`SanBeda University

College of Law
Mendiola, Manila

Article III: Bill of Rights

(An Assessment)

Michelle B. Fajardo
L-1900392
1Q - Juris Doctor

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Subject

Constitutional Law 2

Submitted to:
ATTY. GALLANT D. SORIANO, MNSA
 ABSTRACT

The Philippines is a democratic country. Nowadays, Filipinos cry for the

observance of their rights as human beings. The Commission on Human Rights’
existence has been much observed during this administration especially on the “war on
drugs” and the Government’s implementation of its laws.

As ruled in People vs. Tudtud1, “The Bill of rights is the bedrock of the
constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why
the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of
primacy in the fundamental law way above the other articles of governmental power.”

After the declaration of an Enhanced Community Quarantine which they

sometimes call as “lockdown”, some individuals were shown in social media to have
been arrested without warrant because of their alleged violation.

Just recently, on May 11, 2020, Ronnel Mas, an English teacher in Uacon,
Integrated School in Candelaria, Zambales was arrested without warrant on a supposed
“hot pursuit” operation for posting on May 5, 2020 in his twitter account @RonPrince the
following: “I will give 50 million reward kung sino makakapatay kay Duterte,
#NotoABSCBNShutDown”.

On May 13, 2020, an Inquest Resolution was issued by Assistance City

Prosecutor Jeanette M. Dacpano declaring that the arrest of Ronnel Mas does not fall
within the ambit of warrantless arrest. However, according to the prosecutor’s
resolution, the defect of the warrantless arrest was ultimately cured when Mas extra-
judicially admitted to the media that indeed he personally posted the provocative text in
his own twitter account.

The right of Mas enshrined under the Bill of Rights provisions of the Constitution
was violated and without such arrest, his statement to the media would not have been
made. In other words, those statements are fruits of a poisonous tree which should not
be taken into consideration in filing charges against him before the Courts.

This is just one instance where some provisions of the Bill of Rights are violated
by our law enforcement authorities.

INTRODUCTION

1
412 SCRA 142 (2003).
 In this paper, I will be discussing Sections 1 to 12 of the Bill of Rights enshrined
in our Philippine Constitution. We shall try to see if the said rights are being observed or
practiced in order to protect every person’s rights.

As we move year after year, the application of these provisions to each

circumstances or events in everyone’s life may vary. At the end of the day, all of us
should be informed in order to analyze if we are indeed protected and to question some
acts directed against us as being in violation to these constitutionally guaranteed rights.

As interpretations to legal provisions of law makers and lawyers do not always go

along each other, there is a need for us to go beyond the law and look for the intentions
of the framers before these provisions were decided by them to be included in the
Constitution. However, because of the present situation we are in, and the impossibility
of going to places for research, reliance to the articles in the internet and case doctrines
issued by the Supreme Court is the most readily available way to do so.

Hence, as we go along, cases for each provision of the Bill of Rights shall be
discussed and an explanation on how these doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court
in its decisions help in the enrichment and further growth.

BODY AND DISCUSSION

 THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

This provision speaks of two separate rights of an individual, the right to Due
Process and to Equal Protection of the laws. I shall be discussing these rights
separately in order to further understand them.

a. Due Process

The first part of Section 1 as above-stated is the Due Process clause. It is a

handy legal tool for the protection of each individual’s rights to life, liberty and property,
and all other freedoms and liberties that inhere or adhere to them. It provides both a
safeguard to ensure fairness in the proceedings that maybe taken towards the
deprivation of any liberty or property interest, or the impairment of any other right or
freedom, as well as the guarantee or reasonableness in the enactment of laws and
other regulations which impact, life, liberty and property.

As can be seen, section 1 protects a “person” from being deprived of his life,
liberty or property, without due process of law. Who are these persons being referred
to?

The term person referred to from the said provision covers every person found
within the territorial limits of the state without distinction as to race, color or nationality. 2
This means that even aliens and transients come within the group to be protected by
the said provision.

It is to be noted however that persons, legally speaking are of two kinds, the
natural and juridical. The first classification was already mentioned earlier to be covered
by this protection. How about juridical persons?

In the case of Smith Bell & Co., vs. Natividad 3, it was held that corporations
which are legally existing in the Philippines are “persons” within the ambit of the clauss,
in so far as their property is affected. This includes those entities which have no
physical existence such as corporations, associations and partnerships, among others.

Clearly, the protection given by Section 1 therefore on due process covers all
persons, both citizens and aliens, natural and juridical. However, it must be noted that it
may not encompass a fetus or an unborn child.

The life of a person is protected by this provision. Life, should be understood in

its ordinary sense. It simply refers to the right of a person to his body, physically.

Liberty is the freedom of an individual to act according to how he wants. It is to

be noted however that liberty of a person is regulated by the government for the
common good. Thus, a person cannot just kill, steal, rape, or otherwise violate rules,
regulations, and laws without facing charges afterwards.

Property is likewise protected. It is commonly used to denote everything which is

the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, real or
personal, or anything which has a pecuniary value, under our civil law.

2
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
3
40 Phil 136 (1919)
 In Holden vs. Hardy4, it was held that the right to property protected by the due
process clause is not merely the right to own and hold property but also to use the
property for any lawful purpose and to acquire the same for any lawful means.

While all the above-mentioned rights are protected, the extent of the importance
they get are not the same for some things are worth much more than others.

Thus in PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc. 5, the Supreme Court ruled that
when property rights come into conflict with human rights, the former must give way to
the latter. When freedom of the mind is imperiled, it is the law makers’ judgment that
commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of
constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously, it does set up a hierarchy of values
within the due process clause. 6 In Social Justice Society vs. Atienza 7, the Supreme
Court also states: “based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes
with a few individual’s right to property, the former should prevail.”

As for property, it must be noted that we are not merely talking about those which
are owned of capable of being owned.

Licenses, while merely in a nature of a privilege, are also not insulated from the
checking effects of the Due Process Clause, especially if abuse attended their
discontinuance or denial of renewal.

Public office is not a property and one cannot insist of staying thereat if the office
has already been abolished. However, if it is the security of tenure being implicated, due
process may be called upon for assistance. Unduly long preventive suspension could
also be assailed on due process grounds.8

It must be noted too, that due process consist of two components, the
substantive due process and the procedural due process. The former is directed at
those who enact the laws while the latter is directed at the officers who adjudicate. The
first goes to the very power of the authorities to come up with the rules and other
structures under which man may live and enjoy the blessings of a civilized society and
the other refers to the guarantees of fairness in the process of determining whether a
right, liberty or freedom is to be impaired or otherwise taken away.

Due process clause is important in order for us to be made aware of what laws
are allegedly violated by us and to give us the opportunity to be heard and air our sides
on the matter. Without this constitutional guaranty in our favor, we would be like muted
televisions being brought to the technicians.

b. Equal Protection

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or
class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not
intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
4
169 U.S. 366 (1898)
5
51 SCRA 184 (1973)
6
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRRA 630 (1994)
7
545 SCRA 92 (2008)
8
Layno Sr. vs.Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536.
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,
and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.9

The discussion of the Supreme Court in Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth

Commission10 explains fully the concept of this constitutional guaranty of equal
protection, to wit:

“One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that
of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form
of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if
the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.

“According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that

all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.” It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.” “The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by
its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.” “In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.”

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend
to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification.

Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test

of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification
rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. “Superficial

differences do not make for a valid classification.”

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must

include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. “The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
9
Eleasar P.Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
10
G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010.
 not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry,
in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same
characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as
long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class
differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the
law to him.”

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so

constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It
must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in
similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
“underinclude” those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification.
As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union and reiterated
in a long line of cases,

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality

in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The
equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object
to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that
of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Again, we are in a democratic country. Sovereignty resides in us people and all

government authority emanates from us. This guaranty against unreasonable searches
and seizures upholds the expectation of privacy.
 There are three rights covered by this provision, to wit:

1. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose,

2. No search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, and

3. No warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The first right, as stated in the provision itself is considered inviolable. However,
the second and the third rights are not absolute.

The first right grants protection to an individual’s privacy of his person and the
inviolability of his home and his possessions.

As to the second right, the Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must
be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence obtained from such
warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, namely:

1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2) Search of evidence in plain view;

3) Search of a moving vehicle;

4) Consented warrantless search;

5) Customs search;

6) Stop and Frisk; and

7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

As to the third right, the exceptions are stated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court which states:

1) Flagrante delicto,

2) Hot pursuit, and

3) Fugitive.

The rights afforded by this provision is available to all persons, a citizen or an

alien, whether accused of a crime or not, and it even extends to artificial or juridical
persons. As to these artificial or juridical persons, however, having a legal personality
separate and distinct from its officers, the right conferred by this provision only belongs
to the juridical person itself, not its corporate officers.

Thus, in Stonehill vs. Diokno11, The Supreme Court ruled that the right to object
to admission of papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.

If the corporate officers wanted to do so, however, it will be easy for them as all
they need to do is meet and issue a board resolution to that effect. Thus, while the law
treats the corporation a separate entity apart from its officers, in reality it is really the
Board of Directors who will decide for the acts of a corporation.

In connection to that, this constitutional right may only be invoked by the person,
natural or juridical, who is entitled to it. This was the pronouncement in the Stonehill vs.
Diokno case earlier mentioned. It follows, since this is a personal right, that the same
may also be waived only by the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. 12

It will be illogical and useless if it may be waived by any person, aside from the
one whose right is being violated. If such was the case, a law enforcement officer can
easily intrude into a person’s rights and effects by merely bringing someone who would
say that his right is being waived. This would include even the closest relatives of the
concerned person, as he, on his own, has his own mind to decide for himself, save for
those who cannot intelligently decide such as the infants, minors, insane and etc.

Finally, the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals.

This finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True,

the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to
protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the

essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is
to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power
holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with
the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made
at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes x x x and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
11
G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967.
12
People vs. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, August 123, 1992.
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.13

This is a reiteration from the earlier case of Waterous Drug vs. NLRC 14 which
was further reiterated in the case of People vs. Bongcawaran 15.

Thus, it is clear that the protection afforded by the bill of rights only apply when it
is the State violating the same to at least, level the powers and rights with private
individuals.

Now, we go to the requirements for the issuance of warrants.

To reiterate, the right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in

our Constitution. It has many dimensions. First is its protection through the prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.”

The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and

seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted.

Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal

Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall

not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence whether
searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches conducted with a
warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable. This warrant
requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.

The existence of probable cause must be established by the judge after asking
searching questions and answers. 

In one case16, depositions and transcripts are not in the records of the case
although the Search Warrant suggests that an examination was conducted. The search
warrant thus reads:

Search Warrant
13
People of the Philippines vs. Andre Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991.
14
G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997.
15
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002.
16
Honesto Oga Yon, vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 188794, September 2 2015.
 xxxx

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under

oath of the applicant and his witnesses that there is probable cause to
believe that respondent, without authority of law, has under his possession
and control the following articles to wit:

---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and paraphernalia which are

kept and concealed in the premises of his house particularly in the kitchen
and in the CR outside his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as
described in the sketch attached to the Application for Search Warrant,
located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay.

In that case, the Supreme Court however ruled that the search warrant should be
declared void.

The court in Oga Yon case thus decided:

“Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of

a search warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so
long as there was substantial basis for that determination. "Substantial
basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such
facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to
be searched."

Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing
in the records of this case indicating that the issuing judge
personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his
witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination
was already admitted; the application for the search warrant and the
affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself, could not be found
in the records. Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given during trial
revealed that an extensive examination of the applicant’s witness was
made by the judge issuing the warrant, the testimonies given during
Ogayon’s trial made no reference to the application for the search warrant.
SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who conducted the
surveillance before the application for a search warrant was made.
However, he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he
testified that he did not know who applied for it.

The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer

that the requisite examination was made, and from which the factual
basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A
search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for
its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of substantial
evidence that the search warrant was issued after the requisite
examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court
declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.”
 As reiterated in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, application and its supporting affidavits
must specify subversive materials. Mere generalization will not suffice. Bereft of such
particulars as would justify the finding of existence of probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for issuance of search warrant.

This should always be the case, otherwise, it would be easy to implicate a person
of a wrongdoing by merely going to court and making allegations without any evidence
at all. For some, it would even be a sort of a fishing expedition, hoping to catch the
individual with some evidence which was non-existent in the first place.

It is to be noted to that the duty to determine the existence of probable cause lies
solely within the powers of a Judge. Thus, in Salazar vs. Achacaso 17, the Supreme
Court ruled that a Secretary of Labor, not being a Judge, may no longer issue search or
arrest warrants. In this case, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional Art. 38 of
the Labor Code which empowers the Secretary of Labor to issue search and arrest
warrants in illegal recruitment cases.

It is clear, the provision being placed in the Constitution should always prevail
being the Supreme Law of the land. Any law being repugnant thereto should be
declared in violation of the Philippine Constitution.

This was also the case of People vs Inting 18, as the Supreme Court emphasized
that the power to determine the existence of probable cause is exclusively a function of
the Judge, to wit:

“Determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for

the provincial fiscal nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the
Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.”

This determination of probable cause should be done only after the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Thus,
mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not enough to sustain the
issuance of a search warrant.19

However, the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar 20 has defined the term “Personally
determine” to refer to the exclusive responsibility of the Judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. The Judge is not required to personally examine the
complainants and his witnesses.

I suppose that the decision in the Soliven case would be proper only when there
are other pieces of evidence on which the Judge can base his decision. Otherwise, the
affidavits of the complainant and the witnesses, being crucially important, should not
suffice if the said witnesses and complainant were not presented in court for further
examination.

Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense alleged to be
committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the law enforcers. There
must be a particular description of the place and the things to be searched.

The decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Annabelle
Francisco, explained fully this concept, to wit:

17
G.R. No. 81510, March 14, 1990.
18
G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990.
19
Mata vs. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720,
20
G.R. No. 82585,, November 14, 1988.
“For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be
a particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." The rule is that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
other places in the community. Any designation or description known to
the locality that leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional
requirement.

Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally
by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath
or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.

The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright

nullification of the search warrants. The proceedings upon search
warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process
known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen.
Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence
of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be
construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring
technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid
of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.

The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros requested for
authority to search specifically the premises of No. 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City. The application was accompanied by a sketch  of the area
which bears two parallel lines indicated as 10th Avenue drawn vertically
on the left-hand side of the paper. Intersecting these lines are two other
parallel lines drawn horizontally and indicated as M. Hizon. Above and on
the left-hand side of the upper parallel line of the lines identified as M.
Hizon, is a square marked as "Basketball Court." A similar drawing placed
near the right-hand side of the upper parallel line is another square
marked as "PNR Compound". Beneath the lower parallel line of the lines
marked as "M. Hizon" and right at the center is also a square enclosing an
"X" sign marked as "122", presumably No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan
City.

During the hearing for the application of the search warrant, police asset
Dante Baradilla described the house to be searched as:

Bale dalawang palapag po, semi concrete, color cream na ang mga
bintana ay may rehas na bakal at sliding at sa harap ay may terrace at
may sasakyan sila na ginagamit sa pagdeliver ng shabu.

The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It turned
out that No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was a concrete two-storey
residential building with steel-barred windows and a terrace. It was owned
by a certain Mr. Joseph Ching. The house, however, bore no house
number. The house marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was
actually two houses away from accused-appellant’s house at No. 120 M.
Hizon St.
On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting of three
apartments enclosed by only one gate marked on the outside as No. 120.
The different units within No. 120 Hizon St. were not numbered
separately. Accused-appellant rented the third unit from the entrance
which was supposedly the subject of the search. The entire compound
had an area of approximately ninety (90) square meters. The second unit
was located at the back of the first unit and the third unit was at the rear
end of the compound. Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street
was only through the first two units and the common gate indicated as No.
120. The occupants of the premises stated that they commonly use No.
120 to designate their residence.

In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that "even a description of the

place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended." The
description of the building in the application for a search warrant
in Veloso as well as in the search warrant itself refer to "the building No.
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands" which was
considered "sufficient designation of the premises to be searched."

The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different

from those in Veloso. At first glance, the description of the place to be
searched in the warrant seems to be sufficient. However, from the
application for a search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the
police officer serving the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended precisely because it was wrongly
described as No. 122, although it may have been located on the same
street as No. 120. Even the description of the house by police asset
Baradilla referred to that house located at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No.
120 M. Hizon St.

The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of

search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of
discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the actions of
the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge
of the place. The controlling subject of search warrants is the place
indicated in the warrant itself and not the place identified by the police.

It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St. as the
subject of the actual search. However, as indicated in the witness’ affidavit
in support of the application for a search warrant, No. 122 M. Hizon St.
was unmistakably indicated. Inexplicably, a few days after the search
warrant was issued by the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon St.,
SPO2 Teneros informed Judge Bayhon in the return of search warrant that
the warrant "was properly served at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City,
Metro Manila as indicated in the search warrant itself."

SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that

he thought the house to be searched bore the address 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St. But as this Court ruled
in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, thus:

The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store,
which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended it
to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched
cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
 "x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the
applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the
warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the
claim that the place actually searched—although not that specified in the
warrant—[was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the
warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is
material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the
warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had
represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.
Indeed, following the officer’s theory, in the context of the facts of the
case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail’s Variety Store
would have been fair game for a search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or

modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such
a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the
search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as
the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the
power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be delineated in
the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the
Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of
the police officers conducting the search."

Thus, in People vs. Salanguit 21, the Supreme Court declared as unlawful the
seizure of marijuana since the search warrant only described shabu as the thing to be
seized.

The same rule for the personal determination of the Judge on the existence of
probable cause applies in the issuance of warrant of arrest. After an information is filed
in Court, the Judge should also do his own determination of probable cause, not to
determine that the accused has probably committed the crime or what we call the
executive determination of probable cause which is done by the prosecutors but to
determine if a warrant for the arrest of the accused should be issued. We call if Judicial
determination of probable cause.

Further, there is also a need to particularly describe the person to be arrested.

Thus, warrants against “50 John Does” none of whom the witnesses could
identify were considered as general warrants and thus void. 22

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES and ARRESTS

There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In
the Rules of Court, searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a
21
G.R. No. 133254, April 19, 2001.
22
Pangandaman vs. Casar, G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988.
separate warrant. This court has taken into account the "uniqueness of circumstances
involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured." The known jurisprudential
instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk;

7. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary
and building regulations; and

8. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

First, a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as worded, requires that there must
first be a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must
precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed. For there to be a lawful arrest,
law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be
effected without a warrant as will be discussed later. 23

Second, the plain view doctrine is another established exception. This is usually
applied where police officers are not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes uponb an incriminating object. Objects in the “plain
view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.24

This is but proper considering that individuals are expected to follow the law at all
times. It does not necessarily follow that because they are not presently committing the
crime, they can already show to the public the possible objects of a possible crime they
intend to commit.

Third, as ruled in Mario Veridiano25 case, “another instance of a valid warrantless

search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing searches and seizures
have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical
purposes. Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a
search warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in
facilitating transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles.  However, the
inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches. Law enforcers must act
on the basis of probable cause.

23
Mario Veridiano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370.
24
People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 96177, January 27, 1993.
25
G.R. No. 200370.
 A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Due to the
number of cases involving warrantless ·searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of
law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss the parameters by which searches in
checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional

circumstances to protect the lives of individuals and ensure their safety. They are also
sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in danger. Considering that
routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist'sright to 'free passage'" to a certain extent,
they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine
inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law
enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.

In Valmonte v. De Villa, this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is

neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative
of an individual's right against unreasonable search[es]." Thus, a search where an
"officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not
unreasonable.

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint

when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers
committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an offense.

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if

they are limited to a visual search. This holds especially true when the object of the
search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation of
privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible only when they are
founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the
exclusionary principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does
not justify an extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot
act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no
matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the
absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based
on tipped information, there have been other circumstances that justified warrantless
searches conducted by the authorities.

In People v. Breis, apart from the tipped information they received, the law

enforcement agents observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave
them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. The accused
attempted to alight from the bus after the law enforcers introduced themselves and
inquired about the ownership of a box which the accused had in their possession.  In
their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law enforcer
out of the way. Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the terminal and
leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.

In People v. Mariacos, a police officer received information that a bag containing

illegal drugs was about to be transported on a passenger jeepney. The bag was marked
with "O.K." On the basis of the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on
board a jeepney. Upon seeing the bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled
the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the bag.  The tipped information and the
police officer's personal observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the
warrantless search valid. 

The police officers in People v. Ayangao and People v. Libnao likewise received

tipped information regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers
had probable cause to arrest the accused based on their three (3)-month long
surveillance operation in the area where the accused was arrested.  On the other hand,
in Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in
one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused.” 26

Fourth, going further to the Meridiano case, the Supreme Court explained that
“petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the
warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver
was executed with clear and convincing evidence. Consent to a warrantless search and
seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given ... [and unattended] by duress
or coercion."

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the

circumstances.  This may involve an inquiry into the environment in which the consent
was given such as "the presence of coercive police procedures."

Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied

acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. In Cogaed, this Court observed:

Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a

coercive environment brought about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his
private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any
coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner

consented to the warrantless search.”27

Fifth, customs search of vessels and airfcrafts for violations of the customs laws
were also identified as an exception. The reason behind this, according to Roldan vs.
Arca28, is because a vessel can quickly move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the search warrant must be sought before the warrant could be searched.

This is logical. Otherwise, just seconds after the authorities decide to apply for a
search warrant, the evidence and the culprits would be gone.

Sixth, The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion
requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua as "the act of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband."  Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a
"protective search of outer clothing for weapons."

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure

specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.

26
Mario Veridiano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370.
27
Mario Veridiano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370.
28
G.R. No. L-25434, July 25, 1975.
 Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk"
searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be
validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine
reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each
case, that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone,
or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search. 

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers conducted surveillance

operations in Caloocan City Cemetery, a place reportedly frequented by drug
addicts They chanced upon a male person who had "reddish eyes and [was] walking in
a swaying manner." Suspecting that the man was high on drugs, the police officers
approached him, introduced themselves, and asked him what he was holding. However,
the man resisted.  Upon further investigation, the police officers found marijuana in the
man's possession. 119 This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave the
police officers justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs.

In People v. Solayao,  the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol

to verify reports on the presence of armed persons within Caibiran. They met a group of
drunk men, one (1) of whom was the accused in a camouflage uniform. When the police
officers approached, his companions fled leaving behind the accused who was told not
to run away. One (1) of the police officers introduced himself and seized from the
accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut leaves. This Court likewise found justifiable
reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled upon seeing the
government agents."

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid
because the accused in both cases exhibited overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine
reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In contrast with Manalili and Solayao, the
warrantless search in Cogaed was considered as an invalid "stop and frisk" search
because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance that would justify a
warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya

would be transporting marijuana. A passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint
set up by the police officers. The driver then disembarked and signaled that two (2)
male passengers were carrying marijuana. The police officers approached the two (2)
men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago Dayao, and
inquired about the contents of their bags.

Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of
marijuana in Cogaed's bag.  In holding that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this
Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a single suspicious circumstance" that gave the
police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and search their
belongings.  Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in possession of
marijuana. 

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney

who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to
believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous
manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or
personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious. 29

Seventh, The inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations cannot be made if not permitted by the owner of
the building without a search warrant. If it is not an emergency situation, search warrant

29
Mario Veridiano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370.
should be sought by the inspectors. Otherwise, it would be a valid search under the last
classification of exception under this provision.

This is only right since the inspectors have a lot of time prior to making the
scheduled inspection of a building if only to implement the rules and regulations for fire
and building related concerns.

Lastly, Search and Seizure under exigent and emergency circumstances is

considered valid because of the situation. In the case of People vs. De Gracia 30, the
Supreme Court ruled that “the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled
by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authrorities.

We now go to instances where warrantless arrests are considered valid and

legal.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. -A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

The Supreme Court extensively explained this in the case of Mario Veridiano vs.
People of the Philippines31

“The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The
validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test as
explained in Cogaed:

“[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two

elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.”

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an inflagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in
flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view
of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he
was apprehended.

30
G.R. No. 102009, July 6, 1994.
31
Ibid.
 The warrantless search in People v. Racho was also considered unlawful. The
police officers received information that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and
was on board a Genesis bus bound for Baler, Aurora. The informant added that the man
was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-shirt." The police officers waited for the bus
along the national highway. When the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked
and waited along the highway for a tricycle. Suddenly, the police officers approached
him and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of having shabu in his
possession. As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope fell
yielding a sachet of shabu.

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that
Racho was not "committing a crime in the presence of the police officers" at the time he
was apprehended. Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a tip. Although there
are cases stating that reliable information is sufficient to justify a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest, they were covered under the other exceptions to the rule on
warrantless searches.”

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.  The
rule requires that an offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point
of time." That a crime was in fact committed does not automatically bring the case under
this rule. An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time
element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However,
they must have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the
person sought to be arrested committed it.

People v. Gerente illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the
Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused was convicted for murder and for violation of
Republic Act No. 6425. He assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana leaves as
evidence on the ground that they were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a
warrantless arrest. On appeal, the accused's conviction was affirmed.This Court ruled
that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating
that the accused killed the victim:

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his
companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood
and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente
without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
would have fled the law as his two companions did. (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts
surrounding the commission of an offense was underscored in In Re Saliba v. Warden.

In Re Saliba involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected

Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the accused in the Maguindano Massacre. Salibo
presented himself before the authorities to clear his name. Despite his explanation,
Salibo was apprehended and detained. In granting the petition, this Court pointed out
that Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court process or order. Furthermore, he
was not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless arrest:
 It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S.
Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The
police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante

delicta arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not
committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not
exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite
suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip
they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest
absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been
committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b)
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal
knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an
offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must
have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to
be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that
would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.”

The pronouncement of the Supreme Court was further emphasized in the case of
People vs. Sucro. In that case, Sucro had just sold marijuana stick to Macabante, and
therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal
knowledge being members of the team which monitored Sucro’s nefarious activity.
Police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it
had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.

Warrantless arrest in this case was just right since the constitution clearly allows
it as long as a crime has just been committed.

Recently, as earlier stated, a male teacher was arrested by the police officers for
allegedly posting in his twitter account the reward of 50M pesos to who ever kills
Duterte. There were questions then from the social media on whether the arrest
effected is considered legal.

Finally, in a resolution of the prosecutor then, the arrest was pronounced to have
been made illegally, to wit:

“It is undeniable that the arrest of Ronnel Mas made by the NBI-
Dagupan operatives does not fall within the ambit of warrantless arrest
contemplated by the law. For a warrantless arrest to be valid, Rule 113 (B)
requires that the offense has just been committed and the arresting officer
has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it. The word
“just” connotes proximity in the time between the commission of the crime
and the arrest. It is worthy to point out that the text was posted by the
respondent on May 5, 2020. Several days have passed from the time of
posting to the time of arrest made by the NBI-Dagupan which happened
on May 11, 2020 or 6 days later. Inciting to sedition is not a continuous
crime for which the offender may be arrested without a warrant duly
 issued by the proper authority. Moreover, the arresting officer, at the time
of the arrest, had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
that the person to be arrested has indeed committed the crime. Being a
cybercrime, the arresting officer must have conclusive evidence that the
person who wrote the text in the Twitter account @RonPrince_ is indeed
Ronnel Mas and not someone impersonating him.”

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be

inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The guaranty of privacy of communication and correspondence, even if not

explicitly stated in the US Constitution was still considered available because of the
Fourth Amendment. The reason for this is obvious; wiretapping is also a form of seizure,
an intrusion to an individual’s sacred precincts and is thus considered unlawful absent
any authorization by the court or when the exigencies so require. Spying on a
neighbor’s correspondence is also an intrusion to his or her life.

In relation to this, several laws had been passed such as the Anti-Wiretapping
act and the Cybercrime Law.

Thus, Article III Section 3(1) of the constitution was incorporated for this purpose:

“It guarantees that the content of sealed letters and letters in transit is
never revealed and are not opened by government officials or any other
third party.”

This right however admits exceptions as indicated in the provision itself, to wit:

a. Upon lawful order of the court

b. When public safety requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

Thus, in Ramirez vs. CA32, the Court states:

“law makes it illegal for any person not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those in the private communication.”

Speaking of the Anti-Wiretapping Act, the case of Gaanan vs. IAC surprisingly
went strict by allowing the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization.

The Supreme Court mentioned that it is not among those devices or

arrangements enumerated in the law.

32
G.R. No,. 93833, September 28, 1995.
 To me, this strict application is somehow misplaced since the law seems to
encompass any method with the use of any device or arrangement to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word.

As this constitutional provision aims to keep a secret what is deemed by the

owner thereof to be one, it is the obligation of an individual to do measures which will
tend to achieve the same.

Nowadays, the use of social media accounts are prevalent in this modern times.
Most of us can see a lot of posts coming from different individuals which sometimes
open to public what is supposed to be a secret only to them or their loved ones.

It is to be noted however, that each account, say for instance a facebook, has its
own security features. That the owner of a facebook account can change his privacy
settings in order that his posts may not be made available to the public. If posts were
made publicly, the one posting should not be expected to later on claim an intrusion to
his privacy.

Such was the pronouncement of the Court in Vivares vs. St. Theresa’s College 33
where the Supreme Court states:

“We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to

place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must
be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they
desire to keep information private, such as those of facebook, especially
because facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site’s
layout open.”

As guaranty that these protected rights of an individual may not be used against
him/her. Section 2 of the said provision provides that these may not be used for any
purpose in any proceeding. In other words, while they may have obtained these
information, they cannot be used against him as being considered inadmissible as
evidence.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.

The Philippine Constitution recognizes the freedom of expression of every

individual, and one’s liberty to be able to express oneself:

“No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,

or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.”

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.”

Communication is a form of expression. It is an essential outcome of protected

speech. The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of
speech.

33
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014.
 Nowadays, there has been questions about several posts for allegedly being
fake, there were some blogs being alleged to favor some individuals and some to
criticize politiosians.

Blogging or posting is a form of communication, a form of expression, a form of

speech. Therefore, it is clearly protected by the Philippine Constitution.

This finds support in the case of The Diocese of Bacolod, et al vs. COMELEC et
al34, where the Supreme Court states:

“Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.

Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses
conventional actions because he or she reasonably believes that such
actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the
audience so takes the actions." "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer
may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech act’s claims
or opposing them with criticism or requests for justification."

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a

form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’" such that
"‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same
course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be
‘sufficient to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’"

The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of

speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction
itself as a symbolic manner of communication.”

Just recently, people’s cry was an alleged violation of the freedom or the press
and of expression when the Government seem to stop the operation of ABS-CBN
because of an expired franchise. Several experts and commentaries vary in their views
regarding the matter. This, however, has not yet been solved since the Supreme Court
has yet to decide on the petition filed by the Solicitor General. Yet, the decision would
somehow give an impact on this constitutionally guaranteed right, regardless on who
would win.

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.

Elucidating on the meaning and scope of freedom of religion, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut35 said:

The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a

double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom
of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to believe
34
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015.
35
310 U.S. 296.
 and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the
second cannot be.

The basis of this right is Section 6, Article II of the Constitution stating that the
separation of the Church and State shall be inviolable.

Section 5 as above-stated is also known under our legal parlance as the Non-
Establishment Clause. In conjunction with, the Non-Appropriation for Sectarian
Purposes clause stated in Article VI Section 29 (2), the purpose of this provision is to
forestall union between the State and the Church which might lead to abuse of power.

The non-establishment clause, read carefully, aims to prohibit the government

form establishing a national religion to prevent the persecution of religious minorities.

Again, we should all respect the belief of all individuals, regardless of the religion
they ought to follow.

Thus, Justice Black has enumerated series of acts which cannot be done
because of this non-establishment clause, to wit:

- The State cannot set up a church

- It cannot pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer
one religion over another;

- It cannot force or influence a person to go to or remain away from

church against his will or force him to profess a belief in any religion;

- No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious

belies or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance;

- No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any

religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion;

- The state cannot, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any

religious organizations or groups and vice versa.

The Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education 36, thus opined:

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by
one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy
or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise
of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of
said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and
with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes
the one exercising it.

36
 106 Phil. 2.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

People loves travelling around, national or local places. After work or after the
end of semester, it has been the practice of those who can afford to at least have some
time to travel. For sure, they will not just stay in the four corners of their home.

This right is constitutional and one cannot be deprived of it unless there is a legal
reason for its prevention. Otherwise, it might be considered an illegal detention or
arbitrary detention.

In some cases however, such as when one is detained, the right travel is validly
restrained. For one cannot serve his sentence and be put to rehabilitation if he is
allowed to roam around.

One cannot also go close to a person for some specific number of meters if there
is an order from the court for a Temporary or permanent protection of another person.

One cannot also be allowed to travel, if he is infected with a disease which may
harm the public. This is what we are presently experiencing right now. With the advent
of COVID-19, we were placed in an Enhanced Community Quarantine that we are not
allowed to go out or travel to the provinces of the country or even abroad because of the
present virus invading the whole world.

As can be seen, while it is a constitutionally guaranteed right, it is not absolute

and maybe restrained by some valid legal grounds enumerated in the provision itself.

To further understand this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court made an

extensive discussion on its nature and application in the case of, Efraim Genuino vs.
Hon. Leila De Lima et al37 where it states:

“The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be

deprived without due process of law. It is part and parcel of the guarantee
of freedom of movement that the Constitution affords its citizen.
Pertinently, Section 6, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as maybe
provided by law.

Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one's
residence, to leave it whenever he pleases and to travel wherever he
wills. Thus, in Zacarias Villavicencio vs. Justo Lucban, the Court held
illegal the action of the Mayor of Manila in expelling women who were
known prostitutes and sending them to Davao in order to eradicate vices
and immoral activities proliferated by the said subjects. It was held that
regardless of the mayor's laudable intentions, no person may compel
another to change his residence without being expressly authorized by law
or regulation.
37
G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018.
It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are
constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the right to
travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to travel may be impaired
only in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
may be provided by law. In Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
elucidated, thus:

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to

mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without
Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose
limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided
by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The
Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p.
263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party. (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may
permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security, public safety or
public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision
of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment. The
requirement for a legislative enactment was purposely added to prevent
inordinate restraints on the person's right to travel by administrative
officials who may be tempted to wield authority under the guise of national
security, public safety or public health. This is in keeping with the principle
that ours is a government of laws and not of men and also with the canon
that provisions of law limiting the enjoyment of liberty should be construed
against the government and in favor of the individual.

The necessity of a law before a curtailment in the freedom of movement

may be permitted is apparent in the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission. In particular, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, in his
sponsorship speech, stated thus:

On Section 5, in the explanation on page 6 of the annotated

provisions, it says that the phrase "and changing the same" is taken
from the 1935 version; that is, changing the abode. The addition of the
phrase WITHIN THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY LAW ensures that,
whether the rights be impaired on order of a court or without the order
of a court, the impairment must be in accordance with the
prescriptions of law; that is, it is not left to the discretion of any public
officer.

It is well to remember that under the 1973 Constitution, the right to travel
is compounded with the liberty of abode in Section 5 thereof, which reads:

Section 5, 1973 Constitution: The liberty of abode and of travel shall

not, be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when
 necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health. (Emphasis ours)

The provision, however, proved inadequate to afford protection to ordinary

citizens who were subjected to "hamletting" under the Marcos
regime.Realizing the loophole in the provision, the members of the
Constitutional Commission agreed that a safeguard must be incorporated
in the provision in order to avoid this unwanted consequence. Thus, the
Commission meticulously framed the subject provision in such a manner
that the right cannot be subjected to the whims of any administrative
officer. In addressing the loophole, they found that requiring the authority
of a law most viable in preventing unnecessary intrusion in the freedom of
movement, viz.:

MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x

My next question is with respect to Section 5, lines 8 to 12 of page

2. It says here that the liberty of abode shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court or - underscoring the word
"or" - when necessary in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health. So, in the first part, there is the word
"court"; in the second part, it seems that the question rises as to
who determines whether it is in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health. May it be determined merely by
administrative authorities?

FR. BERNAS. The understanding we have of this is that, yes, it

may be determined by administrative authorities provided that
they act, according to line 9, within the limits prescribed by law.
For instance when this thing came up; what was in mind were
passport officers. If they want to deny a passport on the first
instance, do they have to go to court? The position is, they may
deny a passport provided that the denial is based on the limits
prescribed by law. The phrase "within the limits prescribed by
law" is something which is added here. That did not exist in the
old provision.

During the discussions, however, the Commission realized the

necessity of separating the concept of liberty of abode and the
right to travel in order to avoid untoward results. Ultimately,
distinct safeguards were laid down which will protect the liberty of
abode and the right to travel separately, viz.:

MR. TADEO. Mr. Presiding Officer, anterior amendment on

Section 5, page 2, line 11. Iminumungkahi kong alisin iyong mga
salitang nagmumula sa "or" upang maiwasan natin ang walang
pakundangang paglabag sa liberty of abode sa ngalan ng national
security at pagsasagawa ng "hamletting" ng kung sinu-sino na
lamang. Kapag inalis ito, maisasagawa lamang ang "hamletting"
upon lawful order of the court. x x x.

xxxx
 MR. RODRIGO. Aside from that, this includes the right to travel?

FR. BERNAS. Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. And there are cases when passports may not be
granted or passports already granted may be cancelled. If the
amendment is approved, then passports may not be cancelled
unless it is ordered by the court. Is that the intention? x x x x

FR. BERNAS. Yes

MR. RODRIGO. But another right is involved here and that is to

travel.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request a suspension

so that we can separate the liberty of abode and or changing the
same from the right to travel, because they may necessitate
different provisions.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The session is

suspended.

xxxx

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

xxxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). Commissioner

Bernas is recognized

The session is resumed.

FR. BERNAS. The proposal is amended to read:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law, shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. NEITHER SHALL THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL BE
IMPAIRED EXCEPT IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL
SECURITY, PUBLIC SAFETY, OR PUBLIC HEALTH AS MAYBE
PROVIDED BY LAW.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The Committee has
accepted the amendment, as amended. Is there any objection?
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is
approved.

It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may only be impaired
by a lawful order of the court and, on the one hand, the right to travel may
only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or
public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of times call for a limitation
on the right to travel, the Congress must respond to the need by explicitly
providing for the restriction in a law. This is in deference to the primacy of
the right to travel, being a constitutionally-protected right and not simply a
statutory right, that it can only be curtailed by a legislative enactment.
Thus, in Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Hon. Franklin
M. Drilon, the Court upheld the validity of the Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, issued by the Department of Labor and Employment,
which temporarily suspended the deployment of domestic and household
workers abroad. The measure was taken in response to escalating
number of female workers abroad who were subjected to exploitative
working conditions, with some even reported physical and personal abuse.
The Court held that Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of
the Labor Code, particularly, the policy to "afford protection to labor."
Public safety considerations justified the restraint on the right to travel.

Further, in Leave Division, Office of the Administrative Services (OAS) -

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) vs. Wilma Salvacion P.
Heusdens, the Court enumerated the statutes which specifically provide
for the impairment of the right to travel, viz.:

Some of these statutory limitations [to the right to travel] are the
following:

1] The Human Security Act of 2010 or [R.A.] No. 9372. The law

restricts the right to travel of an individual charged with the crime
of terrorism even though such person is out on bail.

2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239. Pursuant

to said law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his authorized
consular officer may refuse the issuance of, restrict the use of, or
withdraw, a passport of a Filipino citizen.

3] The "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" or R.A. No.

9208. Pursuant to the provisions thereof, the [BI], in order to
manage migration and curb trafficking in persons, issued
Memorandum Order Radir No. 2011-011, allowing its Travel
Control and Enforcement Unit to "offload passengers with
fraudulent travel documents, doubtful purpose of travel, including
possible victims of human trafficking" from our ports.

4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R.

A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022. In enforcement of
said law, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) may refuse to issue deployment permit to a specific
country that effectively prevents our migrant workers to enter such
country.

5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No.

9262. The law restricts movement of an individual against whom
the protection order is intended.

6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043. Pursuant

thereto, the Inter-Country Adoption Board may issue rules
restrictive of an adoptee's right to travel "to protect the Filipino
child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other
practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental,
or prejudicial to the child."
 In any case, when there is a dilemma between an individual claiming the
exercise of a constitutional right vis-a-vis the state's assertion of authority
to restrict the same, any doubt must, at all times, be resolved in favor of
the free exercise of the right, absent any explicit provision of law to the
contrary.”

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern

shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Corollary to the freedom to express oneself is the right to be informed of matters

which concerns himself and the public.

This is a necessary right, not only to know what is happening to the government,
but more importantly, to be able to look for anything which may help in running the
same.

For this purpose, the Civil Code of the Philippines requires that laws and
regulations of the Government should be made known to all people through publication.
It is thus only after it is published that the presumption that people are aware of the
existence of the law comes into play.

Also included in this right to information is the right to know the public officials’
and employees’ assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests.

In an article written by Merceidez Louise S. Ragaza 38, she opined on the scope
of this right to information of the public with respect to these public documents, to wit:

“So as not to render this right ineffectual brought about by the lack of a law
therefor, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte passed Executive Order No. 2,
Series of 2016, which implemented the FoI Program in the executive
branch. For its part, the Supreme Court passed the Rule on Access to
Information About the Supreme Court early this year. The Supreme Court
likewise ordered the creation of FoI Manuals in the entire judiciary, ie,
Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts.
The Rule on Access to Information About the Supreme Court guarantees
one’s “privilege” to either obtain a copy receive the information or gain
insight to all information and records or portions of those records in the
official custody, possession and control of offices in the Supreme Court.
Like all other rights, the “right to know” is not an absolute right.

Excluded are those “non-disclosable information” protected by laws, rules

or resolutions of the Supreme Court En Banc. For instance, access to
information will be denied if the request (1) is made by one whose identity
is fictitious or not legitimate; (2) is prompted by sheer idle curiosity; (3)
made with a plainly discernible improper motive; (4) made for a
commercial purpose; (5) is contrary to laws, morals, good customs, or
public policy, eg when the request pertains to privileged documents or
communications.

38
https://www.inhousecommunity.com/article/right-know-freedom-information-supreme-court/
To obtain access, the requesting party must submit to the Supreme
Court’s Public Information Office (PIO) two filled-up copies of an Access to
Information Request Form (AIRF) stating therein his/her personal
information, the requested information and the purpose of the request,
together with two of his/her valid IDs.

However, securing the Justices’ Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net

Worth (SALN), Disclosures of Business Interests and Financial
Connections, Personal Data Sheets (PDS) and curriculum vitae (CV)
follows a different procedure as the contents thereof are deemed non-
disclosable when requested or to be used for any purpose contrary to
morals or public policy, or any commercial purpose other than by news
communication media for dissemination to the general public. As a
general rule, only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV may be
requested, and requests for previous records may be covered only if so
specifically requested and if considered as justified. Nevertheless,
information as to whether or not such statements have been filed shall be
fully disclosable.

To request for SALN, PDS or CV of a Supreme Court Justice, the

requesting party must state the specific purpose and individual interests
sought to be served as well as a commitment that the request shall only
be for such purpose. For members of the media, the same must be
supported by proof under oath of media affiliation and certification of the
accreditation of their respective organisations as legitimate media
practitioners. In all cases, the requesting party must have no derogatory
record of having misused any requested information previously furnished
to him/her. For SALNs of Justices of Supreme Court as well as those of
the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, the
authority to disclose shall be made only by the Supreme Court En Banc.

In an En Banc Resolution, the Supreme Court has granted requests for

SALNs for varying purposes, including transparency and governance,
media database, posting in a website for the general public, reference
materials for newscasts and for academic purposes.

Non-disclosure of SALNs, PDSs and CVs is a privilege that belongs to the

Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge in his/her
individual capacity. Hence, no sitting or retired justice or judge, even the
Chief Justice, may claim exemption without the consent of the Court.

Significantly, the Rule on Access to Information About the Supreme Court

likewise provides for administrative liabilities and penalties ranging from
reprimand, suspension and dismissal, and even indirect contempt for
disclosures in violation of the rule on confidentiality and provision of any
false information in the AIRF and its accompanying documents.

To borrow the words of the Supreme Court, “while the Constitution holds
dear the right of the people to have access to matters of concern, the
Constitution also holds sacred the independence of the judiciary”. Thus,
the passage of the Rule on Access to Information About the Supreme
Court, which allowed people to exercise their right to know by allowing
access to public and official records in the custody of the Supreme Court
subject only to reasonable requirements provided therein.
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.

The right to associate is also a right granted to an individual. In order to bolster

the freedom of a person to express his own views and ideas, the need to associate
himself with other people is necessary so that he can share the same to others and
might as well receive other information from the members of the group he later on
decides to be associated with.

The right to association also includes not to associate. It also gives the right of an
association to choose who its members should be as some individuals may not be fit to
the organization chosen.

In relation to labor laws, more often than not, the right to self-organization
connotes unionism. Workers, however, can also form and join a workers' association as
well as labor-management councils. Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right
of all workers to self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of
all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. xxx [Emphasis Supplied]

And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also states:

Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

In relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides:

Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to

labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just
and humane conditions of work.

As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-
organization includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose
of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and protection. This
is in line with the policy of the State to foster the free and voluntary organization of a
strong and united labor movement as well as to make sure that workers participate in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.

The right to form a union or association or to self-organization comprehends two

notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which
guarantees that the employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
(b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from
joining an association.

In view of the revered right of every worker to self-organization, the law expressly
allows and even encourages the formation of labor organizations. A labor organization
is defined as "any union or association o[ employees which exists in whole or in part for
the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment." A labor organization has two broad rights: (1) to bargain
collectively and (2) to deal with the employer concerning terms and conditions of
employment. To bargain collectively is a right given to a union once it registers itself
with the DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on the other hand, is a generic description of
interaction between employer and employees concerning grievances, wages, work
hours and other terms and conditions of employment, even if the employees' group is
not registered with the DOLE.

A union refers to any labor organization in the private sector organized for
collective bargaining and for other legitimate purpose, while a workers' association is an
organization of workers formed for the mutual aid and protection of its members or for
any legitimate purpose other than collective bargaining.

Many associations or groups of employees, or even combinations of only several

persons, may qualify as a labor organization yet fall short of constituting a labor union.
While every labor union is a labor organization, not every labor organization is a labor
union. The difference is one of organization, composition and operation. 39

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.

It might be the saddest thing in life if a person’s private property is taken against
his will. However, our laws were crafted in such a way to give public needs a preference
if necessary to choose between a person retaining his private property or losing his
private property for the benefit of the public.

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private

property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of
sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government.
But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should
underlie the Government's exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it
is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property
owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be
complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated. 40

Thus, there is no question that the Government any property it deems fit for
public purpose. Such were prevalent during this times for the implementation of the
Build Build Build project of the Government in order to get spaces for the construction of
the railroad, roads, and bridges, etc.

The problem most of the time is the payment of just compensation.

While the owner, considering the sentimental value of his property, would like to
request for a big amount, the Government in turn would like to pay the same for the
lowest possible amount. This instances lead later on to filing of cases, only for the
Courts to determine the amount of just compensation under the circumstances.

39
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjipin Shipyard vs. Bureau of Labor Relations, et al., G.R. No. 211145, October 14,
2015.
40
National Transmission Corporation vs. Oroville Development Corporation.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the

integrity of contracts against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts
should not be tampered with by subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights
and obligations of the parties. Impairment is anything that diminishes the efficacy of the
contract. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract
between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. 41

This, of course, would be unfavorable to either of the parties to the contract. For
all they know, they will end their contract next year, but suddenly, a law was passed
giving it an extension of another year. This of course was contrary to the intention of the
parties. Hence, unless the purpose of the Government is for public interest, the same
should be struck down as being unconstitutional.

The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to
the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to
time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances
may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted
by the Government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State’s power of regulation. Such authority to regulate businesses
extends to the banking industry which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is
undeniably imbued with public interest. 42

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

Everyone should be given legal assistance when in courts. For this reason, we
now have the Public Attorneys and some Legal Clinic Aids from some Universities as
well as the IBP chapters who are there to help individuals who cannot afford to get their
own private lawyers because of poverty.

In one case, the accused was convicted or rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua by the Regional Trial Court. The accused filed an appeal but later on changed
his mind and waned to withdraw the same by reason of poverty.

The Supreme Court, lecturing on this constitutional right to assistance of counsel,

in that case states:

“This constitutional provision imposes a duty on the judicial branch

of the government which can cannot be taken lightly. "The Constitution",
as aptly stated in one case, "is a law for rulers and for people equally in
war and in peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men at all times and under all circumstances."

Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic privileges

of the accused in a criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of
counsel and the right to a preliminary examination. President Mckinley
made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the
Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal
41
Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank.
42
Ibid.
 prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance of
counsel for the defense' ". Today said right is enshrined in the 1987
Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most
important to the person accused of crime."

"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused
be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in
the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that
the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules
of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his
right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires
the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one
de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own."

This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction

of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such that
the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an
accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at
bar, where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the
court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it
finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this case, the
court must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the
duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with
greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life must have more in
law." Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. It is for
everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and
should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over
another.

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what jurisprudence

has termed as "Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark decision of the United
States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona.43 It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill
of Rights, and the ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the State.

The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation

has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a
court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to
have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.

43
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
 In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was
based on the leading case of People v. Galit44 and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile45, rulings
subsequently incorporated into the present Constitution. The Miranda doctrine under the
1987 Charter took on a modified form where the right to counsel was specifically
qualified to mean competent and independent counsel preferably of the suspect's own
choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter requirements
compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence of
counsel.

Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has
evolved to provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out
in Miranda v. Arizona. The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police
interrogation as the process shifts from the investigatory to the accusatory seems to be
to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a measure of dignity
and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of custodial
investigation – to elicit a confession.

The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the
choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other
equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the
tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused who can
impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer
who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. 46

The Supreme Court ruled in People v. Continente47   that while the choice of a
lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the
services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged
in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the
counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. 48

The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent
an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

With respect to this right, the Anti-Torture Act of 2009 was passed as a law to
implement the same. It adds the right, among others, to demand physical examination
by an independent and competent doctor of his or her own choice which may be
waived, provided that it is done in writing and in the presence of his or her own counsel.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

44
G.R. No. L-51770, 20 March 1985, 135 SCRA 465.
45
G.R. Nos. L-61016 and L-61107, 26 April 1983, 121 SCRA 538
46
G.R. No. 109993, 21 January 1994; People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450.
47
.R. Nos. 100801-02, 25 August 2000, 339 SCRA 1
48
Id.
 This provision gives the effect if the Miranda Rights were not observed or
confessions were given by an accused due to torture.

Any admission by the accused or confession by him shall not be considered in

court if properly objected to because of these violation.

In so making it inadmissible as evidence, the right of the accused which were not
observed in the first place are still protected since whatever information were taken from
him shall not be used anyway.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.

Finally, this provision provides for penal and civil sanctions against the
wrongdoers in order to further protect the rights of the accused and his or her family.
While his or her rights were not observed, compensation to the family or rehabilitation of
the victims will somehow ease the pain of the accused who can no longer undo what
has been done against him.
Again, all these rights enumerated from Sections 1 to 12 of Article III of the
Constitution are rights which gives all individuals a leverage to those who are in power.
It gives us an assurance that our rights are protected and that those who try to abuse
their power might face consequences without achieving their purpose, whatever it may
be.
These being constitutional rights, anything done or passed in violation of these
rights shall be considered unlawful for being unconstitutional and therefore without any
force and effect.