Ichong vs. Hernandez G.R. NO. L-7995 MAY 31, 1957 Labrador, J.
Ichong vs. Hernandez G.R. NO. L-7995 MAY 31, 1957 Labrador, J.
HERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. L-7995
MAY 31, 1957
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities, particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese
businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to
Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of
the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause. He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.
In response, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in
the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject
embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and
the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are
actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. The
Court answer that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since it finds that the
classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it
cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound
to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the
act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. The Court held that this
was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality.
In substance, it held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise
trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due
process or law clauses of the Bill of Rights.
The rule in general is that aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for
similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in
status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power.
As the Court had already said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and
regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help
bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and
allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the
aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and
emergency.