66-68, 76, 92-94, 181,
Israeli Kfir C2, 150 245-46, 252, 281-82, 297
Italy, 13, 17-18, 20 Lafontaine, D.A., Air Marshal, 153, 207
Lal, P.C., Air Chief Marshal, 102, 107
Jacob, Lieutenant General J.F.R., 72, 250 Lal, Air Commodore P.C., 268
Jacquet, Pierre, 43 Lal, Group Captain P.C., 135
Jammu & Kashmir Question, 63 Laos, 46
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), 1, 25, 41, 89, 91, Laser Guided Bomb (LGB), 171, 185
137, 155, 161, 223, 245, 297, 301 LCA Tejas, 157, 164, 174, 192
Japan, 3, 41, 131, 184, 231 Lead-in-Fighter-Trainer (LIFT), 197, 207
Japanese Lebanon War, 115-16, 188
attack on Pearl Harbour, 23, 131 Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), 41
Navy, 23 Leh-Kargil highway, 112
Jatar, Flight Lieutenant Micky, 100 Leyte Gulf, 23
Jet Bomber Conversion Unit (JBCU), 155, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 6, 75-
265 77, 89, 111
Jet Training Wing (JTW), 293 Libya, 13, 17, 28, 124-26
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), 35, 123, Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), 151, 164, 174,
171, 185, 188 184, 192, 216-18, 220
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 78 Limited Series Production (LSP-8), 164, 174
Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), 185 Line of Actual Control (LAC), 5, 50, 163, 252
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 176, 184, 236 Line of Control (LoC), 26, 28, 32, 38, 76, 113-
14, 169, 181, 224, 234
Kalam, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul, 79 Lippmann, Walter, 43
Kalkat, Major O.S., 89 Lockhart, General Robert , 59
 Index 313
Logistics Support Training Unit (LSTU), 267, MiG Operational Flying Training Unit
291, 293 (MOFTU), 206, 274
Long Endurance Multi-intelligence Vehicle Ministry of Defence (MoD), 78, 79, 81, 153,
(LEMV), 191 157, 173, 175, 184, 202, 205, 209-12, 215,
Long Term Integrated Procurement Plan 216-20, 222-25, 231, 237, 245, 247, 258,
(LTIPP), 80 282
Lord Curzon, 42 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 202, 245,
Lord Krishna, 48 258
Lord Mountbatten, 63, 90, 135 Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), 202
Low Intensity Conflict Operation (LICO), 77 Mirage
Low Level Lay Down attacks, 274 -2000, 15-16, 111, 150-52, 157, 165,
Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared 167-68, 178, 184-85, 206, 208-9, 211,
by Night (LANTIRN), 185 233, 238, 251, 274, 299
Luftwaffe (German Air Force), 22, 27, 205 -III, 118, 148, 151, 154
-F-1, 149
Macmillan, Harold, 22 -2000H, 184
Mahabharata, 50 -V, 151
Mahalanobis, P.C., 141 Mitchel, Brigadier General William (Billy), 8,
Mahindra Defence, 216 21
Malaya, 23, 131 Mobile Pulse Doppler Radars (MPDRs), 151
Maldives, 5, 26, 47, 79, 111-12, MoD Annual Report, 205
Malse, Y.V., Air Marshal, 94, 195 Modi, Narendra, 181
Man Portable Air Defence (MANPAD) System, Modified Cash Management System, 212
35, 76, 113, 115, 121, 150, 167, 189, Mohan, P.V.S. Jagan, 104
218 Mueller, Karl, 27
Mangla Dam, 32, 107, 109, 148, 249 mujahideen, 1, 72, 74, 77, 149, 182
Man-portable Anti-Tank (MANPAT) missiles, Mullick, B.N., 65, 96, 246
189 Multi-Mode Radar, 220
Mao Zedong, 4, 82 Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry
McMahon Line, 66-68, 93-95 Vehicle (MIRV) missile, 221, 234
Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), 153, 209 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 190
Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Mystere IVA, 16, 25, 98, 103, 144, 146-47, 155,
UAV, 187 198, 266, 268, 289, 296
Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft
(MMRCA), 16, 164-65, 170, 173, 184, Namka Chu (Thagla), 69
211, 254 National Cadet Corps (NCC), 290
Medium Range (MR), 166, 175, 211, 221 National Defence Academy (NDA), 202-3, 223,
Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (MR 290-91
SAMs), 175 National interests, 49
Mehra, O.P. (Retd.), Air Chief Marshal, 240 National Power, 48
Menon, Rear Admiral Raja, 162 National Security Adviser (NSA), 50, 224, 227,
Menon, Shivshankar, 8, 45, 50, 79, 85, 239, 256
255 National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), 50
Menon, V.K. Krishna, Defence Minister, 65, 70, National Security Council (NSC), 245
95-96 National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS),
METAC, 150 50
MiG, 16, 67, 71, 101, 103, 105-6, 108-9, 116, National security policy, 49
144-46, 148, 150-57, 165, 167, 169-70, National strategy, 49
175, 184, 192, 198-9, 203-10, 217, 220- National Technical Research Organisation
21, 239, 247, 250, 266, 269-70, 272-74, (NTRO), 50
290 Nayar, Kuldip, 75
314 Air Power and National Security
Near space, 173, 190 Pakistani nuclear weapons, 233, 235
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3-4, 42, 46, 56-68, 93-96, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), 58, 70, 137,
134, 139, 231-2, 246 163, 250
Nehru-Liaquat Pact, 64 Pant, K.C., 223
Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD), 185 Param Vir Chakra (PVC), 270, 297
Night Vision Goggles (NVGs), 218 Patel, H.M., 67
Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 143 Patel, Sardar, 4, 56-57, 93, 96
No First Use, 233 Pathania, Flight Lieutenant V.S., 98
No fly zone, 14, 28, 125 Patney, Flight Lieutenant Vinod, 100
Non-Alignment 2.0, 83 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), 73-74, 149,
North Africa, 2, 21 232
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), People First, Mission Always, 201
32, 36, 78, 109, 120-27, 166, 169, 181-2, People’s Democratic Party, 182
253 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF),
North Korea, 220 6, 29, 96, 117, 166, 183-84, 187, 253
North West Frontier Province (NWFP), 11, 21, People’s Republic of China (PRC), 2, 4, 5, 6,
58, 60, 130-1, 133 32, 82, 93, 117, 137, 148, 150, 154, 236
North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), 4, 65-68, Perforated Steel Plate (PSP), 281-82
70, 93-96, 246, 281 Persian Gulf, 46, 119
Norway, 22 ‘Persistent stare’ type missions, 191
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC), 234 Petter, Professor W.E.W., 268
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 235 Philippines, 23
Pilot Attack Instructor (PAI), 199, 201
Offensive Air Support (OAS), 33-34, 99, 108, 148, Pilot Error, 153, 205-6, 209
158, 170, 230, 273 Pilots’ Training Establishment (PTE), 198, 291-
Operation Blue Star, 74, 76, 298 92
Operation Desert Storm, 38, 185 Polo Grounds, Allahabad, 1
Operation Gibraltar, 97 Post-strike damage assessment, 35
Operation Gulmarg, 89 post-World War II, 8, 89, 118
Operation Unified Protector, 124 Pradhan, R.D.
Operational Data Link (ODL), 170 Debacle to Revival, 69
Operational Readiness Platform (ORP), 147, Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), 11, 13-
284, 287 14, 35, 119, 121, 123, 125, 127, 170-72,
Operational Training Unit (OTU), 197, 295 185, 188, 219, 253, 255
Ordnance Factories (OFs), 81, 216 Principles of Flight (P of F), 289
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), 153, Prisoners of War (POWs), 73, 249
157, 209 Prithvi, 188, 220, 234, 251
Professional Military Education (PME), 203
P-5, 233, 251 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), 52
Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), 166, 182
Pakistan Air Force (PAF), 6, 28, 71, 98, 144, Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI), 199, 201,
166, 183, 248, 285 297-98
Pakistan Army, 25, 26, 28, 55, 71, 76, 105, 113, Quick Reaction Missiles (QRMs), 151
247
Pakistan, 1-3, 5, 6, 29, 32, 49, 50, 53-65, 67, Radar Cross Section (RCS), 176
70-77, 81, 89, 91-92, 97, 99, 103, 104, 107, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), 108, 172, 221,
112-13, 124, 133-34, 137-40, 143-44, 146, 273
148-51, 155, 161, 163, 166, 181-2, 184, Radhakrishnan, S., 67
186-89, 192, 194, 220, 232-33, 235-36, Radii of Action (RoA), 108, 146-48, 155, 171,
240, 247-48, 250-51, 253, 272, 295 270
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 149 Radio Telephony (R/T), 136, 269, 296
 Index 315
Radius of Action (RoA), 108, 146, 191, 270 Singh, Group Captain R.H.D., 135
RAF Manual AP 3000, 10 Singh, Jaswant, 223
RAF V-bombers, 47 Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 25, 65, 81, 89, 92-
Rajagopalachari, C., 96 97, 155, 197, 272
Rajkumar, P., Air Marshal, 220 Relations, 252, 299
Ramanna, Dr. Raja, 220 Frontier, 92
Rao, General K.V. Krishna, 223 Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 179,
Rao, P.V.R., 66 216
Rashtriya Rifles (RR), 77 Smith, Chris, 139, 144
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs), 125 Smith, General Sir Arthur, 133
Repair and Servicing Unit (R&SU), 100 Smuts, Lieutenant General Jan Christian, 20
Request for Proposal (RfP), 174, 184 Soman, Vice Admiral S., 102
Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), 76 Sondhi, Group Captain K.L., 135
Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 182 South Asian Association for Regional
Revised Estimate (RE), 212 Cooperation (SAARC), 26, 181
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 13, 177, South China Sea, 52-53
258 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO),
Rocket Projectiles (R/Ps), 91 143-44
Rommel, 23 Space, 37, 173, 227
Roy, B.C., 66, 95 Spanish Civil War, 21
Royal Air Force (RAF), 8, 47, 118, 131, 263 Special Forces Command, 227
Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF), 135-36 Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO), 37
Rules of Engagement (RoE), 169 Sri Lanka, 5-6, 26, 55, 75-76, 79, 89, 111, 162,
Rumsfeld, Donald, 122 223, 251, 299
Srinagar-Leh road, 71, 76
SAAB Viggen, 149 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), 172, 225
Saksena, K.P., 60 Stinger man-portable SAM, 189
Save Our Souls (SOS), 25, 111 Strategic Forces Command (SFC), 227, 234
Sayeed, Mufti Mohammed, 182 String of pearls, 52
Scientific Adviser (SA), 216 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM),
Second Gulf War, 14, 28 234
Security Subrahmanyam, K., 44, 51, 222, 239, 255
Definition, 43-45 Sukhoi, 108, 147-48, 152, 154, 170, 250
Dilemma, 78 Sundarji, General K., 74-76, 223, 232
Discourse, 47-48 Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD),
Why a National Strategy?, 78-85 12, 28, 119-20, 169
Sen, Lieutenant General L.P., 90 Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Senior Air Staff Officer (SASO), 136 (SACEUR), 121
Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 55, 104 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), 28, 31, 109, 115,
Shoigu, Sergey, 182 121, 150-51, 157, 166-67, 186, 189, 199,
Short Range (SR), 166, 221 221
Short Take Off and Landing (STOL), 14 Surveillance, Communication and
Sikorsky S-55C, 94 Reconnaissance Satellite, 170
Singapore, 23, 46, 131, 140, 184, 239
Singh, Arjan, Air Chief Marshal, 98, 99, 102, Tactical Battle Area (TBA), 170, 230
240 Tactics and Air Combat Development
Singh, Randhir, Air Marshal, 94, 100 Establishment (TACDE), 108, 155
Singh, Baldev, 96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, 189
Singh, Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Tamil-Sinhala conflict, 111
Kalwant, 89 Tashkent Agreement, 72, 104
Singh, Dr. Manmohan, 4, 49, 79, 202, 257 Tata Advanced Systems (TAS), 216
316 Air Power and National Security
Tata, J.R.D., 141 Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), 9,
Technical Development Establishment (TDE), 29, 123-25, 184, 187-88, 218, 221, 231,
219 255
Temporary Duty (TD), 294 Uttar Pradesh-Tibet border, 98
Thagla Ridge, 66, 69 US Army Air Force (USAAF), 9, 24, 33
Thapar, General P.N., 70, 102 US-led Allied air forces, 28, 119, 154
Tharoor, Shashi, 53 US-led Coalition, 119
Thatcher, Margaret, 117-18 US-led NATO forces, 122-23
The Military Balance 2015, 165, 168, 183 US-led UN forces, 4
Thimayya, Army Chief General K.S., 74, 95
Third Worldism, 48 Vajpayee, A.B., 73, 76, 220, 233
Thorat, Lieutenant General S.P.P., 95 Verghese, B.G., 57
Thrust Vector Control (TVC), 176 Vietnam, 46, 48, 73, 116
Tibet, 4, 41, 53, 56, 68, 92, 93, 137, 166 War, 12, 119, 185, 255
Time-critical targets, 237 Vulnerable Areas (VAs), 29, 150, 169, 190
Vulnerable Points (VPs), 29, 150, 169
UN Security Council (UNSC), 60, 82
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 3, Walt, Stephen M., 43
58, 63, 167, 207, 247, 264 Waltz, Kenneth, 45
United Kingdom (UK), 13, 122, 124, 126, 142, Warsaw Pact, 145
144, 149, 152-53, 167, 202, 227-28, 237, Weapon Release Line (WRL), 31-32
241, Weapon Systems Operator (WSO), 179
United Nations (UN), 3, 56, 58-62, 64, 97, 119,
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 122
141, 245, 284
Western Air Command (WAC), 110
United Nations Security Council Resolution
World War I, 18-21, 130, 245
(UNSCR), 124, 126
World War II, 3-4, 8, 22, 24, 32-33, 41, 44, 89,
United States (US), 1, 3, 5, 14, 52, 55, 68, 71,
102, 118, 130-33, 136-39, 142, 155, 176,
82, 83, 116, 119, 122, 124, 126, 143, 145,
195, 200, 238, 245, 292, 294, 301
149-50, 166-67, 175, 178, 185, 191, 227,
232-33, 235, 237, 253, 272
Xi Jinping, 181, 252
air power, 116, 119, 123
in Vietnam, 122 Xinjiang, 4, 53, 58, 166
Navy, 23 Xinjiang-Tibet Highway, 92
strategy in Asia, 257
United States Air Force (USAF), 11-12, 14, 16, Yellow Sea, 53
28, 37-38, 108, 120, 123, 191 Yom Kippur War, 114-15
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), 9, 12-13,
32, 35, 116, 123, 125, 170, 172, 184, 187- Zhou En-Lai, 82, 93
88, 191, 218, 221, 231, 255 Zoji La Pass, 91