Vii. Board of Directors and Trustees: A. Doctrine of Centralized Management
Vii. Board of Directors and Trustees: A. Doctrine of Centralized Management
[Great Asian
Sales Center Corp v. CA, (2002)]
AND TRUSTEES
The power to purchase real property is
A. DOCTRINE OF CENTRALIZED vested in the BOD or trustees. While a
corporation may appoint agents to negotiate for
MANAGEMENT
the purchase of real property needed by the
corporation, the final say will have to be with the
A.1. BOARD IS SEAT OF CORPORATE
board, whose approval will finalize the
POWERS
transaction. [Spouses Constantine Rime v.
General Rule. Unless otherwise provided in this
Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation
Code, the corporate powers of all
(2003)]
corporations formed under this Code shall
Indisputably, one of the rights of a
be exercised, all business conducted and all
stockholder is the right to participate in the
property of such corporations controlled and
control or management of the corporation. This
held by the BOD or trustees to be elected from
is exercised through his vote in the election of
among the holders of stocks, or where there is
directors because it is the BOD that controls or
no stock, from among the members of the
manages the corporation. [Gamboa v. Teves,
corporation, who shall hold office for 1 year until
(2011))
their successors are elected and qualified. [Sec.
23]
I. REQUISITES OF A VALID CORPORATE
Exceptions:
ACT BY THE BOD
(1) In case of an Executive Committee duly
(a) The Board must act as a BODY in a
authorized in the by-laws; [Sec. 35]
meeting.
(2) In case of a contracted manager which may
(b) There must be a VALIDLY constituted
be an individual, a partnership, or another
meeting.
corporation
(c) There act must be supported by a
Note: In case the contracted manager is another
MAJORITY OF THE QUORUM duly assembled
corporation, the special rule in Sec. 44 applies.
(Exception: Election of officers requires a vote of
(3) In case of close corporations, the
majority of ALL the members of the board)
stockholders may manage the business of the
(d) The act must be within the powers
corporation rather than by a BOD, If the Articles
conferred to the Board.
of Incorporation so provide (Sec. 97]
Under Sec 23, the power and the responsibility that should have belonged to the corporation,
to decide whether the corporation should enter unless his act is ratified by a 2/3 vote of
minority stockholders exercising cumulative (2) in the same meeting authorizing the
voting can only be removed for cause. Removal increase of directors or trustees If so stated in
without cause may not be used to deprive the notice of the meeting.
H.1. DUTIES
In this jurisdiction, the members of the BOD
have a three-fold duty: duty of obedience, duty
Exceptions: of diligence, and duty of loyalty.
(1) When Articles of Incorporation, by-laws, or (1) Duty of Obedience - shall direct the affairs
an advance contract provides for compensation. of the corporation only in accordance with the
(2) Compensation other than per diems may purposes for which It was organized;
also be granted to directors by the vote of the (2) Duty of Diligence - shall not willfully and
stockholders representing at least a majority of knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
the Outstanding Capital Stock at a regular or acts of the corporation or act in bad faith or with
special stockholders' meeting. gross negligence in directing the affairs of the
The total yearly compensation of directors shall corporation; and
not exceed 10% of the net Income before (3) Duty of Loyalty - shall not acquire any
income tax of the corporation during the personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with
preceding year. their duty as such directors or trustees.
[Strategic Alliance Development Corp v.
COMPENSATION OF DIRECTORS AS Rodstock Securities Ltd. (2009))
CORPORATE OFFICERS
The position of being chairman and Vice- Duty of Obedience
Chairman, like that of treasurer and secretary, The Directors or Trustees and Officers to be
are not considered directorship positions but elected shall perform the duties enjoined on
officership positions that would entitle the them by law and by the by-laws of the
occupants to compensation. Likewise, the corporation [Sec. 25]
limitation placed under Sec. 30 of the
Corporation Code that directors cannot receive Duty of Diligence
compensation exceeding 10% of the net income Directors or trustees who
of the corporation would not apply to the (i) willfully and knowingly vote for or
compensation given to such positions since it is assent to patently unlawful acts of
being given in their capacity as officers of the the corporation or
corporation and not as board members. (ii) (ii) who are guilty of gross
[Western Institute of Technology v. Solos negligence or bad faith in directing
(1997)] the affairs of the corporation or
(iii) acquire any personal or pecuniary least 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock [Sec.
interest in conflict with their duty as 34]
such directors or trustees shall be
liable jointly and severally for all Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity
damages resulting therefrom Unless his act is ratified, a director shall refund
suffered by the corporation, its to the corporation all the profits he realizes on a
stockholders or members and other business opportunity which:
persons. [Sec 31] (1) corporation is financially able to undertake
The conditions for the application of Sec. 31 of (2) from its nature, is in line with corporation's
the Corporation Code require factual business and is of practical advantage to it; and
foundations to be first laid out in appropriate (3) one in which the corporation has an
judicial proceedings. Hence, concluding that a interest or a reasonable expectancy.
person breached fiduciary duties as an officer The rule shall be applied notwithstanding the
and member of the BOD of a corporation fact that the director risked his own funds in the
without competent evidence thereon would venture. [Sec. 34]
be unwarranted and unreasonable. [Republic of By embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of
the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (First Division) the officer or director will be brought into conflict
et al. (2011)] with that of his corporation. Hence, the law does
not permit him to seize the opportunity even if he
Duty of Loyalty will use his own funds in the venture. [Sundiang
Directors and trustees should not and Aquino]
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in NOTE: Differences between Sec. 31 and
conflict with their duty as such directors or Sec. 34:
trustees, otherwise they shall be held liable (1) First, while both involve the same subject
jointly and severally for all damages resulting matter (business opportunity) they concern
therefrom suffered by the corporation, its different personalities; Sec. 34 is applicable only
stockholders or members and other persons. to directors and not to officers, whereas Sec. 31
[Sec. 31] applies to directors, trustees and officers.
Where a director, by virtue of his (2) Second, Sec. 34 allows a ratification of a
office, acquires for himself a business transaction by a self-dealing director by vote of
opportunity which should belong to the stockholders representing at least 2/3 of the
corporation, thereby obtaining profits to the outstanding capital stock. [Villanueva]
prejudice of such corporation, he must account
to the latter for all such profits by refunding the
H.2. LIABILITIES
same, unless his act has been ratified by a vote
I. SOLIDARY LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
of the stockholders owning or representing at
(1) Willfully and knowingly voting for and corporation alone and no personal liability is
assenting to patently unlawful acts of the incurred.
corporation; [Sec. 31) The provisions on seizing corporate opportunity
(2) Gross negligence or bad faith in directing and disloyalty [Secs. 31 and 34) shall also apply
the affairs of the corporation; [Sec. 31] to corporate officers. [Price v. in Innodato Phils.,
(3) Acquiring any personal or pecuniary Inc. (2008)]
Interest in conflict of duty; [Sec. 31) NOTE:
(4) Consenting to the issuance of watered Members of the BOD who are also officers are
stocks, or, having knowledge thereof, failing to held to a more stringent liability because they
file objections with secretary; [Sec. 65] are in-charge of day-to-day activities [Campos]
(5) Agreeing or stipulating in a contract to hold
himself liable with the corporation; Or
(6) By virtue of a specific provision of law
Doctrine of Limited Doctrine of Immunity
II. LIABILITY FOR WATERED STOCKS Liability
(2) On the other hand, membership in and all directors or trustees as fixed in the articles of
articles of incorporation or the bylaws of the (1) Unless the articles of incorporation or
corporation provide otherwise. In other words, the by-laws provide for a GREATER
members" are entitled to exercise their voting (2) In case of election of officers where a
rights (through their executor or administrator), vote of a majority of all the members
laws.