Rodriguez v. Gella G.R. No. L-6266 Facts
Rodriguez v. Gella G.R. No. L-6266 Facts
Gella
G.R. No. L-6266
Facts:
In its decision dated August 26, 1949, the court ruled that the executive orders issued, using
Commonwealth Act No. 671 or Emergency Powers Act as legal authority, were null and void
because the effectivity of said reference law was considered to have already ceased to operate the
moment the legislature (the National Assembly) was able to convene in a special session. CA
671 grants the President powers “to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency”
within a limited period of time or during the existence of an emergency such as war or calamity.
The assailed executive orders were argued to have been issued in furtherance of the emergency
power granted by the said law.
The Court opined that in enacting CA 671, the legislature had in mind the necessity of granting
the President emergency powers in view of the fact that during the war, it is impossible for the
legislature to convene and perform its duties of providing policies to guide the country in the
direction merited by present exigencies such as war. When it convened in 1946, the stated
impossibility of convening, which compelled the legislature to grant the President emergency
power in the first place, already dissipated and hence, the emergency power also ceased to be a
necessity. For this reason, the court ruled that executive orders subsequently issued were already
null and void. The present case partakes of the same nature. The petitioners are questioning the
constitutionality of EO 545 (appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential
public works) and EO 546 (appropriating the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and
cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities) on
the ground that these are likewise based on CA 671 which was already deemed inoperative in its
1949 decision.
Issue: Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are invalid, them being in violation of due delegation of
powers.
Ruling:
YES. The emergency power granted to the President through the enactment of CA 671, which
included the power to issue orders and make special appropriations to address both immediate
and long-terms needs of the country, was conceived on the premise that upon the cessation of the
emergency situation (war), the same should automatically be returned to the legislature since
such powers are merely delegated, not abdicated.
The legislature delegated certain powers to the President vested upon it by the Constitution
because of the impossibility of it convening as a body. By the time it was able to convene in
1946, the aforecited reason for the delegation of power had ceased to be operative. The Court
also emphasized that emergency powers are only exercisable within a limited period of time and
may only be extended upon legislative action.
In the present case, the legislature had no intention to extend the legitimacy of the emergency
powers under CA 671. On the contrary, it expressed its withdrawal of the grant of emergency
power through House Bill 727, which was vetoed by the President. Said veto affirms the claim
that delegated power must extinguish upon the restoration of the capacity of the legislature to
discharge the power so delegated.
The delegated power should automatically return to the legislature, without a need for passing a
law expressly repealing the emergency power previously granted. The Court reasoned that
requiring such law will be absurd. It entails that the legislature can easily delegate powers but
will be hard-pressed to reclaim such powers. Not only does it need to marshal two-thirds of the
votes of its members in order to pass the law expressly repealing the emergency powers of the
President, but it also is at the mercy of the veto power of the President, as illustrated by the fate
of HB 727.
To prevent the occurrence of this situation, the Court maintained that emergency powers should
cease upon the cessation of the situation that compelled its granting, unless extended by the
legislature through enactment. Based on this, CA 671 is deemed inoperative as early as 1946 (the
year the legislature first convened in the aftermath of the war) and therefore, all presidential
issuances based thereto are deemed void for violation of due delegation of powers, it being the
case that the powers previously delegated are deemed to have already been returned to the
legislature. Executive Orders 545 and 546 are therefore declared null and void.