Journal of Service Science Research (2014) 6:29-69

DOI 10.1007/s12927-014-0002-8

Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior

Marina Stoshikj

Received: 21 February 2014 / Accepted: 15 June 2014 / Published: 30 June 2014

© The Society of Service Science and Springer 2014

ABSTRACT
Negotiations are essential part of many business relations. The implementation of the nego-
tiation process is dependent on many factors and its chosen design may lead to different out-
comes. The negotiation features and characteristics shape the negotiation process. The nego-
tiation outcome depends on the negotiation skills of the involved parties, the available infor-
mation and their chosen approach and behavior. When following a distributive approach, the
parties are interested in maximization of the personal outcome so they may not be able to see
the total potential of an integrated approach. Crucial requirements for the integrative negoti-
ations are close cooperation and communication between the parties. These negotiation types
-distributive and integrative-are closely related to the negotiation behavior of the involved
parties: competitive and cooperative. Commonly used competitive and cooperative tactics are
mentioned in this work, followed by economic and social-psychological measures of negotia-
tion behavior. The obstacles for reaching integrative agreements are summarized. The con-
tributions of the negotiation support system (NSS) for integrative negotiations are discussed
in terms of a possible solution for overcoming certain negotiation challenges.

KEYWORDS
Negotiations, Negotiation Skills, Negotiation Types, Bargaining Styles, Negotiation
Behavior, Integrative Agreements, Negotiation Model.

Marina Stoshikj ( )
Department of e-Business
School of Business, Economics and Statistics
University of Vienna
Oskar-Morgenstern Platz 1, 1090 Vienna, Austria
a1049902@unet.univie.ac.at
30 Marina Stoshikj

1. INTRODUCTION
Living and working in a society where people communicate and cooperate with each other
on different bases for obtaining various personal and professional goals opens a large floor
for interactions and mutual coordination. The limited resources additionally create a need for
distribution in a certain manner. With it, a lot of space for rise of possible conflicts opens.
There are situations, very often and in every sphere of our lives, where a person, group or an
organization, holds an opposing position on an issue of interest when compared to the under-
standing of the other involved party/ies. The easiest way out would be to leave the interaction
and move away from the potential conflict, but that would mean non-achievement of certain
objectives. There are also social conflicts from which one cannot just easily get away, but has
to face the other party and try to gain most of what is in its personal interest while consider-
ing the social interest. In order to be successful in that process, one needs to have certain
skills and some kind of knowledge on how to approach and behave through the interaction or
negotiation process.
In line with that, Thompson (1990) defines negotiation as a form of a social interaction,
relevant for anyone that has to coordinate and interact with other person/s in order to obtain
some individual goals. Negotiations have a vast applicability. They represent a kind of a
conflicting situation, and conflicts arise in formal as well as in informal surroundings, in
private as well as business and academic circles. Here is referred to conflicts for which there
are no defined rules and approaches as guidelines for resolution. The view of Raiffa on con-
flict itself is that it must not be observed as a fully negative thing, but as an underlying factor
for further improvements. That is an interesting approach. He assumes that when the exis-
tence of certain tensions, competition or opposing interests on the same situation, are approp-
riately resolved, they may result in advancements and social benefits. It is very important that
the parties come together, recognize the different values and interests and try to find a mutual
agreement through the process of negotiation (Raiffa 1982).
Negotiations can be seen both as skills and science. In terms of skills: as negotiation is
always performed by a certain person, his interpersonal skills, judgment and convincing ability
have high impact on the outcome of negotiations and how the process itself is performed
(Raiffa 1982). According to Pruitt (1981) although different types of social conflicts appear
in different ranges, in terms of size and importance, as well as between different opposing
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 31

parties (ranging from children to nations, from one to many involved parties), the same
principles and causal flow could be recognized. That is why development of certain theory
and usage of scientific methods is seen as possible and useful.
More on the general characteristics and features of the negotiations, involved parties and
possible types of situations will be discussed in the following section. The establishment of
general overview and insight on the negotiation process and the variables that influence on
the negotiation outcome and on its degree of efficiency leads to recognition of the two types
of negotiation-integrative and distributive-and the forms in which they are appearing. A short
discussion on the basic characteristics, model and common problems representative for the
both types will follow.
The discussion about the different negotiation problems and the arising situations, after
knowing the potential of the integrative negotiation, would lead to an interest in the barriers
that do not allow the outcome of a certain negotiation to be maximized. The success of the
process depends much on the skills of the involved parties, their informational involvement in
the process and wise discussion flow. Recognizing that importance, the section afterwards
will deal with the possible negotiation behavior of the parties, cooperative and competitive,
as well as the measures and actions applied in different situations. Discussion on how an
effective negotiator should actually behave is also part of the section. The possible bargaining
styles will be shortly mentioned.
The last section will deal with the obstacles for integrative distributions. It will be elabo-
rated why the full potential in the negotiations is often not used. Considering the importance
of the integrative approach, the section will offer a proposal on how these problems might be
overcome and how the people could be brought to behave rationally when aiming to solve the
negotiation problem.
With it, the aim of this work that has a normative approach and focus on showing how the
negotiators in different negotiation problems and situations with certain characteristics could/
should behave, will be fulfilled.

2. NEGOTIATIONS AND NEGOTIATION PROBLEMS

This section starts with defining the negotiation itself and further familiarizes the reader
with its basic features and characteristics, along with some typical examples that lead to
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recognition of the two main types of negotiations. The focus at the beginning is put general
on negotiation so that the further classification of the two main types of negotiations- inte-
grative and distributive-and their underlying variables can be understood. The basic charac-
teristics and model of the distributive negotiation is shown along with applicable problems,
followed by the model and agreement types of the integrative negotiations, the concept of
joint benefit and a short discussion about the importance of reaching integrative agreements.

2.1 Defining negotiations

“Negotiation is the process whereby people attempt to settle what each shall give and take
or perform and receive in a transaction between them.” (Rubin, Brown, 1975) Based on the
definition, negotiation can be understood as a process, performed by more parties in a certain
give-and-take relation.
What makes the negotiation situations different than situations in which conflicts can be
settled in a manner known in advance, are their specific characteristics. Underlying factor for
having this kind of situation in the first place is having at least two parties that assume to
have conflicting interests. Further on, it is a situation in which the parties are able to com-
municate, and for which certain solution (s) exist (s). The parties propose offers and answer
with counteroffers within the process, until they agree on and accept one offer (Thompson
1990). That’s why Pruitt (1981) defined the process as a one where a joint decision is agreed
between the involved parties. Additionally, it involves more than a situation where pure game
theory could be applied, because the game theorists assume that the parties are making
independent decisions, without knowing the other’s choices. There is a certain joint action
and interaction between the parties in a negotiation. The negotiation situations and the way
the joint actions are performed are dependent on many involved conditions, as for example,
the current and future planned relationship between the parties (e.g. husband and wife would
not want to come to a divorce over a small conflicting situation when a mutual agreement
could be met (Pruitt 1981)).

2.1.1 Basic Features of a Negotiation

The basic features of a negotiation, as recognized by Thompson, include the parties in-

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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 33

volved in the negotiation, the interests they have in the specific situation, the process itself as
well as the resulting outcome (Thompson 1990).

• Negotiation Parties
The negotiation party can be a person or a group that shares certain mutual interests and
has specific preferences upon which it acts in the negotiation process (Thompson 1990). The
number of involved parties is one of the important characteristics based on which Raiffa
classifies the vast amount of different disputes. A dispute might be between two or more
disputants. In case of more, the parties might form two blocks and build two-parties negotia-
tions as coalition members, or even further disaggregate to more subgroups (Raiffa 1982).

• Parties’ Interests
The interests of the parties are an important feature that has a decisive role for the type and
potential of the negotiation situation. The interests are presented through the utilities that the
parties hold for the negotiated resources, meaning, how much the disputed resource is
valuable to each of them. If there is a high degree of conflict between the interests of the both
parties, it is most probable that a pure conflict situation or pure distributive negotiation, will
take place. This type of situation, also known as a fixed-sum negotiation, assumes that the
increase in the outcome of one party would lead to decrease for the same sum of the outcome
of the other party. Typical example for this type is a buyer-seller relation, where the buyer
tries to pay as low as possible, but the seller attempts to gain as high as possible price so that
his profit is higher. Giving more to the one would mean shortening of the limited resources
for the other. The other extreme situation is when the degree of difference between the
interests of the parties is zero. The parties get involved in pure cooperation bargaining be-
cause in this case, positive result for one does not mean negative for the other, but on
contrary-increasing the utility of one party might influence proportionally positively on the
utility of the other. The example provided by Follett (1940) is a situation between two sisters,
one interested in the peel of the orange, one in the juice. Together, by cooperation, they could
fulfill their preferences 100% with only one piece of orange available. What is important in

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this type of situations is that not always the involved parties are able to recognize that they
are after different things and should cooperate so that the both gain more. That is an addi-
tional criteria that decides on what type of negotiation will take place, as sometimes, due to
lack of communication, competitive instead of cooperative negotiation style is pursued and
the total outcome potential is not used (Thompson 1990).
Between the two extremes are the integrative negotiations, where the resources discussed
should be considered to have variable sum. It is assumed that most of the negotiations are of
this type (Thompson 1990). Pruitt provides kind of a proof for this statement with a simple
explanation that is more acceptable to assume that different parties have different prefe-
rences, than to assume the preferences are fully opposite. That is why new alternatives may
be sought for and greater joint benefit achieved (Pruitt 1981). More on the different types of
possible behavior will be given in subsection 2.2 and section 3.

• Negotiation Process
Third feature of the negotiation is the process itself. Negotiation process refers to the
interaction actions between the parties that should result in certain outcome. Different stra-
tegies can be applied within the process. Some of them will be discussed in the next sections.

• Negotiation outcome
Regarding the fourth feature, the negotiation outcome, can be stated that there are two
general outcomes of negotiations-no outcome at all, meaning reaching no agreement between
the parties, or achieving a mutually acceptable agreement. In the latter case, the efficiency of
the achieved outcome can be differentiated. It might be possible that in some cases, a certain
outcome brings additional value to the parties, but there also might have been another one
that would have brought even higher joint benefit. But maybe the discussion between the
parties has not been led in that direction (Thompson 1990).
That would mean that, in terms of the outcome of negotiations, not every dispute is settled
in a way that brings the most value to all parties. Raiffa sees the problem for non-achieve-
ment of the most efficient outcomes in the lack of training of the involved parties, even when

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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 35

the ones are professional mediators and arbitrators (Raiffa 1982).

The way the parties behave during the negotiation process has high influence on the
negotiation outcome itself. It is assumed that when the parties make low initial demands and
the rate of concession making during the negotiation process is high, the outcome will be
reached in shorter time. At this point, the concept of concession will be shortly presented as a
bargaining step in which the negotiator accepts smaller value for certain issue/s, not gaining
improvement of his position on other issues, meaning, when
“uk (xk,t−1) ≥ uk (xk,t) for all k and uk (xk,t−1) > uk (xk,t) for at least one k” (Filzmoser,
Vetschera, 2008), where xk,t is the value of issue k in offer t and uk is the marginal utility of
the negotiator for the issue k.
Empirical evidence shows that too high extremes on the demand side (low requirements,
many concessions) may lead to breach of the negotiations. The reason behind may be the
expectation of the other party that the first will continue to make high concessions. The
second party becomes reluctant to concession and waits the first party with lower demands to
proceed with the same tempo. From the other side, when a bargainer requires a lot, it might
end up with nothing. In case it succeeds, it will have much better results than in the first case
(when making low demands). But in the worst-case scenario he will also lose much more
than in the first situation. Some kind of moderate border is seen to be most plausible. (Pruitt,
1990) The main determinants of the demand level and concession rate will be broader
discussed in the section dealing with the negotiators’ behavior.

2.1.2 Other Characteristics of the Negotiation Disputes

Other important characteristic that helps distinguish between the different disputes is the
frequency of appearance of the bargaining situation. Based on that, certain behavior of the
parties can be explored. Discussion on one-time basis with short perspective opens different
game options for the party than when the discussion topic has high frequency and repetitive
relation with the counterparty. In the second case, the parties might be focused on a long term
positioning and take care for the reputation that they build (Raiffa 1982).
Decisive role on the outcome of negotiations plays the involvement level of the parties in

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the situation. When a certain resolution is highly requested and the possible gain more
appreciated by one party than the other, their approaches in the negotiation process might be
completely different.
The number of issues negotiated has high influence on the approach and flow of the
negotiation process also. In case of a simple buy-sell relation, where no complementary
products are involved, the only issue to be resolved might be the price. What makes the
negotiations more complicated is the involvement of more interrelated issues, mutually
interactive, but from different nature. In that case there is a place for certain trade-offs in the
potential value to be gained, so the issues are jointly determined. Filzmoser, Vetschera (2008)
define the trade off bargaining step, typical for multi-issue negotiations, as a one where
“uk (xk,t−1) > uk (xk,t) for at least one k and uk (xk,t−1) < uk (xk,t) for at least one other k,”
where xk,t is the value of issue k in offer t and uk is the marginal utility of the negotiator for
the issue k.
In a trade-off step, one party lowers the demand on minimum one issue, increasing the
demand on other. This kind of situations have high potential to be integrative type of negotia-
tion, as due to the different values the parties hold for the different issues, certain extension of
the pie before its division might be possible. Still, even in these situations, what finally
influences the type of negotiation is the negotiation behavior. Too competitive party may
obstruct the integrative potential. Additional important thing when dealing with the issues is
the awareness of the parties of those issues. It is very important that the issues in question are
clearly defined at the beginning, so that introduction of new ones or moving of old ones aside
do not have a negative or confusing impact on the process. Importantly, flexibility must be
also maintained (Raiffa 1982).
Very basic characteristic of a negotiation problem is whether an agreement must be met at
the end of the process. In most buyer-seller relations, the both parties might just walk away.
In these cases, it is very important that they previously analyze the point within the negotia-
tion where it would be more beneficial for them to take on another option. Still there are
certain negotiation problems that cannot be escaped from. Raiffa gives example of negotia-
tion between the city and the police force for their wage settlement (Raiffa 1982). This is a
characteristic that also influences how the parties would behave.
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 37

Additional time constraints and costs involved in the negotiations have a decisive influence
on the flow of the negotiation process. Unpleasant situation is when one party is better off
prolonging the process whereas for the other is quite important to finish with it as early as
possible. The scope of the negotiations and their impact is dependent on the nature of the
parties involved. In case of a public negotiation, followed by larger audience, the pressure
might be higher. In terms of the outcome, the parties may act also differently in case when
the contracts agreed are binding as when there is a high uncertainty in the implementation of
the final decision. Additional pressure arises from the possibility of a third party intervention.
When possible, a party may also insert clause that, in case of non-reaching an agreement, the
case might be given to an arbitrator, and causing additional pressure with that move (Raiffa
1982).
All of these characteristics were presented by Raiffa as an indication for the complexity
and importance of the topic, influencing on the final goal-the outcome (Raiffa 1982).
Knowing the basic features and characteristics of negotiations, the summarization of Pruitt
on the different functions of the negotiations can be understood:

“(a) development of specific agreements,

(b) development of longer term policies about roles, obligations, and privileges, and
(c) mediation of social change.” (Pruitt, 1981)

2.2 Integrative and Distributive Negotiation Problems

In subsubsection 2.1.1 were the integrative and distributive type of negotiations named, as
existing and resulting due to different degree of compatibility of the interests of the involved
parties. This is a division followed by many authors, including Raiffa (1982) who constrains
his analyses on two-party negotiations.

2.2.1 Distributive Negotiations-Basic Characteristics, Model and Common Problems

The degree of importance and characteristics of the issues involved in the process were
mentioned above. When there is only one issue in question (the price example above) and
parties have fully opposing interests on it, it can be said that distributive negotiations are led.
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38 Marina Stoshikj

The parties try to gain as much as possible, taking it away from the other party. Still, going to
extremes in the demands might bring nothing. The price example might be generalized for
different types of situations where one party wants to maximize something (the seller) and the
other wants to minimize it (the buyer). Not only when the issues have monetary values, but
also situations with different types of issues the can be observed as buyer-seller one. An
example is negotiation on the time of holding a wedding-the bride wants to be earlier, to mi-
nimize the time till then, and the fiancé tries to postpone it as further as possible, trying to
maximize the free time left till the wedding (Raiffa 1982).
Besides one issue to be settled, the distributive situations might have other recognizable
characteristics, which must not always be present. This kind of process could be present bet-
ween parties that have not had other type of relation or interaction previously and/or do not
plan to build a one in the future, there is no higher body that will have to ratify and accept the
decision, and usually it is between private parties (Raiffa 1982). The tactics that could be
applied in this situation are different than the ones applicable for integrative situations.
Trying to express the distributive negotiations geometrically, some basic parameters can be
set. The reservation price of the seller, the very minimum he is willing to accept, is defined
with ‘s.’ In case the negotiated price of the contract ‘x*’ is less than his minimum, the seller
is worse off if he accepts the agreement than with no agreement. The difference in the price
when ‘x*’ is bigger than ‘s’ is his surplus, which is why he is trying to negotiate a price as
higher as possible, necessary above his minimum. The situation is differently presented on
the buyer side. The maximum he is willing to give, is price ‘b.’ In case ‘x*’ is higher, it is not
the smartest move to accept the offer, so the negotiations might break. When ‘x*’ < ’ ‘b,’ the
difference is the buyer’s surplus (Raiffa 1982).
In case ‘s’ > ‘b’, there is no space for agreement. The space between ‘s’ and ‘b,’ when ‘s’ <
‘b,’ is called the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA), because when ‘x*’ is between those
two, there is option for concluding the negotiations in which the ‘x*’-‘s’ would be the seller
surplus, and ‘b’-‘x*’ the buyer’s surplus (Raiffa 1982). The above-described relations are
expressed in the following figure.

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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 39

Figure 1. The Geometry of Distributive Bargaining

Note: If ‘b’ < ‘s,’ there is no zone of agreement
Source: Raiffa H (1982).

Kersten (2001) proposed the following simple negotiation model, which is recognized to
be applicable for distributive negotiations:

N = {A, B, X, YA, YB, U}

where X is the set of feasible decisions (X ⊂ Rn), A and B are the both parties that have
certain goals, and each wants to achieve as higher level as possible. The goals can be
expressed with a vector function fi = [fji]: X → Yi ⊂ Rmi, (j = 1, …, mi) (i = A, B)
Further on, with gi: Yi → Ui ⊂ R, Kersten (2001) expresses the utility function of each
party, where U is the joint utility space, u = [uA, uB] ∈ U. The set X is assumed to be
convex, and the functions fi and gi are assumed to be concave (pseudo-convex) (Kersten
2001).
Both parties must accept the agreement, and that is possible when the buyer and seller’s
reservation prices are overlapping and forming the zone of agreement. The existence of the
zone of agreement does not necessarily mean positive result of the negotiation, as the parties
might not be able to see its existence, due to the different negotiation strategies they imple-

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40 Marina Stoshikj

ment. The way in which the parties behave is also dependent on the amount of information
they have on the other party’s reservation price (Raiffa 1982).
Assessment of the reservation price of the opposing party is a task that should be fulfilled
before entering the negotiations, because having more information on it, would make the
party able to decide for the most plausible negotiation strategy. It helps in the decision on the
opening offer. During the negotiation, each party behaves in a way that would bring more
value to her, trying to show to the opponent that his reservation price is higher (seller)/lower
(buyer), so that it could maximize its surplus. This type of behavior of the negotiators is also
dependent on the culture they are coming from. Certain cultures do not have problems mis-
leading the other party, whereas that is not the case in certain others. The negotiation flow is
always in a way that the buyer’s offers are increasing, and the seller’s decreasing. Through
this ‘negotiation dance’ by the concessions made from the party/ies, the demanded levels are
coming closer to each other (Raiffa 1982).
The basic characteristics of a distributive negotiation problem (minimize vs. maximize
tactics) were mentioned above. Here specific distributive negotiation examples could be
named so that the applicability of this type is recognized in the praxis.
Most simple every-day business examples would be buy-sell type of negotiation for a
house, a car, insurance premiums for certain damages, salary negotiations, etc. One of the
examples of Raiffa (1982) describes negotiations for acquisition: the buying firm wants to
buy another firm (seller) for a specific, as low as possible price. Still, this would be a very
simplified case. In reality, it might be a one with more involved complex issues. Or, to be
even more complex, the negotiation problem could be merger situation. It would be much
harder to conclude the negotiation if everyone just tries to maximize the individual surplus.
More plausible solution would be approaching, communicating and exchanging information
and preferences, so that the one bargaining issue could be extended to multiple issues,
differently relevant for the both parties, and the process itself and the negotiators’ behaviors
might be different. These types of situations are characteristic for integrative negotiations,
which are discussed in the next subsubsection.
The distributive situations are likely to pass into integrative ones when there is deadlock
point reached and the time is putting additional pressure, and the parties are well aware that
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 41

they are better off with an agreement than without. There is no possibility for unilateral
concession making anymore, but the parties’ demands are already closer to the limits. (Pruitt,
1981) Other conditions for the transition to cooperation after competition are presented in the
section dealing with negotiation behavior.
As a conclusion to this subsubsection, the definition of Thomson, Wang, Gunia on distri-
butive negotiations can be stated: “Distributive: a negotiation is distributive when negotiators
are mainly concerned about their own economic outcomes and not the joint outcomes of all
negotiating parties.” (2010) That clearly explains the claiming value approach of the negoti-
ators, when they just want to divide the scarce resources in own benefit. The authors state a
bit of a different, but typical negotiation problem, the classic ultimatum game (Güth et al.
1982; Ochs & Roth 1989), where one party has to divide a fix amount of money with the
other person. It is task of the first party to propose the division, and in case the second part
does not accept it, the both parties will get 0. In which proportion the split is going to be done
states the distributive aspect of the negotiation. But the pressure of the acceptance of the other
party puts focus on expanding the thoughts on the benefits of the others as well, as without
their compliance, all is lost (Thomson et al. 2010).

2.2.2 Integrative Negotiations-Basic Characteristics, Model and Common Problems

The case when there is no zone of agreement between the negotiating parties for the single
issue does not have to mean that will end as a situation where no agreement is reached. The
parties may be willing to conclude the deal and try to enlarge the whole picture by including
additional relevant factors for them, and with it, moving from single to multiple factor
problem. In this new type of problem, the parties would behave less competitive and more
cooperative, trying to attain the preferences needed the most by expanding the pie itself,
meaning, creating an additional value compared to the one deriving from the single factor
problem. This type of negotiations is called integrative. It is interesting that no longer the
gain of the one party represents a loss for the other party. Still, the enlarged pie at the end has
to be divided between the parties in a certain way (Raiffa 1982).
Raiffa gives very interesting example that presents the problematic in a simplified manner.
In the specific negotiation problem, there are two parties involved, and there are negotiations
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on two separate issues where no zone of possible agreement seems to exist. The one issue is
money, the other settlement value. Both represent distributive problems. Value for the both
parties could be created if they start negotiating the two issues connected. It might appear that
one party is more interested in the money, the other in the settlement value, and certain trade-
off could take place. One party might agree on less money if receiving more settlement value.
At the end, both parties would gain more with this approach than when proceeding with the
distributive negotiations. This example shows in simplified manner the potential of the
integrative problems, when the parties are able to recognize it and act upon it. Still, the actual
negotiator behavior has to be held in mind as highly influential, since, for example, the parties
may not be willing openly to reveal what exactly they are interested in, so that they don’t
become weaker in the process (Raiffa 1982).
The typical orange example for integrative distributions was already mentioned previously.
In that situation is the Pareto optimality principle clear and the meaning of integrative
negotiations and outcomes can be understood-“the extent to which the negotiated outcome
satisfies the interests of both parties in a way that implies the outcome cannot be improved
upon without hurting one or more of the parties involved (i.e., Pareto optimality)” (Pareto
1935). In the orange example, cutting it at half would not have satisfied fully the interests of
the sisters and the outcome could have been further improved, meaning, would not have been
efficient enough. It is important that negotiations are considered integrative when all types of
creative opportunities have been evaluated, and all resources are further divided between the
parties (Thomson et al. 2010).
Specific integrative negotiation problem is a one where two parties, husband and wife want
to decide where to go for two-weeks vacation. At first glance, it would seem quite impro-
bable for them to find a solution, as the wife wants beach whereas the husband vacation in the
mountains. As the parties have certain history and have been and will be conducting other
negotiations as well, a cooperative and trustful climate may be recognized. They would be
willing to share the preferences that derive their different interests. That opens space for
deeper analysis of the conflicting situation and search for a mutually agreeable solution. With
an active search of alternatives, they can establish the real meaning that each preference has
for the defined party (Pruitt 1981).
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 43

It is also important to make distinction between the possible outcomes and their nature.
One option in the specific case would be C (refer the figure below)-no vacation. A and B
would be the extremes (seashore, mountain) bringing satisfaction in the outcome only to one
of the parties at a time. Additional, more obvious alternative would be E-one week on the
seashore, one in the mountains. It has to be clearly understood that this represents only a
compromise situation, but not an integrative option. Integrative outcome would be something
that would bring more benefit for the both parties, than half, with the compromise. That
would be D, as a new alternative, satisfying the needs, the highest preferences of the both
parties, by, for example, inland lake near the mountains (Pruitt 1981).

B
D
Benefit to Wife

A
C

Benefit to Husband

Figure 2. Benefit Space for the Husband-Wife Vacation Example

Source: Pruitt DG (1981) Negotiation Behavior. Organizational and Occupational Psychology Aca-
demic Press:138.

Through the mentioned examples the basic characteristics of the integrative negotiations
can be clearly understood: “creation of value, focus on interests not positions, openness and
exchange of relevant information, learning and problem restructuring” (Fischer & Ury 1983;
Lax & Sebenius 1986; Sebenius 1992; Ury 1993; Fisher et al. 1994; Raiffa 1996; Bazerman
1998), and that is what distinguishes them from the distributive type.
For consistency, a proposed integrative negotiation model from Kersten (2001) will be
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44 Marina Stoshikj

shortly presented.

N = {A, B, Xt, YA, t, YB, t, Ut, t = 1, …, T}.

During integrative negotiations Xt may express modification in the goals and preferences
of the parties within time. That could be achieved in case additional resources are made
available, or new offers are considered (so new set of offers is formed: Xt+1 ⊃ Xt), or it
might be that some issue is not relevant any more, or that the parties did not know they were
already agreed on certain interest, which can be expressed through the following condition:
Xt+1 ⊂ Rn, Xt ⊂ Rm and n ≠ m. Common for each of these cases is introduction of
qualitative difference in the process and not a quantitative one, where the parties tend to come
closer to each other with their offers by changing the values given to the utilities (Kersten
2001).
Pruitt discusses classification on four types of integrative agreement (presented in blocks
below). These types can be seen as models with whose implementation new opportunities or
alternatives could be found, so that the joint benefit could be reached (Pruitt 1981).

• Cutting of One Party’s Costs

When there is an existence of different interests between the parties, it could be that the
beneficial outcome of one party will bring costs to the other. One option for easing on the
costs could be one party’s attempts to cut the costs of the other (costs as for example, sense of
rejection, weakening of the status or perception of reduced freedom by the other), in order to
ensure reaching an agreement by persuading the other to accept some other major demands
the party has in return. Two specific forms of cost cutting could be mentioned:

- easing the other party’s concern about the future implications of the agreement through
specific action of decoupling in order to make the other party feel more secure and not
vulnerable in the future if making concessions now
- or an attempt for protection of the other side’s public image, in a way so that they feel as
included in the decision making. In terms of cost cutting, the party might try to cut its
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 45

own costs also, or a third party may involve some similar approach (Pruitt 1981).

• Compensation
This is another way of reaching integrative outcomes of the negotiation problems. In order
that a party gets most of its desired demands, it might try to compensate the other party for
some of its costs. Specific, homologous and substitute are three types of compensation, men-
tioned by Pruitt (1981). In the first approach alternative ways that can lower the frustration of
the other party have to be searched for. When speaking about homologous compensation, it is
referred to a situation when the party would receive certain benefit with the same value as the
one it has lost with the specific agreement. In this second case, the needs that were the source
of frustration were not directly responded to. That is the case in the substitute compensation
also, where also different costs and needs are included. When implementing these approa-
ches, one must be careful in finding the real equivalence between the frustrated needs and the
new alternatives, so that the both parties are happy. It should be held in mind that the
compensation values might not be visible at first look (as for example, the benefit of nice
reference letter for a former employee). Another issue that has to be dealt with is the trust
component, as it is not always easy to decide which party would be first to go forward with
its cooperative approach so that both are sure the compensation will be fulfilled as agreed
(Pruitt 1981).

• Logrolling
Different than the first two forms where the actor tries to fulfill his action by easement on
the other party, in logrolling (and later in bridging as well), change in the positions of the
both parties is required in order to make the matching of the interests possible. This is a way
of reaching an integrative agreement by which the both parties make concessions on certain
issues. It is possible only when there are more issues involved, and the involved issues have
different values for the actors. In this way, one could give up on an issue for which he does
not have high preferences for receiving a one that is more relevant to him, but maybe not that
much to the opposing party that would make this concession. The characteristics of compen-

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46 Marina Stoshikj

sation above describe the logrolling process, but only from one side. In logrolling, the both
sides try to compensate the other for a certain issue they care about so this form is though
similar, a different one. One nice example would be the negotiation for a salary and overtime
hours with the workers union or an employee (Pruitt 1981).

• Bridging
With the bridging form a brand new option that is supposed to satisfy the needs of the both
parties is found. That is the difference with logrolling, since, although in this case concessions
are made as well, new option is additionally introduced. In order to come to a bridging
agreement, mutual communication and understanding of the underlying values of the parties
are needed. Typical example is a negotiation problem where two women sit in the same
room, one willing to have opened window for ventilation, but the other closed against draft.
Knowing the real interests for having the window opened or closed can help them find an
alternative-opened window in another room-so that the both preferences were fulfilled.
Depending on what the reaching on an agreement constrains, different bridging formulas
could be used. In terms of time constraint, an alteration might be used-e.g. going to vacation
place of preference of the wife one year and then the next year to the one the man prefers.
Other option would be implementation of one idea until it is proved that is not working and
the other one’s is then enacted-so called contingent approach. In case when a resource
shortage is the obstacle, increasing the pie by increasing the resources might be the right call.
Another possible solution might be even the understanding that an agreement on certain issue
cannot be met (Pruitt 1981).
It is important to be understood that in order to reach integrative agreements, the parties
might have to give up or concede on certain issues and goals they have had. In order that to
happen, and the party to be still satisfied, unlinking of the issues and their effects must
happen. That would be a process of going deeper into the issues and searching for alternatives
with which the linked unacceptable issue would be removed and the basic preferences still
obtained (Pruitt 1981).
As a conclusion on this discussion on integrative negotiation, it can be said that they are
present when the agreement considers the both parties’ interests and a maximum joint benefit
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 47

could be created. So, an alternative is considered more integrative, if the joint benefit is
higher. Short explanation of the concept of joint benefit, the pillar of this type of agreement,
may be interesting at this point. One definition would be an outcome that delivers higher
benefit for one party but still equal or higher for the other. This approach does not allow
observation on which alternative brings highest value. In the vacation case, (Figure 2) every-
thing would be better for the parties than no vacation, but that does not suggest the point D.
Other definition would be the sum of the individual outcomes of the both parties, which is
again not fully appropriate, as it might select a situation when one party is highly satisfied
and the other not satisfied at all. Quite acceptable definition might be one where the joint
benefit is seen in correlation with the outcome that the less beneficial party would get. Under
this criterion, the inland lake would be chosen, as an integrative approach. Still, the interests
of the better party are here not fully considered and may lead to less favorable solution (Pruitt
1981). The complexity of defining the joint outcome might be an additional explanation of
why the parties do not manage to find the best solution in every situation. They might not
have same view on what is the best.

2.2.3 Benefits of Integrative Negotiations

After understanding the distinctive characteristics of the both types of negotiations, here is
a summarization on why it is better to perform integrative negotiations: (Pruitt 1981)

• Nevertheless how measured, higher joint benefit brings more good for more people
• As both parties usually tend to set high limits, an agreement would be impossible if a
certain joint benefit is not found and accepted by the both
• Better outcome for the both parties lowers the possibility of withdrawal afterwards and
helps building stable relation between the parties
• As a result of a better joint outcome, the parties will be attracted to each other, will tend
to develop trust in the future and enter in other integrative agreements, producing further
higher benefits
• In terms of an organization, leading integrative processes allows for higher efficiency

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48 Marina Stoshikj

within the organization and greater capability for goals achievements.

Still, not every negotiation problem has the potential to be solved with an integrative
approach. The situation’s characteristics have to show certain integrative potential. As men-
tioned above, simple one-issue negotiations (buy-sell one-time relation) may not have more
alternative options where the joint benefit would be different (bigger). The brighter side is
that these zero-sum situations tend to be not that often. In most of the cases, even when
starting with an obvious one issue, additional issues of mutual interests can be later intro-
duced. When the parties have different priorities on them, the integrative potential is highest
(Pruitt 1981).
Highest potential does not mean guaranteed success. As already mentioned, the outcome
depends not on the hidden intentions of the parties, but on their exercised behavior, as one or
both of them may not be able to see the integrative option and tend to act inappropriately to
the given situation. The different flow of the negotiation process in a specific situation also
might bring different results. In case when the issues are considered simultaneously, the
parties are more open for giving in on issues that are less relevant for them, expecting the
same response from the other party. When dealing one by one, each party may act a bit
competitive, trying to lead the other party to concede as much as possible, which would lead
to lower total benefit at the end. Much energy and concession making could be spent on
issues of less relevance in the latter case (Pruitt 1981).
When some of the basic characteristics and preconditions described for the different types
are not fulfilled, the outcome might not be the most efficient one. After understanding the
great meaning and influence of the negotiation behavior on the whole negotiation process and
outcome, the two general types, common for the two described negotiation types, will be
discussed in the following section. Some common approaches and tactics were already men-
tioned during the description of the integrative/distributive negotiations, as the both issues are
quite connected and dependent on each other.

3. NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR
The introductory part of this work dealt with the definition of negotiation. Nevertheless
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 49

which approach or theoretical definition is used, it is clear that there is an interaction between
two or more parties that need to resolve certain conflict by working together and discussing it
through, as the outcome of each is dependent on the other party’s acceptance/rejection/
interests. Based on that, it can be concluded that the way those parties interact and behave to
each other is decisive for the negotiation outcome. Even in case when the negotiation
problem has the potential to be integrative, if incompatible behavior is exercised, the outcome
may be different. It should not be concluded from the latter that the behavior is fully decisive
because if there is no integrative potential in the negotiation problem, although the parties act
cooperatively, the outcome will not be integrative. But it could maybe open other perspec-
tives for further cooperation. In case the negotiation problem has an integrative character and
the parties act extremely competitive, the joint benefit could end up lower than possible.
The complication comes from the fact that the outcomes are dependent on the negotiation
behavior of not only one, but of the both parties. The combination of the parties’ behavior:
claiming (typical for distributive) and creating (typical for integrative) and with that the
different outcomes it results in, can be clearly recognized in the concept of the negotiator’s
dilemma, presented by Lax & Sebenius (1986):

Party 1:
Create Claim

GOOD GREAT
Create
GOOD TERRIBLE
TERRIBLE MEDIOCRE
Claim
GREAT MEDIOCRE

Party 2:
Figure 3. The Negotiator’s Dilemma
Source: Lax & Sebenius (1986), The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Compe-
titive Gain, 9.

In the following subsection, the negotiator’s behavior will be analyzed to a certain depth.
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50 Marina Stoshikj

After some general characteristics of an effective negotiator, the necessary preparations for
entering in a negotiation process and the main concepts that need to be considered and be
known before and during the negotiation are discussed.
The general characterization and typology of competitive and cooperative behavior as well
as applicable situations that follows is based on the work of Pruitt (1981). Both parties do not
equally know the parameters in a negotiation. The perception of the situation and of the
opponent side might be the main source of information for drawing conclusions, rationalizing
and adjusting the individual behavior. That is why the measures of negotiation behavior, with
focus on the social-psychological ones, are shortly discussed. How a one can negotiate along
the process is analyzed through the general types of bargaining styles.

3.1 Characteristics of an Effective Negotiator

As mentioned when discussing the negotiations from both a science and skills view point,
the personal skills and characteristics of the negotiator can help him in ensuring better out-
comes of the negotiation process for himself and in total. He has to possess certain abilities
and pursue appropriate behavior in other to reach the best results (Raiffa 1982).
Discovering the characteristics that promise efficient negotiation is not a straightforward
task. That is why there are different opinions. Raiffa (1982) starts from the empirical findings
of Karrass (1968) that were derived from answers on the importance of thirty-four traits
which could be considered an effective negotiator’ characteristic, rated as unimportant,
mildly important, important, very important and extremely important by thirty-two bank
officers in the US. It has to be bear in mind that some traits are more important in certain
business spheres and some in others, so the participants rank them by considering the
applicability in their working position. The following ones ranked in the first five:

“1. Preparation and planning skills

2. Knowledge of subject matter being negotiated
3. Ability to think clearly and rapidly under pressure und uncertainty
4. Ability to express thoughts verbally
5. Listening skills” (Adopted by Karrass, 1968)
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 51

Raiffa does not exclude the different variables that have influence on the negotiation
behavior, as age, sex, nationality, social status, religion and similar, but also adds that those
generalizations on the characteristics of all negotiators as due to being part of a certain group
might not be easily proven right (Raiffa 1982).

3.1.1 Things to be Considered by the Negotiator Before and During Negotiation

According to the list above, the planning and preparation skills of a negotiation are seen as
most important for gaining maximum outcome. The negotiator will be able to perform better
if he has considered and thought through some issues in advance.
Before the negotiation starts, there are certain issues he has to think on so that he can plan
his behavior and approach during the process. Of course, one has to start from himself, has to
be sure what does he want from the negotiations, what is the goal he is trying to reach, does
he have a fall back option etc. A negotiation is interaction, so beside his motives, the nego-
tiator should attempt to discover the preferences of the opposing party so that, for example,
he could know at which point they might be willing to get out of the process. Connected with
that and the specific situation, one has to be able to judge to which point he can be trustful
and open to the other party, so that no advantage is taken of him. The possibility for inclusion
of additional parties has to be also thought through, as well as the connected issues with the
execution of the process itself-time, place, etc. After having shaped assumptions on the party
and the surrounding situation, the negotiator has to once again reconsider his aspiration level,
check for plausibility of his BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) and
reservation price (Raiffa 1982). The limit and his aspiration level would define the level of
demand he would have in the negotiation. The limit is the ultimate fall back option or the
level beyond which there is no concession, and the aspiration level is on the other border -
what is sought for or how high is the value of the goal of the bargainer. The aspiration level is
higher or equal to the limit of the negotiator (Pruitt 1981). The BATNA stays constant within
the negotiations and the aspiration level changes based on the negotiation flow. Still, they are
strongly correlated (Pruitt 1981).
The first step, the opening offer, is also something to be planned good in advance. It is very
important for the further negotiations to have the first offer within the acceptance zone of the
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other. It should not be extremely high so that the other party won’t break the negotiations.
The anchoring moment is also something whose misleading effect should be avoided. In case
the counterparty makes extreme high offer, it has to be held in mind that the middle point
might be the final goal, so the counteroffer and the concessions rate should be appropriately
set opposite (Raiffa 1982).
Regarding the mentioned concession making during the negotiation process, through the
‘negotiation dance’ the concessions are generally decreasing in a constant manner and become
smaller as one comes closer to the self-defined limit (reservation or aspiration level). Intere-
sting bargaining behavior that should be held in mind is that the “opponent” (the buyer) would
try to convince the seller that his reservation price is lower than it actually is, and the other
side (the seller)-that the limit is higher than it actually is. High influence on how the parties
behave in these terms is the planned future relationship, fairness feeling, risk attitude etc.
This approach has to be held in mind when reassessing the defined levels along the
negotiation dance (Raiffa 1982).

Choice of Mr. Hee

Cooperate Defect

5 cents 10 cents
to Hee to Hee
Cooperate
5 cents -10 cents
to Shee to Shee
Choice of
Mr. Hee
-10 cents -5 cents
to Hee to Hee
Defect
10 cents -5 cents
to Shee to Shee

Figure 4. A variation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Case

Source: Raiffa H (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 125.

During the negotiation process the parties have to decide whether they will act cooperative
or competitive, and would perform their concession making in the appropriate way and pace.
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 53

As mentioned, that depends on the duration of the planned relationship. The figure below is a
modified version of the negotiator’s dilemma and shows what two parties get in case they
decide to cooperate or defect. The two players (Ms. Shee and Mr. Hee) are involved in couple
of rounds of monetary payoffs, making decisions independently and at the same time. The
picture describes how much they get or lose. It is clear that they would get most if they
defect, but the other party should be lead in to cooperate. One would lose the most if it
cooperates, when the other party is claiming value, which makes the approach of cooperation
risky, but at the same time, with highest joint benefit, if the both parties behave in this way
(Raiffa 1982).
This is an extreme case where the monetary pay-offs are strictly defined and the two types
of reactions produce well-defined outcome in a simplified situation of independent decision-
making.
In terms of reactions to the behavior of the other party within the whole negotiation pro-
cess, since the interactions have high impact on how a one would behave when decisions are
made (based on the previous actions of the other party), two kinds have been distinguished:
matching and mismatching behavior. The negotiator exercises the first one when his demands
are as high as the ones from his opponent, and the concession making is similar in terms of
size and frequency. The second case is when a party sets higher demands even when the ones
from the opponent are smaller, or does not respond with the same pace of concession making,
keeping himself to his part. The matching behavior, which is also called strategy imitation, is
common in bargaining situations, as one behaves cooperatively in response to the cooperation
of the other party, or competitively, if it gets that kind of approach from the opposite nego-
tiator (Pruitt 1981).
The party has to be prepared for the commitment making part, has to have a clear way of
signaling the other party that it cannot go further than the last offer, etc. In case of breaking a
commitment, it has to be done gracefully. The face saving moment is something to be pre-
sserved here, as it would make the other party more cooperative when a certain proposal or
exchange that does not seem as he is directly giving in. That can be done with introducing
new issues and expanding the domain of negotiations. That works especially positive when
there is no zone of agreement with the current discussed issues. Additionally, in case of break
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off, one might think of introducing a third party in the negotiation, an intervener. That should
be also carefully thought through and analyzed.
It is also very important for the image and possibility for further success that the parties
keep their integrity during the process, by acting rationally and fair. The ethical and moral
issues are something to be paid attention too, as the personal beliefs have high influence on
how a negotiator behaves (Raiffa 1982).

3.2 Competitive and Cooperative Behavior

These two general types of behavior were mentioned few times during the description of
different negotiation problems and within the previous discussion on negotiator behavior.
This subsection deals with some general definition of the competitive and cooperative beha-
vior, the main types and applicability, and, quite importantly, the reactions of the other party
on the specific behavior.

3.2.1 Competitive Behavior

Pruitt (1981) defines the competitive behavior as “efforts to elicit unilateral concessions
from the other party.” When the competitive behavior leads the other to make concessions, it
is considered to be successful. It is assumed that the competitive behavior is more applicable
when a distributive negotiation problem exists (Pruitt 1981).
The competitive tactics exercised during competitive behavior are classified by Pruitt (1981)
in five types:

• Putting time pressure on the other party

- convincing the other to concede as otherwise a break in the negotiation could happen.
The time prolongation of the decision is an additional risk. This tactic is most likely
pursued by setting a deadline for reaching an agreement before negotiation stop, or by
introducing an alternative option one has (e.g. other partner with an attracting offer at
disposal). The success of the tactics depends on the perceptions of the other actor of the
credibility of these threats from the opposing negotiator. In case the other party does not
consider the threats seriously, the acting competitor may end up breaking negotiations
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 55

that he would actually like to be positively resolved.

• Acting firm
- the competitive negotiator sets high demands, makes low and slow concessions but
keeps the commitment to the negotiations. Too high demands at the beginning are risky
move, but the negotiator is then able to present the concessions he will make as quite
important ones, showing positive attitude and at the same time involving the other into
making counter concessions. Though slow, the concessions may seem as a sign of
weakness, which is why the negotiator might couple them with certain threats, pointing
out that it is very hard for him to make those concessions, as they have quite negative
impact on his position.

• Reducing the opponent’s resistance

- tactics belonging to this type are pursued in a way to make the other party lower their
aspiration level or change his limit in a favorable direction. The competitive behavior
employs persuasive agreements, threats, or gives certain promises, but in more implicit
form than the threats. In order these tactics to work, the party should be seen as credible
and that depends on the perceived firmness, historical reputation, influence on neutral
third parties and the actor’s control in hands that it could/could not execute the threat.

• Principles of prominence
- tactics which are commonly used, but not deeply explored. It is assumed that the
competitor builds a case on behalf of an agreement that he strives for. For that purpose,
he could try to contribute a lot to the pie that will be further distributed, or push for
moral principles.

• Positive relationship with the other party

- with these tactics, the competitor tries to establish positive relationship with the oppos-
ing party, or influence positive on his mood. He will try to show the other party liking
and identification with, so that the one becomes less reluctant to concession making.
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Choosing a pleasant place for the negotiation, offering favors to the other, following his
values in the own behavior are some of the possible forms for application of these tactics
(Pruit 1981).

• Reactions to the Use of Competitive Behavior

The effects certain behavior has are seen through the reactions of the other party. The final
negotiation outcome is dependent not only on the behavior of the one party but on the reac-
tions of the other party on that behavior, as well.

When the competitor employs heavier tactics, such as the time pressure and threats, nega-
tive attitude is more likely to be developed by the opposing party. Lighter tactics, such as
promises, or building positive relationships, provoke positive or at least neutral reaction.
Furthermore, laboratory studies have shown that in case of employment of heavier tactics, the
other party tends to imitate the strategy and respond in the same way, in order to keep their
face, which has contra productive effect for the negotiation in total. The effect of the way the
tactics are formulated has high influence on the perception and actions of the other party.
Promises, positive formulations work much better than threats and negative connotations.
(Pruitt 1981).

• Applicability
Competitive behavior is usually present when there is low trust between the parties and the
limits are high, so that the bargainer tends to make small concessions in order to stay closer to
the high limits. The competitor has win-lose orientation. When one party is in better position
and has greater capacity, it will tend to act competitive, resulting in distributive negotiations,
as it would be able to take more in the pie division. The perception of the power a party has
from the opponent’s side has high impact on these types of situations. Still, the competitive
behavior is seen to have inverse relation to concession making. The usage of competitive
behavior in situations with integrative potential results in lower joint benefits because through
the mentioned tactics, the interests of both parties are somehow negatively influenced and the
problem-solving behavior is blocked (Pruitt 1981).
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 57

3.2.2 Coordinative Behavior

When behaving coordinative, the parties work together and make efforts to find a solution
that is acceptable and brings higher value for both of them. This type of behavior is also
common for latter stages of situations that started out highly competitive, because otherwise a
breach in the negotiation and bad parties’ relation would be the only negotiation outcome left.
There are two types of coordination observed in negotiations:

- concession exchange, when the parties make concessions on an issue moving towards
each other, in a justified manner, or making exchanging concessions on different issues
with different relevance for them
- and problem-solving discussion, when the parties are open to each other, tell their prefe-
rences and goals and try to find integrative agreement for satisfaction of the both sides
(Pruitt 1981).

Pruitt has defined the coordinative behavior as “any action that seeks to establish coordina-
tion or constitutes a part of coordination” (1981).
Which coordinative actions will be used is dependent on the level of free communication
and trust established between the parties. Based on it, Pruitt (1981) divides them in three
types: high, moderate, and low risk coordinative behavior.

• High-Risk Coordinative Behavior

When a party makes large concessions or reveals very sensitive information to the other
party, in order to develop an integrative agreement, it can be said that the party pursues high-
risk coordinative behavior. It is considered as such, as in this case the party may lose much.
Image loss is one type of loss, as the counterparty may think the party is willing to concede
even more than needed. If a big concession is already made, the party cannot go back to its
previous beneficial position. Once it has discovered a lot of information to the other party, the
latter one may use it for implementation of some distributive actions, such as threats. Using
these approaches in a negotiation, the party clearly states from the beginning that is in for
coordinative behavior so the opponent might do nothing further, beneficial for the party, to
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bring it to this position. Still, the loss of all of these actions is lower when there is trust
between the parties. These actions are pursued in situations when the party is more of less
clear that the other will behave in the same way (Pruitt 1981).

• Moderate-Risk Coordinative Behavior

This behavior is more applicable in negotiation problems where lower level of trust exists,
so the parties might start competitive but they are actually interested in coordination. A party
might use indirect communication, such as signals, sign language for example, to show
indirectly to the other party that is ready to coordinate, within exposing itself to high risk.
Those signals might be certain small concession or some kind of promise. If the other party
understands it and is also willing to cooperate, the following steps will be coordinative.
Signals and messages may be transferred through a third party as well. It is very important
that the signals are noticed from the other party, but are revocable, meaning, if the other does
not approach in an integrative manner, the party is not obliged to follow on those signals
(Pruitt 1981).
Additional approach in which a coordinative behavior is exercised is organizing an
informal discussion where the problem-solving approach is applied and is not part of the
official negotiation. It can be a private chat in a bar or similar. The potential losses mentioned
above are here reduced, as for example, there is no position loss. No promises are made, and
for lowering the formality of the meetings, negotiation team members with lower status, not
fully credible for the team, but able to pursue problem-solving behavior are sent. The
acceptance for participation in this type of meetings is also a signal for cooperative mood
(Pruitt 1981).
Another option that the negotiator has in hands, in case the trust is not high at the begin-
ning, is pursuing fractional concessions. He would start with smaller concessions, and as the
other party accepts them and replies back, the trust is growing and bigger mutual concessions
could be further made (Pruitt 1981).

• Low-risk Coordinative Behavior

In situations when the risk of suffering from image loss is too high, the negotiator cannot
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 59

pursue much revealing tactics. He would try to approach the issue cautiously from the side,
sending signals, but in more hidden way. For example, he can send signals that he would
want an informal discussion, a back-channel meeting, and see how it is accepted from the
other party. Additionally, he might stay in discussion on very minor issues, so that a good
relation is established where no high risk of outcome loss exists (Pruitt 1981).

• Reactions to the Use of Coordinative Behavior

When a party acts in a cooperative manner, it signals trust to the other, so further integra-
tive approach is more likely to take place. The second negotiator may respond with reciprocal
concession making, when the concessions made by the first party are meaningful to him, and
with that, open floor for integration. Still, if the other party perceives the integrative approach
of the negotiator as a sign of weakness, it may not react fully integrative. How a party will
behave is closely connected with the power and interests it has in the negotiation. Still, it is
more likely to answer integrative, when approached in this way. But it must be held in mind
that competitive reactions to coordinative behavior lead to lower joint benefit, but higher for
the competitive party (Pruitt 1981).

• Applicability
Cooperative behavior is usually present when there is high trust between the parties, or at
least possibility for it. Actions for achieving coordination and trust are possible in situations
where one party possesses something that brings small value to himself, but is significant to
the other party. That issue can be used as a reward on the concession that the other negotiator
makes. Negotiation problems in which the party sees that the other has higher potential for
making threats and is maybe in better position are also ones where it would act cooperative,
because otherwise might lose more. This is in compliance with the assumption that the mood
for entering in cooperative negotiation is lower when this type of behavior would bring more
benefits to the other party, as to itself. The existence of a positive connection, a relation, or a
high potential for it, is a good preconditions for integrative behavior. The same effects are
valid when a party sees its opponent acting integrative in other negotiation situations, with
other parties. It is also important that the parties are in good mood and motivated for attaining
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more. When high limits exist in a negotiation, the likelihood that one party would make large
concessions is smaller, so competitive behavior may step in. This is a good situation for em-
ploying a coordinative action, as due to the unlikelihood of performance of unilateral conces-
sion, the negotiations might otherwise fail (Pruitt 1981).

3.3 Measures of Negotiation Behavior

The measures of behavior and performance help in the classification of a certain behavior
as applicable for integrative or distributive negotiations. Those types of measures are further
explored in this subsection.
Thompson defines two main groups, economic and social-psychological measures, where
the first ones focus on the outcome of the negotiation as a result of a certain behavior, and the
latter focus not only on the outcomes but consider the negotiation process and the social
perception as well. The both measures influence each other (Thompson 1990).

3.3.1 Economic Measures

As mentioned, the economic measures focus on the negotiation outcome, not paying
interest in which way the one has been reached. These measures consider the individual utility.
Nash (1950) identifies three types of economic measure of the negotiator performance:
mutual agreement, creating resources (integrative bargaining) and claiming resources (distri-
butive bargaining).
Regarding the mutual agreement, Thompson (1990) states what was also previously dis-
cussed: the parties will reach a mutual agreement if both of them are better off like that,
meaning, if there is a zone of possible agreement. The example given is when the buyer is
willing to pay $700, and the minimum price the seller is willing to sell for is $600. The
outcome of the negotiation process will define where the final price within this zone will be.
In case the both parties would be better off without an agreement, and their reservation prices
do not overlap, resulting in no ZOPA (e.g. buyer $600, seller $700), no mutual agreement
will be reached.
The economic measures of creating and claiming resources were also already discussed
above. The determinants of the negotiator behavior are already clear at this point. The inte-
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 61

grative bargaining is present when the parties can create additional value and find compatible
issues for expanding the set of options, and distributive approach is involved in every
situation (also in integrative ones, except when they have fully compatible issues), sooner or
later, when the pie has to be divided and each is interested in higher surplus (Thompson
1990).

3.3.2 Social-Psychological Measures

What might be more interesting at this point are the social-psychological measures of the
negotiation performance, as they are based on social perception component. People may act
differently in different situations and may react in a manner that is not typical for the
situation. That might be due to the fact that they perceive the information differently and may
understand some actions otherwise than how actually intended. They may, for example, sense
a conflict and act on it where there is no need of a one, or vice versa. These are very impor-
tant issues since, as mentioned, the negotiator does not have at disposal a lot of information
on what is relevant and preferred by the other party and is not always able to perform an
objective analysis of the negotiation situation, so it has to make own assumptions and
conclusions based on the situation and perceived behavior. Here the social perceptions of the
negotiation situation, the party itself and its opponent are considered (Thompson 1990).
The negotiators build their own judgments on how the negotiation process is executed in
terms of fairness of the involved procedures based on the norms they follow and believe in.
Here are their perceptions on the structure of the negotiated task also included, in terms of
whether the one is competitive or cooperative. If one party fails to perceive the integrative
potential of the negotiation situation, distributive light is shed on the whole negotiation
process (Thompson 1990).
When the negotiator likes the other party, certain level of trust may be developed and the
applicable tactics described previously pursued. What they consider is the expertise, social-
bility, skills the other party possesses, and importantly, their cooperativeness and competiti-
veness. In this way, each party tries to understand the behavior of the other and predict the
future one. The dimensions on which the negotiator perceives the other party are also applied
in the self-perception, as it is very important to be aware of the own skills, characteristics and
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interests, in order to be able to compare them to the one of the opposite party (Thompson
1990).
Viewing the negotiation behavior measures from an empirical perspective, it has been
concluded that the economic measures are more widely used than the social-psychological
ones. Still, the second should be included in the analyses and researches, as in many situa-
tions, negotiators do not have much to work with other than their perceptions and it might be
quite useful to compare those subjective perceptions with objective measures. The influence
of the social-psychological measures on the negotiator behavior have been con-firmed and
that further increases the interests for research in the specific field and for searching for
certain patterns (Thompson 1990).

3.4 Bargaining Styles

The negotiation behavior that a certain party exercises is executed through certain bargain-
ing styles that represent patterns of the behavior of an individual in different situations. The
bargaining styles are defined as “relatively stable, personality-driven clusters of behavior and
reactions that arise in negotiating encounters” (Shell 2001). Knowing the bargaining styles
helps the negotiators assess their own strengths and weaknesses, their own actions and
understand the behavior of others (Shell 2001).
Four models are mainly used in the literature and teaching circles for exploration of the
bargaining model:

- personal characteristics (gender, culture, etc.)

- competitive vs. cooperative style (previously elaborated)
- interpersonal orientation and
- dual concern model-the relative concern of the negotiator for his versus the outcome for
the other parties.

At this point, the behavioral classification of the dual concern model will be listed, as
according to Shell (2001), it is strongly believed that it contributes to the subject of negotia-
tion behavior:
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 63

• Competing: highly concerned for the individual outcome and interested in limiting the
outcome of the other parties
• Collaborating: high concern for both individual and outcome of the other parties
• Compromising: moderate concern for both individual and outcome of the other parties
• Accommodating: high concern for the others, but low for individual outcome
• Avoiding: trying to keep away of conflicting situations with others so not following on
attaining the personal goals (Shell 2001).

More than one behavioral characteristic can be recognized for a certain negotiator in
different situations (Shell 2001).

4. OBSTACLES IN REACHING INTEGRATIVE AGREEMENTS

Understanding the basic characteristics of the distributive and integrative negotiation pro-
blems and connected behavior, one can easily conclude that the integrative solution is what
stays longer and gives more benefits in total for the parties. The win-win situation gives posi-
tive contributions to the society in total, as it supports optimal utilization of scarce resources.
Still, the implementation of the integrative approach can be hindered by many factors in real-
life situations. Much were already mentioned, and following is a summarization by Foroughi
(1998):

• Absence of acquaintance of the parties with the integrative, collaborative solving appro-
ach or an intermediary with that knowledge (Walton, McKersie).
• Complexity of the interactions and involved interconnected issues; high number of
possible options (Nyhart & Goeltner 1997); subjective judgments and difficulty in un-
derstanding all possibilities (Antrim & La 1987).

Presence of Cognitive Biases and Prejudices

The great importance of the negotiator’s behavior on the negotiation outcome was pointed
out few times above. The major obstacles for reaching integrative agreements are classified
by Foroughi (1998) in two groups: cognitive biases and socio-emotional aspect of negotiator
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64 Marina Stoshikj

behavior. Following are some examples (Foroughi 1998):

Cognitive biases
• Inability to integrate multiple issues and analyze them as a whole interdependent package
• Viewing the negotiations through negative perspective which leads to risk taking actions
• Assumption that only one can be the winner, as the resources are fixed as given
• Inability to see more optimal solutions and tendency to close the negotiation before
looking at all alternatives
• Focusing and giving more values to information that are salient, vivid

Socio-emotional aspect of negotiators’ behavior

• Not allowing the other party to have the perception that the one gives in
• Different evaluation of the same information in case of ineffective communication
• Thinking that the own assumptions are always the right ones
• Creating big conflict where there is no need of a one

Additionally, it can be stated that the negotiators sometimes act illogically, possible due to
emotional difference in different moments of time. They tend to change their preferences
often and at the end might not be able to follow the development of their own issues and
preferences. Negotiators enter the negotiation process sometimes unprepared, or without
having thought on all options they need to have clear standing point for. All of these factors
contribute to underperformance, even in a situation with high integrative potential.
The obstacles described above may be avoided when the negotiators pay more attention to
the process and prepare in advance appropriately. They should implement a search on the
preferences of the opposing party and the characteristics of the specific situation, trying to
find new options for resolution. Good knowledge and exercise on biases should be practiced,
so that the negotiator stays reasonable und unbiased during the process.
A negotiation support system (NSS) may provide support to the negotiator before and
during the process, as a saving space for all information, contributing to moving the nego-

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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 65

tiations towards more rational than emotional approach, as well as through its focusing role
on close defining and clearly communicating the issues between the parties with aim of
improved understanding, and with it, more optimal outcomes (Bellucci & Zeleznikow 2006).
The contributions of the NSS to reaching integrative agreements can be seen in couple of
its characteristics. It allows for (Foroughi 1998):

• Analytical processing of parties’ preferences and inclusion of objective data

• Parties are supported in the identification of their preferences and interest at the begin-
ning, in a defined step of the system workflow
• Possible conflicting issues and possible alternatives and more optimal solutions are
clearly presented
• Focus is put on alternative options throughout the whole process
• Compromise and concession options are presented to the parties earlier in the process, so
that the giving in can actually be seen as working together towards better total results
• Precise expressed information; focus groups for wording concept testing

It has to be understood that the system is as good as it is used. Its benefits are dependent on
how much and how appropriate the people use it. That is, in turn, the biggest challenge as
well. The major goal of NSS is enabling and teaching the negotiation parties to take broader
look on the negotiations and review all of its specifics (Stoshikj & Greguš 2014). As many
other information systems (Stoshikj et al. 2014), the negotiation support system is there only
to support the parties in the negotiation process and perform certain tasks based on which the
negotiators can make final decisions and exploit the negotiation potential.

5. CONCLUSION
This work has the integrative and distributive negotiation problems and recognizable
behavior in the both types of situations in focus, drawing attention to why the most efficient
outcome might not be always achieved, and entering a bit in the possible resolution options
for this inefficiency. Most of the summarizations were done within the different sections. The
conclusion at this point has an aim of drawing generally valid statements based on the
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66 Marina Stoshikj

summarizations and some outlook for further research directions.

Based on the discussed features, characteristics, types and related concepts, it can be con-
cluded, that, since a negotiation must be performed by more than one party and the need for it
arises as the parties have differing views/interests on the same issues, but there is no regulated
procedure on how those to be formally solved, the complexity of the negotiation situations
themselves is further strengthened with the complexity of the behavior of the involved
parties. The behavior of the negotiators, led by the preference for certain outcome, is further
determined by their personal characteristics, information at disposal, views and beliefs.
Additionally, the culture to which the negotiator belongs has a high impact on his perceptions
and way of behaving. That makes the negotiations between parties coming from cultures with
different characteristics, in terms of perception of power, individualism vs. collectivism etc.,
even more complex.
The complexity does not imply unrecognizable patterns in the situations/behaviors. The
conclusions derived based on the theoretical approach of this work can be further strengthened
with descriptive approach and practical testing of the concepts. Since many variables are
included, a complex, logically connected experimental process may lead to relevant results.
Maybe better source would be analysis of already conducted negotiations, when the underly-
ing variables that had influence on the problem, the parties’ preferences, motives and interests
are known, so that right assumptions could be derived. The first approach has the imperfect-
tion of being conducted in an artificial environment, which might lead to different actions of
the involved parties, as they do not really aim nor fear loosing something. The complexity of
the latter approach due to unavailability of data is also known. But, certain combination of
both types over the years and within different (cultural and conceptual) frames may lead to
further useful theoretical conclusions. The effort would be worth if those could be further
implemented in the practice and contribute to integrative agreements and efficient resource
allocation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable comments and suggestions from Prof. Dr.
Rudolf Vetschera, University of Vienna, which helped in improving the quality of the paper.
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 Integrative and Distributive Negotiations and Negotiation Behavior 67

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES
Marina Stoshikj holds a master degree in international business
administration from the University of Vienna, School of Business,
Economics and Statistics. She received her bachelor degree in eco-
nomics, specialization in E-Business, from the University “Ss Cyril
and Methodius,” Faculty of Economics-Skopje. Her research interests
include, among others, eBusiness/eServices, Organizational Mana-
gement, Project and Process Management, Strategic Management,
Negotiations, Marketing Management.

Journal of Service Science Research (2014) 6:29-69