1)PEOPLE vs.

GODOY, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)

FACTS:

Mia Taha alleged that Danny Godoy, her Physics Teacher, raped her on several occasions. As a
defense, Godoy claims that Mia Taha was his lover and presented a number of witnesses to
testify to such fact. Before the trial, there was an offer of money P30,000 made by the mother
of Godoy for the settlement of the case. Godoy took no part in the offer of compromise.
Furthermore, it was alleged that Godoy offered to marry Taha in order to escape prosecution
by converting to Muslim. The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by Godoy
is an admission of guilt. The RTC of Palawan & Puerto Princesa sentenced Godoy to death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the offer of compromise may be admitted as evidence of an implied admission
of guilt?

HELD:

NO. It has long been held that the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made
under the consciousness of guilt but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was
not in truth an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom. In this case, Godoy took no part in the offer of compromise and the
idea of converting to Muslim was rejected by him because he was already married. These
circumstances show that Godoy did not admit his guilt or attempt to avoid the consequences of
his actions.

2)PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN, 265 SCRA 228 (1996)

FACTS:

Gilda Ambay was on her way home from Anson Department Store where she worked. She
approached the accused if he was taking on passengers in his tricycle. Accused then mounted
his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride, to which she agreed. When she alighted from
the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked away, but after she
had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her accused threatened her. The accused
then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. There the accused
was able to rape her. When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino
Flores Ambray that she was raped by the accused. The incident was reported to the police and
resulted in his capture. Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Piñas Hospital and
issued a medical certificate. She then proceeded to the NBI for a medicolegal examination. Dr.
Valentin Bernales, a medicolegal officer of the NBI, conducted the examination on Gilda. He
opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force applied to her,
while the presence of human spermatozoa in Gilda's genitals indicated recent sexual
intercourse. "Bebey" and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of
Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accused's kumadre, to beg for Gilda's forgiveness for the
accused's sake. The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused's parents, wife,
children and sisterinlaw to Gilda's house. Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she
told them "that should not be tolerated." The Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the parents, wife and relatives asked
for forgiveness as an evidence of accused’s guilt?

HELD:

YES. Despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was "strongly
established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the
finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellant's brief is conspicuously silent thereon.
Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior
knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the
act of his parents, wife, children and sisterinlaw. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasioffense
or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

3)PEOPLE vs. YPARRAGUIRRE, 268 SCRA 35 (1997)

FACTS:

Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape after having carnal knowledge with
Rosita Bacaling. It was established that Rosita Bacaling was a housemaid of appellant and his
wife and one night, while Rosita was cooking porridge, Crispin gave her a white envelope said
to contain medicine for her skin disease. Rosita opened the envelope and counted fifteen (15)
tablets inside. As instructed, Rosita took all the tablets and felt weak and fell down. Suddenly,
she realized that appellant was dragging her to the spouses' bed. She tried to get up but
appellant pushed her down the bed and pointed a hunting knife at her neck. He ordered Rosita
not to move or he would kill her. Then he removed her clothes and went on top of her. He
kissed her face, breasts, stomach and private parts and then entered her. Rosita cried out in
pain but appellant continued entering her. After satisfying his lust, appellant pulled out and
punched Rosita in the stomach.

Rosita did not say a word about the incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres’ for one
month before leaving them to return to her mother's house. Her mother found Rosita in a state
of shock. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer by her mother for examination.
Rosita was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and treatment. After a
week of treatment, Rosita began to talk and revealed that she was raped by appellant. Crispin
pleaded not guilty. The Trial Court however found him guilty.

ISSUE/s:

1. Whether the prosecution evidence is credible? YES.

2. Whether there was a compromise? YES.

HELD:

The prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of Rosita Bacaling, is credible,
reliable and trustworthy. Rosita testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner
and never wavered even on crossexamination and rebuttal. The inconsistencies in her
testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the conclusion that her
testimony was not contrived.

Rosita was a seventeenyear old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the
breadwinner of the family. It is hard to believe that Rosita would fabricate a story of
defloration, open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very
humiliating and compromising situation for no reason at all. Indeed, Rosita's psychological
condition could not have been the product of illmotive and fabrication.

There is also evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, appellant's wife, Mary
Ann Yparraguirre, offered the victim's mother, Merlyn Bacaling, fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Merlyn refused, Mary Ann
increased the offer to twentyfive thousand pesos (P25,000.00). Still Merlyn refused to accept it.
As pointed out by appellant, no criminal complaint had been filed at the time the compromise
offer was made. Nevertheless, the rape incident was already known to appellant's wife. Mary
Ann herself testified that Merlyn told her about it on November 3, 1990, the day when Mary
Ann first offered the money. An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint
be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is
that after committing the crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to
compromise and such offer is proved.

4)US vs. MAQUI, 27 PHIL 97 (1914)

FACTS:

Maqui was convicted by the trail court for the theft of a caraballa and her calf, and sentenced
to imprisonment for a period of five years. Counsel for Maqui contends that the trial court
erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa, the principal witness for the
prosecution; and in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been
made by Maqui, including an offer to compromise the case by the payment of a sum of money.
Counsel likewise contends that evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the
accused should have been excluded on the ground that there is no formal proof in the record
that they were made voluntarily.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court acted correctly in convicting the accused?

RATIO:

YES. The record clearly discloses that the extrajudicial statements were made in the course of
offers to compromise and that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless
these offers to compromise were made in the hope that if accepted he would escape
prosecution.

5)HAWTHORNE vs. ECKERSON CP., 77 f.2D 844 (1935)

FACTS:

The plaintiff was driving her own Marquette automobile and was accompanied by one Addie O.
Kellogg, her partner in an antique furniture business, who was sitting in the driver's seat with
her. As the car was rounding a curve in the highway leading from Middlebury to Brandon, Vt., it
collided with a Chevrolet automobile belonging to the defendant Eckerson Company, and
driven by A. J. Gassett, of Burlington, Vt., one of its traveling salesmen. The plaintiff and Miss
Kellogg were both injured and the Marquette car was damaged to the extent of about $125.
After the plaintiff had put in her case the defendant rested without introducing any proof. The
jury returned a verdict of $4,664.51 for the plaintiff, and from the judgment entered thereon
this appeal was taken.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in permitting the plaintiff to prove settlement by the defendant
for injuries arising out of the accident?

HELD:
YES. Compromises are not in themselves evidence as admissions of liability, and the same rule
applies when they are offered as proof of agency. Wigmore on Evidence, § 1061; Wigmore,
Supp. (1934) p. 460; (citations omitted). It is a quite different matter to allow in evidence
independent statements contained in offers of settlement as admission of liability.

Since, irrespective of any inference arising from the agreement of settlement, there was
uncontroverted proof that Gassett was the agent of the defendant, it may be argued that the
error in admitting evidence of the compromise was not prejudicial, for the judge charged the
jury that the plaintiff could only recover compensatory damages for her personal loss and
injuries. But in the course of the testimony as to the settlement, proof was elicited at the
suggestion of the court itself, that Miss Kellogg had received $4,750 in payment of her claim.
Such evidence might have led the jury to allow the plaintiff a recovery equivalent to that of Miss
Kellogg, the other occupant of the car. It is true that the testimony was only admitted on the
theory that such a substantial payment as $4,750 would not have been made merely to buy
peace and that the making of it, therefore, justified the inference that Gassett was the agent of
defendant and that the latter was responsible for his acts. But the evidence was legally
inadmissible to prove agency, and we cannot say that knowledge by the jury of the amount
paid to Miss Kellogg might not have caused them to take her recovery into account in
estimating the plaintiff's damages.

6)PEOPLE vs. ALEGRE, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)

FACTS:

Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus
Medalla y Cudillan were found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. During the
pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital and
the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed.

Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, was found dead in her bathroom. According to
the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation. Her bedroom was in
"shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were
open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No
witness saw the commission of the crime. However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan
repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product of
compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was
investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any
involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question, they were
attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in using the extrajudicial confessions of Cudillan as
evidence?

HELD:

The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial court was able
to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as
evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla,
under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent
evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his coaccused. It
is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do
not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the
appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their
implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions
to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.

7)PEOPLE vs. RAQUEL, 265 SCRA 248 (1996)

FACTS:

At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the
backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door,
declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband’s lifeless (sic) while a
man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at their window and saw a
man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away. George Jovillano
responded to Juliets plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and
found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the
victims house. He was identified as Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel
were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence. However,
the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately after the shooting
incident. Appellants’ siblings Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel were later apprehended on
different occasions.

Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense. The trial court rendered
judgment finding all accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the extrajudicial statements of accused
Amando Ponce implicating the appellants?

HELD:
YES. A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of
herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of accused
Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said
accused escaped from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged
plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused
which implicates his co-accused. A distinction, obviously, should be made between extrajudicial
and judicial confessions. The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-
examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-
examination and rebuttal.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of
mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers,
neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
8). PEOPLE vs. CABRERA, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)

FACTS:

At about 11:00 in the evening of January 17, 1972 Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, while on a patrol duty, received an instruction from his superior Lt. Carlos Palomares
to proceed immediately to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Manila to investigate an
abandoned person who was found at the North Diversion Road suffering from stab wounds.
This abandoned and wounded person was identified as Luis de la Cruz. Before his death, the
deceased stated and named Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep but did not know
the names of the three men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep.

The next morning, Rosario Cabrera was arrested by the police. She executed an extrajudicial
confession where she pointed to Conrado Villanueva as the mastermind of the robbery. She
claimed that she hired upon his instructions and that the robbery and the killing were done by
Conrado and his two unidentified companions.

The only evidence that would support the judgment of conviction of Conrado was the extra-
judicial confession of his coaccused Rosario Cabrera which was read into the record over the
continuing objection of appellant's counsel. He reiterates his objection when the said extra-
judicial confession was being offered in evidence. Both the counsel for People and Conrado ask
for his acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicialconfession of Cabrera should be taken against Conrado as

evidence of the existence of a conspiracy?

HELD:

NO. The extrajudicial statement of accused Cabrera does point to appellant as the mastermind
and perpetrator, together with two persons whose identities are still unknown, of the killing of
the deceased Luis dela Cruz and the taking of the jeep he was driving. But the said statement is
inadmissible against appellant, who made timely objection.

There is no question that Cabrera's inculpatory statements were made by her during the
investigation. Thus, the said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged
conspiracy between her and appellant, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased
and when she was already in the hands of the authorities. In the absence of any other
evidence against Conrado and the existence of a conspiracy, the judgment must be reversed
and Conrado must be acquitted.
9). PEOPLE vs. HON. YATCO, 97 PHIL 941 (1955)

FACTS:

Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another whose identity is still unknown, were charged
with having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. During the trial, while the
prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the National Bureau of
Investigation, in connection with the making of an extrajudicial confession by Juan Consunji,
counsel for Alfonso Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such
confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other
accused Panganiban.

The Trial Court ordered the exclusion of the evidence on an altogether different ground: that
the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Juan
Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of
such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. The Court further
excluded the confession against Consunji, arguing that that the counsel for people must first
prove the conspiracy through a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as
required by law before the confession can be admitted. The prosecution then moved in writing
for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but the motion was denied. Hence this petition
for certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the extrajudicialconfession of Consunji should be taken against Panganiban as

evidence of the existence of a conspiracy? NO.
2. Whether the extrajudicialconfession of Consunji may be admitted against him? YES.

HELD:

The lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of
the confessions of Juan Consunji. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if
Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his coaccused Panganiban, being
hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being
established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as
evidence of the declarant's own guilt.

Indeed, Sec 12 of Rule 123 provides that: “The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after
the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.” However, this rule
refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises
and in furtherance of its object and not to a confession made long after the conspiracy had
been brought to an end. Additionally, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to
prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them. In fact, the
alleged confessions had not yet even been identified, much less formally offered in evidence.
For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy
between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence.
Suffice it to say that the lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in
evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to
establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the
relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges. Thus, it was premature for the Court to
exclude the evidence completely.

10). PEOPLE vs. SERRANO, 105 PHIL 531 (1959)

FACTS:

In the evening of 16 October 1950, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano alias Piping and
company that they should neutralize Pablo Navarro because he had been prompting people to
call on Senator Pablo Angeles David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre. Eulogio instructed
them to wait for Pablo in the town of Bacolor, lure him to barrio Dolores and kill him. The next
day, they all waited for Pablo at the gambling casino and Chinese stores in the town of Bacolor
where Pablo used to hang around but Pablo did not show up. They finally succeeded in making
contact with Pablo on 20 October when he arrived at the gambling casino. Cenon asked Pablo
for some drinks and suggested that they should go to San Fernando for a "good time," to which
Pablo agreed. Before reaching San Fernando, Cenon suggested that they should instead
proceed to Angeles for the "good time" which Pablo approved. Upon reaching a small road
near the schoolhouse of barrio San Isidro, Cenon told the driver to proceed to barrio Dolores.
There, the group tied, interrogated, shot, and then buried Pablo.

All the members of the group were tried for the murder of Pablo. One of them however,
Anastacio Reyes, was discharged as an accused and testified as a witness for the prosecution.
The statements of Anastacio were admitted by the Court which ruled against all the accused.
The group now contends that the statements of Anastacio cannot be admitted against them.
They opine that it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that
the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a
privy to the conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statements of Anastacio may be admitted against Serrano and the others?
HELD:

YES. The contention does not merit serious consideration because the rule that "The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the coconspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration," applies only to extrajudicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given
on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine the
declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always subject to
grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great
caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.
11). UNITED STATES vs. DELA CRUZ, 12 PHIL. 87 (1908)
FACTS:
At about 10PM on the night of October 30, 1907, a band composed of not less than five
persons, two of whom, the appellants in this case, were armed with revolvers, one with bolo,
and the others with clubs. With threats of violence the band obliged Jimenez and his party to
return to his house and right there and then, Timoteo Dizon, one of the band, went up into the
house with Jimenez, and threatening him with a revolver, demanded P500. Jimenez had no
money, but was compelled to give up his watch, and at that moment, the appellant Pio Yesma
entered the room, and demanded that, if Jimenez would not give the P500, he give at least
whatever money he had. Jimenez insisted that he had no money and the robbers left the
house.
Just before the band encountered, Jimenez and his party, they had captured another resident
of the town, named Delfin Esquivel, who was compelled at the point of a revolver to
accompany them together with Jimenez and his party, and was left downstairs under guard
together with the women to Jimenez’s party, when Jimenez himself was taken upstairs, and
when the band left the house, was thrust inside together with the women, and ordered to stay
there and to make no noise.
A short time thereafter, the Constabulary forces surprises and attacked the band, killing Dizon
and wounding another member of the band. The watch was found upon Dizon’s body, and his
corpse was identified by Jimenez as that of the person who had first gone up into the house and
demanded P500.
The appellants were convicted of the crime of robo en cuadrilla (robbery in an armed band).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting ante-mortem statements made by Timoteo
Dizon in the presence of appellants for the purpose of identifying them and establishing their
participation?
HELD:
YES. The ante-mortem statements admitted by the trial court were an alleged extra-judicial
declaration made by the bandit Timoteo Dizon, a few hours before his death, wherein he
confessed his guilt of the robbery on the night in question, and stated that the appellants were
members of the band. The evidence further discloses that this confession was made to the
provincial fiscal and an officer of the Constabulary. Section 15 of General Orders No. 58,
provides that in all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled to be confronted by,
and to cross-examine the witnesses against him; and while there are some apparent exceptions
to this rule in regard to hearsay testimony, the dying declaration under consideration cannot be
said to fall under any of these so-called exceptions.

12). GARDINER vs. MAGSALIN, 73 PHIL. 114 (1941)

FACTS:
It appears that on October 30, 1940, the herein petitioner, as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Pampanga, filed an information against Catalino Fernandez and the other five(herein
respondents) charging them with having conspired together to kill Gaudencio Vivar, with
evident premeditation.
Upon arraignment Catalino Fernandez pleaded guilty and his five co-accused, not guilty. At the
trial, Catalino was called to testify for the prosecution to narrate to the alleged conspiracy.
Upon timely objection by the defense, the respondent judge did not permit the witness
Catalino to testify against his co-accused, on the ground that he being a conspirator, his act or
declaration is not admissible against his coconspirator until the conspiracy is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration, under Sec 12 rule 123 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, Fiscal Gardiner filed this petition for Mandamus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Catalino Fernandez may testify against his co-accused without violating the res
inter alios acta rule??

HELD:
YES. It is one of the exceptions to the “res inter alios” rule. It refers to an extra-judicial
declaration of a conspirator-not to his testimony by way of direct evidence.
The evidence adduced in court by the conspirators as witnesses are not declarations of
conspirators, but directly testimony to the facts to which they testify. Aside from the discredit
which attaches to them as accomplices, their evidence is entirely competent to establish the
facts to which they testify. The rule for which counsel contends is applicable only when it
sought to introduce extrajudicial declarations and statements of coconspirators.
There is no rule requiring the prosecution to establish a conspiracy in order to permit a witness
to testify what one or all several accused did; and evidence adduced by coconspirators as
witnesses, which is direct evidence of the facts to which they testify, is not within the rule
requiring a conspiracy to be shown as a prerequisite to its admissibility.

13). ALPUERTO vs. PASTOR, 38 PHIL. 785 (1918)

FACTS:

The three parcels of land involved in this case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos. Plaintiff Eladio
Alpuerto (Lleno’s sininlaw) petitioned the lower court to make a declaration against the
defendant Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner of the said lands by
virtue of a contract of sale with right of repurchase executed by Llenos in his (plaintiff) favor.
Defendant Pastor alleged that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought because the
transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired title was simulated and fictitious and
that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as
creditor of Llenos.

The contract of sale with right of repurchase executed (not notarized) by the parties, Llenos and
Alpuerto purports on its face to have been executed on July 3, 1912; but it was not
acknowledged before a notary public until December 3, 1914. It appears that at the time of the
supposed sale to Alpuerto, there was a pending case for collection of a considerable sum of
money, in which Pastor was plaintiff and Llenos was defendant; where on January 27, 1913, or
about six months after the sale took place, judgment in the collection case was rendered in
favor of Pastor, with the properties being levied upon. Despite Alpuerto’s objection on the
ground that he owned the property, the sheriff proceeded with the public sale and the property
was sold to Pastor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pastor, the subsequent, purchaser is a privy or successor in interest of Alpuerto
who is bound by the previous conveyance?
HELD:

YES. According to Article 1225 of the Civil Code, a private document legally recognized shall
have, with regard to those who signed it and their privies (causa habientes), the same force as a
public instrument. The expression “legally recognized” means recognized or acknowledged by
the person or persons executing the document.

Concerning the meaning of the expression “privies”, Manresa has this to say: “The said word
denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also
that of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos and for special purposes;
hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, et., will be privies; in short, he, who, by
succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and
executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and
obligations, is a privy.” Thus, Pastor, the purchaser at public sale must be considered a privy or
successor in interest of the execution debtor and is bound by the instrument, which conveyed
the property to Alpuerto and this from the date of the execution of that instrument as a
private document. Nevertheless, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto
was one in fraud of creditors; the deed of sale with right of repurchase must therefore be
annulled and the property delivered to defendant, Pastor.

14). CITY OF MANILA vs. DEL ROSARIO, 5 PHIL 227 (1905)

FACTS:

This is an action to recover the possession of 2 lots located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona. The
lower court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, City of Manila. During the trial, the
defendant moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
establish the allegation in the complaint. This was however overruled.

Plaintiff presented as evidence the petition presented by Lorenzo del Rosario to the mayor of
Manila and the letter written by him to the municipal board of Manila. Lorenzo admitted the
authenticity of both documents which contain an offer to the municipality of manila to
purchase the land on Calle Clavel. He admitted also that he signed the document on the
misapprehension that the land belonged to the city, but that he had been subsequently
informed by some of the city officials that the land belonged to Cipriano Roco y Vera.

Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from Cipriano Roco y Vera,
the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second document being signed after he had
transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto del Rosario, who took possession of the same and
had it registered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements of Lorenzo del Rosario made in the documents presented are
binding on defendant?

HELD:

NO. They are not binding upon defendant because under section 278 of the code of civil
procedure: where one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act or
omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former only when
made while the latter holds title. In this case, the statements in the documents were made prior
to Lorenzo’s holding of title. Thus, the defendant had a perfect right to ask for the dismissal of
the case on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint.

15). PEOPLE vs. COMPIL, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)

FACTS:

Just before midnight of October 23, 1987, robbers struck MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
which doubled as the dwelling of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The
intruders made their way through the window grills they detached on the second floor where
the bedroom of the Jays were located. Two of the robbers herded the 2 maids of the owners
into the bathroom.

In the investigation, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told operatives of

the WPD that just before the incident that evening while with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso
inside an ownertype jeepney parked near the store, he saw his coworkers Marlo Compil,
Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture shop. Linda confirmed the
information of Bartolome to the police who also learned that the trio who were all from Samar
failed to report to work the day after the incident, and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go
to Tayabas, Quezon to be the baptismal godfather to his sister’s child.

Thus, the WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of deceased, and Jenelyn Valle went to
the parish church in Tayabas to look for Mabini. From there they proceeded to the house of
Lopez who informed them that Mabini and his companions already left the day before, except
Compil who stayed behind.

After being positively identified by Jenelyn as one of the workers, Compil was immediately
frisked and placed under arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless
and was trembling. However, after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated,
Compil readily admitted his guilt and point to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist
from a picture of the baptism of the child of Mabini’s sister. On the way back to Manila, he was
again questioned. He confessed that shortly before midnight of 23 October he was with the
group that robbed MJ Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were
and his participation as a lookout.

The day following his arrest, Compil after conferring with a CLAO lawyer Claroz and in the
presence of his sister, brother and brotherinlaw, executed a sworn statement before Cpl.
Balanay of the WPD admitting his participation. During arraignment, Compil entered a plea of
not guilty and after the prosecution had rested, filed a demurrer to evidence instead of
adducing evidence. The RTC denied his demurrer and instead found him guilty of robbery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Compil’s extrajudicial confession may be admitted?

HELD:

NO. Admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are flawed under the
Constitution and as such they cannot be admitted. Here, it is evident that Compil was
immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas.
He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while
on their way to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three
instances, he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation. In all
those instances, he was not assisted by counsel.

The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of
the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from accused Compil. The operative act, it has been stressed,
is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry
out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the
signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession.

Nevertheless, the court ruled that while the extrajudicial confessions of Compil cannot be
admitted into evidence, there still other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt as such his conviction was still sustained by the Court.

16). PEOPLE vs. WONG CHUEN MING, 256 SCRA 182 (1996

FACTS:
Appellants Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are both British (Hongkong) nationals, who
together with 9 other Malaysian nationals, were charged with unlawfully transporting into the
country shabu. All of the accused pleaded not guilty at their arraignments. All of them arrived in
Manila as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Accused Cheung, an
employee of Select Tours, acted as their tour guide. After passing through and obtaining
clearance from immigration officers at NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim area to
retrieve their respective checkedin baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart and
proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at that time was manned by customs examiner Gomez. He
testified that he instructed the tour group to place their baggages on the examiners table for
inspection. They were directed to hold on to their respective baggages while they wait for their
turn to be examined. Gomez, in the course of examination found brown colored boxes (marked
Alpen Cereals) similar in size to powdered milk boxes in the 3 consecutive baggages that he
inspected. He thus became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter.
Inside, was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez called
Appraiser Palala and Duty Collector Bonifacio.

Bonifacio testified that upon learning about the boxes, she immediately ordered the tour group
to get their baggages and proceed to the district collector’s office. Inside, he found a total of
thirty boxes of Alpen cereals containing the substance. As Gomez pulled out these boxes from
their respective baggages, he bundled the boxes by putting masking tape around them and
handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundles, Bonifacio called out the names
of the accused as listed in the passenger’s manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking
tape placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages.

Capt. Francisco testified that when he conducted a field test shortly after all the boxes were
recovered, the test showed that the substance was indeed “shabu”. Capt. Francisco
immediately informed the 11 accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all of them, as
well as the boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp Crame. There the
accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having identified were
made again to sign on the plastic bags containing the white crystalline substance. The trial court
found all the accused guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1997. Ming and Cheung
now appeals the judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:

NO. The signatures of the accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing
“shabu” are inadmissible in evidence. The accused were never informed of their fundamental
rights during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, they were not
informed of their Miranda rights.
By affixing their signatures on the boxes and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit
admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These
signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extrajudicial confession which is not
sanctioned by the Bill of Rights. They are therefore inadmissible as evidence for any admission
wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.
The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the
“exclusionary rule” because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are
given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

17). PEOPLE vs ALEGRE, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)

FACTS:

Adelina Sajo, a 57 year old spinster, was found dead in her bathroom insider her house. Her
bedroom was in shambles, evidently ransacked. No witness saw the commission of the crime.
Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of
jewelry taken from Adelina. He executed 2 extrajudicial confession, one in Tacloban City where
he was apprehended and the other in Pasay City. In these statements, he admitted his
participation in the killing and robbery of Adelina. He also named his companions in the killing:
Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comaya. These named individuals pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution presented Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City Police who testified that when he
was investigating Cudillan, the latter pointed to Alegre, Comayas and Medalla as his
companions, afterwhich, the pointed individuals only stated at Cudillan and said nothing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged silence of the accused when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as his
companions in the commission of the crime, is an admission of guilt?

HELD:

NO. The silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not
be taken in evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question.

While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence against him as he has a
right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him,
otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. Thus silence of an accused under custody, or
his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime; especially when such
accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be
considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an
inference of acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny the statement would appear
incompatible with the right of an accused against selfincrimination (Miranda v. Arizona).
18). PEOPLE vs. YIP WAI MING, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)

FACTS:

This case involves the crime of murder. Accused Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, who
were engaged to be married, came to Manila on a vacation on July 10, 1993. Hardly a day had
passed when the victim was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. On
the day of the killing, July 11, 1993, the accused was touring Manila while the victim was left in
the hotel room, allegedly because she was not feeling good.

A criminal information was thus lodged against Yip Wai Ming for the slaying of the victim. The
RTC rendered a decision finding that he killed his fiancée before he left for the Manila tour, and
finding him guilty of murder. There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of the victim, only
circumstantial evidence. The evidence upon which the prosecution convinced the trial court of
Yip Wai Ming’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is the testimony of Destresa, the occupant of the
adjacent room where the victim stayed, that she heard a supposedly a faint cry then a thud.
Prior to the death of the victim, her brother, Lam Chi Keung, learned that her life was insured,
with Yip Wai Ming as the beneficiary.

ISSUE:

Whether the confessions of Yip Wai Ming, made during the custodial investigations, as to his
guilt of the crime of murder charged against him, is admissible in evidence?

HELD:

NO. Yip Wai Ming was arrested on July 13, 1993, two days after the killing. There was no
warrant of arrest. Officer Yanquiling testified that there was no warrant and he arrested the
accusedappellant based on "series of circumstantial evidence." He had no personal knowledge
of Yip Wai Ming having committed the crime. Accusedappellant stated that five police officers
at the police station beat him up. They asked him to undress, forced him to lie down on a
bench, sat on his stomach, placed a handkerchief over his face, and poured water and beer over
his face. When he could no longer bear the pain, he admitted the crime charged, participated in
a reenactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his
right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime.

The custodial interrogation of accusedappellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. The Constitution provides that "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible against him." Section 17,
Article III provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Thus, as
stated in People v. Duero, any confession, including a reenactment without admonition of the
right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in
evidence.

This Court notes that accusedappellant did not file any complaint or charges against the police
officers who allegedly tortured him. But he was a foreign national, a tourist charged with a
serious crime, finding himself in strange surroundings. In Hongkong, there would have been
family members and friends who could have given him moral support. He would have known
that he was being questioned in his own country, being investigated under the laws of that
country. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of
a crime he did not commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accusedappellant
states that his lawyers told him not to file any charges against the policemen. He followed their
advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble.

Therefore, the trial court’s decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Yip Wai Ming is acquitted of
the charge of murder on the grounds of reasonable doubt.

19). PEOPLE vs MAQUEDA, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)

FACTS:

In August 27, 1991, Horace Barker was brutally slain while his wife Teresita was battered by
lead pipes in their own home. Evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victim’s former
houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the crime. As to his coconspirators, the prosecution
initially included one Malig in the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical
injuries filed before the RTC. Only Malig was arrested. Prior to his arraignment, the information
was amended to implead Maqueda as coaccused because the evaluation of evidence submitted
establishing his involvement in the crime and drop Malig as coaccused. Maqueda was arrested
and he filed an application for bail. He categorically stated that “he is willing and volunteering
to be a State witness in the case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in
the case”.

During trial, he put up the defense of denial and alibi. In his testimony, Maqueda said that he
while he was in his hometown in Quezon Province, he was arrested by CAFGU members and
was made to sign a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at
Barker’s house. It was alleged by the prosecution that the arresting officers informed Maqueda
of his constitutional rights before making his statement. Subsequently brought to Benguet,
where he was told to cooperate with the police in arresting Salvamante so he would not stay
long in said province. He was also told that if he would point to accused Salvamente, he would
be freed and he could also become a state witness. Maqueda said that all he could attest to was
that he accompanied Salvamonte recently in the selling of a cassette recorder. Instead of
freeing him, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail, where he remained under detention.
The prosecution rebutted Masqueda’s testimony by presenting SPO3 Molleno who declared
that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he was investigated and that he
voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Maqueda’s alleged extrajudicial
confession. The trial court ultimately convicted Maqueda of the crime charged against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sinumpaang Salaysay was an extrajudicial confession?

HELD:

NO. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial

confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of
guilt. The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the
accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent
to commit the offense with which he is charged. A confession is an acknowledgment in express
terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is
something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance
which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt. The trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda
although it was taken without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since
an information had already benefited in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a
warrant of arrest issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken
during custodial investigation.

Hence, Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, which states that “Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel,” is not applicable, i.e., the
police investigation was “no longer within the ambit of a custodial investigation." It heavily
relied on People vs. Ayson where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person under custodial
investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court.

The trial court then held that the admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested
under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of
its execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise,
which he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him.

20). PARKER vs. RANDOLPH, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)

FACTS:

Respondents Randolph, Pickens and Hamilton were convicted, after a joint trial in a Tennessee
court, of murder of Douglas, a professional gambler, committed during the commission of a
robbery. During a game of chance between Douglas and R. Wood, the former kept winning
prompting Wood to grow suspicious. After several lost games, R. Wood was convinced that he
was being cheated. He approached his brother, J. Wood, and they decided to relieve Douglas of
all his illgotten wealth by staging a robbery in an upcoming game. The Wood brothers enlisted
the help of Respondents to carry out the robbery. During the game, Douglas armed himself
with a pistol and a shotgun. In response, J. Wood pulled a pistol on Douglas. He later on gave
said gun to R. Wood and left to tell respondents to move in on the game. However, even before
respondents could arrive, Douglas reached for his pistol and was shot and killed by R. Wood.
When the police came, respondents were apprehended and they confessed their involvement
in the crime.

None of the respondents took the witness stand, and their oral confessions, found by the trial
court to have been freely and voluntarily given, were admitted into evidence through police
officers' testimony. Respondent Pickens' written confession was also admitted into evidence
over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona.
The trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the
defendant who gave it and could not be considered as evidence of a co-defendant's guilt. They
were convicted by the trial court. However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed their
convictions on the ground that that admission of their confessions at the joint trial violated this
Court’s decision in Bruton v. U.S. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the
convictions, holding that admission of respondents' confessions did not violate the rule of
Bruton v. United States, which held that a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a co-
defendant who did not take the stand. It ruled that in this case, the "interlocking inculpatory
confessions" of respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton, "clearly demonstrated the
involvement of each, as to crucial facts such as time, location, felonious activity, and awareness
of the overall plan or scheme." Respondents subsequently obtained writs of habeas corpus in a
Federal District Court, which held that respondents' rights under Bruton had been violated, and
that introduction of respondent Pickens' written confession had violated his rights under
Miranda. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of interlocking confessions with proper limiting instructions
conforms to the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution?

HELD:
YES. Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the incriminating extrajudicial
statements of a nontestifying codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a non-
confessing defendant, adding "substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's
case." Such statements go to the jury untested by crossexamination and, indeed, perhaps
unanswered altogether unless the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and takes
the stand. The prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an incriminated
defendant who has, insofar as the jury is concerned, maintained his innocence from the
beginning is simply too great in such cases to be cured by a limiting instruction. The same
cannot be said, however, when the defendant's own confession "probably the most probative
and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," is properly introduced at trial. The
defendant is "the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past
conduct," and one can scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his defense than his own
admission of guilt. Thus, the incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, be
of the "devastating" character referred to in Bruton when the incriminated defendant has
admitted his own guilt. The right protected by Bruton the "constitutional right of cross-
examination," has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime than
to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's
confession on crossexamination would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose
own admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged. Nor does the natural "motivation
to shift blame onto others," recognized by the Bruton Court to render the incriminating
statements of codefendants "inevitably suspect," require application of the Bruton rule when
the incriminated defendant has corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame
onto himself.

The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment is a safeguard to ensure the
fairness and accuracy of criminal trials, and its reach cannot be divorced from the system of
trial by jury contemplated by the Constitution. A crucial assumption underlying that system is
that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it would
be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an appellate court to
reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed. The Confrontation
Clause has never been held to bar the admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial
statement made by a nontestifying declarant simply because some way incriminates the
defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial
statement only against its source has been found sufficient to avoid offending the confrontation
right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of this Court.

When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen not to take the stand and the
implicated defendant has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions cannot
be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.
Under such circumstances, the "practical and human limitations of the jury system," Bruton v.
United States, supra at, override the theoretically sound premise that a jury will follow the trial
court's instructions. But when the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we
believe that the constitutional scales tip the other way. The possible prejudice resulting from
the failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital" to
the confessing defendant to require departure from the general rule allowing admission of
evidence with limiting instructions.

21). PEOPLE vs. MOLAS, 218 SCRA 473 (1993)

FACTS:

Bernardo Resonable, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 2, 1983, arrived at his
house in Inas, Dobdob, Valencia, Negros Oriental,. He was surprised to find his eight-year-old
son, Abelardo, at the doorway of his house, bathed in his own blood. Abelardo informed his
father that appellant, Josue Molas, was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but also
stabbed his sister Dulcesima and his mother Soledad. Having been informed of the stabbing,
Bernardo looked for his daughter and wife. He found the lifeless body of his daughter Dulce in a
dried carabao mud pool some three (3) arms-lengths from his house. He carried her into the
house and looked for his wife whose corpse he found near the bench by the door of the house.
He ran to report the matter to the barangay captain (Labe) and sought help from the authorities
in the municipal building of Valencia. Meanwhile, Abelardo was brought to the Negros Oriental
Provincial Hospital by his brother Nicolas, who lived in a house on higher ground. Abelardo
expired the next day.

The next morning, after he was informed of his Constitutional rights, Molas refused to give any
statement to the police. However, on March 10, 1983, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, the station
investigator at the Valencia Police Station, took down the sworn statement which Molas freely
and voluntarily gave with the assistance or presence of counsel.

Molas signed his confession before Judge Celso P. Tayrosa of the Municipal Trial Court of
Valencia after the latter and Sgt. Rito Patron, had translated the contents of his affidavit into
the Cebuano dialect. Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as translated.
He signed the document willingly, after which the judge affixed his own signature thereon.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Molas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
three counts of murder.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence against him his extra-
judicial confession which was executed without the assistance of counsel, as required by
the Constitution?
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full faith and credit to the dying
declaration of Abelardo Resonable; and

HELD:
NO. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his
mother and sister was given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding
from stab wounds in his colon and spinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later.
It was indubitably a dying declaration.

To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was
under a consciousness of impending death; (c) that he was a competent witness; and (d) that
his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in
which the declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA
427). All of these circumstances were present when Abelardo made his dying declaration.

While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and
assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission
of the accused established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigation of the accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; People vs.
Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA 249).

The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial
court on October 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which
observed his deportment on the witness stand, found him credible.

Judgement affirmed.

22). U.S vs. PINEDA, 37 PHIL 457 (1918)

FACTS:

Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist and owner of a drug store in Manila. One Feliciano
Santos, having some sick horses, presented to the said drug store a copy of a prescription,
which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results. Santos, under the
belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate, put two of the packages in water and gave the
doses to two of his sick horses. The two horses died shortly afterwards. Santos, took the
remaining packages to Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Pena and Darjuan of the Bureau
found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate.

The two also went to Pineda’s drugstore and asked for potassium chlorate, but was given
barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate is poison, potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a
veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses and found that the death was due to
poisoning.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may admit the testimony of Drs. Pena and Darjuan as to their
purchase of potassium chlorate which turned out to be poison?

HELD:

YES. Although the testimony in substance relates to similar acts of negligence of the accused at
other times, it is admissible where for the purpose is to ascertain defendant’s knowledge and
intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion, performed
similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified and fraudulent
intent may even be established

On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the tendency of a certain testimony
to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is
certain discretion on the part of the trial judge, which a court of error will not interfere with,
unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at
issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action,
which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by
the defendant.

23). PEOPLE vs. IRANG, 64 PHIL 285 (1937)

FACTS:

Benjamin Irang appeals the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. On November
2, 1935, between 7 and 8 pm, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two of
whom were armed with guns and two with bolos went to the house of spouses Perfecto
Melotonoes and Maximiniana Vicente. Perfecto was attacked with bolos and died thereafter.
The wife, who was struck in the face with the butt of a gun, regained consciousness and saw her
husband already dead. Maximiniana, gave money and jewelry to one of the assailants, which
she remembers to have pockmarks and a scar on his eyelid. That same night, the house of
Juana dela Cruz was assaulted by malefactors. All of the assailants had white stripes upon their
faces and dela Cruz noticed one of them had pockmarks and scar on the left eyelid and was
dressed in a maongcolored suit.

With the description made by Maximiniana, the police arrested and presented a group of
suspects. Benjamin Irang was identified by Maximiniana to be the one who struck her. Irang
was also identified by dela Cruz. It was alleged that the accused made an affidavit in Tagalog
wherein he admitted participation in the robbery after being coerced by a certain Fidel Estrella.
The accused denied executing the affidavit, and said that the contents thereof are not true and
that he was maltreated by the soldiers. Accused raised as his defense alibi, saying that at the
time of the commission of the crime, he was in his rice field.

ISSUE:

Whether Irang was identified as one of perpetrators?

HELD:

YES. The victim gave a description of one of the assailants, and on that basis, police presented
appellant three groups of persons. In the third group presented, the victim pointed at the
accused as her assailant. Testimony of dela Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximiana’s testimony
that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded
delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime, as a general rule, is not
admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where
it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged or tends to show his
presence at the scene of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance
connected with a crime.

The court also found that the aforementioned testimonies were corroborated by the admission
of the accused in his affidavit, which the Court found to have been made under oath. The
affidavit cannot be considered to have been made involuntary, therefore, it is admissible
against the person making it. Consequently, the defense of alibi cannot stand as it was
contradicted by the testimony of dela Cruz and the accusedappellant’s own admission.

J. Letrel: Dissent; Justice Letrel was not convinced that appellant has been satisfactorily
identified. The widow referred to the appellant as a man with pockmarks, however a month
later, she testified that she recognized him besides by a scar on his left eyelid. A scar identifies a
man more effectively than mere pockmarks. And J. Letrel does not know why it took the
witness one month to discover this important descriptive detail. Moreover, the assailants were
in disguise when they committed the crime. This makes identification difficult, if not impossible
and probably account for the fact that the widow made no reference to the appellant’s scar in
the beginning.

24). PEOPLE vs. SOLIMAN, 101 PHIL 767 (1957)

FACTS:

At about 2AM of April 29, 1955 , while Ernesto Basa was sleeping in a pushcart along the
sidewalk of Sto. Cristo Street, with Erenesto Balaktaw also sleeping in a box near the pushcart,
Balaktaw was awakened when someone kicked his hand. Balaktaw saw Sofronio Palin and
Geronimo Soliman approach Basa and stabbed him with a balisong. Thereafter, the assailants
ran away. Balaktaw took Basa to a police outpost and reported the incident to Patrolman
Tolentino. They took Basa to North General Hospital where he died on the same day.

During the trial, appellant Soliman testified that prior to the present incident and on several
occasions, the deceased Basa boxed him or beat him up when the former would not give him
money. He also testified that on the night of April 29, 1955, Basa forced Soliman to give him
money and even boxed him; that because Basa had three companions, Soliman pulled out his
knife and they fought in the course of which he stabbed him; that Palin came along and
separated them; that Palin advised him to surrender to the police so he went home and went
to Meisic Station accompanied by his brothers. Appellant Palin merely corroborated the
testimony of his coaccused Soliman. The trial court convicted Soliman and Palin of murder. On
appeal, the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not allowing the defense to prove
that the deceased Basa had a violent, quarrelsome or provocative character.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in not allowing appellants to prove that the deceased had a
violent, quarrelsome or provocative character?

HELD:

NO. While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability
or improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in a crime of murder
where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character
may only be allowed in cases of homicide to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
defensive action was necessary. This rule does not apply to cases of murder.

25). PEOPLE vs. BABIERA, 52 PHIL 97 (1928)

FACTS:

Justo Babiera was the owner of 2 parcels of land in Iloilo. On October 19, 1922 he executed a
contract of sale with the right to repurchase them on or before August 1, 1923, in favour of
Basilio Copreros. The period of repurchase expired, after which Copreros took possession of the
lands and registered his title. That same month, he leased the lands to Severina Haro. In view of
this, Justo Babiera filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the two parcels of land, but
this was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. On several occasions, Justo Babiera
confronted Fermin Bruces, the person plowing the lands for Haro, threatening Bruces and Haro.
On August 21, 1927, while Haro was visiting the lands, he was informed that the day before, the
cow of Clemente Babiera, son of Justo Babiera, was found grazing on that land. At that
moment, Babiera happened to be passing by with Dominga Bores. Haro told Babiera to take
care of his cow in the future and not let it run loose.

In the evening, Haro and his companions were making their way back to town using a torch, as
it was already dark. Haro was walking ahead, while Pedro Tauro followed behind carrying the
torch, followed by Gregorio Torrija and Benito Carreon. Suddenly, Babiera sprang from the
cogon grass and struck Haro with a bolo. Haro turned his head to see who struck him, but got
another blow on his forehead near the right eyebrow. Later, Dominga Bores appeared and held
both knees of the wounded man. Pedro Tauro wanted to come near to help Haro but Clemente
Babiera raised his bolo and kept on brandishing it to warn off everybody. Before the assailants
left, two or three revolver shots were heard. After they left, the companions of Haro went near
him. Haro told them not to fear for he did not feel he was going to die. They took Haro to St.
Paul’s Hospital in the city of Ilo-ilo, where he was examined by Dr. Mariano Arroyo.

In the morning of August 22, 1927, Deputy Fiscal Edmund Piccio took Haro’s sworn statement
relating the occurrence and naming his assailants as Clemente Babiera , and Justo Babiera.
Clemente’s father and Dominga Borres, Clemente’d wife. The sworn statement was ratified
before him on August 27, 1927, when Haro had given up all hope of recovery. The defense tried
to prove that it was Haro and his companions who attacked them after they left Clemente’s cow
grazing in Haro’s land; that when Haro unholstered his revolver, Clemente began slashing
blindly with his bolo in self defense, which resulted in Haro falling down on the ground. The trial
court held them guilty of murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to hold the appellants guilty?

HELD:

YES. The defense contended that Clemente Babiera only acted in selfdefense after Haro
attacked and threatened him with a revolver and fired several shots at him. This, however, was
not proved by evidence. Defense also tried to prove that Haro had a quarrelsome disposition.
However, proof of such disposition must be of his general reputation in the community and not
an isolated and specific acts, such as the accused tried to prove. Thus, the lower court was
correct in not admitting such proof. But even if it was proved by competent evidence that
deceased Haro was of such disposition, it would still not be enough to overthrow the conclusive
proof that it was the accused who treacherously attacked Haro.

26). U.S vs. MERCADO, 26 PHIL 127 (1913)

FACTS:
Defendants Pio Mercado, Tomas Mercado and Catalino Mercado were charged with the crime
of coaccion (coercion) for using force and violence on the person of Claro Mercado to prevent
him from rendering aid to Maria Mateo, who was being maltreated by Santiago Mercado.
During trial, Santiago Mercado was presented as a witness. He was asked how many times had
he been convicted for assault. Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was
impertinent. The judge overruled the objection on the ground that the character of the witness
has an intimate relation with the facts being investigated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in allowing the question to impugn the witness credibility?
HELD:

Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been
called, except by showing a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his general
reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.

In this case, the question propounded by the prosecution neither attempted to show that the
witness made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for honesty, truth or
integrity is bad. Evidence may be presented that the witness had been convicted of a high
crime. However, in this case, the offense Santiago Mercado was convicted of (assault and
battery) is not a high crime. The objection of the defense should have been sustained. Whether
the witness had been convicted of other crimes is of no matter to the present case.

27). UNITED STATES vs. EVANGELISTA, 24 PHIL. 453 (1913)

FACTS:
The accused was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier
attempted to set fire to the same premises.

ISSUE:
Whether or not attempt to set fire the same premises is admissible?

HELD:
YES. While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount
to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in
setting the fire which was charged in the information. Where a person is charged with the
commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed
about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused.

28). BALDRIDGE vs. MAATTHEWS, 378 Pa.566, 106 A.2D 809 (1954)
FACTS:
In this action for criminal conversation the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of
$10,000 composed of $7,500 compensatory and $2,500 punitive damages. The defendant filed
motions for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial, both of which motions the learned court below
refused. The refusal of a new trial was conditioned on the plaintiff's filing a remittitur for so
much of the verdict as was in excess of $5,000. The remittitur was duly filed and judgment was
entered *568 for the plaintiff on the reduced verdict. This appeal by the defendant followed. In
addition to the lower court's refusal of the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v., the
appellant assigns here for error certain of the trial court's rulings on evidence, its refusal of a
number of points for charge and portions of the charge. He also alleges that the plaintiff's
attorney prejudiced the defendant's case by the use of leading questions and by improper
argument to the jury, and that the verdict was excessive.
At trial, the plaintiff, in support of his allegation that his wife and the defendant had stayed
overnight in a hotel tryst, sought to show that they had baggage with them when the defendant
registered himself and companion as "Mr. & Mrs. W.D. Miller". The significance of the baggage
would be in its confirmation of an intended overnight sojourn. To prove the presence of the
baggage, the plaintiff called as a witness the hotel room clerk who was on duty when the
defendant registered. The clerk testified, over the defendant's objection, that the room was not
paid for in advance and that it was the uniform practice of the hotel to require payment in
advance for lodging when the registrant was without luggage. The appellant argues that the
testimony in respect of the hotel's practice was inadmissible since evidence as to how an act
was done on other occasions is irrelevant for the purpose of showing what was done on a
particular occasion. In so contending, the defendant fails to reflect accurately the rationale of
the pertinent principles involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the hotel’s practice, as testified to by its clerk, to require payment in advance
for lodging when the registrant was without luggage?
HELD:
YES. The probative value of a person's habit or custom, as showing what was done on a
particular occasion, is not open to doubt Whether evidence of such usage or habit is admissible
to show what occurred in a specific instance depends on the "invariable regularity" of the usage
or habit. To be admissible the usage must have "sufficient regularity to make it probable that it
would be carried out in every instance or in most instances": Wigmore, loc. cit. supra. In the
present case, it seems clear that the clerk's testimony as to the hotel's usage is such as to come
within the compass of the Wigmore definition.

29). MICHELSON vs. UNITED STATES, 335 U.S. 469 (1948)

FACTS:

In a trial in a federal court for bribery of a federal officer, the defendant admitted the payment,
but claimed that it was induced by the officer, and the case hinged on whether the jury
believed the defendant or the officer. The defendant's character witnesses testified that they
had known the defendant for from 15 to 30 years, and that he had a good reputation for
"honesty and truthfulness" and for "being a law-abiding citizen." In cross-examining them, the
prosecutor was permitted to ask whether they had heard that the accused had been arrested
27 years previously for receiving stolen goods. The trial judge had satisfied himself in the
absence of the jury that the question related to an actual occurrence, and he carefully
instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of this evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution has the right to cross-examine the defendant’s character
witnesses who testified to prove his good reputation?

HELD: 

In the circumstances of this case and in view of the care taken by the trial judge to protect the
rights of the defendant, permitting the prosecutor to ask this question was not reversible error.

The law does not invest the defendant with a presumption of good character; it simply closes
the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution's case in chief.
The defendant may introduce evidence tending to prove his good reputation, but, if he does so,
it throws open the entire subject, and the prosecution may then cross-examine defendant's
witnesses to test their credibility and qualifications, and may also introduce contradictory
evidence.

Both the propriety and abuse of hearsay reputation testimony, on both sides, depend on
numerous and subtle considerations, difficult to detect or appraise from a cold record.
Therefore, rarely and only on clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion, will appellate
courts disturb rulings of trial courts on this subject. In this case, the trial judge was scrupulous
to safeguard the practice against any misuse.
A character witness may be cross-examined as to knowledge of rumors of defendant's prior
arrest, whether or not it culminated in a conviction.

It is not only by comparison with the crime on trial, but by comparison with the reputation
asserted, that a court may judge whether the prior arrest should be made the subject of
inquiry.

That the inquiry concerned an arrest 27 years before the trial did not make its admission an
abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case -- especially since two of the witnesses had
testified that they had known defendant for 30 years, defendant, on direct examination, had
voluntarily called attention to his conviction of a misdemeanor 20 years before, and since no
objection was made on this specific ground.

30). PEOPLE vs. ASINAS, 53 PHIL. 59, MARCH 25, 1959

FACTS:
Canuto Asinas and his brother Eugenio were charged with the crime of Parricide of their father
Aniceto Asinas by and with the aid of Leon Ogacho and Felipe Credo.
The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution, Leon Ogacho (accused) who was
discharged and later became a witness for the prosecution who executed and signed a
confession, is corroborated by the following facts and circumstances: a) Actual possession of
shot guns on the part of the accused Canuto Asinas and Eugenio Asinas; b) The result of the
examination or the autopsy of the body of the deceased made by the health officer Dr. Juan
Rivera; c) The admission on the part of the accused Canuto Asinas that he really ordered Leon
Ogacho and Felipe Credo to tresh abaca in the plantation of Uy Dinto in the sitio Himaanion; d)
Actual existence of enmity between the deceased and the mother of the accused Asinas; e) The
fact that on three occasions the accused Canuto Asinas, once together with the accused
Eugenio Asinas, had attempted or done violence on the body of the deceased; and f) The fact
that the two brothers Canuto and Eugenio has shown cold indifference and lack of any warm
manifestation of filial regard or affection for the deceased upon learning the death of their
father, especially the former, who, upon learning the news, did not go to place unless
accompanied by an old man and a rural policeman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence to the commission of other crimes as tending to prove the guilt of the
defendants is admissible?

HELD:
NO. The general rule is that the evidence is not admissible which shows, or tends to show, that
the accused in the criminal case has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense for
which he is on trial. It is not competent to prove that he committed other crimes of a like
nature for the purpose of showing that he would likely to commit the crime charged in the
indictment. A man may be a notorious criminal, but this fact may not be shown to influence a
jury in passing upon the question of his guilt or innocence for the particular offense for which
he is on trial. To permit proof of other crimes would naturally predispose the minds of the
jurors against the defendant. One who commits one crime may be more likely to commit
another; yet, logically, one crime does not prove another, nor tend to prove another, unless
there is a relation between them that proof of one tends to prove the other. Unless such a
relation exists, it is illegal and manifestly unfair to require a man, who is, charged with specific
crime in the indictment, to prepare a defense against other crimes that the state may prove
against him, but which are not charged in the indictment. The general rule, should therefore, be
strictly enforced in all cases where applicable.

31). NICOLAS vs. ENRIQUEZ, 97 PHIL. 286 (1955

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by Fiscal Nicanor Nicolas to compel the trial court to admit
the preferred evidence of the prosecution. At the trial of a crimona case for concubinage filed
by Rizalby Corazon Viscarra against defendant Jimmy William Nelson and Priscilla Fontanosa,
the court ruled out the testimony of three prosecution witnesses tending to show that a boy
name Paul William Nelson was the son of both defendants. The said testimony was objected to
as immaterial, but the objection was sustained on the ground that inquiry into the paternity of
a natural child is forbidden except in actions for forcible acknowledgement.
Contending that prior sexual relations between the defendants were admissible to show
“propensity” to commit the offense charged or disposition to maintain such relations even after
marriage of one of the defendants to the complainant, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court is correct in denying the proffered evidence?
HELD:
YES. It is a rule of evidence that what one did at one time is no proof of his having done the
same or a similar thing at another time. But the rule is not absolute, for it is subject to the
exceptions enumerated in section 17 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, i.e., it may be received
to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage,
and the like.
The court is not persuaded that the preferred evidence, when viewed in the light of the facts
brought out in the present case, would come under any of the exceptions named. It appears
from the order containing the questioned ruling that the boy named Paul was born five years
before complainant’s marriage to one of the defendants. This means that the previous sexual
relations sought to be proved were far removed in point of time from the illicit act now
complained of, and having, moreover, taken place when there was as yet no legal impediment
to the same, they furnish no rational basis for the inference that they would be continued after
the complainant’s marriage to one of the defendants had created such impediment and made
continuance of sexual relations between the defendants a crime.

32). PEOPLE vs. STEELE, 22 III.2D 142, 174 N.E. 2D 848 (1961)

FACTS:

Robert Jackson testified that about two weeks before December 11, 1958, the defendant had
told him that he could buy narcotics from the defendant and had given him his phone number.
Several narcotics agents were present about 6:30 P.M. on December 11, when Jackson
telephoned the defendant. The defendant was not in, but he returned the call later. Jackson
told him that he wanted to buy an ounce of raw heroin. The defendant said it would cost $400,
and they arranged to meet. Agent Dino listened to the conversation on an extension telephone,
and corroborated Jackson's testimony with respect to it.

Agent Dino testified that he observed the meeting while sitting in a parked automobile and that
he placed the defendant under arrest after the transaction was completed. Stribling testified
that after the defendant was arrested, he denied dealing in narcotics but said that he needed
the money and "When you find a sucker, bump his head." Dino's testimony corroborated this
conversation.

The defendant denied that he had offered to sell narcotics. He testified that he had seen
Jackson several weeks before the arrest, at which time Jackson had complained of being sick
and had asked him if he had any quinine. He went home and got Jackson the quinine. He
testified that he wanted a job, and gave Jackson his phone number so that Jackson could call
him if he learned of anyone who was looking for a doorman or houseman. He also testified that
when he spoke to Jackson on the telephone Jackson asked if he had any more of "the stuff you
gave me the other day," and also requested him to keep some money that Jackson had won
gambling because "I don't want my old lady to know it." He testified that he gave the quinine to
Jackson, but that "the other fellow" gave him the money.

The defendant also contends that the court erred in admitting prejudicial evidence over his
objection. Jackson was the first witness for the prosecution. On direct examination, after he had
given his name and address and had stated that he used narcotics, he was asked, "What kind of
business dealings did you have with the defendant prior to December 11, 1958." Over objection
he was permitted to answer, "Buying narcotics."

ISSUE:

Whether or not evidence of other offenses is admissible if used to show a course of conduct or
prove intent?

HELD:

YES. Evidence of earlier transactions in narcotics supports an inference that those earlier sales
were part of a course of conduct designed to induce the belief that what was now offered for
sale was also a narcotic drug. That evidence also makes it more likely that on the present
occasion the defendant offered to sell narcotics rather than some other substance, and it tends
to show that the defendant knew that what he was selling was not a narcotic drug. The
evidence of other transactions was thus independently relevant apart from its tendency to
show the bad character of the accused, and so its admission was not improper.