Republic v Heirs of Juan Fabio

GR no. 159589
December 23, 2008

Statement of Facts:
On 21 November 1996, respondents, who are the heirs of Juan Fabio, represented by Angelita F. Esteibar
(Esteibar) as their Attorney-in-Fact, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, an application for
registration of title to a lot. The respondents sought the registration of title under the provisions of Act
No. 496 or the Land Registration Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529).
In the application, respondents alleged that they are the owners of the Lot, including all the
improvements, having acquired the same through a bona fide claim of ownership. They declared that they
and their predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the Lot
in the concept of an owner for more than 100 years. They have also submitted several documents to
support their claim of ownership. RTC rendered a decision ordering the registration of the lot in the name
of Juan Fabio. Upon appeal to the CA, the Republic on its part, claimed that the trial court erred in ruling
that respondents have acquired a vested right over the lot. According to one of the witnesses in the trial,
the survey plan submitted by the respondents contained a notation which states that “this survey falls
within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation and disposition hereof shall be subject to the final
delimitation thereof as per Proc. No. 1582-A dated September 6, 1976.”, however, the CA still affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents have acquired a right over the Lot.

Ruling:
No. The letter-certification submitted by the respondents stating that the subject land is alienable and
disposable is insufficient. Conlu is merely a land investigator of the DENR. It is not enough that he alone
should certify that the Lot is within the alienable and disposable zone. Under Section 6 of the Public Land
Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain belongs to the President.
The President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to
be included or excluded from the public domain. The DENR Secretary is the only other public official
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.
Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and
subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot for taxation purposes, or even earlier when
respondents’ predecessors-in- interest possessed the Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from
the time of its declaration as a military reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the Lot is alienable and disposable.
In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot was already classified as alienable and
disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to
registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073.
Hence, there is no need to discuss the other requisites dealing with respondents’ occupation and
possession of the Lot in the concept of an owner.

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v Republic

GR no. 179987
April 29, 2009

Statement of Facts:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to
the judicial confirmation of his title.
The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to
the CA, which reversed the RTC Judgment.
Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petition was denied.
Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
 
Ruling:
No. Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character
and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property
even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

Spouses Fortuna v Republic of the Philippines

GR no. 173423
March 05, 2014
 

Statement of Facts:
In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square meter land
identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed
with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been
in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and
submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of assessment.
In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of the spouses
Fortuna.
In its decision dated May 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Although it found
that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land, they failed
to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945.
Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.
They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land
Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by requiring 30
years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title over an
agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and
instead required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced by PD No.
1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published on May 9,
1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the
Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., they allege that PD No. 1073 and the PRD
should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates,
they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because
Pastora’s possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942 is applicable for registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as
Lot No. 4457 in favor of the spouses Fortuna.

Ruling:
No. The petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED insofar as these
dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna’s application of registration of title.

Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that “[the] Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation,” the
Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that the publication of laws is an
indispensable requirement for its effectivity. “[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.” Accordingly, Section 6 of PD
No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9,
1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove
that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least
30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947. The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove that they possessed Lot
No. 4457 since May 8, 1947. Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of title would
still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.
 Valiao v Republic
GR no. 170757
November 28, 2011
 
Statement of Facts:
 The petitioners (Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea) filed with the
RTC of Kabankalan an application of a parcel of land with an area of 504, 535 square meters in Barrio
Galicia, Ilog, Negros Occidental under the conditions of PD 1529. They claim that they have acquired the
property in 1947 after the death of their uncle Basilio Milliarez who purchased the land from Fermin
Payogao through a Deed of Sale dated May 19, 1916, entirely handwritten in Spanish. Upon their uncle’s
death, they have possessed the land until 1966 when oppositor Macario Zafra disposed them of their
property compelling them to file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against him. The
petitioners submitted a Tax Declaration No. 9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the
heirs of Basilio Millarez. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision to grant the petitioner’s
application for registration.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
2. Whether or not they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation under a claim of ownership.

Ruling:
No. The petitioners failed to prove that the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is
beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.  To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.
In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government.
The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier. There is nothing in the records that would substantiate petitioners’ claim
that Basilio was in possession of the property during the period of possession required by law.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would actually exercise over his own property. As regards petitioners’ possession of the land in question
from 1947 to 1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29,
1976.  At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date.
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
land when not supported for other evidence. It does not necessarily prove ownership.

Republic of the Philippines v Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista

GR no. L-13687
November 29, 1963

Statement of Facts:
This is an appeal certified by the Court of Appeals to this Court, because in its opinion "the only purpose
of the instant appeal is to question the propriety of the lower court's order denying the petition to review
on the grounds alleged therein," which is purely a question of law, the review of which falls exclusively
within the jurisdiction this Court.
It appears that on 6 November 1951, in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan the spouses Segundo
Sioson Pascuala Bautista filed an application for registration four (4) parcels of land situated in barrio San
Roque, municipality of Paombong, province of Bulacan, delimited in plan Psu-12152, attached to their
application, of which the claimed to be the owners in fee simple.
On 20 March 1951, the Director of Lands filed an opposition to one of the parcels of land the registration
which was applied for stating (a) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest had
sufficient title to the said parcel of land, the same not having been a acquired either by composition title
from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894; (b) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors in interest have possesses the land openly,
continuously, publicly, adversely and under bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894; all (e) that
the said parcel of land sought to be registered is a part of the public domain and as such belong to the
Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents have complied all the necessary requirements under section 14 (1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 to acquire the said subject parcel of land.

Ruling:
No. The respondents have not complied with the necessary requirements, two (2) errors claimed to have
been committed by the lower court, to wit:
I
The trial court erred in holding that no extrinsic or collateral fraud had been committed by the
respondents-appellees in collusion with others, against the petitioner-appellant republic of the Philippines,
in effecting the registration of a portion of the land subject matter of the instant case.
II
The trial court therefore erred in dismissing the petition at bar without affording an opportunity to the
petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence in support of the same.
The petition for review is predicated on actual and extrinsic fraud committed by the respondents, then
applicant, and was filed within a year from the entry of the decree. Without hearing the evidence in
support of the allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the respondents
the Court below denied the petition. This is an error.
 Central Mindanao University v Republic of the Philippines
GR no. 195026
February 22, 2016

Statement of Facts:
Petitioner Central Mindanao University is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the
State. The subjects of the controversy are two parcels of land which was taken possession by the
university in 1946 and started constructing the school site upon the confirmation of the Secretary of
Public Instruction.

On January 16, 1958, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476 which reserved certain
portions of the public domain for petitioner CMU’s site purposes. On 1960, the Director of Lands
Castrilio formally requested the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that he be authorized
under Section 87 of C.A. No. 141 to file a compulsory registration of the parcels of land reserved by
President Garcia. With this, the President (Office of the President) authorized and directed the Director of
Lands to file the necessary petition in the CFI of Bukidnon for the compulsory registration.
The cadastral court in 1971, declared the subject parcels of land public and reserved to CMU, and ordered
the registration of the land to CMU. On 2003, the Republic filed before the CA a petition for annulment
of the decision of the cadastral court granting in favor of CMU the title to the subject parcels of land. It
argued that the court should have dismissed the registration proceeding because the lands are inalienable
lands of public domain.
The CA ruled in favor of Republic. CA ruled that there is no sufficient act of the government, such as
presidential proclamation which declared the land of the public domain alienable and disposable.
According to CA, CMU was unable to prove that the subject land ceased to have the status of a
reservation.

Issue:
Whether or not the parcels of land are considered alienable and disposable considering that issuance of
PD476 and the order of the compulsory registration by the Office of the President.

Ruling:
The lands are still inalienable lands of public domain. To prove land is alienable, the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action etc declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established. Proclamation No. 476 were
issued for the reservation of school site for CMU. It was pursuant to Section 83 of CA 141. And
according to the said Act in Section 88: The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section
83, shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other disposition until
again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by Proclamation of the President. In the case
of Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. v. Republic, 50 it was held that parcels of land classified as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-disposable in view of Section
88 (in relation with Section 8) of C.A. No. 141, specifically declaring them as non-alienable and not
subject to disposition; and (2) they remain public domain lands until they are actually disposed of in favor
of private persons. 51 In other words, lands of the public domain classified as reservations remain to be
property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public or quasi-public use for which they have
been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to
have been converted to patrimonial property.
In the case at bar, CMU was not able to prove that there was a positive act from the government making
the property an alienable one. And for lack of proof, the said lands remain part of the inalienable public
domain, thus they are not registrable in the Torrens System.

Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v Republic of the Philippines

 GR no. 177168
August 03, 2015

Statement of Facts:
A Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) issued in Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc (NOVAI)’s name
covers a land situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation in Taguig. This
property was previously a part of a larger parcel of land which TCT’s under the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
The then President Garcia issued a Proclamation No. 423 which reserves for military purposes certain
parcels of the public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Rizal and Pasay City. Thereafter, then
President Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461 which excluded Fort McKinley a certain portion of
land situated in the provinces abovementioned and declared them as AFP Officers’ Village to be
disposed of under the provisions of certain laws. However, this area was subsequently reserved for
veterans’ rehabilitation, medicare and training center sites.
The property was the subject of deed of sale between the Republic and NOVAI to which the TCT was
registered in favour of the latter. The Republic then sought to cancel NOVAI’s title on the ground that the
property was still part of the military reservation thus inalienable land of the public domain and cannot be
the subject of sale. The RTC ruled that the property was alienable and disposable in character. The Court
of Appeals reversed RTC’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the property covered by TCT issued under the name of NOVAI is inalienable land of
public domain and cannot be the subject of sale.

Ruling:
Yes, the property remains a part of the public domain that could not have been validly disposed of in
NOVAI’s favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that the property was not intended for
public or quasi-public use or purpose.
The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain are governed by Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, the country's primary law on the matter.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to time, classify
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and transfer these lands
from one class to another for purposes of their administration and disposition.
In a limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section
9 (d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the general
classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific
declaration under Section 88, in relation with Section 8, these lands classified as reservations are non-
alienable and non-disposable.
As provided in Article 420 of Civil Code, “property of the public dominion as those which are intended
for public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended for some public
service”. In this case, the property was classified as military reservation thus, remained to be property of
the public dominion until withdrawn from the public use for which they have been reserved, by act of
Congress or by proclamation of the President. Since there was no positive act from the government, the
property had to retain its inalienable and non-disposable character. It cannot therefore, be subject of sale
otherwise, the sale is void for being contrary to law.

Heirs of Jose Amunategui v Director of Forestry

GR no. L-27873
November 29, 1983

Statement of Facts:
Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No. L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration.
In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the
application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of
Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names
of said Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also
filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp
which was still classified as forest land and part of the public domain.
Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square
meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

Issues:
Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of registration in the names of the private
applicants.

Ruling:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

It does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
"forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of
forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas
(56SCRA 499), SC granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab
initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

Republic of the Philippines, Benguet and Atok v Court of Appeals and De La Rosa
GR no. L-43938
April 15, 1988

Statement of Facts: 
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by
Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo.
The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-
225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children
by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land
by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the
Liberation.

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September
1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of
adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side
cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and
Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January
2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators
on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels,
and its payment of annual taxes thereon.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims
of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other
words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same
time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet
and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.

Issue: 
Whether respondent court’s decision, i.e. “the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim,” is
correct.

Ruling:
No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at
the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents
by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest
land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already
vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the
Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those
agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim
converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public
domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the
land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did,
to Benguet and Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no conflict of interest”
between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine,
for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the
land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title.
This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the
mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of
the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in
public and even private land devoted to “agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any
purpose other than mining.” Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be
used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once
minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private
party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining
operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

Republic of The Philippines v CA and Republic Real Estate Corporation

GR no. 103882
November 25, 1998

Statement of Facts:
RA No. 1899 which was approved on June 22, 1957 authorized the reclamation of foreshore lands by
chartered cities and municipalities. Invoking RA 1899, the Pasay City passed Ordinance No. 121 for the
reclamation of 300 hectares of foreshore lands along the seaside in Pasay City. The Ordinance was
amended authorizing Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City
under certain terms and conditions.

Republic of the Philippines filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages questioning
subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC on the grounds that the subject-matter of such
Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899 and
the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding. It alleged that that what Pasay City has are
submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of
the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National Park,
known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954, pursuant
to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, continuous and peaceful possession since
time immemorial.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ordinance passed by Pasay City is valid.

Ruling:
No. Foreshore land does not include submerged areas. Foreshore lands refers to the strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide.

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning, much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged
areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands".

The subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the
Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
 Chavez v PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation
GR no. 133250
July 09, 2002

Statement of Facts:
Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a wholly government-owned and –controlled corporation which is the
primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of
the public domain. By virtue of a Special Patent issued by President Corazon Aquino, the Register of
Deeds of the Paranaque, in April 1988, issued certificates of title, in the name of PEA, covering three
reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Paranaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of 157.841 hectares.

In April 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to
develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of
submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan
of the Southern Reclamation Project-Manila Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project. The JVA was
later amended giving AMARI an option to reclaim an additional 350 hectares of submerged area. Part of
the consideration for AMARI’s work is the conveyance of 70% of the total net usable reclaimed area –
equivalent to 367.5 hectares, title of which will be in AMARI’s name.

Issue:
Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5
hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay

Ruling:
No. AMARI as a private corporation cannot acquire the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though alienable
lands of the public domain, except by lease, as provided under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
The still submerged areas (i.e., the more or less additional 250 and 350 hectares of submerged areas) in
Manila Bay are inalienable lands of the public domain; as such, they are beyond the commerce of man, as
provided under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

The reclaimed Freedom Islands: The assignment to PEA of the ownership and administration of the
reclaimed areas in Manila Bay, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. They also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service.  The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.

The submerged areas: The mere reclamation of foreshore and submerged areas by PEA does not convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be
classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

PEA’s authority to sell: In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of
the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands, in view of the
requirement under CA No. 141. Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. PEA’s Charter grants it such
express legislative authority to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

Registration of alienable lands of the public domain: Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No.
1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the land.  Registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized
modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration.  The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. Jurisprudence holding that upon the
grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain
automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.

Lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial
lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws. Several laws
authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD
No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. For instance,

Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, private property purchased by the National Government
for expansion of an airport may be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the
airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may
likewise be titled in the name of the municipality.  All these properties become properties of the public
domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no
requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.

Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become
unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the
Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of title covering such
expropriated lands.

Collado v CA
GR no. 107764
October 04, 2002

Statement of Facts:
Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land
with an approximate area of 120.0766 hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to the application was the
technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge
of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which stated, "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed." Then petitioner Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.
Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of Antipolo, through
its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application.

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been
open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando
Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have registrable title over the lot.

Ruling:
No. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources belong to
the State. Watersheds are considered natural resources which are not susceptible of occupancy,
disposition, conveyance or alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State.

Republic of The Philippines v Southside Homeowners Association Inc.

GR no. 156951
September 22, 2006

Statement of Facts:
The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total
area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where,
military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been
occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP.

Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers.
Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title –
Transfer Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale
purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI.The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was
P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land
scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the examination
undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported signatures in the
document are forgeries.

On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and
the title acquired by the Navy Officer’s Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the
reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig City
the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI,
purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB of (i) the
application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question
is inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale
dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then defendant
SHAI adopted Exhibits "A" and “B” as its Exhibits "1" and “2,” respectively.

During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino
who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit “A” is a
forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document and denied
ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises.
Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a
reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the LMB’s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first
place.

For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector
Redencion Caimbon who testified that Palad’s signature in Exhibit “A” is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos,
then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were signed and then filed
with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full of the contract price.

Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
Republic’s complaint as it considered the parcels covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the
FBMR. Therefrom, the Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not JUSMAG area is inalienable and therefore cannot be subject of a lawful private
conveyance.

Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having
not effectively been separated from the military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable.

The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus
reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again declared
alienable. Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like
the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land.
And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone
and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a
military reservation remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a military camp
or for defense. The same is true in this case.
 
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part of
the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI
would categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that “subject land is
within military reservation,”and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the
government and therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se its own evidence themselves
belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described the property as
situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a
military reservation.
 
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the
process, it has invariably invited attention to the proclamation’s specific area coverage to prove the nullity
of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered inalienable, and hence,
beyond the commerce of man.

The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not
plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And
private respondent SHAI’s unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the
transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized that the
Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
 
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of
the supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.

Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.

The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the
authenticity of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is spurious.

1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert
corroborated Palad’s allegation on forgery.Respondent SHAI’s expert witness from the PNP, however,
disputes the NBI’s findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP cancel each other out.

2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes,
Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig
City to appear before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal Registry and there
stamped “Received” by the entry clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991to be
precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other words, the whole conveyance and registration process was
done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head,
while in the exercise of his functions as the bureau’s authorized contracting officer, has to repair to
another city just to have a deed notarized.

3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to purchase required under Section
89 of the Public Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale and of documents usually
accompanying an application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the property valuation.
The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by
Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the
trial court attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then Chief, Land Utilization and
Disposition Division, LMB, testified having personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no
entry pertaining to SHAI.

4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the “deed of sale specifically meritorious
Official Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full payment of the agreed purchase price” An official
receipt (O.R.) is doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to O.R. No.
6030203 as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt in evidence. We
can thus validly presume that no such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to
SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document as paid has, in fact, never been
paid.
 
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the
LMB the corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit
plausible, SHAI’s witnesses’ account taxes credulity to the limit. 

TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such Deed are declared void and
cancelled.