CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Bail 34
Motion To Quash 29
Prosecution of Offenses 26
Trial 19
Prosecution of Civil Action 18
Search and Seizure 15
Arrest 11
Preliminary Investigation 10
Total # of Questions 190
Arraignment and Plea 9
Judgment 7
Appeal 5
Rights of the Accused 3
Pre-Trial 2
New Trial and Reconsideration 1
Provisional Remedies 1

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

A. GENERAL MATTERS – CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and CRIMINAL LAW, distinguished

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CRIMINAL LAW

Remedial Substantive
It provides how the act is to be punished It declares what acts are punishable
It provides for the method by which a It defines crimes, treats of their nature and
person accused of a crime is arrested, tried provides for their punishment.
or punished.

2. DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Criminal jurisdiction is the authority to hear and try a particularoffense and impose the
punishment for it (People v. Mariano, GR. No. L-40527, 30 June 1976).

3. BASIC OVERVIEW

1. Commission of Crime
2. Investigation and Evidence Gathering
3. Search and Seizure
4. Filing of Complaint
5. Preliminary Investigation/ Inquest (Appeal to Sec. of Justice)
6. Filing of Information

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7. Arrest
8. Bail
9. Arraignment and Plea
10. Pre-Trial
11. Trial
12. Promulgation of Judgment
13. New Trial or Reconsideration
14. Appeal
15. Execution of Judgment

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4. JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER and JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
THE ACCUSED

JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

MATTER OF THE ACCUSED
 Conferred by law at the time of the  Acquired by: (a) arrest of the person;
institution of the action. or (b) voluntary submission of the
 Determined by the extent of the penalty person (e.g. by filing bail, or
which the law imposes based on the facts motions).
in the complaint/information.
N.B.: Absence of jurisdiction over the subject N.B.: Failure to timely object may be
matter may be raised at any stage. The right deemed a waiver.
to make such objection is never waived.

5. REQUISITES FOR EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

• The following requisites must be present before a court can validly exercise its power to
hear and try a case:

(a) the court must have jurisdiction overthe subject matter;

(b) the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed
(this refers to “venue” or the place where the case is to be tried); and

(c) the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

NB: Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only
the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminisis grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available. (Union Bank of the Philippines v. People, G.R. No.
192565, 28 February 2012).

SOLEMNIDAD BUAYA V. HON. WENCESLAO POLO

G.R. NO. 75079, JANUARY 26, 1989

Facts: Buaya, an insurance agent of a corporation, was charged with estafa before the RTC of
Manila. In her motion to dismiss, Buaya claims that the court had no jurisdiction over the case
because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were
collected in Cebu City.

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Issue: W/N the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction over the offense charged
Held:YES

In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960,) this Court ruled that in order to determine
the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose
of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law
fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed.

The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission,
87 Phil. 641).

The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to
June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." Clearly then, from the very
allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.

CHESTER DE JOYA vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 162416. January 31, 2006

Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a) Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the
complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b) Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive
process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c) Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction
over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of
the parties.
d) Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the
pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or
stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to
evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e) Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation).
This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in
question, thus placing it in custodialegis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by
provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or
subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or
suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident
defendant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LIBERTAD LAGON

G.R. No. 45815. May 18, 1990

Facts: The acts (constituting estafa) were allegedly committed in April 1975 when the
jurisdiction over the offence was with the City Court. However, when the information was filed,
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty imposable
upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's
authority to impose.

Note: Before the amendment of Art. 315, the penalty was prisioncorreccional or imprisonment
for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both. After the amendment, the
penalty was changed to arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its
minimum period.

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The dismissal was without prejudice to the refiling of the criminal case in the proper court.

Held:
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters
is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action,
rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged.

In criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out
to the offender after trial or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented during
the trial but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal
obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or information constitutive of the
offense charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed,
it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
information [People v. Buissan, 1981].

RENATO DAVID V. EDITHA AGBAY AND PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 199113, MARCH 18, 2015

In Miranda v. Tuliao, which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this Court discussed
the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Thus:c

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction
over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to detention.

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify

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that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative
relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an
affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by
impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special
appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither
jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.

LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA et al. v. HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA et al.

G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999

A court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites concur:
(1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of,
(2) the offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and
(3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial,
forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court."

In this case, the original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention that the
offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein.

However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation they filed, they stated that the said crime is “work-connected” We therefore hold
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of estoppel and it was thus vested
with the authority to order the amendment of the Information.

6. REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSITORY OR CONTINUING OFFENSES

• For transitory or continuing offenses, the courts of the territories where the essential
ingredients of the crime took place have concurrent jurisdiction.

• First court to take cognizance will exclude the others (People v. Gorospe, 1988).

• Illustrations:
• Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on
a bounced check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of
the offense occurred, that is, where the check was drawn, issued, delivered or
dishonored. (Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, 17 November 2004)
• Estafa is likewise a transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place
where any of the elements of the crime took place, including the place where the
damage and prejudice was caused to the offended party. The principal place of
business of the offended party may be considered as the place where the damage
was caused. (SolemnidadBuaya v. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, G.R. No. L-75079, 26
January 1989).

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 UY V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 119000, JULY 28, 1997

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by
the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction.

7. JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS

(a) MTC, MeTC, MCTC
 Violations of city/municipal ordinances;
 Crimes punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years, regardless of the fine or
other accessory penalties and civil liability;
 Offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence (Sec. 32, BP 129);
 Violations of traffic laws/rules/regulations, of rental laws, and cases where the penalty
prescribed by law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a
fine not exceeding P1000, except that in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence and the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.
 Special jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for writ of habeas corpus or
application for bail in the province or city where the RTC judge is absent;
 Cases involving BP 22—Bouncing Checks Law;
 In election offenses, cases involving failure to register or failure to vote.

(b) RTC
 Cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body (Sec. 20, BP
129);
 All criminal cases where the penalty is higher than 6 years, including government-
related cases wherein the accused is not one of those falling under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan;
 Cases where one or more of accused is 18 years old but not less than 15 years old, or
where one or more of the victims is a minor, at the time of the commission of the offense
(R.A. No. 9344);
 Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;
 Violations of the Child Abuse Act (R.A. No. 7610);
 Actions for written defamation/libel (Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code [RPC], as
amended by R.A. No. 4363);
 Cases of domestic violence against women and children (R. A. No. 8369, Family Courts
Act); and
 Appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by MTCs in their respective territorial
jurisdiction.

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(c) SANDIGANBAYAN

• The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases (see PD
1606, R.A. No. 7975, and R.A. No. 8249):

I. Violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices), RA 1379 (Unlawfully

Acquired Property), and the Revised Penal Code (Book II, Title VII, Chapter II,
Section 2), where one of the accused is an official occupying the following positions
(permanent or interim) at the time of the commission of the offense:

1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the

SangguniangPanlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the SangguniangPanlungsod,

city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.

2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

4. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and

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 5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

II. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
committed by the abovementioned public officials and employees mentioned in
relation to their office.

III. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

• N.B.: The officials enumerated in Section (4) (A) (i) of R.A. No. 8249, i.e. city
treasurers, assessors, etc., are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
regardless of salary grade (Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 434 SCRA 388). Thus, if the
accused does not belong to the national and local officials enumerated, in order for
the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the offense, the same must be
committed by officials classified as Grade 27 and higher, aside from other officials,
expressly covered.

• As explained by the Court in Inding (supra):

“Clearly, therefore, Congress intended these officials regardless of their salary

grades, to be specifically included within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction,
for had it been otherwise, then there would have been no need for such
enumeration.

“This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated
in “a” to “g” are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the x xx Position Titles and
Salary Grades of the Department of Budget and Management x xx.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 169004, 15 September 2010

A member of the SangguniangPanlungsod of a city was charged for

allegedly criminally failing to liquidate certain cash advances he made in
violation of the Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said

official as his salary grade is below SG 27.

Held: Yes.Those that are classified as SG 26 and below may still fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated in said law.

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 SERANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162059, 22 January 2008

An information for estafa was filed with the Sandiganbayan against a

former student regent of the University of the Philippines (UP). Said former
student regent moved to quash the information, contending that the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the offense charged nor over her
person in her capacity as UP student regent. She contends that estafa falls under
Crimes Against Property and not on the chapter on Crimes Committed by Public
Officers, only over which, she argues, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Furthermore, she argues that it was not the government that was duped, but
Pres. Estrada, because the money came from the Office of the President and not
from government funds. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as
a UP student regent, she is not a public officer since she merely represents her
peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio
capacity.

Estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, subject to the twin requirements that: (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of PD
No. 1606, as amended; and (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

It is well-established that compensation is not an essential element of

public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Delegation of
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public makes one a public officer.

A UP Student Regent is a Public Officer. A public office is the right,

authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual
so invested is a public officer.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers Board of Regents. The

Sandiganbayan, also has jurisdiction over the other officers enumerated in PD
No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, the Supreme Court held that while the first
part of Sec. 4(a) covers only officials with Salary grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provisions of law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provisions of law. Sec. 4(a)(1)(g) of PD No. 1606
explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors
and trustees, or manager of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities, or educational foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. The
Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board of trustee of a
non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by PD No. 1606.

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 LACSON V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 128096, JANUARY 20, 1999

As early as 1954, we pronounced that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts. The real nature of the criminal charges is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint
or information.
The noble object of written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained
in U.S. v. Karelsen:

The object of this written accusations was First, To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and second,
to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order
that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law.
Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint
with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him
as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

In this case, the amended information against PanfiloLacson states that he and his co-
accused committed the crime of murder in relation to their public office, there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

The offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

Laches: a bar to question jurisdiction

Note: this is an exception to the general rule.
Also note that this is a civil case (Atty. Arno Sanidad)

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. v. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY, MANILA SURETY

G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968

Facts: The civil action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948,
that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

Held: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches.

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It has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape a penalty. (The party is barred for reasons of public policy)

xxx we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.

8. VENUE

• Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be waived nor subjected to

stipulation.

• General Rule: Criminal action shall be instituted in the courts of the municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Exceptions:

1. Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft or in any other

public or private vehicle in the course of its trip – the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train,
aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure
and arrival;

2. Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage – the
criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of
entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during
such voyage subject to the generally accepted principles of international law (Rule
110, Sec. 15);

3. Felonies under Article 2 of the RPC shall be cognizable by the proper court where
the criminal action was first filed.

i. Piracy – the venue of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial
limits. It may be tried anywhere.

ii. Libel – please see the discussionon the venue for filing of libel cases

4. In cases filed under B.P. 22 – the criminal action shall be filed in the place where the
check was dishonored or issued. In case of crossed-check, in the place of depositary
or collecting bank;

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 5. In exceptional circumstances – to ensure a fair trial and impartial inquiry, the
Supreme Court shall have the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid miscarriage of justice (1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 5[4]).

TRENAS V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 195002, JANUARY 25, 2012

The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People (2007),this Court explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction.

• Venue for filing of libel cases:

 If the offended party is a private individual

• Under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 4363, the venue for
libel cases is either:
1. where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or
2. where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published.

• If the private complainant opts for the second, the Information (formal
indictment) must specifically state where the libelous article was printed
and first published.

• If the libelous article appears on a website, there is no way of finding

out the location of its printing and first publication. It is not enough for
the complainant to lay the venue where the article was accessed, as this
will open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations
where the website is also accessed or capable of being accessed, and
spawn the very ills the amendment sought to prevent.

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 • Thus, in cases where the libelous article appears on a website, the private
complainant has the option to file the case in his/her place of residence,
which will not necessitate finding out exactly where the libelous matter
was printed and first published.

BONIFACIO, ET AL. V. RTC OF MAKATI, BR. 129

G.R. 184800, 5 May 2010

An Information for 13 counts of libel was filed before the RTC of Makati
against accused, for providing a public forum in the internet, which contained
defamatory remarks against the Yuchengco family. The information failed to
state the particular place within the RTC’s jurisdiction where the subject article
was printed and first published, or that the offended parties resided in Makati at
the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
Instead, the information alleged where the offended party first accessed the
internet-published material. The issue now is whether the RTC has acquired
jurisdiction over the case.

The RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the case. Venue is
jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant
is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: (a) where
the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or
(b) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The
[Amended] Information in this case opted to lay the venue by availing of the
second. Thus, it stated that the offending article “was first published and
accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.” In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and
first publication.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published
are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the
Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was
printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines
or serial publications. This precondition becomes necessary in order to forestall
any inclination to harass. For the Court to hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel
suit being filed in all other locations where the Pep Coalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed.

Page 17 of 141
  If the offended party is a public officer
• If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the criminal action may be filed in
the RTC of Manila.

• If the offended party is a public officer whose office is outside Manila,

the action may be filed in the RTC of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.

CHANGE OF VENUE - Art. VIII, sec. 5(4), 1987 Constitution

PEOPLE V. GUTIERREZ
G.R. NOS. L-32282-82, NOVEMBER 26, 1970

The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13 [1935 Constitution]), and such judicial power
connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective
administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to
preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of
government"(Borromeov.Mariano,41Phil.322)

One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases
from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This
authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the
eighteenth century. The opinion in Crocker v. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21
Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex v. Cowle
(Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far
back as it can be traced.”

In Reg. v. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully discussed, and all the judges appear to
have agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:

"There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants and prosecutors, . . . that
where it appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the proper county,
then this court . . . has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to
bring it into an indifferent county . . . This jurisdiction to change the venue . . . has been
exercised by this court from a very early period. We have reported cases, where the doctrine is
laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen’s Bench in England
independently of any practice of our own court . . . The general jurisdiction of the court, in a
proper case, to change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be the subject of doubt."

Page 18 of 141
9. WHEN INJUNCTION MAY BE ISSUED TO RESTRAIN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

General Rule:Prosecution of criminal cases may NOT be enjoined.

Exceptions:
• To afford protection to the accused’s constitutional rights;
• When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid multiplicity of
actions;
• When there’s a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
• When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
• When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
• When there is double jeopardy;
• When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
• In case of persecution rather than prosecution
• When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust or vengeance;
• When there is no prima facie case against the accused and a MTQ on that ground has
been denied; or
• Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent threatened
unlawful arrest.

-o0o-

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B.SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1. NATURE OF SEARCH WARRANT

• A search warrant (SW) is an order in writing; issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines; signed by a judge; and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property described in the warrant and bring it before the court. (Rule
126, Sec. 1)

• A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery.

(Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994)

CHARLIE TE V. HON. AGUSTO V. BREVA

G.R. No. 164974, 5 August 2015

Petitioner argued that impleading the People of the Philippines as respondents in

his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to annul and set aside the
order of the RTC denying the petitioner’s motion to quash the search warrant
issued against him was premature because no criminal case had yet been filed
against him with only the application for the issuance of the search warrant
having been made.

However, impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition

for certiorari did not depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had
already been commenced in court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that
the search warrant in question had been issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, and that fact rendered the People of the Philippines indispensable
parties in the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify the questioned
orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note that the impleading is
further expressly demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

It may be true that that the application for the search warrant was not a criminal
action; and that the application for the search warrant was not of the same form
as that of a criminal action. However, it is clear that the sworn application for the
search warrant and the search warrant itself were upon the behest of the People
of the Philippines. It defies logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend,
therefore, that the application against him was not made by the People of the
Philippines but by the interested party or parties. The immutable truth is that
every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the authority of the
State, regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.

STONEHILL V. DIOKNO
G.R. NO. L-19550, JUNE 19, 1967

The Constitution [Art. III sec. 1 par. 3, 1935 Constitution] provides:

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 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

Most common law jurisdictions … eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this
is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed. [Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497]

2. DISTINGUISH FROM WARRANT OF ARREST

SEARCH WARRANT WARRANT OF ARREST

Order in writing in the name of the Republic Order directed to the peace officer to execute
of the Philippines; signed by a judge; and the warrant by taking the person stated
directed to a peace officer, commanding him therein into custody that he may be bound to
to search for personal property described in answer for the commission of the offense.
the warrant and bring it before the court. (Rule
126, Sec. 1)
Probable cause to search requires facts to show In order to determine probable cause to arrest,
that particular things connected with crime are the judge (not the prosecutor) must have
found in a specific location. sufficient facts in his hands that would tend to
show that a crime has been committed and
that a particular person committed it.
The rules on searches and seizures cover a The rules on arrest are concerned with the
wider spectrum of matters on the search of seizure of a person. A search may follow an
both persons and places and the seizure of arrest but the search must be incident to a
things found therein. lawful arrest.

3. APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT, WHERE FILED

1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. (Rule 126, Sec.2)

2. For compelling reasons stated in the application:

• If the place of the commission of the crime is known, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed.
• Any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

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 3. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

Exception:Malaloan v. CA, G.R. No. 104879, 6 May 1994, subject to Rule 126, Sec. 1
• if a case has not yet been filed, it may be filed in a court with a territorial jurisdiction
other than that where the illegal articles sought to seized are located.

4. In intellectual property rights cases (see A.M. No. 10-3-10-SC, 18 October 2011):

• The issuance of these writs shall be governed by the rules prescribed in Re: Proposed
Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights
(A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which took effect on February 15, 2002).

(A) Special Commercial Courts in Quezon City, Manila, Makati, and Pasig shall have
authority to act on applications for the issuance of writs of search and seizure in civil
actions for violations of the Intellectual Property Code, which writs shall be
enforceable nationwide.

(B) Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, the Special Commercial Courts in
the judicial regions where the violation of intellectual property rights occurred shall
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of search and seizure.

4. REQUISITES FOR ISSUING SEARCH WARRANT

A SW shall not issue except:

1. upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense;
2. to be determined personally by the judge;
3. after examination under oath or affirmation of complainant and the witness he may
produce;
4. particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. (Rule 126,
Sec. 4)

5. SERVICE OF SEARCH WARRANT

• Period of validity – 10 days from its date. Thereafter, it shall be void. (Rule 126, Sec. 10)

• Right to break door or window to effect search.

The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of
his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or
any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant, or to liberate himself or any
person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (Rule 126, Sec. 7)

• Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses.

No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the

Page 22 of 141
 letter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (Rule 126,
Sec. 8)

• Time of making search

General rule: DAY TIME.
Exception: when the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any
time of the day or night. (Rule 126, Sec. 9)
• A SW violates the above rule if the time of the search is left blank, thus enabling
the officers to conduct the search in the evening of the appointed search. (Asian
Surety v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 cited in People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117412,
8 December 2000)

6. PROBABLE CAUSE

• Probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the
objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. (Burgos v.
Chief of Staff, No. L-64261, 26 December 1984, 133 SCRA 800)

• The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining
under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to “the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause.”(Id.)

(a) Comparisons

• Probable cause in preliminary investigation is the existence of such facts and

circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted. (Buchanan v. Vda. De Esteban, No. L-10402, 30 November 1915).

• Probable cause in warrantless arrests: Rule 113.5(b) requires that the person making the
arrest has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed. Probable
cause must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been or is
about to be committed. (People. v. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, 3 April 1998).

7. PERSONAL EXAMINATION BY JUDGE OF THE APPLICANT AND WITNESSES

(a) Determined by judge himself

• The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he

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 may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted (Rule 126, Sec. 5).

8. PERSONAL EXAMINATION BY JUDGE OF THE APPLICANT AND WITNESSES

(a) Searching questions and answers

• Such questions as have the tendency to show the commission of a crime and perpetrator
thereof. (Luna v. Plaza, No. L-27511, 29 November 1968)

9. PARTICULARITY OF PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS TO BE SEIZED

• Warrant issued must particularly describethe place to be searched and the persons to be
seized.

• Description of place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the SW can, with
reasonable efforts, ascertain and identify the place intended. (People v. Veloso, 1925)

• An apparent typographical error will not necessarily invalidate the SW, as long as the
application contains the correct address. (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, No. L-64261, 26
December 1984, 133 SCRA 800)

• Search Warrant must be for only one specific offense.

 General Rule: The offense alleged must be specific to enable the judge to find the
existence of probable cause. Definite provisions of the allegedly violated laws must
be referred to.

 Exception: In People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, 8 May 1990,the SW was declared valid
despite lack of mention of specific offense because the application stated that the
owner of the grocery store against whom warrant was directed, had in his
possession unadulterated stocks in violation of the provisions Art. 188 and 189, RPC,
which are closely allied articles as the punishable acts defined in one of them can be
considered as including or is necessarily included in the other.

(a) Test of Particularity

 The executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the place intended in the SW is
relevant.
 This would seem especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the SW had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the SW
intended the building described in the affidavit.
 It has also been said that the executing officer must look to the affidavit in the official
court file to resolve an ambiguity in the SW as to the place to be searched. (Burgos v.
Chief of Staff, No. L-64261, 26 December 1984, 133 SCRA 800)

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10. PERSONAL PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED

(a) What may be seized (Rule126, Sec. 3)

• Personal property subject of the offense.
• Personal property stolen/embezzled and other proceeds/fruits of the offense.
• Personal property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

11. EXCEPTIONS TO SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT

(a) Instances when warrantless searches are allowed

(1) As incident of lawful arrest (Rule 126, Sec.13)

• A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant.

• A motorist flagged down by a policeman for not wearing a helmet is not deemed
arrested since he was only given a traffic citation and the penalty for the ordinance is
only a fine. Hence the subsequent search of the motorcyclist was illegal and the items
seized were inadmissible in evidence. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012)

PEOPLE V. ARUTA
G.R. NO. 120915, APRIL 3, 1998

Facts: In the morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received information
from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on
December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a
large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant
alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her
out to the law enforcement officers; The law enforcement officers approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her
travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried
marijuana leaves; Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

Held:
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of
arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-
appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the
street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when
the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the
marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect.

Page 25 of 141
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a
moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-
appellant was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact,
she was accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.

The Stop and Frisk principle also does not apply. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely
crossing the street when apprehended.

The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and
emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia. In said case, there were
intelligence reports that the building was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup
detat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and
the occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. Nearby
courts were closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The same could not be said in the
instant case.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure
would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to
a waiver of her constitutional right.

While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe
that appellant -- based on the transcript (of the case) -- did not voluntarily consent to (Officer)
Bolonias’ search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
such search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore,
considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot
appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty.

Waiver of the non-admissibility of the fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a

warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against
unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people.

We consider that appellants objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and
seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises
can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.

(2) Plain view doctrine

Requisites:
(a) A valid prior intrusion, i.e., based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) Evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have a right to be where they
are;
(c) Evidence must be immediately apparently illegal (e.g. drug paraphernalia);
(d) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

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 • An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. (Miclat v. People,
G.R. No. 176077, 31 August 2011)

• Objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to
have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. (Fajardo v.
People, G.R. No. 190889, 10 January 2011)
PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
G.R. NO. 129296, SEPTEMBER 25, 2000

Facts: One morning, the police officers from Nueva Vizcaya received a tip from an unnamed
informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation in the mountains. The next day, a team
was formed to verify the report. Inspector Parungao gave the team specific instructions to
"uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same. The next morning, the police
officers trekked uphill and arrested the person pinpointed by their informant. The person
arrested admitted ownership of the marijuana plants. The officers uprooted the plants and took
photos of the accused beside the cannabis plants.
Issue: W/N the operation was a case of a valid plain view search
For the “plain view” doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

In the instant case, PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before
appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which
preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to
appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of
evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their
discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay
that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the
illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a
"further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view"
or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

KATZ V. U.S.
389 U.S. 347 (1967)

Facts: Petitioner was convicted of violating a federal statute for transmitting wagering
information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston. The Government presented
as evidence Katz’ telephone conversations overheard by FBI Agents who attached an electronic

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listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had
placed his calls.

Issue: W/N the evidence against the accused is admissible

Held: NO

The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to
the recording of oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under . . . local
property law." Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people -- and not simply "areas" -- against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.

(a) an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy;

(b) electronic, as well as physical, intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment,

(c) the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has
long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.

CALIFORNIA V. CIRAOLO
476 U.S. 207 (1986)

Facts: The police received an anonymous telephone tip that the accused grew marijuana plants
in his backyard. The authorities were unable to observe the yard from the ground level because
of a 10 foot high fence enclosing it. The next day, the officers secured a plane and flew over
respondent’s house. From 1,000 feet, the trained officers readily identified marijuana plants
growing in the yard. They took photographs, attached it to an affidavit. The next day, 73 plants
were seized through a warrant.

Issue: W/N the plain view doctrine applies

Held: YES

The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a "constitutionally

protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v. United States, (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Katz posits a two-part inquiry:
o First, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
object of the challenged search?
o Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?

In this case, respondent appears to challenge the authority of government to observe his activity
from any vantage point or place if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and
not the result of a casual, accidental observation.

Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything
that these officers observed. On this record, we readily conclude that respondent's expectation

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that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable, and is not an expectation
that society is prepared to honor.

CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD
486 U.S. 35 (1988)

The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the
Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if respondents
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as
objectively reasonable.

Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to
defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowledge that
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to
animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover,
respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a
third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents'
trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having deposited
their garbage "in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of
speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it,"
respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the inculpatory
items that they discarded.

(3) Search of moving vehicle

• Police may conduct searches of moving vehicles without warrant because it is

impracticable to secure prior judicial search warrant since the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant may be sought.

• These searches are generally limited to visual inspection, and the vehicles or their
occupants cannot be subjected to body searches EXCEPT when there is probable cause to
believe that the occupant is a law offender or the vehicles’ contents are instruments or
proceeds of some criminal offense.

PEOPLE V. BAGISTA
G.R. NO. 86218, SEPTEMBER 18, 1992
PADILLA DISSENTING

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of an
information they received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5’2" or
5’3" in height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately
made on all the baggages of all passengers of the bus where the accused was riding, whether
male or female, and whether or not their physical appearance answered the description of the
suspect as described in the alleged information. If there really was such an information, as
claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the
baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to answer the description
of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.

Page 29 of 141
Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched
her bag, where they allegedly found the marijuana.From the circumstances of the case at bar, it
would seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for evidence when they searched the
baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused. They had no probable cause to
reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the
information they allegedly received.

PEOPLE V. BALINGAN
G.R. NO. 105834, FEBRUARY 13, 1995

Facts: The police received a telephone call from an unnamed informant that Balingan was going
to Manila with a bag filled with marijuana. Based on this tip, the police formed a surveillance
team to monitor appellant’s movements. Officers were deployed at different places in Baguio
City. Balinganeventually boarded a bus bound for Manila. The officers waiting at the Kennnon
Road Checkpoint, who were alerted of the respondent’s identity, conducted a routine check-up
on the bus. An officer boarded the bus, introduced himself as a police officer and asked
permission to check Balingan’s luggage to which she did not object. The police found marijuana
in the appellant’s “maleta.”

Held:
The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio INP
Narcotics Intelligence Division received an information that appellant was going to transport
marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance operations revealed that appellant, whose
movements had been previously monitored by the Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus
bound for Manila carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag. When the moving, public bus
was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those circumstances, the
warrantless search of appellant's bag was not illegal.

(4) Searches conducted in checkpoints

• They are valid as long as they are warranted by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.
• Here, the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to body search
(inspection of the vehicle is limited to visual search).

(5) Consented warrantless searches

• When a person voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his
person/premises. (People v. Malasugui, No. L-44335, 30 July 1936)

(6) Customs searches

• For the enforcement of customs duties and tariff laws, the Collector of Customs is
authorized to effect search and seizure without search warrant, except in search of a
dwelling/house. (General Travel Services v. David, No. L-19259, 23 September 1966)

(7) Stop and Frisk (Terry Search)

• It is a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapon. (Malacat v. CA, G.R. No.
123595, 12 December 1997)

Page 30 of 141
 • Probable cause is not required. But a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer’s experience and surrounding condition to warrant a belief that a person has
weapons concealed

ESQUILLO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182010, 25 August 2010

The trial court found petitioner guilty of illegal possession of

Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu. On appeal, petitioner assails the
application of “stop-and-frisk” in convicting him of said offense. However, the
Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contention. To determine the validity of
“stop-and-frisk,” essential is the existence of a genuine reason, in light of the
police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or
contraband concealed about him. Such a “stop-and-frisk” practice serves a dual
purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer.

From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police
officers constituted a valid “stop-and-frisk” operation. The search/seizure of the
suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner’s possession - later voluntarily
exhibited to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on
what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself
to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was
exhibiting suspicious behavior and, in fact, attempted to flee after the police
officer had identified himself.

TERRY V. OHIO
392 U.S. 1 (1968)
We cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and
other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an
arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he
is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it
would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary
measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the
threat of physical harm.

A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other
search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus, it must be
limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm

Page 31 of 141
the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a
"full" search… He is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.

(8) In flagrante delicto

• When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. (Rule
113, Sec. 5[1])

(9) Hot Pursuit

• A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when an
offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it
(Rule 113, Sec. 5[2]). In this case, the person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense (Rule 126, sec. 13).

(10) Prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment.

• A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (Rule 113, Sec. 5[3]). In this case, the person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense (Rule 126, sec. 13).

PRIVATE SEARCHES

PEOPLE V. MARTI
G.R. NO. 81561, JANUARY 18, 1991

Facts: Four gift wrapped packages were brought by appellant and his common law wife to a
booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders. The packages were supposed to be
shipped to their friend in Switzerland. When asked about its contents, appellant claimed that
they contained books, cigars and gloves. Before the boxes were sent to the Bureau of Customs,
the proprietor Mr. Job Reyes opened the boxes following a standard operating procedure. When
he opened one of the boxes, a peculiar smell emitted therefrom. He opened one of the bundles
and found dried leaves contained in the gloves and cigars. The “books” were actually bricks of
dried marijuana leaves. He reported the matter to the NBI.

Issue: W/N the evidence is admissible when the evidence is obtained by a private individual
Held: YES
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State.

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy.Protection

against whom? Protection against the state.The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between

Page 32 of 141
the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986).

ZULUETA V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 107383, FEBRUARY 20, 1996

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

(b) Remedies from unlawful search and seizure

• Employ any means to prevent search.

• Without a SW, the officer cannot insist on entering a citizen’s premises. If he does
so, he becomes an ordinary intruder.
• The person to be searched may resist the search and employ any means
necessary to prevent it, without incurring any criminal liability. (People v. Chan
Fook, No. L-16968, 6 October 1921)

• File a criminal action against officer.

• A public officer/employee who procures a SW without search just cause is
criminally liable under Art. 129, RPC (search warrants maliciously obtained and
abuse in the service of those legally obtained).

• File a motion to quash the illegal SW.

• This remedy is employed if search is not yet conducted.

• File a motion to return seized things.

• This is the remedy used if the search was already conducted and goods where
seized as a consequence thereof.

• File a motion to suppress evidence.

• This is anchored on the inadmissibility of seized items.

-o0o-

Page 33 of 141
C. PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

1. CRIMINAL ACTIONS, HOW INSTITUTED

• Commenced by the filing of the complaint/information. (Rule 110, Sec.1)
• NOTE: This tolls the running of the prescriptive period of the offense.

2. WHO MAY FILE CRIMES THAT CANNOT BE PROSECUTED DE OFFICIO

• All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. (Rule 110, Sec.5)
• In cases of public prosecutor’s heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public
prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized to prosecute the case.

(a) Cases Which Cannot Be Prosecuted De Officio

• Adultery/concubinage
• Seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness
• Defamation which consists of the imputation of any of the foregoing offenses

(b) Offended parties who can file a complaint

• In adultery and concubinage – the offended spouse. Both guilty parties should be
included if both are still alive.
• In oral defamation – only by the offended party.

AMPATUAN V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 197291, APRIL 3, 2013

The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose
principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the
discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court
deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to
determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of
supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is
clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when
he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."

Page 34 of 141
3. CONTROL OF PROSECUTION

(a)Prior to filing of a case:

• The public prosecutor has the discretion whether or not to file a criminal action.

(b)After a case is filed in court:

• It is the prosecutor’s duty, regardless of his personal conviction or opinion, to proceed

with the presentation of the evidence to enable the court to arrive at its own judgment as
to the accused’s guilt; in this situation, the public prosecutor has no discretion to dismiss
the action without the court’s approval.

• While the Secretary of Justice has the authority to review the acts of his subordinates in
criminal cases, the court always has the discretion to try a motion to dismiss which the
prosecution may file after the Secretary of Justice reverses an appealed decision. (Roberts
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113930, 5 March 1996)

• The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is
mandated to independently asses the merits of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JOSE C. GO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 201644, 24 September 2014

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the criminal cases, ruling that the Go
and Dela Rosa’s right to speedy trial was violated as they were compelled to wait
for five (5) years without the prosecution completing its presentation of evidence
due to its neglect. In their petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto.

The petition for certiorari was obviously defective. As provided in Section

5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it
behooved the respondents herein to implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent in the case before the Court of Appeals to enable the Solicitor General
to comment on the petition.

PEOPLE V. BERIALES,
G.R. NO. L-39962, APRIL 7, 1976

Facts: The accused were convicted of murder by the Court of First Instance of
Ormoc, Leyte. However, the accused were arraigned, and the trial concluded
without the presence of the Fiscal. The private prosecutor only presented an
authorization from the City Fiscal to handle the case. Despite the refusal of the
accused to participate in the proceedings in the absence of the Fiscal, they were
found guilty and were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Page 35 of 141
Held: Under the Rules of Court, "All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the fiscal." In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor
to appeal for the government. As stated by this Court, "once a public prosecutor
has been entrusted with the investigation of a case and has acted thereon by
filing the necessary information in court he is b law in duty bound to take charge
thereof until its finally termination, for under the law he assumes full
responsibility for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately
prepared to pursue it to its termination."

While there is nothing in the rule of practice and procedure in criminal cases
which denies the right of the fiscal, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to turn
over the active conduct of the trial to a private prosecutor, nevertheless, his duty
to direct and control the prosecution of criminal cases requires that he must be
present during the proceedings.

REPUBLIC V. SUNGA, G.R. NO. L-38634, JUNE 20, 1988 citing

CRESPO V. MOGUL, G.R. NO. L-53373, JUNE 30, 1987

“The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is

filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the
records of the investigation." (Crespo v. Mogul, 1987)

The Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial
court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the
complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of
the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without
objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his
own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution of the case
and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It is
only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its
exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.

Page 36 of 141
NAME OF THE ACCUSED

Substitution of private offended party

RICARZE V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 160451, FEBRUARY 9, 2007

Issue: Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this
late stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount
to a substantial amendment

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The
following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only
to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an
amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not
to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under
the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in
the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one
of form and not of substance.

Effect of wrong designation of offended party in an information

SENADOR V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 201620, MARCH 6, 2013

In case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110,
Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal:

SEC. 12. Name of the offended party — The complaint or information must state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or
any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better
way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.

(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged.

(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense
was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true
name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x xx (Emphasis
supplied.)

Page 37 of 141
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the
erroneous designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not the subject
matter of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.

Citing US v. Kepner: In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the
Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described
with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for
purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended
party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in
the information."

We conclude that in offenses against property,

 if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in
the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal
of the accused
 if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the
designation of the offended party is immaterial.

4. SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

• A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed

by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated. (Rule 110, Sec.3)

• Aninformationis an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed

by the prosecutor and filed with the court. (Rule, 110, Sec.4)

• A complaint or information is sufficient if it states:

• the name of the accused;
• the designation of the offense given by the statute;
• the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
• the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and
• the place where the offense was committed.

• When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information. (Rule 110, Sec.6)

• An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is
not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or
circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its
commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. (People v. Dion, G.R. No.
181035, 4 July 2011)

Page 38 of 141
 LITO CORPUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014

The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1,

subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the owner and that the time of occurrence is
not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the
wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not
make the latter fatally defective. Therefore, Corpuz’s argument that the
Information filed against him is formally defective because the Information does
not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned
and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to
by private complainant Tangcoy is untenable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DANILO FELICIANO, JR. ET AL.

G.R. No. 196735, 5 May 2014

The inclusion of the phrase “wearing masks and/or other forms of

disguise” in the information does not violate the constitutional rights of
appellants Feliciano. Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be
stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if
duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent
on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of “wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the evidence,
introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one

offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule
prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the
necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently
prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more
charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule
is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule
117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a
motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived. The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply
because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the
Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived
their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed
to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of
the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of.

Page 39 of 141
 ENRILE V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 213455, AUGUST 11, 2015

An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the

prosecutor and filed with the court. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, specifically require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its
sufficiency. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense
since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense
charged.

PEOPLE V. VILLANUEVA
G.R. NO. 138364, OCTOBER 15, 2003

Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 mandates the material allegations should be stated in
the body and not in the preamble or caption of the Information. Instead, both sections state
that as long as the pertinent and significant allegations are enumerated in the Information it
would be deemed sufficient in form and substance.

We hold that it is irrelevant and immaterial whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship
is mentioned in the opening paragraph of the Information or in the second paragraph which
alleges the acts constituting the crime charged since either paragraph is an integral part of
the Information.

LAZARTE JR. V. SANDIGANBAYAN & CASTILLO

G.R. NO. 180122, MARCH 13, 2009

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in law.

The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable
the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.

The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to
apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison detre of the
rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Another purpose is to enable
accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.

Page 40 of 141
5. DESIGNATION OF OFFENSE

• The acts and omissions constituting the offense must be alleged.

• Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specified.(Rule 110, Sec. 8)

• In case of conflict between the designation of the crime and the recital of facts
constituting the offense, the latter prevails.

• Minority: As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the

victim's minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant must be both alleged and
proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Albalate, Jr. G.R. No. 174480, December 18,
2009)

• A mere statement or a conclusion of law is insufficient to convict an accused. (People v.

Pangilinan, G.R. No. 183090, 14 November 2011)
 Thus, an information charging sexual abuse, stating that accused “with lewd design,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally commit acts of
lasciviousness” upon the person of the offended party is insufficient as it does not
contain the essential facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of
law. (People v. Pangilinan, supra.).

• There is no substitution of the information where the amendment of the information

consists of the allegation of a different mode by which a certain crime is committed, i.e.
when an information charging an accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was
modified to change the specification as to the mode of commission thereof. (Saludaga v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 184537, 23 April 2010)

SALUDAGA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. 184537, 23 April 2010

An Information charging petitioners Saludaga and SPO2 Genio for

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by causing undue injury to the
government was dismissed “for failure of the prosecution to allege and prove the
amount of actual damages caused the government, an essential element of the
crime charged.” The Office of the Special prosecutor re-filed the information,
charging the petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, by giving
unwarranted benefit to a private person, to the prejudice of the government. The
issue is whether or not there was a substitution of the information that should
have warranted the conduct of a preliminary investigation

There is no substituted information here. The Information dated August

17, 2007 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. Only the mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the
most recent being Talaga, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169888, 11 November 2008
provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the offense, thus: a)
by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or b) by

Page 41 of 141
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it
does not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused
may be charged under either mode or under both should both modes concur.

Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag,G.R. No. 103102, 6 March

1992, ruling that, “in substitution of information another preliminary
investigation is entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new
information” is not applicable to the present case because, as already stated, there
is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature of the offense
charged.

SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA V. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 175750-51, 2 April 2014

Moleta filed a case against Consigna, the Municipal Treasurer of General

Luna, Surigaodel Norte, for violation of AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices and
Estafa before the Sandiganbayan. Cosigna argued that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction because the crime as charged did not specify the provision of law
allegedly violated, i.e., the specific type of Estafa. On that issue, the Supreme
Court ruled that what is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein
recited.

CANCERAN V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 206442, 1 JULY 2015

In the subject information, the designation of the prosecutor of the

offense, which was “Frustrated Theft,” may be just his conclusion.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the additional
allegation, “but, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause
independent of accused’s will, that is, they were discovered by the employees
of Ororama Mega Center who prevented them from further carrying away
said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, x xx.” This averment, which
could also be deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge
nebulous. There being an uncertainty, the Supreme Court resolved the doubt
in favor of the accused, Canceran, and held that he was not properly informed
that the charge against him was consummated theft.

DUNGO, ET AL. V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209464, 1 JULY 2015

The Amended Information reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of 14 January

2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy.Pansol, Calamba City, Province of

Page 42 of 141
 Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, during a planned initiation rite and being
then officers and members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other
members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use
personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y
MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission
to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm,
resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioners claim that the amended information avers a criminal

charge of hazing by actual participation, but the only offense proved during
the trial was hazing by inducement. Their contention must fail. It is evident
that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is
whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The “planned
initiation rite” as stated in the information included the act of inducing
Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be
understood to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had
different stages and the perpetrators had different roles therein, not solely
inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the roles of the petitioners in
the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal
not only induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually
brought him there. They fulfilled their roles in the planned hazing rite which
eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not have been
accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim
to be present. Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the
dynamics of hazing. To require the prosecutor to indicate every step of the
planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case,
when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous
task, if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex
non cognit ad impossibilia).

The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state

every element of the crime of hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying
circumstances in the planned initiation activity, which has been satisfied in
the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed
the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the
planned initiation rite.

Page 43 of 141
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RAUL YAMON
G.R. NO. 207816, 24 FEBRUARY 2016

As embodied in Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Further, paragraph 2 of the same
section, it provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is further provided under Sections 8 and 9
of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that a complaint or information to be filed in court
must contain a designation given to the offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts
or omissions constituting the same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it and the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense.

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven,
unless the crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him. (Patula
v. People, 2012)

PEOPLE V. DELIM
G.R. NO. 142773, JANUARY 28, 2003

In this case, the Information states that the specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the
house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the attendant
modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely
incidental to their primary purpose of killing him.

Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information that the primary intent of the
malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was merely
incidental to kidnapping. Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

6. CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION

(a) Allegations required to safeguard the right to be informed

• Allegations must be in ordinary or concise language, sufficient to enable person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged.

• This must be done both for the offense charged and the circumstances involved in its
commission. (Rule 110, Sec. 9)

• The prosecutor’s characterization of the crime is immaterial and purposeless. The facts
stated in the body of the complaint/information determine the crime of which the
accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.

• Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged.

• Aggravating circumstances must be specified in the information, otherwise they are not
to be considered even if proven during the trial. (Rule 110, Sec. 8)

Page 44 of 141
 BALITAAN V. CFI-BATANGAS
G.R. NO. L-38544, JULY 30, 1982

The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is
to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

However, it is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts
necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the
offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the
description of the offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on the
face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a
matter of evidence at the trial.

Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. All that is required is that
the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed and will enable him intelligently to prepare his
defense, and if found guilty to plead her conviction, in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.

PEOPLE V. CHAN TOCO,

G.R. NO. L-3851, DECEMBER 17, 1908

"As a rule, an exception in a statute by which a certain particular are withdrawn from or
excepted out of the enacting clause thereof defining a crime concerning a class or species,
constitutes no part of the definition of such crime, whether placed clause to or remote from such
enacting clause."

DATE, PLACE, TIME OF COMMISSION

PEOPLE V. BUCA
G.R. NO. 209587, SEPTEMBER 23, 2015

It bears stressing that the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential
element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not
render the Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is
carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Lizada, 2003)

ROCABERTE V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 72994, JANUARY 23, 1991

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the defendant; the designation of
the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed.(Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court of 1964)

It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit.

Page 45 of 141
 PEOPLE V. DELFIN
G.R. NO. 201572, JULY 9, 2014

In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not
necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules
of Court merelyrequires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of
commission be approximated. [Rule 110, sec. 6, 11]

The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of commission of
the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when
such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence
are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense.

PEOPLE V. LIZADA
G.R. NOS. 143468-71, JANUARY 24, 2003

Under the two Informations, the rape incidents are alleged to have been committed on or about
September 15, 1998 and on or about October 22, 1998. The words on or about envisage a
period, months or even two or four years before September 15, 1998 or October 22, 1998. The
prosecution may prove that the crime charged was committed on or about September 15, 1998
and on or about October 22, 1998.

The date on or about August 1998 is sufficiently definite. After all, the date of the commission of
the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. The prosecution adduced conclusive
proof that accused-appellant raped private complainant on or about August 1998, as gleaned
from victim’s testimony during the trial.

7. DUPLICITY OF THE OFFENSE

• General Rule:The information must charge only one offense.

• Exception:When the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

• Remedy of accused when the information charges more than one offense: file a
Motion to Quash.

• Section 3, Rule 120 states that “[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense.”

8. AMENDMENT OR SUBSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

(a) Amendments in form and substance before plea

General Rule:
• It must be made before the accused enters his plea.

Page 46 of 141
Exception:
• If the amendment downgrades the nature of the offense charged in, or excludes any
accused from, the complaint/information, it can be made only upon motion of the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.

• Substantial amendments after plea are proscribed. Unlike formal amendments,

substantial amendments cannot be introduced after plea. (Leviste v. Alameda,G.R. No.
182677, 3 August 2010)

• Formal amendments may be made after plea and during trial; but it should not cause
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

(b) Amendment v. Substitution

Amendment
• formal or substantial changes;
• can be effected without leave of court;
• if only as to form, no need for another PI and plea;
• the amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information
or to an offense included in the original charge;
• accused can invoke double jeopardy.

Substitution
• involves a substantial change from the original charge;
• must be with leave of court;
• another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and
• requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which
does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused
cannot claim double jeopardy.

DR. JOEL C. MENDEZ V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 179962, 11 June 2014

Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor
filed an amended complaint which changed the date of the commission of the
offense. The court ruled that amendments that do not charge another offense
different from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution's
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments. The
test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information
pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence that the accused
previously had under the original information.

Page 47 of 141
 PEOPLE V. DEGAMO, G.R. NO. 121211, APRIL 30, 2003 citing
Teehankee v, Madayag, G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992

Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea of the
accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of court is obtained; and (ii)
such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not
permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.

In Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, we had occasion to state that a substantial amendment consists
of recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
court. All other matters are merely of form. The following were held to be merely formal
amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court
might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations
which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) amendment, which does not adversely
affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
We further elucidated in the Teehankee case that the test as to whether an amendment is
only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is
made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally
applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the
amendment is one of form and not of substance.

MATALAM V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 165751, APRIL 12, 2005

According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the
information may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended
in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended
charge is related to or is included in the original charge.

SOBERANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 154629, OCTOBER 5, 2005

The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors. By virtue of the trial court having granted the
prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority
of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing
board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching regarding the
disposition thereof.

As in almost all things, the prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite. The prosecution
must satisfy for itself that an accused excluded from the information for purposes of utilizing
him as state witness is qualified therefor.

Page 48 of 141
The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the information but his
discharge as state witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it rests its case, in
which event, the procedural (in addition to the substantive) requirements of Section 17, Rule
119 apply. Otherwise stated, when no amendment to the information is involved as a by-
product of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the accused falls
squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119.

It is in a situation where the accused to be discharged is included in the information that the
prosecution must present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge in order to convince the judge, upon whom discretion rests,
as to the propriety of discharging the accused as state witness.

9. VENUE OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS

Venue - the place where action is to be instituted.

Venue of criminal actions shall be:

• in the court of the municipality or territory
• where offense was committed; or
• where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

(a) How venue or jurisdiction is determined

• Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element jurisdiction.

(Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, 23 February 2005)

• For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. (Uy v. CA, G.R. No. 119000, 28 July 1997)

(b) When crime is continuing

• A person charged with transitory crime maybe validly tried in any municipality or
province where the offense was in part committed. (People v. Gorospe, No. L-51513, 15
May 1984)

(c) Libel cases

• If a private individual, action may also be filed in the province where he actually resides
at the time of the commission of the offense. If a public officer, action may be filed in the
court of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense. (Art. 360, RPC)

(d) Offense committed on railroad

Page 49 of 141
 • Action may be instituted and filed in the court of the first port of entry or any
municipality or territory where said train, aircraft or vehicle passed thru, including place
of departure or arrival. (Rule 110, Sec.15[b])

(e) Offense committed on a vessel

• Action may be instituted and filed in the court of the first port of entry or any
municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to
generally accepted principles of international law. (Rule 110, Sec. 15[c])

(f) Offense committed outside the Philippines

• Cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (Rule 110, Sec.15[d])

10. INTERVENTION OF OFFENDED PARTY

General Rule:
• An offended party has the right to intervene in the prosecution of a crime. (Rule 110, Sec.
16)

Exceptions:
• Where, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil
liability arises in favor of a private offended party.
• Where, from the nature of the offense, the private offended party is entitled to civil
indemnity arising therefrom but he waived the same or has expressly reserved his right
to institute a separate civil action or he has already instituted such action.
• Offended party has already instituted action.

LEONARDO A. VILLALON, ET AL. V. AMELIA CHAN

G.R. No. 196508, 24 September 2014

Sec. 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly

allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense
for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action.
The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

In this case, the Court of Appeals found no such waiver from or reservation
made by Chan. The fact that Chan, who was already based abroad, had secured
the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest
to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability
from the petitioners. Thus, the trial court should have allowed, and should not
have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as Chan,
being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through
counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the
case.

Page 50 of 141
 RODRIGUEZ V. PONFERRADA
G.R. NOS. 155531-34, JULY 29, 2005

An offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances:
(1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil liability
arises in favor of a private offended party; and
(2) when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but
(a) they waive the right to institute a civil action,
(b) expressly reserve the right to do so or
(c) the suit has already been instituted.
In any of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the case disappears and criminal
prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. [Gorospe v. Gamaitan, 1956]

In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any
remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of Court is
limited in the sense that rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Private
complainants intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the prosecution of
her interests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by
the Constitution.

A recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under the
other [BP 22 orEstafa]. Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust
enrichment, this is in essence the rationale for the proscription in our law against double
recovery for the same act or omission.

MERCIALES V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 124171, MARCH 18, 2002

Facts: The accused in a rape case were acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence. Petitioner, who
is the mother of the victim filed a petition to annul the RTC Order. The respondents claim that
the petitioner had no legal standing to appeal their acquittal.

Held:
It is true that a private complainant cannot bring an action questioning a judgment of
acquittal, except insofar as the civil aspect of the criminal case is concerned. In the case at bar,
we agree with petitioner that this issue was rendered moot when the Solicitor General, in
representation of the People, changed his position and joined the cause of petitioner, thus
fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor.
In any event, petitioner has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal prosecution,
being the mother of the deceased rape victim. The right of offended parties to appeal an order
of the trial court which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only
limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused
in double jeopardy.
-o0o-

Page 51 of 141
D. PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

1. RULE ON IMPLIED INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ACTION WITH CRIMINAL ACTION

General Rule:
• When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of damages is
deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1)

Exception:
If the offended party:
• waives a civil action;
• institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action; or
• reserves the right to institute it separately.

Exceptions to the exception:

• Claims arising out of a dishonored check under BP 22 where “no reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.”
• Claims arising from an offense which is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. (Sec. 4, PD
1606, as amended by RA 8249)

Effect of acquittal on civil liability

PADILLA V. CA,
G.R. NO. L-39999, MAY 31, 1984

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB
v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature
(De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of
estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil
liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or
is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

A person may be acquitted of malversation where, xxx, he could show that he did not
misappropriate the public funds in his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore
said funds or at least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for
purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable
rules and regulations. (Republic v. Bello)

2. WHEN CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY

• The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made:
• before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence, and
• under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.

Page 52 of 141
(a) Procedure for making the reservation
• Filing a manifestation in the criminal case that the offended party is reserving his right
to file a separate civil action.
• Filing the separate civil action and informing the court trying the criminal case that the
offended party has filed a separate civil action.
• No counterclaim, cross-claim or 3rd party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1)

3. WHEN SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IS SUSPENDED

• The civil action which should be suspended after the institution of the criminal action is
that arising from delict or crime.
• Civil actions mentioned in Rule 111, Sec.3, under Arts. 32-34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
are exempted from the rule that after a criminal action has been commenced, the civil
action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.

4. EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF ACCUSED OR CONVICT ON CIVIL ACTION (RULE 111,

SEC.4)

General Rule:
• If death is before arraignment, the case is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of
civil action against estate of the deceased.
• If death is after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action, it
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused.

Exceptions:
• If civil liability is predicated on other sources of obligations, as with independent civil
actions, recovery may still be made against the estate of the deceased or legal
representative after proper substitution.
• If death is while appeal is pending – it extinguishes criminal liability and civil liability
based thereon.

Effect of judgment on civil case on the criminal action

• A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is
not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject
of the civil action. (Rule 111, Sec.5)

DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO AND DR. CLENIO YNZON V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 163879, 30 July 2014

It is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil
liability subsists as the same is not based on delict but by contract and the
reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code. For this reason, a separate civil action may be enforced either against the

Page 53 of 141
 executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based, and in accordance with Section 4, Rule
111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

5. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

• A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal.

• The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.

(a) Requisites of a Prejudicial Question

1. Previously initiated civil action involves issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action;
2. The resolution of such issue determines WON the criminal action may proceed.

(b) Effect of prejudicial question

• Gen Rule: Where both a civil and a criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in
court, the criminal case takes precedence.
• Exception: If there exists a prejudicial question which should be resolved first before an
action could be taken in the criminal case.

PEOPLE V. ARAMBULO
G.R. No. 186597, 17 June 2015

In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the

resolution of the two (2) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) cases in
their favor would necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case for
estafa. The first case, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659, is an action f or accounting of all
corporate funds and assets, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and
damages. The second case, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, involves the issue on
whether the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the
corporation and whether they are duly authorized to make a demand for
remittance.

The following requisites must be present for a civil action to be

considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.

Page 54 of 141
 SEC Case No. 05-97-5659, which is an action for accounting of all
corporate funds and assets, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and
damages, does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case for estafa.
Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged
free from criminal liability. It also does not automatically follow that an
accounting of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of
corporate assets would result in the conviction of respondents in the estafa case.

With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, a prejudicial question exists.

The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the nullification of the
election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the issue
is the authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation. If
it is ruled in the SEC case that the present Anaped directors and officers were not
validly elected, then respondent Victoria may have every right to refuse
remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the essential element of misappropriation
in estafa may be absent in this case.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. V. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ET AL.

G.R. No. 166836, 4 September 2013

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought

by the buyer of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates
of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a
criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 9571
on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a
logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery
of the TCTs.

The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine

whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the
delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide
whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously precede
that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not
entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs, the basis for the criminal liability for the
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby
negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a

case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the
criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is
lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a
prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to

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 wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal

case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel Properties’ submission that there could be no
prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial
question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings
determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance
was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the
HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.

PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL
G.R. NO. 172060, SEPTEMBER 13, 2010

The rule [111, Sec. 7] is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30
August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of
receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case for pre-trial and trial on 14
February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.
Respondents petition in the Civil Case was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5
November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of
the criminal action.

6. RULE ON FILING FEES IN CIVIL ACTION DEEMED INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL
ACTION
• General Rule: Actual damages claimed or recovered by the offended party are not
included in the computation of the filing fees. (Rule 111, Sec. 1)
• Exception: In criminal actions for violation of BP22, the amount of the check involved
shall be considered as the actual damages for which no separate civil action is allowed.

7. INDEMNITY

• Civil indemnity is automatically awarded upon proof of the commission of the crime by
the offender. (People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 175836, 30 January 2009).

• The rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Courts can acquit an accused on
reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case. It is not
even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted. (Romero vs. People, G.R. No.
167546, 17 July 2009).

Page 56 of 141
 PEOPLE V. JUGUETA
G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016

The Supreme CourtEn Banc, through Justice Peralta, increased the civil
indemnity that should be awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was
done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. It
is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it
can be increased by the Court when appropriate.

In Summary:

I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation,

Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

Page 57 of 141
 1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely
attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely
attempted:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where
death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result
of the crime committed. In other complex crimes where death
does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil
indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the
prescribed penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery
with Rape, Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, Robbery with Arson,
Rape with Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with
Homicide or Carnapping with Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide,

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Qualified Piracy, Arson with Homicide, Hazing with Death, Rape,
Sodomy or Mutilation and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual
abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of
damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed is Death
but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following
shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of
damages is the same as the above if the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following
shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages
shall likewise be dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds
sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed
or injured in the incident.

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 Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall
likewise apply, and that for every additional rape committed,
whether against the same victim or other victims, the victims shall
be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape
are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages
awarded to simple rape/qualified rape shall apply.

V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty
consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous
Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender,Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except
those crimes where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence
and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the
trial, even if not alleged in the Information,in addition to the
above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral damages,
the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated;
₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and ₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be
awarded.

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion

perpetua and death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those
who died are entitled to the following:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the
rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00

Page 60 of 141
 c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of

burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00
as temperate damages shall be awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the
minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity is ₱3,000.00, but does not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants
it.

-o0o-

Page 61 of 141
E. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

1. NATURE OF RIGHT

• Preliminary investigation(“PI”) – an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there

is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. (Rule 112,
Sec.1)

• The right to PI is a statutory rightin those instances where it is required, and to withhold
it would violate the constitutional right to due process (People v Oandasa, 1968); it is not
a formal or technical right but a substantial right.

• It is a personal rightwhich the accused may waive expressly or impliedly.

ROLITO GO V. CA
G.R. NO. 101837, FEBRUARY 11, 1992

While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive right.

The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation,

humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to
any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due process.

ESTRADA V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 21214-41, JANUARY 21, 2015

Facts: Accused Senator Jinggoy Estrada was served a copy of a complaint for plunder against
him by the Ombudsman. Petitioner filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-
Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings in the
Ombudsman. However, the Ombudsman refused as according to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the petitioner is not entitled to be furnished with the documents used in the
preliminary investigation.

Held: Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he
respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he
may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense." A respondent’s right to
examine refers only to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."

Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of
the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits
executed by the correspondents should be furnished to a respondent.

Page 62 of 141
2. PURPOSES OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
• To determine whether or not a crime has been committed and whether or not there is
probable cause to believe the accused is guilty;
• To protect the accused from inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in
a formal trial;
• To secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.

RODOLFO M. AGDEPPA V. HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 146376, 23 April 2014

Agdeppa’s assertion that he had been denied due process is misplaced,

bearing in mind that the rights to be informed of the charges, to file a comment to
the complaint, and to participate in the preliminary investigation, belong to
Junia. Clearly, the right to preliminary investigation is a component of the right
of the respondent/accused to substantive due process. A complainant cannot
insist that a preliminary investigation be held when the complaint was dismissed
outright because of palpable lack of merit. It goes against the very nature and
purpose of preliminary investigation to still drag the respondent/accused
through the rigors of such an investigation so as to aid the complainant in
substantiating an accusation/charge that is evidently baseless from the very
beginning.

PEOPLE V. OMILIG
G.R. No. 206296, 12 August 2015

Accused executed his extrajudicial confession during the preliminary

investigation. Is this extrajudicial confession admissible in evidence?

Custodial Interrogation/Investigation “is the questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” On the other hand,
Preliminary Investigation “is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held
for trial.” A person undergoing preliminary investigation cannot be considered as
being under custodial investigation.

The import of the distinction between custodial interrogation and

preliminary investigation relates to the inherently coercive nature of a custodial
interrogation which is conducted by the police authorities. Due to the
interrogatory procedures employed by police authorities, which are conducive to
physical and psychological coercion, the law affords arrested persons
constitutional rights to guarantee the voluntariness of their confessions and
admissions, and to act as deterrent from coercion by police authorities. These
safeguards are found in Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution and Section 2

Page 63 of 141
 of R.A. No. 7438. Sans proper safeguards, custodial investigation is a fertile means
to obtain confessions and admissions in duress.

In this case, accused’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence

because it was obtained obtained during a preliminary investigation. And even if
accused’s extrajudicial confession was obtained under custodial investigation, it is
admissible. To be admissible, a confession must comply with the following
requirements: it “must be (a) voluntary; (b) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel; (c) express; and (d) in writing.” In the case
at bar, the prosecution did not present proof of the absence of any of these
requirements.

3. WHO MAY CONDUCT DETERMINATION OF EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE

• Provincial/city prosecutors and their assistants, national and regional state

prosecutors,and other officers as may be authorized by law. (Rule 112, Sec.2)
• COMELEC may conduct investigation re: election offenses. (Omnibus Election Code)
• Ombudsman is authorized to conduct PI re: criminal cases involving public officers and
employees. (Ombudsman Act)

ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION V. ANG

G.R. No. 182157, 17 August 2015

Petitioner explains that there are two determinations of probable cause:

the first is for the purpose of filing a criminal information in the court, and the
second is for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner submits that since the
first kind is executive in nature, then the Regional Trial Court had absolutely no
jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause to hold respondent as
an accused in the crime of estafa. Hence, for petitioner, the Regional Trial Court
grievously erred when it gave due course to the Omnibus Motion of respondent,
which questioned the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor.
Respondent counters this argument by alleging that the Regional Trial Court
may resolve issues brought before it pursuant to the power of the court to
administer justice.

Petitioner’s interpretation of the rules on the determination of probable

cause is inaccurate. Although courts must respect the executive determination of
probable cause, the trial courts may still independently determine probable
cause. They are not irrevocably bound to the determination of probable cause by
the prosecutor and the Department of Justice. The trial court actually has the
following options upon the filing of a criminal information: (a) immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause;
(b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of
doubt as to the existence of probable cause. These options are provided in Rule
112, Section 6 (a) of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the Regional Trial Court is

Page 64 of 141
 allowed to dismiss the charge of estafa against Ang notwithstanding the
executive determination of probable cause by the prosecutor. If we were to
construe otherwise, we would be contradicting the basic principle that “once an
information is filed in Regional Trial Court, any disposition of the case rests
already in the sound discretion of the court.”

HILARIO P. SORIANO V. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON VICTOR C.

FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 168157, 19 August 2015

The public respondents, in dismissing the charge against Atty. Cleofe, did
not gravely abuse their discretion. The Office of the Ombudsman found the
evidence against him to be insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to
charge him. Undoubtedly, he was a public officer discharging official functions,
an essential element of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019. However, the other elements of the crime, specifically: that the accused
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and that his acts complained of caused any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions were not
shown to be present.

The discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman in the determination of

probable cause to charge a respondent public official or employee cannot be
interfered with in the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

(a) Procedure of PI
• Filing of Complaint (Rule 112, Sec. 3[a]);
• Action of the investigating prosecutor (Rule 112, Sec. 3[b]);
• Respondent’s counter-affidavit (Rule 112, Sec. 3[c]);
• Hearing (Rule 112, Sec. 3[e]).

4. RESOLUTION OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR

• If there is no finding of probable cause, the investigating prosecutor dismisses the case.
• If there is probable cause, he prepares the information and resolution.
• Note: The investigating prosecutor cannot file information without prior approval of
superior.

5. REVIEW

• Within 5 days from resolution, the investigating prosecutor officer will forward the case
to the prosecutor or Ombudsman.
• Within 10 days from receipt, the prosecutor or Ombudsman will act on the case, who
must authorize/approve the filing of the information by the investigating prosecutor.

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 • In case of dismissal by the investigating prosecutor, the prosecutor or Ombudsman, if he
disagrees, may file the information himself or any deputy or order any prosecutor to do
so without conducting a new PI.
• The Secretary of Justice may direct the filing of information or dismissal of the
complaint. If an information is already filed in court, he may direct the prosecutor to
move for the dismissal of the information with notice to the parties.

(a) Procedure of Appeal to the Secretary of Justice from a Resolution on Preliminary

Investigation

• Filing of a verified Petition for Review within 15 days from receipt of resolution, or of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation.

• Outright dismissalby the Sec. of Justice if the petition is patently without merit or
manifestly intended for delay.

• Verified comment to the petition by the adverse party within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of the petition

• Reinvestigationif the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case.

• Disposition/Decision of Appeal. The Sec. of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the
appealed resolution. (only one MR of the Decision is allowed)

• It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the
ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of
the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of
the merits of the motion and should not merely rely on the findings of the Secretary.
(Harold Tamargo v. Romulo Awingan, et al., G.R. No. 177727, 19 January 2010)

HAROLD TAMARGO V. ROMULO AWINGAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. 177727, 19 January 2010

Informations for murder were filed against respondents. The DOJ, on

review, directed the withdrawal of the Informations, and declared that the
extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and
that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. The
trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. The issue now is
whether or not Judge Daguna erred in denying the said motion.

It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an

Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial
based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make
an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. It may either agree or

Page 66 of 141
 disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the
resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced
that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. Here, Judge
Daguna seriously erred by limiting her evaluation and assessment only to
evidence that supported probable cause while completely disregarding
contradicting evidence.

• The validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation.(Lee, et al. v. KBC Bank N.V. G.R. No. 164673, 15 January 2010)

LEE, ET AL. v. KBC BANK N.V.

G.R. No. 164673, 15 January 2010

As to the issue of probable cause for estafa, petitioners claim that the
Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the admissibility of the facsimile
message is a matter best ventilated in a full-blown trial.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals. The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. In fine,
the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation.

ELMA V. JACOBI
G.R. NO. 155996, JUNE 27, 2012

Memorandum Circular No. 58 of the Office of the President bars an appeal

from the decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary
investigations of criminal cases via a petition for review, except for those
involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

Therefore, a party aggrieved by the DOJs resolution - affirming or reversing the

finding of the investigating prosecutor in a preliminary investigation involving
an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua to death - cannot appeal to the
Office of the President and is left without any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. This leaves a certiorari petition as the
only remedial avenue left. However, the petitioner must allege and show that the
DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting or denying the petition for
review.

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6. WHEN WARRANT OF ARREST MAY ISSUE

• PC for Prosecutor: WON there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged and should be held for trial for which the information is to be
filed.
• PC for Judge: WON there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested, and warrant of arrest should be issued
so that the accused may be held in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
• If the judge finds PC, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if
accused is already arrested.
• The judge need not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in the
determination of PC, but he must personally evaluate the prosecutor’s report supporting
evidence, and on that basis, dismiss the case, issue warrant of arrest, or require further
affidavits.

PDIC V. HON. CASIMIRO

G.R. No. 206866, 2 September 2015

It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez’s

affidavit as inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point
out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.
In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary
investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay.

WHEN WARRANT OF ARRREST IS DISMISSED

PEOPLE V. YADAO
G.R. NOS. 162144-54, NOVEMBER 13, 2012

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an appeal. Here,
the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an order issued in the subject
cases. But it reconsidered its action and withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was
not an effective, speedy, and adequate remedy. In other words, the prosecution’s move
was not a case of forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief
that respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her various
orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-encompassing remedy
for the prosecution.

Page 68 of 141
 DELOS SANTOS V. CAGUIOA
G.R. NOS. 178947 & 179079, JUNE 26, 2013

While a judge’s determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of
issuing arrest warrants, Section 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly
fails to establish probable cause

It must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause – that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows
that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties
to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to
order the presentation of additional evidence.

Once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of
evaluating the evidence on record, he may either:
(a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause;
(b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause; and
(c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of
probable cause

7. CASES NOT REQUIRING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

• If the complaint is filed directly with the prosecutor involving an offense punishable by
imprisonment of less than 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, the procedure outlined in Rule
112, Sec. 3(a) shall be observed. The prosecutor shall act on the complaint based on the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant within 10
days from filing.

8. REMEDIES OF ACCUSED IF THERE WAS NO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Effect of denial of right to PI:

• While PI is a statutory and substantive right and a component part of due process, its
absence :
(1) does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective;
(2) neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court;
(3) nor constitute a ground for quashing the information.

• Before the information or complaint is filed, the person arrested may ask for a P.I., but
he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC in the presence of his

Page 69 of 141
 counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail. The investigation must be
terminated within 15 days from its inception.

• After the filing of the complaint/information in court without a P.I., the accused may
within 5 days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a P.I.

• In practice, when an Information is filed and the accused did not undergo P.I., the
following motions may also be filed in court:
• Motion for Reinvestigation.
• Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.

BROCKA v. ENRILE
G.R. NOS. 69863-65, DECEMBER 10, 1990

Where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the
instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time
that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted,
charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.

9. INQUEST

(a) Definition of inquest

• Inquest is a summary inquiry conducted by the prosecutor for the purpose of

determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person is based on probable cause.

General Rule:
• PI is required to be conducted before a complaint/information is filed for an offense
where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, without
regard to the fine. (Rule 112, Sec. 1)

Exception:
• When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense that requires
a PI, a complaint/information may be filed without conducting the PI if the necessary
inquest is conducted.

• After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a PI, the accused may,
within 5 days from the time he learns of its filling, ask for a PI with the same right to
adduce evidence in his defense as provided in Rule 112. (Rule112, Sec. 6)

LEVISTE V. ALAMEDA
G.R. NO. 182677, AUGUST 3, 2010

Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public

prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a
warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of determining whether said persons
should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court.

Page 70 of 141
 It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested person
and the private complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp the respective remedies
available to them before and after the filing of a complaint or information in court.

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information

for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one
day without regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a
preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type of
offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted.

-o0o-

Page 71 of 141
F. ARREST

1. ARREST, HOW MADE

• Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. (Rule 113, Sec.1)

(a) Constitutional requirements of arrest

• The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses that he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. 3, Sec. 2,
Constitution)

• An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission

to the custody of the person making the arrest.

• No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. Person arrested shall
not be subject to a greater restraint than necessary. (Rule 113, Sec. 2)

• Time to make arrest: Arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or
night. (Rule 113, Sec. 6)

2. ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT, WHEN LAWFUL.

(a) In Flagrante Delicto

• Literally, caught in the act of committing a crime. When the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence
of the peace officer or private person who arrested him. (Rule 113, Sec. 5a)

• When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. (People
v. Ng Yik Bun, G.R. No. 180452, 10 January 2011)

• When an arrest is made during anentrapment or a buy-bust operation, it is not required

that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless arrests by a peace officer or a private person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. (People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, 16 August
2010)

Page 72 of 141
 PEOPLE V. SEMBRANO
G.R. No. 185848, 16 August 2010

Accused was arrested after the police conducted a buy-bust operation

and was eventually convicted for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. On the
issue of the legality of the arrest of the accused, the Supreme Court noted that
accused was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment
operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the provisions
of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless
arrests by a peace officer or a private person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.

Furthermore, a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in

recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending
drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving accused, deserves
judicial sanction. Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search
and seizure conducted on the person of accused were allowed under the
circumstances. The search, incident to accused‘s lawful arrest, needed no
warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets of shabu
recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation, are admissible and were
properly admitted in evidence against him.

• Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the
legality of the buy-bust operation and the warrantless arrest of the accused caught in
flagrante delicto. (People v. Manlangit, G.R. No. 189806, 12 January 2011)

PEOPLE V. DE LOS REYES

G.R. NO. 174774, AUGUST 31, 2011

To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer

VALDEZ V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 170180, NOVEMBER 23, 2007

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Page 73 of 141
 HOMAR V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 182534, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015

The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which
the corpus delicti of the crime - shabu - was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the
alleged confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner's body is
surely a violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a
consequence, the alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.

PEOPLE V. DORIA,
G.R. NO. 125299, JANUARY 22, 1999

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was
caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto
as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant.

(1) Entrapment v. Instigation

• Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to commit an offense originated from
the inducer and not the accused who had no intention to commit the crime and would
not have committed it were it not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the
accused. Instigation leads to the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar
prosecution and conviction.

(b) Hot Pursuit Arrest

• When an offense has just been committed and the officer or private person has probable
cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of acts or circumstances, that the person
to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Sec. 5b)

PESTILOS V. GENEROSO
G.R. NO. 182601, NOVEMBER 10, 2014, J. LEONEN DISSENT

The elements of a valid warrantless arrest under Rule113, Section 5(b) are the following:
(1) the offense has just been committed;
(2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts of circumstances; and
(3) these facts and circumstances give rise to probable cause that the person to be
arrested has committed the offense

The first element requires that there are facts leading to a conclusion that an offense has been
committed. Being based on objectivity, the first element requires the occurrence of facts that,
when taken together, constitutes the commission of an offense.

Page 74 of 141
Former Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, in his dissent in In Re Ilagan, was of the opinion that
"just been committed" "connotes immediacy in point of time." Former Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado emphasized the requirement of immediacy:

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now
required by Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by
reason of such recency of the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer
acquiring personal and/or reliable knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is
necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer the interval, the more attenuated are the
chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge

PEOPLE V. TUDTUD
G.R. NO. 144037, SEPTEMBER 26, 2003

Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the
arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The
question, therefore, is whether the police in this case had probable cause to arrest
appellants. Probable cause has been defined as:

An actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are

reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the
arrest.

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is
that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a),
Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

(c)Arrest of an Escaped Prisoner

• When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped: (Rule 113, sec. 5c)
From a penal establishment or place where he is:
• Serving final judgment;
• Temporarily confined while his case is pending;
• While being transferred from one confinement to another;
• Escapee may be immediately pursued or re-arrested without warrant at any time
and in any place within the Philippines. (Rule 113, Sec. 13)

(d) Effect of Failure to Object to Warrantless Arrests

• Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Page 75 of 141
3. METHOD OF ARREST

(a)By officer with warrant

Duties of the arresting officer:

• Execution of warrant (Rule 113, Sec.4);
• The head office to whom the warrant of arrest was delivered shall cause the warrant
to be executed within 10 days from its receipt;
• To make a report to the judge who issued the warrant within 10 days after expiration
of the period to execute;
• In case of his failure to execute, he shall state the reasons therefore;
• To arrest the accused and deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without
unnecessary delay. (Rule 113, Sec. 3)

Rights of the arresting officer:

• To summon assistance. (Rule 113, Sec. 10)
• He may orally summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in
effecting the arrest.
• Persons summoned shall assist in effecting the arrest when he can do so without
detriment to himself.
• To break into any building/enclosure where the persons to be arrested is or is
reasonably believed to be. (Rule 113, Sec. 11)
• To break out from the building/enclosure when necessary to liberate himself. (Rule
113, Sec 12)

(b) By officer without warrant

Duties of arresting officer without warrant:

• The officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of
the arrest. (Rule 113, Sec. 8)
 Exceptions:
• The person to be arrested is engaged in the commission of the offense;
• He is pursued immediately after its commission;
• He escapes, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has the opportunity
to so inform him;
• Giving such information will imperil the arrest.
• The private person shall inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest
him and the cause of the arrest. (Rule 113, Sec. 9)
 Exceptions: same as those for the arrest by an officer.

(c)By private person

Duties of private person effecting an arrest:

• The private person must deliver the arrested person to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Sec. 7.
• Otherwise, the private person may be held liable for illegal detention.

Page 76 of 141
4. REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT OF ARREST

• It must be issued upon probable cause which must be determined personally by a judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. (Art. 3, Sec. 2, Constitution)

(a) Instances When Judge Issues Warrant of Arrest

• Upon the filing of the information by the public prosecutor and after personal
evaluation by the judge of the prosecutor’s resolution and supporting evidence. (Rule
112, Sec. 6a)
• Upon application of a peace officer and after personal examination by the judge of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce. (Rule 112, Sec. 6b)

5. DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST.

• Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested.

• The probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause, the
facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonable prudent
man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has beencommitted. (People v. Allado,
G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994)

6. DISTINGUISH PROBABLE CAUSE OF PROSECUTOR FROM THAT OF A JUDGE

• The law requires personal determination on the part of the judge. The judge may rely on
the report of the investigating prosecutor provided he also evaluates the documentary
evidence in support thereof. Hence, the fiscal’s finding of probable cause is not
conclusive upon the judge as to his determination of whether or not there is indeed
probable cause. (AAA v. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, 8 June 2007)

• PC of Prosecutor(Executive Determination of Probable Cause): WON there is

reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial for which information is to be filed

• PC of Judge(Judicial Determination of Probable Cause): WON there is reasonable

ground to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested, and warrant of arrest should be issued so that the accused may be held in
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Page 77 of 141
 ROBERTS V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 113930, MARCH 5, 1996

• The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial
Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the
Judge alone makes this determination.

• The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists
him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow
what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if
any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

-o0o-

Page 78 of 141
G. BAIL

1. NATURE
• Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by
him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under
conditions hereinafter specified. (Rule 114, Sec. 1)
• Bail is a constitutional and statutory right.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MELCHOR D. BRITA

G.R. No. 191260, 24 November 2014

Brita asserts that the grant of bail bolsters his claim that the evidence of the
prosecution is not strong enough to prove his guilt. The Court is not convinced. “A
grant of bail does not prevent the trial court, as the trier of facts, from making a final
assessment of the evidence after full trial on the merits.” It is not an uncommon
occurrence that an accused person granted bail is convicted in due course.

FELICIANO V. PASICOLAN
G.R. NO. L-14657, JULY 31, 1961

The petitioner upon learning that an amended information charging him and
seventeen others with the crime of kidnapping with murder had been filed, and that
a warrant for his arrest had been issued, immediately went into hiding and until now
is at large. Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that
the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial. It is, therefore,
clear that the petitioner is a free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to
admission to bail.

2. WHEN A MATTER OF RIGHT; EXCEPTIONS

(a) When bail is a matter of right (Rule 114, Sec. 4)

• Before or after conviction by MTC;
• Before conviction by RTC of all offenses punishable by penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua.

PEOPLE V. VALDEZ
G.R. Nos 216007-09, 8 December 2015

FACTS: Accused Valdez was charged with a complex crime of

Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not Valdez is entitled to bail.

HELD:YES.The appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an

accused who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00.

Page 79 of 141
 Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that “[a]ll persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties x xx.” The term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable,
penalty.

The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the
felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what
is referred to as the "prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 249 of the
RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal which ranges
from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides
for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission
of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict.
This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the
case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the
RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable
penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty)
which is the "penalty actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has
to serve.

For the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification

of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00, the
"prescribed penalty" is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. After trial, should the commission of such crime be proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the "imposable penalty" is reclusion
perpetua in view of the RPC mandate that the prescribed penalty of reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua shall be applied in its maximum. The
falsification, which is the means used to commit the crime of malversation, is in
the nature of a generic aggravating circumstance that effectively directs the
imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. The phrases "shall
be applied" and "shall impose," found in Articles 63 and 64, respectively, of the
RPC, are of similar import as the phrase "shall be imposed" found in Article 48.
Both Articles 63 and 64 refer to the penalty to be imposed after considering the
aggravating or mitigating circumstance/s. Finally, the "penalty actually imposed"
is still reclusion perpetua, considering that the ISL finds no application as the
penalty is indivisible.

Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in
charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of the
complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses
were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is charged and
the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the
defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.

At this point, there is no certainty that accused Valdez would be found

guilty of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public
Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an
aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For
purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed
crime committed is a complex crime since it is only when the trial has

Page 80 of 141
 terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of committing
malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the
constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none of
them, would be proven after full-blown trial.

It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and
grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime
committed. Likewise, it is unjust to give a stamp of approval in depriving the
accused person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a complex
crime that is not even considered as inherently grievous, odious and hateful. To
note, Article 48 of the RPC on complex crimes does not change the nature of the
constituent offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law. When committed through falsification of
official/public documents, the RPC does not intend to classify malversation as a
capital offense. Otherwise, the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds
P22,000.00 should have been expressly included in Republic Act No. 7659. If
truly a non-bailable offense, the law should have already considered it as a
special complex crime like robbery with rape, robbery with homicide, rape with
homicide, and kidnapping with murder or homicide, which have prescribed
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an

accused charged with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is
palpable when compared with an accused indicted for plunder, which is a
heinous crime punishable under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 765935
and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder
committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount or
total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be at
least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is alleged
to have committed malversation of public funds thru falsification of
official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled to
bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as P22,000.01.
Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been contemplated by the
law.

PEOPLE V. DONATO
G.R. NO. 79269, JUNE 5, 1991

Before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the
right is absolute.

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that
the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.

Page 81 of 141
(b) When right to bail not available.

(1) When evidence of guilt is strong in capital offenses or offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetuaor life imprisonment.

• Except: When the accused charged with a capital offense is a minor, he is entitled to
bail regardless of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

• Capital Offense: An offense which under the law existing at the time of commission
and of the application for admission to bail is punishable by death. (Rule 114, Sec. 6)

• The capital nature of the offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law and
not the one actually imposed.

• If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding 6 years, the
accused shall be denied bail or his bail shall be cancelled upon showing by the
prosecution of the following:
 Recidivism, quasi-recidivism, or habitual delinquency or commission of a
crime aggravated by reiteration.
 Previously escaped legal confinement, evaded sentence or violated bail
condition w/o justification
 Commission of an offense while under probation, parole or conditional
pardon
 Probability of flight
 Undue risk that he may commit another crime during pendency of appeal

(2) Right to bail is not available in the military.(Comendador v. De Villa, G.R. No. 93177,
August 2, 1991)

(3) After a judgment of conviction has become final.

• If he applied for probation before finality, he may be allowed temporary liberty
under his bail (Rule 114, Sec. 24).

(4) After the accused has commenced to serve his sentence. (Rule 114, Sec. 24)

3. WHEN BAIL IS A MATTER OF DISCRETION

(a) Before conviction, in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment.

ENRILE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to

bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show
clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be

Page 82 of 141
excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua
considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof
showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not
be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of
90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes, but is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. Admission to bail in
offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is subject
to judicial discretion. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies
within the discretion of the trial court. But such discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the
purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.

Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. Enrile has averred in
his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should
be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time
of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.

In granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the

earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The
Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. Enrile’s social and political
standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his
being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect
for the legal processes of this country. At an earlier time many years ago when
he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was
not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health
presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the
Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

Page 83 of 141
 Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying Enrile bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the
trial. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then
enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not
only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will
guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. On the other hand, to mark time
in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.

(b) Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment.

• “Conviction”refers to conviction by the trial court, which has not become final, as the
accused still has the right to appeal. After conviction by the trial court, the accused
convicted of a capital offense is no longer entitled to bail, and can only be released when
the conviction is reversed by appellate court. (Art. 3, Sec. 13, Constitution)

LEVISTE V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010

Accused was convicted of the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to

suffer an indeterminate penalty of more than six (6) years. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part, which was denied by the Court of Appeals.

In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the Supreme Court held that the

discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal does not mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty
imposed on the accused applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.
The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph
not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the
said circumstances. In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion
to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even

Page 84 of 141
 if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
are absent. On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of
the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other
option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Thus, a finding that none of
the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound
discretion approach

TEEHANKEE V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. NO. L-278, MAY 4, 1946

This Court in its resolution of January 11, 1946, above quoted, gave the following instructions to
the People's Court:

(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for
release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion,
grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose;

(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not
justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to
judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;

(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on
the ground that the answer any particular question on the ground that the answer may
involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public
interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to
that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is
vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial,
be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce —
provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or
detainee.

4. HEARING OF APPLICATION FOR BAIL IN CAPITAL OFFENSES

• Capital offense is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and of the application for admission to bail may be punished with death. The capital
nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, and not by the
penalty that may be imposed after trial and on the basis of the evidence adduced and the
presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance. (Rule 114, Sec. 6)

• Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is not

bailable when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution (Rule 114, Sec. 7)

(a) Duty of judge to conduct hearing

• Where the prosecution agrees with the accused’s application for bail or foregoes the
introduction of evidence, the court must nonetheless set the application for hearing.

Page 85 of 141
 • It is mandatory for the judge to conduct a hearing and ask searching and clarificatory
questions for the purpose of determining the existence of strong evidence against the
accused; and the order, after such hearing, should make a finding that the evidence
against the accused is strong.

(b) Prosecution has burden of proof

• At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person in custody for the commission
of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. (Rule 114, Sec. 8)

• “EVIDENCE OF GUILT” in the Constitution and the Rules refers to finding of innocence
or culpability, regardless of the modifying circumstances.

(c) A.M. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March 2014

• Sec. 6 of The Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of
Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial, A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March 2014,
outlined the hearing of applications for bail in capital offenses:

(a) The hearing of the accused's motion for bail in offenses punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be summary, with the prosecution bearing
the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The accused may at his
option, if he wants the court to consider his evidence as well, submit in support of his
motion the affidavits of his witnesses attesting to his innocence.

(b) At the hearing of the accused's motion for bail, the prosecution shall present
its witnesses with the option of examining them on direct or adopting the affidavits they
executed during the preliminary investigation as their direct testimonies.

(c) The court shall examine the witnesses on their direct testimonies or affidavits
to ascertain if the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The court's questions need
not follow any particular order and may shift from one witness to another. The court
shall then allow counsels from both sides to examine the witnesses as well. The court
shall afterwards hear the oral arguments of the parties on whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong.

(d) Within forty-eight (48) hours after hearing, the court shall issue an order
containing a brief summary of the evidence adduced before it, followed by its
conclusion of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Such conclusion shall not be
regarded as a pre-judgment on the merits of the case that is to be determined only after a
full-blown trial.

Page 86 of 141
5. GUIDELINES IN FIXING THE AMOUNT OF BAIL. (RULE 114, SEC.9)

• DOJ Department Circular No. 89, as amended, otherwise known as the “2000 Bail Bond
Guide” provides standards and criteria for recommendation of amount of bail to be
granted, if possible, and the rules for the computation of bail.

• The Department of Justice's Bail Bond Guide shall be considered but shall not be
controlling. In no case shall the court require excessive bail. (Sec. 1, A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC,
18 March 2014)

(a) Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail. (Rule 114, Sec.9)

• Financial ability of the accused
• Nature and circumstances of the offense
• Penalty for the offense charged
• Character and reputation of the accused
• Age and health of the accused
• Probability of the accused appearing at the trial
• Forfeiture of other bail
• Fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
• Forfeiture of other bail
• Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

6. BAIL, WHEN NOT REQUIRED

• When a person has been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced, he shall
be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or
proceedings on appeal.

• If the maximum penalty is destierro, he shall be released after 30 days of preventive

imprisonment.

NOTE: No bail shall be required in prosecution of offenses covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, except:
• When a warrant of arrest was issued for failure of the accused to appear when so
required
• When the accused is:
• A recidivist
• A fugitive from justice
• Charged with physical injuries
• Has no known residence (Secs. 10 and 12, Rules on Summary Procedure)

Page 87 of 141
7. INCREASE OR REDUCTION OF BAIL

The court may either increase or reduce the amount of bail:

• After the accused is admitted to bail;
• Upon good cause.
• INCREASED bail: Accused may be committed to custody if he does not give bail in the
increased amount within a reasonable period of time. (Rule 114, Sec. 20)
• REDUCED bail: Person in custody for period equal to or more than minimum of
principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged may be released on a reduced bond.
(Rule 114, Sec. 16)
• If the accused does not have the financial ability to post the amount of bail that the court
initially fixed, he may move for its reduction, submitting for that purpose such
documents or affidavits as may warrant the reduction he seeks. The hearing of this
motion shall enjoy priority in the hearing of cases. (Sec. 3, A.M. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March
2014)
• Inappealable: The order fixing the amount of the bail shall not be subject to appeal. (Sec.
4, A.M. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March 2014)
• Release after service of minimum imposable penalty:The accused who has been
detained for a period at least equal to the minimum of the penalty for the offense
charged against him shall be ordered released, motuproprio or on motion and after notice
and hearing, on his own recognizance without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him. [Sec. 3, A.M. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March 2014, citing Sec. 16, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court and Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. l0389]

VILLASENOR V. ABANO
G.R. NO. L-23599, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967

[The 1964] Rules of Court, provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either
increase or reduce the amount" of the bail, and that "defendant may be committed to custody
unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called upon to furnish."

Along with the court's power to grant bail in bailable cases is its discretion to fix the amount
thereof, and, as stated, to increase or reduce the same. The question of whether bail is excessive
"lays with the court to determine."

In the matter of bail fixing, courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose for
which bail is required. The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court, gives this
purpose — "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance."

8. FORFEITURE AND CANCELLATION OF BAIL

(a) Forfeiture of bail (Rule 114, Sec. 21)

• If the accused fails to appear in person as required by the court, bondsmen are given 30
days within which to:

Page 88 of 141
  Produce the body of principal or give reason for the non-production. Bondsmen
may:
- Arrest the accused;
- Cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of
suitable age or discretion upon written authority endorsed on a certified
copy of the undertaking;
- Explain why the accused failed to appear.
 If the bondsmen fail to do these, judgment is rendered against them, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail.
 Bondsmen’s liability cannot mitigated or reduced, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted.

(b) Cancellation of bail (Rule 114, Sec. 22)

• Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the prosecutor, bail may be
cancelled upon:
(a) surrender of the accused has been surrendered of the accused; or
(b) proof of his death.
• Upon acquittal of the accused;
• Upon the dismissal of the case; or
• Upon execution of judgment of conviction.

9. APPLICATION NOT A BAR TO OBJECTIONS IN ILLEGAL ARREST, LACK OF OR

IRREGULAR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

• Bail no Bar Rule: Bail is no longer a waiver of objections (Rule 114, Sec. 26; Yusop v
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 138859-60, 22 February 2001), provided that the proper
objections are timely raised (i.e., before accused enters a plea). An application or an
admission to bail shall NOT bar the accused from challenging or questioning the:
 Validity of his arrest
 Legality of the arrest warrant
 Regularity of PI
 Absence of PI

• The court shall resolve the objections as early as practicable but not later than the start of
the trial of the case.

• Pending the raffle of the case to a regular branch of the court, the accused may move for
the fixing of the amount of bail, in which event, the Executive Judge shall cause the
immediate raffle of the case for assignment and the hearing of the motion. (Sec. 2, A.M.
No. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March 2014)

Page 89 of 141
BAIL ON APPEAL
LEVISTE V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 189122, MARCH 17, 2010

 Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared
to be discretionary.

 The discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as this where the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from
non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus,
the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal.

 Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
stages:
1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must
determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will
exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for
bail pending appeal and

2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within
the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court
may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice;on
the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.

10. FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINTS AGAINST JUDGES

• A party or a lawyer who is guilty of filing a frivolous administrative complaint or a

petition for inhibition against a judge arising from the latter's action on the application
for bail may be appropriately sanctioned. (Sec. 7, A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March 2014)

11. HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER & BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION WATCHLIST

• Bondsmen can prevent accused from leaving country by arresting him or asking for him
to be re-arrested by a police officer upon written authority. (Rule 114, Sec. 23)

• The accused may be prohibited from the leaving country during the pendency of his
case (People v. UyTuising,G.R. Nos. 42118-42120, 25 April 1935; Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals,No. L-62100, 30 May 1986). If the accused released on bail attempts to depart
from the Philippines without the permission of the court where his cases is pending, he
may be re-arrested without warrant. (Rule 113, Sec. 23)

• Hold-Departure Orders: This may be issued only by the RTCs in criminal cases within
their exclusive jurisdiction. (SC Circular No. 39-97, 19 June 1997)

Page 90 of 141
(a) DOJ Cir. No. 41-10 (25 May 2010)

Sec. 1.Hold Departure Order.– The Secretary of Justice may issue an

HDO, under any of the following instances:
(a) Against the accused, irrespective of nationality, in criminal cases
falling within the jurisdiction of courts below the RTCs.
(b) Against the alien whose presence is required either as a defendant,
respondent, or witness in a civil or labor case pending litigation, or any case
before an administrative agency of the government.
(c) The Secretary of Justice may likewise issue an HDO against any
person, either motuproprio, or upon the request by the Head of a Department of
the Government; the head of a constitutional body or commission; the Chief
Justice of the SC for the Judiciary; the Senate President or the House Speaker for
the Legislature, when the adverse party is the Government or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities, or in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health.

Sec. 2.Watchlist Order.– The Secretary of Justice may issue a WLO, under
any of the following instances:
(a) Against the accused, irrespective of nationality, in criminal cases
pending trial before the Regional Trial Court.
(b) Against the respondent, irrespective of nationality, in criminal cases
pending P.I., petition for review, or MR before the DOJ or any of its provincial or
city prosecution offices.
(c) The Secretary of Justice may likewise issue a WLO against any person,
either motuproprio, or upon the request of any government agency, including
commissions, task forces or similar entities created by the Office of the President,
pursuant to the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003” (R.A. No. 9208) and/or
in connection with any investigation being conducted by it, or in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health

NOTE: It must be noted that, to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs resulting in
inconvenience and prejudice to the parties affected thereby, the Supreme Court issued SC
Circular No. 39-97 providing that HDOs shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. (cf. Par, 1, SC Circular No. 39-97)

GMA v. DE LIMA ET AL. / JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO v. DE LIMA

G.R. No. 199034 / 199046, 15 November 2011

The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining

Secretary of Justice Leila M. De Lima, her agents, representatives, or persons
acting in her place or stead, from enforcing or implementing DOJ Department
Circular No. 41, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to issue a Hold
Departure Order. Said temporary restraining order is effective until further
orders from the Supreme Court.

Page 91 of 141
(b) Immigration Lookout Bulletin

The Bureau of Immigration may place a person in its Immigration Lookout Bulletin
(ILB) pursuant to an order by the Department of Justice. Said order merely directs the Bureau of
Immigration to be on the “lookout” and take prudent steps to verify on the status of the
criminal case against a person. If the concerned agency raises no objection to the departure, then
the person will be allowed to leave.

-o0o-

Page 92 of 141
H. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

1. RIGHTS OF ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL

(1) To be presumed innocent;

(2) To be informed of the nature and cause of accusation;

(3) To be present and defend in person OR by counsel;

(4) Right to be present at every stage of the proceedings:

• This right may be waived when:

- Accused is absent without just cause at the trial;
- Accused under custody escapes.

• However, presence is mandatory:

- For purposes of identification;
- At arraignment; (Rule 116, Sec. 1b)
- At the promulgation of judgment;
o Exception: If the conviction is for a light offense. (Rule 120, Sec. 6)

• Requisites of Trial in absentia: (Parada v. Veneracion, 1997)

- Prior arraignment;
- Proper notice of the trial;
- Failure to appear is unjustifiable.
• Effects: waiver of right to be present, right to present evidence and right to
cross-examine witnesses. (Gimenez v. Nazareno, 1998)

(5) Right to counsel;

• The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even
mistakes in the realm of procedural technique, except, when the reckless or
gross negligence of the counsel deprives the client of due process of law.

(6) Right to defend in person;

(7) To testify as witness in his behalf;

(8) Right against self-incrimination;

Page 93 of 141
 DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200748, 23 July 2014

A police officer arrested for extortion was compelled to undergo a drug

test by submitting his urine sample. He was found positive for drugs and
thereafter convicted for use of dangerous drugs (Sec. 15, Art II R.A. 9165). The
Court held that the urine sample is inadmissible for being violative of the
accused’s right against self-incrimination. Cases where non-testimonial
compulsion has been allowed reveal that the pieces of evidence obtained were all
material to the principal cause of the arrest.

(9) Right to confrontation;

(10) Right to compulsory process;

(11) Right to speedy, impartial and public trial;

• Remedies against denial of right:

- Motion to dismiss
- Dismissal subject to rules on double jeopardy
- Petition for Mandamus (Vide Abadia v CA, 1994)

(12) Right to appeal.

2. RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (SEC. 2, R.A. No. 7438)

(1) To be assisted by counsel at all times.

• Waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the assistance of counsel.
(Art. 3, Sec. 12(1), Constitution)

• To be assisted specifically in the following instances:

- Signing of the written custodial report;
- Signing of the written extra-judicial confession
• In the absence of counsel and upon valid waiver, it may be
made in the presence of any of his parents, elder brothers and
sisters, spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or priest/minister of gospel as
chosen by him.
- Signing of the waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC.

(2) To be informed, in a language known to and understood by him, of his right to

remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation.

Page 94 of 141
 • If he cannot afford to have his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

• Assisting counsel may be any lawyer, except those:

- Directly affected by the case;
- Charged with conducting preliminary investigation;
- Charged with the prosecution of crimes (Sec. 3, RA 7438)

(3) To be allowed visits by or conference with:

• Any member of his immediate family (“Immediate family” includes his or
her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or
grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward), or
• Any medical doctor or
• Priest or religious minister
• Chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,
or by
• Any national NGO duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights or
by any International NGO duly accredited by the Office of the President

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JERRY PEPINO AND PRECIOSA GOMEZ

G.R. NO. 174471, 12 JANUARY 2016

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion
that would lead the accused to admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the
start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the accused.

Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a
suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. As a rule, a police lineup is not part
of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup.

PEOPLE V. DEL ROSARIO

G.R. NO. 127755, APRIL 14, 1999

This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438to include "the
Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated inconnection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that -

x xxx Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known and understood by him of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided
with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

Page 95 of 141
 PEOPLE V. AMESTUZO
G.R. NO. 104383, JULY 12, 2001

The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be
claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the
custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatoryand it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

PEOPLE V. ESCORDIAL
G.R. NOS. 138934-35, JANUARY 16, 2002

An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up,

the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police
line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that
purpose.

During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution which necessitate the presence of counsel for
the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings might well settle
the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.We have thus ruled that any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that
matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.
Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on January 3,
1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police
line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did not
have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence
against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications
should have been held inadmissible for being the direct result of the illegal lineup come at by
exploitation of [the primary] illegality.

PEOPLE V. ANDAN
G.R. NO. 116437, MARCH 3, 1997
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
(1) to remain silent;
(2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and
(3)to be informed of such rights

These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession
or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality
for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent.The incommunicadocharacter
of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what
really transpired.

Appellant’s confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from
the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed
appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there
to check appellant’s confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an
interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before
interviewing him.

Page 96 of 141
 PEOPLE V. MORADA
G.R. NO. 129723, MAY 19, 1999

In the case at bar, it is doubtful whether, as Manimbao claimed, accused-appellants

confession was given divorced from the police interrogation. In his testimony, SPO3 Gomez
stated:

We conducted [oral] interrogation to the suspect. During our [oral] interrogation with the
help of Bgy. Captain [Edgardo Manimbao], the suspect admitted to us that hes the one who
hacked JonalynNavidad. Although we do not reduced [sic] it into writing because of the
absen[ce] of [a] lawyer.

It would thus appear that Manimbaos conversation with accused-appellant was part of the
then ongoing police investigation. In fact, he said it was SPO3 Gomez who told him about the
alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him (Manimbao). Since the confession was admittedly
given without the safeguards in Art. III, sec. 12 and the additional ones provided in R.A. No.
7438, particularly the requirement that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the
suspect in the presence of counsel, we hold that accused-appellants confession is inadmissible,
and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting accused-appellant.

3. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

• The Supreme Court held that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and
immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not
seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. (People v. Balunsat, G.R.
No. 176743, 28 July 2010)

PEOPLE V. BALUNSAT
G.R. No. 176743, 28 July 2010

Accused was convicted by the RTC of two (2) counts of rape and one (1)
count of attempted rape. Upon appeal, the CA modified the judgment by (a)
acquitting him of rape on the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No.
762-T and (b) downgrading the attempted rape to consummated acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 781-T.

The Supreme Court held that a judgment acquitting the accused is final
and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the
State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.
Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy
whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the CA.

In Criminal Case No. 781-T, the CA modified the guilty verdict of the
RTC from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness. The Supreme Court affirmed
the CA’s modification, and held that it can no longer review the “downgrading”
of the crime by the appellate court without violating the right against double
jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the
purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the accused. In effect, the CA
already acquitted accused of the charge of attempted rape, convicting him only

Page 97 of 141
 for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less severe penalty. Hence, the High
Court limited itself to determining whether there is enough evidence to support
accused’s conviction for acts of lasciviousness.

4. EXCEPTIONS TO THE COMPUTATION OF TIME IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO A

SPEEDY TRIAL

• Under Rule 119, Section 3, the only delays that may be excluded from the time limit
within which trial must commence are those resulting from proceedings concerning the
accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can
only be excluded from said time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same.
Hence, in this case, the time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the
private complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the time limit of 30 days from
receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119. (Mari v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
187728, 12 September 2011)

-o0o-

Page 98 of 141
I. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

1. ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA, HOW MADE

• Arraignment is the stage where the accused is formally informed of the charged against
him by reading before him the information/complaint and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. (Rule 116, Sec. 1a)

• It is the stage where the issues are joined and without which the proceedings cannot
advance further or, if held, will otherwise be void. (Borja v. Mendoza, No. L-45667 June
20, 1977)

(a) How arraignment made

• the complaint or information is furnished the accused in open court;
• it is read to him in a language or dialect known to him;
• the accused is asked whether he pleads guilty or not guilty; and
• the accused enters his plea.

(1) In general:
• The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was
filled or assigned for trial.
• The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea.
• NO ARRAIGNMENT IN ABSENTIA (Nolasco v. Enrile, No. L-68347 and L-69482
November 7, 1985) – The presence of the accused is not only a personal right but also a
public duty, irrespective of the gravity of the offense and the rank of the court.

(b) If the accused is under preventive suspension:

• The case shall be raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was
raffled within 3 days from the filling of the information complaint.
• The accused shall be arraigned within 10 days from the date of the raffle.

2. WHEN SHOULD PLEA OF NOT GUILTY BE ENTERED

Plea of NOT GUILTY to be entered for the accused when either: (Rule 116, Sec. 1c)
• Refuses to plead;
• Makes a qualified plea of guilty;
• Plea of guilty, but accused presents exculpatory evidence.

3. WHEN MAY ACCUSED ENTER A PLEA OF GUILT TO A LESSER OFFENSE (RULE 116,
SEC. 2)

• At the arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plea guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged.

Page 99 of 141
 • After arraignment but before the trial, the accused may still be allowed to plea guilty to
said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary.

4. ACCUSED PLEADS GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE, WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO

• When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may present evidence in his behalf. (Rule 116, Se. 3)

5. SEARCHING INQUIRY

• It is the process by which the Court conducts a hearing or asks searching and
clarificatory questions from the accused

• The court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability, and the accused may present
evidence in his behalf; such procedure is mandatory. Failure to observe the duties in this
regard on the part of the trial judge amounts to grave abuse of discretion. (People v.
Devico,1997)

• The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies in cases of re-arraignment.

• The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases
in which it was the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a “guilty” plea
to the accused.(People v. Janjalani, G.R. No. 188314, 10 January 2011)

6. IMPROVIDENT PLEA

• It is a plea without proper information as to all circumstances affecting it; based upon a
mistaken assumption or misleading information/advice. (Black’s Law Dictionary)

• General Rule: Improvident plea should not be accepted. If accepted, it should not be
held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction. (People v. De Ocampo Gonzaga, No. L-48373
January 30, 1984).Case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

Exception: If the accused appears guilty beyond reasonable doubt from the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and defense. (People v. Documento, G.R. No. 188706, March
17, 2010).

• To emphasize: Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if
such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because

Page 100 of 141

 then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence
proving his commission of the offense charged. (People v. Documento, id.)

PEOPLE V. ALBA
G.R. NOS. 131858-59, APRIL 14, 1999
In entering a plea of not guilty during his arraignment, he waived all possible
objections to the sufficiency of the informations against him. As Sections 1 and 8 of Rule 117
provide:

SECTION 1. Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the accused may
move to quash the complaint or information.

SEC. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion
shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no
offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged,extinction of the offense or
penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this
Rule.

PEOPLE V. MOLINA
G.R. NOS. 141129-33, DECEMBER 14, 2001

Where facts are however adequately represented in the criminal case and no procedural
unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of
the improvident plea of guilty, the settled rule is that a decision based on an irregular plea
may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by
other evidence on recordsince it would be a useless ritual to return the case to the trial court
for another arraignment and further proceedings.

ESTIPONA JR. V. JUDGE LOBRIGO

G.R. NO. 226635, AUGUST 15, 2017

In this case, the constitutionality of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 - which prohibits plea bargaining
on drug cases – was challenged.

The Supreme Court held:

“We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the
constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future
discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified
version thereof, we deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea
bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.”

Page 101 of 141

 PEOPLE V. ESTOMACA
G.R. NOS. 117485-86, APRIL 22, 1996

The rationale behind the rule [116, sec.3] is that courts must proceed with more care where

the possible punishment is in its severest form - death - for the reason that the execution of such

a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded

guilty.

We stressed [in People v. Albert, 1995] the need to avoid improvident pleas of guilt since the

accused may thereby forfeit his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,

significance and consequences of his plea.

PEOPLE V. GAMBAO
G.R. NO. 172707, OCTOBER 1, 2013

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the

cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the

trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did

in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the

guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged. The manner by

which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where

the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by

the accused.

7. GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OF ARRAIGNMENT

• Unsound mental condition of the accused at the time of the arraignment;

• Prejudicial question exists;
• Pending petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor with the DOJ or Office of
the President. (Rule 116, Sec.11)

• Accused should file motion to suspend and secure a ruling on his petition for review
within 60 days from the filing of his petition for review.

• N.B.: The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by

Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
Information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, if the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the
corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused,
which, in the normal course of criminal procedure, logically follows the filing of the
information. (Gen. Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172476-99, 15 September 2010)

Page 102 of 141

 GEN. RAMISCAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 172476-99, 15 September 2010

The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan twelve (12) Informations

for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and twelve (12) Informations for
falsification of public documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
Petitioner questioned the finding of probable cause by the Ombudsman and is
pending second motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, in the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner moved to set aside his arraignment pending
resolution of his second motion for reconsideration.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by

Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
Information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, if the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing
of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the
accused, which, in the normal course of criminal procedure, logically follows the
filing of the information.

FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ V. REYNALDO P.

VENTUS AND JOJO B. JOSON
G.R. No. 176033, 11 March 2015

Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for

Reconsideration before the DOJ. However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7
months warranted the application of the limitation of the period for suspending
arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment
to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court
is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.

-o0o-

Page 103 of 141

J. MOTION TO QUASH

1. GROUNDS (RULE 117, SEC.1)

The following grounds for a motion to quash are EXCLUSIVE(Galzote v. Briones and People,
G.R. No. 164682, 14 September 2011):
a) Facts charged do not constitute an offense.
b) Court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
c) Court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person accused.
d) Officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.
e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
f) More than one offense is charged. (Duplicitous offense)
Exception: When a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law.
g) Criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
h) Averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or jurisdiction.
i) Accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
(Double Jeopardy Rule)

• Matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.(Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No.

183824, 8 December 2010)

ANTONE V. BERONILLA
G.R. No. 183824, 8 December 2010

The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements
of Bigamy were rendered incomplete after respondent presented documents to
prove a fact, which the court believed would negate the allegation in the
Information that there was a first valid marriage. The evidence presented
showed that respondent later obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.

The trial court erred when it sustained respondent’s motion to quash on

the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the Information. A motion to quash
an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of
law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. This motion
is “a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,” for which
reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the
face of the Information. In this case, the documents showing that: (1) the court
has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from
the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory,
and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are
pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the
Information ˗ that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the
respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been

Page 104 of 141

 considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to
quash.

• Fundamental Test: The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments of an information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by
law. Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not to be considered.
People v. Dumlao, G.R. No. 168918, 2 March 2009.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. IRENEO JUGUETA

G.R. NO. 202124, 05 APRIL 2016

As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same
is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of
Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., thus:

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to

give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or
more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is
a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash
before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for
the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same.
Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion
to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of
Section 3 of this Rule."

PEOPLE V. ODTUHAN
G.R. NO. 19566, JULY 17, 2013

As defined in Antone v. Beronilla (2010), "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is
whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
information are not to be considered.

To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident
on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity
to correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order
that another complaint or information be filedexcept when the information is quashed on the
ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.

Page 105 of 141

 VIRGINIA DIO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 208146, JUNE 8, 2016
If a motion to quash is based on a defect in the information that can be cured by amendment,
the court shall order that an amendment be made (Rule 117, Section 4).

When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an
Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information;
rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to
be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only
result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided(People v. Sandiganbayan, 2015).

2. DISTINGUISH FROM DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Motion to Quash:
• Filed before accused enters plea
• Does not go into the merits of the case

Demurrer to Evidence:
• Filed after the prosecution has rested its case
• Based upon the inadequacy of evidence adduced by the prosecution

3. EFFECTS OF SUSTAINING THE MOTION TO QUASH

(a) Court order sustaining motion

• General Rule: The court may order that another complaint or information be filed (Rule
117, Sec. 5)

• Exception: If the MTQ was based on the following:

• Criminal action or liability has been extinguished
• Double Jeopardy

PEOPLE V. AQUILINO ANDRADE, ET AL.

G.R. No. 187000, 24 November 2014

It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the

motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made. In the
present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the Informations. Thus, the
RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its evidence
in court or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right
to due process.

Page 106 of 141

(b) Court order sustaining motion

• General Rule: If in custody, the accused shall not be discharged, unless admitted to bail.
The order must state either release of accused or cancellation of his bond.

• Exception: If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed

within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court may allow
for good cause.

• Exception to the exception: If the accused is in custody for another charge. (Rule 117,
Sec. 5)

• As a rule, when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, petitioner’s remedy is

not certiorari, but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses
invoked in his motion to quash. In the event that an adverse decision is rendered after
trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom is the next appropriate legal step.

(c) Remedies of the prosecution

• General Rule: To amend the information in order to correct the defects if the trial court
makes the order, and thereafter prosecute on the basis of the amended information (Rule
117, Sec. 4)

Exception:Prosecution is precluded where the ground for the quashal would bar
another prosecution for the same offense.

4. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE THAT SUSTAINING THE MOTION IS NOT A BAR TO

ANOTHER PROSECUTION

• Sustaining the MTQ will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense (Rule
117, Sec. 6), except:
If the ground for the quashal is either:
 The criminal action or liability has been extinguished. (Rule 117, Sec.3[g])
 The accused has been previously convicted, or in jeopardy of being
convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged. (Rule 117, Sec.3[i])

5. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
(a) Rule on Double Jeopardy
• When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal
or conviction or in any other manner without the express consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. (Rule 117, Sec. 3i)

(b) Kinds of Double Jeopardy (Art.3, Sec. 21, Constitution)

• No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the SAME OFFENSE.
• When an act punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the SAME ACT.

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(c) Requisites for 1st Jeopardy to Attach
• A valid complaint or information - sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
• The court had jurisdiction;
• A valid arraignment;
• A valid plea; and
• Conviction, acquittal of the accused OR dismissal of the case, without accused’s express
consent

PEOPLE V RELOVA
G.R. NO. L-45129, MARCH 6, 1987

Where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are
alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense
charged under a statute.

The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective
legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are
claimed to have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute
must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and
space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so related to each
other in time and space as to be reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same
occasion and where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or
voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized as an integral
whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under different legal enactments
(a municipal ordinance and a national statute).

The rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity
of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense
or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to
be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the
technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an
accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another
are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

Page 108 of 141

 PEOPLE V. YORAC
G.R. NO. L-29270, NOVEMBER 23, 1971

If after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes" on which defendant may be held liable,
resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense."

The indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with
the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense.

PEOPLE V. CITY COURT OF MANILA

G.R. NO. L-36342, APRIL 27, 1983

Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charge again
with the same or Identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former.
However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People (1950), the rule of Identity does not apply when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the reason that in
such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for
an offense that was then inexistent.

"Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction, the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy." Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the
facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be
in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

(d) Previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries bars a
second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property.

JASON IVLER V. JUDGE MODESTO-SAN PEDRO

G.R. No. 172716, 17 November 2010

Petitioner assails the RTC’s Orders affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s

ruling finding inapplicable the double jeopardy clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property, considering accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident.

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner would be placed in double

jeopardy in this case. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted
or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. The essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense. As the careless act is

Page 109 of 141

 single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons,
the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split
into different crimes and prosecutions.

NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY

GALMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 72670, SEPTEMBER 12, 1986

The Court declared that the acquittal of the accused in the assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino Jr. was a result of a mock trail and a pre-determined judgment by the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan. As a result, the Court nullified the proceedings and
declared that there was a mistrial.

There has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in
September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrileas now admitted by Enrile
himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law and authoritarian one-man
rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.

Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith
and confidence in the courts. xxxWith this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity
of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial, there must be a
rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we
rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become simply
the beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now
face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the people
and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused
as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when
justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.

PEOPLE v.DANTE TAN

G.R. NO. 167526, JULY 26, 2010

 There is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its
presentation of evidence by the trial court In People v. Bocar(1985), the parties were not
placed under oath before they answered the queries of the judge. The dismissal was
arbitrary,whimsical and capricious as no evidence in law has been entered into the
records of the case.

 There is no double jeopardy when the trial court preemptively dismissed the case. In
People v. Judge Albano (1988), the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically
held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a
proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. The Judge deprived
the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its
fundamental right to due process.

Page 110 of 141

 MANANTAN V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 107125, JANUARY 29, 2001

The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. When a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical
offense.

This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be
established:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.

GALMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 72670, SEPTEMBER 12, 1986

"A verdict of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not
put him in jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense (State
vs. Lee, 30A. 1110, 65 Conn. 265,48 Am. S.R. 202,27 L. RA. 498).

GALMAN V. PAMARAN
G.R. NOS. 71208-09, AUGUST 30, 1985

The first sentence of Section 20 of the Bill of Rights stating that "no person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself," applies to both the ordinary witness and the suspect under
custodial investigation.

In support of the rule that there can be no implied waiver of the right against self-incrimination
and all other constitutional rights by the witness or by the accused, is the fact that the right
against double jeopardy can only be renounced by the accused if the criminal case against him
is dismissed or otherwise terminated with his express consent. Without such express consent to
the dismissal or termination of the case, the accused can always invoke his constitutional right
against double jeopardy.

5. PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL

• Definition: A case is dismissed without prejudice to its being refilled or revived.

• General Rule: Cases are provisionally dismissed where there has already been
arraignment and accused consented to provisional dismissal, with notice to the offended
party.

• Exception: If dismissal was due to a demurrer to evidence.

Page 111 of 141

(a) When dismissal becomes permanent:
• The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived (Rule 117, Sec. 8).

(b) How to revive a case

• Refiling of the information.
• Filing of new information for the same offense or one necessarily included in the
original offense charged.

(c) Periods of reinstatement or revival

• Within 1 year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than 6 years.
• Within 2 years for offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 6 years.

(d) Requisite procedure (Rule 117, Sec.8):

• Motion can be made:
 By the prosecution, with the express conformity of the accused
 By the accused
 By both

(e) Requisites for Provisional Dismissal:

 Consent of the prosecutor;
 Consent of the accused; and
 Notice to the offended party

• N.B.: It bears emphasizing that an oral order has no juridical existence until and unless
it had been reduced into writing and promulgated, i.e. delivered by the judge to the
clerk of court for filing, release to the parties and implementation. Thus, a provisional
dismissal, which was declared in open court, but was never reduced into writing, has no
juridical existence. (People v. Salak, G.R. No. 181249, 14 March 2011)

PEOPLE V. PANFILO LACSON

G.R. NO. 149453 APRIL 1, 2003

The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Rule 117, sec. 8:

1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves
for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;
3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal
of the case.

Page 112 of 141

 CONDRADA V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 141646, FEBRUARY 28, 2003

A permanent dismissal of a criminal case may refer to the termination of the case on the merits,
resulting in either the conviction or acquittal of the accused; to the dismissal of the case due to
the prosecutions failure to prosecute; or to the dismissal thereof on the ground of unreasonable
delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused’s right to speedy disposition or trial of the
case against him.

In contrast, a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is a dismissal without prejudice to the

reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a
new information for the offensewithin the periods allowed under the Revised Penal Code or the
Revised Rules of Court.

TORRES V. AGUINALDO
G.R. NO. 164268, JUNE 28, 2005

A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to
an action filed in court, their legal effect varies.
 The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15)
days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon
reinvestigation.
 On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days
after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order
achieves finality.

Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not
fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses,
with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party:
(a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of
any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1)
year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or
(b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived

There is provisional dismissal when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the
following requisites:
(1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and
(2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the
filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law
on provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case.

Page 113 of 141

(f) Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails by Enforcing the Rights of Accused Persons to
Bail and to Speedy Trial (A.M. 12-11-2-SC, 18 March 2014)

Sec. 10.Provisional dismissal.– (a) When the delays are due to the
absence of an essential witness whose whereabouts are unknown or cannot be
determined and, therefore, are subject to exclusion in determining compliance
with the prescribed time limits which caused the trial to exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days, the court shall provisionally dismiss the action with the
express consent of the detained accused.

(b) When the delays are due to the absence of an essential witness whose
presence cannot be obtained by due diligence though his whereabouts are
known, the court shall provisionally dismiss the action with the express consent
of the detained accused provided:
(1) the hearing in the case has been previously twice postponed due to the
non-appearance of the essential witness and both the witness and the offended
party, if they are two different persons, have been given notice of the setting of
the case for third hearing, which notice contains a warning that the case would
be dismissed if the essential witness continues to be absent; and
(2) there is proof of service of the pertinent notices of hearings or
subpoenas upon the essential witness and the offended party at their last known
postal or e-mail addresses or mobile phone numbers.

(c) For the above purpose, the public or private prosecutor shall first
present during the trial the essential witness or witnesses to the case before
anyone else. An essential witness is one whose testimony dwells on the presence
of some or all of the elements of the crime and whose testimony is indispensable
to the conviction of the accused.

6. REMEDY AGAINST THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH

GODOFREDO ENRILE V. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS

G.R. No. 166414, 22 October 2014

The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant
accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate
on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to
quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not
be subject of a petition for certiorari because the availability of other remedies in
the ordinary course of law.
N.B.: However, in Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, 19
July 2016, the Supreme Court, through Justice Bersamin, ruled that when there is
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in the
issuance of an interlocutory order, the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 is
available
-o0o-

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K. PRE-TRIAL

1. PRE-TRIAL ORDER
(a) When issued

• The Pre-Trial Order is issued by the court after the pre-trial conference.

• Judgment of acquittal based on pre-trial despite disputed documents and issues of fact
amounts to grave error and renders the judgment void (People v. Santiago, 1989).

(b) Contents
• Action taken;
• Facts stipulated; and
• Evidence marked.

(c) Effects
• It binds the parties, limits the trial to matters not disposed of, and controls the course of
action during trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice (Rule 118,
Sec. 4).
PEOPLE V. RAMON CHUA UY
G.R. NO. 128046, MARCH 7, 2000
Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:
SEC. 40. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless
reduced to writing and signed and his counsel.

Put in another way, to bind the accused the pre-trial order must be signed not only by him but
his counsel as well. The purpose of this requirement is to further safeguard the rights of the
accused against improvident or unauthorized agreements or admissions which his counsel may
have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial
conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon

However, in this case, the accused cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels
signatures on the pre-trial order. When the prosecution formally offered in evidence what it had
marked in evidence during the pre-trial, the accused did not object to the admission of the
police officer’s Preliminary Report Final Report, another Final Report, and of the plastic bags.

2. REFERRAL OF SOME CASES FOR COURT ANNEXED MEDIATION AND JUDICIAL

DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(a) A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC

• After arraignment, the court shall set the pre-trial conference within 30 days from the
date of arraignment.

• In mediatable cases, the judge shall refer the parties and their counsel to the Philippine
Mediation Center unit for purposes of mediation if available.

-o0o-

Page 115 of 141

L. TRIAL

1. INSTANCES WHEN PRESENCE OF ACCUSED IS REQUIRED BY LAW

(a) Presence is mandatory:

a) For purposes of identification;

b) At arraignment; (Rule 116, Sec. 1[b])
c) At the promulgation of judgment;
Exception: If the conviction is for a light offense. (Rule 120, Sec. 6)
d) Examination of prosecution witness (Rule 119, Sec. 15)
• When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or
in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

2. REQUISITE BEFORE TRIAL CAN BE SUSPENDED ON ACCOUNT OF ABSENCE OF

WITNESS

(a) Absence or unavailability of an essential witness

• “Absent” means that his whereabouts are unknown or cannot be determined by due
diligence.

• “Unavailable” means that his whereabouts are known but presence for the trial cannot
be obtained by due diligence.

3. TRIAL IN ABSENTIA

• Requisites:
 Accused has been arraigned;
 He was duly notified of trial; and
 His failure to appear is unjustified.

• Purpose: To speed up disposition of cases.

• General Rule: The right to be present at one’s trial may be waived.

• Exceptions: At certain stages: (Lavides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129670, 1 February
2000)

Page 116 of 141

  Arraignment and plea;
 Promulgation of sentence, unless for light offense
 During trial whenever necessary for ID purposes
• Exception to the exception: If the accused unqualifiedly admits in open court after
arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial.

4. REMEDY WHEN ACCUSED IS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED

PERIOD

(a) Effect of delay (Rule 119, Sec.9)

• On motion of the accused, the information may be dismissed on the ground of his right
to speedy trial.
• This must be raised before trial otherwise it is considered a waiver of the right to dismiss
under this section.
• It is subject to the rules on double jeopardy such that if it is with prejudice, it cannot be
revived anymore.
• The accused has the burden of proving the ground of denial of right to speedy trial,
while the prosecution has the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish the
exclusion of time under Rule 119, Sec.3.

PEOPLE V. MODESTO TEE

G.R. NOS. 140546-47, JANUARY 20, 2003

The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be
one hundred eighty (180) days. However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of
the scheduled hearings of the case.

The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:

(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
(3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried

5. REQUISITES FOR DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BECOME A STATE WITNESS

• General Rule: It is the duty of the prosecutor to include all the accused in the complaint
or information.

Exception: The prosecutor may ask the court to discharge one of them after complying
with the conditions prescribed by law. (Rules 119, Sec. 17)

• This applies only when the information has already been filed in court.

Page 117 of 141

6. REQUISITES FOR DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BECOME A STATE WITNESS

Requisites: (Rule 119, Sec. 17)

• When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of an offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or
more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be
witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

• Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of

the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state
witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.

General Rule: The order of discharge shall: (Rule 119, Sec. 18)
• Amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused;
• Bar future prosecutions for the same offense.

Exception: if the accused fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with
his sworn statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
• Any error in asking for and in granting discharge cannot deprive the discharged of the
acquittal and the constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy. (People v. Verceles,
G.R. No. 130650, 22 September 2002)
• Subsequent amendment of the information does not affect discharge. (People v. Taruc,
No. L-14010, 30 May 1962)

JIMENEZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 209195, SEPTEMBER 17, 2014

 Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when
he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is not
there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution’s evidence.

 Considering the circumstances of the case (there was an alleged conspiracy) and that the
other accused could not be compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the conviction
of the accused would not come to light unless the accused was allowed to testify for the
State. (People v. Court of Appeals and Perez et al., 1984)

Page 118 of 141

  The record justified his discharge as a state witness considering the absolutenecessity of
his testimony to prove that the accused Luciano Tan had planned and financed the theft.
(People v. C.A. and Tan, 1983)

MERCIALES V. C.A.
G.R. NO. 124171, MARCH 18, 2002

Rule 119,Section 17 of the Rules of Court expressly requires the presentation of evidence in
support of the prosecutions prayer for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness.

PEOPLE V. ANINON
G.R. NO. L-39083, MARCH 16, 1988

The irregular discharge of one of the accused xxx, will not invalidate his acquittal. Under the
then applicable provision of Rule 119, his acquittal becomes ineffective only if he fails or refuses
to testify against his co-accused

Before the discharge is ordered, the prosecution must show and the trial court must ascertain
that the five conditions fixed by section 9 of Rule 115 are complied with. But once the discharge
is ordered, any future development showing that any or all of the five conditions have not been
actually fulfilled, may not affect the legal consequences of the discharge, as provided by section
11 of Rule 115.

Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the discharge and of the court in
granting the petition, no question of jurisdiction being involved, cannot deprive the discharged
accused of the acquittal provided by section 11 of Rule 115 and of the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy.

PEOPLE V. OCIMAR
G.R. NO. 94555, AUGUST 17, 1992

According to Sec. 9 of Rule 119, the trial court must be satisfied that the conditions prescribed
by the rule exist. The court therefore, upon prior determination by the public prosecutor, retains
the prerogative of deciding when a co-accused may be discharged to become a state witness.
With Sec. 9 providing the guidelines, the discharge of an accused depends on sound Judicial
discretion. Once that discretion is exercised under those guidelines and a co-accused is
discharged to become a state witness, and subsequently testifies in accordance with his
undertaking with the government, any legal deficiency or defect that might have attended his
discharge from the information will no longer affect the admissibility and credibility of his
testimony, provided such testimony is otherwise admissible and credible.

The matter of discharging a co-accused to become state witness is left largely to the discretion of
the trial fiscal, subject only to the approval of the court. The reason is obvious. The fiscal should
know better than the court, and the defense for that matter, as to who of the accused would best
qualify to be discharged to become state witness. The public prosecutor is supposed to know
the evidence in his possession ahead of all the rest.

Page 119 of 141

Rationale:
 A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at
the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the
trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime
charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need
for the formality of a trial.
 In coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested," as to "availability or non- availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence," as to which (who) of the accused is the "most guilty" one, and
the like, the judge must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the information
furnished by the prosecuting
officer.

AMPATUAN V. DE LIMA
G.R. NO. 197291, APRIL 3, 2013

The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are,
namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court;
and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ
in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act).

Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981

Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has

The trial court must ascertain if the following participated in the commission of a crime and
conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119 are desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and,
complied with, namely: if qualified as determined in this Act and by the
Department, shall be admitted into the Program
a. there is absolute necessity for the testimony of whenever the following circumstances are present:
the accused whose discharge is requested;
b. there is no other direct evidence available for a. the offense in which his testimony will be
the proper prosecution of the offense used is a grave felony as defined under the
committed, except the testimony of said Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under
accused; special laws;
c. the testimony of said accused can be b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
substantially corroborated in its material c. there is no other direct evidence available for
points; the proper prosecution of the offense
d. said accused does not appear to be most committed;
guilty; and d. his testimony can be substantially
(e) said accused has not at any time been convicted corroborated on its material points;
of any offense involving moral turpitude. e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude.

The trial court shall require the Prosecution to DOJ determines who are to be admitted into the
present evidence and the sworn statements of the Witness Protection Program
proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the
discharge.
Requires that the applicant must be charged There is no requirement that the witness is an
accused
Operates as an acquittal Operates as an acquittal
Except: if witness fails or refuses to testify Except: if witness fails or refuses to testify

Page 120 of 141

 QUARTO V. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 169042, OCTOBER 5, 2011

RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity in any hearing, inquiry
or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives.

Section 17 of this law provides:

Sec. 17. Immunities.x xx.

Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant
immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to
determine the truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by
the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the furtherance
of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted
under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the
witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be
exempt from demotion or removal from office.

The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the need to take into account the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court which
requires that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

7. WITNESS PROTECTION PROGRAM (R.A. No. 6981)

(a) Admission in to the Program (Section 3)

• Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the commission
of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or
quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the
Program, provided that:
(A) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;

(B) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

Page 121 of 141

 (C) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there
is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to
prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on
account of his testimony; and

(D) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against the
other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of
his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this law.

• If the Department of Justice, after examination of said applicant and other relevant
facts, is convinced that the requirements of this law and its implementing rules and
regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program,
require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or
information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper
certification. For purposes of this law, any such person admitted to the Program
shall be known as the Witness.

(b) Witnesses in legislative investigations (Section 4)

• In case of legislative investigations in aid of legislation, a witness, with his express

consent, may be admitted into the Program upon the recommendation of the legislative
committee where his testimony is needed when in its judgment there is pressing
necessity therefor: Provided, That such recommendation is approved by the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be.

(c) Memorandum of Agreement With the Person to be Protected (Section 5)

• Before a person is provided protection under this law, he shall first execute a
memorandum of agreement which shall set forth his responsibilities including:
a) to testify before and provide information to all appropriate law enforcement
officials concerning all appropriate proceedings in connection with or arising from
the activities involved in the offense charged;
b) to avoid the commission of the crime;
c) to take all necessary precautions to avoid detection by others of the facts
concerning the protection provided him under this law;
d) to comply with legal obligations and civil judgments against him;
e) to cooperate with respect to all reasonable requests of officers and employees of
the Government who are providing protection under this law; and
f) to regularly inform the appropriate program official of his current activities and
address.

(d) Breach of Memorandum of Agreement (Section 6)

• Substantial breach of the memorandum of agreement shall be a ground for the
termination of the protection provided under this law: Provided, however, that before
terminating such protection, the Secretary of Justice shall send notice to the person
involved of the termination of the protection provided under this law, stating therein the
reason for such termination.

Page 122 of 141

(e) Confidentiality of Proceedings (Section 7)

• All proceedings involving application for admission into the Program and the action
taken thereon shall be confidential in nature. No information or documents given or
submitted in support thereof shall be released except upon written order of the
Department of Justice or the proper court.

• Any person who violates the confidentiality of said proceedings shall upon conviction
be punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6)
years and deprivation of the right to hold a public office or employment for a period of
five (5) years.

(f) Rights and Benefits (Section 8)

• The witness shall have the following rights and benefits:

(a) To have a secure housing facility until he has testified or until the threat,
intimidation or harassment disappears or is reduced to a manageable or tolerable
level. When the circumstances warrant, the Witness shall be entitled to relocation
and/or change of personal identity at the expense of the Program. This right may be
extended to any member of the family of the Witness within the second civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity.

(b) The Department of Justice shall, whenever practicable, assist the Witness in
obtaining a means of livelihood. The Witness relocated pursuant to this law shall be
entitled to a financial assistance from the Program for his support and that of his
family in such amount and for such duration as the Department of Justice shall
determine.

(c) In no case shall the Witness be removed from or demoted in work because or on
account of his absences due to his attendance before any judicial or quasi-judicial
body or investigating authority, including legislative investigations in aid of
legislation, in going thereto and in coming therefrom.

Any Witness who failed to report for work because of witness duty shall be paid
his equivalent salaries or wages corresponding to the number of days of absence
occasioned by the Program. For purposes of this law, any fraction of a day shall
constitute a full day salary or wage. This provision shall be applicable to both
government and private employees.

(d) To be provided with reasonable travelling expenses and subsistence allowance

by the Program in such amount as the Department of Justice may determine for his
attendance in the court, body or authority where his testimony is required, as well as
conferences and interviews with prosecutors or investigating officers.

(e) To be provided with free medical treatment, hospitalization and medicines for
any injury or illness incurred or suffered by him because of witness duty in any

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 private or public hospital, clinic, or at any such institution at the expense of the
Program.

(f) If a Witness is killed, because of his participation in the Program, his heirs shall be
entitled to a burial benefit of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) from the
Program exclusive of any other similar benefits he may be entitled to under other
existing laws.

(g) In case of death or permanent incapacity, his minor or dependent children shall
be entitled to free education, from primary to college level in any state, or private
school, college or university as may be determined by the Department of Justice, as
long as they shall have qualified thereto

(g) State Witness (Section 10)

• Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this law and by the
Department of Justice, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined
under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed;
(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
(f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude

• An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order

that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the
other requirements of this law. Nothing in this law shall prevent the discharge of an
accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

(h) Sworn Statement of a State Witness (Section 11)

• Before any person is admitted into the Program pursuant to the next preceding Section
he shall execute a sworn statement describing in detail the manner in which the offense
was committed and his participation therein. If after said examination of said person, his
sworn statement and other relevant facts, the Department of Justice is satisfied that the
requirements of this law and its implementing rules are complied with, it may admit
such person into the Program and issue the corresponding certification.

• If his application for admission is denied, said sworn statement and any other testimony
given in support of said application shall not be admissible in evidence, except for
impeachment purposes.

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(i) Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program (Section 12)

• The certification of admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full
faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required not to include the
Witness in the criminal complaint or information and if included therein, to petition the
court for his discharge in order that he can utilized as a State Witness. The Court shall
order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information.

• Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from
criminal prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given
or used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof.

(j) Failure or Refusal of the Witness to Testify (Section 13)

• Any Witness registered in the Program who fails or refuses to testify or to continue to
testify without just cause when lawfully obliged to do so, shall be prosecuted for
contempt. If he testifies falsely or evasively, he shall be liable to prosecution for perjury.
If a State Witness fails or refuses to testify, or testifies falsely or evasively, or violates any
condition accompanying such immunity without just cause, as determined in a hearing
by the proper court, his immunity shall be removed and he shall be subject to contempt
or criminal prosecution. Moreover, the enjoyment of all rights and benefits under this
law shall be deemed terminated.

• The Witness may, however, purge himself of the contumacious acts by testifying at any
appropriate stage of the proceedings.

8. JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE (A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC)

• The Judicial Affidavit Rule is applicable to all criminal actions:

(1) where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;
(2) where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the
penalty involved; or
(3) with respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved
are (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Section 9).

• NOTE: The Judicial Affidavit Rule is deemed modified by A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, or
the “Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases,” which took effect
on 1 September 2017.

• The prosecution shall submit the judicial affidavits of its witnesses not later than five
days before the pre-trial, serving copies of the same upon the accused. The complainant
or public prosecutor shall attach to the affidavits such documentary or object evidence
as he may have, marking them as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on. No further judicial
affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial (Judicial
Affidavit Rule, Section 9).

• If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of
the prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those

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 of his witnesses to the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a
copy of each on the public and private prosecutor, including his documentary and object
evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as
direct testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when they appear before the court to
testify (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Section 9).

(a) Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases (A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, 1
September 2017)

• For the First Level Court, in all criminal cases, including those covered by the Rule on
Summary procedure, the testimonies of witnesses shall consist of the duly subscribed
written statements given to law enforcement officers or the affidavits or counter-
affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor and if such are not available,
testimonies shall be in the form of judicial affidavits. The trial prosecutor may opt to
dispense with the sworn statements submitted to the law enforcement officers and
instead prepare judicial affidavits or modify or revise the said sworn statements.

• For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals, where the demeanor
of the witnesses is not essential, like the forensic chemist, medico-legal officers,
investigators, auditors, accountants, engineers, custodians, expert witnesses and other
similar witnesses, who will testify on the authenticity , due, execution and the contents
of public documents and reports, and in criminal cases that are transactional in character
such as falsification, malversation, estafa or other crimes where the culpability or
innocence of the accused can be established through documents the testimonies of the
witnesses shall be the duly subscribed written statement given to law enforcement
officers or the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating
prosecutor, and if such are not available, testimonies shall be in the form of judicial
affidavits.

• For Second Level Courts, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals, x xx

In cases where the culpability or the innocence of the accused in based on the
testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses, the testimonies of these witnesses shall be in
oral form.

9. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Definition: Objection by one of the parties to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue. (Gutib v. CA, 1999)

(a) How initiated (Rule 119, Sec. 23)

• After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard OR (2) upon demurrerto evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.

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(b) Motion for leave to file demurrer (Rule 119, Sec. 23)

• It must specifically state its grounds.

• It must be filed within a non-extendible period of 5 days after the prosecution rests.
Prosecution may then oppose within a non-extendible period of 5 days from its receipt.

VALENCIA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 165996, OCTOBER 17, 2005

A demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution’s

evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same
must be filed after the prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be
admitted, the rules require that the same be formally offered, otherwise, it
cannot be considered by the court. A prior formal offer of evidence concludes the
case for the prosecution and determines the timeliness of the filing of a demurrer
to evidence.

In the present case, petitioner’s motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence is
premature because the prosecution had yet to formally rest its case.

(c) Effects of granting the demurrer to evidence

• The court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (Rule 119,
Sec. 23)
• Sufficient evidence for frustrating a demurrer is evidence that proves: (Gutib v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 131209, 13 August 1999)
 Commission;
 Precise degree of participation.
• The prosecution cannot appealfrom a ruling granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused as it is equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution can sufficiently prove
that the court’s action is attended with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the
constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy will be violated. (People v.
Sandiganbayan and Basco, et al., G.R. No. 164577, 5 July 2010)

PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND BASCO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164577, 5 July 2010

In a charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, accused filed
their respective motions for leave to file their demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution rested its case. The motions were granted. The Sandiganbayan then
granted the demurrers to evidence and dismissed the case. A Rule 45 Petition
was filed by the People of the Philippines, represented by the Ombudsman,
assailing the Sandiganbayan’s ruling.

The prosecution cannot appeal from a ruling granting the demurrer to

evidence of the accused as it is equivalent to an acquittal, unless the prosecution
can sufficiently prove that the court’s action is attended with grave abuse of

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 discretion. Otherwise, the constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy will be violated.

Procedurally, the prosecution resorted to a wrong remedy. It is settled

that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil
action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not
violated. Unfortunately, what the prosecution filed with the Court in the present
case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.

(d) Effect of denial of motion for leave to file demurrer

• Order denying the motion for leave or order denying the demurrer itself is not
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (Rule 119, Sec. 23)

• It is interlocutory, but it may be assigned as error and reviewed in the appeal that may
be taken from the decision on the merits (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 121422, February 23,
1999)

• The accused has the right to present evidence after demurrer is denied (Rule 119, Sec. 23)

(e) If Demurrer was filed with leave of court:

• If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce evidence in his defense.

(f) If Demurrer was filed without leave of court:

• When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives the
right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution
• Even if the demurrer is granted, the trial court may hold the accused civilly liable and he
can no longer adduce evidence on the civil aspect because of his waiver. (Alferez v.
People, G.R. No. 182301, 31 January 2011)

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas then
separately filed their respective demurrer to evidence asserting that the

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Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were
denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show
that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions for
reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the
Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such
an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order denying the motion for leave
of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.”

It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of

the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did
not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused
was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the
conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is
doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not
be limited, because to do so –

x xx would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness.

So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting
to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending control over
other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for
the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the
bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of
discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence,
the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy
of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

PEOPLE V. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL

G.R. NO. 159450, MARCH 30, 2011

Section 15, Rule 119 provides:

Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution has rested its case,
the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on

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 its own initiative after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2)
on motion of the accused filed with prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without
express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the
case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.

Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to present
evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for her demurrer to evidence,
thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present evidence.

The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver, for her
opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first obtaining express leave of court effectively
waived her right to present her evidence.

PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN & BARCENAS

G.R. NO. 174504, MARCH 21, 2011

An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an
acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

In criminal cases, the grant of a demurreris tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order
may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.Although the
dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

10. REVERSE TRIAL

• A reverse trial is one where the accused presents evidence ahead of the prosecution and
the latter is to present evidence by way of rebuttal to the former’s evidence.
• This kind of trial may take place when the accused made known to the trial court, on
arraignment, that he is to adduce affirmative defense of a justifying or exempting
circumstance and thus impliedly admitting the acts/s imputed to him.
• The trial court may then require the accused to present evidence first, proving the
requisites of the justifying or exempting circumstance he is invoking, and the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence controverting it.

-o0o-

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M. JUDGMENT

1. REQUISITES OF A JUDGMENT
• Written in official language.
• Personally and directly prepared by the judge.
• Signed by the judge.
• Contains clearly and distinctly a statement of facts proved and the law upon which
judgment is based.
• Judge who penned the decision need not be the one who heard the case.
• The fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the
judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his judgment
erroneous or irregular.

2. CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT

(a) Conviction

(1) The judgment of conviction shall state:

• The legal qualification of the offense and the attendant aggravating, mitigating
circumstances.
• Participation of the accused (principal, accomplice or accessory)
• That penalty should not be imposed in the alternative.
• The civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act, if any, unless the enforcement
of the civil liability is by a separate civil action, or is waived or reserved.

(2) Judgment for 2 or more offenses

• General Rule: Complaint/information must charge only one offense.
Exception: Cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.

• General Rule: Duplicitous information is subject to a motion to quash.

Exception: Defect is waived when accused fails to move for quashal.

• Thus, where the accused fails to object to 2 or more offenses charged in a single
information/complaint before trial (Rule 120, Sec.3), the court may:

(a) Convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved; and
Exception: One of the offenses has been a necessary means for committing the
other offense and where both have been result of a single act.

(b) Impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the
findings of fact and law in each offense.
Exception: maximum duration of offense: Follow the three-fold rule on the
service of penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 70).

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(3) Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof

• General Rule: The defendant can be convicted only of the crime with which he is
charged.

• Rationale: He has the right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is
charged before he is put on trial.

• However, minor variance between the information and the evidence:

• Does not alter the nature of the offense;
• Does not determine or qualify the crime or penalty;
• Cannot be ground for acquittal.
• Exception: The accused can be convicted of an offense only when it is both
charged and proven.
- He can be convicted of an offense proved provided it is included in the charge,
or of an offense charged which is included in that which is proved. (Rule 120,
Sec.4)

• The mere fact that the evidence presented would indicate that a lesser offense
outside the court’s jurisdiction was committed does not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction which had vested in it under the allegations in the information.
• Exception to the exception: Where there are facts that supervened after the filing
of the information which change the nature of the offense.

(4) When an offense includes or is included in another (Rule 120, Sec. 5)

• The offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements/ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint/information, constitute
the latter.
• An offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

Effects:
• The accused shall be convicted of: (Rule 120, Sec. 4)
 The offense proved which is included in the offense charged; or
 The offense charged which is included in the offense proved
• The right to be informed of the charges has not been violated because where an accused
is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed also of lesser crimes/offenses
included therein. (People v. Villamar, 1998)
• Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one
of the component offenses, the accused can be convicted of the one which is proven.

(b) State liability for unjust conviction

• Under R.A. No. 7309, victims of unjust imprisonment or detention may file a claim for
compensation with the DOJ Board of Claims.

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(1) Who may file claims for compensation:
(a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;
(b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without being charged;
(c) anyvictim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as defined in the Revised
Penal Code under a final judgment of the court; and
(d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes.
For purposes of this law, violent crimes shall include rape and shall likewise
refer to offenses committed with malice which resulted in death or serious physical
and/or psychological injuries, permanent incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion,
serious trauma, or committed with torture, cruelly or barbarity.

3. CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT

(a) Acquittal
Definition: A finding of not guilty based on the merits, either:
• The evidence does not show that his guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; or
• A dismissal of the case after the prosecution has rested its case and upon motion of the
accused on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond doubt that accused is
guilty.
• REASONABLE DOUBT- Doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and
an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt.
• Rationale: It is always better to err in acquitting than in punishing. (People v. Lizada, G.R.
No. 97226, 1993)

(b) The Judgment of acquittal shall state whether:

• The evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or
• It merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• However, on this second statement, this does not extinguish the civil liability of
the accused arising from his acts, since civil liability arose not from a crime but
from the damage caused by such acts.

• The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist.

4. PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT; INSTANCES OF PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT

IN ABSENTIA

• Promulgation: An official proclamation or announcement of judgment or order.

• Two things are essential and necessary for the valid promulgation of a court
decision:
 There must be a judge or judges legally appointed or elected and actually acting
either de jure or de facto, and

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  The said judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the
incumbency of the judge who signed it. (Miguel v. MTC,1986)

• The judgment or sentence does not become a judgment or sentence in law until it:
 Is read and announced to the defendant; or
 Has become a part of the record of the court. (US v. CFI of Manila, 24 Phil 321)
• Where there is no promulgation of judgment, no right to appeal accrues.

(a) Notice for Promulgation

• Clerk of Court gives notice to accused personally or through bondsman or warden and
counsel.
• If the accused jumps bail or escapes from prison and was tried in absentia, notice will be
served at his last known address. (Rule 120, Sec. 6)

(b) Sin perjucio judgment: Judgment without a statement of facts. (Dizon v. Lopez, 1997)

(c) Promulgation where the judge is absent

The judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court when the judge is absent or outside the
province or city. (Rule 120, Sec. 6)

(d) Presence of accused required in promulgation; exception

• General rule: Presence of the accused is mandatory.
• Exception: convictions for light offenses.

(e) Presence of accused required in promulgation; exception

• If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment
and the court shall order his arrest.

(f) Judgment becomes final in 4 instances:

1. After the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
2. When the sentence has been partially /totally satisfied or served; or
3. The accused has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal,
4. When the accused applies for probation, and thereby waives right to appeal

COLINARES V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 182748, 13 December 2011

It is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals “from the
judgment of conviction” is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out
to herein accused: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial
court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court. x xx The Court’s finding that accused was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction
that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the trial court

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 done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded accused the right to apply for probation.

Since the Court found accused guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and held that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prisioncorreccional, as maximum, it would be but fair to
allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial
court.

5. WHEN DOES JUDGMENT BECOME FINAL

(a) When judgment of acquittal becomes final

• It is immediately final and executory.
• The State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.

• N.B.: The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the
occasion to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during trial but merely relied on the
records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous, especially where the
evidence on record is sufficient to support its conclusion. (People v. Paling, G.R. No.
185390, 16 March 2011)

-o0o-

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N. NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

1. GROUNDS FOR NEW TRIAL. (RULE 121, SEC. 2)

(1) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the trial;

• General Rule: Error of the defense counsel in the conduct of the trial is neither an error
of law nor an irregularity.
• Exception: Acquittal would in all probability have allowed the introduction of certain
testimony which was not submitted at the trial under improper or injudicious advice of
incompetent counsel.
• Irregularities must be with much seriousness as to affect prejudicially the substantial
rights of the accused.

(2) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.

2. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION (RULE 121, SEC. 3)

• Errors of law or fact in the judgment, which requires no further proceedings.

Rationale: To afford the trial court the opportunity to correct its own mistakes and to
avoid unnecessary appeals.

3. EFFECTS OF GRANTING A NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION(RULE 121, SEC. 6)

In all cases:
• The original judgment is set aside or vacated; and
• A new judgment is rendered accordingly.

(a)Specific effects when granted upon different grounds:

(1) Errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial

• All proceedings and evidence affected shall be set aside and taken anew.
• If error or irregularity goes into the jurisdiction, entire proceeding is void and must be
set aside.
• Further, the Court may allow introduction of additional or other evidence in the interest
of justice.

(2) Newly-discovered evidence

• Evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
evidence shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already on record.
• All proceedings and evidence affected shall be set aside and taken anew.
• Further, the Court may allow introduction of additional or other evidence in the interest
of justice.

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4. APPLICATION OF NEYPES DOCTRINE IN CRIMINAL CASES.

NEYPES V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141524, 14 September 2005

• Fresh Period of Appeal after denial of Motion for New Trial or Motionfor
Reconsideration.
• “Henceforth, the “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
theMTCs to the RTCs; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the CA; Rule 43
on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
• The raisond’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided
in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted. Litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the
balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from
receipt of the order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any
final order or resolution. (Yu v. Samson-Tatad,GR No. 170979, 9 February 2011)

JUDITH YU V. SAMSON-TATAD
GR No. 170979, 9 February 2011

An information for estafa against petitioner was filed with the Regional
Trial Court which convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later,
petitioner filed a motion for new trial, alleging that she discovered new and
material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion for new trial for
lack of merit.

The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court,
alleging that she had a fresh period of 15 days from the receipt of the denial of
her motion for new trial, within which to file a notice of appeal. The prosecution
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being belatedly filed and a Motion for
execution of the decision.

To standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away

with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted, the
“fresh period rule” applies to appeals in criminal cases. Were we to strictly
interpret the “fresh period rule” in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an
absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal
than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives undue favor to civil
litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property interests
are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to
reason.

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O. APPEAL

1. EFFECT OF AN APPEAL
• An appeal in a criminal proceeding in throws the whole case open for review and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the
appealed judgment, whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of errors. (People
v. Calayca, G.R. No. 121212, 20 January 1999)

2. WHERE TO APPEAL
• To the RTC – from the MTC/MeTC/MCTC
• To the Sandiganbayan – from the RTC or MTC/MeTC/MCTC if accused is government-
official or employee and act is duty-related (i.e. filed under EO 1, 2, 4 and 14-A)
• To the CA – from the RTC (if it involves questions of questions of fact and of law)
• To the SC – from the RTC
- If it involves questions of law only
- If it involves constitutionality or validity of any treaty/ordinance/Executive
Order/regulation or the jurisdiction of the inferior court
- In criminal cases involving offense for which penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment
- Other offenses, which, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been
committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more
serious offense
• To the SC – from the CA or the Sandiganbayan
• Improper designation
• The designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the validity of the
notice of appeal. However, the designation of the proper court should be made
within the 15-day period to appeal. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court would apply. (Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074, 31 August 2011)

3. HOW APPEAL TAKEN (RULE 122, SEC. 9)

1) Transmission of record to RTC

Within 5 days from the perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the
original record to the appropriate RTC.

2) Notifications of parties
Upon receipt of the complete record, Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) and
evidence of the case, the RTC clerk of the court shall notify the parties of such fact.

3) Submission of memoranda/briefs
Within 15 days from the receipt of notice, the parties may submit memoranda/briefs, or
may be required by the RTC to do so.

4) Decision

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 After the submission of such memoranda/briefs or upon the expiration of the
period to file the same, the RTC shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of
the case and of such memoranda/briefs as may have been filed.

4. WHEN APPEAL TO BE TAKEN (RULE 122, SEC. 6)

• Within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from.
• Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain
proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules
is mandatory and imperative. Only strong considerations of equity will lead us to allow
an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice. (Villamor v.
People; and Vios v. People, 2011)

5. EFFECT OF APPEAL BY ANY OF SEVERAL ACCUSED

• General Rule: An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal.
 As to the appealing party, the execution of judgment appealed from is stayed
upon the perfection of the appeal.
 As to the co-accused who did not appeal, the judgment of the trial court insofar
as it relates to him becomes final and the appellate court has no power to
interfere with it. (Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107797, 26 August 1996)

Exception: Insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
those who did not appeal or who withdrew his appeal. (People v. Escano, G.R. Nos.
129756-58, 19 January 2001)
 The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the criminal
aspect of the judgment or order appealed from.

6. GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

• When appeal by the people will not lie:
 The People/State cannot appeal when it will put the accused in double jeopardy.
 The prosecution cannot appeal from a judgment of acquittal.

Rationale: A verdict of this nature is immediately final and to try it again on the merits, even in
an appellate court, places the accused in double jeopardy. (Central Bank v. CA, 1989)

7. QUESTIONING AN ACQUITTAL THROUGH A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

• A Rule 65 Petition for certiorari is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether
at the trial court or at the appellate level. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in
a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

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 of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
(People v. Asis, G.R. No. 173089, 25 August 2010)

PEOPLE V. ASIS
G.R. No. 173089, 25 August 2010

Accused Abordo was acquitted by the trial court for two (2) counts of
murder. The prosecution filed a Rule 65 Petition with the Court of Appeals,
which was dismissed. A Rule 45 Petition was thereafter filed with the Supreme
Court to contest the Court of Appeals’Decision.

The Supreme Court held that a Rule 65 Petition for certiorari, not appeal,
is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the
appellate level. The Philippine judicial system adheres to the finality-of-acquittal
doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void. In this petition, the Office of the Solicitor General(OSG) claims
that Abordo’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-2213 was improper. Since appeal
could not be taken without violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right
against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court.

8. REPRESENTATION DURING APPEAL

• N.B.: If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines
on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal.

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P. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES

1. NATURE
• The provisional remedies in civil actions, insofar as they are applicable, may be availed
of in connection with the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule
127, Sec.1)

2. KINDS OF PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

1. Attachment.—When the civil action is properly instituted in the criminal action as

provided in Rule 111, the offended party may have the property of the accused attached
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered from the accused
in the following cases:

(a) When the accused is about to abscond from the Philippines;

(b) When the criminal action is based on a claim for money or property embezzled or
fraudulently misapplied or converted to the use of the accused who is a public officer,
officer of a corporation, attorney, factor, broker, agent or clerk, in the course of his
employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful
violation of duty;

(c) When the accused has concealed, removed, or disposed of his property, or is about to
doso; and

(d) When the accused resides outside the Philippines. (Rule 127, Sec.1)

2. Preliminary Injunction

3. Receivership

4. Delivery of Personal Property

5. Support Pendente Lite

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