MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S.

ANCHETA, respondent
G.R. No. 145370.        March 4, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had
eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children.
Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where
the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner
on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was
already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted service was
rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to
answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition and
declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with
respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She
alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the
case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she
now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.

HELD:

NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6
of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union
but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered
to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that
their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot
declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between
the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our
social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. 43 Whether or not a
marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only
one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her
marital duties and obligations.

Petition is GRANTED.

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN,JR.,respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-716          October 25, 1995
Facts:

An administrative case was filed by Abadilla (a clerk of court) alleging that Judge Tabiliran
had scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan (with whom he begot 3 children) during
the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela-Tabiliran. The respondent and Baybayan
were married on May 23, 1986. It was further alleged that Judge Tabiliran falsely represented himself as
“single” in the marriage contract and that Mrs. Tabiliran also filed a complaint against the
respondent for abandoning the family home and living with Leonora Pillarion, with whom he begot a
son. the judge was also alleged to have committed corruption and bribery.

In his defense, Judge Tabiliran claimed that he was not liable for bigamy because he cohabited
and married Baybayan after Mrs. Tabiliran left and abandoned him and their family in 1966. Since then,
he had not heard any news about his wife. He also alleged that Abadilla was filing this case in retribution
and resentment. The RTC said that the marriage between Tabiliran and Baybayan is valid until the
reappearance of his first wife.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in recognizing the second marriage valid.

Ruling:

The Court found that Judge Tabiliran started cohabiting with Baybayan as early as 1970, prove by the
birth of their children in 1970, 1971 and 1975 respectively. Hence, the cohabitation occurred while the
first marriage was valid and subsisting and contrary to Sec 3 of the Rules of Court and Art 390 of the
Civil Code which states that a spouse is presumed to be dead after 7 years of absence. In this case, Mrs.
Tabiliran was absent only for 4 years when respondent and Baybayan cohabited. Therefore, Judge
Tabiliran was found guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption.

4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to Teresita T. Banzuela but who left and abandoned their
family home sometime in 1965 in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until now at present her whereabouts is not
known.

It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83 (2) of the Civil Code which, although bigamous, remains valid
until automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42, Family
Code). Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to the present, his first wife Teresita T. Banzuela had left their conjugal
dwelling and did not return, her whereabouts being unknown, was not controverted. Living as husband and wife
pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage, respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and scandalous
manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union since 1969 duly declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit, may be
considered cleansed by their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification on contracts in general is
allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family
Colde was intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in a state of concubinage
for more than five years (Tolentino, Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code, 1992
Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage contract as "single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation of
fact, specially to the solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C. Ruedas, Jr. to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit
was submitted.

G.R. No. 214529

JERRYSUS L. TILAR, Petitioner
vs.
ELIZABETH A. TILAR and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

FACTS:        Jerrysus L. Tilar filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of his wife’s
(Elizabeth) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
Elizabeth failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then required the Public Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as
to the absence of collusion between the parties. Trial, thereafter, ensued with Jerrysus and his witness testifying.

The RTC issued its assailed Decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated:

“Marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely religious.
Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an
ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by
the Church’s Canon Law not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the
principle of separation of Church and State finds application in this case.

Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus, resolving the validity of the church marriage is
outside the province of its authority. Although the Family Code did not categorize the marriage subject of the petition for
nullity or annulment, the Constitution as the fundamental law of the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it is
beyond cavil that nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken out of the church jurisdiction. The court being an entity of
the State is bereft of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.”

Jerrysus filed a petition for review directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family Code.

RULING:

Yes.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. The State is mandated to protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is
the foundation of the nation.

Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional provision to protect the inviolability of
marriage and the family relations.

Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting
parties but are governed by law. The Family Code provides for the essential as well as formal requisites for the validity of
marriage.

The contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The
marriage of Jerrysus and Elizabeth which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance
with the above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As Jerrysus correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to
nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the declaration of
nullity of the parties’ marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for
church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the church and state finds
no application in this case.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the
grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable
marriage or in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which Jerrysus filed before the RTC falls within its exclusive
jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

———————————————-

THINGS DECIDED:

A) Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested.

B) As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the stipulations of the contracting
parties but are governed by law.

C) Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences which are
governed by the Family Code.

D) The proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State
as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO

AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS
OF LUIS DELGADO, petitioners, v.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733.       January 27, 2006.

Facts:

On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado, the sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of the
estate of deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia (died 1972 and 1974 respectively). Such
letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the
beneficiaries of the estate. The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo,
to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate
natural child, hence, she should be the sole heir of the estate. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses
were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa (herein
petitioner) in this case. The RTC appointed dela Rosa as the administrator of the estates of the deceased.

Issue:

Whether or not dela Rosa should be the sole administrator of the estate noting that Josefa and
Guillermo did not contract marriage.

Ruling:
The Court held, through the testimonies of the witnesses, that marriage between Josefa and Guillermo
never occurred. Although it is presumed that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, such testimonies shall prevail. Since, no marriage
had occurred between the two, the estate must be settled in different proceedings. Therefore, dela Rosa
cannot be appointed as the sole administrator of the estate of the deceased.

Leoncia Balogbog and Gaudioso Balogbog, petitioners, versus Honorable Court of

Appeals, Ramonito Balogbog and Generoso Balogbog, respondents.
G.R. No. 83958 March 7, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal
who died inestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died
predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private respondents brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that
they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. In their answer,
petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and
without issue in their parents’ residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu.

Respondents presented witnesses. One testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and
wife and Ramonito to be their first child because they performed at his campaign rallies. The witness
also contended that he attended their wedding in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and
Egmidio Manuel, then a councilor, acted as one of the witnesses. The second witness testified that
private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. He likewise attended the wedding and was
in fact accompanied Catalina and carry her wedding dress. He also said that he was a carpenter and he
was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple’s son, Petronilo,
who died when he was six. Catalina Ubas likewise testified that after the wedding, she was handed a
“receipt,” presumably a wedding certificate by Fr. Jomao-as and was burned during the war. She said
that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children. She stated that after the death of
Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated. Private
respondents presented certificates from the Local Civil Registrar and by the Parish Priest of Asturias.

On the other hand, petitioner testified that Gavino died single. She denied that her brother had any
legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents. The petitioner likewise
presented a witness stating that Gavino died single and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio
Keriado after the war. He added that Catalina had children by a man she married before the war.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased Gavino Balogbog.

Held:

Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as
husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the
contrary. In this case, petitioners claim that the certification presented by private respondents was belied
by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners
argue that this book does not contain an entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents’
parents. This contention has no merit. Private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence. The
law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and
the sanctity of the family s a matter of constitutional concern. What is in issue, however, is not the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiations of private respondents as their children. Moreover, the
evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted that Ramonito is his nephew.
This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is
considered as a reliable declaration against interest.

Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz

the petitioner were resting on the argument that the respondents are without legal personality to
institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as
legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.

Evidence presented to prove marriage:

1. A certificate of marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang-alang, Leyte as well as a
copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence.
2. A canonical certificate of marriage
3. The respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

the petition is hereby DENIED

On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in the
case of United States v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages,
and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act
No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. 34 They
are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings
in accordance with the rules of evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing that the
authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela
was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.

Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a
solemnized marriage.36 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. 37

"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in
public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil
Registrar)."42 Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are presumed
valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated in them. 43

"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting
the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient." 44

The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be a
competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and jurisprudence. In fact, the
petitioner's reliance on Roces45 is misplaced considering that what was sought to be proved is the
fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not legitimate filiation.

Foreign Divorce

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada,
United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent
acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on
the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

Held:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Alicia Reyes
under our National law is still considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

G.R. No. 152577.                September 21, 2005

FACTS:

Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger
and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all
of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly
using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration
of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.

On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied
having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers.
After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband
and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal
because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and
void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with
interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the
ground of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and married another man and has established another family of
her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to
another man in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus
and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although
the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after
which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was
still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even
when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus.

The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
remains valid and subsisting.

Republic vs. Orbecido

GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City.  They had a son and a daughter named
Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively.  In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son
Kristoffer.  A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a
divorce decree and married a certain Stanley.  He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable
to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

G.R. No. 171914               July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro
indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the
divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and,
secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any
rights in property. 

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued
the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.  Conformably with the nationality rule,
18

however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which
characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,  and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
19

between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.  The non-recognition of absolute
20

divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse,
or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no
divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in
this jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.  In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
9

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10

2. Consistent with Articles 15  and 17  of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
11 12

cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a
case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and
Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the
divorce instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the
former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not
discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the
foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that
the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow
such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018

STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a
divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage. 2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition and recognized
the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws. 3 On November 25, 2015,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT TO THE
DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE SUBMISSION OF
AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE AS REQUIRED BY THE
RULES.

the Court similarly rules that despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in
Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from
the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu
Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby
capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019

MARLYN MONTON NULLADA, PETITIONER, v. THE HON. CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA, AKIRA
ITO, SHIN ITO AND ALL PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM ANY INTEREST, RESPONDENTS.

The action arose from a Petition2 for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and
cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code, by Marlyn in 2014 with the RTC of Manila. She claimed that on July 29,
1997, she and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan

In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate 5 that was issued
by the Embassy of Japan

Marlyn seeks to justify her immediate recourse to the Court by explaining that the present petition
involves a pure question of law based on a lone issue, as follows: Whether or not Article 26, paragraph
2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so as to apply only in cases where it is the alien
spouse who sought the divorce, and not where the divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses. 27

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

In determining whether a divorce decree obtained by a foreigner spouse should be recognized in the
Philippines, it is immaterial that the divorce is sought by the Filipino national.
The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the
Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The fact that the divorce was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Aldra was not sufficient ground to
reject the decree in this jurisdiction.

Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of excerpts of
The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of
Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300.37 This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance
with the rules on proof of Japan's law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed
by the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings
and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the
Court.

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Facts:

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad  San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death.

Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s

estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 146.

Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the  Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death

respondent presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to
prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had
the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code

Issue:

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering
that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988.
the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him
was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership,
it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven.

Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24,
1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It was also REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

CORPUZ v. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

(G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010)

FACTS:

Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto. Tomas but
subsequently filed for divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor,
Ontario, Canada. Two years later, Corpuz fell in love with another Filipina. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage
certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National
Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine
law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a
competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or

declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that
Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article
26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien
spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grant aliens the right to
institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Ruling

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive
right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void 15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18

No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens BUT the foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven in court and
recognized according to our rules of evidence. Thus, it serves as a presumptive evidence of
right in favor of the alien, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO,

respondent.
G.R. No. 138322,             October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace
Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his
Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated
to marry Grace.

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground
that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union
to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to
Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been

restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.