1 |Nature of Election and Suffrage: People vs Corral

G.R. No. L-42300             January 31, 1936 And section 2642 provides:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not
vs. entitled so to do, ... shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
AMADEO CORRAL, defendant-appellant. one month nor more than one year and by a fine of not less than one
hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by
ABAD SANTOS, J.: deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office
for a period of not more than four years.
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on
June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court
while laboring under a legal disqualification. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on March 3, 1910,1 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio
based on section 2642, in connection with section 432. of the Revised mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had
Administrative Code. been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the general
elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in election precinct No. 18 of the
Said Section 432 reads as follows: municipality of Davao, Province of Davao.

The following persons shall be disqualified from voting: The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government.
The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred
exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the
and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less
representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was
than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been
limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic
removed by plenary pardon.
ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to embrace
the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the the the generally excluded classes are minors idiots, paupers, and convicts.
United States.
The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons. having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of
such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write. presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base
offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
section who, after failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholding of
the board of inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and a privilege and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.)
revision, that they are incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to
permanent physical disability, present themselves at the hour of voting as Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not
incapacitated, irrespective of whether such incapacity be real or feigned. entitled to vote on June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised
2 |Nature of Election and Suffrage: People vs Corral

Administrative Code which disqualified from voting any person who, since the
13th day of August, 1898, had been sentenced by final judgment to offer not less
than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed
by plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final
judgment to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor, and had not been
granted a plenary pardon.

Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his
offense had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal
voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly
without merit. The disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the
Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and not
having been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and
rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934.

Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant
that the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been
removed at the expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an
erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a
punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed, "for
protection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the
denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long established
administrative practice are against such a view.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.