G.R. No. 139412.

April 2, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias
"Talino," RONALD CASTILLANO alias "Nono" and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR., alias
"Junjun," accused, RONALD CASTILLANO alias "Nono" and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR.
alias "Junjun," appellants.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the RTC convicting Ronald Castillano and Jaime
Castillano, Jr., for murder.

It was alleged by the prosecution that Luz, wife of the victim Diosdado Volante, heard
voices near their house when she saw Jaime Sr. and his two sons, Jaime Jr. and Ronald on
their way to their house. Luz immediately alerted her husband. Jaime Sr. fired his gun at
Diosdado's house. Terrified, Luz sought cover and hid with her baby daughter. Jaime Jr. and
Ronald, armed with bladed weapons, took turns in stabbing Diosdado. Jaime Sr. fired his
gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. Luz was shocked by the sudden turn of events and
fled to the rice paddies where she hid for a time. When Luz returned, she saw her husband
on the ground in a pool of his own blood.

Judge Tolentino conducted the preliminary examination and thereafter issued an order of
arrest against the Castillanos. On July 1996, Luz gave a sworn statement to the police
investigators.

Upon arraignment, the Castillanos pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Ronald
Castillano admitted that he killed Diosdado but insisted that he acted in self-defense and
that his father and brother had nothing to do with Diosdado's death.

Appellant Jaime Jr. asserts that the testimony of Luz, widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent
with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the MTC and her sworn
statement before the police investigators as well as the testimnoies of SPO1 Fornillos and
SPO4 Javier and the physical evidence on record.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the
testimony of Luz, the prosecution's principal witness, cannot be impeached via her
testimony during the preliminary examination before the municipal trial court nor by her
sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason that the transcripts and
sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor
admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with
her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police
investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported
inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of Luz Volante’s testimony can be impeached.

HELD: NO.

Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence reads: How witness is impeached by
evidence of inconsistent statement. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he
has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness
and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior
statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay
the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the
witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to
explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the
circumstances under which they were made. The Court held in People v. Escosura that the
statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching
her credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and
she was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-
examiner tries to impeach the credibility and truthfulness of a witness via her testimony
during a preliminary examination, this Court outlined the procedure in United States vs.
Baluyot, thus: . . For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain
witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal
materially different from that given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon
the attorney when cross-examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and
to ask him if he did not make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there
make a statement different from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of
such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the witness
has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness
denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the
witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce
the document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of
cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the
practice of the American courts "laying a predicate" for the introduction of contradictory
statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-
examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness;
though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.

In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any
discrepancies between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in
evidence the said transcript and sworn statement for the specific purpose of impeaching
her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so marked and offered in evidence and
accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement cannot be considered by
the court.

The inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants pertained only to minor and collateral
matters and not to the elements of the crime charged; hence, they do not dilute the
probative weight of the testimony. It bears stressing that even the most truthful witness
can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily affect his credibility. The
testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in their entirety and not by
their truncated portions or isolated passages. And then again, minor contradictions among
several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate to the
gravamen of the crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in
impressions, memory, vantage points and other related factors.