CS155: Computer Security

Isolation

The confinement
principle
Dan Boneh
 Running untrusted code
We often need to run buggy/unstrusted code:
– programs from untrusted Internet sites:
• desktop and mobile apps, Javascript, browser extensions

– exposed applications: browser, pdf viewer, outlook

– legacy daemons: sendmail, bind

– honeypots

Goal: if application “misbehaves” ⇒ kill it

Dan Boneh
 Approach: confinement
Confinement: ensure misbehaving app cannot harm rest of system

Can be implemented at many levels:

– Hardware: run application on isolated hw (air gap)

app 1 app 2

Network 2 air gap network 1

⇒ difficult to manage
Dan Boneh
 Approach: confinement
Confinement: ensure misbehaving app cannot harm rest of system

Can be implemented at many levels:

– Virtual machines: isolate OS’s on a single machine

app1 app2

OS1 OS2

Virtual Machine Monitor (hypervisor)

Hardware
Dan Boneh
 Approach: confinement
Confinement: ensure misbehaving app cannot harm rest of system

Can be implemented at many levels:

– Process: System Call Interposition
Isolate a process in a single operating system

process 1
process 2

Operating System
Dan Boneh
 Approach: confinement
Confinement: ensure misbehaving app cannot harm rest of system

Can be implemented at many levels:

– Threads: Software Fault Isolation (SFI)
• Isolating threads sharing same address space

– Application level confinement:

e.g. browser sandbox for Javascript and WebAssembly

Dan Boneh
 Implementing confinement
Key component: reference monitor
– Mediates requests from applications
• Enforces confinement
• Implements a specified protection policy
– Must always be invoked:
• Every application request must be mediated
– Tamperproof:
• Reference monitor cannot be killed
… or if killed, then monitored process is killed too
– Small enough to be analyzed and validated Dan Boneh
 A old example: chroot
To use do: (must be root)
chroot /tmp/guest root dir “/” is now “/tmp/guest”
su guest EUID set to “guest”

Now “/tmp/guest” is added to every file system accesses:

fopen(“/etc/passwd”, “r”) ⇒
fopen(“/tmp/guest/etc/passwd” , “r”)
⇒ application (e.g., web server) cannot access files outside of jail
Dan Boneh
 Jailkit
Problem: all utility progs (ls, ps, vi) must live inside jail
jailkit: auto builds files, libs, and dirs needed in jail env
• jk_init: creates jail environment
• jk_check: checks jail env for security problems
• checks for any modified programs,
• checks for world writable directories, etc.
• jk_lsh: restricted shell to be used inside jail
note: simple chroot jail does not limit network access
Dan Boneh
 Escaping from jails
Early escapes: relative paths
fopen( “../../etc/passwd”, “r”) ⇒
fopen(“/tmp/guest/../../etc/passwd”, “r”)

chroot should only be executable by root.

– otherwise jailed app can do:
• create dummy file “/aaa/etc/passwd”
• run chroot “/aaa”
• run su root to become root
(bug in Ultrix 4.0)
Dan Boneh
Many ways to escape jail as root
• Create device that lets you access raw disk

• Send signals to non chrooted process

• Reboot system

• Bind to privileged ports

Dan Boneh
 Freebsd jail
Stronger mechanism than simple chroot

To run: jail jail-path hostname IP-addr cmd

– calls hardened chroot (no “../../” escape)
– can only bind to sockets with specified IP address
and authorized ports
– can only communicate with processes inside jail
– root is limited, e.g. cannot load kernel modules
Dan Boneh
 Problems with chroot and jail
Coarse policies:
– All or nothing access to parts of file system
– Inappropriate for apps like a web browser
• Needs read access to files outside jail
(e.g., for sending attachments in Gmail)

Does not prevent malicious apps from:

– Accessing network and messing with other machines
– Trying to crash host OS
Dan Boneh
 Isolation

System Call Interposition:

sanboxing a process

Dan Boneh
 System call interposition
Observation: to damage host system (e.g. persistent changes)
app must make system calls:
– To delete/overwrite files: unlink, open, write
– To do network attacks: socket, bind, connect, send

Idea: monitor app’s system calls and block unauthorized calls

Implementation options:
– Completely kernel space (e.g., Linux seccomp)
– Completely user space (e.g., program shepherding)
– Hybrid (e.g., Systrace)
Dan Boneh
 Early implementation (Janus) [GWTB’96]

Linux ptrace: process tracing

process calls: ptrace (… , pid_t pid , …)
and wakes up when pid makes sys call.
user space
monitored
application monitor
(browser)

fopen(“/etc/passwd”, “r”)
OS Kernel
Monitor kills application if request is disallowed
Dan Boneh
 Example policy
Sample policy file (e.g., for PDF reader)

path allow /tmp/*

path deny /etc/passwd
network deny all

Manually specifying policy for an app can be difficult:

– Recommended default policies are available
… can be made more restrictive as needed.
Dan Boneh
 Complications cd(“/tmp”)
open(“passwd”, “r”)
• If app forks, monitor must also fork
cd(“/etc”)
– forked monitor monitors forked app open(“passwd”, “r”)

• If monitor crashes, app must be killed

• Monitor must maintain all OS state associated with app

– current-working-dir (CWD), UID, EUID, GID
– When app does “cd path” monitor must update its CWD
• otherwise: relative path requests interpreted incorrectly
Dan Boneh
 Problems with ptrace
Ptrace is not well suited for this application:
– Trace all system calls or none
inefficient: no need to trace “close” system call
– Monitor cannot abort sys-call without killing app

Security problems: race conditions

– Example: symlink: me ⟶ mydata.dat
proc 1: open(“me”)
time

monitor checks and authorizes

proc 2: me ⟶ /etc/passwd
not atomic
OS executes open(“me”)
Classic TOCTOU bug: time-of-check / time-of-use Dan Boneh
 SCI in Linux: seccomp-bpf
Seccomp-BPF: Linux kernel facility used to filter process sys calls
• Sys-call filter written in the BPF language (use BPFC compiler)
• Used in Chromium, in Docker containers, …

Chrome renderer
process starts
… Renderer process
renders site
user space

prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, due to exploit:

&bpf_policy) fopen(“/etc/passwd”, “r”)

seccomp-bpf run BPF program … kill process

OS Kernel
Dan Boneh
 BPF filters (policy programs)
Process can install multiple BPF filters:
– once installed, filter cannot be removed (all run on every syscall)
– if program forks, child inherits all filters
– if program calls execve, all filters are preserved

BPF filter input: syscall number, syscall args., arch. (x86 or ARM)
Filter returns one of:
– SECCOMP_RET_KILL: kill process
– SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: return specified error to caller
– SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: allow syscall
Dan Boneh
Installing a BPF filter
• Must be called before setting BPF filter.
• Ensures set-UID, set-GID ignored on subequent execve()
⇒ attacker cannot elevate privilege

int main (int argc , char **argv ) {

prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS , 1);
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &bpf_policy)
fopen(“file.txt", “w”);
printf(“… will not be printed. \n” ); Kill if call open() for write
}
Dan Boneh
Docker: isolating containers using seccomp-bpf
containers

Container: process level isolation

• Container prevented from

App 1

App 2

App 3
making sys calls filtered by
secomp-BPF Docker engine
host OS
• Whoever starts container hardware
can specify BPF policy
– default policy blocks many syscalls, including ptrace
Dan Boneh
 Docker sys call filtering
Run nginx container with a specific filter called filter.json:
$ docker run --security-opt seccomp=filter.json nginx

Example filter:
“defaultAction”: “SCMP_ACT_ERRNO”, // deny by default
“syscalls”: [
{ "names": ["accept”], // sys-call name
"action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW", // allow (whitelist)
"args": [ ] } , // what args to allow
…
]
Dan Boneh
Ostia: SCI with minimal kernel support
Monitored app disallowed from making monitored sys calls
– Minimal kernel change (… but app can call close() itself )

Sys-call delegated to an agent that decides if call is allowed

– Can be done without changing app … using a libc stub

⇒ Incorrect state syncing will not result in policy violation

monitored user space
application
agent
libc policy file
fopen(“/etc/passwd”, “r”) for app

OS Kernel
Dan Boneh
 Isolation

Isolation via
Virtual Machines

Dan Boneh
 Virtual Machines
VM2 VM1
Apps Apps

Guest OS 2 Guest OS 1
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM, hypervisor)
Host OS
Hardware
Example: NSA NetTop
single HW platform used for both classified and unclassified data
Dan Boneh
 Why so popular now?
VMs in the 1960’s:
– Few computers, lots of users
– VMs allow many users to shares a single computer

VMs 1970’s – 2000: non-existent

VMs since 2000:

– Too many computers, too few users
• Print server, Mail server, Web server, File server, Database , …
– VMs heavily used in private and public clouds
Dan Boneh
 Hypervisor security assumption
Hypervisor Security assumption:
– Malware can infect guest OS and guest apps
– But malware cannot escape from the infected VM
• Cannot infect host OS
• Cannot infect other VMs on the same hardware

Requires that hypervisor protect itself and is not buggy

• (some) hypervisors are much simpler than a full OS
Dan Boneh
 Problem: covert channels
Covert channel: unintended communication channel between
isolated components
– Can leak classified data from secure component
to public component

Classified VM Public VM
malware

secret
covert
doc listener
channel

hypervisor
Dan Boneh
 An example covert channel
Both VMs use the same underlying hardware

To send a bit b ∈ {0,1} malware does:

– b= 1: at 1:00am do CPU intensive calculation
– b= 0: at 1:00am do nothing

At 1:00am listener does CPU intensive calc. and measures completion time
b=1 ⇒ completion-time > threshold

Many covert channels exist in running system:

– File lock status, cache contents, interrupts, …
– Difficult to eliminate all
Dan Boneh
 VM isolation in practice: cloud
VM instance VM instance
customer 1 customer 2

Guest OS Guest OS
Xen hypervisor
Hardware
Type 1 hypervisor:
VMs from different customers may run on the same machine no host OS
• Hypervisor must isolate VMs … but some info leaks
Dan Boneh
 VM isolation in practice: end-user
Qubes OS: a desktop/laptop OS where everything is a VM
• Runs on top of the Xen hypervisor
• Access to peripherals (mic, camera, usb, …) controlled by VMs

Disposable VM Work VM Personal VM

sketchy PDF:

Debian OS Windows OS Debian OS

Xen hypervisor
Hardware
Dan Boneh
 VM isolation in practice: end-user
Qubes OS: a desktop/laptop OS where everything is a VM
• Runs on top of the Xen hypervisor
• Access to peripherals (mic, camera, usb, …) controlled by VMs

Vault VM Work VM Whonix VM

Personal VM
Pwd/U2F Manager Force all traffic through Tor

Debian OS Windows OS Debian OS

Xen hypervisor
Hardware
Dan Boneh
Every window frame identifies VM source

GUI VM ensures frames are drawn correctly

Dan Boneh
 Hypervisor detection
Can an OS detect it is running on top of a hypervisor?

Applications:

– Malware can detect hypervisor

• refuse to run to avoid reverse engineering

– Software that binds to hardware can refuse to run in VM

– DRM systems may refuse to run on top of hypervisor

Dan Boneh
Hypervisor detection

Dan Boneh
 Hypervisor detection (red pill techniques)
• VM platforms often emulate simple hardware
– VMWare emulates an ancient i440bx chipset
… but report 8GB RAM, dual CPUs, etc.

• Hypervisor introduces time latency variances

– Memory cache behavior differs in presence of hypervisor
– Results in relative time variations for any two operations

• Hypervisor shares the TLB with GuestOS

– GuestOS can detect reduced TLB size

• … and many more methods [GAWF’07] Dan Boneh

 Hypervisor detection in the browser [HBBP’14]

Can we identify malware web sites?

• Approach: crawl web,
load pages in a browser running in a VM,
look for pages that damage VM

• The problem: Web page can detect it is running in a VM

How? Using timing variations in writing to screen
• Malware in web page becomes benign when in a VM
⇒ evade detection
Dan Boneh
 Hypervisor detection
Bottom line: The perfect hypervisor does not exist

Hypervisors today focus on:

Compatibility: ensure off the shelf software works
Performance: minimize virtualization overhead

• VMMs do not provide transparency

– Anomalies reveal existence of hypervisor

Dan Boneh
 Isolation

Software Fault Isolation:

isolating threads

Dan Boneh
 Software Fault Isolation [Whabe et al., 1993]

Goal: confine apps running in same address space

– Kernel module should not corrupt kernel
– Native libraries should not corrupt JVM

Simple solution: runs apps in separate address spaces

– Problem: slow if apps communicate frequently
• requires context switch per message

Dan Boneh
 Software Fault Isolation
SFI approach: Partition process memory into segments

code data code data

segment segment segment segment

app #1 app #2

• Locate unsafe instructions: jmp, load, store

– At compile time, add guards before unsafe instructions
– When loading code, ensure all guards are present
Dan Boneh
 Segment matching technique
• Designed for MIPS processor. Many registers available.
Guard ensures code does not
• dr1, dr2: dedicated registers not used by binary
load data from another segment
– compiler pretends these registers don’t exist
– dr2 contains segment ID
• Indirect load instruction R12 ⟵ [R34] becomes:
dr1 ⟵ R34
scratch-reg ⟵ (dr1 >> 20) : get segment ID
compare scratch-reg and dr2 : validate seg. ID
trap if not equal
R12 ⟵ [dr1] : do load
Dan Boneh
 Address sandboxing technique
• dr2: holds segment ID
• Indirect load instruction R12 ⟵ [R34] becomes:

dr1 ⟵ R34 & segment-mask : zero out seg bits

dr1 ⟵ dr1 | dr2 : set valid seg ID
R12 ⟵ [dr1] : do load

• Fewer instructions than segment matching

… but does not catch offending instructions
• Similar guards placed on all unsafe instructions
Dan Boneh
Problem: what if jmp [addr] jumps directly into indirect load?
(bypassing guard)

Solution:

This is why jmp instructions need a guard:

jmp guard ensures [addr] does not bypass load guard

Dan Boneh
 Cross domain calls
caller callee
domain domain
call stub draw:
call draw

return

br addr br addr
br addr ret stub br addr
br addr br addr
• Only stubs allowed to make cross-domain jumps
• Jump table contains allowed exit points
– Addresses are hard coded, read-only segment
Dan Boneh
 SFI Summary
• Performance
– Usually good: mpeg_play, 4% slowdown

• Limitations of SFI: harder to implement on x86 :

– variable length instructions: unclear where to put guards
– few registers: can’t dedicate three to SFI
– many instructions affect memory: more guards needed

Dan Boneh
 Isolation: summary
• Many sandboxing techniques:
Physical air gap, Virtual air gap (hypervisor),
System call interposition (SCI), Software Fault isolation (SFI)
Application specific (e.g. Javascript in browser)

• Often complete isolation is inappropriate

– Apps need to communicate through regulated interfaces

• Hardest aspects of sandboxing:

– Specifying policy: what can apps do and not do
– Preventing covert channels
Dan Boneh
THE END

Dan Boneh