“LIMBUWAN IS OUR HOME-LAND, NEPAL IS OUR COUNTRY”: HISTORY,

TERRITORY, AND IDENTITY IN LIMBUWAN’S MOVEMENT

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Dambar Dhoj Chemjong

December 2017
© 2017 Dambar Dhoj Chemjong
 “LIMBUWAN IS OUR HOME, NEPAL IS OUR COUNTRY”: HISTORY,

TERRITORY, AND IDENTITY IN LIMBUWAN’S MOVEMENT

Dambar Dhoj Chemjong, Ph. D.

Cornell University 2017

This dissertation investigates identity politics in Nepal and collective identities

by studying the ancestral history, territory, and place-naming of Limbus in east Nepal.

This dissertation juxtaposes political movements waged by Limbu indigenous people

with the Nepali state makers, especially aryan Hindu ruling caste groups. This study

examines the indigenous people’s history, particularly the history of war against

conquerors, as a resource for political movements today, thereby illustrating the link

between ancestral pasts and present day political relationships. Ethnographically, this

dissertation highlights the resurrection of ancestral war heroes and invokes war scenes

from the past as sources of inspiration for people living today, thereby demonstrating

that people make their own history under given circumstances. On the basis of

ethnographic examples that speak about the Limbus’ imagination and political

movements vis-à-vis the Limbuwan’s history, it is argued in this dissertation that there

can not be a singular history of Nepal. Rather there are multiple histories in Nepal,

given that the people themselves are producers of their own history. Based on

ethnographic data, this dissertation also aims to debunk the received understanding

across Nepal that the history of Nepal was built by Kings.

 This dissertation is a case study of Limbu claims for their collective identity

and Limbu resistance to the state of Nepal. This dissertation illustrates that identity

politics in Nepal and the Limbu quest for Limbuwan identity is better studied in terms

of their contending relationship with the state-led making of the collective aryan

Hindu identity in Nepal over more than six centuries.

 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Dambar Dhoj Chemjong was born and brought up in a mountain village of

Limbuwan in east Nepal in a Limbu Subba family with local kipat land holding

functionary rights. After finishing his School Leaving Certificate. he taught as a

primary school teacher for three years. He did his Intermediate and B.A. degrees from

Dhankuta Campus in east Nepal. He did his Masters degree in anthropology from

Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu and started teaching there from 1996. He did his

M. Phil. in anthropology from the University of Bergen, Norway in 2002. He also

worked in the Nepal government civil service for ten years.

In 2007 the Government of Nepal appointed him to the Electoral Constituency

Delineation Commission, which delineated the country into 240 constituencies for the

purpose of the post-conflict Constituent Assembly election in 2008. He is currently

lecturer at the Central Department of Anthropology at Tribhuvan University. He lives

in Swoyambhu, Kathmandu with his spouse Hema, and two sons, Mukum and

Muksam.

v
Dedicated to the memory of my

Grand Father

Subba Darwar Singh Limbu

vi
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many peoples and institutions have unconditionally helped me in research and

writing this dissertation. David Holmberg, my committee chair, has been a remarkable

mentor and teacher, who not only showed me the way to Cornell but also taught me to

think differently about culture. I learned anthropology not only from his classes but

also through informal conversations with him over 15 years now. Had he not shown

me the way to Cornell I would have ended up elsewhere nor would I have had a

valuable perspective to look into societies, including my own. The intellectual product

I have at hand here has been possible only because of David’s unconditional support

and academic guardianship. I shall remain forever grateful to my committee chair,

David Holmberg, for all the support he has given me both on and off campus in Ithaca

and Nepal. I feel proud and fortunate to be his student and thankful to him for

accepting me as his student. My committee member, Kathryn S. March, has been so

remarkably helpful both academically as well as in helping me navigate through

difficulties with Cornell’s bureaucracy as an international student. I learned so much

about the conceptual and theoretical differences and similarities between non-Hindu

adivasis and Hindu caste cultures in Nepal from her class on Peoples and Cultures in

the Himalayas. I would also like to recognise Kathryn for all her support, guidance,

and care not only for me but also for my spouse Hema, and my boys, Mukum and

Muksam. My committee member, Magnus Fiskesjö, has been a great help in relation

to choosing my research topic. During my first semester at Cornell, I took his class on

Asian Minorities in which his discussions and readings on the Wa people from the

vii
borderlands between Burma and China were greatly helpful for me as I looked into

Limbu society. Limbu lifeways and customs seem similar to the Wa in many respects.

At the Department of Anthropology at Cornell, informal meetings and

conversations with Terence Turner were serendipitously helpful in whetting my

anthropologically blunt intellectual edge then. To me, Terry’s concept of synchronic

pluralism is a theoretical capsule that is useful in dealing with the problems facing

multi-cultural societies like Nepal. His phrasing of Marx and anthropology together,

by “anthropologizing Marx and [the] marxification of anthropology” during his talk on

“Indigenous Peoples’ Movement and Marxism” in Kathmandu in May 2012, was

profoundly helpful in conceptualizing my research. Terry is no more with us now but

the anthropological theoretical capsules he has left behind are so useful and perfect for

interpreting indigenous peoples movements in particular, and societies in general. I am

really grateful to the late Professor Terence Turner for providing me with a uniquely

different understanding of anthropology, which helped me to look towards a different

horizon. Jane Fajans was the Director of Graduate Studies in the Department when I

came to Cornell. It would not have been easy for me in starting graduate school at

Cornell without her support and guidance. In my first semester, the proseminar class

with Steve Sangren was intellectually stimulating as well as enlightening. I am

thankful to Steve not only for that class but also for thoughtful conversations, focusing

mainly on politics. I am also grateful to Audra Simpson for her class on the

Anthropology of Colonialism. The class mainly discussed native Americans, and The

First Nations’ historical and political issues in the face of European colonization. Her

class really helped me to think through the adivasi Limbu situation in Nepal.

viii
 My travel between Ithaca and Nepal for my research was supported by the

Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies and the Graduate School at Cornell.

The Department of Anthropology’s emergency fund also provided invaluable financial

support. I am grateful to these organizations for financially supporting me.

While doing my field research in Nepal, many individuals and organizations

were generous and helpful. I worked with DB Angbung, a promising student of

anthropology but also a scholar in Limbu mundhum, literature and writing as well as a

full time activist in the Limbuwan movement. Without his support, this work would

not have gotten into this form. Conversations with the leaders of the Federal

Limbuwan State Council including Kumar Lingden, Khagendra Makhim, and Surya

Makhim were extremely helpful in knowing the history of the Limbuwan based

political parties and their movements in Nepal. I am thankful to DB Angbung for all

his support. I am grateful to Kirat Yakthung Chumlung’s Arjun Limbu, Yograj

Wanem and Lila Singak for their time and help for me. I am also thankful to the

Department of Anthropology at Tribhuvan University and the professors and the staff

for all the support they given me. I am thankful to Professor Om Gurung for his

support and generosity to me during my field research years in Nepal. I am also

grateful to Professor Laya Uprety for recommending my study leave from the Central

Department of Anthropology while I was writing up my dissertation. I would also like

to thank Professor Binod Pokharel in this regard. Coffee talks with colleagues Janak

Rai, Mukta Lama, and Suresh Dhakal were always stimulating as well as helpful for

generating new ideas about adivasi-janajati politics in Nepal. I am thankful to Suresh

Dhakal, Janak Rai and Mukta Lama for their time and stimulating kurakani.

ix
Coversattions with Dr. Krishna Bhattachan has been always invigorating and

enlightening. I have learned a lot from his about the adivasi-janajati movements in

Nepal. I would like to express my sincere horchhe to him.

My association with Cornell began through the Cornell Nepal Study Program

(CNSP) in Kirtipur, when the program recruited me as a Tribhuvan University student

in 1995. CNSP’s Program director Banu Oja unconditionally helped me in when I was

a Tribhuvan University student, and even thereafter by recruiting me as Teaching

Fellow at the program. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Banu didi for

her support not only for me but also for Hema, Mukum, and Muksam. In Ithaca, I am

extremely thankful to Shambhu Oja for all the support and care he gave our family

including myself, Hema, Mukum and Muksam. Shambhu even hosted all of us at the

Oja home for a whole week in summer 2015, taking us to different places around New

York and Washington, DC.

I wish to extend my sincere thanks to James Sharrock for reading and

meticulously copy-editing and formatting this dissertation. I am truly indebted to

James for his contribution I also thank Pauline Limbu for her constant suggestions

and curious questions about my research. I also appreciate Pauline for suggesting the

title of this dissertation. I would like to thank Yogendra Gurung for his unconditional

help in solving the formatting issues in the dissertation. I would also like to thank Sher

Bahadur Gurung for his help in designing the maps in the dissertation.

Finally, the source of my inspiration for this research is my grandfather, late

Subba Darwar Singh Limbu, who constantly taught his six grandchildren to live a life

with dignity and identity. I dedicate this work to the memories of my grandfather. My

x
sincere gratitude is for my mother, Kaushila, and my father, the late Gorakh Bahadur

Limbu, for giving me such a beautiful life and the entire world. My three brothers and

two sisters provided much support to me while I was growing up. My little family:

my beloved wife Hema, jetha chhora Mukum, and kanchha chhora Muksam are the

ultimate source of inspiration for my work, life and living. It is my sincere

understanding that I would be no one without the support and love of my family and

society.

xi
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................... v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... vii

NOTES ON TRANSCRIPTON ..................................................................................xiii

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... xiv

LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................... xv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... xvii

CHAPTER ONE
HISTORY, TERRITORY, AND IDENTITY OF LIMBUWAN .................................. 1

CHAPTER TWO
THE FORMATON OF LIMBUWAN BASED POLITICAL PARTIES .................... 34

CHAPTER THREE
LIMBUS AND LIMBUWAN IN LIGHT OF THE POLITICS OF PLACE -
NAMING AND MAPS ................................................................................................ 58

CHAPTER FOUR
HISTORY AS A RESOURCE FOR POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND
COLLECTI VE IDENTITY ....................................................................................... 103

CHAPTER FIVE
THE NEW REPUBLIC OF NEPAL, THE CONSTITUTENT ASSEMBLY, AND
THE POLITICS OF LIMBUWAN ............................................................................ 148

CHAPTER SIX
THE CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2015: TRIUMPHANT ARYAN IDENTITY
VERSUS RESILIENT ADIVASI IDENTITY .......................................................... 201

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 237

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 251

xii
 NOTES ON TRANSCRIPTON

In this dissertation, I have transcribed Nepali words into the Roman alphabet as they

are pronounced in vernacular Nepali. I have also transcribed Limbu language words

into the Roman alphabet as they are pronounced by the native Limbu speakers. I have

also used “L” and “N” in parenthesis: (L) and (N) in which L = Limbu, and N=

Nepali. Non-English terms are italicized. I have also pluralized Nepali and Limbu

words by adding “s” wherever appropriate. Nepali or Limbu proper names are not

modified. The official calendar used in Nepal is based on the Vikram era (Vikram

Sambat) which is approximately 56 years and 4 months ahead of the Gregorian

calendar. Materials consulted in the Nepali language are generally dated in Vikram

Sambat based calendar. They are indicated with the abbreviation “v.s.” following the

date. All translations and images are mine unless stated otherwise.

xiii
 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Limbu Population in Limbuwan by Districts ............................................... 22

Table: 5.1 Showing different political parties and their adivasi janajati winngs ....... 172

xiv
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Showing Nepal in the World Map ................................................................ 4

Figure 1.2 Welcome to Bijaypur, the Historic Capital City of Limbuwan - FLSC ....... 8

Figure 1.3 Victory to the Unity of Limbuwan- FLSC .................................................... 8

Figure 1.4 The Sign Board Displaying the Text of the Treaty with Gorkha Kingdom,
and Map of Limbuwan, Erected by KYC ..................................................... 9

Figure 1.5 Sirijanga, the Propagator of the Limbu Script and Language. Erected by
KYC ............................................................................................................ 10

Figure 1.6 The Statue of Historian IS Chemjong in Bhedetar. .................................... 12

Figure 1.7 It Cannot be Imagined of Nepal without Limbuwan .................................. 14

Figure 1.8 Map Showing the Density of Limbu Population in Nepal .......................... 19

Figure 1.9 Showing Caste and Ethnic Populations in Nine Districts of Limbuwan .... 22

Figure 2.1 Photos of the Two FLSC Martyrs Placed on Table .................................... 56

Figure 3.1 Nepal Map Showing 14 Provinces Proposed by CA ................................ 100

Figure 4.1 A Pamphlet Issued by Gopal Kirati .......................................................... 127

Figure 4.2 Sketch of Kangsore and Raghu Rana, Gorkhali commander.................... 131

Figure 4.3 FLSC Leaders and Cadres Carrying homage to the warrior Kangsore..... 134

Figure 4.4 Establish Autonomous States on Historical Basis .................................... 139

Figure 4.5 Cover Page of the Training Manual: Kangsore Commanding Course ..... 141

Figure 4.6 Yalambar’s statue Paying respect to First Kiranti kingyalamber. ........... 145

Figure 5.1 King Gyanendra's effigy in Display in Gongabu April Revolution 2006 . 149

Figure 5.2 Ganatantra Chok [Republic Intersection]................................................. 151

Figure 5.3 Silam Sakma ............................................................................................. 162

Figure 5.4 CA Members from Limbuwan Being Felicitated by Chumlung............... 170

xv
Figure 5.5 Guarantee the Limbuwan Autonomous State with Right to Self-
Determination – JLF ................................................................................. 174

Figure 5.6 Limbuwan Activists and Cadres in the Sit-in Program: Declare Limbuwan
Autonomy- FILSC ..................................................................................... 189

Figure 5.7 CPN-UML's Leaders Mainly From adivasi-janajati Background

Announcing their Abandonment of the CPN-UML. 2012. ...................... 193

Figure 5.8 Joint Victory Rally in Tundikhel, Kathmandu. 2006 ................................ 199

Figure 6.1 Placard Slogan Reads: Discard the Cow as the National Animal ............. 229

Figure 6.2 Placard Held High With a Message: Victory to Secular State of Nepal ... 232

Figure 7.1 Limbuwan Volunteer Carrying a Placard Ringroad March Pass .............. 238

xvi
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJJF = Adivasi-janajati Joint Front

CA = Constituent Assembly

CNSP = Cornell Nepal Study Program

CPN (Maoist) = Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

CPN-ML = Communist Party of Nepal- Marxist Leninist

CPN-UML = Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist

EC = Election Commission

ECDC = Electoral Constituencies Delineation Commission

FDF = Federal Democratic Party

FDNF = Federal Democratic National Forum

FDNF = Federal Democratic National Front

FDP = Federal Democratic Party

FILSC = Federality Implementation Limbuwan Struggle Committee

FLP = Federal Limbuwan Party

NP = Nationality Party

FLSC = Federal Limbuwan State Council

FPTP =First Past the Post

FSP = Federal Socialist Party

IPO = Indigenous Peoples Organization

JLF = Joint Limbuwan Front

KNLF = Kirat National Liberation Front

KPGSC = Kirat Peoples Government State Council

KYC = Kirat Yakthung Chumlung

LLF = Limbuwan Liberation Front

LLM = Limbuwan Liberation Front

xvii
LNLF = Limbuwan National Liberation Front

LRA = Limbuwan Reform Association

MJF = Madhesi Joint Front

NC = Nepali Congress

NFSF = Nepal Free Students Front

NGO = Non-Governmental Organization

NPLP = Naitonal People’s Liberation Party

PLP = Peoples Liberation Party

RLF = Revolutionary Limbuwan Front

RPP = Rastriya Prajatantra Party

TV = Television

VDC = Village Development Committee

xviii
 CHAPTER ONE

HISTORY, TERRITORY, AND IDENTITY OF LIMBUWAN

You can not erase our identity

We will not let our self-respect down
We are the first settlers, this country’s pride
You can not erase our identity1.
- Rajan Rai

Introduction
This dissertation is a study of the politics of Limbuwan based on the movements for

collective identity [pahichan ko andolan], ancestral history [purkhauli itihas], territory [that-

thalo2], and naming of the Limbuwan province by the Limbus in east Nepal. The description and

interpretation of the Limbuwan movement vis-à-vis the dominant “Hindu” state of Nepal

showcased in this dissertation comprises the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century when

the state of Nepal was in the process of drafting a new constitution through the two tenures of the

Constituent Assembly (CA). This includes the first CA from 2008-2012, and the second CA

1
मेट्न सक्दै नौ तिमीले हाम्रो पहहचान ।
ढल्न हददै नौँ हामी हाम्रो स्वाभिमान।।
मल
ू बासी हौँ हामी, यो दे शको शान।
मेट्न सक्दै नौ तिमीले हाम्रो पहहचान।। (Lyrics, music and vocal by Rajan Rai) [my translation].
2
The word ‘territory’ is often translated into Nepali as bhugol [geography]. The Nepali term bhugol does not
provide us the meaning of political sovereignty and autonomy to the extent by which the term “territory” or
“territoriality” (Godelier 2009) does both denotatively as well as connotatively. Hence I shall translate ‘territory’
into Nepali as that-thalo based on common parlance in Limbuwan. For the Limbus and the Limbuwan politicians,
that-thalo means a territory that belongs to a group which first-settled and ruled in the area before the arrival of any
other groups. Limbuwan politicians classify the population groups in Limbuwan also in relation to that-thalo,
namely that-thalo khuleko (those whose ancestral territories are known) and that-thalo nakhuleko (those groups
whose ancestral territories are unknown) meaning that the adivasi-janajatis are the that-thalo khuleko groups as their
ancestral territories are the same area they inhabit now, and the Bahun, Chhetri, Dalits are the that-thalo nakhuleko
groups, since their ancestral territories are elsewhere.

1
from 2013-2015. As the aim of Limbuwan identity politics was to ensure a Limbuwan federal

state in the constitution, this dissertation juxtaposes the aryan, Hindu, casteist [jatiya] identity

(Hindu jatiya pahichan) with the non-aryan, non-Hindu, non-caste indigenous-nationality

[adivasi-janajati] identities, focusing on the Limbus and their quest for Limbuwan. Lionel

Caplan, on the expansion of the Hindu aryan civilization across the mountains and the foothills

of the eastern Himalaya, states:

The spread of Hindu civilization throughout most of South Asia has taken place over
many centuries. An important aspect of this process has been manner in which the
Hindus, advancing here by military conquest, there by migration, have interacted with the
tribal communities lying on the route of their progression (Caplan 1970:1).

Caplan’s statement above is succinct and accurate as Limbuwan was the last territory to

the eastern frontier to be incorporated under the Hindu Gorkha Kingdom through a conciliatory

agreement (Regmi 1978; Chemjong, 1967; Kurumbang 2009; Baral and Tigela-Limbu 2008;

Tigela-Limbu, Tunghang, and Angla 2013) between the two in 1774.

The political and historical trajectories portrayed in this dissertation will demonstrate that

Hindu rulers initiated identity politics in Nepal as early as in the 14th century during the rule of

the Malla dynasty in the Nepal valley3, by legally protecting the cows and Brahmans4 during the

King Jaysthiti Malla’s reign5, the early Shah period in the 17th century6, and throughout the Shah

monarchy ever since the expansion of the Gorkha Kingdom in the 18th century. These legal

examples illustrate the Hindu Aryan caste supremacy in Nepal for more than six centuries. The

making of the Hindu state of Nepal was based on casteist [jatiya] politics, initiated through legal

injunctions and orders that culminated in the promulgation of the Muluki Ain 1854 (Civil Code),

3
The present capital of Nepal, Kathmandu valley, was known as Nepal, Nepal khalto [valley], tin sahar Nepal
[three cities Nepal] in common parlance until the 1940s.
4
Brahman is called Bahun in common parlance as well as in vernacular Nepali writing. Both the terms Brahman and
Bahun will be used interchangeably in this dissertation.
5
NAYAVIKASINI (MANAVANYAYSHASTRA): Laws Made by King Sthitiraj Malla in Bikram Era 1436 B.S.
[1379 CE] (Nepal Era 500) (Nepal Law Commission. http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en)
6
Rules Issued by His Majesty’s Ram Shah (Nepal Law Commission. http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en)

2
thereby classifying the populations of Nepal into vertical hierarchies of a caste system

classifying the Bahun and Chhetri - tagadhari jat - as the high and symbolically pure castes, and

the artisan groups as untouchables. The Muluki Ain 1854 (Civil Code) also incorporated non-

Hindu, non-Aryan, non-caste indigenous-nationalities [adivasi-janajati] groups by classifying all

of them as matawali jat7 [liquor drinking castes]. Various injunctions in relation to prohibiting

beef consumption and respecting Brahmans in the Hindu land in the names of mainly adivasi

Tamang, Limbu, Rai, were already in place (Regmi 1979) but the Muluki Ain 1854 (Civil Code)

was the legal consolidation of the process of constitutionalizing Hindu Aryan identity as the

Nepali state’s identity:

[It is] a Hindu Kingdom, the law of whose court maintains that the killing of cows,
women and brahmans shall not be allowed. [It is] a sacred land of the Himavatkhanda8,
of the holy shrines [dedicated] to Vasuki, the effulgent phallus of Pashupati and
Guhyesvari…It is the only Hindu Kingdom in the Kali Age (MA:1:1:8 quoted by Sharma
[2004:xvi]).

The promulgation of the Muluki Ain in 1854 legally institutionalized Nepal as a Hindu

State in all terms of the state polity, governance and bureaucratic administration and, above all,

in terms of the cultural identity of the people including the non-aryan, non-Hindu indigenous-

nationalities [Adivasi-janajatis]. The Muluki Ain assigned the adivasi-janajati groups with a

new, but in many ways, derogatory sounding matawali jat [liquor-drinking caste] that also

brought about an enormous impact on their commensal, religious, social, cultural and customary

practices. In this regard, present day political movements led by Nepal’s adivasi-janajatis in

7
The Civil Code 1854 classified the populations of Nepal into broadly five hierarchical strata: i) Wearers of the holy
cord [tagadhari]; ii) Non-enslavable Alcohol-Drinkers [namasinya matawali]; iii) Enslavable Alcohol-Drinkers
[masinya matawali]; iv) Impure but touchable castes [pani nachalnya chhoi chhito halnu naparnya]; v) Impure and
untouchable castes [pani nachalnya chhoi chhito halnu parnya] (Höfer 2004:9–10; Sharma 1977:281–284; Bista
1991:35–44).
8
Part of the Himalaya.

3
relation to their collective identity and history should be viewed in juxtaposition with their ever-

contentious relationship to the making of the Hindu state of Nepal.

Figure 1.1 Showing Nepal in the World Map

This dissertation is a case study of Limbuwan identity politics focusing on the Limbus’

claims of their collective identity based on the war-history, territory, and place-naming, and

resistance to the state of Nepal. This dissertation is a double-edged depiction of identity politics

in Nepal in which the Limbus’ quest for Limbuwan identity may be better studied in terms of

their contending relationships to the making of the collective aryan Hindu identity in Nepal over

more than six centuries.

4
Exploring the Research Topic

In the summer of 2008, I returned to Nepal from Ithaca to explore my possible field

research sites as well as my research topic for my Ph.D. dissertation. Although I had decided to

work among the Limbu in east Nepal, I was not yet sure if I would pursue the topic about the

‘kipat9 ownership of land among the Limbus’. The Limbus were one of the “aboriginal

inhabitants” (Campbell 1840:595) whose geographically contiguous territory [that-thalo] was

divided into three different states (Subba 2006)10 “following the absorption of Limbuwan into

the Nepal state” in the 1770s. Mahesh Chandra Regmi (1977) and Lionel Caplan (1991) have

studied the socio-economic aspects of Limbu kipat land in relation to the Nepali state’s constant

efforts over two centuries to transform the autonomous Limbu tribes into tax paying Limbu

peasants (Caplan 1991). With the loss of kipat land, Limbus were alienated from their culture

and identity too:

With the abolition of kipat the Limbus lost their 'claim to the past' and to do so is 'to lose
part of who one is in the present' (Weiner 1985:210, quoted by Caplan). The
consequences of changes in land tenure, therefore, may be less severe in terms of
livelihood than in terms of sense of 'self''… How can there be Limbus without kipat?
Kipat provided a means of belonging, to a place and a distinctive community - one was
not separable from the other. Conversion of the land to raikar11 has severed that

9
Clan based communal land ownership. Limbus did not hold land as individual property until the Land Reform Act
1964 abolished the Kipat land right. The word kipat is not from Limbu language. Limbus seemed to have used the
phrase Tangsing Khoksing (Chemjong 1966) meaning ‘clear forest and cultivate’. The communal land ownership
prevalent among the Limbus prior to the Gorkha conquest was recognized by the state in the very days of Gorkha
expansion in 1774-75 by a royal decree, which is considered by the Limbus, as the treaty between the Gorkha Hindu
King and the Limbu Chiefs. The treaty described Limbus as the “true owners” of the land and territory. From the
1770s until the 1960s, Limbu headmen (Subba functionaries assigned by the state) were the ones who assigned land
cultivation rights to any non-Limbu immigrants willing to settle in Limbuwan. The state encouraged other non-
Limbus — particularly Bahun and Chhetris - to emigrate to Limbuwan, also by issuing royal orders instructing
Limbu headmen to assign cultivable land to the immigrants. In Limbuwan, Subba were exclusively from the Limbus
enjoying the jurisdictional rights as the collective owners of the territory and land. Kipat land was the inalienable
cultural property of the Limbus, alienation from which created a cultural disruption and crisis in Limbu identity,
which the Limbu community seems to have understood as being associated with their territorial autonomy. The state
also assigned kipat land to other communities for different purposes. For example, the Majhi community were
assigned kipat land in exchange for ferrying the governments’ logistics, postal service, military, ammunitions across
rivers.
10
Gorkha Hindu State, British-India, and Sikkim (Sikkim was an independent state until it was annexed into India in
the 1970s).
11
A form of land ownership whereby land was transferable as individual ownership.

5
 connection, and rendered the land what it had never before - a commodity. By legalizing
for the alienation of what had previously been inalienable, the state effectively
inaugurated the last phase in the transformation of a tribal into a peasant community
(Caplan 1970; Caplan 1991:319).

My initial research interest was motivated by scholarly works of various scholars (Caplan

1970; Sagant 2008; Shrestha 2042; Sangraula 2067 v.s.) focusing on Limbu’s kipat land, and

based upon the movements and claims by Limbus themselves in their quest for their ancestral

kipat land ever since Limbuwan’s annexation under the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal in 1774

(Chemjong 1957). In this short reconnaissance trip, I wanted to explore if kipat was an important

collective reference for Limbuwan’s identity politics in the wake of the success of the People’s

Movement II or April Revolution in 2006. This movement subsequently led to Nepal being

declared officially a republic country in May 2008 by the Constituent Assembly (CA). I wanted

to study if land or territory [that-thalo] was also a resource for organizing collective political

activities and movements to claim their right to cultural identity. I considered this in the light of

Lionel Caplan’s findings from his study on the changing social relationship vis-a-vis mutually

conflicting interests over the land between Limbus and Bahuns in the 1960s. Caplan has

demonstrated that the Limbu wanted to maintain the kipat land whereas the Bahuns wanted to

transform the land into an individual ownership system. Since the Bahuns were socio-culturally

and politically well connected to the state bureaucracy and the court system they were able to

capture the Limbu land. With the formal abolition of Limbus’ kipat land by the state in the 1960s

the Limbus were not only dispossessed of their ancestral land but also became alienated from

their culture. I wanted to investigate if the Limbus were still trying to bring back the bygone

kipat land in order to solve a broader question: what binds together the Limbus as collective

sociopolitical agents? Is it the memory of the collective kipat land - right over the ancestral land -

or some other social, cultural, historical elements that Limbus embrace as the common

6
referential resource for their identity and culture? For my research topic, I wanted explore the

elementary cultural substances that bind the Limbus as a collective society irrespective of the

vast differences amongst Limbus.

The Limbuwan Movement and Spectacular Displays of Limbuwan Identity

Slogans of political, territorial claims, and Limbuwan are painted on roadside walls,

posters, banners hung by the trees, or tied to the utility poles across streets, billboard-like. They

look like the welcome signs for any visitor to the entrance of Dharan city - located at the

immediate end of the mid-hills. Dharan is also a border city where both the hills and the plain-

land Tarai meet. As soon as one approaches the southern entrance to Dharan from the south,

signboards with different messages welcome visitors:

i. “Welcome to Bijaypur-Dharan, the historic capital of Limbuwan”.

ii. “Victory to the unity of Limbu and Limbuwan! Cheerful greetings to you in
Limbuwan”.
iii. “Let’s establish the Limbuwan autonomous state, with right to self-determination”

These three greeting boards were put up by the Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad

[Federal Limbuwan State Council] (FLSC), a political party established in December 2005.

7
Figure 1.2 Welcome to Bijaypur, the Historic Capital City of Limbuwan - FLSC

Figure 1.3 Victory to the Unity of Limbuwan- FLSC

8
 Figure 1.4 The Sign Board Displaying the Text of the Treaty with Gorkha Kingdom, and Map of Limbuwan,
Erected by KYC

The photographs above are some of the political landmarks announcing the identity, history and

territory of Limbuwan.

Hardly one hundred meters ahead is an intersection called Tinkune, an entrance to

Dharan. Two greatly important objects are placed together at the corner of Tinkune and are no

less pronounced evidence to speak about Limbuwan than those of the signboard messages

mentioned above.

The statue of Sirijanga, the propagator of the Limbu script in Limbuwan, stands about 25

feet tall on a marble platform. This statue is an epitome of the invention of the script and

beginning of a writing tradition in the Limbu community. In the 18th century, while campaigning

for the Limbu script (now called Sirijanga) and writing in Sikkim - then an independent state

ruled by the Buddhist rulers of Tibetan origin - Sirijanga was captured following an order by

rulers and brutally murdered. They tied him to a tree and shot with arrows. Sirijanga is one of the

9
trio of Limbu national heroes together with Phalgunanda (a religious social reformer) and

Imansingh Chemjong (historian, politician and Kiratologist). Sirijanga is also considered by

many to be the first hero to achieve martyrdom for the cause of the Limbu writing tradition.

Figure 1.5 Sirijanga, the Propagator of the Limbu Script and Language. Erected by KYC

Besides Sirijunga’s statue is a signboard displaying the full text of the royal decree -

considered as the treaty between the Gorkha King and the Limbu chiefs - issued by King PN

Shah in July 1774. The text of the treaty is translated into English and it reads:

We desire peace and harmony. Our intent is good. We hereby pardon all of your crimes
and confirm the customs and traditions, rights and privileges of your country. Join our
nobles and render them assistance. Take care of the land as you did when it was being
ruled over by your own chieftains. Enjoy the land from generation to generation as long
as it remains in existence. As mentioned above, remain under your chieftains and enjoy

10
 your traditional rights and privileges and your lands. In case we confiscate your land,
may our ancestral gods destroy our kingdom. We hereby inscribe this pledge on a copper
plate and also issue this royal order and hand it over to our Limbu brethren (Regmi
1978:626q; Chemjong 1957).

Also included in the signboard is a map of Limbuwan showing 17 thums.12 The Map is

entitled: “Pallo Kirat, Das Limbuwan, 17 thum” which refers to a historical fact that Limbuwan

was also called Pallo Kirat [far Kirat], Das Limbuwan [Ten Limbuwan]13 meaning that the

Limbuwan was founded by ten chiefs defeating other chiefs during the early 2nd millennium.

On the top of the board with the Limbuwan map and treaty text is a slogan that reads:

“aitihasik sandhi samjhautama Limbuwanko sthan!

Limbule arjeko sangharsha ra biratako shan!!”
[Limbuwan’s status within the historical treaty and accord is the dignity of bravery
earned by the Limbu]

To me, the signboards and the statue, as spectacular displays, were speaking so much

about Limbuwan’s historic memory of the treaty preceded by war with the Hindu Gorkha

Kingdom. Their territorial claim, as shown in the map defined by the treaty, and the heroics of

Limbuwan were evidence of the Limbus unique and different history.

As I reached the center, the main square of Dharan city, only about 1.5 miles north from

Tinkune, to travel further north towards the hills, mountains and the Tamor river valley, there

were dozens of buses and jeeps travelling between Dharan and different hill towns to the north.

Those buses and jeeps were also carrying slogans about Limbuwan politics such as the State of

Limbuwan or ‘Limbuwan State’ painted on their front.

I took a bus heading to Raja Rani, a hill village in Dhankuta district, about 35 kilometres north-

east of Dharan. As we reached Bhedetar, a hill town 18 kilometres north from Dharan, the bus

12
Thum means an administrative region. Nepal was divided into 75 districts and more than 450 thums in 1962. The
districts remained and prevailed over time whereas the thums were deliberately made obsolete.
13
Limbuwan was ruled by ten chiefs before it was annexed into the Gorkha kingdom in the 1770s.

11
stopped for a brief tea break. In the middle of Bhedetar town square is a shining golden statue of

the historian and Kiratologist, the late IS Chemjong.

Figure 1.6 The Statue of Historian IS Chemjong in Bhedetar.

My bus left Bhedetar and stopped for another break at a town called Danda Bazar where I

could see various political messages painted on roadside walls, house walls, and mile-posts.

There I saw an appealing and telling statement on Limbuwan identity in particular, and the

politics of identity in Nepal in general. A slogan painted on a building wall read:

“Limbuwan binako Nepal ra Nepal binako Limbuwan Kalpana samma pani garna
sakidaina -L.V.”
[One cannot imagine of Nepal without Limbuwan and Limbuwan without Nepal -
Limbuwan Volunteers].

Some other slogans painted here and there by the roadside included:

i. mero jyan, mero Limbuwan [My Life, My Limbuwan];

ii. jaga Limbuwan, maga Limbuwan [Rise-up Limbuwan, Fight for Limbuwan];
iii. hamro bhasha hamro bidhyalay [Our Language Our School];
iv. Welcome to Limbuwan.

12
All the slogans were painted and put up by the Limbuwan volunteers.

I had hardly travelled 25 kilometres of distance in my trip, but I came across plenty

objects, messages, and unique ways of telling visitors what is happening in the region regarding

the identity movement. Beginning from the sign-boards at Tinkune, Dharan, multiple agents

associated with the Limbuwan movement or the Limbu community were involved in putting

together these politically telling symbolic objects. Dharan’s entrance point, Tinkune’s first three

greeting sign boards were put up by the Federal Limbuwan State Council party (FLSC).14 Kirat

Yakthung Chumlung (KYC or Chumlung),15 a representative adivasi association of the Limbus

founded in 1989 (described further in chapter 5), established the statue of Sirijanga in Tinkune.

Similarly, the signboard with the Limbuwan map and the treaty text was erected by the

Limbuwan sangharsha samanbaya samiti [Limbuwan Struggle Coordination Committee]. The

paintings on the front of buses and jeeps were said to be done by the FLSC’s Limbuwan

Volunteers (LVs). And the political slogans in Danda Bazar were also painted by the LVs.

14
The FLSC party was established in December 2005.
15
KYC, founded in 1989, with its central office in Kathmandu, has organizational branches and extensions all
across the villages and the districts in the Limbuwan area. KYC is one of the members of the Nepal Federation of
Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) and involved in both Limbuwan politics as well as adivasi-janajati identity
politics through cultural and social movements.

13
 Figure 1.7 Wall Painting Message: It Cannot be Imagined of Nepal Without Limbuwan and Limbuwan Without
Nepal

Having observed these objects and the involvement of multiple actors, agents, and

associations of the Limbu community in putting up those objects I realized that the movements

vis-à-vis the kipat land was no longer as much sought after among the Limbus as it was during

the 1960s and 1970s when anthropologists Lionel Caplan (1970), Rex Jones and Shirly Jones

(1976) and Philippe Sagant (2008) were undertaking studies among the Limbus in the same

region. The kipat land was the culturally binding factor for the Limbus in the 1960s and 1970s.

But the spectacular objects erected at the intersections and along the roadsides, including the

slogan paintings in and around Dharan were telling the fact that the Limbus inalienable

association with the kipat land seemed to have now been transformed into the politics of

Limbuwan. The shift of the movement from kipat land to the Limbuwan federal state could be

14
clearly read in the LV’s (Limbuwan Volunteers) slogans: “My life: My Limbuwan” and “Rise up

Limbuwan: Fight for Limbuwan.”

Having seen those objects in relation to Limbuwan politics I could say that the idea of

‘Limbuwan’ was an important binding factor for the Limbu adivasi society. There might be

some other elements that I have overlooked but in my observation, the politics of Limbuwan was

the most visible and spectacular movement that brought Limbus together for their political cause.

To me, Limbuwan was the socially binding referent for the Limbus. While I agree on the

definition of “culture as human capacity to produce themselves as well as their own society”

(Turner 1997; Turner 2008; Turner 1999; Turner 2007b; Holmberg 2012) and culture as the

result of collective “human imagination and simultaneous enactment for actualizing the

imagination” (Godelier 2009; Godelier 1999a; Godelier 1984), I will demonstrate with

ethnographic data that Limbuwan is the culture of present day Limbus, regardless of where they

live now. To me, the Limbus history of war against the Gorkha King, the Limbu belongingness

to their that-thalo [territory] that their ancestors laid their lives to defend, and their that-thalo

were the substantive cultural elements that set the Limbus apart from others, and historically and

culturally different from the society and culture of the Nepali state-makers. To me, those

arresting displays of everything about Limbuwan suggestively resonated with the Limbu

imagination and enactment of cultural difference. It was their quest for that difference to be

recognized by the Nepali state by ensuring a Limbuwan federal state in the constitution to be

drafted in the years ahead. Fully agreeing with the statement: “Ethnography is an artefact of

cultural differences” (Holmberg 1989:9fn) I will juxtapose between two fundamentally different

cultural identities, namely the culture of adivasi Limbus vis-à-vis the dominant arya Hindu

15
cultural domination in Nepal. The identity politics of Limbuwan is, in other words, the politics of

difference.

Field-Work, Data Collection, and Interpretation

I mentioned at the outset that this dissertation mainly comprises political trajectories of

the quest for Limbuwan within the time-span of around 15 years, during the first one and a half

decades of the 21st century. Those were the tumultuous years facing Nepal and Nepali politics. I

did a reconnaissance visit to Limbuwan during summer 2008. During my three-months stay in

summer 2008, I visited Limbuwan’s Dharan city - then claimed by Limbuwan as the capital city

of Limbuwan - and a village of Rajarani in Dhankuta district for four weeks. From that first visit,

with the purpose of exploring possible research topic and field research sites, I took scores of

photographs and collected stories and anecdotes about the Limbuwan name and its history. At

that time, I was also fortunate to be invited by Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (KYC or Chumlung) to

participate in series of meetings among the different Limbu leaders, held in Lalitpur at the Kirat

Yakthung Chumlung office. This culminated in the establishment of the Joint Limbuwan Front,

(JLF) which included the representatives of eight or nine political parties. The meetings were

coordinated and facilitated by Kirat Yakthung Chumlung.

I was in Nepal for four years from fall 2010 until August 2014 for field research.

Considering the dynamic nature of the Limbuwan’s political movement, which was mainly

concentrated in the lowland districts of Sunsari, Morang, Jhapa, and Kathmandu valley’s

Lalitpur and Kathmandu my observations of the movements or my participation in them were not

limited to a specific location or research site. Rather, I tried to participate in the movements and

programs wherever they were organized and listened to the leaders’ speeches, talked to the

16
cadres and heard the LV’s slogans about Limbuwan. The Federal Limbuwan State Council

(FLSC) was well-known for organizing the movements in a different style. Among such

programs, the FLSC organized March-Pass rallies both in Limbuwan and in Kathmandu. I

partially participated in a March-Pass rally - from Urlabari to Itahari in Limbuwan (distance

about 35 kilometres) - in December 2011. Similarly, I also participated in a complete March Pass

rally around the Ring-Road (27 kilometres) in Kathmandu on May 5, 2012. During this I listened

to speeches, voice-recording them, talked with cadres, took photographs and marched along with

them. I mainly used a voice recorder. Sometimes I also video recorded the programs and

speeches and transcribed them later.

In April 2015, while I was writing my dissertation in Ithaca, a devastating earthquake hit

Kathmandu and the surrounding districts, killing nearly nine thousand people and causing

enormous destruction of physical properties. I returned to Nepal in the summer of 2015. During

my two months stay in Nepal, I observed the Sanghiya Limbuwan Party’s (Federal Limbuwan

Party - FLP) meetings held in Dharan in July 2015. I also observed different meetings organized

by the KYC as it was planning to forge an alliance for a new movement in the face of the draft

constitution that proposed an unnamed seven provinces and a promised secular state qualified by

some constitutional recognition of Hinduism. I also helped facilitate the Limbuwan Study Center

(LSC), a division of Kirat Yakthung Chumlung, to organize two interaction or discussion

programs in July and August in Kathmandu that focused on the strategies and directions of the

Limbuwan movement in the face of the draft constitution’s regressive clauses from the vantage

point of Limbuwan and the adivasi-janajatis. Those two meetings organized by LSC were so

fruitful that chapter six of this dissertation is based on the discussions in those meetings.

17
 My main interlocutors were the leaders, cadres, volunteers, of the Limbuwan parties, the

KYC’s committee officials and members, Limbu student leaders and other Limbu intellectuals. I

have collected data from the orations, speeches, and opinions delivered by leaders during mass

rallies, processions, and demonstrations and from their interviews with the media. As I showed

above, the signboards, slogans painted on walls and placards with slogans are also part of the

information this study relies on. Furthermore the poems, songs, and novels composed in

invocation of Limbu war heroes, historical personalities and the patriotic, nationalistic songs

composed to describe Limbuwan’s historicity and identity also form part of my data that speak

about Limbuwan’s identity politics founded on its unique history, place-naming, and territorial

belongingness.

Fredric Barth suggests that anthropology students take on three levels of inquiry in

undertaking studies on identity politics: micro, median, and macro levels of inquiries, which I

find useful for my research as well. By the term micro, he means local individual levels,

interactions and activities, as the real foundations of movements. Similarly, by median level, he

means intermediary organizations (Limbuwan-based organizations in this regard), which actively

mobilize local people for the movement on one hand and, on the other hand, also put pressure on

the state or even bargain with the state for the fulfillment of their political cause. Such

intermediary organizations play a vital role in staging movements, and for that purpose, they

persuade their people locally and also put pressure on or negotiate with the government to fulfill

their political cause. Finally, Barth considers the state or the constitutional and legal

arrangements as the macro level context. Barth suggests us to undertake the study of ethnicity by

looking into the detail at the roles performed at these three levels by different actors and agents

(Barth 1994:21–26).

18
 To me, Barth’s suggestion is helpful as my field research is primarily focused on what

Barth calls the intermediary organizations, namely in my research’s case the Limbuwan based

parties and the Chumlung (KYC). These are the median level organizations that mobilize the

local peoples on the one hand and also put pressure on the government on the other.

Figure 1.8 Map Showing the Density of Limbu Population in Nepal

My presentation of the data and analysis are primarily based on the Limbuwan movement

as it has occurred over the past 15 years, essentially from the turn of the century until the

promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal in 2015. However, every movement, demonstration,

rally, speech, and activity staged during those 15 years were only the continuation of events from

the past. I have interpreted the present day movements of Limbuwan in relation to their war

history, which the ancestors of the Limbus were involved in to defend their territory. In this

regard, my dissertation also partially relies on secondary sources of the data in terms of linking

19
the present with the past. The constitution, since its draft stage, led to further violence in madhes

costing about four dozens lives. The Limbuwan movement’s organizers, supporters and

sympathizers disowned the constitution by burning it at public intersections in different parts of

Limbuwan, and abroad (e.g. in London and Hong Kong) from where the Limbuwan based

parties’ sister organizations were actively supporting Limbuwan movements in Nepal. This does

not mean that everyone disowned the constitution. Equally large masses in Nepal embraced and

celebrated the constitution. But the objective of this research is also to interrogate the

constitution making process from the perspective of Limbuwan, and to look into the political

trajectories of how the state-makers and the dominant political parties succeeded in promulgating

a constitution that embraced the dominant symbolic markers of the Hindus while failing to

embrace the collective cultural differences and diversity in Nepal.

The data presented in this dissertation demonstrates that imagination and enactment of

Limbuwan is what unites most of the Limbus and their organizations in a single thread. This is

the way that the Limbus have been producing and reproducing the notion and practice of

Limbuwan for many decades now. Their involvement in the Limbuwan movement will make

them realize their Limbu identity. Therefore, taking on the fundamental definition of

anthropology as the science of culture and culture as a capacity to reproduce itself (Turner 1997;

Turner 2008; Turner 2007a; Holmberg 2012; Godelier 2009; Godelier 1999b), I argue that the

politics of Limbuwan is synonymous with the culture of the Limbus.

Limbuwan: Geography and Population

The nine districts16 eastwards from the Arun river and westwards from the Mechi river—

that borders with India—are historically known as Pallo-Kirat or Limbuwan. These nine districts

16
Taplejung, Pachthar, Ilam, Jhapa, Sankhuwasabha, Terathum, Dhankuta, Sunsari, Morang

20
are the territories where the Limbuwan movement is mainly concentrated. But Kathmandu

valley—the capital of Nepal—is also no less important for the Limbuwan movement. Limbuwan

based political parties maintain their offices in Kathmandu while the Kirat Yakthung

Chumlung’s (KYC) central office is in the Kathmandu valley too.

The Limbu population comprises about 0.39 million—1.5 percent—of the total

population of Nepal, of which more than 97 percent of the Limbu population lives in the nine

districts in the eastern most corner of Nepal. While about 375,000 Limbus inhabit the area east of

the Arun river, there are only 231 Limbus in Bhojpur district, 456 in Saptari, and 458 in

Udayapur, which are the immediate three districts to the west of the Arun river. Such a high

concentration of the Limbu population just in the nine districts shows that the Limbus have a

very limited pattern of migration even within Nepal. After the nine districts of Limbuwan, the

largest population concentration of Limbus is in Kathmandu valley. There are 11,149 Limbus in

Kathmandu, 4,358 in Lalitpur, and 1,101 in Bhaktapur. Although the Limbu population in the

Kathmandu valley is small compared to Tamang, Magar, Gurung, Rai, and Newar populations

the Limbus’ organization, KYC, is one of the strongest organizations among the adivasi-janajati

associations in Kathmandu valley. The following table shows the Limbu population distribution

in Limbuwan by districts.

21
Table 1.1 Limbu Population in Limbuwan by Districts
S. N. DISTRICT Limbu Population Percent
1 Dhankuta 21305 5.86
2 Ilam 45626 12.54
3 Jhapa 53721 14.76
4 Morang 40771 11.21
5 Panchthar 80339 22.08
6 Sankhuwasabha 8682 2.39
7 Sunsari 24256 6.67
8 Taplejung 52784 14.51
9 Terhathum 36375 10.00
Total 363859 100.00
Source: CBS, Nepal.

Panchthar district has the densest concentration of Limbus among the nine districts while

Taplejung and Terathum also have fairly large Limbu populations.

Figure 1.9 Diagram Showing Caste and Ethnic Populations in Nine Districts of Limbuwan

The above table shows that the adivasi-janajati population outnumbers other populations

in the nine districts of Limbuwan. Such a population composition indicates the need for an

adivasi-janajti alliance in the area.

22
The Emergence of adivasi-janajati Political Parties in Nepal and Theoretical Concerns

Before the adivasi-janajati movement peoples usually got involved in politics and

political parties were formed so as to create a society based on economic equality, and ultimately

to create an exploitation-less society from the vantage point of economic life and living. This

seems to be the fundamental political agenda of mainstream political parties in Nepal, even

today. Overly focusing on economic aspects alone is likely to eclipse other problems and

different types of exploitation facing people with different cultural backgrounds, meaning that

exploitation and domination may not occur only within the economic sphere. Exploitation and

domination in social, cultural spheres can be even more profound and enduring for generations.

While the adivasi-janajatis in Nepal have started to establish political parties in their own

leadership, scholars and leaders from the dominant parties criticized adivasi-janajati identity

based parties and said they would not succeed as their movements lack theoretical foundations.

Do the indigenous peoples movements really need to be buttressed by conventional political or

anthropological theories, as pointed out by some scholars and political leaders in Nepal?

Anthropologist Terence Turner has a different view on whether the theories support the

movements or vice versa:

The 'indigenous question'...constitute the sort of total challenge that puts a theoretical
discipline on its mettle. The inadequacies of the responses to that challenge by
anthropologists directly reflect fundamental shortcomings in anthropological
theory…One reason [of shortcomings] is surely the predominantly static orientation of
anthropological theory, which has concerned itself primarily with traditional cultures and
social institutions in the ' ethnographic present' rather than with situations of inter-ethnic
contact, conflict, and irreversible historical change. A corollary of this static orientation is
that anthropological theory has focused primarily upon understanding the systematicity of
social structures and the rationality of cultural classifications and symbolic forms at the
expense of seeking to relate these phenomena to a theory of action (Turner 1979:1–8).

To me, Turner’s statements are enlightening in many ways for those interested to study

adivasi-janajti movements in general and Nepal in particular. Turner also says elsewhere that the

23
indigenous peoples’ movements, beginning from the 1970s at the world scale, have also

motivated anthropologists to revise their own theoretical positions, which means that received

perspectives have been transformed. The contexts and the tropes have changed, as those involved

in adivasi-janajati politics in Nepal now seem to believe that economic inequality alone does not

explain the exploitation, which is unlike the leaders of the mainstream political parties in Nepal.

In Nepal, for the adivasi-janajati movement organizers, cultural inequality and cultural

exploitation imposed and initiated by the Nepali state seems to be the most pressing problem. So

nowadays those involved in identity politics are well aware of the fact that they may need to

fight for the creation of a society in which the State shall treat all different cultural groups on an

equal basis as guaranteed by a constitution. Therefore the adivasi-janajatis and madhesi peoples

in recent decades have been organizing themselves politically to build a new Nepal in which all

kinds of cultural inequalities, including the state’s exclusionary treatment towards ‘other

cultures’ on the basis of ‘differences’, should come to an end. Be it in the form of ‘recognition’

of cultural identity, or the ‘inclusive democracy’ or as ‘compensation for the historical injustices

inflicted upon now marginalized populations, or through federalism based on cultural identity, all

these measures should be directed towards building a new Nepal where all different cultures

shall be understood as “contemporaneously existing at spatially different” locales (Turner

1999:115). This is as opposed to an understanding of cultural differences as surviving across

hierarchically linear stages as the very first generation of anthropologists, EB Tylor and LH

Morgan, suggested. Nowadays the understandings of what comprises a society is shifting in

Nepal and across the world, with rising of the fourth world, with the upsurge in identity

movements led by the indigenous nationalities over the world. Thomas Kuhn (1974) rightly

argues that new ideas that can shift the existing paradigm may arise often from youths and from

24
the marginalized groups of society. So what is the basic fabric of society, which threads are any

society woven by? Nowadays the new political movements in Nepal suggest that exploitation

and domination are multidimensional. Hence equality and equity in society should not be

measured by economic categories alone.

Marginalization and exclusion of certain groups in society has reasons as Godelier says:

‘Capitalism and the state are responsible for some group’s exclusion and marginalization from

broader society. Once excluded, it is very difficult to be included back in the society’ (Godelier

1999).

Cultural Equality is Achievable but Economic Equality is a Utopia

In Nepal non-government organizations (NGOs) have, since the early 1990s, contributed

to economic and community development to some extent but have not contributed in terms of

real political empowerment as well as ensuring people’s cultural rights, particularly adivasi

people’s rights. NGOs in general depoliticizes people, if not actually blocking them from being

involved in organized politics. This might have been one of the reasons that the Maoists

vehemently opposed the NGOs presence in Nepal during the jana yudha (Peoples War, 1996-

2006). The rconomic development perspective grossly ignores cultural contexts. Ever since

Limbuwan was absorbed by the Hindu state, Limbus have been trying to achieve their territorial,

historical, and cultural rights. However, the state and NGOs - particularly after the advent of

democracy [prajatantra] in 1951 - have dealt with the Limbus as though economic progress and

community development are all they need as a society. This might be a reason that once a self-

ruling, self-reliant, and autonomous Limbu society - when measured by economic standard - was

25
relegated to being among the poorest communities by the end of the second millennium as

UNDP’s Nepal Human Development Report in 1998 reported:

“Among the various caste/ethnic groups, the incidence of poverty is highest among
Limbus, followed by socially downgraded formerly untouchable castes (Kami, Damai,
and Sarki)” (NESAC 1998:131).

As soon as the above report came to the notice of officials in the KYC, Limbu adivasi

organization, they interpreted that such an economic regression was a consequence of the

abolition of Limbus ancestral kipat land by the state. While the Limbus’ would seek reasons for

their economic “backwardness” in the context of state-imposed cultural exploitation and

domination, the state and developmental NGOs would simply look into Limbu society from a

lop-sided vantage point of economic progress. If one looks at Nepal’s progress from the vantage

of culture, the Hindu state of Nepal may be seen to have advanced at the cost of cultural

regression of the adivasi-janajatis.

In fact, modernization, development and the state’s goal is to universalize or homogenize

the society in general and Nepal in particular. If homogenized, it will be the ruling caste or class

gaining the most benefits from the state of Nepal. Creating equality in societies in terms of

economic, political, or developmental relations is problematic and not even possible in the

present day “economically globalized politically differentiated” (Turner 2004:198), globological

(Frank, 1998) world.

In fact equality on the basis of economic standard cannot be created but cultural equality

may be achievable if cultures are conceived as collective and uniquely different identities. If

there is treatment of all cultures equally in the eyes of legal arrangements, cultural co-existence

is achievable and possible as well. Achieving economic equality, educational equality, and

developmental equality seem to be utopian goals that a state can hardly achieve. Furthermore,

26
states’ roles have now been reduced to “defending the interests of their own as well as

international development and finance organizations” (Turner 2007a:118–119). The state of

Nepal is not an exception in terms of what Terence Turner writes about the state’s reduced role

as well as its control over its citizens. This is even more so the case when regarding the adivasi

populations as now about 20 per cent of the total Nepali population are working abroad as

migrant workers to remit money back home to maintain their livelihoods. Regarding the

theoretical relevance and possible solutions to the Limbuwan’s quest for state recognition of

their pahichan, itihas ra that-thalo [identity, history and territory], I find Terence Turner’s

formulation of synchronic pluralism as a concept helps us better understand the problems in the

adivasi-janajati quest for recognition in relationships with the state.

Limbu and Limbuwan Identity in View of the European Anthropologists and

Administrators (c.a.1800s-1950s)

EB Tylor, who is said to have defined culture for the first time in anthropology in his

book Primitive Culture: Researches in the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion,

Art, and Custom published in 1874 mentioned the Limbus as practicing sacrificial rituals

including sacrifice of cow:

So, in India, the Limbus of Darjeeling make small offerings of grain, vegetables, and
sugar-cane, and sacrifice cows, pigs, fowls, &c., on the declared principle “the life breath
to the gods, the flesh to ourselves.” It seems likely that such meaning may largely explain
the sacrificial practices of other religions…in conjunction with these accounts, the
unequivocal meaning of funeral sacrifices (Tylor 1874:392).

Tylor’s mention of Limbu sacrificial ritual was also to exemplify the ‘philosophy of

religion among the “lower races of mankind” (Tylor 1870) to support his classification of

religion into animism, polytheism and monotheism based on a hierarchic concept of cultural

27
 evolutionism. As for the factual information, his mention of Limbu animistic religious ritual

was based on A. Campbell’s article entitled ‘On the Tribes Around Darjeeling’ published in the

Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London in 1869 (Campbell 1869:148–159).

The above is an example of how the 19th century ‘armchair’ anthropologists, particularly

in the British version of anthropology, generalized in classifying culture and customs by relying

on information published by the British government’s administrators in their colonies. It is

anthropologically interesting as well as thought provoking to read in Tylor’s book about the

Limbus in the 1860s that ‘they sacrificed cow, and soul was for the god but meat was for

themselves’. All of this took place while the Hindu state of Nepal had been issuing injunctions

against slaughtering cows and the consumption of beef.

A. Campbell, the then British-India colonial government's resident representative in

Darjeeling, India, who frequently wrote about the Limbus and also found, through the help of a

military lieutenant, a book written in Sirijanga script subsequently published that script in the

Journal of the Asiatic Society (Campbell 1855; Campbell 1869:153–155). Campbell introduces

the Limbu peoples thus:

The word "Limboo" is a corruption, probably introduced by the Goorkhas, of

"Ekthoomba" the correct denomination of these people; and is generally used by
foreigners to designate the whole population… the Limboos consider themselves to be
the aboriginal inhabitants of the country they now occupy, at least they are satisfied that
none of the neighboring tribes have any claims of preoccupation" (Campbell 1840:595).

Much earlier than Campbell, Kirkpatrick, in 'An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal

(Being the Substance of Observations Made During A Mission to that Country in the Year 1793)'

writes:

The mountainous tract is inhabited by various uncivilized nations, …the principle of

these tribes are ... the Limboos or Limbooas, whom the Nepal government finds it no
easy matter to keep in order" (Kirkpatrick 1811:281).

28
 Hodgson, the permanent resident representative of British government to Nepal for more

than two decades in the 1830s-40s and later stationed in Darjeeling, India in the same capacity

for more than a decade, also wrote extensively about the Limbus, and their culture and

languages. The Description of the Gorkha-Limbuwan War, hand written in Sirijanga Limbu

script and now saved among the unpublished manuscripts of Hodgson, is reportedly based on

Hodgson’s interview of then Limbus about the Gorkha-Limbuwan war. Linguist RK Sprigg who

met with IS Chemjong in 1955 in Nepal and Kalimpong later “sent out those manuscripts to him

[Chemjong] to translate into English” (Sprigg 1999:ix).

Risley (1891) and Vansittart (1894) also described the Limbus and relied on details from

their predecessors' writings, in which Limbus were described as “quarrelsome” and “intractable”

peoples for both the Hindus and the Buddhists. In this regard, Hamilton (1971[1819]) writes:

The Kirats, being vigorous beef-eaters, did not readily submit to the Rajputs [ i.e., Hindu
Kshetriya ruling caste]. Among the Kiratas was settled a tribe called Limbu… and it
would not appear that the Lamas had made any progress in converting the Limbus
(Hamilton 1819:54).

Furthermore, Vansittart writes:

There is one regiment of Limbus in the Nepalese army, called the "Bhaironath " but on
account of their quarrelsome nature they were always quartered apart. The Limbus are
born shikaris (hunters) (Vansittart 1894).

In fact the Limbus inhabited (and still do) the geographically contiguous hills located

between Nepal, India, and Tibet. So their territory adjoins the borders of three different

countries. In fact, the making of the three different states, namely the Hindu state of Nepal,

British-India and the then Kingdom of Sikkim, cut across the Limbu national territory, thereby

separating the Limbu population into three different countries (Sikkim was an independent

country until it was annexed by India in 1974). Being a borderland people, Limbus might have

29
experienced different identity crises compared with other adivasi populations of Nepal too. This

could be a reason why they were ‘difficult to deal with’ and quarrelsome in the eyes of others.

Historicizing Identity Politics in Nepal

For many scholars and commoners alike, identity politics in Nepal now seems to be like a

unnecessary fuss. Dominant political parties and dominant caste groups argue that identity, as a

resource of political mobilization, is divisive for social harmony. It will only lead to dividing the

country. In fact, identity politics has created a deep division in Nepal’s politics, which is good

for social change. Only divisions, conflict and contradictions will create new avenues for better

solutions. From a superficial perspective, madhesi and adivasi-janajati people started identity

politics in Nepal, but this is only a lopsided view. The CPN-Maoist party espoused identity based

politics for multiple groups so as to organize adivasi-janajatis in support of their peoples’ war.

Gopal Kirati, now a main leader in the CPN-Maoist Center, says that his Khambuwan Mukti

Morcha (Khambuwan Liberation Front) merged with the CPN-Maoist towards the end of the

1990s only because the Maoists had embraced identity as the main political agenda. Even the

Maoists leaders may have believed that class [bargiya] revolution is possible only after solving

the problem of national [jatiya, rashtriya] liberation. But in reality, identity politics in Nepal was

initiated by ruling groups. The state began to take such steps ever since the 14th century, during

the Malla period and the Brahmans played an instrumental role. Baburam Acharya writes

The Thakuri Kings who came to establish new Thakurai (Thakuri dominion) only
arranged the administrative dealings. The Brahmans used to propagate the Hindu religion
amongst the Magars and Gurungs” (Acharya 1967:7).17

Hindu State-Making as Identity Politics

17
नय ाँ ठकुर ईको स्थ पन गनन आएक ठकुरी र ज हरु प्रश सनको प्रबन्धम त्र गर्नथे । ब्र ह्मणहरु मगर र गरुु ङम हहन्र्ू धमन प्रच र गर्नथे ।

30
 In Nepal, the Hindu state was the identity maker or imposer in a true sense during the

19th century. Injunctions on cow slaughter, beef-eating, various commensal norms, and practices

associated with legal punishments in accordance with one's caste status (Civil Code 1854) were

all the formal institutionalization of the process of imposing hierarchized order upon others.

Assigning the matawali caste for the non-Hindu, non-Aryan Adivasi peoples including the

Limbu, may be taken as exhibit A of the imposition of ‘inferior’ identity upon others lives on

behalf of the state in Nepal. Limbus were either called yakthumba or Limbu then, but they were

classified as matawali [iquor-drinker] caste by the state. Only recently, after the 1990s, did those

formerly classified as matawali begin to be classified as adivasi-janajati, mainly for the analysis

of development indicators. From the 1990s, Limbus were known as adivasi-janajati [indigenous

nationalities]. Many peoples and scholars may think that Limbu began to be known as

Indigenous Nationalities only after the 1990s. This is not true. As early as the 1840s, Campbell

mentioned that the “Limbu are the indigenous nation of that territory” (Campbell 1840:592).

Therefore, in Nepal's case, identity politics is also an imposition as well as a consequential

response of the Hindu state making process. Identity based political parties had been denied

registration by the election commission or by the state ever since 'democracy' was founded in

Nepal in 1951. In the general election in 1960, Limbuwan Sudhar Sangh [Limbuwan Reform

Association] was denied registration after it was alleged that the Party name sounded

"communal" or it did not meet the basic requirements for a democratic party in its naming.

Therefore, there has been an old ploy of denying excluded groups of populations the right to

found their own party for the cause of their political interests. Indigenous peoples were

discouraged to establish their party, and encouraged to join the mainstream and exclusionary

parties. Because of such discouragements by the state, and also because of the lack of confidence

31
among adivasi-janajatis themselves, they could not found the parties of their own. Yet a more

important obstacle was that since 1960 political parties were banned, and only the Communists

and democratic parties remained in existence but underground for the next three decades. During

those three decades, thinking about identity - because of the influence of the mainstream parties -

was considered divisive and communal. This was a problem. Indeed, Nepali Congress,

Communist parties and all the political forces thrived by espousing the rhetoric of mukti

[liberation], never defining clearly what kind of liberation they were fighting for. I am interested

to know, what sort of mukti the different jana-mukti sena [peoples liberation armies] who led the

liberation movements in the 1950s, 1960s, throughout the underground politics of the Panchayat

regime, and even during the Maoist peoples war might have imagined. Edwin Wilmsen writes:

"to discuss ethnicity [in South Africa during 1990s] was felt to legitimate its existence as a

divisive force and thus to sanction the apartheid state". The situation in Nepal in relation to

adopting identity as a political agenda is allegedly said to be creating divisive politics. The

dominant parties and leaders, including the prime minister KP Oli often scaremonger about

identity politics, referring to the “horrors of Rwanda”.

Limbuwan Politics and Globalization:

In Limbuwan’s case, globalization has had both a beneficial as well as disintegrative

impact on its movements. Out migration of the work force has been rampant for two decades

now in Nepal. Now an estimated ten per cent of the total population of Nepal work abroad,

mainly in the Gulf countries and Malaysia. Yet India hosts the largest number of Nepalese

unskilled workers. Since the active work force from villages live abroad, it might be higher than

one third of the total actively productive force that are outside of the country. There have been

many instances that women have started ploughing the field due to the unavailability of men in

32
the village. People have begun to complain about not having enough males in the villages when

someone dies. Cremation or burial of a body is considered a male job. There has also been a

severe impact on agriculture production because of the lack of labor force that is invested on the

agro-fields. One may find many lands left fallow in rural Nepal.

Regardless of these economic and social, cultural impacts, the political movement is no less

affected by globalization, that is, work opportunities available at a global level for Nepali

workers. Limbuwan politics is no exception in terms of losing its cadres and LVs (Limbuwan

Volunteers) everyday as most of the LVs from seven or eight years ago might be now migrant

workers somewhere in this globalized world.

33
 CHAPTER TWO

THE FORMATON OF LIMBUWAN BASED POLITICAL PARTIES

All students of the country, unite for ethnic liberation and national freedom
(Nepal Free Students Front, 1990)

This chapter is aimed at introducing the formation of the Limbuwan party and subsequent

movements. Nepal witnessed historic epochal transformations in the 1950s, the 1960s, the 1990s,

and the 2000s, each time bringing to an end to old regimes as well as originating new political

movements and democratic organizations. I want to raise a question at the outset: Did these

political transformations really address or fulfill the aspirations of indigenous peoples (adivasi-

janajatis)? The adivasi-janajati – who were not in the leadership of any of these movements -

dedicated their lives to the revolutions that occurred in Nepal every other decade. They

contributed in no less a way than the dominant caste groups, who now self-define as arya. But

from the adivasi-janajati vantage point, every other revolution seemed to have ended, as the

saying goes: “much bruit [from French for noise] little fruit.” The Limbu experiences and their

political movements in the wake of different revolutions in the past have shown that the

revolutions in which they fought for their own goals, actually accomplished very little of

concrete value. The Limbus have therefore, since the 1950s, expressed a consistent desire to

establish a political party representing their interests.

The armed revolution of 1950-1951 under the leadership of the Nepali Congress18 Party-

led jana mukti sena [people’s liberation army] brought to an end the 104 year old Rana

18
The present day Nepali Congress Party was founded in April 1950 through the merger of two parties, namely the
Nepali Rastriya Congress (founded in January 1947 in Calcutta, India) and the Nepali Democratic Congress
(founded in August 1948 in Calcutta, India) (taken from the Nepali Congress website).

34
oligarchic family rule19 (1846-1951 AD). The Declaration of Democracy [prajatantra ko

ghosana] by the late King Tribhuvan20 on 18 February 1951 not only formally brought people-

based political parties to the frontline of Nepali politics but also reinstated the centuries old Shah

dynastic monarchy, which had been rendered as symbolic ‘titular heads of the state’ by the Rana

family prime ministerial rule. There are numerous instances throughout the country where

adivasi-janajti commanders led the jana mukti sena [people’s liberation army] in different fronts

of the revolution in 1951.21 The adivasi-janajati, especially the Tamang, Rai, and Limbu,

returned to Nepal from Darjeeling and other parts of India to join the people’s liberation army.

However, after achieving the overthrow of the Ranas and the advent of democracy, none of the

adivasi-janajati could be seen at the head of the Nepali Congress (NC) Party’s organizational

pyramid, unlike the dominant Bahun and Chhetris castes. Some of the commanders of the jana

mukti sena with matawali or “alcohol drinking” ethnic backgrounds were later given jobs in the

newly formed Nepal Police. G. B. Yakthumba (Limbu), for instance, who was the second-in-

command during the founding of the jana mukti sena in Calcutta in December 1949.22 became

the Inspector General of Police after the transition. Yakthumba had served in the British Army in

Burma during World War II and had given the name “jana mukti sena” to the newly founded

freedom fighting force (Tamang 2005; Malagodi 2013). Many other Tamangs, Rais, Limbus, and

19
The Rana regime was founded by a junior courtier called Jung Bahadur Rana who killed more than three-dozen
other courtiers at an event known as the kot parva (Kot Massacre) in September 1846. Jung Bahadur Rana started
the hereditary prime minister system for his own family, a dynastic rule which only ended in 1951.
20
Since King Tribhuvan made prajatantra ko ghoshana (declaration of democracy) he was known as rastra pita
(father of nation) - echoing the King PN Shah as the rastra nirmata (nation builder) among monarchist followers in
Nepal.
21
See Shyam Kumar Tamang’s book Jana mukti sena: Euta Nalekhiyeko Itihas [Peoples Liberation Army: An
Unwritten History] for details. And also http://www.tamangsamaj.com/nepal/931/history-with-shyam-kumar-
tamang-part-1
22
Shyam Kumar Tamang, who was among the founders of the jan mukti sena, said in an interview with Amrit
Yonjan in 2015, that G.B. Yakthumba Limbu was the one who named jan mukti sena the freedom fighting force.
Tamang also says that Yakthumba had served in the Burma platoon, and he was the second in command when the
jan mukti sena was founded. Later, G.B. Yakthumba became the IGP of the Nepal Police force. Within three months
of revolution, the number of jan mukti sena reached about 10,000 strong (Tamang 2015).

35
Magars served in the Nepal Police force in different ranks after the establishment of democracy.

Pahal Singh Lama, also a freedom fighter, also rose up the ranks to head the Police force after

Yakthumba. In one sense, these developments may be considered as positive for the matwali

populations who contributed in significant ways to the very first revolution for democracy in

Nepal. They were, however, appointed almost exclusively in public security institutions (the

Nepal Police and Military). In this regard, they can also be interpreted as having been excluded

from decision-making positions in mainstream politics and in power centers occupied

exclusively by high castes Hindus. As non-aryan, non-Hindu, and non-caste ‘others’ they were

structurally excluded. If politics is considered to be a pivot point in determining the direction,

design, and proceedings of the state, adivasi-janajatis were not in positions of political influence.

I want to raise a hypothetical question in consideration of the adivasi-janajati’s

involvement in the jana mukti sena: How did they perceive mukti [liberation] at the time when

they fought the mukti sangram [liberation war]? It is quite understandable that the dominant

castes fought to form political parties and establish the liberation army to revolt against the

Ranas for democracy but why did the adivasi-janajati groups take part? Although the adivasi-

janajati Limbu, Tamang, and Rai were among the founders of the jana mukti sena, what passion

inspired them - in addition to fighting for democracy in its most abstract sense - to fight against

the Rana regime? What did the term mukti [liberation] mean to those groups who were

disparagingly classified in the old order as enslaveable and non-enslaveable, “drunkard” castes

by the state? Was the founding of democracy alone a solution to the question of mukti for them?

To me, this question is important given the fact that the non-aryan, non-Hindu, non-caste

Tamangs, Rais, and Limbus had different experiences and relationships to the Hindu state and

the Rana regime than the self-defined aryan Hindu Bahuns and Chhetris.

36
 The Tamangs who now imagine their home territory as Tamsaling, the Kirat Rais who

imagine their home territory as Khambuwan, and the Limbus who imagine theirs as Limbuwan

were all conquered by the Hindu King PN Shah from the principality of Gorkha over a span of

two decades between the 1750s and 1770s during the consolidation of what became the state of

Nepal. Subsequent rulers, including the Rana regime, carried out different forms and strategies of

domination and exploitation upon the conquered groups of people that they imagined as

‘enemies.’23 In other words, the Aryan Hindu high caste Bahuns and Chhetris belonged to the

conquering group while matawali groups belonged to the conquered ones. Members of

conquered groups joined with sectors of the conquering groups to establish the mukti sena and

overthrow the Rana regime. Nevertheless it seems logical that the ‘conquered’ groups would

have perceived the notion of liberation at that time in a way that was quite distinct from those of

the ‘conquering’ groups. The Limbus’ constant struggle for forming a political force of their own

with their own leadership not only resisted the state but also the Bahun and Chhetri castes that

dominated the organs of the state. The desire of the conquered groups for liberation and their

understanding of democracy would both have been different from those of the ruling groups.

Democracy, modernization and development in Nepal after the 1950s could not

adequately address the muktiko chahana ra abasyakta [need and desire for liberation] of the

adivasi-janajatis. Their ancestors had lived thorough devastating transformations to their forms

of life and struggled to save what they could of their socio-cultural integrity. Domination and

ensuing catastrophes in social, cultural, political, and territorial aspects of their lives led to the

reality of the exclusion of adivasi-janajatis, an elemental fact unrecognized in the types of

democracy, development, and modernization that the state of Nepal initiated after the 1950s. To

23
Holmberg (2006:34) describes how the Nepali bureaucracy, including military officers described his fieldwork
area, i.e., Tamang territory, as the ‘enemy territory’ or even ‘non-Nepal’.

37
put this another way, the democracy that was established in 1951 in Nepal was desirable and

acceptable for the ‘conquering’ caste groups, while it was not as acceptable for the adivasi-

janajatis. Therefore one can see that the advent of democracy in 1951 continued to sustain a

population divided into dominating and dominated groups from the vantage point of the state. In

a similar vein, the 2015 Constitution of Nepal has enshrined culturally specific privileges to

aryan and sanatan-dharmi [Hindu-religious] groups into law, thereby favoring one sector of the

population while denying recognition to non-aryan and non-Hindu populations. The same

constitution thus has been largely welcomed by some sectors of the population but has been

considered utterly unacceptable for adivasi-janajati groups. This context of exclusion from the

very origin of democracy in Nepal set the stage for the desire of the Limbus to form their own

party representing their itihas, that-thalo, and pahichan [history, territory and identity].

The Formation of the Dominant Political Parties in the 1950s and 1960s

The first political parties of Nepal were founded just before or after the revolution of

1951. The Nepali Congress (NC), Nepal Communist Party (CPN), Praja Parishad (Mishra), Praja

Parishad (Acharya), Sanyukta Prajatantra Party, and Gorkha Parishad all trace their origin to this

period. They all fielded candidates in the first general election held in February 1959 in which

the Nepali Congress was victorious, winning a two-thirds majority in the parliament. In this

regard, it is noteworthy that the late IS Chemjong unsuccessfully struggled to register the

Limbuwan Sudhar Sangh (Limbuwan Reform Association or LRA) as a political party with the

Election Commission (EC) for this election. The Limbuwan Reform Association (LRA) wanted

to field candidates for the general election of 1959. The Election Commission denied registration

and justified their decision by asserting that a party with a name beginning with ‘Limbuwan’

38
sounded like a jatibadi [casteist] and sampradayik [communal] organization. The LRA was thus

denied registration. As a consequence, IS Chemjong had to file his candidacy from a different

party called Nepal Prajatantrik Mahasabha, whose leader was Ranga Nath Sharma. Thus with the

inception of democracy, a subtle exclusionary practice was initiated. Even though all the

registered political parties were implicitly jatibadi [casteist] and sampradayik [communal] in the

exclusive presence of Bahun and Chhetri in leadership roles, it was the Limbu party that was

disallowed registration on these grounds, even though it was explicitly not communal (described

below). This pattern has structured Nepal’s democratic politics from the beginning.

The Limbuwan Sudhar Sangh (Limbuwan Reform Association, LRA): The Genesis of the

Limbuwan-Based Party in the 1950s.

The LRA was founded in 1952. In the beginning, this organization was conceptualized as

a non-political, non-party organization. Even Bahuns were initially involved in this organization.

IS Chemjong, however, wanted to develop and run the LRA as a political party. At the second

LRA convention in 1954, the LRA passed a set of resolutions in reference to the autonomy and

federal rights of Limbuwan. The second convention clarified the rationale of founding the LRA

in these terms:

Limbuwan is a different group from other Nepalese populations. We have our own state,
own history, own geography and own language too. Before 1831 BS (1775 AD), we were
with our own state system based on our customs and traditions. But after that we agreed
to accept the King PN Shah as the King of the central government, and ever since we
have been living as a Protectorate State [Sangrachhyit Rajya] under Nepal… We have
also equally contributed to overthrow the Ranas and to reinstate the monarchy in
Nepal…The Ranas tore apart our ethnic history. When we realized this, then we founded
the LRA (KYC 2004:180–185).

The second conventions further stated that governance in a democratic system should be
controlled and implemented by the people, however, the three million people of Limbuwan did

39
not have rights to govern themselves. In response to charges that the LRA was communal, the
second conventions asserted:
Limbuwan Sudhar Sangh is not an organization of the Limbus alone. Limbuwan is a
name of the territory, just like the Kirat province is place’s name, Koshi province is a
place’s name. These three are interchangeable names. Limbuwan belongs to all the
inhabitants living in this territory.’ The LRA wanted to honor and promote the pride and
dignity of Nepal and it also wanted to see a federated Nepal into different provinces with
their own system of governance except for foreign policy, military, and transportation.
With the federal autonomy, Nepal would not be divided into pieces but this will keep
Nepal even united. This is our principle, policy and ideology. Our slogans are:

i) Rise up – Limbuwan;
ii) End to the Communality;
iii) We must establish Unity;
iv) Peoples’ Rule is the Must.
v) Jaya Limbuwan [victory to Limbuwan];
vi) Jaya Kirat [victory to Kirat];
vii) Jaya Nepal [victory to Nepal] (KYC 2004:180–185).

Two years after its establishment, the LRA held its second convention in June 1954 in

Ilam district with more than five hundred participants from different parts of Limbuwan. The

LRA Chairman, IS Chemjong, informed the convention that there were more than two hundred

branches and about hundred and fifty thousand members in the LRA. The LRA also managed to

lead Limbuwan delegations to the King in Kathmandu in 1951 and 1952, delegations that

demanded autonomy and land rights for Limbuwan.

In spite of its strong presence and strong foundation in Limbuwan in the 1950s, the LRA

did not continue after the general election of 1959. Chairman IS Chemjong became politically

frustrated after his defeat in the 1959 election and quit politics. He devoted the rest of his life to

research and writing about the language, religion and history of Limbus and the Kirat people.

Chemjong was a historian at Tribhuvan University from 1961 until he died in 1975. Although the

LRA could not continue as a political party, it initiated and put forward the principles of

federalism and Limbuwan autonomy in its political agenda. Both principles are still awaiting

40
fruition. One of the main reasons that the LRA could not survive long was the Limbus

themselves. They had become politically divided and did not seem to recognize the LRA as a

political party. In this regard, Limbu political motivations and aspirations were co-opted into the

Nepali Congress’s slogan of liberation. Ironically, “it was only the Nepali Congress which

demanded, in absolute terms, the abolition of the kipat system…In spite of the Nepali Congress

stand on Kipat, the party’s candidates - only four of whom were Limbus - won all eight

parliamentary seats from Pallo-Kirat [Limbuwan]” (Regmi 1978:578) in the February 1959

election.

As mentioned before, the Nepali Congress (NC) secured a two-thirds majority and

formed a government in May 1959. The NC rhetorically offered people democracy, nationalism,

and socialism in the abstract with little concrete plans. The Limbus overwhelmingly voted for

Nepali Congress, with very little understanding of what the terms democracy and socialism

meant in the context of their history, land, and territory, for which their ancestors had laid their

lives to defend. The elected government with an overwhelming majority lasted for a mere 20

months before King Mahendra dissolved parliament and suspended the constitution in December

1960. King Mahendra declared a new regime called the Panchayat system, that lasted until 1990.

The Panchayat Era and Limbuwan in the 1960s

The Hindu Monarchy and its de facto ruling mechanism, the Panchayat system,

constitutionally banned all political parties and barred people from any kind of organized

political practice. Restrictions were also placed on freedom of speech. The then monarch

promulgated the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1962:

[f]or all-round progress of the Kingdom of Nepal and of the Nepalese people to conduct
the government of the country in consonance with the popular will... is possible only
through the partyless democratic Panchayat system...I King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah

41
 Dev, in exercise of the sovereign powers and prerogatives inherent in us... as handed
down to us by our August and Revered Forefathers, do here by enact and promulgate this
constitution (Preamble, Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal, 2019 [1962]).
Sovereignty lay with the Hindu king, and multiparty democracy was abolished forcing

democratic political leaders to go underground, to quit politics, or to adhere to the rules of

Panchayat politics.

The four precepts of the Panchayat polity were i) a Hindu Kingdom or the Hindu

monarchy based on the idea of supreme divine right; ii) Khas /Nepali language, the mother

tongue of the ruling castes, as the only official language as well as the only medium of

education; iii) a party-less political structure with no opportunity for people to organize to

express themselves politically; and iv) monarchy as the only recognized form of sovereignty.

These four fundamentals of Panchayat polity24 were deliberately designed to create the state of

Nepal as an absolute monolithic, ‘all-assimilative’, ‘all-encompassing’ and culturally

“universalizing” society. From the vantage of a liberal, democratic point of view, the Panchayat

regime was autocratic. The Nepali Congress party - which had launched armed revolution to

establish democracy in 1950-51 - once again initiated armed revolution in the wake of King

Mahendra’s coup d’état in 1960. They sought to restore democracy and ‘re-liberate’ the people

from the autocratic Panchayat regime. Panchayat politics and the mono-cultural state policies

implemented in all of Nepal’s diverse social and cultural landscapes had profound effects on the

social, cultural, religious, and political lives of adivasi-janajati communities. These effects were

especially significant for Limbus and the Limbuwan movement for the following reasons: i)

Panchayat era laws abolished the indigenous land ownership system of the Limbu through which

they produced and reproduced their unique socio-cultural system; ii) the Panchayat era also saw

24
For an elaborate discussion of this, see Michael Hutt’s Nepal in the Nineties (1994).

42
the introduction of a new administrative system that divided the country into 75 districts and 14

zones25, erasing the name Limbuwan from the official bureaucratic system. Nevertheless the

name Limbuwan seems to have been retained in common parlance well into the 1970s and even

until today despite its erasure in constitutional or legal terms.

Even though the Panchayat polity had a variable impact upon caste-based and adivasi-

janajati societies, everyone in Nepal was oppressed. To alleviate that oppression, the Nepali

Congress invoked the rhetoric of the mukti andolan [liberation movement] once again and

unsuccessfully waged an underground, armed revolution against the Panchayat regime in 1961

and 1962. Many Limbus took part and devoted their lives to this movement (Basnet and Portel

2016). For the Nepali Congress or similar dominant political parties, the term ‘liberation’

perhaps meant the re-establishment of democracy based on western liberal democracy. Liberal

democracy, however, would not lay the foundations or fulfill the aspirations and imaginations of

liberation among the Limbus, Tamangs, Tharus, Kirat-Rais, and other indigenous groups because

their political-historical as well as territorial problems vis-à-vis the Hindu state making process

were fundamentally different from that of the political problems facing Bahuns, Chhetris, Dalits,

and madhesis.

Since the late 1950s, like elsewhere in the world, mainstream politics in Nepal began to

revolve around questions of economic inequality and equality. For many underground political

parties and their leaders, the term mukti meant liberation from economic exploitation. The ideal

of a classless society and exploitation-less society focused almost exclusively on the questions of

labor and compensation. Such an excessive domination of economic issues in politics and the

formation of political parties eclipsed the cultural, historical and territorial exploitation that were
25
Nepal was divided into 14 zones and 75 districts in 1962 after the start of the Panchayat regime. For more details
ee Grishma Bahadur Devkota’s Nepal ko Rajnitik Darpan [Political Mirror of Nepal] vol. 3.

43
key issues for adivasi-janajati communities and their leaders. In Nepal in the late 1960s and the

1970s to assert one’s own culture, language, customs, or religion was considered sampradayik

[communal, narrow-minded] and retrograde; to express such things publically was not even

allowed. This hegemony of a perspective that focused on the inequality and equality of citizens

who were seen as isolated from their communities dominated political discourse. Adivasi-

janajatis and their leaders lacked the confidence to organize themselves based on the idea of

diverse identities in Nepal and thus had to rely on the Bahuns for leadership. In this regard, Arun

Baral, a scholar and Bahun himself writes “At the end, even the ideology is formed in relation to

the power. The ideologies of those who are in power, gain the legitimacy easily” (Baral 2067

v.s.:v). Because alternative avenues were explicitly outlawed, adivasi-janajati political leaders

and organizers were channeled into political parties with high caste leaders even though those

leaders had no appreciation for the political problems that stemmed from the unique historical,

territorial, and socio-cultural circumstances of adivasi-janajati communities. Thus ruling caste

groups were able to coopt adivasi-janajatis into their political agendas.

During the 1970s, another stream of politics, namely the expansion of underground

communist parties across the country, strongly influenced Limbu political life. Immediately

across the border from Limbuwan in West Bengal, India, the Naxalite armed rebellion erupted

and communist leaders in east Nepal imported slogans of mukti that had a strong appeal and

captured the imagination of Limbus. This ideology undergirded an armed communist movement

in east Nepal in 1971.

The Panchayat era did not provide much scope for continuing the efforts of IS Chemjong

to establish a Limbuwan party. Limbu activists were funneled into mainstream parties including

the communists who received new inspiration from the Naxalite movement in West Bengal,

44
India in the late 1960s. Nevertheless, in 1986, towards the end of the Panchayat era and the

difficult days when political parties were still banned, Bir Nembang from Panchthar district

founded the Limbuwan Mukti Morcha (Limbuwan Liberation Front or LLF). For founding a

political party during the Panchayat regime, Bir Nembang was punished with multiple arrests

and prison terms. The LLF eventually merged with the Sanghiya Limbuwan Party (Federal

Limbuwan Party or FLP) in August 2014 when five Limbuwan-based parties declared

unification. I will now explore these developments further.

The 1990s: The End of the Panchayat, Reinstating Multi-Party Democracy, and the

Continuity of Monarchy and Hindu Nepal

The jana andolan-I [People’s Movement-I] in early 1990 overthrew the Panchayat

regime and led to a new constitution for Nepal in 1991. Although the 1991 Constitution ensured

multi-party political democracy, it denied recognition to adivasi-janajati and their collective

identity based politics. It also did not recognise the demand for a secular state. Despite demands

from adivasi-janajati leaders to declare Nepal to be constitutionally secular, the 1991

constitution clearly stated that Nepal is a “Hindu constitutional monarchical” country. That may

be one of the main reasons why adivasi-janajati political activists, particularly youths and

students, did not take ownership of the 1991 constitution and began to look for a new political

organization. They wanted a new political movement that would liberate adivasi-janajati people

from Hindu cultural as well as political domination. In this regard, Surya Makhim, then a young

student and now a leader in Limbuwan politics, wrote:

Whether you say it is the blunder of the rulers or the misfortune of the Nepali people, the
suggestions and the voices raised by adivasi-janajati, madhesi, dalit, and women and

45
 minorities were not included in the Constitution of Nepal 1991. The 1991 Constitution
once again discriminated against the aforementioned excluded groups by
constutionalizing a caste’s monopoly in the rules and again the afore-mentioned excluded
groups were made second-class citizens by the constitution (Makhim, 2062 v.s.:4).

Likewise Singh Man Tamang, Tamsaling Autonomous Council’s Vice Chair and

Sanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya Manch’s (FDNF) Finance Secretary, asserted the following at a

political rally in Dhankuta:

On behalf of the Tamsaling Autonomous Council, I would like to welcome with cheerful
greetings of phyafula and hearty sewaro! This is not the first time we are bringing you the
message of this national liberation [jatiyamukti] but for many years now, the oppression,
suppression, exploitation, that our ancestors and ourselves are facing now cannot be
described here in detail, but I would like to tell you how we have been struggling to
liberate ourselves from such suppression. After the political change in 2046 (1990), the
constitution of Nepal was in the drafting process. During the draft period, the majority of
the indigenous nationalities’ leaders and communities had suggested that the constitution
must embrace a federalist structure, not the unitary polity anymore. The constitution of
unitary polity before could not do any justice to indigenous nationalities for the past 240
years but only suppressed, oppressed and exploited indigenous peoples and marginalized
groups. The upcoming constitution must guarantee the rights of all caste and ethnic
groups of the country. But the state just ignored the indigenous nationalities’ demands
and suggestions. They lopsidedly promulgated the constitution without any glimpse of
federalism and secularism in it. The ruling groups of this country, promulgated the
constitution in 1990 and began to claim that the constitution would last for 100-200
years. But after five years, the Nepal Communist Party Maoist began the People’s War
against that constitution and it came to an end in 2006.26
In this regards, Mara Malagodi writes “The ‘unity in diversity’ approach adopted by the

Nepali state actors led to growing discontentment among many social groups since 1990 and

fierce opposition to the 1990 Constitution itself” (Malagodi 2013). Although it could not become

functional (see below), the Janajati Party proposed and envisioned concrete names of provinces

based on ethnic identity and history, and also demanded a secular state.

Denial of Rights as an Opportunity for Political Organization

26
I listened to the voice recording of the speech Singh Man Tamang delivered at a rally in Dhankuta, and
transcribed it. Since I could not be there, I am thankful to D.B. Angbung for making available the data from that
program.

46
 It was in this political climate that adivasi-janajati leaders started to found their own

political parties. They formed new parties because their rights were explicitly denied by the

constitution and the state and not just because political opportunities were unavailable to them.

One of main demands or suggestions put forward by adivasi-janajatis during the 1990

constitution drafting process was that Nepal be declared a secular state and initiate a federal

structure so as to incorporate adivasi-janajatis into the political mainstream. As the Constitution

denied their demands for a secular Nepal and federalism, adivasi-janajatis felt a responsibility to

establish political parties in their own leadership. Therefore, in Nepal’s case, the denial of

adivasi-janajati claims for their collective cultural rights by the state may be considered as a

helpful opportunity and push towards establishing political parties for the quest of identity

politics. Some politicians with an adivasi-janajati background formed a political party named the

Janajati Party [Nationality Party] in the wake of the people’s movement in 1990.

The Janajati [Nationality] party was established under the Chair of Kajiman Kandangwa
(Limbu). Khagendra Jung Gurung, a staunch advocate and supporter of adivasi-janajati
movements was the general secretary and Bhadra Kumari Ghale was the Treasurer of the
party. The then prime minister of the interim government, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai - one
of the founders of the Nepali Congress Party - accused this party of being a jatibadi27
[castiest/communal] organization and barred the party from operating. Bhadra Kumari
Ghale, frustrated by the Prime Minister’s utterly negative response towards the ‘name’ of
the party that denoted adivasi-janajati nationality, retired from active political life
thereafter. The Janajati Party, in its party manifesto had envisioned and proposed a total
of 12 ethnicity-based federal provinces: namely Limbuwan, Kochila, Khambuwan,
Sherpa, Tamsaling, Newa, Bhojpura, Mithila, Magarat, Tamuwan, Tharuhat or
Tharuwan, and Khasan.28

Khagendra Makhim, now a leader of the Federal Socialist Forum, writes “In its party

manifesto, the Janajati Party had proposed 12 provinces and had a party flag with 12 stripes

representing the 12 provinces.”29 However, the Janajati Party was not allowed registration

27
The term jat is the Nepali or Hindi translation of the English term ‘caste’. I will translate the Nepali term jatibadi
as casteist [advocate of caste-based principles in politics].
28
Based on conversations and communication with Khagendra Makhim, now a leader of the Federal Socialist
Forum (FSF).
29
Personal communication.

47
[darta] by the Election Commission. In Nepal, the legal provision for any political party is that if

they opt to participate in general as well as local elections, the Election Law stipulates that the

parties must be registered with the Election Commission. The Commission is the constitutional

body administering elections at all levels in the country. In this regard, the adivasi-janajati

political leaders who were barred from registering a party with a name reflecting ethnic identity

could either participate in the election as independent candidates or they could try to form a party

with a different name that would not be barred.

Split of the Janajati Party

When the Janajati Party was not allowed registration by the Election Commission, one of

the leaders formed a new party called the Jana Party (People’s Party) and registered with the

Election Commission. This move created confusion and raised mutual suspicion among Janajati

Party leaders. The unregistered party’s Chair and its General secretary afterwards stood as

independent candidates in the general election.

The Janajati Party, for its part, unified with the Janamukti Morcha (People’s Liberation

Front), a party that operated mainly in the Magar areas of western Nepal. This new party, after

the unification with the Janajati Party in 1991, called itself the Rastriya Janamukti Party

(National People’s Liberation Party or NPLP). However, both the Chair and the General

Secretary of the party, MS Thapa and Gore Bahadur Khapangi (both Magars) respectively, were

from the former Jana Mukti Morcha. The main difference between the Janajati Party (Limbu)

and the Jana Mukti Morcha (Magar) was that the former had a plan for ethnicity-based names for

federal states whereas the latter had no such plan except for the ‘proportional representation of

all caste and ethnic groups in parliament’. To put it in other words, the Janajati Party believed in

48
an ethnicity-based federal structure of the state and was on a quest to restructure the state. On the

other hand, the Jana Mukti Morcha’s main political quest regarding identity issues was limited to

the inclusion of all caste and ethnic groups in the state system on the basis of population

composition. These problems of leadership as well as political differences generated conflict

within the party and a split could not be avoided in 1994. The main playmaker was an

Athpahariya Rai, Kamal Chharahang, from Eastern Nepal, who initiated the split and formed a

new party called the Janamukti Party, Nepal, with its chairperson being Nil Bahadur Thing, a

Tamang from Sindhuli. After some time, Kamal Chharahang became the Chair and Kumar

Lingden became the General Secretary of this party. Jitendra Raj Chemjong (Limbu), Atalman

Rai, Jagan Kirat (Rai), Bishwa Artist (Rai), Shobha Khajum (Limbu), Man Kumari Yakha,

Laxmi Tuladhar (Newar), and MB Maden (Limbu) were the central committee members of this

party. The Janamukti Party aspired to be a regional party concentrated in east Nepal.

Subsequently, in 2001, the Rastriya Janamukti Party and the Janmukti Party united together. The

main reason they re-united once again was that both the parties experienced poor defeats in the

1999 election. Kamal Chharahang (Athpahariya Rai) and Kumar Lingden (Limbu), the chair and

the general secretary of the former Janamukti Party, Nepal became central committee members

of the newly unified party that was called the Unified National Janamukti Party. Sanjuhang

Palungwa (Limbu) was the Chair of the eastern region (Limbuwan) chapter of that party.

The Formation of the Nepal Free Students Front (NFSF): The First adivasi-janajati

Students organization in Nepal

In Nepal, every political party has a party wing comprised of school, college and

university level students. In fact, one may consider the student wings as the backbone of political

parties in terms of the recruitment of party cadres as well as staging the movements,

49
demonstrations, election campaigns, rallies, and conventions. No such collective campaigns and

rallies are performed successfully among well performing political parties in Nepal without

mobilizing student wings. The Nepal Students Union is the student wing of Nepali Congress; the

All Nepal National Free Students Union is the students wing of the Communist Party of Nepal-

UML; and the All Nepal Revolutionary Students Union is the similar wing of the Communist

Party of Nepal- Maoist. Similarly, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal, and madhesi parties all

have their own student wings.

In Nepal, students have proven themselves to be the vanguards of political

demonstrations and rallies as they are the ones who make programs of protests against the old

regimes leading to the transformation of society. When the political parties were banned during

the Panchayat regime, political party leaders remained underground or in exile. In those days, the

colleges and schools were the centers of politics and the students would stage various protests in

different ways. But the hidden objective of such protests was to weaken and harangue the old

regime. It was students staging demonstrations in Kathmandu in 1980 that culminated in an

announcement of a referendum to choose between the then Panchayat regime and multi-party

democracy in Nepal. Student wings of different parties played a decisive role even during the

first jana andolan-I [People’s Movement I] in 1990.

A few dozen adivasi students who opposed the key provisions of the 1991 Constitution of

Nepal established the Nepal Free Students Front (NFSF) on March 31, 1991. The key points of

disagreements that they had with the new constitution were i) the declaration of Nepal as a Hindu

state and ii) a provision that banned people from establishing political parties with names

signifying or denoting ethnic content. The latter provision meant that adivasi-janajatis could not

register an adivasi-janajati Party with the Election Commission. Conscious of their collective

identity, they declared the NFSF to be the student wing (sister organization) of the Rastriya

Janamukti Party (National People’s Liberation Party or NPLP) in 1992.

50
On October 4, 2002 King Gyanendra dissolved the government and the democratically elected

parliament and appointed a new prime minister who was responsible to the King alone, rather

than parliament. King Gyanendra’s undemocratic move proved to be a historically defining

moment for Limbuwan’s politics as the King appointed the Chair of the Rastriya Janmukti Party,

Gore Khapangi Magar, as the Minister for Women and Social Welfare. The Chair of the Party

and now the King’s appointee minister was seen to have submitted the adivasi-janajati political

movement to the King for its dissolution. Gore, who had initiated a movement among adivasi-

janajatis to boycott Dasain [Dasain bahiskar], appeared to go against his earlier beliefs when he

received a blessing (tika) from King Gyanendra on the occasion of Dasain in 2003.30 The leader,

whose political popularity was once based on the Dasain boycott, was now said to have betrayed

the adivasi-janajati people. This event caused a rift between the party leadership, the chair

himself and the students organization (the NFSF). The students and youths truly believed in the

Dasain boycott and they also opposed the decision of the party to join the King’s government.

The NFSF continued to focus on student politics through its own activities and organizational

extension. The NFSF organized various workshops in Kathmandu and elsewhere focusing on

such topics as the ‘Present State Structure and Lingual Rights’ or the ‘New Structure of the State

in Nepal.’ The NFSF was also involved in various adivasi-janajati movements whenever needed.

On February 1, 2005 King Gyanendra seized complete control of the government and

ruled directly. The Rastriya Janamukti Party welcomed the King’s move in a press conference

whereas its sister organization, the NFSF, condemned the decision and issued a press statement

against the monarch’s move. The party instructed the NFSF through an official letter to rescind

the press statement and instead welcome the King’s move. The party stated that if they refused

“[Receiving] tika is a sign of one's inferiority to and dependency on the one giving the tika” (Forbes 1999:3;
30

Holmberg 2006).

51
they would face disciplinary action. The NFSF retaliated and disowned the party. The King’s

move, also known as the Royal Coup, proved to be the catalyst that separated the student wing

from the Rastriya Janamukti Party. The Party joined the monarch whereas the students joined the

movement against the royal coup. In October 2005, the NFSF organized a press conference

calling upon politicians, intellectuals, students, youths and all common people to come together

to form a common political movement for jatiya mukti [ethnic liberation] and sanghiya loktantra

[Federal Democracy] in Nepal.

The NFSF, founded 15 years earlier and comprised mainly of youths from the Limbu,

Rai, Magar, and Tamang communities, decided to establish a new political party that would fight

for ethnic liberation and federal democracy in Nepal. They held a meeting on December 11 and

12, 2005 in Birtamod, Jhapa in East Nepal, and established the Sanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya

Manch (Federal Democratic National Forum or FDNF) in a model previously not seen in Nepal.

The FDNF was founded with a bottom up organizational structure that matched the proposed 12

province federal structure. The party’s main slogan was “Let’s Unite All the Federal

Republicans”. The Federal Democratic National Forum (FDNF) was based in Kathmandu as the

central party coordinated all the 12 provincial level parties for an envisioned future federal state:

i) Limbuwan, ii) Khambuwan, iii) Kochila, iv) Sherpa, v) Tamsaling, vi) Tharuhat, vii)

Bhojpura, viii) Mithila, ix) Newa, x) Magarat, xi) Tamuwan, and xii) Khasan based parties

would come together. In this regard, there would be little or no interference by the center of the

party in the provincial level parties. For example, the FDNF was the coordinating party center

under which Limbuwan Autonomous Council, Khambuwan Autnomous Council, Tamsaling

Autonomous Council, Tharuhat Autonomous Council and so forth existed independently of each

other. In Limbuwan’s case they had established the Federal Limbuwan State Council (FLSC).

52
The most important element uniting all these different provincial level regional parties was that

they all shared the same election symbol, which belonged to the FDNF, meaning that only the

FDNF had to be registered with the Election Commission (EC). Therefore, these twelve different

ethnic parties could come together when needed, for example, during the election and for other

common issues when politically bargaining with the state.

As a provincial level Limbuwan based party inside the FDNF, the Federal Limbuwan

State Council (FLSC) was established together with the FDNF in December 2005. Such an

organizational structure is very different from those of the dominant parties that are centrally

based in Kathmandu and control all the lower level branches right down to the local village level.

In this sense the mainstream political parties organizational framework is done through a top-

down format whereas the Federal Democratic National Forum and its associated parties

organizations are bottom-up.

FLSC Split and CA Election 2008

The FLSC suffered a split within a few weeks of its establishment thereby creating two

different FLSC parties in Limbuwan: FLSC (K) and FLSC (SH).31 However, the majority of the

FLSC cadres and members remained with the establishment side in 2006 and the establishment

FLSC (K) began to call itself the FDNF-affiliated FLSC (Forum-affiliated FLSC) because the

FLSC (SH) was not affiliated with the FDNF. The forum-affiliated FLSC (K) was able to

persuade the Tamsaling Autonomous Council and the Tharuhat Autonomous Council to join the

FDNF. These three parties fielded their candidates with the same electoral symbol for the

31
Led by Kumar Lingden (K) and Sanju Hang Palungwa (SH). Ironically, a political party that was established for
the cause of Limbuwan collective identity came to be known by Limbu individuals personal names immediately
after the establishment of the party.

53
Federal Democratic National Forum in the first Constituent Assembly (CA) election in 2008. In

the election they secured two seats in the proportional electoral system in the 601 member body

of the CA. Of the two one Limbu (male) from FLSC (K) and one Tharu (female) from Tharuhat

represented the FDNF in the CA. The Tamsaling Autonomous Council could not secure a seat.

Unfortunately the FDNF could not hold on to its two CA members. Both the Limbu (from FLSC

(K) and the Tharu (from Tharuhat), taking advantage of the CA rules and regulations, quit the

FDNF and formed their own political parties. On the other hand, the FLSC (SH) boycotted the

first CA election.

After the first CA failed to promulgate a new constitution, a second CA election was held

in 2013. This time the FLSC (SH) took part in the election but did not win a seat whereas the

FLSC (K) boycotted the election.

Weaknesses in Electoral Politics

There were more than half a dozen Limbuwan based political parties by 2012. None of

them could come together to forge an alliance for the movement or for the election. Rather all of

them seemed to be hostile and in conflict with each other. The period between 2006 and 2015

was the prime time in Nepal’s political history when political circumstances necessitated

alliances and fronts among the Limbus as well with other adivasi-janajatis but unfortunately that

did not happen. Instead of forging alliances and coming together for a common political cause

the adivasi-janajatis kept quarrelling and shouting at each other for almost a decade. As the

Nepali proverb goes: abhagilaai Khane belama ris uthchha [the unfortunate one becomes angry

when it is time to eat].

54
Strength in Political Movements

Although the FLSC were neophytes in electoral politics, it emerged as one of the most

influential movements among adivasi-janajati political parties in Nepal. There are multiple

factors contributing to the success of the movements organized by the FLSC: i) the FLSC had

formed a support organization composed primarily of youths called Limbuwan Volunteers (LV).

The Limbuwan Volunteers (LV) moved swiftly and created momentum around particular issues;

ii) the spontaneous involvement of Limbus in the movement; and iii) financial backing from the

Limbus living or working abroad. By 2013, the FLSC had affiliate organizations in at least 20

countries in Europe, Asia, USA, and Middle Eastern countries. FLSC movements in Limbuwan

or in Kathmandu were partly funded by these foreign-based “branches” affiliated with the FLSC.

The Limbuwan Movement’s Martyrs

Martyrdom and martyrs are highly respectfully invoked in Nepali politics, and even more

so among communist parties. Martyrs are remembered and revered before the beginning of every

formal program of political parties. All official meetings and programs begin with the

observation of one minute’s silence whereby those gathered pay homage to the martyrs. The

FLSC lost two of its Limbuwan Volunteers as the police shot them dead during movements in

Limbuwan.

Rajkumar Angdembe Mangtok 20, a Limbuwan Volunteer, was married and had a four-

month-old daughter when he died. Police shot him dead on October 7, 2007 at Kamal Khola

during a Limbuwan general strike and protest. The government declared him a martyr on

December 10, 2008 after series of talks between the Limbuwan movement and the government.

55
Mangtok was declared by the FLSC to be the first martyr of the present day Limbuwan

movement.

The second martyr of the Limbuwan movement was Manil Tamang 21 from Jhapa. He

was studying in grade 12. He was shot dead by the police on March 19, 2009 in Dhulabari,

during the Federal Students Union32 protest against the unitary rules for holding Students’ Union

elections in Dhulabari campus. Manil Tamang was also declared a martyr by the FLSC.

Figure 2.1 Photos of the two FLSC Martyrs Placed on the Table in Front of the Party Dignitaries. The Third Photo is
of Kangsore, the Limbu Commander, Shown Fighting the Gorkha Commander in the 1770s

The two martyrs are highly revered and respected in the party. Formal programs,

meetings, and processions do not begin without paying tribute to their names and photos. The

party respectfully remembers the martyrs in each and every formal program. Other dominant

parties, such as the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, the

Communist Party of Nepal-UML (CPN-UML) also have their own declared martyrs. Martyrdom

32
The Federal Students Union (FSU) is a sister organization of the FLSC. The Federal Students Union has a proven
strong presence in different campuses in Limbuwan as well as in the University Campus, Kirtipur. The Federal
Students Union demands in Dhulabari campus were that the election of the student union seats and officials be held
on the basis of proportional representation.

56
is highly revered inside political parties and it seems to be an asset of the party that is

incomparable with other things.

Republic, Federalism, and Secular State are the Fundamentals of Limbuwan Politics

Regardless of the internal conflict and competition between Limbuwan based political

parties, all of them seem to agree upon the fundamental political principles and importance of the

Republic of Nepal [ganatantra], federalism [sanghiyata], and a secular state [dharma

nirapekshya rajya]. When it comes to the question of how to realize these principles of

federalism and a secular state, Limbuwan politics diverges from mainstream politics as the basis

of Limbuwan’s politics are identity [pahichan], history [itihas], and territory [that-thalo].

Limbuwan’s persistent quest for federalism is based on their unique territorial [that-thalo]

belongingness and the history [itihas] of having fought a war against the conquerors in the past.

FLSC leaders and cadres will not compromise on the province’s name of Limbuwan as their

leader proclaims: Limbuwan ko lagi hajar barsh ladna tayar chhaun [we are prepared to fight for

one thousand years for Limbuwan]. Similarly, the FLSC’s struggle for a secular state is not for

the secularity defined by sanatan dharma and also not with cow as the national animal. These

political issues of federalism and secularism in relation to Limbuwan will be discussed in the

next chapters.

57
 CHAPTER THREE

LIMBUS AND LIMBUWAN IN LIGHT OF THE POLITICS OF PLACE-NAMING AND

MAPS

Introduction of Place-Naming in Relation to Indigenous Identity and State Making

At the beginning of the 1970s, anthropologists took a new direction by studying place-

naming from the vantage of relationships between the state and indigenous peoples. They began

to focus on naming as a discursive practice employed by dominant groups, particularly in the

name of “nation-state building to secure and maintain power that served their own interests”

(Scott, Tehranian, and Mathias 2002:20), and the re/naming of indigenous place names and the

subsequent erasure of the identity and history of indigenous peoples and their places (Basso,

1996; Gengenbach, 2000; Jenson, 1995; Vom Bruck & Bodenhorn, 2006). Further,

anthropologists considered such processes as the colonial exploitation of indigenous peoples by

nation-states (Scott, Tehranian, & Mathias, 2002). Indeed, there was no “state-making without

naming” (Scott et al., 2002) and, as Yeoh states, “toponymic inscriptions in the landscape are

shaped in line with the instructions of the nation-state” (Yeoh 1996:304). Magnus Fiskesjö, in his

study among the Wa Peoples of the border lands between China and Burma, found Chinese

bureaucratic officials using only Chinese writings/publications about the Wa place-names.

Fiskesjö observes that in "failure to promote Wa writing" the "Wa State leaders are often known

publicly mainly by their Chinese names"(Fiskesjo 2010:132). The Limbus, having had a similar

experience in terms of their language and script, have a similar problem now.

Scholars have also argued that ethnonyms, and place names among indigenous societies

are rooted in concrete customs and "lived realities” (Dean 2005:808). In addition, Emmerson

58
argues that "names also express the power of the namer over the things named"(Emmerson

1984:4). Therefore, the territorial space names that indigenous peoples deploy, rooted as they are

in culture and historically significant political relations, cannot be easily obliterated by the efforts

of state actors or any other colonial forces. State power looms large in re/naming places in the

'earned' territories or dominions of colonists, with efforts to change all kinds of names including

both social and geographic: those of individuals, groups, societies and nations as well as regions,

territories, trails, streets, and neighborhoods. Nevertheless, these efforts simultaneously generate

political consciousness among indigenous populations to protect the names “practiced” by and

“lived” in their everyday lives (Dean, 2005:808-809). Hence, both the “namer” and the “named”

exercise power to fulfill their own purposes. Regarding place naming, Alderman writes:

“Naming is a powerful vehicle for promoting identification with the past and locating oneself

within wider networks of memory... It is also a form of symbolic capital as well as symbolic

resistance to the state. Naming is not always controlled by elites and dominant groups. It can also

be appropriated by marginalized stakeholders who wish to have a greater voice in determining

what vision of the past is inscribed in the landscape” (Alderman 2016:195). In other words,

indigenous peoples and the state have distinct purposes, meanings, and values in reference to

place-naming and peoples. Galasinacuteski and Skowronek write: "Names are means of taming

reality. They are a cultural way of making distinctions in what surrounds people… what is

without name does not exist"(Galasiński and Skowronek 2001:51). Therefore individual, group,

and place names bear social, political and cultural implications. "Names, and more particularly,

names related to peoples or nations, become part of “national identities" (Galasinski and

Skowronek 2001:51). In this regard, names, particularly ethnonyms at the national scale, become

59
established through a dialogic process between the concerned groups (Bakhtin 1981), namely the

indigenous peoples and the state-makers.

In Nepal, institutionalization or specifically the constitutional status of specific place-

names may be integral to the politics of recognition of history, and collective identity between

different communities and collective cultural groups involved in the process. In other words,

institutionalization and naturalization of any place-names proceeds as part of the competitive

politics between marginalized indigenous peoples and the dominant political parties.

Disagreements as well as dissenting voices and movements in relation to the naming of federal

states during the constituent assembly’s two tenures in Nepal (2008- 2012, and 2013-2015)

showed us that place-naming could be part of a dialectical political process between indigenous

peoples and the state makers.

Cultural Colonization of a Hindu State Over Indigenous Peoples Through Transformation

of Place-Names in Nepal
There is no unanimous understanding on how Nepal was named. Historians have mainly

relied on old puranic sanskrit—Indo-European language, and Newari—Tibeto-Burman,

language texts in interpreting the etymology of Nepal as a place-name. The same problem lies

with the name Gorkha—the territory from where the rulers of a consolidated state of Nepal

originated— in terms of how the place-name Gorkha came into existence or how the name was

founded. In Nepal, the persons in bureaucratic control, holding power [satta] and in writing

practice [lekhan parampara] have remained dominant and decisive in terms of place-naming and

renaming of place-names if they are found to be unfit or unintelligible in the language of the

rulers.

60
 Baburam Acharya, a historian who extols the history of the Shah dynasty, writes that “the

name Gorkha was chosen because the Yogis of the nath sect had created an idol of nath and had

left it with a stone inscription on a hill that was later called Gorkha when Drabya Shah

conquered that part of the Magarat” (Acharya 1967:3) [my translation]. This interpretation by the

author appears to provide legitimacy to the Hindu ruler’s conquests and reflects the rulers’ desire

to expand their own dominion rather than to ‘unify’ the country. Some authors even claim that

the name of the Kingdom of Gorkha is associated with protection of cows (go in Sanskrit) in the

Hindu land. Chakrapani & Keshabji, (2013 B.S.: 1) assert that “our country Nepal is called

'Gorakha' and the inhabitants of Nepal are called 'Gorkhali'. The name Gorkha is the corrupted

form of 'gorakshya, 'go=cow, rakshya=protection, and the Gorkhali name is given to the

'protectors of cow', it is said by the historian scholars.” [my translation]. Kirkpatrick was perhaps

the first European scholar to describe how King PN Shah from Gorkha invaded and conquered

the cities of Nepal in the 1760s. He mentioned that the “native Newars called [the cities] Yin,

Yulloo, and Khopo whereas the Parbatiya Gorkhalis called those three cities

Kantipur/Kathmandu, Lalit/Patan, and Bhatgang/Bhadgaun” respectively (Kirkpatrick 1811:159–

165). Kirkpatrick’s observation is succinctly summarized by Hamilton:

[T]he changes in the names of places, since the Hindu conquest, has been rapid [and]
almost beyond conception; for instance, the capitals of the three principalities into which
Nepal was divided, and which are now called Kathmandu, Lalit Patana, and Bhatgang,
and which, in 1802, I always heard called by these names, were, during the Newar
government, which ended in 1767, called Yin Daise, Yulloo Daise, and Khopo Daise.
(Hamilton 1819:25).

The above observations corroborate the assumption that appropriation and change of

indigenous place-names in Nepal began with the Gorkha invasion. The Tibeto-Burman place

names that were found to be unintelligible to Indo-European speaking conquerors were bound to

be changed. Govinda Neupane writes: “Districts and zones were founded with new names that

61
displaced the old and ethnicity oriented names. The Khasas were smart in the renaming process

since long ago. An example of this can be taken from the changes of the place names in the

Kathmandu valley”(Neupane 2000:124) [my translation]. In this regards, Malla’s study has

shown how the names of the rivers and different places, which were originally in Tibeto-Burman

Newari language, in the Kathmandu valley began to be changed from the early first millennium.

He states that the Hindu political cultural domination in Nepal began as early in the 5th century

“in the course of the Hindu political-cultural domination by the Lichchavis (A.D. 464-789), the

Thakuris (A.D. 880-1200), and the Mallas (A.D. 1201-1769), the tribals were Hinduised or

Sanskritised; and in the process, different species of tribal toponyms were Sanskritised, including

the name of the country itself” (Malla 1996:1). Malla, in a different article entitled River-Names

of the Nepal Valley: A Study in Cultural Annexation asserts that changes in the Kathmandu

valley’s place-names—which were originally in the Newari language -into the Indo-aryan

immigrants’ language were made so as to follow suit with the rulers’ language, thereby

colonizing indigenous peoples’ languages and cultures. He writes: “Aboriginal cultures are

subjugated and annexed by Indo-aryan immigrants through changing the river names in the

Kathmandu valley from the Newari language into the Khas Nepali language…The puranic river-

myths are unacknowledged statements of the process of cultural conquest of toponyms. What is

more embarrassing is that a majority of aboriginal names have survived if only to uncover this

cultural subterfuge. Thus we know how Tibeto-Burman nwa-khu (mouth-river or murmuring

river) has become Indo-aryan, Vak-mati = Vagmati” (Malla 1983:57–62). Dr. Malla further

states that the Nepal valley was the first victim of colonial Hinduization of place-names. He

writes: "An overwhelming number of older place-names of this ancient valley are increasingly

submerged under the "Nepalized" substitutions. Many more of the less familiar place-names are

62
receding into the world of oblivion with each passing generation. Place-names are as much a part

of one's cultural heritage as personal surnames are of one's social history"(Malla 1983:68). But

such unique cultural and social identities embedded in indigenous peoples’ territorial names are

often vulnerable to transformation and even extinction in the face of the state’s bureaucratic

expansion. Malla observes three stages of cultural annexation through the Sanskritisation of

place-names, namely “Approximation; Translation; and Substitution”(Malla 1983:64). These

processes of place-names changing with political subjugation and cultural colonization can be

observed even among the Limbu adivasi’s place-names in east Nepal. The following sections

will demonstrate how Limbus have suffered such colonial consequences through place-names’

changes in Limbuwan.

In Limbuwan, the Limbus have names in their own Limbu language, of their that-thalo

[territory], villages, mountains, rivers, forests, and other places. But the place-names of

Limbuwan that-thalo have been changing rapidly only in favor of the state bureaucracy, colonial

development, and culturally exploitative governance. For example, a famous pilgrimage site

Mukum Lungma33 (L) is called Pathivara in Nepali. The Limbus’ sacred mountain Faktanglung

(L) is Kumbhakarna or Jannu in Nepali. Mount Everest’s is called Sagarmatha in Nepali but it is

Chumjan Lung in Limbu language. These are examples of how the Limbus have names of their

places in their own language. But the Limbus collective identity, which is also embedded in their

place-names has been in crisis, as Nepal’s ruling caste groups favor their own Indo-European

language over the Limbus’ Tibeto-Burman. Acclaimed poet, writer and former Chancellor of the

Nepal Academy (and a Limbu), Bairagi Kainla said:

Nepal’s modernization, or Nepalization was to be founded on the destruction of the

diverse mother tongues, scripts, religions, cultures, indigenous knowledge, and skills. The

33
A pilgrimage site famous for both Hindus and Limbus, located in Taplejung district.

63
 adivasi peoples of Nepal consider the Nepalization process as the Sanskritization or
Hinduization of Nepal. The Nepali state has always favored Khas-Nepali language over
others in the name of ‘national unity and indivisibility’ of the country. As a consequence,
the state has been encroaching into other non-Hindu, non-caste cultures. One of the forms
of cultural destruction still continuing is a planned change of place-names from the
Limbu language into Khas-Nepali. During the Panchayat regime, names and boundaries
of different villages were changed to serve the interest of the ruling groups. Even after the
Panchayat regime, the shape, size and names of different VDCs have been changed.
These changes in the place-names have been exclusively in favor of Khas-Nepali
language (Kainla 2059 v.s.:4) [my translation].

Kainla’s observations suggest that the Hindu state of Nepal proved to be culturally as
well as linguistically colonial for the Limbus. Numerous cases could be presented to show the
Limbus’ ancestral territory’s place-names were transformed into Nepali so as to make them
intelligible for the rulers and ruling groups. However, irrespective of the Nepali state’s political
as well as cultural exploitation, Limbus have been protesting against the state for claiming their
territorial names due to need for their collective identity to be recognized.

One People, Three Ethnonyms: Kirat, yakthumba, and Limbu

The Limbus belong to three different ethnonyms, namely Kirat, yakthumba, and Limbu.

The ethnonym Kirat—now also referred to as Kirat religion—is linked with the first known

formal ruling dynasty who ruled over Nepal “from 2000 to 2500 years back” (Hodgson

1858:447; Acharya 2012 v.s.). Many scholars have stated that the Limbus were a nation

belonging to the Kirat confederacy in ancient times (Hodgson 1858:447; Chemjong 1966;

Chemjong 1975; Acharya 2060 v.s.; Acharya 2012 v.s; Yongya 2050 v.s.). In this regard,

Limbus were also called Kirat in the past but it is not used so often as an ethnonym now except

in reference to Kirat as a religion. Similarly, the yakthumba ethnonym is exclusively used among

Limbus themselves whereas “Limbu” is a common ethnonym used among Limbus to introduce

themselves to non-Limbus. In the following sections, I will discuss these three terms, Kirat,

yakthumba, and Limbu, in detail.

64
The Limbus and the Kirat Connection

Historians have written that the Kirat were the first ruling dynasty of ancient Nepal who

ruled over Nepal “for 800 years (550 BC – 250 CE)” (Acharya 2060 v.s.:63). Under the Kirat

dynasty, a total of 32 kings ruled the country and Yalambar was the first Kirat king. Historians

and other scholars have traced genealogical connections between the Kirat kings and the Ten

Limbu chiefs who founded their own chiefdoms during the first millennium (Chemjong 1966;

Chemjong 1975; Baral and Tigela-Limbu 2008; Mabohang Limbu and Sharma Dhungel 2047

v.s.; Yongya 2050 v.s.). These scholars claim that the Limbu chiefs who founded Limbuwan in

east Nepal were the descendants of the Kirat dynasty.

Brian Hodgson describes the history and vast extension of the Kirat territory and Kirati

peoples:

The Kirantis, on account of their distinctly traceable antiquity as a nation and the peculiar
structure of their language, are perhaps the most interesting of all the Himalayan races,
not even excepting the Newars of Nepal proper...[W]e are assured that the Kiranti people
was forthcoming in their present abode from 2000 to 2500 years back, and that their
power was great and their dominion extensive, reaching possibly at one time to the delta
of the Gangas (Hodgson, 1858, pp. 447–448).

The Kirat territory in east Nepal used to be known by three different names given on the

basis of the geographical distance from the center, that is Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal.

The area nearest to Kathmandu was called Wallo-Kirat, and is mainly inhabited by Sunuwars.

The territory in the middle was called Majh-Kirat, which is mainly inhabited by many of the Rai

Kirati groups. Similarly, the farthest of the Kirat territory from the “center” was called Pallo-

Kirat, and mainly inhabited by the Limbus. In this regards, the term “Kirat” denoted: i) the first

ruling dynasty in Nepal; ii) the geographical territory or a kingdom; and iii) certain peoples

inhabiting the territory and also believed to have been descended from the Kirat dynasty.

65
Scholars writing about the Kirat’s political, social, and ethnic histories of have followed these

categories in describing the history and the past politics of the present day Rai, Limbu, Yakha,

and Sunuwars (Regmi 1978:536–539; Hodgson 1858:248–249; Acharya 2060 v.s.:18–26;

Acharya 2012 v.s.; Yongya 2050 v.s.; Chemjong 1966; Chemjong 1952). Hodgson also

described the Kirat territory on the basis of two provincial divisions demarcated by rivers. He

stated that the sub-division of Kirant territory was called Khambuwan, which comprised the

territories between the Sunkosi and Likhu rivers and the Likhu and Arun rivers. These are the

territories inhabited mainly by the various clan groups of Rais including Sunuwars. In this way

Hodgson described Khambuwan as a sub-province in the Kirat confederacy. Similarly Hodgson

stated the territories between the Arun river and the Mechi river were called Limbuwan,

inhabited by the Limbus, Yakha, Lohorung and Chintang (Hodgson 1858:248). Hodgson’s

descriptions of the Kirat groups show that they neither shared the same territory nor spoke the

same language. Rather these different groups belonged to different ancestral territories, and

followed different deities and divinities and different customs. In this regard, Hamilton’s

statement: “Among the Kirats was settled a tribe called Limbu, the manners of which were very

nearly the same, and indeed the tribes intermarry," (Hamilton 1971:54) also suggests that the

Limbus were considered a tribe under the Kirat. Furthermore, these different groups of Rais,

Sunuwars, Yakha, Limbu were different nations with their own culture, language, and customs

under the Kirat confederacy.

The term “Kirat” is preferred over “Limbu” in the writing traditions of older Limbu

scholars. Limbu historian I.S. Chemjong wrote four books34 (two in English and two in Nepali)

on Limbu and Limbuwan’s history but none of the four books used the term ‘Limbu’ in their

34
1. Kirat Itihas (1952) 2. History and Culture of Kirat People, Vol. 1 (1966). 3. History and Culture of Kirat
People, Vol. 2 (1967). 4. Kiratkalin Bijaypur ko Itihas (History of Bijaypur During the Kirat Period) (1975)

66
titles. Similarly, the title of the booklet: “Pallo-Kirat Limbuwan ka Magharu” [Demands of the

Limbuwan Pallo-Kirat] by B.B. Chemjong, published in 1957, also seems to follow the trend

established by the previous authors. However, since the 1970s the term Limbu seemed to be used

more than the term Kirat among authors who focused their studies on Limbu and Limbuwan.

Anthropologists Lionel Caplan (1970), Rex Jones (1973) and Shirley Jones and Rex Jones

(1976), Philippe Sagant (1996), Bedh Prakash Upreti (1976) used the terms Limbu and

Limbuwan with little in relation to the idea of Pallo-Kirat. One may find the term “Pallo-Kirat”

being replaced by the terms “East Nepal” in the titles of these anthropologists’ publications.

More recent publications focusing on the history, politics and identity of Limbus provide central

importance to the term “Limbu”. Shiva Kumar Shrestha’s “Limbuwan ko Aitihasik Rup Rekha”

[Historical Outline of the Limbuwan] published in 1985; “Limbuwan ko Rajniti: Vartaman ra

Dastabej” [Politics of Limbuwan: Present and the Documents] by Bhawani Baral and Kamal

Tigela (2008), and “Hodgson pandulipi ma Limbu Gorkha yudhda” [Limbu-Gorkha War in the

Hodgson Manuscripts], by Kamal Tigela et al (2013), are a few examples.

Kirat Alliance for Cultural Recognition

Four adivasi-janajati organizations, namely the Limbus’ Kirat Yakthung Chumlung, the

Rais’ Kirat Rai Yayokha, the Yakha’s Yakha Chhumma, and the Sunuwars’ Sunuwar Samaaj

made a collective decision in 2001 that they should mobilize their respective local offices and

people to report that their religion35was Kirat in the census held in 2001. They decided to start a

35
Whether the Limbus should call their religion as Kirat or something else has been a contentious issue. The Limbus
in Sikkim call their religion yuma samyo (yuma religion as the yuma divinity is the creator of all the living and non-
living beings in this universe). The Limbus in Nepal are divided in this regards. It would be safe to say that around
half the Limbus observe the religion known as “animism” by E B Tylor as they observe sacrificial rituals whereas
the “true” observers of Kirat religion (also called satya hangma) do not sacrifice animals, do not offer alcohol to the
divinities, and also abstain from eating meat and drinking alcohol.

67
collective campaign that all the Limbus, Rais, Yakha and Sunuwars should mention Kirat as their

religion in the census form. All of those organizations’ central offices printed leaflets, posters

and distributed them across their territories. Kirat Yakthung Chumlung organized workshops and

held other programs in different parts of Limbuwan as part of their contribution to the effort.

Their efforts paid off. The census in 2001 reported the Kirat religion to be4.5 percent of the total

population compared with merely 1 percent who said their religion was Kirat in the 1991 census.

In fact Rais, Limbus, Yakhas, and Sunuwars differ from each other in cultural and religious ritual

observations. It is believed that they all belong to a broad Kirat group but the groups all have

different deities and divinities. Their ancestral that-thalo are different and far apart. But why did

they have to come together to forge alliance for Kirat religion? Their collective decision for Kirat

religion should be understood in the context beyond their actual religious and ritual practices. In

fact their decision’s rationale may be clearly seen in relation to the politics of collective cultural

identity and recognition of these groups as belonging to a different religion other than the

dominant Hindu religion. The then chairman of Kirat Yakthung Chumlung explained that “one

of the objectives of bringing together those four Kirati groups in the census report was to show

the strength of the number of the followers of Kirat religion so that they could create a

synergistic force for demanding a public holiday on their national festivals, namely udhauli and

ubhauli.36After almost a decade long struggle on this issue by Kirat peoples, the government of

Nepal has declared public holidays on the occasions of their main festivals, udhauli and ubhauli,

since 2009. By forging the Kirati alliance, the Rai, Limbu, Yakha and Sunuwar succeeded in

being recognized by the state as Kirat-religion groups with their own religion, culture and

festivals. Gaining public holidays on udhauli and ubhauli was considered by the movement

36
Udhauli and ubhaulifestivals are called chasok tangnam and yakwa tangnam respectively in Limbu language.
Chasok tangnam is celebrated during crops harvesting time while yakwa tangnam is celebrated during the cropping
time.

68
organizers to be a major success of their movement, particularly in light of the boycott of the

Dashain festival by adivasi-janajati groups in Nepal. It is the Kirati groups themselves who

forged an alliance andmovement to meet the goal to be recognized as a different religion.

The meanings of the term Kirat have been changed along epochal movements and time. Kirat

was the name of a ruling dynasty and the Kirat kingdom extended all across the Himalayan

regions during the remote past and they ruled over Nepal for about 800 years before the Kirats

were overthrown by the Lichhavi dynasty (Hodgson 1858; Acharya 2060 v.s.; Acharya 2012v.s.;

Chemjong 1966; Chemjong 1952). Once overthrown, they were diminished to the status of

chieftains of the different chiefdoms in east Nepal (Chemjong 1966; Chemjong 1952; Mabohang

Limbu and Sharma Dhungel 2047 v.s.). These Kirat chiefdoms were renamed as Wallo-Kirat,

Majh-Kirat, and Pallo-Kirat, respectively eastward from the Nepal valley after the Kirat

chiefdoms were annexed under the dominion of the Gorkha Kingdom in the 1770s. This is how

the ancient Kirat dynasty gradually lost its political status from a kingdom that extended across

vast territories to a confederacy shrunk within east Nepal.

Now the term Kirat, both as a territorial-historical confederacy and a category of religion,

is contested within Nepal. Since the representative organizations of Rai, Limbu, Yakha and

Sunuwar decided their own group of four belonged to the Kirat religion, the decision seemed to

close the door for other groups. The Dhimals, at some point during the early 2000s, raised their

voices to claim that they also belonged to the Kirat confederacy but those “original” Kirats did

not seem to listen to the Dhimal claim. However, for the Limbus, their religion for the official

census reporting is Kirat whereas they are called Limbu as an ethnic group. In a nutshell,

“Limbu” is an ethnonym and “Kirat” is a religion for the Limbus

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Yakthungba/yakthumba as Endonym of the Limbus

Both the terms yakthungba and yakthumba are used interchangeably as common parlance

among Limbus. I will use the term with the spelling yakthumba in this dissertation. Limbus call

themselves yakthumba while communicating among themselves in their own Limbu language

which they call yakthung pan (yakthung (L) = Limbu; pan (L) = language). yakthung pan, with a

tradition of writing in its own script, has been reported as the 'Limbu' language by the census

reports of Nepal. Yakthumba introduce themselves as a “Limbu” to other non-Limbus when

communicating through the Nepali language with other non-Limbus. Limbuwan (Limbu territory

or region) is called yakthung laje (L) (Limbu state/province) in the Limbu language. Scholars

state that the territorial name yakthung laje preceded the name Limbuwan (Chemjong 1952;

Laoti 2005; Baral and Tigela-Limbu 2008; Mabuhang 2063 v.s.; Chemjong 1975; Subba 1995;

Nembang 1987). It is also widely believed and written by Limbu scholars that yakthumba was

their endonym and Limbu was exonym (Laoti 2005; Subba 1995; Mabohang Limbu and Sharma

Dhungel 2047 v.s.; Kainla 2059 v.s.). I mention this because many social scientists and others,

including politicians who are not familiar with the details, believe that the terms/names Limbu

and Limbuwan are words from the Limbu language. On the contrary, available writings,

etymology and some political historical circumstances reveal that the names Limbu and

Limbuwan were rather “introduced or given by the outsiders” (Campbell 1840:595; Campbell

1869:148) and established through the political negotiation between the tribal yakthumba and the

“outsiders”. yakthumba and Limbu names can be explained in their own political and social

relations.

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Political/Territorial Basis of yakthumba

In Limbu language, “yak (L) means fort and thum (L) means physical strength, power;

and thung (L)means war” (Chemjong and Kainla 2059 v.s.:191). Hence, etymologically, the

group that belonged to the same fort or waged battles to defend their fort might have been named

as yakthumba or yakthungba. The word, thum also means “an administrative unit” (Chemjong

and Kainla 2059 v.s.:206). In this sense, yakthumba refers to the people united under the same

fort or administrative unit.

The term yak has two broad meanings and contexts in Limbu society and Limbuwan

territory: i) yak as an aspect of individual identity and dignity; and ii) yak as an aspect of

collective identity, with reference to Limbuwan’s history and territory. Laoti writes: “yak is also

called 'mangenna'yak.” (Laoti 2005:22).The “Limbu-Nepali-English Dictionary” defines

mangenna in three interrelated terms: the “place of origin of the Limbu tribes…to (perform)

worship to raise one’s head high;…to perform a worship for one’s welfare and safety”

(Chemjong and Kainla 2059 v.s.:324). In this regard, mangenna yak carries important

connotations for the Limbus. Having one's mangenna low means (Nepali: sir khasnu) means that

the person ultimately will lose his or her identity. Without his/her mangenna high, a Limbu can

do nothing important; a person may even die, or will become socially non-existent, with no pride

or dignity in society. This sense of personal ontology is directly linked to lineage identity.

mangenna mundhum37 or mythic accounts tell the ancestral origin of a lineage and the locales of

where and how the lineage first started settled life. The mangenna mundhum helps the Limbus to

37
mundhum is the “holy Kirant- Limbu scripture based on oral tradition…scriptural
knowledge…mythology”(Chemjong and Kainla 2059 v.s.:343). Mundhum is the whole of all the Limbu oral texts or
mythologies that tell about the origin of this universe, world, living and non-living beings, and human-nature
relations. For the Limbus, mundhumexplains the meanings of the totality of human life and society including the
rites of passage.

71
trace their lineage's territorial history. The ritual specialist known as a phedangma38, while doing

the mangenna ritual of a person, propitiates ancestors and recites: “you were originated in such

and such a place, and you are the descendant of such and such an ancestor. Your main root is

such and such, you have such and such foundation. You have such and such ancestors.” In this

regard, a person losing his/her identity is equal to the loss of the person’s lineage and territorial

affiliation.

Secondly, yak means fort or gadhi (N). yak is believed to be the sacred site of the origins

of the Limbus. In Limbuwan, there are dozens of yaks which belong to different Limbu

chieftains who ruled the territory in the past (Khajum, 2069 v.s.). Each Limbu clan group has

their own yak, which may be understood as the place or territory where the ancestors of that clan

originated or may have been the first settlers. The location of a yak is usually on a hill or a

mountain top. The yak’s location also connotes the clan's political relations as the clan’s

ancestors would have established the yak so as to defend their territory. In present day Limbu

literature and mundhum,39a yak [fort] is also described as the palace of a yakthumba King. There

are dozens of such yaks all across Limbuwan, each of them with their own history. Many of

these yaks have been the sites for pilgrimage and cultural preservation. They are also being

revived as sites for the heritage of Limbuwan. For example, the editorial of a souvenir report

about one such fort says: “Forts had an important role during the rule of Limbuwan in the past

but these forts diminished and lost their roles after the annexation of Limbuwan under Nepal.

Now even the word yak seems to have diminished its meaning let alone its history” (Khajum,

2069 v.s.:2). Similarly, a Limbu oral text describes the grandiose and vast expansion of a

38
A class of Limbu priest “well-versed in scriptures” (Chemjong and Kainla 2059 v.s.:313). Phedangma is a Limbu
ritual performer priest.
39
The oral texts that describe the origin, history and all aspects of human lives and their relationships with this living
world and beyond.

72
yakthumba King Lilim Hang and his fort in these terms: “From one side flows the Brahmaputra

river up northward to China and Tibet and downward to the plain ocean. In the middle lies the

Tawalung Susuwaden Taklung yak, the fort-palace of the King Lilimhang”40 (Baral & Tigela-

Limbu, 2008:83) [my translation].

Padam Singh Subba 'Apatan' (2062 v.s.; 2005 AD) writes in reference to the Limbus in

Sikkim: "The Limbu are called by three interchangeable names: 'Chong', 'Limbu', and 'Subba'.

But the Limbus do not call among themselves by these three ethnonyms. They rather call

themselves yakthumba, meaning 'defenders of the fort” (Subba 2005:242) [my translation].

Similarly, George van Driem writes: "The Limbus designate themselves by the name Yakthuŋba

... The component-thuŋba may derive from the etymon thuŋ- of which the adjective kɛdhuŋba

'brave, heroic, manly, hold appears to be an active participle" (van Driem 1987:xix).

The word yakthumba as discussed above corroborates Maurice Godelier’s statements

about the relationships between societal existence and territorial defense. Based on his study

among the Baruya in the New Guinea highlands, Godelier wrote about the relationships between

indigenous societies and the state in relation to how indigenous societies lose their autonomous

status as a society, and are thereby diminished to the status of community, when they are

incorporated under the state. He writes:

When [the Baruya] lost sovereignty over their mountains and their rivers, and over their
own persons, the Baruya ceased to be a society, and became a local "tribal community"
under the authority of a state, an institution totally alien to their history and their ways of
thinking and acting…We thus see what it means to have a territory, a set of natural
elements—lands, rivers, mountains, lakes, sometimes sea—that provide human groups
with resources for their livelihood and development. A territory can be conquered, or
inherited from ancestors who conquered it or appropriated it without a fight (if they
settled uninhabited regions). Aterritorial border must be known, if not recognized, by the
societies that occupy and exploit the neighboring spaces. In all cases, a territory must be

40
“हथक्न ङ् कर नवु यु (र्धु कोसी(, हथक्न ङ् कर तस्रु ोती उम्रोती यु (ब्रम्ह पत्रु नहर्(, थो कर हसन्यक ु मर्ु ने मो कर तेमने वलङ, आव सो क व रे क क्मेन्र्ेनेन:, ख म्लङु अईरे :
पन्ु मेन्र्ेत्नेन, हकहधर्ङ् न रे हलनमेन्र्ेत्नेन, फक्फक हमय रे कप्मम्मेनर्ेत्नेन, स प्मची कुलमु य क्थङु ् ह ङ हलहलमह ङ् लेन ह ङ् यक्ु न र्ेन त व लङु ससु वु र्ेन त क्लङु यक”।

73
 defended by force, through the use of arms and organized violence, but also through rites
that appeal to the gods and other invisible powers to weaken or annihilate enemy.
(Godelier 2009:145–146).

Godelier’s concluding statement based on the study of Baruya and their relationships

with the New Guinea state is convincing. To me, Godelier’s general points based on his

ethnographic study are comparable to the situation of the yakthumbas in Nepal. The words: yak,

thung, and thum, which in combined make up the term yakthumba connote the meanings of

territorial strength and power through which the yakthumbas would maintain their autonomy.

Following Bourdieu (1991) and Alia (2007), I argue that ethnonyms and place-names are integral

to each other. In their anthropological essence these words speak about power relations and

political motivation. Bourdieu writes:

[social scientists] must examine the part played by words in the construction of
social reality and the contribution which the struggle over classifications, a
dimension of all class struggles, makes to the constitution of classes… clans, tribes,
ethnic groups or nations (Bourdieu 1991:105).

Names, particularly referring to any ethnic group or nation, are primarily loaded with politico-

historical facts in which economic relations would occur only secondarily. In this regard,

Valerie Alia, referring to her work on naming among the Inuits, writes:

The politics of naming has never been defined as such, but has existed between
the lines of many disciplines…[which] provide the foundation for political
onomastics, the politics of naming (Alia, 2007:6-7).

Alia argues that "naming is inseparable from other political phenomena and is an important

key to analyzing power relations" (Alia, ibid:7). Inside the Limbu community, references about

yakthumba exist not only in day-to-day conversation but also in rites of passage and other

religious rituals. The word yak [fort] is invoked in almost all rituals, irrespective of individual or

groups. Individuals belong to their clan yak, which the phedangma invokes in incantation of the

mundhum and the individuals must be referred as belonging to a particular yak for the purpose of

74
all rituals that are performed either within the household or group. Chemjong (1966) in his book

History and culture of Kirat People writes that the Limbus, before their conquest by the Gorkha

Hindu kingdom, were politically administered under the ten fort system. He writes that the

Limbu territory was divided into ten Thums- districts- in which each of the chiefs or Hangs[L]

also built his fort and fixed the boundaries of his district. For example:

Thindolung Khokya Hang was elected king of the Yangwarok district. He built his
fort at Hastapur and ruled Mabo, Thebe, Loksom, Setling, Tamling, Saling, Kambang
and other tribes (Chemjong, 1966:67).

Similarly, Campbell’s account of how the yakthumba Hangs [L] built and defended their

forts also corroborates the present day Limbus’ association with their yak:

Before the conquest of the whole of the country east of the Arun, the Limboos held a
great portion of the country…They were then divided into many small chiefships…In
each chiefship it was the custom to maintain a fort or stronghold of very difficult access,
in which the chief generally lived, and to which his chosen followers repaired for its
defence during a feud with a neighbor, or a dispute with the lord superior. It was to these
strongholds that the Limboos retired during the incursions of the conquering Goorkhas,
and in many of them they are said to have displayed the most heroic bravery against the
common enemy of all the mountain tribes (Campbell 1869:151).

The etymology of the word yakthumba and political as well as cultural meanings associated

with it indicate that the tribal name yakthumba is the endonym of the present day Limbus. Their

tribal endonym yakthunba and its meanings also resonate with aitihasik that-thalo [historical

territory] of the Limbus from the ritual, and political-cultural dimensions.

Limbu as a Negotiated Ethnonym

Both Limbu and foreign scholars have different theories on how the ethnonym Limbu
came into existence. I find the observations of two foreign scholars, one from the 18th century
and another from the very end of the second millennium, illuminating. Campbell, the then British
-India colonial government's resident representative in Darjeeling, wrote:

75
 The word "Limboo" is a corruption, probably introduced by the Goorkhas, of
"Ekthoomba" the correct denomination of these people; and is generally used by
foreigners to designate the whole population…the Limboos consider themselves to be the
aboriginal inhabitants of the country they now occupy, at least they are satisfied that none
of the neighboring tribes have any claims of preoccupation (Campbell, 1840, p. 595).

Another scholar Dr. R.K. Sprigg writes in the foreword for “The Limboos of the Eastern

Himalaya With Special Reference to Sikkim” to say: “Limbus inhabited Limbuwan and parts of

Sikkim even before they were known as Limbus! This is because the original name of the

Limbus, the name that they prefer to use for themselves, is not Limbu but yakthungba or

yakthumba” (Subba 1999:v. Foreword by Sprigg). I. S. Chemjong added further texts—on the

basis of those new materials—to his book The History and Culture of Kirat People published in

1967.

I. S. Chemjong views Limbu as an ethnonym and yakthumba as a race and considers that

yakthumba was adopted as a new name for a race:

After the partition of the Kirat land of Limbuwan into Ten thums, the representatives of
the Ten Leaders of Shan Mokwan people again assembled in a meeting at their holy place
Ambe Pojoma, discussed and decided to name their nationality. Accordingly, they
resolved and changed the name of Shan Mokwan in yakthumba or Limbu. The Ten
Leaders or chiefs became Ten Limbus and the word yakthumba was retained as the new
name for race (Chemjong 1966:63).

Yehang Laoti seconds I. S. Chemjong’s statement but also calls for further studies

focusing on whether the word “Limbu” existed before the contact between Limbuwan and the

Gorkha King, known in Limbu language as Pene Hang or King of the Chettri-Bahun (Laoti

2005:18). Swami Prapannacharya also writes: "To date, no proof has been discovered the use of

the term Limbu before the 17th century. There remains this as a topic for inquiry”

(Prapannacharya 2047 v.s.:18) [my translation].

To sum up the many views recounted above, initially a new group called yakthungbas

diverged froma broader confederacy of Kiratas in the 7th-8th century CE. From 17th -18th century

76
onwards the yakthumbas appear to have received a new name, Limbu, after they came into

contact with both Hindu Gorkhalis, European explorers and colonial administrators.

The word 'Limbu' has comparably reliable and variable etymologies. According to a Limbu

dictionary, Li (L) means bow and Pu (L) means bird (Chemjong&Kainla, 2059 v.s.). It is said

that the Limbus earned this name for being excellent archers and hunters. This ethnonym appears

to be based on their subsistence patterns, especially hunting birds and other game. Another

etymology traces the origin of ‘Limbu’ to the fact that the Limbus occupied their land by

defeating their enemies with their li (L) = bows. The name “Limbu” however, does not seem to

be convincingly derived from the Limbu language or economic practices as many scholars cited

above state that the ethnonym Limbu was unfamiliar for the yakthumbas before they entered into

political relationships with the Gorkhali Hindu aryan rulers (Laoti 2005; Prapannacharya

2047v.s.). Yet there is no mention of Limbu in mundhum too. A lot of references of the word

yakthumba may be found in mundhum but not the word Limbu. The two issues namely that

scholars view that the “Limbu” ethnonym was given to yakthumbas by the outsiders on the one

hand and absence of the term Limbu from the mundhum on the other evoke further questions.

How had outsiders, be it the Gorkhalis or the Westerners, introduced the ethnonym Limbu with

reference to the yakthumbas?

So far we are only told by scholars that during the 18th and 19th centuries the Gorkhali

conquerors or the colonists from Europe contributed to the genesis of the denomination 'Limbu'

or 'Limboo' for the yakthumbas. What is yet unanswered is why did both the Gorkhali

conquerors and other 'foreigners' alike call those people Limbu? Much earlier than Campbell,

Kirkpatrik in his book “An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal (Being the Substance of

Observations Made During A Mission to that Country in the Year 1793)” wrote:

77
 The mountainous tract is inhabited by various uncivilized nations, …the principle of
these tribes are ... the Limboos or Limbooas, whom the Nepal government finds it no
easy matter to keep in order (Kirkpatrick, 1969:281[1811]).

Several decades later, Hodgson, the then permanent resident representative of the

British government to Nepal for more than two decades in the 1830s-40s and later spending

his retired life in Darjeelingfor more than a decade, wrote extensively about the Limbus,

their culture, and their language. He used both yakthumba and Limbu denominations in the

beginning but seemed to have stopped using the former term in his subsequent reports,

writing “Limbu” exclusively. Risley (1891) and then Vansittart (1894) described the

Limbus relying on the same details from their predecessors' writings. In this regard,

Hamilton (1819) wrote:

The Kirats, being vigorous beef-eaters, did not readily submit to the Rajputs [i.e., Hindu
Kshetriya ruling caste]. Among the Kiratas was settled a tribe called Limbu… and it
would not appear that the Lamas had made any progress in converting the Limbus
(Hamilton, 1971:54 [1819]).

Furthermore, Vansittart wrote:

There is one regiment of Limbus in the Nepalese army, called the "Bhaironath" but
on account of their quarrelsome nature they were always quartered apart. The
Limbus are born shikaris [hunters] (Vansittart,1894).

These quotes drawn from the 19th century writings suggest, I would argue, that the

denomination of Limbu, having been ascribed and deployed by outsiders, gradually came

to be accepted by the Limbus in recognition of the outsiders.

The Limbus, as I recounted above, inhabited and still inhabit geographically

contiguous hills located amidst Nepal, India, and Tibet. In fact, the creation of three

different states, the Hindu nation-state of Nepal, the British colonial state in India, and the

Kingdom of Sikkim, divided the Limbu population into three different countries—Sikkim

was an independent country until it was annexed by India in 1974—by cutting through

78
traditional Limbu territory. Hence, the Limbus' problem of identity and national history is

similar to the problems facing other ethnic minorities such as the Wa (Fiskesjo 2010), the

Akha (Sturgeon 1997), and Kachin (Dean 2010) of South-East Asia. To demonstrate how

the Kachin territory has been divided into three states, Dean writes: “The Kachin are a

nation divided territorially and made into minorities in modern China, Myanmar and India

by the imposition of so-called “international” boundaries” (Dean 2010:1). The Limbus’

case in relations to their territory being divided into three different states is similar to the

situation of the Kachins. Understandably, outsiders who were dealing with the Limbus

faced two immediate problems: i) how to control the yakthumbas, who as the border-land

people did not succumb easily to state authority and ii) how to create a name for those

peoples whose self-given endonym in a Tibeto-Burman language, yakthumba, was literally

difficult to utter for the Indo-European language speakers (both Nepali and English belong

to the same root). As (Sturgeon, 1997), Dean (2005), and Fiskesjö (2010) have

demonstrated in their studies among Akha (China and Thailand borders), Kachin (China

and Burma, even India, borders), and Wa (China and Burma borders), it has not been easy

for outsiders to name and tame border-land peoples in Asia. Outsiders struggled to find

intelligible and pronounceable words to denominate groups like the yakthungba. Gorkhali

and British colonial administrators, thus, might have coined appropriate names to “tame”

the “uncivilized” groups.

The encounters between the Limbus and the Hindu Gorkhali rulers occurred in two

ways: firstly in battle at least three times as described by historians (Chemjong, 1967) and

through the treaty between the Limbus and the Hindu King Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1774.

There is no yakthumba word used in the text of the treaty but the word Limbu is:

79
 We have received your reply to our previous letter. We desire peace and harmony.
Our intent is good…We hereby pardon all of your crimes and confirm the customs
and traditions, rights and privileges of your country…Take care of the land as you
did when it was being ruled over by your own chieftains. Enjoy the land from
generation to generations. You are different from the 9,00,000 Rais, [of Majhkirat],
because [their] chieftains are to be displaced, but not you…As mentioned above
remain under your chieftains and enjoy your traditional rights and privileges and
your lands. In case we confiscate your land, may our ancestral gods destroy our
kingdom. We hereby inscribe this pledge on a copper plate and also issue this royal
order to our Limbu brethren.
Kantipur: Shrawan Sudi 12, 1831 (July 1774) (Chemjong, 1967:115; Regmi
1978:626)

The treaty-paper above is the first formal document (discovered so far) written by

the Gorkha King to the name of the Limbus. His descendants continued to write to the

Limbus with no references to yakthumba. Limbus did not seem to have complained about

the ethnonym. However, historical documents maintained and written by the Limbus show

that the Limbus also did not call the Gorkha King by his real name: Prithvi Narayan Shah.

Instead Limbus called him pene hang41 (Chemjong, 1967; Tigela-Limbu, Tunghang, and

Angla 2013).

Names are integral to identity. The yakthumbas seem to have accepted the

ethnonym Limbu because it recognized their identity as linked to a that-thalo or territory

(Godelier, 2009) and provided them with a political status in the emergent order of the new

state-nation in which they were now encompassed. Therefore it seemed that the Limbu

name or identity was established in a "dialogic" process between the Yakthungbas and

outsiders.

41
Pene (L) = Chhetri; hang (L)= King

80
Place-Naming and State making

Having located the Limbu and yakthumba names in their politico-historical contexts, I shall now

move further to see how the Nepali Hindu state apparatus dominated the Limbu people, a process

that led to detrimental consequences for the Limbu’s culture and language. In summer 2008,

during a trip to Limbuwan in search of possible fieldwork area, I visited Rajarani village and

interviewed local Limbus about the history and social aspects of the village’s name. The place-

name Rajarani sounds beautiful in Nepali language as the name raja (N) = king, and rani (N)=

queen, are embedded within it. The question I posed was how did a Nepali place-name become

established in an area where Limbus outnumbered all other population? If the Limbus in the past

communicated with each other exclusively in the Limbu language, how did a place-name in

Nepali became so popular and institutionalized in that area?

In fact the location to which one could exactly pin-point as Rajarani was the place where—as I

was told by the elderly Limbus— the post-office, police post, and school had been established

over the past seven decades. These services all represented the intrusion of the state into a

locality. I wondered how such an amiable Nepali name- with the words raja and rani42 being

among the most highly respected words during the monarchical era—became established in an

area where majority of the people would speak Limbu. The landscape of Rajarani constitutes a

small valley surrounded by hills with two small ponds or rather swamps on both sides of a small

hill. People called these ponds swamps in the past. They were literally swamps. These two small

swamps were called Mawarak43and Pawarak44. After the names of these two swamps, a new

place-name “Rajarani” was invented and appropriated as the whole VDC (Village Development

Council) is called Rajarani VDC now.

42
Raja (N) = King; rani (N) = Queen
43
Ma warak (L) = female pond.
44
Pa warak (L) = male pond

81
 There are also two villages located in the watersheds of both swamps by the same names

Mawarok and Pawarok. Other villages in the vicinity, are also all named in Limbu language:

Singemba, Sambhekwa, Nangi.45 Hence, all these five village names remain with the Limbu

names as they were. Why did Rajarani alone acquire a Nepali name while other village names

remained in the Limbu language? This question is difficult to answer. Local Limbus could only

guess that this place began to be called Rajarani after the government conducted the first

informal official land survey in the 1930s.But the naming of Rajarani has created some conflict

and disarticulation among other local place-names in this local Limbus’ that-thalo. Firstly,

Rajarani is the name of the administrative and political unit called a VDC, which is further

divided into nine wards. Different villages and settlements surrounding the center of Rajarani are

assigned ward numbers. For example, Mawarok village is assigned to ward number 6, Pawarok

village is assigned to ward number 9, Singembato number 3, and Nangi tonumber1. In this

regard, the name of the VDC, Rajarani, and respective wards represent the Nepali state

apparatus. Even village names that are in the Limbu language have lost their relevance for

administrative purposes. Local people, including Limbus, as citizens have to acquire essential

documents such as land ownership certificates, citizenship cards, passports, and marriage

certificates. Such documents bear only the ward numbers but not the village name. So the state

creates a different bureaucratic world through its agents, and name assignment is one of the ways

it does this. Bourdieu states: "There is no social agent who does not aspire, as far as his

circumstances permit, to have the power to name and to create the world through naming"

(Bourdieu,1991:106). Similarly, Scott et al. write:

"State naming practices and local, customary naming practices are strikingly different.
[Naming] are devised by very distinct agents for whom the purpose of identification are
radically different... Purely local, customary practices… achieve a level of precision and
45
Singemba (L)= tall tree; Sambhekwa (L) = flattened rice available; Nangi (L) = snow fall

82
 clarity, perfectly suited to the needs of knowledgeable locals. State naming practices are,
by contrast, constructed to guide an official 'stranger' in identifying unambiguously persons
and places, not just in a single locality, but in many localities, using standardized
administrative techniques" (Scott, Tehranian, and Mathias 2002:4).

In Rajarani’s case, locally, customarily, socially institutionalized names: Mawarak (L),

Pawarak (L), Singemba (L), and Nangi (L) were replaced by the numerical assignments, that is,

ward numbers 6, 9, 3, and 1, respectively with the standardized technique applied to all over the

country. However, indigenous practice is so resilient that it is not possible to completely replace

the place-names founded in local social and customary practices. Despite the state

administration’s effort to erase Limbu names, they remain intact and meaningful in Limbu social

practice. For example, they not only remain in use in day-to-day social interactions between

people but also are essentially used during social events, such as marriage ceremonies, death

funerals, and other rituals. The Limbus of Rajarani have a custom of chesung46 (L) and hukwa47

(L) exchange between the affinal kins and within the lineages respectively. Households must

keep the exact record or memory of chesung and hukwa gifts so that it may be gifted back with

the same item and quantity (in hukwa’s case) in the future. Villages’ names are exclusively used

in keeping such records and memorization, and also for the labor exchanges. Hence, the state

imposed names and numbers are deployed for the purposes of a state machinery while the Limbu

place-names, which bear the social, historical and territorial meanings in terms of the Limbus'

lived experiences as a nation, resiliently persist because the place-names “touches so many

46
chesung (L) is a gift mainly in the form of food (mainly meat) and drinks (alcohol). It is called chesung when
received or gifted away between affinal kins, between the in-laws families. For example, in the first year of
marriage, a married daughter, with her husband, visits her natal home and relatives with elaborate items of
chesung: two whole pig carcasses, two vessels of liquor, different snacks (for the parents family) and pig legs, ribs,
and bottles of liquor for other close kins.
47
hukwa (L) is an informal type of gift mainly in the form of food or drink givenaway or received within the same
lineage. At the occasions of wedding feast, last funeral feast, and such events, the invitees from the same lineage
bring in liquor, beer, and snacks. Such gifts that are exchanged within the lineage are called hukwa. huk (L) = hand;
wa (L) = available. It is believed among Limbus that we are not supposed to visit anyone’s house empty-handed.
However, in practice, it is basically the women who bring in or receive hukwa and keep an excellent memory of
who has brought what and how to gift back with the same item and quantity in the future.

83
dimensions” (Myers 1986:47) of Limbu life. Fred Myers states that a country [nation] is relevant

in the system of significant places as "a projection into symbolic space of various social

processes" (Myers 1986:47; Feld and Basso 1996:15).

In this regard, we are able to distinguish between a “nation” (cultural), and “state”

(bureaucratic) as two different spheres in life with which the Limbus of Rajarani have to engage

with. In other words, Rajarani’s local place-names still prevail in Limbu social practices in

relation to their social history, their ecological reality, and relation to the land. I argue here that

language, social institutions, relationships to land, kinship organization, customary practice, and

a particular history are the foundations of the Limbu nation in parallel to the state’s apparatus.

The persistence of place-names in the Limbu language and the everyday use of these terms in

practice produce and reproduce among the Limbus a different sense of national unity. Yet, there

is no denial that the Limbus are part of the Nepali state. All Limbus need citizenship cards, many

need passports if they wish to travel abroad, have land ownership certificates, require voter

registration cards to exercise their right to vote, and may require other documents for other

benefits. Through these bureaucratic necessities, individuals become part of the broader political

process. All these state-issued documents show information exclusively in the Nepali language.

In their everyday lives Limbus, therefore, constantly switch between two realities. On the one

hand, they define themselves as members of a collective Limbu society and, on the other, as

citizens of the state of Nepal.

In the case of the invention of Rajarani as a designated place, one can clearly see how a change

in place name made exclusively Limbu places intelligible and visible to the state through the

official Nepali language. From the perspective of the Limbu language, state-imposed language

displaced and marginalized Limbu place-names and colonized their lands and polity.

84
Views of Political Party Leaders and Scholars on Limbuwan

In July 2015, the Limbuwan Study Center (LSC), a research wing of the Kirat Yakthung

Chumlung (KYC), the Limbus’ organization in Nepal, organized an interaction program entitled:

Limbuwan: hijo, ajara bholi (Limbuwan: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow). The program was

organized in the context that the Constituent Assembly (CA) had made public the preliminary

draft of the constitution for public discussion and feedback, if any. Yet, the preliminary draft

included seven federal states with no names, let alone the Limbuwan state for which the

Limbuwan-based political parties, and the KYC had been struggling for decades (described in

chapters 2 and 4). Since the final constitution was highly unlikely to have Limbuwan in light of a

constitution draft with un-named states, Limbus and their organizations took the chance to

interact amongst Limbu organizations as well as others. The Limbuwan Study Center’s (LSC)

program with the above topic was also organized in such a context around the uncertainty of

Limbuwan. As a research student and a member of the LSC, I also attended the program. Three

non-Limbu scholars and political activists were invited as the main speakers. One of the

speakers, Khagendra Sangraula, an acclaimed author and a Marxist scholar said:

Limbuwan is a civilization, it is not a name alone, neither is an ethnic enclave. It has a

historical basis. Limbuwan has its geographical continuity, and contiguity. The
subjugation and oppression of the Limbuwan by the state has a history. Having been
reminded of the oppression they experienced and having remembered their ethnic
civilization, they have claimed for autonomy to be guaranteed by the constitution. There
is legitimacy and strength in their demands. Talking about their organization, it does not
seem to be well managed, as they are not well organized politically. The five parties of
Limbuwan having come together, the central committee seems too large. But there is
continuity in the Limbuwan movement, so there is possibility of Limbuwan [my
translation].

Sangraula’s view was supportive to the Limbuwan movement. He even praised and

equated Limbuwan with a civilization beyond merely a name. He also criticized the Limbus for

85
not being well organized politically to create a decisive momentum for the movement against the

defiant state of Nepal. He also criticized the dominant party leaders who seem to believe that

having a Limbuwan federal state would be detrimental to national unity in Nepal.

Despite the dominant political parties disinclination towards Limbuwan, the leaders of

the Limbuwan based parties had made claims for Limbuwan on the basis of history, identity and

territory [itihas, pahichan ra that-thalo] as Bangai Dhimal, a leader of the Federal Limbuwan

State Council (FLSC), speaking before a crowd in Dhankuta in March 2010 said:

I must tell you the history of Limbuwan. Limbuwan is the name of the land conquered by
the Limbu with their bow and arrow about 1300 years ago. The name of Limbuwan is not
dropped from the sky, neither is it dug out of the soil. Limbuwan is the name of the state
triumphed and established by the Limbu archers some 1300 years ago. The Limbuwan
then had 10 provinces and 17 thums [administrative districts]. Of the 17 thums, one thum
was Mikluk thum. The place called Letang-Rajarani is the historic place. There is a place
called Sanguri gadhi [fort] just westward from Bhedetar. That gadhi belongs to Dhimals.
Dhimal have clans called Yonghang, Nembang, Makhim etc. It is written in a book on
Yonghang Dhimal that the Yonghang Dhimal had ruled over their territory from Sanguri
gadhi, [located] northward from Dharan. This means the ancestors of the Dhimal had
settled inthe Sanguri gadhi area. Therefore, the Dhimal of Mikluk thum had the self-rule.
The area is now known as Morang, Jhapa and Sunsari. Friends, we have such a clear
history. Limbuwan’s border reached beyond Biratnagar to the south. And today, this is
what is called the historical basis of delineating the federal states48 [my translation]

Dhimal, himself a non-Limbu leader of a Limbuwan based party, presented Limbuwan’s

history and ancestral territorial identity based on gadhi (N) as a basis of a federal state. He

clearly expressed this by reiterating the present day Dhimal historical and territorial connections

with Sanguri gadhi. Bangai presented the ancestral political history of Dhimals as a part of

Limbuwan’s ancestral history when he highlighted in his speech about how the Limbu archers

founded the 17 thums of Limbuwan by defeating the others. Of the 17 thums, his emphasis was

on Mikluk thum, which belonged to the Dhimal ancestors. Also worth noticing in his speech was

the similarity in some clan names that sounded similar to both Limbus and Dhimals. Some clan

48
I listened to the voice recording, transcribed the speech in Nepali and translated it into English.

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names, such as Yonghang, Nembang, Makhim, may be found in both Limbus and Dhimals. Such

similarities and shared history in relation to the clan names, that-thalo and gadhi between the

Dhimals and Limbus seem to have brought together the Limbus and Dhimals for the cause of

Limbuwan. It might be because of these similarities, I have heard in many informal

conversations among Limbusthe saying that Dhimal haru madhes ka Limbu ho—Dhimals are the

Limbu of the low land.

Limbuwan: Name and Nation

The name Limbuwan is a powerful source as well as resource in the production of a

political consciousness of collective identity for Limbus. Through the large political parties

[thula dalharu]49, Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, regressive ideas against Limbuwan loom so

large upon the political lives of the Limbuwan’s citizens. However, other political forces based

on collective identity and histories are being carefully developed within specific cultural nations

in Nepal.

Limbu politicians, irrespective of their affiliation to the large political parties [thula

dalharu] or small [sana dalharu] also seem to recognize and be loyal to a collective Limbu

identity, albeit individually. For example, Limbus associated with different parties and

organizations came together and formed the United Limbuwan Front (ULF) in July 2008 at the

time of the first constituent assembly. Through this Front, they lobbied and organized different

programs and demonstrations across Limbuwan to ensure that a Limbuwan province gained

49
During both CA’s tenures (2008-2012 and 2013-1015) a dichotomy of thula dal (large parties) vs sana dal (small
parties) was popular in Nepali politics. The thula dal referred to Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and the CPN-Maoist
and sana dal referred to all other parties which had secured comparatively smaller number of members in the CA.
Consensus among the three thula dal was highly influential in determining the course of the Nepalese politics. Thula
dal, both as a new concept and practice in Nepali politics ultimately materialized as a dominant political force in
terms of denying the collective identity of the adivasi peoples including the Limbus.

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recognition in a new constitution. The thula parties wrote the constitution without taking into

account that a majority of members of the first CA supported federal provinces including

Limbuwan (described in Chapter 5). The thula dals thus mocked the will of the constituent

assembly in their eventual declaration of only seven unnamed provinces in the second CA,

instead of the proposed 14 named provinces during the first CA. Nevertheless, the struggle for

the recognition of Limbuwan continues with new alliances and new movements.

Limbus have continued to erect signboards and welcome gates in their territory and

painted slogans on walls, vehicles, and milestones along the roadsides of Limbuwan. These

public affirmations of Limbuwan do not speak about cessation, isolation, separation, or an

exclusive Limbuwan but of a Limbuwan as a nation within other nations inside the state of

Nepal. The state's way of "place-naming reduces the landscape to an impersonal piece of

territory"(Alia 2007:124) but among indigenous peoples, "place-names implies ownership [of

land] by a person or group. More importantly, they establish power and territorial claims" (Alia

2007:124) through the place-names.

Naming Provinces is Naming Nations: Limbuwan as Home and Nepal as Village

One of most fascinating slogans I observed during my field research in Limbuwan was

about Limbuwan as a metaphorical home and Nepal as a country. The slogan says: “Limbuwan

hamro ghar ho, Nepal hamro desh ho—Limbuwan is our home, Nepal is our country/village.

Lakoff and Johnson write: “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one

kind of thing in terms of another…Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in action but

in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act,

is fundamentally metaphorical in nature… Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in

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defining our everyday realities… We act according to the things we conceive of” (Lakoff and

Johnson 2003:5). Any individual Limbu owns a house which is an integral part of the village.

We cannot have a village without households and families. Similarly, even if there is only one

house in a particular settlement, it may have a village name. There cannot be a human settlement

without a name. We cannot imagine a home without a village and we can not imagine a village

without a name. We can further interpret the metaphor of ghar (N) and desh (N)—home and

country—in the following terms: a ghar is a concrete, observable reality and a desh is an

imagined reality (Anderson 1983). Both are real but home/house is more tangible than the

country/village. Only the totality of home and village together would make up the whole of

Limbuwan: the combination of home, village, and nation. Events and actions are conceptualized

metaphorically as objects, and activities as substances.

During my field research, I once came across a slogan written on the roadside wall:

Limbuwan bina ko Nepal ra Nepal bina ko Limbuwan kalpana samma pani garna sakidaina—

One cannot imagine Nepal without Limbuwan and Limbuwan without Nepal. For the

Limbuwan volunteers this slogan conveys a heartfelt sentiment symbolically reflecting their dual

identity as Limbus and as Nepalis. This slogan suggests that the Limbuwan volunteers could not

imagine Limbuwan in isolation or in the absence of Nepal. How could they? As Limbuwan is

their home and Nepal is their “village”, how could one imagine of a home without village?

Having carefully read those two slogans presented above, I would also conclude that “home”, i.e.

Limbuwan signifies the Limbus identity as a nation and that being Nepali (country) is their

identity as citizens of a state.

As the saying goes, faith can move mountains. Faith and the imagination of Limbu

politicians and people coupled with their political actions and activities will keep Limbuwan a

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reality in the hearts and minds of Limbus, irrespective of the outcome of constitutional debates

and machinations. Limbus and their allies continue to enact Limbuwan in the form of

demonstrations, banners, claims, processions, speeches, and orations, even if their claims go

unrecognized constitutionally. One can see Limbuwan as an imaginary that sustains itself in the

everyday political lives of the Limbus. However, Limbus still eagerly await the recognition of

Limbuwan to be inscribed in the constitution. I can conclude that the cultural Limbuwan already

exists but that a political Limbuwan, articulated in the modern Nepali democratic organization, is

yet to be accepted and recognized by those who control the state.

The dominant castes seem to understand politics only partially and partly while the

adivasi-janajati seem to have a holistic understanding of the politics, culture, and customs as

being integral to politics. If one looks into the election manifesto of the thula dal or listen to their

leaders’ speeches delivered before the mass, they mainly highlight aspects of economic

prosperity—arthik sambridhdi (N)—that is to be achieved through economic and infrastructural

development. Also highlighted are points on democratic and human rights based on the concept

of humans as individual units, with little understanding of the notion of humans as embedded in

collective cultural content (Turner 1997; Holmberg 2012). The dominant parties main objective

of political mobilization seems to be to create economic equality in the society, thereby

undermining other dimensions of the society. A political party with the sole objective of creating

economic equality will ultimately promote a society based on sameness, regardless of cultural

diversity and multi-cultural movements. Such a uni-dimensional perspective on politics will be

problematic for the thula dals of Nepal in understanding politics based on cultural diversity. But

the indigenous peoples’ political organizations, the way they mobilize their people for the

movements, the way that their movements are embedded in their own cultural content are the

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testimonies of politics in totality. This is why they came out to the street during demonstrations

and political processions with their customary garbs, traditional musical instruments, and

performances, implicitly telling, through their actions, that one cannot perform politics and

political movements in isolation from the social and cultural context.

Constituent Assembly, Constitution Drafting and the Denial of Ethnic Names

The second constituent assembly (CA, 2013-2015) hastily promulgated the Constitution

of Nepal 2015 just four months after the devastating earthquake in April 2015. This constitution

declared seven unnamed federal provinces—only assigned with numbers, one to seven. Adivasi-

janajatis have long demanded that, at the very least the names of the federal provinces should be

on the basis of their historical, territorial, and cultural identities. The names proposed by the

adivasi-janajatis, which denoted that-thalo [territory] and pahichan [identity], were

misrepresented by the ruling group’s leaders and scholars as being divisive for the state of Nepal.

Their fear campaign against the provincial names and historical identity and territory yielded a

federal structure with no provincial names. The ruling groups and the ruling parties seemed to

have only thought of their own interests. As Karl Marx wrote:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same
time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas
of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Tucker 1978:72).

Since the constitution did not inscribe a Limbuwan federal state, the Limbuwan based

parties disowned and vehemently protested against the constitution. Throughout the course of the

contentious discussions during the first CA (2008-2012), adivasi-janajati leaders demanded that

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the provinces be named based on the peoples’ territorial history—aitihasik that-thalo— and

identity—pahichan. Secondly, they had also demanded that the total number of provinces must

be more than ten or eleven, and include 23 autonomous areas [swayatta ksehtra]—because only

that number, at a minimum, would accommodate the cultural, historical and territorial diversity

in the country. The report of the then Restructuring of the State and Distribution of State Power

Committee, which was tabled to the first CA in January 2010, had taken adivasi-janajati

demands into consideration. This committee had proposed fourteen provinces50 of which nine

names were based on the identity and territory of major groups of the adivasi-janajatis, three of

which were named after rivers whose names are in Nepali language one of which was named

after a famous Hindu Yogi (Khaptad,) and one was named on the basis of its cold climate (Jadan)

(Constituent Assembly Nepal, 2010). The report had also proposed 23 swayatta kshetras

[autonomous areas]51 for adivasi-janajati groups with relatively smaller populations. The report

had taken into consideration ‘cultural identity and economic capability’ as the main basis for

delineating the provinces and autonomous areas. As the report said:

Identity and capability have been taken as the main basis for state creation. Under
identity basis, fall the ethnic/community, linguistic, cultural, and historical continuity.
The capability basis includes economic inter-dependence, economic capability, status of
infrastructures and their viability, availability of natural resources and administrative
accessibility…identity and capability, thus, have to be taken into consideration on the
basis of some specific principles while creating the states. The states created on these
bases would be able to exercise autonomy and self-rule. Nepal, therefore, has been
divided into 14 states by restructuring the existing unitary structure into a federal
democratic republic (Constituent Assembly Nepal 2010:18) [original report in English].

50
1. Limbuwan 2. Kirat 3.Sherpa 4. Mithila-Bhojpura-Koch-Madhes 5. Sunkoshi 6. Tamsaling 7.Newa
8.Narayani 9. Tamuwan 10. Magarat 11. Lumbini-Awadh-Tharuwan 12. Jadan 13. Karnali 14. Khaptad

51
1. Kochila 2. Jhagad/Urau 3. Dhimal 4. Meche 5. Santhal 6. Lepcha 7. Yakha 8.Chepang 9. Dura 10.Kumal 11.
Danuwar 12. Pahari 13. Thami 14. Majhi 15. Baram 16. Thakali 17. Chhantyal 18. Sunuwar 19. Danuwar
20.Surel 21.Jirel 22.Hyolmo 23. Byasi.

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 Regarding the naming of federal units, the same report states that “ethnic, communal,

lingual, historical background and cultural identity” was the primary basis of naming provinces.

As the report states:

In areas where identities are linked to ethnicity/community and culture, and where
communities have been continuously living there for centuries and still dominating the
settlements, the demand for identities should be addressed while naming the provinces. In
a region which has a majority of certain language, a federal unit may be named on the
basis of the language. Similarly, regions without ethnic and lingual dominance may be
named on the basis of the places of multi-cultural, multi-lingual, historical and cultural
importance (Constituent Assembly Nepal 2010:89) [original report in English].

Immediately after the proposal was tabled by the CA’s own committee with the provinces

names proposed on the basis of cultural identity and the autonomous areas for 23 adivasi-janajati

groups, voices against such names as Limbuwan, Kirat, Sherpa, Tamsaling, Tamuwan, Magarat,

Newa, began to be heard, mainly from the thula dal, namely the NC and the CPN-UML. The

thula dals leaders began to claim that names based on ethnicity and identity would have a

divisive impact on the national and cultural unity of the country. The thula dals also argued that

all proposed provinces and areas are inhabited by a diversity of cultural groups and, therefore,

having specific ethnic names would only create ethnic cultural domination in that province or

area. The NC and CPN-UML seemed extremely uncomfortable about naming provinces on the

basis of adivasi-janajati identity. The NC formally did not propose names or the total number of

provinces during the first CA. One of the influential leaders of the CPN-UML initially worked

out a plan for 15 provinces, with no specific names, but quickly dropped that idea. The agenda of

the party leaders emerged as an effort to maintain the political status quo. The high caste ruling

groups, through their control over the dominant parties, denied recognition of the adivasi-

janajati as a way of maintaining their domination, even though they collectively constituted a

minority of the population. For them, even sanghiyata [federalism], rajya puna:sangrachana

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[state restructuring] and naya Nepal [creating a new Nepal] were deeply threatening because

restructuring the state in a federal model that recognized cultural differences would dispossess

them of the centuries old domination and control over the state that they enjoyed since the

inception of the state of Nepal. Only the Maoist party seemed committed to constitutionally

ensuring the collective identity of indigenous nationalities during the first constituent assembly

because they had expanded their political constituency and forwarded their insurgency by

voicing support for adivasi-janajati identity and recognition during the peoples war (1996-2006).

But with the expiration of the first constituent assembly even the Maoist party seemed to have

backed down from their commitment to recognition of indigenous nationalities.

For their part, the Maoist party - which was yet to be well accepted in international

arenas- gradually dropped their support for recognition of adivasis in response to the negative

campaign against the demands of the indigenous communities. As a consequence the ruling

parties, completely under the control of high caste Bahuns, constitutionally established their own

identity. Had the dominant politicians genuinely believed and thought that recognition and

inscription of identity in the constitution would have politically divisive consequences, then why

did the Bahun caste group, who controlled the writing of the constitution, include arya in the

constitution? Did the dominant caste not enshrine their own identity as supreme by recognizing

aryans, a term derived mainly from Hindu religious traditions? How shall we understand arya in

its racial denotation? The term arya is meaningful only in opposition to something else; in this

case, in the rhetoric of race, what in Nepal is termed the Mongol race, which includes the most

significant of the indigenous ethnic communities in Nepal. The constitution thus rubs out all but

the highest caste groups from recognition and appears to do so on a racial basis.

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 In such a political and constitutional environment, how will the Limbu continue to make

a history of Limbuwan through its name? The Limbuwan movement will not only “preserve”

their culture, as they say in common parlance, but also enact Limbuwan by raising its name and

fame. Culture, in this sense, is not something to preserve and store safely in a museum. Culture

itself is a capacity to reproduce itself (Holmberg 2012; Turner 1997) through human imagination

and enactment (Godelier, 1999). Limbuwan is identified and defined by the movement and

enactment of political power. This is what one can observe in all demonstrations and programs,

as they are said to be shakti pradarsan or showing off power.

The Limbus claim the right to be a different and distinct society within Nepal. They

struggle for this right on the basis of a specific political history of autonomy in the past and how

they lost their autonomy due to the Hindu Gorkha invasion. They also demand this right on the

basis of the accord/treaty agreed between the Gorkha Hindu King and Limbuwan in1774. They

organize their movements within Limbuwan on the basis of the boundary of a territorial domain

delineated by the then rulers, that is the territory east of Arun river and west of Mechi river.

Leaders of the Limbuwan movement continue to reproduce and transform these macro-logics in

the present Nepal through their everyday political activities. In other words, the collective

identity movement based on itihas and that-thalo is for the constitutional recognition of the

Limbuwan name. Constitutional recognition of the Limbuwan name will partially fulfill the

demand of Limbus on acceptance of their pahichan and itihas in what was supposed to be a New

Nepal.

The Politics of Maps and the Federal States Name

Arun purba nau jilla, Limbuwan ko killa—nine districts east of Arun is the fort of Limbuwan!

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 The politics of naming has a correlate in the politics of mapping. Over the last ten years,

the production of maps has been as crucial as other issues, particularly for the Limbu who put

history and place at the core of their collective identity. They claim their historical boundaries to

be one of the basis for delineating federal provinces in Nepal. For the last 240 years, different

land records, royal orders and decrees issued to the Limbus, as well as historical documents

show that the territory demarcated by the Arun river to the west and the Mechi river to the east

has been officially accepted as Limbuwan (Acharya 2060 v.s.; Chemjong 1957; Chemjong 1952;

Regmi 1978; Shrestha 2042). Kiratologist and historian I. S. Chemjong included a map of

Limbuwan in his first book Kirat Itihas—Kirat History—published in 1948.His un-scaled map

shows 17 thums in Limbuwan. B.B. Chemjong’s (1957) booklet Pallo kirat Limbuwan ka mag

haru—Demands of the Limbuwan Pallo-Kirat also published a map of Limbuwan, which

seemed to be copied from Chemjong (1948). This shows that the Limbus have been presenting

Limbuwan and their that-thalo [territory] in maps since at least the 1950s.

Although the maps drawn by the Government of Nepal ignore Limbuwan, social

scientists studying the Limbus in Limbuwan have frequently mentioned the territory between the

rivers Arun and Mechi as Limbuwan (Baral and Tigela-Limbu 2008; Sangraula 2067 v.s.; Upreti

1975; Shrestha 2042v.s.). In July 1962, the government of Nepal delineated the country into 75

districts and some 335 thums (Devkota 2048 v.s.:93). After the delineation of 75 districts,

historical Limbuwan, the territory east to west from the Arun river to the Mechi river and north

to south from the Himalaya to North India, included nine districts. In recent decades, the map of

Limbuwan comprises these 9 districts and is a reference point for the Limbuwan movement

everywhere. This map is found in calendars, greetings, invitation cards, sign boards, wall

paintings, posters, advertisements of cultural events, political manifestos, banners, and in

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documents of various Limbu organizations including student groups, Limbuwan related books,

journals, newspapers, and magazines for the last ten years during the tenures of the two CAs and

thereafter.

Besides the Limbus, even political parties were competing with each other to draw the

best and “most scientific” map of Nepal during the tenure of the first CA. Such a competition

was termed as “The War of the Maps” by a report:

The Maoists, by now the largest political party and leading the government, had in June
2010 proposed a federal structure of 12 autonomous states based on caste, language, and
region... The janajati favored a Nepal of many provinces (11 or 14), the Madhesi didn't
mind smaller provinces as long as the lowland region was not divided, the Nepali
Congress and the UML settled for 6 provinces, and numerous smaller factions promoted
their respective maps as well (Suhrke 2014:6).

Maps were not independent of individuals’ mental understanding of what Nepal should

look like. Yet “[t]he battle lines hardened...to focus on the boundaries of the sub-national units ...

and the symbolic but emotionally charged issue of the name of the provinces” (Suhrke 2014:6).

Both the boundaries of proposed federal states and their names were pitched against one another

but the large parties, the dominant ones, prevailed over the marginalized groups. In this regard,

social scientists and historians became key players in the debates about maps and naming. Maps

drawn on paper are actually the manifestation of mental maps imagined by individuals. In the

recent history of Nepal, the map in the minds of the dominant castes and classes became

manifested in their reactions to the proposed federal states. Social scientists who joined these

debates were steeped in the ideologies reproduced in the schooling system of a now fallen Hindu

nation. They refused to restructure their own mindsets in imagining a new Nepal.

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The Legacy of a Mono-cultural Polity and Scholarly Debates over Naming and Federalism

The Panchayat regime (1960-1990) imagined a mono-cultural state. Any advocacy or

organization for cultural recognition or rights was silenced. The government did not recognize or

officially accept the existence of different languages and cultures; they worked, in fact, to erase

those languages and cultures. Through the cumulative structural “legacy” of centuries of

monarchical Hindu rule culminating in the Panchayat era, political actors, mostly drawn from

high castes, inherited and reproduced a particular mindset. The ideology of a homogenous mono-

cultural Nepal affected many social scientists as well. Academics, like almost all professionals

and bureaucrats, are drawn largely from Hindu high caste social backgrounds. The political

habitus of high caste academics, like political leaders, was steeped in a mono-cultural ideology:

one state/one nation, one state/one culture.

The proposed multi-cultural ethnic identity based names were vehemently opposed even

by some social scientists. The authenticity of the proposed names were debated. For example the

name Limbuwan was debated and questioned:

Limbuwan as a form of state never existed in history, hence Limbuwan cannot be a

legitimate name for a federal state (Dhungel 2010:23).

Dhungel’s op-ed entitled “apabyakhaya ko kheti ra rastriya barbadi [Cultivation of Mis-

interpretation and National Downfall] argued that indigenous people were misinterpreting the

history of Nepal, and by doing this they were also destroying Nepal as the nation, built and

unified by the King PN Shah in the second half of the 18th century (Dhungel 2009). Such views

only sustained the notion of a mono-cultural state with one nation, one language, one religion,

and one culture built during the making of the Hindu state of Nepal.

Initially there was no provision on federalism in the Interim Constitution of 2006. The

madhesi movement in January 2007, with the sacrifice of scores of people, compelled the

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government to amend the Interim Constitution in March 2007, thereby inserting the provision of

federalism in it. Suhrke writes:

The omission of the word "federalism" from the Interim Constitution—drafted by a

government-appointed Commission—sparked a violent protest from the Madhesis when
the document was made public. Already stung by being left out of the peace negotiations,
a broad spectrum of Madhesi groups took to the streets to demand a federal constitution
(Suhrke 2014:5).

While Suhrke’s report cited above is based on observation of the facts, David Seddon, an

academic familiar with Nepal’s situation for long, held a different opinion on federalism and

identity politics in Nepal. The Kathmandu Post published an interview with David Seddon:

Federalism is a Big Mistake in Nepal !

The growth of identity politics [is an issue for Nepal to tackle].In fact that there is now an
obsession, in my view, and a very dangerous one, with ethnic and caste identity. The
Maoists have unleashed a tiger, that they are now riding... I think that this is extremely
dangerous. Federalism is a big mistake, for Nepal. This is not necessary in fact to defend
the interests of majorities or minorities, whether women, or Dalit or Janajatis—that can
be done in other ways. This idea of a federation of broadly ethnic and caste based
autonomous regions seems to me to be enormously problematic (Seddon 2009:6).

When Nepal’s adivasi-janajatis, and the madhesis were struggling for constitutional

recognition of their cultural differences, namely collective identity and federalism, such

statements against identity politics and federalism were absorbed into a regressive move back

towards the previous political status quo.

In 2012, Nepal was at a historical juncture to decide whether to designate provinces on

the basis of aitihasik that-thalo and pahichan or economic and developmental capacity. The

initial recommendation for 14 provinces was based primarily on identity. Almost immediately

opposition surfaced against this, arguing that identity must not be the criterion because: i) this

would create misunderstandings among different caste and ethnic groups, thus leading the

country to racial war in the future; ii) the “nation-state” would break into pieces, which is both

unacceptable and unthinkable. The proposed names, not the number or the geography itself,

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invited and ignited intense political debate. In my assessment some people who were opposed to

the proposal protested out of ignorance and some conspired against the adivasi-janajati

recognition.

Figure 3.1 Nepal Map Showing 14 Provinces Proposed by CA's Sub-Committee in 2010

Embedded in the demands of Limbus and other indigenous communities is recognition of

their right to exist. They seek to restructure a multi-national state in recognition of the fact that

indigenous peoples have been producing distinct cultures, languages, and religions. This occurs

at the same time as they belong to and are loyal to a state, whose foundation is bureaucratic and

administrative. The terms nation and state carry different meanings and relevance. Culture may

be the essence of a nation, hence the Limbus fighting for a nation means claiming for their

culture congealed in the form of Limbuwan. Limbuwan is more than politics. It is their culture so

long as the imagination of Limbuwan binds them together, brings all the Limbus in to one goal,

and one objective of founding a Limbuwan province in east Nepal. On the other hand,

bureaucratic politics and economic relations may be the essence of a state. Hence, a Limbu could

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be a Nepali citizen, a civic person, a voter for civic political purposes, or could be an employee

in any of the state organizations. In this sense, this person belongs to the state. For adivasi-

janajatis, fighting for and founding a multi-cultural, multi-national state does not mean breaking

a nation into pieces but the mono-cultural, unbending notions of one-culture and one-nation,

which is a unitary Hindu model, did not let multi-cultural names into the constitution.

Conclusion

The Limbus quest for recognition of a unique and different identity is embedded in their

ancestral history. The basis of the Limbus’ collective identity is their unique itihas [history] and

the that-thalo [territory], which their ancestors settled first and fought to defend. That-thalo is

where one’s heart rests. I have no knowledge of any Limbu going on pilgrimage to any parts of

India or Kathmandu, where the most famous Hindu and Buddhist pilgrimages sites are. Instead I

have observed the Limbus worshipping their own local deities and divinities, offering everything

they consider symbolically pure and most desired: home distilled alcohol, home brewed millet

beer, live chickens, pigs, goats, buffaloes, and other pleasing things. The Limbu identity is

intrinsically tied to their that-thalo, both through the organized political movement and through

ritual offerings.

The Limbus believe in a shared Nepali identity and a collective Limbu identity. Their

political movements, slogans, demands, and everyday life activities never called for fragmenting

the country. Their political slogans in relation to Limbuwan as a federal state’s name

demonstrate that Limbu and Limbuwan are both integral to and indivisible from the Nepali state.

The Limbus only seek to find a space in the constitution that acknowledges that they too are part

of the state of Nepal and have a stake in its future. They too want to share the ownership of the

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constitution by having the federal state’s name as Limbuwan. One can ask as series of questions

about how Nepal went from the hope for an inclusive democracy to an exclusionary constitution.

What difference does it make to the broader Nepali political scenario if there is no Limbuwan

named as a federal state in the constitution? The Limbus and Limbuwan will remain excluded

from the broader Nepali identity as it failed to incorporate their name Limbuwan into the

constitution. As a consequence Limbus will be discriminated against and will feel excluded.

Why did the CA promulgate the constitution with un-named provinces? Was this part of

apolitical conspiracy against the adivasi-janajati and madhesi peoples or else? Why did the

names denoting aitihasik that-thalo [history and territory] and pahichan [identity] of adivasi-

janajati seem to be “frightening” and “divisive” to the dominant political parties? Failure to

recognize adivasi and madhesi identities in the constitution will only escalate the political

conflict for many more years to come.

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 CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORY AS A RESOURCE FOR POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND COLLECTI VE

IDENTITY

Critiques of the Linear Teleological Vision of History and Societal Progress

Social scientists, including anthropologists (Wilmsen 1989a; Wilmsen 1983; Wilmsen

1989b; García Linera 2007; Turner 2007; Turner 1988; Turner 1993; Turner 2004) critique that

until recently many Marxists social scientists believed in a linear teleological vision of history as

though there was a single line of inevitable stages, which all societies would pass through to

achieve a higher and more developed stage of societal progress. Such a conventional

understanding of history has been in crisis facing challenges both in theory and in political

movements for the past four or five decades. Terence Turner argues that identity and rights-

based movements of indigenous peoples have, since the 1970s, posed new challenges for

anthropology in relation to the perspective, method and ethnographer’s responsibility towards the

people they study. Turner said "The historical events of the last several decades... have

profoundly affected the social sciences in general and anthropology in particular, both as a

theoretical discipline and an activist project" (Turner 1999:114). Indigenous peoples’ movements

all over the world have not only influenced anthropology, as a science of culture and humanity,

but have also equally influenced the definitions and histories of societies. As a consequence of

the indigenous peoples’ movements for cultural equality and claiming of their rights, the

perspective that human societies and cultures inevitably pass through linear stages of progress is

no longer popular. In this regard Arif Dirlik et al write: "It is precisely the models earlier

imported from Europe—Marxism, a belief in progress and modernity, a commitment to

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revolution as forward-looking, linear, developmentalist transformation—that are now in doubt”

(Dirlik, Bahl, and Gran 2000:192). Dirlik et al locate the problem within the model of “linear

progress and modernity” while Terence Turner argues that modernity is conceived by indigenous

peoples differently from those of the dominant groups who represent state:

Modernity is now conceived as a world of contemporaneous culturally different groups

sharing national spaces, the latter comprising socially differentiated places rather than
places occupied by homogeneously assimilated members of a nation. A new chronotope,
which we may call "synchronic pluralism", has superseded the previously dominant
modernist chronotope of progressive evolution towards assimilation into homogenous
national cultures within uniform spaces delimited by state frontiers" (Turner 2004:197).

Terence Turner’s concept of “synchronic pluralism” (Turner 2004:197), compared with

diachronic pluralism, is both illuminative as well as explicative for interpreting the claims of

multiple histories, territories and cultures by adivasi-janajtis in Nepal. For example, Turner

states that a society’s history, culture or identity is not at all inferior/superior,

backward/advanced in comparison to others:

As the evolutionist ideology of progress, which until recently was the established frame
of reference for dealing with social and cultural diversity, tends to give way to the
pluralist forms of identity politics and multiculturalism, national societies increasingly
tend to appear to their citizens more as a plurality of mutually differing but contemporary
culturally-differentiated identities than as a culturally homogenous national community"
(Turner 1999:116).

David Graeber also suggests that anthropologists should "break out of the evolutionary,

Eurocentric" trap too (Graeber, 2006:63). All different cultures are contemporary to each other

and co-exist in their own ‘cultural niches’ in a broad geographic territory. In his article Ecologic

Relationships of Ethnic Groups in Swat, North Pakistan, Fredrik Barth has shown how

Kohistanis, Pathans and Gujars - three different language-speaking groups - harmoniously as

well as contemporaneously share the same ecologic base with no or minimum economic

competition over resources. Barth concludes that “different ethnic groups with radically different

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cultures co-reside in an area in symbiotic relations of variable intimacy” (Barth 1956:1079).

Barth’s argument can be applied to look into the process and understanding of histories of

different societies in a country like Nepal. Nepal’s adivasi-janajatis’ political claims of their

unique histories suggest that the histories of hitherto ruled and marginalized groups are no less

authentic than those of the rulers. Nowadays the growing adivasi-janajati movements talk about

non-aryan adivasi-janajati history and this is as much valid as the Hindu aryan history in Nepal.

Adivasi-janajatis identity movements that are founded on claiming the ownership of history and

territory corroborate all the different histories in Nepal and should be considered equally valid.

The state should officially recognize all the different cultures of the country as equal before the

constitution and other laws.

Different Societies, Different Understandings of History

Anthropologists have also explored how indigenous peoples may have a different

understanding of history from those of dominant colonial societies. In this regard, Audra

Simpson, referring to Vine Deloria Jr., states:

Western imperialism and colonialism flowed from a Western epistemology that was
premised on either-or logic systems based on Christian precepts. Native traditions are
spatial in that they articulate to particular land bases, whereas Christianity and other
traditions are temporal in that they seek converts from any land base on an eschatological
framework that envisions and requires an end to history…Christian religion and the
Western idea of history are inseparable and mutually self-supporting…Where did
Westerners get their ideas of divine right to conquest, of manifest destiny, of themselves
as the vanguard of true civilization, if not from Christianity? It therefore follows that the
pathway to decolonization requires a fundamental epistemological shift away from
Western theory. Indigenous epistemologies…will provide the foundation for indigenous
liberation (Simpson and Smith 2014:3–4).

Vine Deloria Jr.’s statement on the source of Western epistemology seems to hold truth if

critically contextualized in relation to John Locke’s (1632-1704) views towards the Indians and

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American lands in his book Two Treatises of Government (Locke 1821). Barbara Arneil

criticizes John Locke’s arguments by saying “John Locke saw America as the second Garden of

Eden; a new beginning for England. It should manage to defend its claims in the American

continent against those of the Indians and other European powers" (Arneil 1995:1). The political

fate of adivasi-janajatis in Nepal is not much different from that of the North American Indians

as the Hindu rulers conquered the adivasi-janajati populations and their territories. The way that

the aryan Hindu rulers annexed territories is now understood by the adivasi-janajatis and the

madhesi politicians as a colonial expansion. Addressing the madhesi peoples during the Madhes

bandh52 [general strike] in protest of The Constitution (described in chapter 5) in September

2015, the Chairman of the Federal Socialist Forum (FSF) party Upendra Yadav said:

Madhes is an internal colony of Kathmandu. The type of exploitation and domination the
ruling elites or the rulers of Kathmandu or Singha Durbar have been doing to the Madhes
is similar to the ones imposed under colonial rule. The madhesi peoples, for 250 years,
have been facing suppression, oppression and exploitation. The struggle is against that
exploitation. In fact, this is a struggle against state discrimination.53

Madhesi leaders in recent years, particularly in response to regressive moves by dominant

political parties in drafting the constitution (described in chapter 5), have begun to reiterate that

the Madhes land and the madhesi peoples have been colonized ever since the establishment of

the Gorkha Kingdom in the 18th century.54 The madhesi political leaders and their movements

speak about a shift in the understanding of the following terminology: history, colonialism,

nation, identity, and territory. These are now the key terms in understanding Nepali politics and

political movements today.

52
General strike or shutting down the city and transportation. Shops, transportations are not operated.
53
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbBiz2HgkGk&spfreload=5 (accessed: 3-4-2017)
54
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S8QU8kkhTMk (accessed: 3-4-2017)

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 Terence Turner highlights the notion of production and analysis of value as

fundamentally important for applying Marxian notions towards understand human activities,

including indigenous peoples’ movements:

Indigenous societies are different from non-indigenous or settler societies not only in
relation to their cultural traits, feasts and festivals but their fundamental productive
regimes and relations are different. Analysis of which would be possible from none other
than Marxian theory of value and production (Turner 2008:43).

I find Turner’s statements on Marxian notions of production and value useful to look into

for the people-territory relationships for my study of history as an inspiration for political

activism. I also find the notion of production directly linked to human activities, which reproduce

social-cultural relationships and society itself.

Marxism and History as a Capacity for the Production of Social Reality and Society

Marxism has been questioned particularly for Marx's theoretical statements on the

evolutionary stages of societal transformation, namely ancient communism, slavery, feudalism,

capitalism, and socialism. Taking on Lewis Morgan's classification of social evolution as moving

from savagery through barbarism and then to civilization (Morgan 1877), Marx and Engels

argued that societies pass through such linear stages of societal transformation, from simple and

less advanced to more complex and advanced stages. Because of Marxism's "preoccupation with

economic exploitation and the question of economic class, [it] has been blind to problems of

oppression and exploitation that have their sources outside of a narrowly conceived economic

organization under capitalism" (Dirlik 1994:3–4). Marx’s analysis on how human beings

collectively make and remake their history themselves is profound and fundamental for

understanding today’s identity politics in relation to history and territory. In German Ideology,

Marx and Engels (1963) define history on a social basis. Human beings must involve themselves

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in the production process to fulfill their own needs. History begins as soon as humans enter into

concrete relations of material production. Terrence Turner succinctly summarizes Marx’s idea of

production:

[Marx and Engels] described production as self transforming social praxis that consists of
four main aspects ('moments'): the production of means of material subsistence, including
tools and techniques; the production of needs, which give rise to new social relations; the
production of human beings themselves…and the production of the different relations of
social cooperation involved as 'productive force' in their own right as part of each
historical mode of production (Turner, 2008:44-45).

Marx’s conclusion is that history is a result of the imagination and drudgery of human

beings. Furthermore, "history is rooted in a consciousness of creative agency as a property of

contemporary social actors…It is not primarily defined as a form of awareness of the past but

mode of consciousness of the social present" (Turner, 1988: 47). In a country like Nepal,

scholars and politicians alike still seem to hold that history is a gift given to the peoples by the

rulers, or by the Kings. For example, King P. N. Shah “unified” Nepal, hence he could be said to

have left behind the “gift of unification” of Nepal for Nepalis. This is a history too but this is not

the only history of Nepal. Different societies, peoples, and cultural groups are equally capable of

making and remaking their own history through their collective imaginations and actions.

Maurice Godelier writes:

History or the multiple histories of individual societies is result of synergic

combination of “the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. These three orders combine to
make up human social existence, human social reality…It is first and foremost the
different ways humans imagine their relationships with each other and with what we call
nature that distinguishes societies and the periods during which some of them exist. But
imaginary cannot transform itself into the social; it cannot manufacture “society” by
existing on a purely “mental” level. It must be “materialized” in concrete relations which
take on their form and content in institutions, and of course in the symbols which
represent them and cause them to send messages back and forth, to communicate. ”
(Godelier 1999:26–27).

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 In Nepal, adivasi-janajatis have practically started to debunk the understanding that

history is made and given by the rulers. The colonial imagination of history, protected and

disseminated by the ruling castes and dominant Nepali political parties, has been challenged by

the adivasi-janajatis imagination and activism of their own histories in defending their that-thalo

[territory]. Ethnographic studies on the Tamang (Tamang, 2008), Dhimal (Rai, 2013), and the

Limbu’s ongoing movements on identity politics for the recognition of their unique history vis-à-

vis the Gorkha conquest have vigorously challenged received understandings of the history of

Nepal. One can observe adivasi-janajatis invoking their historical as well as territorial “identities

in opposition to such hegemonic construction” (Dirlik 1997:13) of mono-cultural pan Nepali

identity. In present day world politics, "indigenous peoples take on their past as legacy and [as a]

project for construction of cultural nationalism, ethnicity and indigenism" (Dirlik 1996:1).

Marx's statements about the relationship between history, society and individual imagination is

illuminating:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living (Marx 1964:15).

For indigenous people, history is not only produced by themselves but the same product,

in turn, produces active and conscious subjects, aware of their collective identity based on their

history and territory—itihas ra that-thalo.

History as a Resource in the Production of Identity Politics

Maurice Godelier says "Marxism is not a theory of production [of goods and services]. It

is a theory of production of society, not a theory of production in society" (Godelier, 1984:44).

For indigenous peoples, land may be both means and relations of production. This is because

people not only produce goods and services from the land but it is also territory and space where

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the whole of human society is sociologically made possible. To paraphrase Marx, as men and

women involve themselves in productive activities to fulfill their own social and biological needs

they simultaneously reproduce themselves and their society. David Graeber succinctly

paraphrases what Marx says in The German Ideology: "Capitalism and 'economic science' might

confuse us into thinking that the ultimate goal of society is simply the increase of national GDP,

the production of more and more wealth, but in reality wealth has no meaning except as a

medium for the growth and self-realization of human beings" (Graeber, 2006:70). For Marx,

"productive activity was the basis of all human societies” (Turner, 2004). In this regard,

indigenous societies may be viewed as having capacity to produce and reproduce the forms of

their own social relations. Back in the 1980s, reviewing Michael Taussig's book The Devil and

Commodity Fetishism, Turner wrote "Marxist anthropologists would do better to start from

Marx' s and Engels' programmatic 'anthropological' definition of production in The German

Ideology, in which production is said to comprehend, not merely the production of the means of

subsistence, but of human beings and families, social relations of cooperation, and new needs as

well" (Turner 1986:92). Having mentioned this, suffice it to say that Marx's notion of production

as a totality shall serve as a guideline for anthropologists to undertake their subject, i.e. culture as

a whole. Yet, the conception of "production' must be coupled with an emphasis on the

importance of reproduction… of the social forms and forces of production" (Turner, 1986:93).

Theory of Mode of Production and Indigenous Societies

The notion of mode of production (MoP) may be the most-debated Marxist theory among

the Marxists themselves. One understanding of MoP is that certain modes represent a particular

historical epoch, which is 'scientifically' more progressive than the past. Such an understanding

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of MoP holds that all societies pass through a progressive-evolutionary path of development,

such as, primitive communism- slavery-feudalism- capitalism- socialism. Such an interpretation

of MoP in the past has proved to be prejudicial towards understanding indigenous societies, as

they were perceived to have represented the primitive mode of production. Marxist

anthropologists introduced this difficulty, mainly in the 1970s when they “artificially inserted the

pre-capitalist modes of productions (indigenous societies) into the [global] capitalist system”

(Forster-Carter quoted in Wilmsen, 1983:16). When Eric Wolf, Sidney Mintz, A.G. Frank, and

Immanuel Wallerstein began to focus on world-system theory considering the headquarters of

capitalism as the center and the rest of the globe as peripheral, which depended on centers in

most aspects of production relations, they also shut the window through which they could view

non-commodity producing societies as a cultural whole. This challenge to anthropology posed by

world-system theorists, including Marxist anthropologists, was well observed by Terrence

Turner "with this has gone a repudiation of the anthropological tendency to treat such

[peripheral] societies as self-containing entities, and a certain impatience with traditional

anthropological concerns with culture, meaning and non-economic dimensions of social

organization such as kinship" (Turner, 1986:94). This genre of Marxism created a sort of crisis in

the holistic conception of society. Terence Turner’s critique of world-system theory is

illuminating for anthropologists as his criticism helps us to look into, for example, Limbu society

in itself comprising totality, a whole, having their own history, culture and that-thalo [territory].

The world-system approach also considers a third-world “nation-state” as a peripheral

society, which utterly overlooks the fact that “nation-states” themselves have been transformed

into an owner of the means and forms of economic, cultural and social productions within a

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country. This is the process that has occurred in Nepal for the past two and a half centuries,

starting from the second half of the 18th century.

The consolidation of the Gorkha Hindu state, mostly during the second half of the 18th

century, also meant incorporation of other means and relations of economic, cultural, social

productions into the dominant Hindu caste-based relations of production. Godelier has suggested

looking into the Indian caste system from the Marxian concept of mode of production.

Criticizing Louis Dumont, Godelier argued that the Indian caste system was a specific "relation

of production". He writes:

"The caste system is not only what we call religious structure; it is, from the inside, the
relations of production. I have offered Louis Dumont an alternative hypothesis,
explaining that perhaps this is the case because the relations of production are dominant
in the mind and in the social logic of Indian society" (Godelier 1984:39).

Godelier’s statement above is helpful to summarize the past relationships between the

Hindu Gorkha State and Limbuwan. Limbus as an autonomous and autochthonous society had

their particular means and relations of production including communal land ownership, which

may be termed an indigenous mode of production. The Gorkha Hindu State, having annexed

Limbuwan into its domain, also transformed Limbuwan’s economic mode of production so as to

benefit the Hindu state. For example, Limbu communal/collective land ownership was abolished

and individual land ownership was introduced. Non-aryan, non-Hindu, non-caste Limbus were

also incorporated under the Hindu four-fold caste classification, thereby assigning them with

matawali caste category. This is how Limbu modes and relations of productions were

transformed to suit the interest of the Hindu caste relations of production. Such a comparison

between the mode of production models seems valid and well explained, to some extent, but this

approach does not allow us to study Limbu society as comprised of a whole or in terms of the

totality of its own relations of production. Nepali politicians as well as social scientists,

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particularly from a Marxist background, fashionably categorize Nepali society as a semi-feudal

society, now gradually transforming into a capitalist society. It is not very sensible in

anthropology to try and classify a state or ‘state-nation’55 as a single society or a single mode of

production (MoP). Marxian center-periphery theorists have also failed to take into account

internal colonial domination, which has been one of the main political issues of indigenous

people's politics today, especially within peripheral countries. For example, internal colonial

domination has been one of the most important political debates in Nepal, with the fact that

Nepal as a Hindu state-nation, was formed by incorporating other indigenous modes of

productions under a dominant Hindu caste-based MoP. As a concrete example, David

Holmberg's ethnographic picture of the ritual production of power among the indigenous

Tamangs is sketched on a background political canvas of internal colonialism (Holmberg 2000).

The world-system theorists also ignore the reality of the simultaneous existence of multiple

MoPs within the boundary of a state-nation, let alone consider the indigenous societies as

different MoPs. In Nepal’s context, sociologists and anthropologists (Seddon, Blaikie, and

Cameron 1979; Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 1980; Mishra 1987) have undertaken similar

studies following world-system theorists, specifically Wallerstein (Wallerstein 1974) and Frank

(Frank 1969). These scholars studies consider different indigenous societies as 'peasants' thereby

misplacing them with the peasants from dominant class/caste. Holmberg's remark upon Guha's

(Guha 1983) consideration of Indian 'peasantry' is spot on in this regards: "Subject-agents are

produced in different social forms by kin-based collectivities, and subject-agents in turn

reproduce those collectivities; Tamang agents are irreducible to a generic mold" (Holmberg,

2000:945, n.8). Therefore, taking into account the simultaneous existence of multiple MoPs is

55
In a common academic and political parlance it is called ‘nation-state’ but I prefer the term ‘state-nation’ (Stepan,
Linz, and Yadav 2011) over ‘nation-state’

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necessary as only this perspective enables us to explain how the nation-state or the state-nation

as the owner of means of production expropriates from and appropriates other forms of

production within a country. While saying this, I am not arguing that indigenous MoPs are

idealistically egalitarian modes where exploitation, expropriation and appropriation of value do

not occur at all. Of course relations of exploitation and appropriation characterize even

indigenous societies. As Marx says: every society possesses the seed of its own destruction and

transformation. Hence, another topic of studying indigenous societies would be to look into the

social forms of exploitation within such societies and their relationships to other societies,

including the state.

Marxian Theory of Value and Indigenous societies

Terence Turner asserts that “[t]he production of value is an organized social activity that

simultaneously produces and reproduces the social relations and institutional structures of

production and the forms of social consciousness of this activity" (Turner, 2008:45). The notion

of praxis is helpful to establish linkages between consciousness and action. According to Marx,

human beings are cultural because they possess the capacity to imagine. They can build the

imaginary of something in their thoughts before they make it through their labor. Godelier takes

the side of Marx's notion of the imaginary over Levi-Strauss's idea of the primacy of symbols in

defining culture. Godelier says: "imaginary cannot transform itself into the social, it can not

manufacture "society" by existing on a purely "mental" level. It must be "materialized" in

concrete relations which take on their form and content in institutions, and of course in the

symbol…When the imaginary is "materialized" in social relationships, it becomes a part of social

reality" (Godelier, 1999:27). For Terrence Turner, 'praxis' is preferable over Bourdieu's 'practice'

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because in 'praxis', we can analyze the 'value that bridges the gap between socially productive

activity [labor] and subjective motivation [imagination]' (Turner, 2006). This is where, according

to Turner, "recent theoretical work associated with [indigenous people's] activism and rights has

made original and valuable theoretical contributions" (Turner, 2006). He argues that Marxian

value theory is an "alternative approach to the integration of ideas of agency, action and social

consciousness with social organization to that offered by 'practice theory' and earlier forms of

anthropological Marxism" (Turner, 2008:43).

David Graeber, in his book Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value (Graeber 2001),

describes how value is conceptualized among non-commodity producing societies. The example

he uses of Dutch settlers 'buying' the Manhattan Island from local Indians for twenty-four dollars

worth of beads and trinkets is meaningful in many ways. The author goes on:

The story could be considered one of the founding myths of the United States; in a nation
based on commerce, the very paradigm of a really good deal. The story itself is probably
untrue (the Indians probably thought they were receiving a gift of colorful exotica as a
token of peaceful intentions and were in exchange granting the Dutch the right to make
use of the land, not to "own" it permanently), but the fact that so many of the people
European merchants and settlers did encounter around the globe were willing to accept
European beads, in exchange for land or anything else, has come to stand, in our popular
imagination, as one the defining features of their "primitiveness" --- a childish inability to
distinguish worthless baubles from things of genuine value (Graeber 2001:91).

The anecdote above tells us how differences are realized. How in indigenous societies

imagination of others or objects is fundamentally different from dominant societies. Perhaps the

Dutch settlers belonged to the colonial power to prove themselves having bought the land from

local Indians, while the Indian societies did not seem to be familiar with the practice of buying

and selling things. Or perhaps the money - the main medium of exchange - was not yet

introduced in Indian lives. Then how could the Dutch claim that they had bought the land from

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the Indians? But the Indians might have been interested only in establishing a social contract

with the newcomers for the purposes of peace and harmony through exchanging gifts.

Limbus: The Khambongbas56 (Risen from the Earth)

Limbus call themselves Khambongba [kham (soil); bongba (risen)], meaning that Limbus

are believed to have originated from the earth. This is why they consider themselves as

indivisible to the territory of Limbuwan. Their that-thalo and Limbuwan’s history is also

recounted in similar ways to the case of the Indians “selling’ Manhattan land to the Dutch.

Documents and the political history of Nepal in relation to Limbuwan demonstrate that the

arrival of non-Limbu populations to Limbuwan, particularly Bahuns and Chhetris, began only

after the annexation of Limbuwan into the Gorkha Kingdom. Bed Prakash Upreti, himself a

Kumai Bahun has presented an anecdote about the Kumai Bahun arrival in Limbuwan in the

1770s:

After Prithvi Narayan Shah's victory over Limbu chiefs (in 1774) the Limbu went to pay
tribute to the king in Nepal...There the Limbu stayed with a Brahmin family ...a family of
Parsai surname. The king told the Limbu chiefs to be loyal to him and asked them to
invite settlers (raiti basnu). So, before the Limbu left Nepal they asked their host family
to come to Limbuwan with them and two Parsai brothers came with them" (Upreti
1975:30).

The above case is an example of how the Limbu community was persuaded to accept

new guests in their territory. However, Limbu territorial and political rights were promised by

the Hindu King through a royal decree, considered by the Limbus as a treaty made between the

Limbu chiefs and the Hindu King. The collective indigenous land ownership, mainly based on

Limbu kinship, was called thang sing khok sing57 in the Limbu language. Thang sing khok sing

56
Kham (L) = soil/earth, pongba (L) = risen. Khambongba (L) = risen from the earth.
57
Thang sing khok sing (L) = slash and burn the forest for cultivation.

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ownership was renamed as kipat land ownership, probably to make it intelligible to non-Limbu

language-speaking groups.

When the kipat collective land ownership was functional, a non-Limbu immigrant to

Limbuwan had to present himself to a local Limbu headman (Subba) with a gift—supposedly a

quid pro quo—requesting for land cultivation rights in the territory under the Subba’s

jurisdiction. Such gift items included liquor, live goats, roosters, and meat. The Subba would

then gift back a patch of land to the immigrant. So the non-Limbu immigrants in Limbuwan had

only an usufruct right to the cultivated land while the true cultural ownership remained with the

Limbus as their purkhauli that-thalo [ancestral territory], meaning that neither the Limbus nor

the immigrants could own land as individual private property in an economic sense. However the

Limbus were the “cultural owners of the land” (Myers 1986:127–158) as they believed (and still

believe) that their land was owned and protected by their divinities and deities. Therefore such

divinities are propitiated as the true ‘owners’ of the land. Here I argue that those Limbu local

headmen who accepted the gift from immigrants and allowed the immigrants to cultivate their

ancestral land had only wished to establish social contract with their guests - who represented

completely different societies - by gift-giving their land in exchange with gifts from guests.

Limbus enjoyed their right to land until the state’s Land Reform Act abolished the

collective kipat land ownership in the 1960s (Regmi 1978; Caplan 1970; Sagant 1996; Jones and

Jones 1976; Jones 1973; Jones 1986; Sangraula 2067 v.s.; Shrestha 2042 v.s.). The jagga dhani

purja [land ownership certificate] in individual cultivators’ name were issued only after the

enactment of the Land Reform Act in 1963 followed by the land cadastral survey, implemented

from the early 1970s through to the mid-1990s. Limbus’ Kipat land was gone when the land

cadastral survey was completed all over Limbuwan. After the survey individual land ownership

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certificates were issued to individual owners. This is the process by which Limbus lost their right

to their ancestral land. After the abolition of kipat many former Limbu Subbas, who did not own

much land in their own name, were often derided by others in stories stating things like ‘that

Subba finished all of his lands in exchange for raksi [alcohol]’. But the fact was that the Limbus

culturally lacked the concept of economic ownership or economic value of land. This could be

the reason, among others, many Limbus became landless in an economic sense after the full

implementation of land reform in Nepal. Ironically, the land givers themselves became the land

beggars (Caplan 1970) at the end in consideration of land as an economic property. But for the

Limbus, the definition of land in practice goes beyond the economic limit. For the Limbus, land

is considered as the creator. The definition of land for the Limbus includes everything in the

environment, in an ecological sense. For the Limbus, land is not merely an economic property

rather land is understood as a cultural entity, a territory - that-thalo - and an abode for the

divinities and deities of the Limbus.

Ancestral history in relation to defending territory [that-thalo] is central to Limbu identity

politics. Hobsbawm writes: “All human being are conscious of the past… by virtue of living with

people older than themselves” (Hobsbawm 1997:10). Similarly, Michel-Rolph Trouillet writes:

“Human beings participate in history both as actors and as narrators” (Trouillot 1995:2). In this

way the Limbus are conscious of the history of their ancestors who fought the Gorkhali Hindu

invaders to defend their that-thalo. The Limbus relationships to their own past is not a

soliloquized boasting about themselves but a dialogic one involving the other invaders. Limbu

identity is produced in relation to the wars that their ancestors fought to defend their territory.

Godelier states “identity is always a product of a particular history” (2009: 12). He even argues

that "[a]n anthropologist who knows nothing about history, or shows no interest in learning about

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it, cannot fully discharge his or her professional, ethical, and political responsibilities" (2009:

37). If we look into the history of Nepal, the rulers and ruling caste groups have written an

aryan-centric history of Nepal. In this regards, George Orwell’s point is spot on: "Who controls

the past...controls the future: who controls the present controls the past" (Orwell 1961:56). The

Limbus, in their political activities, seem to be aware of this fact as they want to control their

own present with reference to the past wars that they fought before. In this regard Howard Zinn’s

statement is also illuminating “those people who control … the mass media, government,

educational system, the text book publishers, are determining our future unless we break away

from that” (Zinn 2013).

Interrogating the History of the Domination of Aryan Civilization and Shah Dynasty in

Nepal

Nepal’s “unification”, during the second half of the 18th century is no longer an

unanimously agreed History of Nepal, particularly following various political movements by

adivasi-Janajati people who have claimed that they have their own history and that their

ancestors fought and gave their lives to defend their territory from the attacks of the Hindu King

P. N. Shah (whom the then Limbus called by the name pene hang58 [Chhetri King]). Those who

try to understand the “unification” of Nepal from the adivasi perspective argue that the mission

was accomplished by conquering other autonomous principalities. Therefore how this country of

Nepal as a Hindu giri raj (Hindu mountain Kingdom) achieved its present size, shape and

structure socially, culturally, religiously and politically, now requires empirical interrogation not

only based on different peoples’ understandings and imaginations of their own history but also

on observable political enactments whereby indigenous imaginations of the past are now being

58
pene hang (L) = Chhetri King

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transformed into organized political actions today. Observations and interpretations of

ethnographic evidence now confirm that diversity is the undeniable reality of Nepali societies,

cultures, and politics. Gone are the days that the scholars both Nepali (such as Acharya, Panta,

Gyawali, Vajracharya, and Nath) and foreigners (Stiller) alike believed in the making of Nepal as

a monolithic Hindu nation-state during the 18th century as something inevitable and essential.

They write that ‘unification’ of Nepal was the great desire of all Nepali societies and people.

Hence the great King Prithvi Narayan Shah is said to have ‘accomplished the mission by his dint

and valor’ with the assistance of Brahman pundits. History writing in Nepal was similar to the

process observed in China by a scholar of seventeenth century China, who argued that “the

historian and the ruler write each other into existence” (Rublack 2011:96).

Eric Hobsbawm writes “The history of social movements is generally treated in two

separate divisions” (Hobsbawm 1959:1). This is what one finds when dealing with important

political historical events including some rebellious movements in Nepal too. The Tamang and

Limbu rebellious movements in the 1950s-60s for prajatantra [democracy] or mukti [liberation]

were simply depicted as “loot” (criminal), while a similar kind of politically motivated

movements undertaken by mainstream political parties are seen and analyzed as ‘rebellions

against the feudal exploiters’ for the liberation of Nepalis from exploitation and domination.

Numerous similar “lootings” occurred during the People’s War (1996-2006) but those were also

considered to be part of political movements. My concern here is that the Limbu rebellion

against the Bahuns in Limbuwan in 1951 (Upreti, 1975) and the Tamang rebellion against high

castes in the then West no 1 Tamsaling (Holmberg 2006:46–48) should be seen in a broader

political historical context of the ruling caste’s exploitation of the Limbus and the Tamangs,

rather than seeing them simply as ‘looting’. We shall look into those Limbu and Tamang

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rebellions from the perspective of mukti [liberation], at least focusing on what the term mukti

meant for these movements. I argue that The Constitution of Nepal 2015 may have fulfilled the

ruling caste’s desire of liberation [mukti ko chahana] but the adivasi-janajati and madhesis’

quest for liberation is underway. This is particularly after the empirical fact that the new

constitution 2015 could not address the identities of adivasi-janajati and madhesis and that those

communities boycotted the constitution.

None of the post-1950 Nepali historians write about the human cost of “unification”, let

alone the political, socio-cultural, economic, religious and, above all, the historical cost of the

‘unification’ of Nepal. However such an understanding about PN Shah having ‘unified’ Nepal is

not the eternal truth anymore. Even if he did, he carried out ‘unification’ for himself. Nowhere in

the historical record can one find him speaking of planning war and attacks for the purposes of

‘unification’ and to bring together the divided states.

One of the main sources of writing history of Nepal has been the “imperfect chronicles

furnishing bare dynastic lists of kings and their regnal years, intermixed with mythological,

religious and legendary tales… There are two distinct sets of these chronicles - Buddhistic and

Brahmanical; the former evidently composed by the Vajrcharyas, and the latter by the

Brahmans” (Hasarat, 1970, p.xv). To me what seems to be missing from Hasarat’s statement is

yet another set of chronicles, which may be called the Kirat chronicles. They are completely

different from both the Buddhistic and Brahmanical traditions and composed neither by the

Buddhists nor the Brahmans. Following Hasarat’s point, one can see that the motivation of

writing history in post-1950 Nepal was to glorify the Aryan civilization’s expansion across the

Himalayan foothills accompanied by mutually competing Chhetriya Kingdoms which led to

“unification” as the foundation of the future Hindu Kingdom of Nepal. These historians include

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Baburam Acharya, Naya Raj Panta, Yogi Narahari Nath, Surya Bikram Gyawali, Dilli Raman

Regmi and Dhanvajra Bajracharya. They started to write Nepali history only after the Rana

regime was overthrown and the Shah monarchical dynasty was reinstated in 1951. With the

exception of Imansingh Chemjong’s “Kirat itihas” [History of Kirat], first published in 1948, the

history of non-Aryan civilizations remained undocumented and their ruling history was eclipsed

by the history of Aryan civilization.

During the Hindu monarchy, the Brahmans advised Kings and the Thakuri Kings ruled.

When the kings thought of attacking other kingdoms, the Brahmans fulfilled multidimensional

roles, sometimes as “fortune tellers” calculating the “auspicious day” to successfully attack the

“enemy”, at other times conspiring secret plans on how to defeat other kingdoms in one attack.

The Kings only imagined while the Brahmans advised them how on to succeed. There are

numerous examples of how Brahmans were supportive and instrumental in helping P. N. Shah’s

conquest. Kirkpatrick writes: “During the seize of Kathmandu the Brahmins of Gorkha came

almost every night into the city, to engage the chiefs of the people on the part of their King; and

to more effectually to impose upon poor Gainprejas, [Jay Prakash], many of the principal

Brahmins went to his house, and told him to persevere with confidence, that the chiefs of the

Gorkha army were attached to his cause, and that even they themselves would deliver up their

king Prithwinarayan into his hands” (Kirkpatrick 1811:383). This is how one may find the

Brahmans fulfilling their major advisory role in the making of the Hindu state of Nepal.

Kirat Civilization and Kirat Ruling History

Nepal has been ruled by four different dynasties, namely the Kirat, the Lichhavi, the

Malla and the recently ousted Shah dynasty, which was the last in the monarchical history of

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Nepal. Among those four dynasties, historians claim that the Lichhavi period was the golden

period while the Kirat dynasty was an unknown period because there are no clear written

documents available whatsoever. One of the reasons for the unavailability of written materials on

the Kirat dynasty may be related to language. Kirats were non-Aryan, non-Sanskrit language

speaking groups. But the Lichhavis used Sanskrit language in the available documents.

Notwithstanding the unavailability of the “historic” documents, present day adivasi-

janajati politicians in Nepal harken back to the Kirat dynasty as their ancestral dynasty.

Particularly Rai Kirati scholars and politicians both proudly associate the present day Rai Kirati

population as the direct descendants of the ancient Kirat dynasty. I. S. Chemjong contributed in

writing the history of non-Aryan59 civilizations and their kingdoms across the Himalayan

foothills that existed prior to any other ruling dynasties in Nepal. This narrative is invoked

currently in adivasi-janajati identity politics in general and in the politics of the Kirat province in

particular (Kirati 2016). Because of the domination of the Indo-aryan language group - namely

Sanskrit and Khas-Nepali languages – which was used as the basis of writing history by the

historians primarily with an aryan racial background, the adivasi-janajati non-aryan asura

groups could only count on being mentioned briefly by the aryan historians. They would be

happy to find their ancestor’s stories included in mainstream history, if only in passing.

Nepal observed the jana yudhda [people’s war] (1996-2006), an armed war fought to

overthrow the Hindu monarchy, which led to the declaration of the republic of Nepal. For the

Maoists, the monarchy was the only residue of feudalism, which protected feudal rule in Nepal.

59
All genres of writings both in social science and literature disparagingly depict non-aryan groups as asura
(demon) groups as opposed to the arya or sura (god) groups. Consequently the asura groups are interpreted to be an
evil force, who had to be tamed and defeated by the sura (aryan gods) to keep the broader social harmony.
Observance and boycott of the Dashain festival in Nepal is a perfect example to look into the politics in Nepal on the
basis of Arya (Sur) versus asur (demon), which is the Hindu high caste ruling groups versus the adivasi-janajati
ruled groups respectively.

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So overthrowing the purano satta [old regime] and replacing it with the nayaa satta [new

regime] was inevitable. The Maoists fought a bloody war as they were said to have controlled

more than half the territory of Nepal, thereby limiting the old regime to within the Nepal khaaldo

[Kathmandu valley]60 and other major cities of the country. The Jana yudhda’s culmination was

the jana andolan II [people’s movement II]61 in 2006 that literally brought the Maoists

combatants in to the Kathmandu valley, inside the Ring Road62 to fight and capture the Old

Nepal, which would soon be transformed into naya Nepal63 [New Nepal]. It took 10 years for the

Nepal Communist Party-Maoist to succeed in their strategy to capture and defeat the Nepal

Khaldo, the capital of the Hindu monarchy and the Shah dynasty (the same Shah dynasty’s King

P. N. Shah, the forefather of the last King Gyanendra had captured Nepal khaldo in 1768 from

the rulers of the Malla dynasty - the ancestors of the present day Newars). The Hindu Thakuri

(Kshetriya) King PN Shah from an economically poor Gorkha kingdom, with the help of his

Bahun advisors, conquered the then Nepal (Kathmandu valley), one of the most prosperous city

states in South Asia during the 18th century. After two and a half centuries elapsed, and after ten

generations of the Shah dynasty’s rule, the Bahun Maoist leaders from the same Gorkha and

Kaski region (the descendants of the advisors to the then Shah conqueror in the 1700s) led the

People’s War64 to overthrow the same Shah dynasty and the Hindu monarchy (for which the

60
Until the 1930s only Kathmandu valley was called Nepal. In vernacular language it was called Nepal khaldo
(Nepal valley). What we call Nepal now was called the Gorkha Kingdom. Similarly, what we call Nepali bhasa
(language) used to be called Gorkhali bhasa until the 1950s.
61
Also called the April Revolution as the leftists would prefer, probably learned from the Russian revolutions
named after the certain months, such as February Revolution and October Revolution.
62
The cities of Kathmandu and Lalitpur, the center of the state power and the center of country’s finance and
politics are surrounded by the Ring Road.
63
One of the most hyped political rhetoric in the wake of jana andolan II was that the naya Nepal [New Nepal] was
going to be created by restructuring the state through the new constitution of the new republic. For the adivasi-
janajati including the Limbus, the founding of new provinces based on their cultural identity and unique history was
the most sought after goal under the rubric of naya Nepal.
64
The Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) leadership was predominantly composed of Bahuns. One of the top leaders
originally from Gorkha said during his visit to the Gorkha Palace that his ancestor also played an instrumental role
in the King P. N. Shah’s conquest campaign.

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Brahmans fulfilled essential and indivisible advisory roles for the rulers for more than six

hundred years65).

Ancestral Heroics and War Accounts as the Resource for Political Organization and Social

Movements

The aryan Hindu kingdom of Nepal succeeded and thrived on conquest and colonial

exploitation of non-aryan adivasi peoples. Conquest and colonization of the Tamang, (Holmberg

2006; Tamang 2008), Kirat Rais and Limbus (English 1982; Pradhan 1991; Chemjong 1952;

Chemjong 2055 v.s.; Baral 2012; Nembang 1987) are some examples documented by various

scholars. These scholars have documented how Tamangs, Kirat Rais, and the Limbus resisted the

conquerors with bravery to defend their society and territory [that-thalo]. A new trend in Nepali

politics in general and particularly in identity politics is emerging. Recently adivasi-janajati

politicians have started invoking their ancestral history in order to politically motivate and

organize their own people. Gopal Kirati, one of the apex leaders of Communist Party Maoist

Center, argues that “historical and collective community identity should be the basis of the

formation of the Kirat state through which the federality can be extended as a political strategy”.

He states that five historically epochal events occurred in the history of Kirati people as glorious

events, which shall inspire Kirati people forever:

“First, hang [king] Yalambar was the founder of the country of Nepal. His dynasty ruled
over the Nepal valley for 32 generations. Second, the Gorkha-Kirati Resistance War, in
which the Kirati ancestors bravely fought the resistance war. The Gorkhali kidnapped the
sovereignty of Kirati peoples but the Kirati people did not surrender. Third, the rebellion
of prince Atal Singh Khambu, the last prince of the Hatuwa66 state of Kirat. Fourth, the
people’s leader Ram Prasad Rai’s armed rebellion, who had operated a revolutionary

65
During the Malla dynasty, King Jayasthti Malla had brought in Brahmans from south India to help introduce the
four-fold varna and caste system in the then Nepal, consequently issuing codes in line with the caste system in
ca.1379. There are many instances of protection of cow and Brahman in this code (Nepal Law Commission n.d.).
66
Hatuwa, now in Bhojpur district, west of Arun river.

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 people’s government to the east of Banepa for six months. [Rai was] Captured from
Bhojpur via Okhaldhunga to Singha Darwar (during the revolution against the Ranas).
Fifth, the armed movement under the leadership of Gopal Kirati, who proclaimed and
staged an organized rebellion for the Kirat state and continued by unifying it with the
Maoist movement and operated the Kirat autonomous people’s government. This is the
very glorious history, which will not let the new generation live quietly. History inspires,
excites and agitates the new generation. As a consequence, the youths of the Republic
Generation will ponder about how to build the Kirat state (Kirati, 2016, [my translation].

One can see a difference in understanding and claiming history between aryan and non-

aryan scholars and politicians alike as it may be understood from the “ five glorious historical

epochs” as depicted by Gopal Kirati in his pamphlet. Gopal Kirati, an adivasi Maoist, seems to

have understood Kirati ancestral history both from the ruling as well as resistance perspective. In

addition, his influential invoking of the Kirati resistance to the Gorkha conquest further inspires

present day Kirati youths to fight for their rights to guarantee the Kirat state in the constitution of

Nepal. Gopal Kirati’s take on Kirati history as a political resource for mobilizing the Kirati youth

is a testimony to speak about how Nepal’s adivasi-janajati are in the process of organizing

themselves politically in reference to their ancestral history.

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Figure 4.1 A Pamphlet Issued by Gopal Kirati

127
Account of the Gorkha versus Limbuwan War

Brian H. Hodgson, a British colonial administrator stationed in Nepal for more than two

decades (1823-1845), first as an assistant resident representative and later as the British Empire’s

resident representative to Nepal. Hodgson wrote widely on different topics during his stay in

Nepal, and later on in Darjeeling after retirement. A great amount of information he collected

was never published and those manuscript collections are at the India Office Library in the

British Library in London. Hodgson’s manuscript on the Limbu-Gorkha war (1770s), written in

Limbu language and script by Jovan Singh Fago, is now accessible to interested scholars. But it

was R K Sprigg, a British linguist primarily interested in the Lepcha language, who met with the

Kirat historian I. S. Chemjong in the 1950s and handed him the copies of those manuscripts and

other books written in Limbu language and script during the mid-nineteenth century (Subba

1999, foreword by R.K. Sprigg). Bairagi Kaila, an acclaimed Nepali litterateur and Limbu

scholar visited the India Office Library, London in 2005 to read different volumes including the

description of the Gorkha-Limbuwan War. He brought back to Nepal the photocopies of those

manuscripts written by Jovan Singh Fago and handed them to Kirat Yakthung Chumlung thereby

making the copies of such an important historical document available in Nepal too. In this

regard, Jovan Singh Fago is considered to be the first Limbu historian who described the

Gorkha-Limbuwan war and handed in his description to Hodgson in the 19th century. Now two

books have been published with a translation of the war description from Limbu into Nepali

(Tigela-Limbu, Tunghang, and Angla 2013; Mabuhang and Tunghang 2070 v.s.). The war

described by Jovan Singh Fago, collected by Hodgson, and now the text transcribed in deva

nagari script, also translated into Nepali begins as follows:

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 [I wrote] whence the pene hang (Chhetri king) was sighted. Came from the west.
Destroyed Newar king in Nepal. Thereafter came to Tamakoshi. Balinghang, Ulihang
lived in Khambuwan. [They] fought against the Gorkha. Fought seven years. Gorkhas
killed many peoples. Putlung (Yakha) and Yathang yakthumba (Limbu) lived here-side of
the Arun. [They] did not help, although help was sought by Balinghang. Gorkhas finished
Khambuwan in seven years...Then the Gorkha soldiers, having finished the Khambuwan,
appeared in Arun. They came to Arun with thoughts of taking over the yakthung laji
(yakthung state) but the yakthumbas rose and went to Sabha confluence67 and fought the
war. The [yakthumba] fighters were Sangbotre, Tesakpa, Kangkare, Kangsore, Sipa,
Fakte... [The] Gorkhas could not win here side of Arun. yakthumbas chased them away.
After three years of war, they were chased away to the distance of eight walking days.
They were chased away up to Dumja68 (Tigela-Limbu, Tunghang, and Angla 2013:19).

The war description has presented a war hero, the bravest of the braves, Kangsore, as the

commander who was killed by the Gorkha force by deception on the battlefield later.

How the Gorkha Force Deceived the Limbu force

Kirat Historian I.S. Chemjong describes how the Limbu commander Kangsore was killed

by the Gorkha soldiers through cheating:

Raghu Rana, the commander of the Gurkha force asked the commander of the Limbu
force to fix a day for a combat only between the commanders themselves. He proposed
that all fighting soldiers should keep their weapons at home and attend the duel of their
two commanders, as spectators only. And the officer who would win the combat would
have the power of command over both armies. If the Limbu officer should win, the whole
army of the Gurkha officers would be under him. If the Gurkha officer should win, the
whole army of the Limbu officers would be under him…So in the morning of the first of
May 1774 A.D. all the soldiers of both sides stood on the upper and lower sides of the
fighting ground situated to the southern side of Chainpur town; and the combat between
the Limbu officer, Kangsore and the Gurkha officer, Raghu Rana started. The soldiers
stood by watching. The two commanders fought on from morning till afternoon. In the
afternoon, Kangso Rey finally smote Raghu Rana in such a way that he died. Seeing the
defeat of their officer, the Gurkha soldiers drew out their hidden arms and suddenly
attacked Kangsore and his soldiers. The latter, nevertheless surrounded their enemies on
the way to Tambar and closing the way towards the river killed them all together. After
that, the Limbus picked up the corpses of those two heroes and buried them. They buried
the corpses of Raghu Rana and Kangsore on the upper and lower sides of the fighting
ground and erected stone monuments over their graves in their honor. The Limbus then
returned to their respective villages (Chemjong, 1967:151).

67
The confluence location of Arun and Sabha rivers is called Sabha Dovan.
68
Dumja lies in Sindhuli district now.

129
 History is conventionally understood to be the interpretation of the recorded past and

written records. But history is also enlivened by the memories, tales, and, most importantly, is

produced and reproduced by peoples’ spectacular movements and activities. Historically

documented events or even the memories and myths are enacted and resurrected; people are

organized and motivated for concrete movements and actions, thereby further reproducing

political values and relationships.

130
Figure 4.2 Sketch of Kangso Re, Limbu Commander and Raghu Rana,
Gorkhali Commander. This Sketch has been Widely Used in Different
Publications by the Limbus. Sketch: Tek Bir Mukhiya

131
Paying Homage to the Warrior Kangsore: Resurrection of a War Hero

In April 2010, the Federal Limbuwan State Council’s (FLSC) leaders and cadres paid

homage to a warrior at the battlefield site of the Gorkha-Limbuwan war on the banks of the Arun

river in present day Sankhuwa Sabha district in eastern Nepal. The visit was part of the party

expansion mission targeted for Dhankuta and Sankhuwa Sabha districts (Mission DS). However,

I will focus on the invocation of the great hero, the warrior ancestor who gave his life for

defending Limbuwan. In this homage the chief guest was the Chair of the Federal Limbuwan

State Council (FLSC). In such events, the chief guest is the chief conversant of the topic. As the

homage program took place, a small drama-like situation developed at the scene. The crew’s

photographer and videographer were directing participants as to how they should line-up for the

best photographs at the edge of river.

Lined-up in an arc-shape, some participants held Limbuwan party flags high. All the

leaders and cadres were paying tribute to their warrior hero, perhaps for the first time in 237

years, ever since the warrior gave his life in the battle. The tribute ceremony began with a poem

composed by a retired (Limbu) British Gurkha Officer followed by the chief guest’s tribute to

the hero. The chief guest and the chair of the party, in an emotional pose, called for two slogans

about Limbuwan and the warrior Kangsore:

Arun Purba Limbuwan: Limbuwan, Limbuwan [East of Arun: Limbuwan, Limbuwan]

Mahan Limbuwani Yoddha Kangsore: jindabad [Victory to the great Limbuwani
warrior].

The leader of the FLSC said:

For his own land, in defense of Limbuwan land, on one of the days in the month of Saun,
1831 BS; the great warrior Kangso Re raised his sword to fight the enemy giving his own
life to martyrdom in this very place, to whom I would like to pay the most sincere tribute
on behalf of all the leaders, the cadres, the Limbuwan Volunteers, the students, the
women, teachers and all and above all, the Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad [FLSC]
from all nine districts of Limbuwan as well as on behalf of all, from all over Nepal. I bow

132
 my head in his memory with the deepest respect and want to say Jaya Limbuwan [victory
to Limbuwan].

The leader highlighted internal Limbu political and ideological confusion in the past:
How it took so long for Limbuwan politicians to arrive at this sacred place: “We could
arrive in this place only after about 250 years. O, great Kangsore, we could not recognize
you, we remained stranded as Kangres [Nepali Congress] for some time, we remained
stranded as Emale [CPN-UML] at other times, we remained stranded and confused by
being poojibadi [capitalist], or samajbadi [communist]. But we failed to realize for 250
years the solemn causes you fought for and we also failed to recognize the path you
carved for us until now.” He begged for apology for not being able to follow Kangsore’s
footsteps for such a long time. Having arrived at this sacred place, he proclaimed: “we
are saying that we awoke from the long sleep today and we are saying that we recognized
you, and we are wondering what objectives and philosophies of Limbuwan did inspire
you to fight? And we are proud to say that you fought to build Limbuwan, one of the
most beautiful states in the world.” Then the leader announced that “thousands of cadres
and leaders of FLSC should be following the path Kangsore paved for Limbuwan.” He
asked the crowd: “ Friends, are we not in his path? Are we or not?”. “Yes, we are”. All
responded loud and clear as it seemed like an oath taking ceremony in the name of
Limbuwan. He went on to say briefly: “Today we are fighting for the nine districts east of
Arun to declare Limbuwan Autonomous Province on the basis of ethnic historicity [jatiya
aitihasikata] under the Federal Republic of Nepal. And we hope that this fight will be
peaceful, and we hope this fight shall be powerful.” During his speech, he also made
some remarks on how different adivasi-janajati shall forge a common front to fight for
the adivasi-janajati right to autonomy based on unique historicity, i.e. similar experiences
of domination by the Hindu State and violent resistance against conquest. As he said:
“Yesterday, we made mistakes, when Kathmandu was attacked, Tamsaling happened to
be simply onlookers, attack fell upon the Tamsaling and Khambuwan happened to be
onlooker and Limbuwan was an onlooker when Khambuwan was attacked. Those were
the mistakes on our behalf. We shall promise that such mistakes shall not be repeated.”
He also said: “We promise before the witness of Arun’s water that if Limbuwan province
under the federal republic of Nepal will not happen in the constitution, we will not sleep
and we will never ever let the [rulers] have peaceful sleep either. I want to proclaim this
on behalf of all.

Then he moved on towards his plan and vision about how Kangsore’s name, fame and

bravery would be made integral to scholarly and academic aspects in Limbuwan. He said:

After the establishment of Limbuwan, as we have already promised, we still have a plan
to establish Limbuwan Kangsore University, in which our Limbuwan Volunteers (LVs)
will have opportunity to learn every kind of technical and tactical skills so that we can
have highly skilled and trained human resource in Limbuwan.

Finally, so as to honor the bravery of Kangsore and continue with his legacy, he said:

133
 After the establishment of Limbuwan, a medal for bravery and gallantry the Kangsore
Highest Medal will be conferred on behalf of the Limbuwan State Government to those
who fought for the Limbuwan before, and are fighting for the same cause now.”
Furthermore, the chair of the party and the chief guest of the ceremony expressed that
“we all should be happy and proud that we finally arrived today exactly at the place
which has been the most important historical place in the history of Limbuwan. At this
historic moment, I would like to express my commitment to conserve this place in
memory and honor of Kangsore, and this place shall be developed as the Kangsore War
Memorial when we have the Limbuwan state government.

Figure 4.3 FLSC Leaders and Cadres Paying Homage to the Warrior Kangsore at the Confluence of the Arun and
Sabha Rivers. Photo: D.B. Angbung

Dhan Hang Limbu, a retired British Gurkha officer, now in his late 70s, read a poem that

he had composed for Kangsore’s honor and dedication. Dhan Hang described how the Gorkhali

soldiers deceived the Limbu warriors. For doing this the poet impersonated himself as the

warrior Kangsore with the announcement for his audience before he started reading the poem: “ I

[Dhan Hang] am reading this poem but imagine that this is Kangsore’s soul speaking through my

words”.

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 A Never Defeated Territory
-Dhan Hang Limbu

Show me, how did I lose?

This is history;
Whoever wins in one on one fight between the two commanders,
the winner’s army will have the victory.
Declared was this, and condition was this.
My force had left the arms back home.
As soon as I killed Raghu Rana,
The Gorkhali force struck me with the arms they had hidden beneath the earth.
This was Gorkhali army’s well-planned conspiracy, a deception.
Is this your bravery?
No! Acting like this is cowardice.
A warrior may face off with indomitable courage.
Will sustain the strikes of arrows and the bullets with the bare chest as shield.
But will not fight with deception.
Kangsore, I am! I am Kangsore!
Show me, How did I lose?
How did I lose. [my translation].

The poem above depicts basically what Jovan Singh Limbu described in his writing

discovered in the Hodgson manuscript collections. Similarly, Kumar Lingden, the chair of the

FLSC has also composed a poem in honor of and dedication to Kangsore:

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 No palam69 was composed in Kangsore’s name,
No kelang70 played and danced, no Chumlung71 held in Kangsore’s name.
Not even a single khukuri72 brandished,
Not even a stick and a sword rose,
In our own country, in our own Limbuwan,
Like a story long forgotten,
Kangsore, continued to be forgotten…forgotten.
[my translation].

Similarly, another song played at different events as a backdrop song that described

Limbuwan as dear and adorable to everyone The following song also invoked the great warrior

Kangsore’s bravery and pledges to follow in the footsteps of Kangsore in order to establish

Limbu identity.

Our Limbuwan is
Dear to us
-Raj Kumar Dikpal

Raising soil-clenched fist, we dedicate our lives,

Our Limbuwan is adorable to us.
With our Chest filled with pride and brave history,
Prepared for oblation, we the archers,
Our pride is high like Faktanglung,
We have been fighting and fighting, we will again fight,
Following the footsteps of Kangsore, we march ahead.
Founding our own Identity [my translation].

The FLSC’s leader’s speech, the poems, songs, the war description, the invoking of the

warrior Kangsore through different mediums, the slogans chanted in rallies, and the photographs

presented in this chapter are testimonies of how the social relationships in relation to the

Limbuwan’s history and the Limbus’ collective identity are being produced through organized

activities and movements. Limbus have invoked the bravery and warrior character possessed by

their ancestral hero, Kangsore. For the Limbuwan politicians, cadres and the LVs, Kangsore is

69
Limbu courtship song.
70
Limbu dance with music from a large drum. ke (L)= Limbu musical instrument drum, lang (L) = dance
71
Assembly.
72
Type of knife, often translated into English as a Gurkha knife.

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synonymous with Limbu itihas [history], that-thalo [territory], and pahichan [identity].

Kangosre earned martyrdom trying to defend the that-thalo of the Limbus. I take on the line

from the poem “Show me, how did I lose?” to look further into trajectories around the claim of

not having lost the war. With the treaty with pene hang73 the Limbu seemed to have lost their

sovereignty, territory and cultural autonomy. With this, they lost their chiefdom’s history, built

from the time immemorial. The Hindu state conquered Limbuwan and also the Limbu

chiefdoms, albeit through a conciliatory treaty in 1774. On the one hand, the Limbus might

interpret that this was a ‘nation to nation treaty’ between the Hindu Gorkha kingdom and the

Limbuwan. Hence the Limbuwan were not “defeated” but an agreement on a nation to nation

basis was made so as to establish social contract (Graeber 2001) between two different societies,

or nations. While the Gorkha kingdom might have conspired, as they did with other kingdoms

earlier. As an old Nepali saying goes: halo bhayera pasnu phali bhayera niskanu—enter like a

needle and succeed [exit] like a ploughshare. The Gorkha Kingdom entered into Limbuwan

territory like a needle through a conciliatory agreement with not much bloody war, and with

some flattering words in addressing the Limbus:

“You are different from the 900,000. Rais [of Majhkirat], because [their] chieftains are
to be displaced, but not you…In case we confiscate your land, may our ancestral gods
destroy our kingdom. We hereby inscribe this pledge on copper plate and also issue this
royal order and hand it over to our Limbu brethren” (Regmi 1978:626).

The Limbu chiefs seemed to believe in this and they seem to believe even today as their

political slogans in the placards during demonstrations, and their leaders’ speeches repeatedly

highlight: “Limbuwan is never a defeated land”. One may ask further if Limbuwan was never a

defeated land, then what is this fight for? What inspires them to fight to “bring back” Limbuwan

or their ‘land” if they never lost it? I have heard Limbuwan leaders time and again saying:

73
Limbus called the Shah king pene hang (Chhetri King)

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“Limbus are prepared to fight for one thousand years for Limbuwan”. Why? Is it possible to

bring the old Limbuwan chiefdom back in present day society and democratic state? Are the LVs

and the cadres fighting to establish back the ancient Limbuwan ruled by the Limbu chiefs ? I

assume not. The struggle is not for bringing back the ‘ancien regime’. In fact it is for the

constitutional recognition of Limbuwan and the Limbu culture on a par with others. It is for the

establishment of broader Nepali society made up of a mosaic of culturally “synchronic co-

existence” (Turner 2004:197) in which all different cultures are constitutionally recognized and

treated as equal as suggested by Terence Turner in the concept of synchronic pluralism:

Cultural and ethnic difference has become a basic principle of contemporary social and
political life. This new meaning of cultural difference is distinct from the liberal doctrine
of individual equality as it applies to the rights of citizens in modern states. Cultural or
ethnic difference is a collective rather than an individual feature, and it serves as a rubric
under which individuals of disadvantaged groups can claim individual rights by virtue of
the need to correct or compensate for the historic inequality of state policy towards their
group (Turner 2004:197).

In fact this is their history, through these actions they are producing the social

relationships that Limbu society is historically a different society and that their history is in no

way inferior or superior than that of the rulers history. Therefore, one can see them through their

political activities, believing in the difference and their demands that ‘difference’ must be

constitutionally recognized as having an equal share, at a cultural level, in broader Nepalese

politics.

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 Figure 4.4 FLSC leaders and cadres in a rally in Kathmandu. The Slogan on the Banner Reads: Lets Establish
Autonomous States on the Basis of Ethnic Historical Backgrounds.

Kangsore as the Inspiration for Party Organization and Mobilization

The Federal Limbuwan State Council developed a training manual, Kangsore

Commanding Course, for the Limbuwan Volunteers (LV) in 2009. The training manual’s main

slogan reads thus: Limbuwanko mukti, rakshya ra sammriddhi ko lagi [For the Liberation,

Defense & Prosperity of Limbuwan] in the opening page of the manual. In addition, the cover

page instructs the LVs thus: “LVs, Lead the Limbuwan” (L Vharu, Limbuwanlai netritwa gara).

This manual is for instructing LVs about Teamwork, Leadership and Communication (TLC).

The Kangsore Commanding Course seems a well-designed training syllabus for a political party

desiring to have its own volunteer force. One could believe that there were 1500-2000 standing

LVs in Limbuwan organized under the FLSC party. The 16 page long manual is divided into two

parts: the first part focuses on different skills required for a volunteer, while the second part

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focuses on the imparting knowledge about the party’s organizational structure, ideology and

policies. In the first part, the instruction manual includes standing orders for Limbuwan

volunteers in which 19 standing orders are listed. Similarly, the manual lists out 17

characteristics, which an LV must possess. The LV leaders must have the following qualities: i)

Accountable, ii) Aggressive, iii) Candid, iv) Competent, v) Confident, vi) Courageous, vii)

Decisive, viii) Dependable, ix) Disciplined, x) Honest, xi) Motivating, xii) Passionate, xiii)

Resilient, xiv) Selfless, xv) Tenacious, xvi) Vigilant, xvii) Planner.

Kangsore Commanding Course also includes eleven principles of leadership development:

i. Know yourself and seek self-improvement;

ii. Be technically and tactically proficient;
iii. Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions;
iv. Make sound and timely decisions;
v. Set the example;
vi. Know your team and look out for their welfare;
vii. Keep your team informed;
viii. Develop a sense of responsibility in your team;
ix. Ensure the task is understood, supervised and accomplished;
x. Train your members as a team;
xi. Employ your team in accordance with its capabilities.

This course presents SALUTE as a formula for identifying the enemy force. SALUTE

stands for Size, Activity, Location, Uniform, Time, and Equipment. What may be the number or

size of the enemy? What activities are the enemy carrying out? How and in which location is the

enemy positioned? How are they dressed up? What time did you notice the enemy? How are they

equipped?

The points above are some of the important topics included in the first part of the

Kangsore Commanding Course. The second part of the course includes some policy guidelines

and detail on the party’s organizational structure. As for the party’s basic approach, the course

states that the FLSC is tired of seeing the top-down type politics in Nepal. Hence the FLSC

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wants to establish bottom-up model politics in Nepal. The bottom-up model is explained as

having the federal level co-coordinating political institutions under which there shall be

Limbuwan, Khambuwan, Tamsaling, Newa, Magarat, Tamuwan, and Tharuhat councils. All

these councils shall remain autonomous. As for its political line, the Kangsore Commanding

Course states that ganatantra [Republic], sanghiyata [Federality], loktantra [Democracy],

dharma nirapkshyata [Secularism] and jatiya aitihasikata ko adharma prantahru [provinces on

the basis of ethnic historicity] are the main political agendas of the FLSC. The FLSC’s main

philosophy is federality and co-existence. Kangsore Commanding Course does not say anything

about the warrior Kangsore as such. But suffice it to say that the course itself has been named

after him, which is intended as an inspiration for the new recruitment of Limbuwan Volunteers.

Figure 4.5 Cover Page of the Training Manual: Kangsore Commanding Course

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Transformation of Greetings and the Invention of the Kangsore Salute

One of the fascinating and clearly observable transformations in Nepali societies and

cultures has been in how Nepali people greet each other upon causal encounters. The common

greeting of “namaste” has now been diversified so much in contemporary Nepal across cultural

and linguistic differences. The adivasi-janajati groups with their own language, other than

Nepali, have begun greeting each other in their own languages. This is a testimony to the

growing consciousness towards one’s own ethnic identity in Nepal. Similar transformations can

be observed in Nepali political life as well. Anyone familiar with Nepali politics for the past

three or four decades must have observed changes in the way politically conscious people

address each other, be it in causal encounters or formal political meetings or in the field of

movements and protests. Gone are the days of the Panchayat regime when the Panchayati

politicians would conclude their address to a crowd or a formal program with ‘jay des jay nares’

[victory to country, victory to king] as a sign of supporting the monarchy and a partyless, mono-

cultural polity. Jay Nepal [victory to Nepal] is the term that Nepali Congress party followers,

leaders and cadres alike use to greet each other and also while concluding their speeches. During

election campaigns in the 1990s Nepali Congress party candidates used a major election slogan

jay Nepal ko narale, sukha paye sarale [saying the slogan of jay Nepal brought happiness to all].

Similarly the leftist, communist party followers, also called progressives, imported communist

Lenin’s red salute [lal salam] via Indian communist parties.

Neither of the above greetings fit into the political and social logic of the Limbus. Saying

sewaro is a common greeting between the Limbus. Similarly, jay Limbuwan [victory to

Limbuwan] is popular for the politically conscious Limbus and those well-wishers of Limbuwan.

Limbuwan political party leaders and cadres alike use this greeting while addressing crowds or

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political programs. Jay Limbuwan is neither imported from abroad nor borrowed from other

political parties within Nepal. Similarly Limbuwan Volunteers perform the Kangsore salutation

when greeting each other. This is a formal salutation performed only at the formal ceremonies

such as the Volunteer’s oath taking ceremonies after completion of certain courses or trainings.

This salutation is performed by placing the fist of the right hand on the left chest or heart. Many

aspects of Limbuwan politics are uniquely different from other groups given that Limbus history

and historical resources are different.

Reading Dead History versus Observing Live History

To me as a student of anthropology, reading the history of Nepal made by Kings and

Rana rulers is like reading bed time stories. On the other hand, observing the enactments of the

past through social movements and political organizations is authentic and fascinating. Nepali

historians writing the history of aryan civilization and Hindu rule in Nepal mention the Kirat

ruling dynasty as being in the age of “darkness” because no written documents or scriptures

whatsoever are available to shed light on the Kirat dynasty. However the Kirat dynasty is

documented to have ruled over Nepal for 32 generations. The point is that the non-aryan Kirat

dynasty did not remain in darkness in the eyes and minds of the Kirat adivasi-janajatis. It may be

true that the Sanskrit language might not have entered into Nepal valley until the Lichhavi

dynasty displaced the Kirats. Kirats were non-aryan, non-Hindu, non-Sanskrit lingual groups.

This may be the reason that they did not leave traces of written documents showing their rule in

Nepal.

Although the Kirat dynasty may not have left behind written traces of their rule, present

day Kirat Rai and Limbus are constructing absolutely spectacular visual images of their

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ancestors. One can find the first Kirat King Yalambar’s statue in different places in Limbuwan

and Kirat areas. One can see such images printed in journals, calendars, invitation cards, and

essays commemorating Yalambar as the first king of the first ruling dynasty of Nepal. On this

basis, it is further claimed by the Kirat Rais that the Kirat province be declared on the basis of

this historical fact. Furthermore, Kirat Rai and Limbu have also started yele tangbe [yele era]

calendar, which is named after King Yalambar’s name and reign. The Yele era’s new year falls

on Magh 1st (the 10th month of the Nepali calendar, in the late second or early third week of

January of CE calendar), which is widely celebrated among the Rais, Limbus, Yakhas and

Dhimals, the four groups considering themselves as being part of the ancient Kirat confederacy

in Nepal.

This is how the past is resurrected and enlivened in the everyday political lives of

Limbuwan. The Kirat dynasty, which is otherwise said to have remained in “darkness” in the

eyes of dominant historians, is alive and vibrant through the adivasi-janajati imagination of their

ancestral past and in concrete, observable activities. This demonstrate that the understanding and

imagination of history has shifted from textbook readings towards productive actions and

performances, which might be called claims for equal recognition of every society’s collective

identity before the constitution. History is a source from which identity politics also emanates.

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Figure 4.6 Yalambar’s statue. http://photopatrakarita.com/culture/reverence-king (accessed: 2-8-2017).
The Photo Caption reads: A Worshipper, Baliraj Rai, paying respect to the first Kiranti King Hang
Yalamber by worshipping his statue during the celebration of ubhauli festival in Mudhe Shanishchara,
Sankhuwasava, Nepal. Photo: Lakpasange Sherpa.

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Conclusions

In “The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1959, 318-49; original, 1852), Marx writes:

The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the
living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in
creating something entirely new, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they
anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names,
battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this
time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language… The awakening of the dead in
those revolutions therefore served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of
parodying the old; of magnifying the given tasks in imagination, not of taking flight from
their solution in reality; of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its
ghost walk again (Marx 1959, 320).

The rulers and writers wrote the history of Nepal. On the other hand the adivasi-janajatis

could only speak their own truth – as the saying goes: lekheko rahanchha, boleko hawale udai

lanchha [what is written remains but the spoken goes with the wind]. The history of aryan Hindu

rulers was “authentically” written, primarily by authors whose ancestral language was Sanskrit

or Pali. But the non-aryan ancestors of the present day Kirats, the Limbus, did not leave behind

written testimonies required to qualify as “history” as desired by conventional history. This was

also because Sanskrit was not their language. However, as a Nepali proverb goes: jaha ichchhya

tyaha upaya [where there is will there is way]. However, curious minds and eyes may observe

the Limbus and the Rais as being more creative in producing history through their own

imagination of their dead ancestors compared to other historians who only rewrite stories of the

dead.

The way the Limbus are organizing different movements in relation to their ancestral past

shows that the past, present and future are not separate but, instead, are parts of the same

continuum. Carole McGranahan writes:

Historical truths are always also social truths. The making of history is a social and
political process, not a neutral rendering of what happened in the past. To make history is

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 to historicize, to socially and politically legitimate a particular happening or version of
what happened as true…history is as much about organizing the present and working to
secure certain futures as it is about the past" (McGranahan 2010:3).

Observations of Limbuwan politics that are based on Limbu politicians’ imagination of

their ancestral pasts demonstrate that the basis of political organization and mobilization is not

solely derived from the existence of economic inequality in society. Unlike the mainstream

dominant political parties, adivasi Limbus have invoked heroes from past wars. Additionally

archaic documents are re-read, re-written, and re-interpreted so as to mobilize the people. In this

regard, the past heroes have become the political affidavits of the present. In a sentence, ancestral

history is the foundation of Limbuwan politics. History is one of the foundations of identity-

based political organizations in Nepal.

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 CHAPTER FIVE

THE NEW REPUBLIC OF NEPAL, THE CONSTITUTENT ASSEMBLY, AND THE

POLITICS OF LIMBUWAN

Purano satta bye bye naya satta hi hi [bye bye to the ancient regime, welcome to the
new regime] –Slogan chanted at the Republic’s victory rally in May 2006

An End to the Ancien Regime, Welcome to the New Regime

In the late evening of the 28th of May 2008, the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly

(CA) of Nepal declared the country a republic, thereby abolishing the 240-year old Shah dynastic

monarchy. Of the total 564 elected CA74 members, 560 said ‘Yes’ to Republic and four voted

against. With this action the people of Nepal officially abolished the monarchy and Nepal was no

longera Hindu Kingdom. This was the first time in Nepal’s history that a popular revolution

overthrew a hitherto all-powerful monarchy. Earlier changes to regimes had taken place

including the Shah dynasty overthrowing the Malla dynasty in the 1760s, the Malla dynasty

dethroning the Lichchhavi dynasty around the 14th century and the Lichchhavis displacing the

Kirats, the first rulers of Nepal, at some point during the 1st millennium. In these changes one

74
The Constituent Assembly consisted of a total of 601 members in an Assembly tasked with drafting and
promulgating the constitution of the republic of Nepal. The CA election was held on April 10, 2008. The CA was
formed—with the total of 601 members—through a mixed electoral system: i) 240 members elected by first-past-
the-post (FPTP), ii) 335 members elected by proportional representation, and iii) 26 members nominated by political
parties. For the FPTP seats the country was delineated into 240 electoral constituencies. The proportional seats were
based on broader population groups, namely i) Women (50%), ii) adivasi-janajati (37%), iii) Madhesi (31%), iv)
Dalit (13%), v) Remote regions (4%), and vi) anya meaning ‘others’ (31%). The category anya (others) denoted the
high caste Bahuns, Chhetris and Dasnami/Sanyasis. Political parties nominated the remaining 26 members after the
government was formed. The first meeting was held with only 564 members as the 26 members were not yet
nominated and 10 members had won from two constituencies.
The ruling caste groups or the state-makers themselves were classified as “others” for the purpose of the CA’s
proportional electoral basis. This created confusion and crisis among the ruling political parties’ Bahun and Chhetri
leaders about their own identity. How could the ruling castes (Bahuns 12%, and Chhetris 18% of the total
population), the descendants of the Hindu state makers, be classified as “others” (Lohani 2011). This was one of the
reasons why the Bahuns and Chhetris had to classify themselves as arya and khas respectively in the constitution
later.

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ruling dynasty typically fought against another ruling dynasty. The latest Shah monarch and

dynasty, however, were overthrown by a people’s revolt.

Figure 5.1 King Gyanendra's Effigy in Display Just Before it was Burned in Gongabu, Kathmandu During the April
Revolution 2006

The same Shah dynasty often touted itself publicly as having led the revolution against

the earlier Rana regime and aided the establishment of prajatantra [democracy] in 1950-51.

That same Shah regime came to an end after a people’s revolution for lokatantra [democracy]. In

other words, the declaration of the Republic of Nepal in 2008 was the official formalization of

the political mandates supported by the three week long revolution in April 2006. This was

organized jointly by an alliance of the seven major political parties including the Communist

149
Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-Maoist), who were still at war with the government. This agitation

for transformation took place in Kathmandu and all major cities in Nepal during April 2006. The

19-days revolution, in which 23 people died and achieved martyrdom for the sake of loktantra

brought the Shah monarch—also understood as a residue of feudalism—to his knees. This

historic revolution, also known as the Peoples’ Movement II or April Revolution 2006, was

preceded by a decade-long violent jana yudhda or People’s War (1996-2006), between the CPN-

Maoist and the government that swept over Nepal. This conflict discredited the old structure,

which had systematically discriminated against women, Dalits, adivasi-janajatis and other

marginalized groups in so many respects. Suffice to say that women, Dalits, adivasi-janajatis

and madhesis (from the southern plains) alike were an integral part of the Maoist jana mukti sena

[People’s Liberation Army] during the conflict. Among the common Nepalese people, who

would have thought before the People’s War (1996-2006) that the centuries old almighty

monarchy would be toppled in one fell swoop by people’s power? But the Maoist-led jana

yudhda, as it involved and also politically empowered hitherto marginalized and excluded Dalits,

women, adivasi-janajatis, and madhesis from mainstream politics, transformed the

understanding and imagination of the state and politics in Nepal. As the April Revolution 2006

succeeded in forcing the King to hunker down and step down from the throne, the long

institutionalized feudal Hindu monarchy—considered by the Maoists as the source of all

structural problems—came to a relatively peaceful end. “His Majesty’s Government of Nepal”

was replaced by the “Government of Nepal.” Signboards, letterheads, or objects whose names

began with ‘His Majesty’s’ were promptly replaced or erased throughout the country.

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 Figure 5.2 Ganatantra Chok [Republic Intersection]: A Newly Named Intersection in Gongabu During April
Revolution.

The only national flag carrier airline called Royal Nepal Airlines was renamed Nepal

Airlines. Organizations which were founded under the patronage of the King or the Queen

changed their names to follow the new polity. For example, the King Mahendra Trust for Nature

Conservation changed its name to the National Trust of Nature Conservation. The statues of

former monarchs erected in different places over the country were toppled and such spaces as

corners, intersections, and public squares were renamed as ganatantra chowks [republic

intersection]. Newly inscribed names for spaces, places, and offices followed the shift to

loktantra [democracy]. This level of political transformation did not happen or was not possible

when a similar revolution ousted the Rana regime to establish prajatantra75 [democracy] in1950-

75
Although both Nepali words loktantra and prajatantra may be translated into English as ‘democracy’, the term
prajatantra denotes ‘subjects’ rule while the word loktantra denotes ‘peoples’ rule’. Hence by the term
prajatantra, one could understand the type of democracy under the auspices of monarchy as it lasted for more than a
half century (1951-2006) in which ‘subjects’ were loyal to the king. However, the word loktantra (lok=people,

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51. After the success of the April 2006 revolution, the reinstated parliament of Nepal formed an

interim constitution drafting committee. Subsequently the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007

was authenticated by the interim House of Representatives on January 15, 2007.The Interim

Constitution of Nepal 2007 declared Nepal to be a secular state and stipulated for a Constituent

Assembly (CA) to be elected through a general election. The CA would promulgate the new

constitution of the Republic of Nepal. Subsequently the election of the CA was held on April 10,

2008—which later turned out to be the first and failed CA in Nepal’s political history—exactly

two years after the April Revolution, which had started on April 5, 2006.

The Constituent Assembly (2008 - 2012) and Limbu Representation

The decade long Maoist jana yudhda helped to debunk the old political mindset of many

sections of Nepali society. Prajatantra was conceptually transformed into loktantra, which also

loosely meant inclusive democracy. Adivasi-janajati, madhesi, Dalit, and women who were

structurally76 excluded by the previous Hindu monarchic state wanted to be constitutionally

included in making of a naya Nepal [new Nepal] on an equitable basis. The Hindu kingdom of

Nepal changed into the Republic of Nepal, the Federal Republic of Nepal, or the Federal

Democratic Republic of Nepal based on different peoples’ different political tastes. New

vocabularies hitherto unheard of now carve spaces in everyday Nepali political conversations.

For example, naya Nepal [New Nepal], sanghiyata [federality], rajya puna:sangrachana [state

restructuring], pahichan [identity], that-thalo [territory] began to be heard often amidst the

transformation of broader Nepali political tropes. Adivasi-janajati and madhesi voices were the

main voices who were heard loud and clear in terms of sanghiyata [federality] and pahichan

tantra=rule) prevailed in Nepalese politics after the April 2006 revolution as this word matched attitudes after the
republic of Nepal was established.
76
Excluded by the state through the law and by Hindu caste domination in different walks of life.

152
[identity], both being the elementary bases for political organization, party formation and

movements in new Nepal. In short, the declaration of Nepal as a Republic by the CA was the

final outcome of: i) the jana yudhda (1996-2006); ii) the April Revolution 2006; and iii) the

formation of the CA through the general election held on April 10, 2008.

In early 2007 the government agreed to amend the Interim Constitution with the addition

of Article 63(3) following an agreement with the Madhes movement:

The Constituent Assembly shall be composed of the following number of members who
are elected on the basis of the equality of population, geographical congeniality and
specificity, and on the basis of the percentage the population of Madhes, in accordance
with the mixed electoral system, as provided in the law: (a) Two hundred and forty
members elected on the basis of first-past-the-post electoral system;
(b) Three hundred and thirty five members to be elected on the basis of the
proportional electoral system where voters vote for parties, while treating the whole
country as a single election constituency;
(c) Twenty six members to be nominated by the Council of Ministers, on the basis of
understanding, from amongst the prominent persons who have rendered outstanding
contributions to national life, and the indigenous peoples which could not be represented
through FPTP and Proportional system" (The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007).

Of the 601 members, 240 were elected through the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral

process, for which the country was divided into 240 single-member electoral constituencies by

the Electoral Constituency Delineation Commission (ECDC)77 in May-July 2007. Similarly 335

members were elected through proportional electoral system, which took into consideration the

diversities in social-cultural composition of the population,78 namely status as adivasi janajati,

madhesi, Dalit, Others (Bahun and Chhetri), and those from Backward or isolated regions. Each

of these categories had to include 50% women. In this regard, adopting this proportional or

77
I was privileged to be a member among the five members Commission.
78
The proportional representation system included the following percentages:Madhesi (31.2%), Adivasi Janajati
(37.8%), Dalit (13%), Backward region(Humla, Mugu, Jumla, Kalikot, Dolpa, Bajhang, Bajura, Achham districts)
(4 %), Others (Bahun and Chhetri) (30.2 %). Each of these categories guaranteed 50 percent to be included for
women. The CA 2008 rather hurriedly categorized the Bahun and Chhetri as Others (anya) that prompted
dissatisfactions among Bahun and Chhetri activists. The ‘Others’ category was changed into Arya-Khas category in
The Constitution of Nepal 2015.

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representative method as an integral element in the electoral system benefitted formerly excluded

groups in many respects.

Of the total 601 members in the CA, the CPN-Maoist was elected as the largest party

with 220 seats; the Nepali Congress (NC) came second with 115; and the Communist Party of

Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) gained109 seats. A newly formed party – the

Madhesi People’s Rights Forum (Nepal) - secured 54 seats and the Tarai Madhes Loktantrik

Party secured 21 seats. 20 other parties secured from one to nine seats of which six different

political parties secured only 1 seat each. A total of 25 political parties comprised 599 members

while 2 members were elected as independent candidates. Limbuwan’s own party, the Federal

Democratic National Forum (FDNF) (described in chapter 1) secured two seats (one male Limbu

and one female Tharu) in the proportional group. With its two CA members, the FDNF79came

15th position amongst the 25 political parties in the CA. The example of Limbuwan’s own party

electing a non-Limbu Tharu adivasi-janajati woman demonstrated the inclusionary political

characteristic of Limbuwan politics. Although the FDNF secured only two seats, the Limbu

community was over represented in the CA compared to the size of their population in Nepal.

There were 14 (6.3%) Limbu80 CA members elected from five different political parties, which is

a larger proportion compared to their population size (1.5 % of the total population) in the

country. The three major political parties - the CPN-Maoist, the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML

- elected four Limbu members each while two other parties, namely the Rastriya Prajatantra

Party-Nepal (RPP-Nepal) and the Federal Democratic National Front (FDNF), elected one

Limbu member each. Furthermore, by ethnic background, the Chair of the CA was a Limbu too,

79
The FDNF lost both of its CA members as Rukmini Choudhary (Tharu, female) split the party by forming a
different party called theSanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya Manch -Tharuhat (FDNF-Tharuhat). The only remaining
FDNF CA member Rajkumar Nalbo (Limbu, male) also formed a different party and quit the FDNF. Therefore,
towards the end of the first CA’s tenure, the FDNF had no representation in the CA.
80
a) CPN Maoist (4), b) Nepali Congress (4), c)CPN-UML (4), d)FDNF (1), and e) RPP-Nepal (1)

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elected from the CPN-UML party. Despite the fact that Limbus were well represented and the

CA itself was chaired by a fellow Limbu, the Limbu CA members individually could not do

much to ensure a Limbuwan province in the naya Nepal [New Nepal] as their political loyalty

seemed to be directed more towards their own parties than ensuring a Limbuwan province in the

constitution. These Limbu CA members simply followed the directives of their respective

parties.

The CA of 2008 was dismissed on May 28, 2012, exactly four years after it had declared

Nepal a republic. The first CA failed to promulgate a constitution let alone a constitution

instantiating ethnicity based federal states. In the following sections I will describe the efforts

rendered by Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (henceforth Chumlung or KYC), an adivasi-janajati

Limbu social organization, to mobilize both the Limbu CA members as well as the people to put

pressure on the CA and the dominant political parties to inscribe Limbuwan in the constitution. I

will describe in detail how Chumlung exerted enormous efforts to bring together Limbu

members of the CA and generally the adivasi-janajati members of the CA for the cause of both

Limbuwan and for identity based names of future federal provinces in Nepal.

Kirat Yakthung Chumlung: Brief Profile

Kirat Yakthung Chumlung was established in September 1989 as a “collective and

representative” organization of Limbu adivasi-janajati. Chumlung was established during the

autocratic Panchayat regime when Nepalis were barred from establishing organizations that had

any political motivations. Chumlung’s objectives were as follows:

i.To undertake various activities for the upliftment of the Limbus, their language including
the kirat-sirijonga script, literature, religion and culture.
ii.To conduct research on subjects related to Limbus and promote awareness among them.
iii.To organize various activities of economic development in Limbuwan to improve the
living standard of local people.

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 iv.To make the Limbus, as well as other ethnic groups of Limbuwan, aware of the
constitution of Nepal, their constitutional rights and the prevalent laws of Nepal.
v.To conduct effective programs to curb the destruction of the environment and
ecosystems.
vi.To undertake activities for the achievement of Limbuwan autonomy under the federal
system, to ensure the country's national integrity and sovereignty as well as
sustainable development by promoting communal harmony among different ethnic
groups and communities.
vii.To conduct awareness programs against drug abuse and provide treatment and
rehabilitation facilities for drug addicts.
viii.To plan and carry out appropriate programs in order to wipe out superstition and
ignorance of people about health problems in rural areas. Also, to encourage peopleto
make the best use of available and possible means and measures in the field of
primary health care.
ix.To increase mass awareness among the people to stay away from AIDS and other fatal
diseases. Also, to make them aware of safety measures and precautions against such
diseases.
x.To work for human rights, indigenous rights and women rights and child rights.
xi.To carry out campaigns to improve the educational status of the Limbus (Kirat Yakthung
Chumlung 1989).81

Chumlung’s then General Secretary, Lila Singak, in her 2015 report entitled: “Kirat

Yakthung Chumlung Sthapanaka 25 barsha” (25 Years Since the Establishment of Kirat

Yakthung Chumlung) states the following:

[KYC]…..was founded by Limbu students and young professionals in Kathmandu on the

2nd September 1989. Limbu students and professionals living in Kathmandu far from
their original that-thalo (territory) felt the need to have a common social platform for
ethnic solidarity and cooperation among the Limbus. They held a meeting at the Law
Campus, Kathmandu on September 2, 1989 and formed an ad hoc committee chaired by
Nanda Kandangwa to find a proper name, develop concrete objectives and legislation for
a formal Limbu organization. That ad hoc committee organized the first convention held
on January 6, 1990 in the auditorium hall at Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur. The
convention founded the organization and named it Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (Lila
Singak 2015) [my translation].

Since its foundation, Chumlung has expanded with 13 branches established across nine

districts in Limbuwan as well as branches in Kathmandu, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, and Chitwan

districts. Lalitpur Chumlung has built a three-floor chumlung him82 in Lalitpur with a seminar

81
http://www.chumlung.org.np/page.php?page=1
82
Chumlung (L)= meeting/assembly. him (L)= house/building

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hall with 450 seating capacity. Kirat Yakthung Chumlung celebrated its silver jubilee with

different programs and events for the whole year in 2014. By the end of 2015, Kirat Yakthung

Chumlung had held nine conventions and dozens of Council meetings including the year-long

Silver Jubilee celebration in 2015 with many different events. The constitution of Chumlung has

been amended five times so far. Similarly, Chumlung has program-oriented divisions under the

central body. The departmental divisions under the central committee include the Limbu Cultural

Council, KYC Rehabilitation Center, the Yakthung Help Trust, the Limbu Language and

Literature Academy, and the Limbuwan Study Center.

There are Kirat Yakthung Chumlung organizations established in at least 15 countries83

around the world. Some of them are directly affiliated to Chumlung Nepal as branches while

many of them are independently established organizations. The constitution, the organizational

operation, and internal structure of these organizations is similar to Chumlung in Nepal.

Irrespective of their affiliation to Nepal Chumlung, Chumlungs all over the world contribute

financially to Nepal’s movement for Limbuwan when requested by the Nepal Chumlung. Apart

from financial contributions for the Limbuwan movement, Chumlungs abroad also establish and

contribute to trusts and funds for various awards, research scholarships, and student scholarships

in Nepal. In addition, individual Limbus permanently or temporarily based abroad substantially

help fund Limbuwan and Limbu related activities in Nepal. For example, a Limbu family now

living in Canada recently donated 3.5 million Nepali rupees (35,000 USD) to the Limbuwan

Study Center, the research and academic division of Chumlung. There are life-sized golden

statues of three Limbu national heroes recently erected at the front-yard of Chumlung Him

83
i) Hong Kong ii) United Kingdom iii) Qatar iv) Singapore v) Dubai vi) Bahrain vii) Israel viii) Japan ix) South
Korea x)Kuwait xi) Malaysia xii) Australia xiii) Canada xiv) USA xv)Portugal.

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Central Office in Lalitpur. These statues were built with a donation of approximately 3 million

Nepali rupees (30,000 USD) from a Singapore-based Chumlung.

In addition, Chumlungs in Nepal and abroad feel their most important responsibilities

come after natural disasters and calamities in Nepal. In summer 2014, scores of houses were

swept away by landslides in Taplejung district, part of Limbuwan, with dozens of human

casualties. Chumlungs in Nepal and abroad mobilized their members in their respective countries

to make donations to the victims of the landslide. About 7 hundred thousand Nepali rupees

(7,000 USD) was collected for this purpose. The Nepal Chumlung coordinated the distribution of

this relief fund to the victims of the Taplejung landslide.

After the deadly earthquake of April 2015, Chumlung Nepal did its best to help rescue

victims in Kathmandu and later to distribute relief materials to the Pahari and Tamang

communities in Lalitpur district. Chumlung Nepal was able to raise about 950,000 Nepali rupees

(9,500 USD) in donations from Chumlungs abroad and from the Limbu community in Nepal.

The Chumlung of Hong Kong separately donated money to rebuild 14 houses damaged by the

earthquake in Sindhuli district.

Chumlung’s Convention: Festivity Rather Than Organizational Activity

To non-Limbu or non-adivasi outsiders, the conventions staged by Chumlung look more

like Limbu social or cultural events than official organizational proceedings. These conventions

include festive displays of Limbu social and cultural practices. Anyone observing the

conventions or any formal program—be it an academic workshop/seminar or a social event—

with “innocent eyes and open mind” (Barth 1993) will witness a gamut of cultural, social,

economic, political, and historical aspects of Limbu society. Barth suggests that anthropologists

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pick an event to explore the aggregate meaning or total consequences of the event. By this

method one can explore broader politico-historical aspects of a society by observing any event in

minute detail. Furthermore a politically attentive observation and analysis of such an event helps

us see the relationships between a society and the state, in this case the relationship between

Limbu society and the state of Nepal. In other words, micro events and macro historical, and

political processes are brought into relationship. As Geertz (1973) has demonstrated, detailed

descriptions of public events, festivals, conventions, or ceremonies, for example a “cockfight”

allow one to “interpret the resonances of the event outward in space and backward in time”

(Barth 1993). In my understanding the phrase “outward in space” means the social, cultural,

economic, and political aspects within a society as well as its relations to other societies.

Similarly “backward in time” means the history of a society itself and in its historical

relationships with the state. Public ceremonies, conventions, and any festivals celebrated under

the management of Chumlungs speak to the essence of Limbu society and history in its totality.

If one carefully observes a convention of the Kirat Yakthung Chumlungfrom beginning to end,

with an unprejudiced eye,an observer will know who the Limbu are in relation to their primordial

identity, an identity that they cannot escape. They will also learn what Limbu people want

politically in the process of making a new Nepal, restructuring the state, and creating a multi-

cultural federal republic. Chumlung conventions may be divided into mainly three interrelated

parts: i) the inauguration, ii) the main program, and iii) the closing ceremony.

The Inauguration Session

Inauguration sessions are preceded by a festive procession through urban streets in which

Limbu art, musical instruments, costumes, and jewelry are publicly on display. Participants,

especially women, wear beautiful Limbu attire and adornthemselves with customary jewelry.

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Photographers, often outsiders, find these eventsespecially photogenic and national and local

newspapers oftenprint pictures of these displays. A group known as ke lang84is a main attraction

too. Even Limbu shamans participate in these parades intheir full regalia. In addition to such

performances in the procession, participants unfurl the Chumlung flag with the symbol of silam

sakma85and carry banners and placards with various slogans, messages, and demands.With these

banners, the marchers communicate to the state of Nepal and the dominant political parties their

key demands: Aitihasik that-thalo ra pahichanko adharma Limbuwan swayattataghoshana gara

[declare Limbuwan on the basis of territorial history and identity]; Nepal lai dharma nirapekshya

rajya ghoshana gara” [declare Nepal a secular state]; “Chumlung ko chahana, swayatta

Limbuwan rajyako sthapana” [the wish of Chumlung is the establishment of an autonomous

province of Limbuwan]. These slogans and messages are also chanted out loud as the procession

proceeds around the city and finally come together at the program stage. Such a procession of

festive celebration resembles a political demonstration too.

The stage built for the convention is beautifully decorated with banners and Chumlung

flags raised high facing upstage. The stage further includes chairs, desks, and a podium for the

guests, dignitaries, and the speakers at the program. At the very front of the stage is a low table

that serves as an altar on which are placed the photos of the three Limbu heroes: i) the Limbu

script inventor, Sirijanga, ii) the social reformer, Phalgunanda, and iii) the Kirat-Limbu historian,

Imansingh Chemjong. These three heroes may be considered as the key symbols of Limbu

nationalism.86 Not a single Chumlung public event is complete without honoring those three

84
Ke (L)= large drum made of a hollow wood with goatskin tied to both sides of hollow wood.Lang (L)= dance. Ke
lang is a group dance performed during weddings, housewarming, and similar auspicious events.
85
Si(L)= death, lam (L.)=path, sakma(L)= to block. Silam sakma means to block death, to avoid death or evils. In
Limbu mundhumSilam Sakma is described as a symbol to protect culture, custom, and human life. Chumlung uses
the image of silam sakma as its logo and Chumlung’s flag.
86
Adorning photos of the respectful heroes in programs is compulsory practice, almost an essential ritual, among
Nepalese political parties and social organizations. For example, the Nepali Congress political party, in its

160
Limbu national heroes. This act of honoring their own national heroes at such events sets the

Chumlung activities apart from other adivasi organizations and even Limbuwan-based political

parties. As the procession and the tableau of cultural displays arrive near the stage, amusical

overture reverberates out creating a pleasant ambiance for the participants:

Yakthung laje Limbuwan, Asakma re kuma sam!

hing e sang si e sang, A lung ma o Limbuwan!!87

Limbuwan, the motherland of Limbu, my breath and my soul!

In life or death, forever Limbuwan in my heart (Singak 2015)

While the procession is entering the venue, the master of ceremony calls upon the

dignitaries and the guests to take their seats on the stage, including the chief guest and the chair

of the event. When the seating arrangement is completed, badges and silam sakma insignia are

distributed to the chief guest and the guests as a sanskritik chino [cultural emblem]. One can see

the chief guest, other guests, and almost all participants with Chumlung’s logo, silam sakma,

worn on the collars of their jackets.

The gifting of silam sakma emblems to the guests including the chief guest, who is often

drawn from the high level of the administration of the state, may be viewed as cultural and

political communication by Limbus to the state. In recent years, adivasi janajati people have

started presenting their cultural or social symbols to the chief guest and other guests at formal

events, conventions, and festivals. For example, the Kirat Rai, in their formal programs, present a

white turban to the chief guest. Similarly, the Tamang may offer a Tamang hat to the chief guest.

High level administrators can be seen adorned in different cultural costumes depending on which

cultural group has invited them to be the chief guest. Such an adivasi cultural way of offering

programs, adorns the photos of the troika of leaders B.P. Koirala, Ganeshman Singh, and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai,
the founders of the party. Communist parties adorn the photos of Marx, Lenin, Mao. In this regards Chumlung’s
revered heroes in reference to Limbu history, identity, and politics are different from that of dominant parties.
87
Song: Yakthung laje Limbuwan, Lyrics: Amar Tumyahang, Vocal: Sita Kumari Singak.

161
symbolic items to representatives of the state may be interpreted as a claim of cultural difference

by adivasi people. They are saying that “we are a different culture within this state of Nepal,

recognize us as a different group”.But the invitees, especially the chief guest,may not internalize

or be conscious of the message that adivasi people want to impart through these symbolic gifts.

Figure 5.3 Silam sakma

Every formal program of the Chumlung begins with a ke lang88 dance, considered as the

auspicious beginning of any event. The chief guest then inaugurates the program by garlanding

the photos of the three Limbu heroes: Sirijanga, Falgunanda, and Imansingh. Inauguration

sessions, unlike the main business sessions,are open events. Attendees include a long list of

people: general invitees, pramukh atithi [chief guest], atithi [guest], various dignitaries, founders

of the Chumlung, past officials and members, foreign delegates, and representatives from

different branches of the Chumlung, representatives from similar organizations of the Rai,

88
Ke lang…

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Yakha, Tamang, Magar, Gurung, Newar and other ethnic groups, officials of political parties

including the dominant parties, officialsfrom other Limbuwan-based parties and organizations

such as the Limbu Students Forum, and Limbuwan parties.This session is more like a festival

collectively celebrated with non-Limbu guests whereby the organizers welcome the participants

and guests. Similarly the program schedule details for the inaugural session are presented. On

behalf of the program organizers and greetings for the success of the convention are extended by

guests. The inauguration session has more of a symbolic than practical or official value. As the

name suggests, the inauguration is for wishing the best success of the convention and for sending

out a message to non-Limbu others.

Main Program

The main program is solely for officials of the Chumlung and the representatives from

different district branches. Reviews and reports on administrative, financial and activity-wise

progress from past years are presented before the representatives. Legislation and policies are

reviewed and necessary amendments are made. The main program is not different from the

political party’s general convention in its procedures, policy reviews, and planning strategies for

the future. The old governing committee is dissolved and a new committee is elected following a

process similar to that of electing a committee inside a political party.The main program as a

whole orients the future course of the Chumlung.

Closing

At the closing ceremony the new committee governing the Chumlung until the next

convention is announced. Congratulations and well wishes are extended to the new committee

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members. The closing ceremony, rather the whole convention, also ends with some fanfare. I

have attended Chumlung’s various programs’ closing ceremonies accompanied by feasting in

numerous occasions over two decades. Mainly the hosts—with an exception of some guests

too—of the convention throw a party. Copious amount of tongba89 [millet beer], and raksi

[home-distilled liquor] drinks, pork and other snacks are consumed. The closing party seems

literally a feasting. Limbu traditional dance yalang and kelang are performed. Some nice-hearted

financially capable Limbus also sponser different items, such as pork or pig, raksi and tongba.

In this way, the general convention, comprised of an inauguration, the main program and

a closing ceremony, transforms the social, organizational, and political orientation of the

Chumlung. As Victor Turner suggests about the three phases in any ritual processes: separation,

liminality, and incorporaton (Turner 1977), Chumlung’s convention can also be viewed as a

ritual during which the status of the Chumlung is suspended temporarily before it is transformed

into a new one, that is with new political agendas and renewed status as an adivasi organization.

The Transformation of Chumlung from a Development-Centered NGO to a Politics-

Centered Organization Advocating for Limbuwan

Ms. Lila Singak, former General Secretary and now Vice-Chair of Chumlung divides

Chumlung’s overall activities and programs advocating for Limbuwan into two phases: i) Socio-

cultural and developmental phase; and ii) Adivasi-janajati right based phase (Lila Singak 2015).

89
Tongba is a beer container or jar made of wood carved inside that looks like a bamboo culm. Fermented millet
grain solid beer is put in the tongba and the millet grain beer soaked with warm water. After the solid millet grain
beer soaks well in warm water in the wooden jar, it is seeped with a straw made of bamboo, called pichhing in
Limbu language.

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Organizational Extension and Community Development Phase

Kirat Yakthung Chumlung was established during the autocratic Panchayat regime when

the monarchy outlawed political organizations. This situation may be a reason that Chumlung’s

objectives were limited to “promotion and preservation of Limbu culture, customs, religion,

language.”90Chumlung’s officials and members, however, were politically conscious individuals

mainly with the leftist political backgrounds and some of them were involved in the then

underground leftist parties fighting to overthrow the Panchayati regime. Six months after the

founding of Kirat Yakthung Chumlung (September 1989), Nepali Congress and the Left-Front

[bam morcha] launched the first People’s Movement on the 7th of Fagun 2046 BS (February 18,

1990).91Chumlung did not officially participate in the People’s Movement I but its officials and

members individually took part in the movement that overthrew the 30 years old autocratic

Panchayat regime. The People’s Movement I brought the return of political parties that had been

banned by King Mahendra in 1960 at the start of the Panchayat regime.

During this first phase, Chumlung mainly focused on introducing itself among the Limbu

people by expanding its organizations at district as well as village levels. For this, Chumlung

developed and implemented a decade long strategic plan for research, documentation, and

publication of the history of Limbu culture, religion, language, and the history of Limbuwan.

They carried out research and development programs and activities such as:

i) The identification of Limbu costumes and festivals92

ii) the development of a non-formal literacy program in Limbu language and script
in Limbu villages and primary schools in Limbuwan
iii) the construction ofchumlung him [community halls] in different districts
iv) introducing savings and credit programsfor Limbu women

90
http://www.chumlung.org.np/news_detail.php?id=153
91
Fagun 7 used to be celebrated as Democracy Day in Nepal since 1951. This was the day that the then King
Tribhuvan had declared democracy in Nepal in 1951 after the revolution overthrew the 104 years old Rana regime.
92
Boycotting the Hindu festival Dashain and collective celebration of chasok tangnam during the late 1990s may be
an example of this.

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 v) programs to build institutional capacity
vi) a program in legal literacy
vii) a study of kipat land
viii) a rehabilitation program for drug abusers in Dharan city (since 1996)
ix) a study of Limbu indigenous knowledge of herbs and medicinal plants;
x) a study of Limbu traditional healing and treatment systems
xi) Community Radio programs in the Limbu language
xii) the foundation of various awards and trusts in the names of the three Limbu
National Heroes
xiii) publication of I. S. Chemjong’s books on Kirat history, Limbu language, and
Limbuwan history
xiv) cooperation and networking with local development bodies and national and
international non-governmental organizations
xv) the strengthening of the central body and the branches
xvi) identification of a development agenda for adivasi Limbu

Adivasi-janajati Rights Based Phase

The 5th general convention of Chumlung held in Dharan, Sunsari district in February

2003 marked a turning point in terms of the political stance of the Kirat Yakthung Chumlung as

a representative platform for Limbu adivasi peoples. As an adivasi social organization,

Chumlung’s focus in previous conventions was on Limbu social, economic, educational,

linguistic, and cultural promotion and development. But the 5th convention discussed “the

development related agenda of adivasi-janajti Limbu” (KYC 2004) in detail and declared that

“collective human rights, adivasi rights, and rights to self-determinationand inclusive

democracy” (KYC 2004:25) were also crucial aspects of KYC’s agenda. Chumlung’s document

states the following:

i) “Given that human rights related international laws are limited to individual rights,
the definition of human rights must embrace collective community rights for ensuring
the cultural rights of indigenous nationalities.
ii) On indigenous peoples ‘right to self-determination and inclusive democracy’ it says:
In a multicultural and multi-lingual country like Nepal, there should be inclusive
democracy based on pluralism. We [Limbu people] firmly believe that only an
inclusive democracy will ensure equal status of different languages, ethnicities,
religions, genders, and cultures.

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 iii) By recognizing the Limbu’s right to self-rule on the basis of their history and that-
thalo [territory], the state shall guarantee the ethnic autonomy for Limbuwan and the
province should be named as ‘Far Kirat Limbuwan Autonomous Province’.
iv) Nepal’s constitution shall guarantee to devolve all rights in relation to culture,
religion, education, communication, health, housing social welfare, transportation,
employment, taxation, land and resource management, and environmental
management to autonomous provinces leaving currency, foreign affairs, and national
defense to the national government.
v) The provincial government should have all three pillars of the government: executive,
judiciary, and legislature based on separations of power.
vi) The indigenous populations inhabiting Limbuwan province shall be provided with the
‘right to semi-autonomy within autonomy’.
vii) The groups whose history and that-thalo are unclear shall be provided with special
minority rights.
viii) We Limbu should have representation in the central government on the basis
of ethnic proportional electoral system.
ix) The Limbuwan provincial state should create such a social environment conducive to
create mutual cooperation, recognition, and equality among all castes, ethnic groups,
genders, languages, and cultures.” (KYC 2004:25–26) [my translation].
In short, the fifth convention embraced autonomy for Limbuwan as integral to its

developmental agenda. From this convention, Chumlung also realized the limitations of the

conventional understanding of human rights, development, and even democracy. The report

“Agenda for the Development of the Limbu adivasi-janajati” (2004) was published after

undertaking participatory meetings, discussions and analyses in all districts of Limbuwan.

Chumlung now realized that politics guides the course of development and that the political

empowerment of the Limbu and Limbuwan’s collective identity were integral to Limbus’ social,

cultural, and economic development. Such a change in Chumlung’s perspective transformed its

understanding of development from a narrow view to a more holistic perspective. Such an

affirmative understanding of politics guided Chumlung to focus directly on collective cultural

rights for indigenous peoples as well as rights to self-determination and inclusive democracy.

When Chumlung was in such a transformative process to involve itself in politics in 2003, the

dominant political parties such as NC and CPN-UML were sidelined by the absolute monarchy.

King Gyanendra had taken over the dictatorial control of the country while most of rural Nepal

167
was swept up in the Maoist-led jana yudhda. In such an adverse political situation, Chumlung’s

bold decision to advocate for Limbuwan was an inspiration for common Limbu people to move

towards identity politics and the politics of Limbuwan even though the organization was

formally a “non-political, non-partisan organization”.

From Developing the Limbu movement to the Establishment of Limbuwan

Chumlung held its 6th convention on June 8-11, 2006 in Damak city of Jhapa district. The

convention presented a spectacular tableau of performances in front of the Chief guests and other

guests who came from different political parties and represented different branch offices from

different districts and villages. The 6th convention was also special in terms of participation of

the CPN-Maoist party-affiliated cadres and leaders as the 2006 April Revolution was concluded

barely two months before and the CPN-Maoist party was no longer underground. This

convention also amended the basic status of Chumlung in its constitution from a ‘social,

apolitical organization’ to an ‘adivasi organization’ meaning that Chumlung changed its status

from Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) to an Indigenous People’s Organization (IPO).

From this convention, Chumlung decided to adopt slogans related to Limbu’s muktiko chahana

[desire for liberation] and the Limbuwan ko kalpana [imagination of Limbuwan]. Similarly,

Chumlung also decided to put all its strengths and efforts towards establishing Limbuwan

autonomous state under the federal democratic republic of Nepal. The convention formulated a

slogan that highlighted the province’s name Limbuwan and the province’s autonomy: hamro

chahana Limbuwan jatiya swayattatako sthapana [our wish is to establish Limbuwan ethnic

autonomy]. Chumlung openly declared its desire to re-establish Limbuwan through the Damak

convention. This slogan alone would not fulfill Chumlung’s desire for Limbuwan. Therefore the

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7th convention held in Meyanglung town of Terathum district decided to directly involve

Chumlung itself in the movement for Limbuwan. The seventh convention concluded with the

solemn commitment and promise for Limbuwan: Limbuwan Jatiya Swayattata Hamro

Pratibadhdata [Limbuwan ethnic autonomy is our pledge and promise]. This shift in slogans

suggests that the declaration of the Damak convention was not enough and hence the following

7th convention pledged and promised to transform the ‘desire’ into a movement.

Felicitation of the CA members from Limbuwan (June 2008)

Chumlung organized a felicitation program for CA members from Limbuwan, which in

their reckoning, like other Limbuwan based parties, included all the districts between the Arun

and Mechi rivers in eastern Nepal. Both Limbu and non-Limbu CA members were present at the

event in which Chumlung—in addition to congratulating the CA members on their success—put

forward the essentiality of Limbuwan in creating a new Nepal.

With the program of felicitation, Chumlung wanted to “kill two birds with one stone” as

it would honor and congratulate the newly elected CA members, on the one hand, and the new

CA members would be informed of Chumlung’s message about Limbuwan on the other. The

banner hung over the wall said: We want to establish an ethnic autonomous Limbuwan. This was

written in the Limbu language in Limbu script and in the Nepali language.

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Figure 5.4 Newly Elected CA Members from Limbuwan Being Felicitated by Chumlung. 2008

As always, there were three photos of the Limbu heroes placed on a low table just in front

of the guests and the hosts. With the displays of the banner and the photos of the three Limbu

national heroes, Chumlung was sending a message to the new CA members that Limbus were a

culturally and nationally different and distinct community. I attended the felicitation program

and listened to the addresses of guests and hosts according to the program. Most of those who

spoke were hopeful and quite confident that a Limbuwan province would be inscribed in the

constitution. In contrast, one CA member present at the meeting, Chandra Parkash Mainali

(CPN-ML), a Kumai Brahmin by caste background, clearly expressed his reluctance to delineate

provinces on the basis of identity. His view, together with ruling parties and ruling castes,

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ultimately prevailed against adivasi janajati and madhesi identity based names of the federal

states.

The Formation of The Sanyukta Limbuwan Morcha (Joint Limbuwan Front-JLF)- July
2008
Chumlung made a successful effort towards uniting Limbu politicians across political

party lines with a goal to inscribe Limbuwan in the constitution. There were 13 Limbu CA

members93 elected from different political parties during the first CA. There were also about half

a dozen Limbuwan based political parties unable to win a seat in the Constituent Assembly. In

fact, some of them, for example, the Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad (Federal Limbuwan

State Council-FLSC) led by Sanjuhang Palungwa boycotted the CA election 2008. I attended and

observed five meetings held at the Chumlung’s central office facilitated by Chumlung. During

the open discussions, the representatives from different parties did not address each other as

though they belonged to a different culture or society. Irrespective of their party based

ideological differences, they addressed each other by kinship terms. For example, I overheard a

Maoist CA member refer to a Nepali Congress CA member as kaka [father’s brother], which was

based on how they were related to each other through the Limbu kinship network. In fact kinship

networks incorporate every individual Limbu, irrespective of their educational, economic, and

political differences. For example, if two Limbu students run into each other in Kathmandu, it is

desirable that they ask each other’s clan and what part of Limbuwan they are from so as to figure

out how they are related according to Limbu kinship. Kinship and that-thalo are integrally

related among Limbus. This may be a reason that the Limbu participants during the meetings

addressed each other in kinship terms rather than calling each other by titles or first or last

93
a) CPN Maoist (4); b) Nepali Congress (4); c)CPN-UML (4); d)FDNF (1); and e) RPP-Nepal (1).

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names. The following table shows a list of the main political parties and their respective Limbu-

based wings:

Table: 5.1 Showing different political parties and their adivasi janajati wings and number of Limbu CA
members
S Political Party Limbu wing associated with Limbuwan Limbu CA
N Members
1 Nepal Communist Limbuwan Rastriya Mukti Morcha 4
Party Maoist - Unified (Limbuwan National Liberation Front)

2 Nepali Congress Nepal Limbu Sangh (Nepal Limbu Association) 4

3 Communist Party of Nepal Loktantrik Kirat Limbu Sangh (Nepal 4

Nepal-United Marxist Democratic Kirat Limbu Association)
Leninist
4 Nepal Communist Nepal Limbuwan Swasasit Sangh (Nepal -
Party-United Limbuwan Autonomous Association)
5 Sanghiya Loktantrik Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad (FLSC) 1
Rastriya Manch
(FDNF)
6 Rastriya Janamukti Limbuwan Prantiya Parishad (Limbuwan -
Party (NPLP) Provincial Council)
7 Limbuwan Mukti -
Morcha
(Limbuwan Liberation
Front (est. 1987)

13
Source: Field Research, 2008-2012.

After three or four weeks of discussions, the Samyukta Limbuwan Morcha (Joint

Limbuwan Front-JLF) was declared on July 26, 2008 through a press meet in Kathmandu. The

Limbu politicians joining the front individually belonged to eight different political parties. They

included Kumar Lingden (Sanghiya Limbuwan Rajya Parishad-FLSC), Bir Nembang

(Limbuwan Mukti Morcha-LLM), Dambar Sambahamfe (CPN-UML, CA Member), Purna

Kumar Sherma (NC, CA Member), K. P. Palungwa (Jana Mukti Party-PLP), K.B. Fudong (Jana

Morcha-PF), Uttam Thangden (Chumlung, Vice-Chair), and Dhruba Angdembe (CPN- Maoist,

CA Member). These Limbu leaders, although divided by their political parties, also were related

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to each other by kinship. Some of them also grew up together speaking the Limbu language and

observing their own customary festivals and feasts. Perhaps such a cultural context of being

Limbu may have motivated these Limbu leaders and party cadres to come together to form the

JLF under the facilitation of Chumlung. No Limbu would question the loyalty and responsibility

of Chumlung to the cause of Limbuwan. By observing the way the participants had

conversations, one could predict that they would fight together for Limbuwan irrespective of

their loyalty to their respective parties.

Nevertheless, Limbus without affiliation to a specific political party were not convinced

that, in the end, Limbu party members would not be controlled by their respective parties. If their

parties decided not to delineate identity based federal states, then these Limbus would follow

their party lines. And who controlled the parties? All dominant ruling parties were controlled by

the ruling castes. All ruling parties, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary alike, were in the

grip of high caste leaders. Individual participants loyalty to their original parties were explicitly

expressed when some individuals put forward their opinions:

“Only our party would get us Limbuwan. Other parties are simply faking it by having

Limbuwan wings and they are only deceiving the genuine Limbuwan”. The JLF focused on the

following activities:

i) The JLF forwarded a letter of memorandum in support of Limbuwan to the dominant

parties: the CPN-Maoist, NC, and CPN-UML.
ii) The JLF organized joint programs and campaigns for Limbuwanto be held at the
district headquarters of all nine districts in Limbuwan.
iii) The JLF leaders called on the top leaders of Nepali Congress in June 2011 to hand
them theletter of memorandum on behalf of Limbuwan.
iv) The JLF held an evaluation meeting in Birtamod Jhapa on December 11, 2011.
The JLF did not turn out to be as successful as it had originally hoped to be in terms of

creating a synergetic movement and joint participation by all co-signers of the Front. Those co-

signers belonging to large parties contributed only nominally to the movement while the

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Limbuwan based parties, such as the FLSC, involved themselves fully in the Front. The joint

activities did not seem to be “joint” in a real sense. The JLF, however, did inspire other adivasi

organizations to produce joint efforts. Furthermore, Chumlung played a leading role in bringing

eight adivasi organizations together to form a kind of alliance for the cause of Limbuwan and

other identity based federal units.

Figure 5.5 JLF's Prossesion in Limbuwan. The Banner Slogan Reads: Guarantee the Limbuwan Autonomous State
with Right to Self-Determination – JLF (Photo courtesy: Chumlung)

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Adivasi janajati Joint Front, March 2012

Chumlung was actively involved in establishing the adivasi-janajati Joint Front (AJJF).

Limbu, Rai, Sherpa, Tamang, Newa, Tharu, Gurung, and Magar ethnic organizations94decided to

launch various programs in support of and advocating for a federal system with 14 provinces and

23 autonomous areas, despite opposition from the ruling parties’ leaders against this federal

model. The adivasi-janajati Joint Front (AJJF) organized sit-in protest programs at the offices of

the main political parties, namely NC, CPN-UML, CPN-Maoist, and the Madhesi Joint Front

(MJF). On March 15, 2012, the Front released a joint press statement in protest at the insidious

move by these parties against identity based provinces. The Front also called on the President,

the Chair of the CA, and the Chair of Constitutional Committee and handed a letter of

memorandum to them. Similarly, the front organized a motorcycle rally in symbolic support of

the proposed 14 provinces and 23 autonomous areas on March 23, 2012.

Sanghiyata karyanbayan Limbuwan struggle samiti (Federality Implementation Limbuwan

Struggle Committee, FILSC), March 2012

As the first Constituent Assembly was persistently squandering the time for writing the

constitution, adivasi- janajati organizations like Chumlung were despondently waiting for a

constitution. Chumlung had no option but to pressure the ruling parties and the CA as much as it

could. For this, Chumlung facilitated the formation of the sanghiyata karyanbayan Limbuwan

sangharsha samiti (Federality Implementation Limbuwan Struggle Committee-FILSC) on March

31, 2012. This struggle committee was formed due to the JLF’s inactivity and also to enhance the

94
i)Kirat Yakthung Chumlung, ii) Kirat Rai Yayokha, iii) Nepal Sherpa Sangh, iv) Nepal Tamang Ghedung, v)
Newa Dye Dabu, vi) Tharu Kalyankari Sabha, vii) Tamu Hyol Choj Dhi, viii) Nepal Magar Sangh.

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involvement of a broader array of Limbuwan related organizations and circles. The main purpose

was to put pressure on the government and the ruling parties to promulgate a constitution based

on a federal structure with14 identity based provinces and 23 autonomous areas. The committee

was formed under the Chair and General Secretary of Bijay Subba (CPN-UML) and Dharma

Chandra Lawoti (CPN-Maoist) respectively and was comprised of leaders from different

political parties, CA members from Limbuwan, former government ministers, national figures,

intellectuals of Limbuwan, artists and journalists, students, representatives of Limbuwan based

women’s organizations, and lawyers. The committee organized programs both in Limbuwan and

Kathmandu valley and Chumlung functioned as the secretariat.

FILSC called on the top leaders of the three main political parties (CPN-Maoist, NC and

CPN-UML) to hand them a letter of memorandum that described the history, territory, and past

relationship of Limbuwan with the Gorkha State.The memorandum also described the possible

consequences of failing to promulgate the constitution without incorporating the identity of

adivasi- janajati peoples in relation to peace and political stability in Nepal.

I accompanied the FILSC delegates on two occasions calling on Prachanda—former

Prime Minister and the Chair of CPN-Maoist, and Jhala Nath Khanal—former Prime Minister

and the Chair of CPN-UML, to hand in the memorandum in late April 2012. Both the party

leaders responded to the FILSC delegates positively. The CPN-Maoist Chair Prachanda said:

I would like to extend thanks to your delegation on behalf of myself and the party for
handing in the memorandum in support of federality with identity, Limbuwan and in
support of the 14 states model for restructuring the state of Nepal. Our party CPN-Maoist
is committed in support of 14 provinces based on identity. I personally think that the
Maoist party itself will be extinguished if we give up identity-based federality. I have
been fighting for identity-based federalism at the expense of our party’s other important
issues. We gave up so much in adjustment of our combatants to the army for the sake of
identity-based federalism. It will be injustice on your behalf to equate us with other
parties on identity-based federalism.

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 Anyone listening to Prachanda saying all the above would not have thought, even for a

second, that his party would join with the NC and CPN-UML parties in the regressive

“consensus” of not promulgating the constitution on the basis of identity and capability let alone

without declaring Limbuwan. Similarly, the Chair of CPN-UML Jhala Nath Khanal said:

There are more than 103 caste/ethnic groups in Nepal and more than 90 languages spoken
here. There is enormous diversity and all these diverse groups have to have equal
opportunity in developing this country. There should be no doubt on this. The upcoming
constitution will ensure more rights than those ensured by the interim constitution. But it
is difficult to say how we all will have consensus in the upcoming constitution. We all
have our own perspectives and it is difficult to find a common perspective out of these
different perspectives. However, we all have already agreed in the CA to carve out the
federal units on the bases of five criteria on identity and four criteria on capability. We
will delineate the federal units on the very basis which we have agreed upon.

Compared with Prachanda’s response, Mr. Khanal was ambiguous about specifically

committing to the point about Limbuwan and 14 provinces. He rather digressed and tactfully

dodged the topic by highlighting the enormous diversity in Nepal, which he thought could not be

“managed” without the three main parties coming to a consensus, highlighting the need for

consensus.

Unfortunately, I could not accompany the FILSC delegation when they called on Sushil

Koirala, the President of the NC party. Later I had conversation with a member in the delegation

to learn the response of the final leader of the main trio. My respondent said:

Sushil Koirala did not even seem to know the Nepali word pahichan [identity] as he said
the word parichaya [introduction] instead of pahichan while responding to us. Similarly,
he also did not seem to know the word samarthya [capability] as he said sambhabbyata
[potentiality] instead. Is it possible to persuade a political party to restructure federal
states on the basis of identity and capability [pahichan ra samarthya] when that party’s
President himself is completely unaware of the words let alone the concepts of pahichan
and samarthya?

It was both humorous and frustrating to know that the President of the Nepali Congress

did not understand the Nepali words for identity and capability. What could Chumlung and

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FILSC expect from a leader with that level of capacity in understanding the politics of identity in

Nepal? Nothing.

Having heard all three sirshastha neta’s [main leaders] understanding of identity and

capability during their brief and off the cuff responses to the Limbu delegations, I thought

Prachanda was facing constraints in implementing what his party had originally imagined about

creating a Naya Nepal after overthrowing the monarchy. Overthrowing the monarchy and the

founding of a republic might have been the end goal of the jana yudhda, however, one cannot

deny that the Maoists were the vanguards of Nepal’s ongoing political transformation. Only their

imagination of ganatantra Nepal [Republic of Nepal], the sambidhan sabha [Constituent

Assembly] and the actions thereafter had made this possible. The CPN-UML’s leader neither

protested nor supported identity-based federalism in his response to the FILSC delegates. He

preferred to remain in the grey zone rather than taking a side, mainly for his and his party’s

benefit. It was beyond one’s understanding that the leader of the NC did not even know the

words pahichan and samarthya, which were the basis of federalism tabled in the Constituent

Assembly two and a half years earlier (January 2010), creating enormous debates for and against

thereafter. Perhapsthe top leadership of the Nepali Congress had just ignored the issue of

identity.

One could say that the Nepali Congress party, on the whole, did not seem to be updating

itself with the political changes happening from the bottom of social scale in Nepal. In fact the

Nepali Congress prospered as a ‘democratic party’ by reaping the benefits of the seeds sowed by

a previous generation who overthrew the Rana regime in the revolution of 1950-51. Why is this

true? What factors motivated many Limbu leaders [neta], cadres [karyakarta], followers

[pachhaute], lackeys [chamche], and hopefuls [ase] to have confidence in the Nepali Congress

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party? Their own party leader did not even know the word pahichan and their party’s top

leadership were against the establishment of Limbuwan. Each and every Limbu loyal to the

Nepali Congress with whom I met expressed their support for Limbuwan. Was it impossible for

Limbu people to say “no” to Limbuwan? During a discussion of Chumlung’s future strategies for

the Limbuwan movement held in July 2015, a Limbu scholar, Yehang Lawoti, offered an

excellent observation: the Limbus are “automatic Congress (kangres)”. He was curious as to why

Limbus remained loyal to the Nepali Congress given that the Nepali Congress did not support

the push for Limbuwan. When asked, he was told by kangres Limbus that they were “automatic

kangres.” He went on to ask, “What do you mean by being an automatic kangres?” “Can there

be an automatic kangres, like an automatic rifle?” The kangres party member replied, “No, you

did not get my answer. My grandfather fought in the sat sal ko kranti [revolution of 1950-51], he

was a jana mukti sena [peoples’ liberation soldier]. My father was a kangres. So am I a kangres

too.”

The three main political leaders differed drastically in their policies on Limbuwan when

representing their party lines. It was obvious that they could not join together in terms of their

party policies. But they did reach a consensus not to promulgate the constitution (described

below) only a month after the FILSC called on them.

The Collapse of the First Constituent Assembly

On May 12, 2012, just two weeks before the first CA died its unnatural death, the FILSC

organized a mass rally and demonstration in the city of Damak, Jhapa district in Eastern Nepal.

The FILSC expressed its solidarity and support for an all Nepal bandh [shutdown of Nepal] on

May 20 to May 22, 2012 called for by all the major adivasi janajati organizations. The FILSC

participated in that bandh. Chumlung and the FILSC also participated in the gherau

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[encirclement] of the CA building in Kathmandu to put pressure on the CA members to

promulgate a constitution with identity based federal states.

As the first CA ended its term without promulgating the constitution, Chumlung held an

emergency meeting and planned strategies for further movements, which they made public on

May 31, 2012. Chumlung and the FILSC held a meeting in Dharan on June 23-24 and decided to

hold a National Political Conference on Limbuwan. As a consequence, an International

Conference on Limbuwan was held in April 2014. Chumlung also concluded that the CA had

failed to promulgate the constitution with identity-based federalism for the following reasons:

i) The high caste supremacist egotism attitude of the NC and CPN-UML leaders.
ii) The CPN-Maoist’s wishy-washy attitude towards identity and federalism towards the
end of the CA’s tenure.

Chumlung’s Declaration of Limbuwan and theCPN-Maoist’s Dilemma

Chumlung’s Damak declaration about Limbuwan created a wave of support among

Limbus and attracted the attention of leaders of the CPN-Maoist party. The CPN-Maoists had

“disbanded [the] previously existing krantikari limbuwan morcha (Revolutionary Limbuwan

Front-RLF) of Bhakta Raj Kandangwa to assimilate with the Kirat rastriya mukti morcha (Kirat

National Liberation Front-KNLF) during the jana yudhda” (Baral 2012) and the Maoists had

declared the entire hill and mountain area of the Mechi, Koshi and Sagarmatha regions as under

the operation of the KNLF. Thus Chumlung’s declaration of Limbuwan was not a welcome

message to the CPN-Maoists who did not include Limbuwan as part of their future political

agenda. The Maoists considered themselves as the vanguard of the political transformation to

create a New Nepal. The Maoists vehemently opposed Chumlung for declaring Limbuwan in the

face of the CPN-Maoist’s KNLF. A senior Maoist leader even charged Chumlung, with “having

gotten INGO’s ‘dollar’ for bringing up the Limbuwan issue in order to challenge the Maoist’s

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Kirat jana sarkar rajya parishad (Kirat Peoples Government State Council-KPGSC)”.95 In this

regard, Gopal Kirati, then a Central Committee member of the CPN-Maoist [arty expressed his

dissatisfaction in response to a question about Chumlung’s declaration of Limbuwan:

“Initially, the Revolutionary Limbuwan Front was under the leadership of Bhaktaraj
Kandangwa [Limbu], and the Khumbuwan Liberation Front was under our [Rai]
leadership. The Kirati NationalLiberation Front was formed by uniting those two fronts.
The Kirat jana sarkar [Kirat peoples government] was declared as per the goal and
objectives of the Kirat National Liberation Front. In one sense, this guaranteed the basis
of unity among the Kirati Peoples, which means to create theadhar ilaka [base area] for
the Nepali jana yudhda in the eastern Command of the Eastern Nepal.”

Kirati also hurled serious charges at Kirat Yakthung Chumlung:

I heard that Chumlung's convention was held in Damak and was trying to endorse
Limbuwan... In one sense, [Chumlung] has been an organization for the sahariya
budhdijibi [urban intellectuals]. The true directors of this organization are [some]
Generals of the Royal Nepal Army. These Generals are conspiring to divide Kirat into
two or three pieces...upon the people's rebellion tomorrow, would Chumlung be
courageous enough to come out to the street to bear the bullets of the old regime?
Thousands have to be ready to sacrifice their lives. If Chumlung's friends would play that
role to create a new Nepal, they will undoubtedly get that [Limbuwan]. But, if so called
Limbuwan is sought after without fulfilling that role, without shedding a drop of sweat
for jana yudhda, then that is the line of the Generals of the Royal Nepal Army. We will
use all our forces to defeat that line [of politics]”(Kirati 2008) [my translation].

Immediately after they came out of hiding following the April Revolution 2006, the
CPN-Maoists opposed the proposal for Limbuwan in terms like those above. Chumlung did not
“react to such a vitriolic comment by the Maoist leaders” but quietly continued advocating for
Limbuwan.96
The CPN-Maoist, despite their outright opposition to Limbuwan, were compelled to form

the Limbuwan rastriya mukti morcha (Limbuwan National Liberation Front-LNLF) well before

the first Constituent Assembly [sambidhan sabha] election. Why did they feel compelled to form

the Limbuwan National Liberation Front (LNLF) after the end of the jana yudhda? Two

examples help answer this question. First, the then Chair of Chumlung related to me the

95
Personal communication with Kirat Yakthung Chumlung’s then Chair Arjun Limbu.
96
Personal communication with a Chumlung official.

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following anecdote concerning Limbu Maoists leaders and the social pressure that led them to

form the LNLF:

When the Limbu Maoist leaders came out of hiding after the April Revolution 2006, their
common Limbu brethren received these leaders with acknowledgements. The Maoists
were known to have been prepared to lay down their lives for liberating the country,
therefore those common Limbu brethren also thought that the Maoists would also liberate
Limbuwan or at least bring in Limbuwan to naya Nepal. Wherever the leaders went and
whichever Limbu with whom they met, they were greeted by the same happiness and
confidence that they would bring back Limbuwan. The local Limbus eagerly wanted to
treat the Maoist leaders with khaja-pani [snacks and drinks] to honor them and their
sacrifice for Limbuwan. But the Maoists, as they were well-trained and eloquent orators,
responded that there was no Limbuwan but only the Kirat National Liberation Front
proposed and founded by their party. Upon knowing the fact that the Maoists did not
have Limbuwan in their agenda, those common Limbu brethren gradually turned their
back on those Maoist leaders and were no longer interested to meet with the Maoists. The
Limbu Maoists also realized the fact that they were not well accepted politically in their
own society for not having Limbuwan as part of their agenda. After all, they were going
to take part in the Constituent Assembly election, to be held shortly afterwards. This
social pressure compelled the Maoists to form the LNLF.

During the CA election in 2008, the CPN-Maoists deployed a unique election strategy

compared to other parties. They displayed a map of Nepal showing the proposed provinces based

on ethnic identities including Limbuwan. During the election campaign, voters in local

constituencies could see this provincial map in the Maoist party’s election materials. Maoist

candidates effectively enhanced their election campaigns by showing those maps and convincing

voters that they supported Limbuwan.

The second example relates as to how party symbols rather than texts came into play

when persuading common constituents to cast votes for particular parties. In June 2008, I visited

a village in Limbuwan and had many conversations with local leaders and teachers about the CA

election held just three months before. That particular electoral constituency, a Limbu dominant

area by population, was known to be a CPN-UML stronghold. Local leaders, namely the former

Village Development Committee (VDC) Chair, the Vice-Chair, and a local high school principal

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all belonged to the CPN-UML party. The school principal told me that they decided to travel

from house to house in the entire village to meet with the voters individually and persuade them

to cast their vote for the sun, which was the election symbol of the CPN-UML party. Although

they believed that most of the voters would vote for the CPN-UML candidate, they thought it

would be good to visit villagers and meet with the voters out of courtesy. When they met with a

Limbu voter who they assumed would surely vote for UML, they were surprised to hear his view

on which party he wanted to vote for. The CPN-Maoist ballot symbol was a hammer and sickle.

One of the three leaders told me thus: The villager showed them the sample ballot paper posted

on the wall and, pointing at the sign of the crossed hammer and sickle, said in the Limbu

language: anga ga ambha kang o thepchi kok pirung ba-ro. kalle rok Limbuwan taru mel-reba

khepsung [I will thwack my vote on this [hammer and sickle], I am told that only they can bring

us Limbuwan]. The three leaders were flabbergasted to hear their villager (and also a kin relative

belonging the same clan group) saying this. This villager who made his living by mostly working

for others, did not even know to read and write, and seemingly had nothing to do with politics,

wanted to vote for the Maoists, meaning for Limbuwan. These three local leaders could not

understand his interest in voting for a Maoist candidate who, in the villager’s view, would make

Limbuwan a reality. These three Limbu leaders were the highest educated, richest, most

powerful, and socially most prestigious trio of their locality but they remained oblivious as to

how a “poor,” “apolitical,” and “illiterate” Limbu could make Limbuwan a deciding factor in

how he voted.

The examples above speak to issues of identity. Limbuwan is a key factor in the

production of a sense of self and identity. Identity is different from economic, educational,

political, or social statuses. Those Limbus who barely communicate with non-Limbu others

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through the Nepali language might be the ones in need of a Limbuwan to form a sense of

themselves. The essence of identity lies in one’s existence or being. The Limbu constituent in the

second example above was an underprivileged, “under achiever” in all aspects of life. He

probably understood that elections would not give him any “development” benefits. He may

have realized the fact that the government had been promising him development benefits during

every election but had always failed to uphold their promises. The past elections have not helped

him dispel his own dukha [hardships of life] or socio-economic struggles. He might have decided

to vote for a party that promised to recognize his existence by designating his Limbuwan

homeland on a map of Nepal. I can conclude that to prosper in one’s life socio-economically and

to be recognized oneself as at a par with others identities are different dimensions of our lives.

Socio-economic prosperity alone will not fulfill one’s desire for identity.

Political Transformation from the Bottom Up: Movements Reform the Theories

Different parties, indigenous peoples’ organizations, and other activist organizations all

wanted to give a new name to naya Nepal [New Nepal]. The ‘Federal Democratic Republic of

Nepal’ includes the terms‘federal,’ ‘democratic,’ and ‘republic’and reflects a “paradigm shift”

(Kuhn 1970) in how people thought of the Nepali state. For example there was no mention of the

word ‘federal’ [sanghiya] in The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 (authenticated on January

15, 2007). Only after the madhesi uprising against the interim constitution during January –

February 2007 was progress made in guaranteeing the rights of marginalized people. The madhes

uprising forced the government to make the first amendment to the interim constitution. Through

this the word sanghiya [federal] was added to the constitution barely two months after its

promulgation. Furthermore Article 138 added, “There shall be made progressive restructuring of

the State with an inclusive, democratic federal system of governance” (The Interim Constitution

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of Nepal (2063 v.s.) 2007:Article 138). Thus the adivasi-janajati and madhesi groups were ahead

of the dominant parties in formulating a vision for naya Nepal, a re-structured Nepal, a federal

Nepal, and an inclusive democratic [sambasi loktantrik] Nepal.

As time went by, however, the then dominant parties, NC and CPN-UML, seemed to be

backtracking on their promises to implement the mandates of jana yudhda and the April

Revolution. They also seemed to be reluctant to recognize the contribution of madhesi and

adivasi-janajati groups in the process of Nepal’s political transformation. Madhesi and adivasi-

janajatis were thus forced to resume their agitation to pressure the government and the dominant

parties. As a consequence, the fifth amendment was made to the interim constitution in July

2008. Article 138 (Progressive restructuring of the State) (1a) then came to read: "Recognizing

the desire of the indigenous peoples and of the people of backward and other areas including

madhesi people towards autonomous provinces, Nepal shall be a federal democratic republican

state. Provinces shall be autonomous and vested with full authority. The boundaries, number,

names and structures, as well as full details of the lists, of autonomous provinces and the center

and allocation of means, resources and powers shall be determined by the Constituent Assembly"

(The Interim Constitution of Nepal (2063 v.s.) 2007).

In the above paragraphs, I presented an example showing that not everything in relation

to the rights of adivasi janajati and madhesi groups were included in the package called The

Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007. Madhesi and adivasi pressure from below through social

movements compelled the parties and the State at the top to incorporate changes that

marginalized peoples sought.

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Malleable Constituent Assembly 2008

The main leaders of the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML were defeated by CPN-Maoist

candidates in the first CA election. For example, K.P. Oli and Madhav Kumar Nepal,97 top

leaders of the CPN-UML, were defeated by unheard of CPN-Maoist candidates in Jhapa and

Kathmandu electoral constituencies respectively. Although the main leaders were left out of the

CA for not having been elected they continued to keep indirect control over the CA through their

party’s chain of command. In this regard, the CA could not function independently of the

political parties. Despite not being members of the CA, the leaders of dominant parties remained

in control over the CA. For the whole four years of its tenure, the CA remained unpredictable

and malleable as it voted for bills related to the constitution. Top leaders from the NC, CPN-

UML and CPN-Maoist leaders failed to come to ‘consensus’ [sahamati] on the names, number

and models for a federal structure. Among the dominant parties, the NC openly expressed its

reluctance to accept a model of 14 provinces and 23 autonomous areas (described in chapter 2)

after the Committee for Restructuring of the State and Distribution of State Power tabled that

proposal in January 2010. Gradually, the CPN-UML joined the NC in opposing that model, and

finally the CPN-Maoist joined the other two in not accepting that proposal. The clause of

“consensus” (Article 70) in the interim constitution proved to be an excuse for not supporting the

14 provinces model, which, upon promulgation of the constitution, would have constitutionally

recognized ethnicity based cultural differences in Nepal.

97
CPN-UML’s Madhav Kumar Nepal was later nominated under the proportional system in a seat vacated through
resignation of a member, Mr. Sushil Chandra Amaytya, from the same party. Later, Mr. Nepal became the Prime
Minister of Nepal (May 2009-February 2011).

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The Final Scene of the Constituent Assembly Drama

The main leaders of the three major parties, NC, CPN-UML and CPN-Maoist continued

holding meetings every other week to reach ‘consensus’ on the names and number of the

provinces until the CA finally legally dissolved on May 28th, 2012.

During the very last days of the first CA, Baneshwor chowk in Kathmandu, next to the

premises of the International Convention Center (where the CA meetings were held), was the

center stage for adivasi-janajati organizations and identity based political parties to protest. I

observed their demonstrations which looked more like the programs of festivities, and included

spectacular performances of adivasi-janajati concert and songs highlighting pahichan, itihas,

that-thalo ra yudhda [identity, history, territory and war] in adivasi costumes and adivasi style.

Music played amidst the speeches. One Kirat song was as follows:

Yo bhumi chumne pahilo hami haun mulbasi !

Yo shrishti jasto purano hami haun kirati !!
We are the first settlers of this earth. As old as the creation, we are the Kirati.
The whole world of Knowledge, the civilization of mundhum is ours,
Our jewelry and costumes are as pristine beauty as nature.
Shifting cultivators and the sedentary settlements combined,
Exemplary living with differently destined,
As old as the creation, we are the Kirati.
In front of witnessing us is our unwritten history,
Awaiting to be highlighted is ancestors’ legacy,
Trove of skills are the basis of our Culture,
Born on this earth [and] will be dissolved on this earth,
We are the first settlers of this earth.
As old as the creation, we are the Kirati”
- by Bhupal Rai [my translation].

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 This kind of song could be heard during intervals between speeches of leaders exhorting

the audience to support demands for identity based federal provinces. I observed a demonstration

on the day of dismissal of the CA late in the evening at the Baneshwor intersection. Gossip was

circulating that the CPN-Maoists were able to garner the consent of more than 200 adivasi-

janajati, madhesi, and Dalit CA members from NC, CPN-UML and other parties in support of

the 14 provinces model. Rumors were that the main leaders of the CPN-Maoist had secured a

private letter signed by 418 CA members willing to vote for the 14 provinces by “crossing the

floor” (disobeying the party whip) to cast their votes. I could see the demonstrators’ faces shine

when the whispers about 418 signatures supporting 14 provinces wafted across the crowds of

demonstrators. In this regard, the demonstrators only wished that the CA Chair call for the CA

meeting and proceed to voting. Then more gossip drifted across the crowd that the CA Chair,

Mr. Nembang was holding meetings with major party leaders for ‘consensus’ instead of calling

the CA to a vote. I could clearly see the wave of frustration sweep across the crowd, causing

despair and hopelessness. Also a rumor went around that some women CA members from the

CPN-Maoist personally tried to call upon the CA Chair to call for the CA vote only to be told

that he would not do so unless there was “consensus” among the three sirsha netritwa [main

leaders] of the three ruling parties. Later I heard from my colleagues that some women CA

members from the CPN-Maoist even burst into tears out of despair and anger as their pleas for

CA voting fell on deaf ears. At the same event, I asked the FLSC’s leader if his organization had

any plan for a movement in case the CA promulgated the constitution with no Limbuwan or in

case of no constitution at all. He had no answer to my question but I could witness the streaks of

despair and frustration in his face. My hunch was that if the CA failed to inscribe Limbuwan in

the constitution, the FLSC would start the Limbuwan movement afresh but, in fact, there were no

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important events held by the FLSC immediately after the dismissal of the first Constituent

Assembly.

Figure 5.6 Limbuwan Cadres in the Sit-In Program in front ot the CA Hall. The Banner Message Reads: Declare
Limbuwan Autonomy- FILSC

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 The three main party leaders, despite meeting for “consensus” hundreds of times, failed

to agree upon the CA’s own proposal for the names and numbers of the 14 provinces. Rather the

leaders remained vocally against the proposed provinces arguing, with no evidence, that

“delineating the provinces on the basis of identity will break the country apart” [jatiya

sanghiyata le desh tukryauchha]. In this manner, the provision of ‘consensus’ stipulated by the

Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 proved to be an excuse that the leaders of the dominant

parties denied the adivasi-janajati peoples their right to cultural difference.

Why did the CA Chair not call for meeting to proceed to voting? Why did the three major

parties use their control over the CA to overbear the identity of adivasi-janajati people? Why did

they decide to go against the fundamental procedure adopted in modern democracy, namely the

voting process?

Acclaimed writer Manjushree Thapa’s answer to above questions resonates with the

interpretation of adivasi-janajati leaders:

What do you do if you’re the [hill] high-caste leader of a democratic party faced with a
vote that will end your caste’s supremacy? You avoid voting at all costs…The leaders
had betrayed the very principle of democracy. And they had done so for the lowest
possible reason: they wanted to preserve Nepal’s high-caste monopoly. With democrats
like these, who needs autocrats? (Thapa 2012).

Similarly Pramod Mishra’s criticism of the top leaders comes to a similar conclusion:

There was a time not long ago when the ruler was the state and his word was law—
hukumi sasan. Then until 1990, the king gifted the constitution to his subjects. And now
the top leaders of the three political parties have proposed to gift the constitution to the
marginalized, sidestepping all the processes of the Constituent Assembly committees and
commissions. I mean what are they thinking? Are Tharus, Madhesis, and Janjatis still
fools and cowards? (Pramod Mishra in The Kathmandu Post, May 17, 2012).

With this conclusion, the ruling caste groups, through the ruling parties, could continue

their long standing domination over others and monopolize state power in a way that was even

stronger and more secure than the banished monarchy. Either consciously or unconsciously the

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trio of main leaders happened to be Bahuns—the caste group which has been in the privileged

position in all aspects of life opportunities in Nepal for centuries. Now in the CA politics, the

ruling castes seemed to be united to deny cultural rights to the adivasi janajati, despite their

significant differences in party lines and ideological stands. The adivasi-janajatis and

marginalized people’s hopes of being constitutionally recognized as culturally different groups

were shattered. To them, the Constituent Assembly proved to be like the Nepali saying goes:

hatti ayo hatti ayo fussa—elephant coming, elephant coming but nothing.

Chumlung and Other adivasi Organizations’ Role in Building New Parties

As soon as the first CA was dismissed, Chumlung held emergency meetings along with

the FILSC, both in Kathmandu and Dharan, to develop strategies for further efforts in support of

identity based federalism in Nepal and inscribing Limbuwan in the constitution. To fulfill this

purpose, Chumlung mainly decided that the process of writing the constitution must be

completed by the CA, not by a parliament. Chumlung attributed the failure of the first CA to

promulgate the constitution to the leaders of the three main parties. In this context, Chumlung

also made a decision to facilitate and render its support towards forming a new political party

that included recognition of adivasi-janajati identity as the main political agenda.

On May 29, 2012, Chumlung held a meeting in Lalitpur to discuss the possibilities and

basic requirements of beginning a new political party for naya Nepal based on identity and

federalism. Among the 16 attendees at the meeting were members of the dominant political

parties, intellectuals, and the Chair and other officials of the Chumlung.

On June 7, 2012, the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Students Central Coordination

Committee and the Kirat Rai Students Organization organized a discussion workshop in

Kathmandu on the topics: i) Building federal states on the basis of adivasi history and identity, b)

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Campaigning for an inclusive, federal education system based on identity, ii) Establishing the

basic reasons behind the dismissal of the CA and ways forward for sympathizers of identity

based federalism. The CPN-UML’s Ashok Rai, Rakam Chemjong, Rajendra Shrestha, CPN-

Maoist’s Barshaman Pun, the acclaimed writer and scholar, Khagendra Sangraula, and Dr.

Sundar Mani Dixit addressed the workshop.

On June 16, 2012, the Chumlung organized an interaction program on the topic,

“National and Limbuwan Politics after the Dismissal of the CA.” The focus of the interaction

was to seek avenues for establishing a new national party and for consolidating Limbuwan based

parties otherwise divided into smaller factions. On October 4, 2012, a defining move, in terms of

a new political party formation, was observed in Kathmandu. Half a dozen central level leaders

of the CPN-UML from the adivasi-janajati and minority communities, including the vice-chair,

Ashok Rai, announced, amidst hundreds of party cadres and other guests, that they would be

‘abandoning the UML’ [emale parityag]. The message printed on the banner said: “Abandoning

UML for Building a Forerunner Political Power” [agragami shakti nirmanaka lagi emale

parityag karyakram]. Also printed on the banner was: “Organized by Forerunner Thought

Group, Central Coordination Committee” [agragami bichar samuha, kendriya samanbay samiti].

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Figure 5.7 CPN-UML's Leaders Mainly From adivasi-janajati Background Announcing their Abandonment of the
CPN-UML. 2012.

Now former UML leaders who had spent three-four decades of their lives to build a

‘communist party,’ abandoned it. They were not any ‘late-comers’to the party. They were, rather,

among the ‘builders’ of the then Communist Party of Nepal- Marxist Leninist, founded during

the early 1970s, when they were an underground party during the partyless, non-partisan

[nirdaliya] and autocratic Panchayat regime. These UML renouncers, who were once prepared to

lay down their lives for the sake of their dear party toward the goal of ‘liberating’ [mukti ka lagi]

people from the shackles of tyranny, injustice, and all kinds of exploitation, relinquished their

political ‘home’. What kind of mukti and whose mukti these adivasi leaders might have imagined

for when they became ‘communists’ in the past. But this time, it was obvious that they

abandoned the CPN-UML because the UML went against the proposed 14 provinces model of

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‘identity based federal states’even if they were to be established as identity-based if only in

name.

Founding of New Parties amidst Identity Crisis

On November 22, 2012, these dissidents and others formed a new party called Sanghiya

Samajbadi Party Nepal (Federal Socialist Party Nepal- FSP) under the chairmanship of Ashok

Rai. Surprisingly enough, though interesting for further reflection, the word pahichan [identity]

was not in its name. Rather they chose the word samajbadi [socialist]. They seemed, however, to

have realized that the dream or imaginary of adivasi janajati mukti [liberation of adivasi janajti]

could not happen under the communist parties in the multi-cultural Nepal. This message was

reflected on FSP’s slogan:

“Sadhai ladyou aruko lagi .

Aba ladaun afnai lagi.”
[You] always fought for others.
Now you fight for yourself. (Rai 2012) [my translation].

This slogan certainly suggested that adivasi-janajati groups should engage in further

fighting for the liberation of their people. Three to four months into a party expansion campaign,

the FSP had created district and village committees in more than 65 districts in Nepal. The FSP

took part in the second Constituent Assembly election held on November 19, 2013. For the

FSP’s election campaign, new slogans were generated and new songs were composed in

dedication to adivasi identities:

मेट्न सक्दै नौ तिमीले हाम्रो पहहचान -Metna sakdainau timle hamro pahichan,
ढल्न हददै नौँ हामी हाम्रो स्वाभिमान- Dhalna didainau hami hamro swabhivman,
मूलबासी हौँ हामी, यो दे शको शान- Mulbasi haun hami yo desako san.

You cannot erase our identity,

We will not let our self-respect down,
We are the first settlers, we are this country’s dignity [my translation].

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 हाम्रै कााँधमा बन्दक
ु राखी सारा युध्द जित्यौ- Hamrai kandhma banduk rakhi sara
yudhda jityou
शासन सत्ता हाि पारी उल्टै हामीलाई लुट्यौ- Sashan satta hat pari ultai hamilai lutyou
रगिका आाँशु पपउाँ दै सहे का छौँ अपमान- Ragatka ansu piudai saheka chhaun apaman
हदनै परे हदन्छौँ अब आफ्नै लागग ज्यान- Dinai pare dinchhaun hami afnai lagi jyan
मेट्न सक्दै नौ तिभमले हाम्रो पहहचान- Metna sakdainau timile hamro pahichan.

You won the wars shooting guns from our shoulders;

Having taken over the rule, you looted us in return;
We have handled the insults by swallowing tears of blood;
We are ready to lay our lives for ourselves, in need.
(Rai 2012) [my translation].

Identity Based Parties are not Underachievers: Seeing Sociologically

Although the FSP leaders and cadres expected to garner 13 to 14 seats, they only secured

five seats in the second CA election. The fledgling party was only one year old in terms of

ideology, party organization, and action. A political party requires time to grow and expand

among the people. It might even take a few generations for a political party to be fully

incorporated into the hearts and minds of people. Their affiliation, loyalty, or affection to a

particular party is not merely a political issue in the villages of Nepal. Long-lasting affiliation

and trust to a party is like individuals and families accumulating social and symbolic capital.

Party loyalty is interconnected with social, economic as well as kinship relations. Switching to a

different party might impact an individual in terms of his other social, economic, and kinship

relations. Therefore, political loyalty to a party should be viewed in a holistic way.

Furthermore, why does a particular candidate lose an election? How shall we approach to

look into the election process in Nepal? David Holmberg, having observed the first CA election

in Nuwakot district, north-west of Kathmandu, writes: " [E]lections rests on three separate

principles: i) locality is important; ii) elections are best approached as a form of social

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production; and iii) they are complex (Holmberg 2009:11). In the rural villages of Nepal, voters

may have different motivations for casting their votes for certain candidates. Elections are not

much different from what one might call a ‘festival.’An election day is a festive occasion for

villagers, not simply a political action. Local people celebrate at the same time that they cast

their votes. Such leisure gatherings are rare as villagers’ lives are dominated by labor in their

fields. Women, in particular, dress in their nicest or newest clothes reserved for festive occasions

and take along some pocket money for purchasing treats at the shops. They walk to the voting

areas with their kith and kin. On the way, they are less likely to ask, “who are you going to vote

for?” than, “Who is likely to win”? The latter is the decisive question, particularly during

national level elections if not the local elections. They may comment, “I have known such and

such a candidatefor many years but I hear that s/he is not likely to win, so I am going to cast my

vote for another.” The implication here isthat the voter does not want to waste her vote on this

festive occasion. This voting behavior is perfectly rationalin village cultural logic for wasting

your vote on such an auspicious day is an “inauspicious act”. One would not want to waste one’s

auspicious vote and one wants to celebrate with the winners. This happens during the national

level elections.

The FSP could not win as many seats as expected by its leaders in the CA 2013. That was

understandable because of the sociological and cultural reasons described above. What is

important is that the founding of the FSP and Samajik Loktantrik Party (Social Democratic

Party-SDP)98 is aharbinger forthe futureof Nepali politics as it enters a new epoch.

The Constituent Assembly 2013

98
SDP was established in 2012 under the Chairmanship of Dr. Chaitanya Subba, a Limbu scholar and expert on
federalism in Nepalese context. A former CA member, and Chair of NEFIN, Pasang Sherpa,—who also abandoned
the CPN-UML—was the general secretary of the SDP. The SDP boycotted the Second CA election.

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 The CA election of 2013 was held on November 19, 2013. A total of 122 parties took

part in this election compared with 54 parties in 2008. A total of 30 parties were able to gain

seat/s to the assembly compared with only 25 in 2008. Out of the 30 parties, 10 parties garnered

only one seat each through the proportional electoral system. Similarly four parties secured two

seats each and other four parties garnered three seats each. The Bhaktapur-based Nepal Peasants

and Worker’s party garnered four seats while another two parties, the CPN-ML (distinct from

CPN-UML) and recently formed FSP, secured five seats each. madhesi identity based parties,

namely the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum Nepal, the Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party, and the

Sadbhavana Party won 10, 11 and six seats respectively. Similarly, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party

and the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum-Loktantrik secured 13 and 14 seats respectively. The

Nepali Congress party, and the CPN-UML were able to secure the largest and second largest

positions with 196 and 175 seats respectively. The CPN-Maoist, now hard-hit by a party split

and ideological issues, only procured 80 seats, dropping from 220 in the first CA and becoming

the third largest bloc. The Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal (National Democracy Party-RPP

Nepal), a staunch advocate for a Hindu state and return to monarchy, secured the fourth position

with 24 seats through the proportional electoral system (meaning they won no seats in the first-

past-the post contests), expanding their influence from four seats in the first CA. How was it

possible for the RPP-Nepal to garner that many seats through proportional system while not

winning even a single seat through first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system? In Kathmandu

district, the RPP-Nepal gained more votes than the Nepali Congress party in the proportional

electoral system

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 After the RPP-Nepal’s electoral success, one interpretation of their success was their

election slogan: ek bhot dai lai ek bhot gai lai99 [one vote for brother, one vote for cow].

“Brother” referred to the Nepal Congress and “Cow” referred to RPP. An alternate explanation

was that their success was a function of a backlash by high castes, a Hindu Bahunlash, against

the identity agenda of adivasi janajati political activists. RPP Nepal’s great comeback in the

second CA election was a parallel phenomenon of the sabotage of the first CA by the Nepali

Congress and the CPN-UML parties denying adivasi janajati aspirations. The Federal Limbuwan

State Council (Palungwa Group), which had boycotted the first CA, now took part in the election

but could not secure a single seat. Another party, the Federal Limbuwan State Council (Lingden

Group), affiliated with the FDNF, which had secured two seats in the first CA, boycotted the

election this time around.

Buoyed by their success beyond expectations, the Nepali Congress, the CPN UML, and

high caste scholars along with the major news media interpreted the election result as a defeat of

identity politics. The victors could be seen on TV and in the newspapers gloating over the

‘defeat’ of the parties who were said to have had ‘identity’ as their political agenda. The CPN-

Maoist were among the ‘losers’.

The Constituent Assembly was created to devise a long-term solution to the problems of

social exclusion and discrimination initiated by the State, including the question of liberating

adivasi janajati groups from the centuries old Hindu aryan domination. One of the main slogans

of the April Revolution was: “sambidhan sabha hamro nikas bindu ho” [constituent assembly is

the target point for solution]. Within two years after its election in November 2013, the CA

99
Dai (N) = brother. Sushil Koirala , the president of Nepali Congress, was called Sushil dai. In this, ‘one vote for
dai’ meant a vote for Nepali Congress. Similarly gai(N)= cow, was the election symbol for RPP Nepal. For CA
election, the voters cast votes on two different ballots: one for the FPTP candidate, and another for the proportional
electoral system.

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finally promulgated The Constitution of Nepal 2015 detailing only seven unnamed provinces.

This constitution did not provide rights to adivasi janajati or madhesi groups provoking

uprisings among the madhesis (that cost more than forty human lives) and among adivasi

janajatis groups including Limbus.

Figure 5.8 Joint Victory Rally in Tundikhel, Kathmandu. 2006

In July and August of 2015, just two months before the promulgation of the constitution,

the Limbuwan Study Center, a division of Chumlung, organized two interaction programs at

Chumlung’s central office in Kathmandu. These programs focused on creating an overview and

way forward for the Limbuwan’s movement in the face of a defiant three-party syndicate

governing Nepal. Past movements were assessed and strategies were questioned: Was peaceful

and open social movement an appropriate strategy for achieving Limbuwan or should a more

vigorous strategy be developed to achieve Limbuwan? Chumlung then formed yet another front

called Limbuwan Sangharsha Samiti [the Limbuwan Struggle Committee] charged with starting

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afresh the movement against a ‘regressive’ constitution that did not address issues of identity and

federalism.

The constituent assembly fulfilled the expectations of only half the population of Nepal

by completely failing to incorporate the expectations of adivasi janajati and madhesi populations

whose liberation [mukti] was long overdue. The history of the two constituent assemblies in

Nepal proved to be what Karl Marx, drawing on Hegel, characterized in this way:

[A]ll facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice.
He [Hegel] forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce (Marx 1964:15).

Nepal’s constituent assembly occurred twice, first as the tragedy of failure to recognize

adivasi-janajati and madhesi peoples and second as a farce in a return to a variant of the old

order of high caste domination. Limbu and Limbuwan were part of this encompassing process.

Now their agitation against a regressive constitution and an exclusionary state continues in new

forms.

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 CHAPTER SIX

THE CONSTITUTION OF NEPAL 2015: TRIUMPHANT ARYAN IDENTITY VERSUS

RESILIENT ADIVASI IDENTITY

The second Constituent Assembly (2013-2015) made the draft constitution public in July

2015. The draft included neither the Limbuwan state nor the number of federal states that the

Limbus had demanded. Rather, the draft included seven unnamed federal states and there was

also a possibility that the term “secular” would be replaced by “religious freedom” in the

constitution. Such an extreme deviation from the proposals of a “secular state” and identity based

models in the first CA to the unnamed provinces created confusion as well as frustration among

Limbuwan activists, scholars, lawyers, and Kirat Yakthung Chumlung’s (KYC) officials alike. In

this regard, the Limbuwan Study Center (LSC) organized a workshop entitled: masyouda

sambidhan ra Limbuwan ko andolan kata tira? [Draft constitution and where is the Limbuwan

movement heading?] on July 18, 2015. Among the participants of the workshop were Limbus

coming from different professions: Limbu CA members, teachers, students, Limbuwan activists,

government job retirees, the KYC as well as LSC officials and also non-Limbu sympathizers. I

also participated in the workshop as a member of the workshop organizing team as well as a

research student. In the workshop, the secretary of the Lawyers Association for Human Rights

for Indigenous Peoples (LAHURNIP), a staunch advocate for indigenous peoples’ rights and a

lawyer, Shankar Limbu, criticized the ruling political parties, which were dominant and decisive,

for the “regressive” draft from the vantage point of the collective identities and cultural rights of

adivasi-janajatis in Nepal. Shankar Limbu further said that the dominant parties might have

made public such a regressive draft based on regressive theories of constitution in their mind so

that the dominant parties could continue to control and rule over adivasi-janajatis. Limbu said

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that three approaches, namely a [Hindu] colonial legacy, [aryan] racial supremacy, and the

criminalization of adivasi-janajatis, could be in the dominant party leader’s mind when they

came up with the draft, which seemed regressive compared to the Interim Constitution 2007.

Shankar Limbu described the three approaches: a) the ruling parties might have thought to

maintain a colonial legacy through the new constitution, as the Hindu state of Nepal survived and

thrived while exploiting and marginalizing adivasi-janajti economies, cultures and politics under

the reign of the Hindu monarchical state, which is characterized by internal colonialism [gharelu

upanibes (N)] within the country; b) the ruling groups might have taken on racial supremacist

theory as the basis of the constitution. Insertion of the terms arya and sanatan in the constitution

to denote the Bahuns and Hindu religion respectively, and the cow as the national animal could

be seen as the ruling groups wanting to promulgate a constitution based on arya Hindu

supremacy in Nepal; c) there were many provisions in various articles in the proposed

constitution draft that seemed to have characterized adivasi-janajatis as “criminal” groups. In

this regard, Shankar Limbu presented an example from the British Indian rule that the then

colonial government had classified some tribal groups as “criminal” groups.

Another point discussed at the meeting was about the term “religious freedom” [dharmik

swatantrata (N)] alternatively proposed in the draft in place of the term “secular” [state]. During

the first CA’s tenure, it was well understood among Nepalis, let alone among adivasi-janajatis,

that the country would be declared a secular state, as in the Interim Constitution 2007. The CA’s

first meeting in 2008 had already declared it to be so. The rumor was that the dominant leaders

wanted to accommodate demands from the pro-Hindu, pro-monarchical part, the Rastriya

Prajatantra Party-Nepal (RPP-Nepal). Shankar Limbu and many other participants in the

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workshop said that the dominant parties floated the idea to replace “secular” with “religious

freedom” as part of a conspiracy to reverse the proposal of a secular state.

The Limbuwan Study Centre organized another workshop entitled: Limbuwan hijo aja a

bholi: Limbuwan prapti ko jukti [Limbuwan yesterday, today and tomorrow: the strategies for

achieving Limbuwan] on August 8, 2015 as a continuation of the program of July 18. The LSC

decided to hear from non-Limbu scholars about the draft constitution, with the main invitees

being Khagendra Sangraula (a writer), Yug Pathak (an author) and Anubhav Ajit (a civil society

activist). Khagendra Sangraula said:

The rights of the women, Dalits, madhesi, adivasi-janajati, and marginalized groups,
guaranteed by the interim constitution have been slashed in the draft constitution…The
only way to protect the rights of these various marginalized groups is through uniting the
dispersed strengths and straggled groups. Those groups oppressed by the state must unite
for the common causes…We cannot fight alone.

Sangraula reiterated that an alliance between the groups marginalized by the state is a historical

necessity. Similarly, Yug Pathak said:

Inside the CA is being staged a drama of drafting constitution. Having seen the drama so
far, the drama is slowly moving towards tragedy…In history, there have been efforts to
make a monolithic mono-cultural Nepal through imposition of various national symbols
such as cow, Nepali as the only official language as well as the only medium of
education, and Hindu domination. The rulers chose specific symbols in the name of
Nepali rastrabad (nationalism) in association with the King and his religion, lineage, and
agnates…if we really want to build rastrabad in a real sense, then all different cultural
groups’ rights must be equally institutionalized by the constitution.

Another speaker, Anubhav Ajit, a madhesi scholar and activist, said;

While talking about Limbuwan and federalism in Nepal, it is not about someone giving
Limbuwan and the Limbus receiving Limbuwan from others. Limbuwan should be more
of a claim than a demand or begging. It should be built by the Limbu themselves rather
than to be received from others. We will build Madhes and you will build Limbuwan,
within Nepal as of now.

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 The three speakers’ views above clearly indicated that Limbuwan was not going to

happen in the constitution. The speakers also suggested that the Limbus themselves needed to be

united and have alliances with other marginalized groups in order to stage further movements in

the future.

Locating Problems in the Constitution

Despite protests against the draft constitution all across Nepal mainly by the madhesis

and adivasi-janajatis, the new Constitution of Nepal was promulgated on September 3 2015.

Although boastfully touted and trumpeted by the ruling parties as “the best constitution in Asia”,

it provoked enormous protests and disobedience by agitating groups. The day on which the

constitution was promulgated is celebrated as Constitution Day, a national festival for the ruling

parties and those who welcomed and embraced the Constitution. The same day is considered as a

Black Day by adivasi and madhesi groups: with a slogan: asoj tin kalo din (Asoj 3/September 17

is the black day). The protests against the constitution occurred even abroad. For example,

Limbus burned the constitution in London, Hong Kong, and in the Gulf Countries too.

My focus in this chapter will be to interrogate the inclusion of three symbolic markers of

the Hindus in the constitution from an anthropological vantage point: a) the inclusion of the term

sanatan100 with reference to declaring Nepal a secular state; b) the declaration of the cow101 as

the national animal; and c) the use of the term arya102 referring to the Bahun caste. I will seek to

answer the question as to why collective identity is such an important and integral part of society

and why symbolic signifiers of collective identity are inalienable from a population group.

100
As mentioned in Article 4.
101
As mentioned in Article 9.
102
As mentioned in Article 84.

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The three symbolic signifiers are enshrined in the constitution as follows:

Article 4. State of Nepal: (1) Nepal is an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular,

inclusive, democratic, socialism-oriented, federal democratic republic state.
Explanation: For the purposes of this article, "secular" means religious, cultural
freedoms, including protection of religion, culture handed down from the time
immemorial.103
Article 9. National Anthem… (3) …[t]he Cow shall be the national animal…
Article 84. Composition of House of Representatives: … (2) The Federal law shall
provide that, in fielding candidacy by political parties for the election to the House of
Representatives under the proportional electoral system, representation shall be ensured
on the basis of a closed list also from women, Dalit, indigenous peoples, Khas Arya,
Madhesi, Tharu, Muslims and backward regions, on the basis of population.
Explanation: For the purpose of this clause, "khas Arya" means Kshetri, Brahmin,
Thakuri, Sanyasi (Dasnami) community.104

The terms sanatan dharma, aryans, and cow collectively embody the essence of Hindu

collective identity. The laws that ban cow slaughter and beef consumption — violations of which

are subject to 12 years of imprisonment—were consolidated during the early 19th century. But

these laws remain effective even today. Hindu King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the conqueror of

Nepal in the 18th century, had instructed that Nepal should be an asali Hindusthan [pure Hindu

land], arguably in contrast with the then Hindustan (India) of the south being polluted by the

Muslims and the European mlechchhas [foreigners]. In this regard, I argue that Nepal’s new

constitution fulfills P. N. Shah’s imagination to build Nepal as an asali Hindustan and further

denies the adivasi janajati [indigenous nationalities] peoples of their collective cultural identity.

James Dingley's conclusion of the review of the relationships between religion and national

identity exactly fits into the situation of Nepal. Dingley says "..religion has not gone away and in

many ways is just as prevalent today in influencing national identity as in the past, despite the

103
यस धाराको प्रयोजनको लागि "धर्मगनरपेक्ष" भन्नाले सनातनदे खि चगलआएको धर्म संस्क्रगिको संरक्षण लिायि धागर्मक,
सां खस्क्रगिक,स्विन्त्रिा सम्झनु पर्म ।

स्पष्टीकरण: यस उपधाराको प्रयोजनको लागि "िस आयम" भन्नाले क्षेत्री, ब्राम्हण, ठकुरी, सन्यासी
104

(दशनार्ी) सर्ुदाय सम्झनु पर्म ।

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popularity of the secularization thesis, although religion's overt presence, role and form may

have changed" (Dingley 2011:389). This situation is exactly what one can find in Nepal’s

constitution, if it is observed carefully. Juxtaposing between cow and pig as unique sacred

animals to the aryan- Hindu Bahun and to the Limbu non-aryan adivasi janajati, respectively, I

will showcase some cases of fundamental cultural differences between Hindu castes and the non-

Hindu adivasi-janajati cultures. I will also show the adivasi Limbu’s cultural capacity of

resilience and resistance to the Hindu state’s intervention upon their culture. Drawing on

ethnographic examples about the cow and pig in relation to how these animals are considered

differently sacred by Hindu Bahuns and the adivasi Limbus respectively, I will argue that the

new constitution of Nepal is exclusionary as it only enshrines the cow as sacred, thereby failing

to duly recognize the cultural diversity and differences of the country. Furthermore, the

constitution is also discriminatory—a result of which has been vehement protests and agitations

against it since its promulgation. If Nepal’s constitution is to be respected as a common “sacred

document” for all citizens, it has to embody the collective identities of all the different cultures

and communities inside Nepal.

The Secular State Qualified by Sanatan dharma

The term sanatan denotes nothing other than the Hindu religion. “Nepali Brihat

Sabdakos” [Nepali Advanced Dictionary] defines the word sanatan as: “i) eternal, ii) from the

time immemorial, iii) the name used to denote Bramha, Vishnu, Shiva, Laxmi, Durga, and

Saraswati. sanatan dharma means i) the religion prevalent among aryans from ancient times, ii)

current day Hindu religion as endorsed by veda, purana, tantra and idolatry” (Nepal Academy

2040 BS:1296). This word is included in the constitution for the first time in the country’s

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constitutional history. In other words, in the history of making of Nepal’s constitutions, the word

‘Hindu’ is replaced by the word ‘sanatan’ now. Although the literal meaning of sanatan is

‘eternal’ or ‘traditional’ the suggestive or substantive meaning of sanatan is Hindu religion as in

the meaning given by the Advanced Nepali Dictionary (2040 v.s.). Historian Baburam Acharya

prefers using sanatan over Hindu when comparing between the Hindu and Buddhist religions

(Bhandari 2031a v.s.:158). Other scholars define sanatan as a “more amorphous signifier of

Hinduism as a religion, distinct from other religions” (Zavos 2001:109). So symbolically as well

as semantically, Nepal is a ‘secular’ state with the constitutional recognition and protection of

the sanatan dharma, namely Hinduism. Looking at it the other way around, Nepal’s

constitution—in its symbolic kernel—is a Hindu constitution veiled in a secular garb. In its form,

the constitution looks to be secular but it is Hindu in its meaningful content.

Secularism: Multiple Understandings

In India “[s]ecularism emerged in the context of a secular colonial state that is

professedly neutral toward religious divisions in society. The British in India were deeply

concerned with projecting an image of transcendent neutrality. They were at least partially

successful in doing this, since Indians today often see dharma-nirapeksata, the indigenous term

indicating the neutrality of the state as a distinctive character of Indian civilization, rather than a

colonial invention. Sometimes for example, by Gandhi, this neutrality is more positively

interpreted as [sarba] dharma sambhava, the equal flourishing of all religions under the state’s

neutrality” (Van der Veer 2011:278–79). Gandhi’s interpretation of secularism seems to be

applicable in Nepal’s context too.

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 There are two understandings of dharma nirapekshya in Nepal in common parlance:

dharma nirapekshya rajya [secular state] is understood as ‘indifferent to religion’. In this regard,

dharma nirapekshya rajya means firstly, the state shall remain indifferent to religion. During the

workshops and seminars I attended on this topic in Kathmandu organized by the LSC some

Limbu scholars activists argued that ‘a state has no religion’ or that ‘there is no relationship

between state and religion’ therefore ‘the constitution must be silent about religion whatsoever’.

But those scholars and activists would resort to a ‘secular state’ as a practical solution to the

Hindu’s exploitation imposed upon Limbus when Nepal had been a Hindu state for more than

two centuries. Secondly, understanding of dharma nirapekshya rajya is there shall not be any

religion that prevails over other religions, meaning that all religions are equal. For the adivasi-

janajati Limbu, the latter part of the statement seems to be true considering their experiences of

Hindu domination. Limbuwan politician’s demand for a secular state may be viewed in the

context that the Hindu religion prospered in Nepal under the auspices of the state exploiting

other non-Hindu populations including the Limbus. So it is understandable that the Limbuwan

demand for a secular state in Nepal is intended to shake off the yoke of Hindu domination on the

one hand and also to bring to an end the country’s broader identity as a Hindu country on the

other. Social scientist Peter Berger says “secularization is the process by which sectors of society

and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Berger

1967:107). In contrast to Peter Berger’s statement, Nepal’s new constitution enshrines Hindu

religious symbols and identity as the dominant symbols to broadly identify Nepal as a Hindu-

dominated country.

Similarly, Vanaik states: “Further secularization means the further decline of religious

identity. This is both possible and desirable. Religion should become more privatized and

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religious affiliation more of an optional choice.” But Nepal’s new constitution has offered no

option for the adivasi-janajati Limbu apropos the prohibitions on cow/calf/ox slaughter and

eating beef. Given the fact that many individuals from adivasi-janajati, Muslims, Christians, and

Hindu Dalits are still facing court cases against cow/ox slaughter, Nepal has been declared a

secular state only in nominal form, with detrimental consequences on the day-to-day lives of

people. In this regard, Nepal cannot be anthropologically considered a secular state considering

the conflicting relationships between the state, ‘sacred cow’, and adivasi-janajati communities,

including the Limbu.

Michi Knecht and Jorg Feuchter write “Religion is back. At the turn of the new

millennium, swan songs of religious decline have given way to the rhetoric of religious returns”

(Knecht and Feuchter 2008:9). Nepal’s Tamang, Magar, and Gurung representative social

organizations lobbied and campaigned during the 2001 census for their respective peoples to

report to the census that their religion was Buddha dharma. Similarly, Limbus’ KYC, Rais’ Kirat

Rai Yayokkha (KRY) also printed leaflets, held many programs for campaigning among Limbus,

Rais, Sunuwars, and Yakhas in order to encourage their people to report their religion as ‘Kirat’

during the 2001 census. “Generally, the Rai organization Kirat Rai Yayokkha and the Limbu

organization Yakthung Chumlung have a strong normative power to propagate the particular

vision of their leaders” (Gaenszle 2016:332). Here an obvious question arises, how shall we

consider the notion of a secular state and demands to be formally recognized as belonging to a

different religion other than the Hindu, as logical given that such an understanding of secularism

is to remain indifferent from religion? On one hand, Nepal’s adivasi-janajati were demanding

for an inclusive democracy with their inclusion in a secular state while they were also

campaigning to classify their groups as belonging to a religion, different from that of the Hindu

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too. How do the Nepali adivasi-janajati movement for a secular state and their campaign for a

different religion help us redefine the concept of secular or secularism on the basis of local

understanding and practice? In this regard, Gellner and Letizia state: “Secularism…is a political

doctrine that implies the religious neutrality of the state, its protection of the religious freedom of

its citizens, and the equality of religions in the public sphere” (Gellner and Letizia 2016:13).

However, my problem here is not about discussing secularism and the characteristics of a secular

state in detail. Rather my question is to why were the dominant parties interested in inserting

sanatan dharma as the qualifier of the secular state of Nepal?

Aryans, the most Ancients in the Constitution

Aryans probably originated in Europe and entered the Gangetic plain before the 3rd

millennium BC (Acharya 2060 v.s.). The aryans roamed around Europe and Asia long before the

four fold Hindu varna system originated in India. Introducing the aryans, Pemble writes:

“The word ‘aryan’ was formerly used to designate the Sanskrit-speaking tribe or tribes
who, originating probably in eastern Europe, invaded India at the dawn of the recorded
history. It was devised by the distinguished orientalist Max Muller, from the Sanskrit
word arya, meaning ‘noble’, which the authors of the early Sanskrit epics used to
distinguish their own people from the darker indigenous inhabitants of north India. The
term never was universally accepted as an ethnological label, and since the Nazis
propagated the notion that the ‘aryans’ were a fair-haired, blue-eyed ‘master-race’ (it is
more likely that they were, in fact, Mediterranean or ‘Brown’ people) it has been
generally dropped. It is retained only to describe the group of languages (Iranian,
Sanskrit, and the descendants of Sanskrit, all forming a branch of the larger Indo-
European family) associated with the people in question” (Pemble 1971:4).

The Constitution has adopted the term ‘arya’105 denoting Bahun caste groups. For

example, under the Right to Social Justice (article 42), it says “…and indigent khas arya shall

105
Historian Baburam Acharya has described the aryans as a race. He has stated that the people of the
arya race (nasla) roamed between the Ganga and Volga rivers around the 3rd millennium BC. As one of
the offshoots from the then aryan race advanced to the Gangetic plain, they enslaved other non-aryans

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have the right to participate in the State bodies on the basis of an inclusive principle… For the

purpose of this clause, khas arya means Kshetri, Brahman, Thakuri, Sanyasi communities.” This

is how the Bahuns, anthropologically an ethnic category [jatiya], have been escalated to a

constitutional status. Prior to this constitution, only the King was said to be “a descendant of the

Great King Prithivi Naryan Shah and adherent of aryan Culture and Hindu religion” (The

Constitution of Nepal 1962). By this definition and constitutional arrangement, the Bahun jati

are constitutionally recognized as aryans, the most civilized and most ancient peoples of all.

Despite adivasi-janajatis strong movements for a secular state, why would dominant political

parties so dexterously write the constitution, which is obliquely seen as nothing less than a Hindu

constitution?

State Protection of Cows and Brahmans

Both in India and Nepal, Legal documents and scholarly writings show that the protection

of cows and Brahmans began to fulfill political purposes, particularly to propagate a primordial

Hindu identity, rather than to maintain religious sanctity. DN Jha writes:

The Sikh Kuka/Namdhari Movement in late 19th century used cows as a symbol for
mobilizing Hindus and Sikhs against the British who had allowed cow slaughter in the
Punjab. In 1882, Dayanand Saraswati founded the Cow Rakshini Sabha [Cow Protection
Society] and was successful in mobilizing a wide variety of people under this symbol,
which was mainly directed against the Muslims. From then onwards, the cow has become
an important factor in India’s communal politics…So cow killing, associated with many
Vedic sacrifices, tended to lose its importance over time. In the post-Mauryan and Gupta
periods and subsequent centuries, the Brahminical injunctions clearly discourage and
disapprove of cow slaughter. In the medieval period, we see it emerging as an emotive
symbol and, in the 19th century, it became a mark of Hindu identity. The aggressive
projection of Hindu identity has significantly influenced politics in India during the 20th

long before they created the fourfold varna system comprised of Brahman, Kshetriya, Viashya and Shudra
(Bhandari 2031b v.s.:198–199). Acharya’s description denotes the aryans as among the most ancient as
well as civilized humans.

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 century. With its increased belligerence now, it is playing a vicious role in contemporary
politics106 (Jha 2015).

Jha’s statements above show how the Hindus have gradually transformed cows from a

sacrificial animal to a symbolically charged political animal that signifies the Hindus’ collective

identity. This occurred first when used as the Hindus’ unifying symbol against the British, and

later when used against Muslims in Indian politics. Both cows and Brahmans were, by the same

token, protected as well as directed against the non-aryan and inferior caste populations in

Nepal.

Such a notion and practice of placing Brahman, Cow and King at the center of the social

cultural universe of a society started in Nepal ever since the four-fold varna system was

introduced during the reign of Jayasthiti Malla, who was said to have invited Brahmans from

South India to implement the caste system in the then Nepal in the late 14th century. His

NYAYAVIKASINI (MANAVANYAYASHASTRA), the volume of codes and legal injunctions states:

The king and Brahman are infinite for the human beings. The king is illustrious. The
Brahmans are sacred. As long as they do not deviate from their path it is not necessary to
provide directions to them, they should not be condemned because the king is illustrious
and the Brahmans is sacred (Nepal Law Commission n.d.:79).

In addition to placing the King and Brahman at the center of the socio-religious cosmology,
Jayasthiti Malla’s legal injunctions protected Brahmans at the expense of non-Brahman lives:
If a Kshetriya insults a Brahman by verbal abuse such a Kshatriya shall be liable to a fine
of One Hundred pana. If a Vaishya insults a Brahman in such a way he shall be liable to a
fine of one hundred fifty or Two Hundred Pana. If a Sudra insults a Brahman in such a
way, he shall receive the death penalty (Nepal Law Commission n.d.:74).

Jayasthiti Malla’s legal codes also favored and protected Brahmans economically:
One who finds any wealth buried [gaddhan] by somebody else; it should be deposited to
the state fund because all of the buried property and property from the mine goes to the
state treasury except the property of a Brahman (Nepal Law Commission n.d.:35).

106
http://www.dailyo.in/politics/dadri-murder-beef-ban-cow-slaughter-hinduism-islam-muslims-brahmans-british-
rule-mauryan-empire/story/1/6665.html (accessed: 10-26-2017)

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 As the saying goes: nyaya napaye Gorkha janu vidya napaye Kashi janu [go to Gorkha

for justice, and go to Kashi (Banaras) for knowledge]. The Gorkha kingdom during Ram Shah’s

(ca.1608-1636) reign was said to be the land of justice. But ironically of the total of 26 codes that

Ram Shah issued, code 12 was for protecting cows and Brahmans: “If cows and Brahmans can

not get enough to eat, it would be sinful to the king”107 (Nepal Law Commisson n.d.). One can

observe that both the cow and Bahuns were continuously favored by the state throughout the

Hindu state making process in Nepal. David Holmberg describes how the state protects both

Brahmans and cows while undermining Tamang identity. He states that “injunctions against

killing cows… had profound effects in the socio-economic practices of the dominant and

subordinated alike” (Holmberg 2006:31). Referring to the "87 cases of cow slaughter cases

registered from 1999 to 2003" he states that "this high number of cases demonstrates the

important place cows continue to play in the symbolic life of the law" (Holmberg 2006:41).

While the constitution of Nepal declared Nepal a secular state, one could count scores of arrests

against cow slaughter across the country as reported by local news sources in a span of eight to

nine months. Ironically such arrests were made while the CPN-Maoist (Center) was among the

ruling parties. CPN-Maoist cadres and militia butchered cow or ox during the jana yudhda

(1996- 2006) for feasting as well as in defiance of the purano satta [old regime] of the Hindu

state of Nepal. David Holmberg further writes "Maoist revolutionaries (Bahun no less)

slaughtered cows in an anti-Dashain spectacle and feasted on cow flesh in as emotively charged

a challenge to the old order that one could imagine" (Holmberg 2006:59). The question arises,

107
िौचर राषनु भन्या हुकुर् भयो िौ ब्राह्मणलाई षाना कन दु ;ु् ि हुन्र् र राजालाई प्रत्यवायलािर् भंना
गनगर्त्त िाउिाउर्ा गनकास पैसारको चल्दो गर्ल्दो पारी िौचर राषनु भंन्या गिगि बागध वक्सनु भयो
(www.lawcommissoin.gov.np)

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why did the Maoists, when in state power, vote for the cow as the national animal whereas they

butchered this animal during the jana yudhda?

It is not a mere coincidence that the cow, the aryans, and the sanatan dharma have been

enshrined in the constitution. By enshrining these three signifiers of the primordial Hindu

identity in the new constitution, the state of Nepal has fulfilled the dream of the King PN Shah to

build Nepal as an asali Hindusthan [true Hindu Land]. King Shah had instructed to his followers

during his final days in 1775, after capturing ‘the three cities of Nepal [tin sahar Nepal] the

Hindupati Raja (the Sen dynasty), the Kirata and the Limbu chiefdoms in the east.’

[i]f everyone is alert, this will be a true Hindustan of the four jats, greater or lesser, with
the thirty-six classes. Do not leave your ancient religion (Stiller 1968:44).

This is how he imagined as well as instructed his followers and descendants on how to build

asali Hindustan across the Himalayan foothills. After his death, it did not take too long before

his descendants issued royal orders to protect cows and injunctions against the consumption of

beef:

Limbu, Bhote, Lapche, Yakha, Lohar, Athpahar[e], Khamire and Khambu households in
the Chanipur region east of the Arun river and west of the Tista river, who took the flesh
of dead cattle as food, were each ordered to supply one piece of hide for manufacturing
scabbards and other equipment for the Gorakh Bux and Sheodal Companies (Regmi
1979:21).

Gurungs and Lamas in the regions east of the Trishuli river were granted exemption from
the obligations to supply hides and skins to the munitions factory when they promised to
join the army under Kaji Nayan Singh and proceed to the Kangra front in A.D. 1805,
respect Brahmans, and refrain from taking the flesh of dead cattle (Regmi 1979:22).

Although cow slaughter and beef consumption was banned, allowance to eat sino

[carrion] of cow, calf, oxen was allowed for those matawali [liquor drinking caste] in order that

they could supply hides necessary for the military. Since the Limbus inhabited the eastern-most

territory of the country - bordering with Sikkim (then an independent state), West Bengal of

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British India to the east and Tibet to the North – then they would have no reason to eat sino in

exchange for supplying hides to the government. In 1854, King Surendra consolidated otherwise

scattered legal arrangements and orders in the form of the Muluki Ain (Civil Code). Richard

Burghart summarizes the injunction on cow slaughter and capital punishment upon violation of

the injunction:

Persons who commit heinous crime of slaughtering oxen in a Hindu land shall be flayed
alive, impaled, or hanged upside down until dead. Their property shall be confiscated and
members of their families enslaved (Burghart 2008:196).

As recently as 1963, in addition to continuing with protection of cows the state made

amendments to certain clauses of the Muluki Ain (Civil Code), even protecting the Hindu

religion against other religions. For example, it states under Chapter 19, Adalko (on interchange):

Within Nepal, no one shall propagate Christianity, Islam faiths creating obstruction to the
religion prevailing among the Hindu caste. No one of the Hindu religion shall be taken to
the afore- mentioned faiths by converting their religion. Three years imprisonment, if
such an effort is made, and 6 years imprisonment if the effort to conversion is completed
(Nepal Law Commission 1963).

As the constitution of Nepal 1962 had declared the cow as the national animal, the

Muluki Ain 1963 amended some injunctions under the mahal [chapter] of Chaupaya ko [on

Quadrupeds]:

Cow and ox shall not be slaughtered for no reason. Even cannot be offered to the
divinities and deities. Punishment for killing cow or ox, 12 years. If anyone only
promises to kill cow or ox, six years imprisonment (Muluki Ain 1963).

It should be noted here that cow slaughter is not directly a crime because it is the national

animal but mainly because it is banned by the Country’s Code of Law. These two points, cow as

the national animal and the ban of cow or ox slaughter by the Muluki Ain are in direct

contradiction with the declaration of Nepal as a secular state. Such an antithetical legal

arrangement on cows in relation to the secular state has deeply polarized Nepali politics. In

215
addition to others, this is one reason that adivasi-janajati peoples have been vehemently

protesting against the constitution. Their movement for the secular state of Nepal could not be

meaningfully realized even in the “secular” state of Nepal, for which they started a movement

through an organized political party since the late 1980s. The adivasi-janajati fought for the

secular state with the thoughts and expectations that no citizen of Nepal should face a criminal

case for consuming beef or slaughtering cow/ox. Adivasi-Janajati politicians seemed to have

understood that the secular state meant ox slaughter and beef consumption would not be an

offense against the law as Nepal was declared both a secular and republic state in 2008 by the

Constituent Assembly. But arrests and court cases against ox slaughter continued even in the

aftermath of that declaration and continues even now after the promulgation of a new

constitution 2015. Such arrests and court cases have been reported from all over the country,

even from the Kathmandu valley, the capital city of Nepal. The aggression of police in such

cases is elevated to the extent that even the adivasi-janajati organization’s leaders, who inquire

about such arrests then get themselves arrested by the police.

In 2011, Bouddha (an area of Kathmandu dominated by Tamangs and Sherpas) police

arrested and put into custody three Tamang youths with the charge against cow slaughter. The

General Secretary of the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) went to the

police station to inquire about the case in detail, as the arrest was illegal in the understanding of

NEFIN. But the NEFIN general secretary himself ended up being arrested by the police there and

then, possibly after an exchange of some harsh words with the police.

In 2014, Nepal Police arrested Indra Bahadur Tamang from Sindhupalchok district.

Tamang was arrested in possession of 20 kilograms of beef, one Khukuri knife and one

saucepan. The police had raided the scene based on information given by an undisclosed

216
informant. The police had to use physical force including shooting a few blank gunshots to arrest

Tamang. Some others said to be involved in the incident reportedly fled the scene. Such arrests

have prompted number of questions about the status of cows as a sacred and protected animal in

a declared “secular” state. Now the questions are also directed towards high caste Bahuns and

Chhetris, who do not hesitate to eat beef in restaurants in Kathmandu or elsewhere in Nepal.

In this regard a new website published the following questions and comments after the

news of Indra Bahadur Tamang’s arrest:

i) Owners of five star hotels selling beef steak do not get arrested, but why are the
adivasi villagers arrested on the [false] charge of killing of cows when they have only
eaten the meat of a dead ox?
ii) Australia’s national animal is a kangaroo, but Australia has not banned kangaroo
meat. Tiger is the national animal of India, but tigers can be killed in the national
parks with hunting permission in India.
iii) Why has the state not yet repealed the old Civil Code’s cow and beef-eating related
arrangements while those arrangements directly contradict with the secular state, and
Nepal’s [interim] constitution?
iv) What if the endangered one-horned rhino was declared the national animal, thereby
repealing the status of the cow as the national animal?
v) For what reason should they declare the cow as the national animal while this will
have a detrimental impacts upon the cultures and food habits of Kirati, Muslim,
Christians, and Himalayan adivasi peoples?
vi) What if beef consumption and cow slaughter is banned only for the Hindu Arya and
Khas but not for others?
vii) Imprisoning adivasi-janajati against the charge of cow killing is a mockery of the
secular state so why are those who are in prison against the same charge not
amnestied?
viii) Why are those Arya and Khas friends - who eat the meat of cow and ox both in
Nepal and abroad -not protesting against the laws that prosecute the adivasi-janajati
against cow slaughter?” (Nepalisamachar.com 2014) [my translation]

The above questions clearly demand new legal arrangements suitable to the multicultural

Nepal. The identity of the state of Nepal must not be conceptualized and defined on the basis of

aryan civilization and Hindu monolithic logic. When even the Bahun and Chhetri have no

hesitation to consume beef and when high affluent class Bahun-owned restaurants serve beef

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even to their Nepali customers, then there is no reason to ban beef consumption in Nepal. In this

regard, former CA member Pasang Sherpa says:

Sherpa, Tamang, Bhote should have right to slaughter cows and eat beef. The state’s laws
which prohibit them from observing their customs and culture and the laws which
prosecute them for observing their rituals can not be considered as democratic, legitimate
and equitable.” Sherpa goes on to say that “in the first CA, we demanded for the right of
the adivasi-janajati that they should have right to eat cow meat, but the government tried
to table a bill that even prohibited beating a cow, let alone eating cow meat. After our
vehement protests, they put off that point. Even after Nepal has become a loktantrik
ganatantra [democratic republic] and secular state, the laws are still against the cultures
and customs of the adivasi-janajati. There should be laws that allow the Tamang, Sherpa,
Bhote communities to slaughter cows (Nepalisamachar.com 2014) [my translation].

The above cases are some testimonies of how people in the margins of the state have

organized political movements demanding for amendments in the laws so as to accommodate

their cultures and customs in the constitution, which have otherwise detrimental impacts upon

their lives. But how do the politicians who belong to the high caste ruling political parties

respond to this debate and their yearning to declare cow as the national animal? One of the

leaders of Nepali Congress, Krishna Sitaula, who often plays a decisive role in government, says:

As for the pro-Hindus, we have made the cow our national animal. Now, the animal has
constitutional protection and cow slaughter has also been banned. This provision had
been removed from the first CA but we brought it back (The Indian Express 2015).

The above statement by Krishna Sitaula clearly corroborates the reason behind the first

CA having failed to write the constitution. It is clearer when compared with the ex-CA member

Pasang Sherpa’s demand on adivasi-janajatis right to eat beef. Sitaula’s statement also indicates

the fact that first CA could not write the constitution because the adivasi-janajatis and madhesis

wanted to inscribe their collective cultural identity in the constitution. In addition, the adivasi-

janajati and madhesi caucuses held more than a two-thirds majority in the first CA. Had the first

CA decided to go for voting to pass the constitution, it would have passed their historical as well

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as collective identity-based names as proposed and desired by adivasi-janajati and madhesi

communities. The cow would not be the national animal. Perhaps fearing that the adivasi-

janajati and madhesis may inscribe and guarantee their collective identity-based rights in the

constitution the voting process in the first CA was avoided at any cost. This was done in the

name of ‘consensus’ among the major three political party leaders. In essence, by declaring the

cow as the national animal, the ruling caste fulfilled their desire to identify Nepal through the

dominant Hindu symbol, namely the cow. With the trinity of dominant Hindu symbols, namely

cow, sanatan dharma, and aryan race enshrined in it, the constitution symbolically signifies

Nepal as a Hindu country. This is how and why the constitution making process was orchestrated

to glorify the aryan Hindu identity while vilifying adivas-janajati collective identities. The

leaders of dominant political parties, who also belonged to the aryan race, formed a coterie for

‘consensus’, which has been proven to be politically damaging for adivasi-janajati peoples. This

is the context one should have in perspective in order to look into the adivasi-janajati protest

against the constitution of Nepal.

The leaders of the three major parties forged an alliance - irrespective of their ideological

differences - against the adivasi-janajti and the madhesis so as to enshrine their own collective

identity in the constitution. The polar ideological differences of the three major parties— Nepali

Congress (rightist social democratic), CPN-UML (centrist socialist communist), and CPN-

Maoist (ultra-leftist, Maoist)—became assimilated into each others’ common interest of aryan-

Brahamanist identity as all these three parties leadership tiers were comprised of an

overwhelming majority of Bahuns, also known as aryans. Acclaimed writer Manjushree Thapa

succinctly describes the domination of the Bahuns and Chhetris in Nepal:

Brahmins and Kshatriyas — called Bahuns and Chhetris in Nepal — occupy almost all
national space. This is a glaring, undeniable fact and it holds true for all the political

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 parties (including the Maoists), every media house, the entire private and NGO sectors,
and the vast informal networks of power — including the well-heeled of Kathmandu who
exert immense influence over confused donors and ambassadors (Thapa 2012).

The Brahmans, who remained as advisors to the royal court and the king seemed to have

used the cow as a shield to protect themselves from any kind of undesired consequences upon

their lives or as a means to benefit themselves in every possible way: politically, economically,

culturally, religiously.

Incidents of slaughtering an ox, calf for the ritual and meat purpose have been increased

in Nepal after the April Revolution, particularly after the abolition of Monarchy and declaration

of Nepal as a secular Republic in 2008. Even during the Maoist Insurgency for 10 years from

1996-2006, the insurgents were often reported to have slaughtered ox for meat as well as for

excoriating the state (Holmberg 2006) despite the escalating arrests and court cases for such

“offenses”. Many people are behind the bars for this “crime”. The state machinery have their

own interpretation. Why would particularly adivasi janajati have started slaughtering ox during

different rituals particularly after the abolition of monarchy and declaration of Nepal as a secular

state. My hunch is that it is not because they were craving for beef for so long for more than two

centuries but they do so as to express their resentment against the state. Is beef eating prohibited

in a Hindu society because the cow is a national animal? Or there is political reason behind it. I

argue that in Nepal the cow is a political animal.

Now one can say that Nepal as a secular country has nothing to do with prohibition of

eating beef. Just declaring an animal the national animal shall not be a reason why the state shall

have injunctions on eating beef. This is a dubious and ambivalent point on behalf of the state.

The term ‘state’ shall not be understood as an abstract entity without any motivation and

interests.

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 There does not seem a logical plausible reason that one must avoid eating beef just

because the cow is a national animal? The Phillipines’ national animal is water buffalo like

animal called the carabao (not so different from water buffalos in Nepal), which is raised for

hide, milk, meat. But why does the cow as national animal have to be considered completely

differently from other animals, even in Nepal? There are so many other things that are declared

to be national symbols: dress, hat, color, national bird, and national flower for which the

constitution and civil code are quiet. One wears the national dress, national hat, speaks the

national language, and people get smeared with red color powder on their success and

achievements as one could see during the elections and other such occasions in Nepal. The

‘national language’ Khas-Nepali is imposed to be spoken by everyone. Why we do have

different standards for taking on and accepting these national symbols, including the cow as the

most sacred and others with different purposes? The notion of ‘nation’ or national has been

supported by the term Hindu. Nepali societies were unsuccessfully planned and designed as a

single Hindu nation, a nation that was the Hindu culture and the way of life of high caste Hindus.

So the ruling caste imposed their own ways of life upon the cultures and ways of the lives of the

‘others’ as well. The animal that the ruling caste ‘worshipped’, the costume and color that they

liked, the language they spoke, the religion their lives and society were made meaningful and

were legally imposed upon others and legally demanded such liking from all ‘others’ as well.

Legal arrangements were designed in such a way that the offenders could be punished

accordingly. So the making of Nepal as a nation in the past was the making of a Hindu Nation of

Nepal, as PN Shah the ‘unifier’ and the ‘father’ of Nepal for the high caste Hindu Hill people,

and a conqueror for the adivasi-janajati and madhesi communities, said in his dibyopadesh

[noble instructions] “yo asli Hindustan ho” [this is original Hindusthan]. To make Nepal an “asli

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Hindustan” may not be a religious project but it may be a political project. Since the old and real

‘Hindustan’ all across the Indo-Gangetic plain no longer remained as pure and pristine after the

Muslim entry into South Asia and the occupation by foreigners. In this context, it is quite

understandable that King PN Shah would have liked to build an “asli Hindustan” [original

Hindustan] across the Himalayan foothills, which would remain untouched and undefiled by

‘others’. King PN Shah in fact did not let any Christians into Nepal during his reign. I argue that

the Hindu ruling caste groups even today are so preoccupied with the notion of asli Hindusthan

that the cow as the national animal in the most recent constitution of Nepal is not a new idea but

a continuation of the political project of ‘asli Hindustan’ strategically designed by the King of

Gorkha in the second half of the 18th century and expanded across the Himalayan foothills

through conquest.

Father Giuseppe, who was in Nepal during the invasion of Nepal wrote in 1799 "... the

Brahmens..is the same as is followed in Hindustan, with the difference that in Hindustan, the

Hindus being mixed with the Mohammdans, their religion also abounds with many prejudices,

and is not strictly observed; whereas in Nepal, where there are no Muselmans (except one

Cashmirian merchant) the Hindu religion is practiced in its greatest purity" (Giuseppe

1799:310).

This is the context in which Nepali politicians are likely to perceive Nepali national

culture and the Nepali nation. It is absolutely with reference to the past Hindu culture and Hindu

nation, even in the guise of the secular state of Nepal. The Nepali national symbol after Nepal is

no longer the Hindu Kingdom, or Hindu Nation. So the old Hindu identity now is understood and

imposed in new ways, namely through the Nepali identity. So the Nepali nation is nothing

different from the Hindu nation.

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The Politics of Sacred Cow versus the Culture of Sacred Pig

The notion of sacredness emanating from the cow for the Nepali Hindu ruling caste shall

be more meaningful and interesting if we look at the term from a political angle. It will be clearer

if we compare the Limbus’ notion of a sacred pig and the Hindu high caste notions of a sacred

cow. Limbus raise pigs and, if seen from a materialist point of view, pork is the most valued food

delicacy that a Limbu would crave for. It would be impossible to find a Limbu household with

no pigsty and no chicken coop in the backyard or the front yard. Any Limbu who has maintained

a Limbu religious and cultural ethos would not slaughter a pig by himself/herself because it is

believed that the pig belongs to a deity and divinity.

Limbus believe that humans were the last creations after all other lives made by the

Tagera Ningwafumang Yuma in this earth. In this respect, pigs are older than humans. But

humans domesticated pigs. Since both humans and pigs were created by Yuma Limbus believed

that pigs were owned by Yuma, hence they began to beg to Yuma before they butchered pigs for

meat. Similarly, when a sow gives piglets, they compulsorily spare one or two piglets in the

name of Yuma, only to be offered to the Yuma mang [divinity], later through a ritual. This could

be one reason that Limbus started doing pooja [worship] before butchering a pig. Another story

is that during the hunter-gathering days when Limbus had not started a sedentary life, pigs

guided them through the forests and the places in search of water. After domestication, pigs

would go out to graze and would come back home smeared with mud-water. Humans would

follow the pig the next time in order to locate the water pond. If the place with an availability of

water was inhabitable, humans would settle in that new place. In those days, particularly Yoppa

[boar] would guide humans through forests. It is also said that yakthumbas [Limbus] used to

have pig-herds in ancient times. They used to shift their settlements and bring along the pigs. As

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the aryans (newcomers) encountered the Limbu pig-herders, living a different life, and speaking

a different language, the aryans called them Kirat, then a derogatory term that reverberated in

meaning as an ‘uncivilized’ barbarous and violent group. Limbu scholars now believe that ‘kirat’

is a disparaging term.

Another interpretation of why Limbus worship pigs is that the Limbus butcher pigs only

after propitiating two divinities, namely Him Sammang [home divinity] and the supreme divinity

called Yuma Sammang, who is said to have created both the earth and all creators including the

humans in this earth. As the pooja begins, the phedangma [Limbu priest] propitiates the divinity,

the spear on the altar, and the phedangma asks for permission from the divinity to use that

weapon for killing the pig:

We were raising your pig, now for such and such reasons we needed to slaughter this
pig. Please forgive us for not being able to keep this animal any longer, and please do
not inflict any problem upon us.
The pig is always speared through the underarm in order to strike the heart and lungs.

After killing the pig, the spear is brought back to the altar, placed with the spear side up with a

banana leaf tied to it. The butchered pig’s stomach lining fat is placed on the altar covering the

urn vase with flowers. There are different ways to offer raw, cooked, and smoked meats to the

divinity. After the offering is finished, the phedangma says ‘we offered you the pig already, now

these starving humans also want to eat some left over meats, as your ‘prasad’ [religious

offering].

The true owner of the pig being raised in ones’ pigsty is a deity so it would be an utter

violation of cultural rule to slaughter a pig without the permission of the ‘owner’. A pig is both

sacred and sacrificial for the Limbus. There is no logical ambivalence in the relationship between

the Limbus and the sacred pig. In rural Limbuwan, I have not seen any Limbu house without a

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pigsty. Limbu society as a whole comprises hundreds of different clans. Certain clans avoid

certain animal meat. For example, the Angbuhang clan does not eat pork but one may still find a

pigsty in an Angbuhang house as well for the wife’s or daughter-in-law side brings along her

own maternal divinity. There are other Limbu clans that avoid other animals, such as the Khewa

clan that avoids chicken, and the Yonghang clan that avoids goat meat. Each clan has their own

mythical stories explaining the avoidance relationship with certain animals.

Pigs and pigsties look dirty and defiling from the material health and hygiene point of

views. Christian biblical writings classify 'swine as defiling and impure’ "because it parts the

hoof but does not chew the cud, it is unclean for you. Their flesh you shall not eat, and their

carcasses you shall not touch" (Douglas,1992, p. 42). In Nepal too, both pig and pork are

polluting to the Bahuns, traditionally. A Bahun shall neither touch a pig nor consume pork. For a

Bahun a pig is unclean, thus untouchable as well as inedible. The old civil code (1854)

prohibited Bahuns from consuming pork and drinking alcohol. There is a stark difference

between a cow as ‘sacred’ for Hindus and a pig as sacred for Limbus. The cow is sacred but not

sacrificial for the Hindus whereas a pig is both sacred and sacrificial for Limbus. A cow is sacred

but beef must not be consumed. In Christian writings what is unclean is abominable, while what

is clean is consumable. From the Limbu cultural vantage point a pig is pure, untouched, clean

and undefiled. Pigs are not supposed to be kicked or beaten because the true owner might get

angry and inflict sickness upon human’s physical body. There are sociological relationships

between the Limbus and their divinities as the true owner of pig. The divinities inhabit nearby

forests, hills, the fields, the huge chestnut tree, and nearby natural water springs. Worshipping all

of these, for Limbus, is to worship the land, the nature, and the territory. For a Limbu woman, a

pig is sacred and almost at the level of divinity so that when she is sick or has a fever and

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headache, she may ask: “did anyone kick or beat the pig today? I am not feeling well. Would any

one go and bring the phedangma108?” So a Limbu woman has enormous faith on her deities and

divinities superimposed upon the pig she raises. Then what would she think about the cow in

relation to the idea of sacredness and faith? Her understanding towards a cow may be indifferent.

For her a cow is neither sacred nor profane. A cow is simply a useful animal, for milk, manure

and, even better if the cow gives birth to oxen. But what about eating beef? She would never ever

eat beef, nor even taste. Why? A Limbu woman cannot even think of eating beef, not because it

is sinful to eat the meat of a sacred and mother goddess cow, but because it is disgusting and

abominable. Here we get into the differences between the injunction made by the Hindu state and

how a non-Hindu adivasi-janajati perceives the state’s order and legal arrangements. The Hindu

state may have ordered its subjects to worship the cow as the mother goddess, not to slaughter

cows, and to refrain from eating beef because it would be utterly sinful to eat the meat of the

mother goddess. But the state injunction is perceived in adivasi-janajati’s own cultural context,

which looks to be the opposite of and in contrast to the state’s injunction. I argue here that the

cow is neither a sacred nor a national animal for for the Limbus. Rather, studies from the 19th

century report that Limbus sacrificed and consumed beef:

[T]he Limbus of Darjeeling make small offerings of grain, vegetables, and sugar-cane,
and sacrifice cows, pigs, fowls, &c., on the declared principle “the life breath to the gods,
the flesh to ourselves.” It seems likely that such meaning may largely explain the
sacrificial practices of other religions…in conjunction with these accounts, the
unequivocal meaning of funeral sacrifices (Tylor 1874:392).

The case example of from the Limbu society today, and the testimony from the past that

they sacrificed and consumed cow meat demonstrate that by constitutionally declaring the cow

as the national animal, the castiest state of Nepal has once again inflicted the aryan Hindu

symbolic domination upon the lives of the Limbus. Interestingly for the Bahuns, the cow is

108
Limbu ritual performer and a healer

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sacred but not sacrificial. An obvious concern arises: did the ancestors of present day Bahuns—

aryans—never eat beef? BR Ambedkar, refering to the Rig Veda, writes in his essay entitled Did

Hindus Never Eat Beef ?:

That the Aryans of the Rig Veda did kill cows for purposes of food and ate beef is
abundantly clear from the Rig Veda itself. In Rig Veda (X. 86.14) Indra says: ‘They cook
for one 15 plus twenty oxen". The Rig Veda (X.91.14) says that for Agni were sacrificed
horses, bulls, oxen, barren cows and rams. From the Rig Veda (X.72.6) it appears that the
cow was killed with a sword or axe (Ambedkar, 2015).109

BR Ambedkar further states that the aryans slaughtered cows, and consumed beef even

much later than the period of the Rig Veda:

That the Hindus at one time did kill cows and did eat beef is proved abundantly by the
description of the Yajnas given in the Buddhist Sutras which relate to periods much later
than the Vedas and the Brahmanas. The scale on which the slaughter of cows and animals
took place was colossal. It is not possible to give a total of such slaughter on all accounts
committed by the Brahmins in the name of religion (Ambedkar 2015).

Considering Ambedkar’s statementments above, it is clear that the Hindus had a different

project, other than religious and cultural aims, when they gradually stopped sacrificing cows as

DN Jha writes in his thought-provoking book, The Myth of the Holy Cow:

For over a century the sanctity of the Indian cow has been more than a matter of
academic debate—communalist Hindus and their fundamentalist organizations have
repeatedly attempted to force it into the political arena (Jha 2002: ix).

The above writings about ancient India in relationship to the cow and the Hindus show

that the reasons behind the state’s protection against cow slaughter lay in state politics rather

than religious sanctity.

But Limbu culture is defiant and resilient. Limbus have defended their culture and unique

collective identity by using the pig and pork as symbolic items to deride the aryan Hindu culture

and constitution. Furthermore such a cow-based nationalism is hollow and a hoax in a

109
http://www.countercurrents.org/ambedkar050315.htm (accesed: 2016-10-26)

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multicultural society like Nepal. The perception and practice of nationalism in Nepal differs in

similar ways as to how ideas about the ‘sacred cow’ and ‘beef avoidance’ are perceived and

practiced differently in different sociological and cultural contexts. Limbus celebrate the Dasain

festival with extravagant consumption of pork and alcohol, even by gifting a large quantity of

pork and alcohol to the wife-giver families. What does it mean in an anthropological sense when

Limbus consume plenty of pork and liquor, which are otherwise prohibited for Bahuns, during

the Hindu Dashain festival? This may be a Limbu way of mocking a Hindu festival.

Social Discrimination and Legal Arrangements

Mara Malagodi states:

It seems clear, however, that even after 1990 Nepal’s juridical order maintained the
privileged position of Hinduism. The enduring constitutional ban on ‘causing others to
change their religion’ was still designed to protect Hinduism from other
religions…Another issue that has been deemed discriminatory towards non-Hindus and
Dalits in Nepal has been the criminalization of cow slaughter (Malagodi 2013:240–241).

When we talk about discrimination, even the Bahuns were also discriminated against by

the Muluki Ain 1854. The Muluki Ain prohibited Bahuns from consuming pork, and drinking

alcohol. But they gradually repealed those arrangements or they started drinking alcohol and

consuming pork in private. But I have not heard or read news about a Bahun being arrested for

violating this prohibition, whereas beef-eating is still strictly prohibited and may result in severe

punishment.

Alcohol drinking is sinful for the high caste Bahun and Chhetri as prohibited by the law

of the land. “In the classic Indian sources, since the time of the Vedas, alcohol drinking had been

regarded as one of the greatest sins and as unanimously condemned as the murdering of a

Brahmin” (Kane, 1953 quoted in Hofer, 2004:18).

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 Figure 6.1 Placard Slogan Reads: Discard the Cow as the Ntional Animal

Now there is no legal punishment for high caste Chhetri and Bahuns for violating the

legal code about drinking liquor and consuming pork. The prohibitions in relation to Bahuns

have been abolished and amended. BP Upreti observed about 5 decades ago:

The most astounding change in Brahmin commensal practices he observed was the liquor
drinking habit of Brahmin youths in his field area as well as the rest of Nepal. Previously
consumption of liquor of any kind was considered a 'Sin" and ritually polluting to a
Brahmin. In 1972 all Brahmin as well as other high caste Hindu boys of above age 18 had
either tried rakshi or were regular visitors to a local bar [bhatti] (Upreti 1975:238).

BP Upreti also states that the Bahuns in this study area claimed to have made the Limbus

civilized:

Some of the Brahmin even claimed that the Limbu were beef-eaters before their arrival
and that their company and influence "sanitized" and "civilized" the Limbus. Brahmins
refrained from drinking alcoholic beverages [rakshi]; this abstinence was probably the

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 source of greatest pride in the Brahmin religious life. But liquor [rakshi] and beer [jad]
constituted an integral part of Limbu social life. ... One of the aspects of Limbu social life
most disliked by the Brahmin was the killing of a buffalo during a Limbu mortuary ritual
(Upreti 1975:143).

Cow as a national animal is so powerfully presented as to be “sacred” and the national

animal is only meaningful in its political connotation through which the Hindu high caste ruling

groups maintain and continue their domination over others. It is through this recognition that the

high caste Hindu rulers alone are the builders of this country. But I have no hesitation to mention

here that those advocating for the cow as the national animal might still crave to eat beef at the

five star restaurants in Kathmandu or when they travel abroad. These opportunistic beef-eaters

are “against beef” only to maintain the ancient Hindu domination in Nepal as the saying goes:

dhanilai chain, gariblai ain [rules for the poor, entertainment for the rich]. Hence, cow as the

national animal and the prohibition of beef-eating in the legal code only replicates the above

proverb that consuming beef is a delicacy for the ruler castes while it is a punishment for the

ruled caste. To paraphrase Marx here in Nepal’s case, the ruling caste produces only the ruling

ideas and strategies. So cow as the national animal is not only the medium through which Hindu

domination is maintained but the national animal also masks ambiguous characteristics of the

ruling castes in Nepal.

For a common Nepali Hindu family or community, to observe Hindu rituals can be

financially both burdensome and even cheap for the same ritual. I have observed time and again

in my neighbor community some rituals held at different households. There are certain rituals in

which the person who is holding the ritual has to gift away a she-calf to the Bahun priest. Since it

is so expensive to give away a live cow, they find an easy solution by giving away a coin (minted

in aluminum or copper) with an image of a cow printed in it. Since it is symbolically a cow, one

cannot simply toss away the coin towards the priest, the priest asks the novice to lead the “cow”

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towards him. Hindu religion is adaptive to a situation like this but the high caste Hindu rulers do

not seem to be prepared to adapt to the multicultural reality of Nepal.

An All-Inclusive Constitution is Possible

How could the Constitution be made acceptable to all and embody such features that even

the adivasi-janajati may feel ownership of it and access? For this and also for the inclusive

democratic constitution, every community and culture’s unique collective identity and their

national symbol, if only in one word or one sentence, must be enshrined in the constitution. I

believe that this will make the adivasi-janajati feel that they also own the constitution as their

collective identity national identity would be inscribed in it, irrespective of the number of caste

or ethnic groups. Just like the Hindu high caste groups, even the adivasi-janajati deserve due

respect and recognition by the constitution. When the adivasi-janajati see their collective names

and history enshrined in the constitution they will protect and worship the constitution as the

bearer, protector and legal recognizance of their identity. For this to happen the state makers, or

the ruling caste themselves must come forward and prepare themselves to amend it.

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 Figure 6.2 Placard Held High with a Message: Victory to Secular State of Nepal

Conclusion

In Nepal, it seems that one cannot escape his/her ancestral identity, as the data shows –

why should the Maoist Party - whose cadres and leaders, irrespective of their caste background,

slaughtered cow oxen for feasts during the war - have declared cow as the national animal when

in power ironically when making the Naya Nepal [new Nepal]. It is because of their ancestral

identity as the Bahuns, the protectors of cow. For whatever reason the constitution has adopted

cow, sanatan dharma and aryan race. It has therefore created symbolic domination and

hegemony of the Hindu arya civilization over other non-aryans. And it is also to maintain the

legacy of the King PN Shah’s instructions.

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 The Limbu social symbolic relationships with pigs and their anthropologically indifferent

relationship to cows shows that the cow is not, culturally, a national animal for the Limbus. The

cow has merely an economic value for the Limbus. Therefore the cow does not represent the

Limbus primordial identity. It does not mean that we should propose a pig as the national animal

for the Limbus. I argue that the cow is the national animal only for the Hindus meaning that

declaring the cow the national animal will reflect the “only Hindu” mono-cultural mindset of the

leaders of the dominant parties. Consequently the constitution has failed to embrace the

country’s multi-religious, multi-cultural reality. In this regard, how long will the mono-cultural

constitution of Nepal last politically? Upendra Yadav, the Chairman of the Federal Democratic

Forum (FDF) party and a madhesi leader, in support of the no-confidence motion against the

then CPN-UML government said in July 2016:

The Ranas promulgated a constitution [in 1948] that did not even last for two and a half
years, then the NC, the King, and the Ranas together promulgated a constitution that too
could not last for 6-7 years, then the King alone promulgated one that only lasted for 30
years [1960-1990]. Then the NC, Leftist Front, and the King promulgated one in 1990,
touting that that was among the best constitutions in the world but one of the leftist
parties themselves started the peoples’ war to overthrow both the constitution and the
monarchy since 1996, which ended in 2006.
This constitution was promulgated without consulting the agitating political parties and
forcefully imposed upon the madhesi and advasi-janajatis, despite their vehement
protests. This constitution has been stained by the blood of Madheshis.110 Although we
are in the parliament but we are not here to accept this naslabadi [racist] constitution.
This constitution did not guarantee the rights of madhesi, adivasi-janajti, Dalits, Khas,
and other marginalized groups. That is why we staged movements, in which the state shot
dead 58 peoples including a four year old child. I would call such a heinous act of the
government genocide of the madhesi peoples. Racism has become dominant in this
constitution. Those who have insulted madhesi and adivasi-janajatis, and are not
prepared to accept madhesi and adivasi-janajati identity have become dominant in this
constitution.111

110
He was referring to the 58 peoples killed by the state in the Madhes movement during the promulgation of the
constitution.
111
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6AUfXtH8Avw (accessed: 8-6-2016)

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 Upendra Yadav questioned both the legitimacy and the possible longevity of the

constitution in the face of its exclusionary as well as discriminatory provisions against madhesi

and adivasi-janajati people.

It is said that the constitution is the most sacred document of the modern democratic

society (Godelier 2009; Godelier 1999). Every community and cultural group must feel

ownership of and respect to the constitution. In Nepal, the ruling caste made the constitution a

sacred document only for themselves. Hence the adivasi non-aryan Limbus felt excluded from

the inclusive democratic vantage point. Guaranteeing the fundamental individual rights - free

speech, free movement, free to earn property - all matter to Limbus too but what seems to matter

even more is Limbuwan named in the constitution for which their ancestors consecrated their

lives defending their territory during the Gorkha conquest. Inscribing Limbuwan in the

constitution seems to be of value to the Limbus more than others as only after the province’s

name is in the constitution will be there be real recognition of Limbu historical identity [aitihasik

pahichan]. Only with this step might Limbus feel that they are also included in and recognized

by the constitution.

It seems that cow is declared a national animal by the state for 'othering' the 'enemies'

(Holmberg, 2006) of the state and also to hold the giriraj [mountain kingdom] under the purview

of aryan civilization. If the state-makers think that the constitution, the sacred document, must

remain pure and undefiled by the 'demonic' asura adivasi-janajati others, then this creates two

problems: on the one hand, the 'others' become excluded and marginalized from the constitution,

which would only mock the 'inclusive democracy' that the current state of Nepal brags about. But

also such an 'othering' places those with lower cultural status in the hierarchy on the other,

meaning that the ruling caste are constitutionally civilized groups and that the 'others' are the

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'uncivilized' groups. But for a solution, the state must go beyond this conceptualization of the

state as necessarily comprised of 'uncivilized' and 'civilized' societies. The state should move

beyond a monolithic conceptualization that some specific signifiers - the cow - in this reference -

truly represent the cultural and national diversity and stark realities of Nepal. The rulers should

go beyond the imagination that a state builds on the foundation of dividing cultures into Self

versus others, as the Muluki Ain [Act of the Land] did in 1854 by creating a high caste tagadhari

‘self’ and lowly matawali [liquor drinkers] ‘other’ together with the ‘other’ ‘untouchables caste.

Furthermore the Nepalese constitution makers should go beyond the understanding that a

society is composed of chokho jat [pure castes] and jutho jat [polluting castes]. These all are

hierarchically modeled and imagined frames of the state. But is it possible to go beyond such a

monolithic, mono-cultural as well as vertically hierarchized conceptualization of the state and

societies? Indeed anthropologists have proposed such a conceptualization, which looks both

relevant and essential in Nepal’s case. The state makers or the ruling caste should change their

imagination of the state, what it should look like, and how a state based on cultural equality can

be founded in New Nepal. Anthropologist Terence Turner argues for “synchronic pluralism”

(Turner 2004:197), that all societies and cultures exist side by side in contemporaneously-

spatially-distributed patterns.

In an inclusive democracy, if you truly believe that the constitution is the most sacred

document shared by every different culture and community in the country, the constitution

should respect the history of the adivasi non-aryans too, and therefore recognize their identity.

Eulogizing Hindu aryan history alone is not what the adivasi fought for when overthrowing the

Rana regime – or during the Nepali Congress’s armed rebellion against the Panchayat regime, or

during the Communists’ underground politics in the 1970 and 1980s – or during the jana

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andolan I in the 1990s and, most importantly, during the People’s War of which the adivasi were

no less important in strength than those of other forces in overthrowing the monarchy. A stark

question could be raised now in the wake of the constitution being promulgated, which really

enshrined the primordial identity of the Hindu. For what rights and for whom did the adivasi-

janajati fight against in every political revolution or movement from the 1950s until today?

The Limbus were expecting that New Nepal’s new Constitution would recognize their

ancestral history too but their hopes were shattered. The new constitution has left no stone

unturned in order to fulfill the project of asli Hindusthan, contrary to the inclusive democratic

state. The new Nepali state yet again marginalizes and excludes adivasi communities from

recognition of their collective identity. In this sense, from the vantage point of adivasi-janajati

identity the Constitution of Nepal 2015 is yet another mockery of inclusive democracy.

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 CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

Our Limbuwan is dear to us

Our beloved Limbuwan is adorable to us.

Raising soil-clenched fist, we sacrifice our lives,
Our Limbuwan is adorable to us.
Carrying along Chest-filled pride of history,
Prepared for oblation; we, the archers,
Our pride is high like Faktanglung.
Our Limbuwan is adorable to us.
We have been fighting and fighting; we will fight again;
Following the foot steps of Kangsore, we march ahead.
Founding our own Identity,
Our Limbuwan is adorable to us112
(Rajkumar Dikpal) [my translation].

The Cultural Foundations of Limbuwan

The politics of Limbuwan is a culturally founded politics. It is in the imagination of

individual Limbus. It is popular among Limbus not just because Limbuwan based political

parties have the strength and capacity to convince individual Limbus to join them but because

Limbuwan is the Limbus ancestral asset, the essence of their own identity. Limbuwan based

political parties so far seem to be only facilitators, mainly benefiting from the affirmative

sentiment of individual Limbus towards Limbuwan. This is not to underestimate the importance

of the Limbuwan based political parties. Political parties are much needed and desirable to

112
मठ्
ु ठी माटो उठाई अपपिहदन्छौं ज्यान; हामीलाई प्यारो लाग्छ हाम्रो भलम्बव
ु ान ।।
इतिहासको गौरब बोकी छािीिरर; बभल चढ्न ियार छौँ हामी धनध
ु ािरी ।।
फक्िालुड० झैँ उच्च हाम्रो स्वाभिमान; हामीलाई प्यारो लाग्छ हाम्रो भलम्बुवान
लड्दै लड्दै आएका हौँ फेरर हामी लड्छौँ; काङसोरे को पाइला पछ्याई हामी अति बढ्छौँ ।।
स्थापपि गदै हाम्रो आफ्नो पहहचान; हामीलाई प्यारो लाग्छ हाम्रो भलम्बव
ु ान ।। (Raj Kumar Dikpal)

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transform the culturally imagined Limbuwan into political organization and activism. However

Limbu individuals, both women and men alike, do not need any explanation as to why

Limbuwan should be desirable for them.

Figure 7.1 Limbuwan Volunteer Carrying a Placard During the Ringroad March Pass.
May 2012

Chumlung has been able to bring together all Limbus who were otherwise divided across

different political parties to form the sanyukta Limbuwan morcha [Joint Limbuwan Front]. In

this regard, Limbuwan is an imagination that involves all Limbus, uniting them together for a

common cause. Culture is defined as a ‘binding force’ for individuals of a society. Culture is also

defined as “capacity” when a society is capable of producing/reproducing itself. Limbuwan’s

imagination was seen in associated activities performed by Limbu people, politicians, cadres,

Chumlung officials and members, well wishers, Limbus in Nepal or abroad and Limbus who

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supportted either the mainstream parties, Limbuwan based parties, Chumlung, or any other

organizations

Nun-pani ko sandhi and the Political Justification of Limbuwan

A scholar on Limbuwan’s history and politics and a journalist, Bhawani Baral, writes:
Limbuwan had with the Gorkhali state the nun-pani ko sandhi [treaty of salt and water] in
which both nun [salt] and pani [water] would not lose their taste and quality but would
result into a new quality in terms of political, social and cultural taste. Limbuwan has a
politically established status. It has also gained in part constitutional recognition.
Limbuwan has been repeatedly recognized legally in the past. The past treaties and
accords [with the Shah Kings] justifies this. Limbuwan has been established by the
present political movement too. Hence Limbuwan is a people-endorsed politics.
Limbuwan has been proposed even by some political parties in their political manifesto
too. None of the political parties have ignored or gone against Limbuwan. Even the
Nepali Dictionary published by Nepal Academy, the government of Nepal’s own
institution defines Limbuwan as “the hills across the Koshi and the Mechi zones,
permanently settled by the Limbu people from a long period of time.” Limbuwan was not
at all incorporated under Nepal as a defeated state, rather Limbuwan had joined Nepal as
a suzerain state.
Limbuwan’s movement did not rise up only when loktantra [democracy] was reinstated.
Not even raised by the Maoists during the jana yudhda. Whence the then Shah, Rana
rulers began to seize Limbuwan’s autonomy thenceforth arose the Limbuwan movement.
There were armed and without-armed movements of Limbuwan even before 1990. Late
Imansingh Chemjong had established a political party named as Limbuwan sudhar sangh
(Limbuwan Reform Association) with non-Limbu leadership. Bir Nembang, the founder
of the Limbuwan Liberation Front (1988), himself was put in jail, spent years in exile. He
is in Limbuwan’s politics even today. In this, the Limbu’s mukti [liberation] is the first
question. Similarly, the liberation of all inhabitants of Limbuwan is the basic condition.
The federal Limbuwan province should be created on the basis of cultural rights, history
and identity (Baral 2012) [my translation].

Many scholars say that identity is ephemeral and that the adivasi-janajatis in Nepal

should not be focusing on identity for their political organization because identity is so

changeable, as in you have it today but you may not have it tomorrow - aja chha bholi chhaina.

Identity keeps transforming and changing. Having seen Nepal’s case, I can say that individual

identity or the identities of individuals are ephemeral and ever changing but so long as it is a

collective identity, it remains forever. However collective identities will continue to be

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transformed along with an ever-changing social, political, economic context. For example, the

central unifying source for the Limbus was kipat land (Caplan 1970; Caplan 1991) until the

1970s and 1980s. But now the source of the central unifying reference for the Limbus is

Limbuwan itself.

Limbuwan Politics on Two Fronts: Political Parties, Social Movement and Fronts

The politics of Limbuwan has been in progress at present through two fronts i) through

civil political parties and ii) through social movements. Limbuwan’s civic political party base is

just beginning. For the last 10 to 12 years, Limbuwan based parties have witnessed constant

break aways and splits. Such continuous splits within the party have demonstrated a negative

political image about the party. In this regard, the Limbuwan based parties have not been able to

garner as much support and sympathy from the people as they might have done.

However, Limbuwan’s politics viewed through social movements in the leadership or

coordination of the Limbu representative adivasi organization, Kirat Yakthung Chumlung, has

been effective, unifying and consequential. The movements and fronts are effective and unifying

in the sense that their methods have brought together Limbus who were otherwise divided across

different organizations and political parties, for the common cause of Limbuwan. In this regard,

Chumlung is a pivotal organization in unifying the Limbus for the cause of Limbuwan.

The Unfulfilled Dream of Mukti [Muktiko adhuro sapana]

Limbus dreamt of liberation through the establishment of Limbuwan. For this Limbus not

only took part in the armed revolution for their own liberation but a Limbu, GB Yakthungba, had

given the name jana mukti sena [Peoples Liberation Army-PLA] when it was formed in Calcutta

to wage an armed revolution (1950-51) in Nepal. GB Yakthungba led the then PLA and liberated

the country, becoming the first Inspector General of Police later, and also Nepal’s Ambassador to

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Burma afterwards. But Limbus did not seem to be satisfied as IS Chemjong’s Limbuwan Reform

Association’s (LRA) political agenda and objectives demonstrated (as described in chapter two).

Their continued delegations to the Shah kings (Chemjong 1957), even after the installment of

democracy in 1951, in order to defend their kipat land, autonomy, and development also shows

that Limbus’ mukti ko kalpana [imagination of liberation] had not been fulfilled by the sat sal ko

kranti [revolution of 1951].

Every revolution in Nepal has been followed by important appointments of Limbus by

the state and responsibilities have fallen upon the shoulders of Limbu individuals. GB

Yakthungba became the first IGP, but this did not mean that Limbus were liberated. Most

recently the Chair of both the CAs in 2008 and 2013 was a Limbu but that did not help to

inscribe Limbuwan in the constitution. Therefore, the meaning and justification of liberation

should be understood and realized at a structural and societal level in general, not at individual

level in particular.

The self-construal attitude of the ruling parties and the ruling caste to enshrine their own

primordial identity as constitutional while ignoring adivasi janajati and madhesi identities has

sparked off social science researchers, writers and politically conscious youth to hark back their

own understanding of mukti [liberation]. They have asked what sort of mukti had the adivasi

janajati and madhesi desired for when they fought for prajatantra [democracy] and for

lokatantra [democracy]? Why did the adivasi Limbu fight for democracy in 1950-51 and for

what kind of mukti did they seek? Did they desire for cultural equality or economic

development? As I understand it, mukti ra samanata [liberation and equality] were two

fundamental motivating factors for Limbus to join the jana mukti sena [Peoples Liberation

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Army] in the revolution of 1950-51. But the imagination of liberation has remained unfulfilled

for Limbus to date.

A Clash of Identities: The Hindu State-makers versus the Others

The State of Nepal was founded on identity politics. If one considers King PN Shah’s

expansion of his kingdom - also known as the building of modern Nepal among the mainstream

casteist politicians and social scientists - as the beginning of present day Nepal, Shah was the one

who also sowed the seeds of the Hindu Kingdom, which would germinate, grow and prosper for

10-11 generations after his life. The monarchy has gone. Nepal is no longer a kingdom. Nepal is

no more a Hindu State in its form but the content and symbolic cultural substance of the past

Hindu state - the cow, the Aryan identity, the sanatan dharma - still prevails in the 2015

Constitution. Adivasi janajatis and madhesis have boycotted and disobeyed this constitution. The

Constitution Day for others is called The Black Day for adivasi janajati and madhesi peoples.

Adivasi janajati and madhesi feel betrayed by the main leaders of the main parties [sirsha

partika sirsha netahru] in promulgating the constitution, as the constitution failed to duly

recognize adivasi and madhesi identities as different cultural wholes. On the one hand the ruling

caste and ruling parties have successfully enshrined their ancestral identity in the constitution as

represented by the national animal of the cow, constitutional race of Arya and sanatan dharma.

But adivasi janajatis and madhesis have boycotted the constitution for not having recognized

their identities as at par with other identities. The 2015 Constitution is now a new ground zero

for the clash of identities in Nepal. Limbus will remain a part of the ongoing clash between

identities and will remain the same so long as the exclusionary state-based casteist democracy

[jatiya lokatantra] prevails in Nepal. If the state makers and hardcore developmentalists,

including social scientists, still find the Limbus and Limbuwan “troublesome”, “quarrelsome”

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and “difficult to deal with” for the “progress and prosperity” of Nepal, then so be it. They were

“quarrelsome” and “difficult to deal with” for Hindus and the Buddhists (Hamilton 1819;

Kirkpatrick 1811) even two centuries ago.

Adivasi Cultures: From Society to Community

Godelier’s argument about how indigenous societies become relegated to the status of

community from society due to the ‘colonial’ expansion of the state is relevant when looking

into the process of Nepal’s adivasi societies being downgraded to ‘communities’. This occurred

as the Hindu Gorkha state conquered relatively autonomous and independent states thereby

exploiting them in a colonial fashion. Godelier says that when those indigenous societies had

autonomous status with their own governance as well as a defense system, they were societies.

But when the state conquered them, thereby incorporating their socio-cultural as well as

economic modes of production under the conquering state, these states become downgraded to

‘communities’. Goderlier writes:

When [Baruya] lost sovereignty over their mountains and their rivers, and over their own
persons, the Baruya ceased to be a society, and became a local "tribal community" under
the authority of a state, an institution totally alien to their history and their ways of
thinking and acting (2009: 145).
In this regard in Nepal, the Rais, Tamangs, and Limbu were enjoying the status of society

but after the King PN Shah’s invasion these societies became relegated to a community.

Similarly, Godelier also explains in detail about the importance of defending one’s territory to

qualify as a society. Limbus have similar history of fighting to defend their territory. I have used

the term that-thalo in Nepali, which is a close translation of the term ‘territory’.

We thus see what it means to have a territory, a set of natural elements ---lands, rivers,
mountains, lakes, sometimes sea - that provide human groups with resources for their
livelihood and development. A territory can be conquered, or inherited from ancestors
who conquered it or appropriated it without a fight (if they settled uninhabited regions).

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 A territorial border must be known, if not recognized, by the societies that occupy and
exploit the neighboring spaces. In all cases, a territory must be defended by force,
through the use of arms and organized violence, but also through rites that appeal to the
gods and other invisible powers to weaken or annihilate the enemy (Godelier, 2009:145-
146).
While I was finishing my dissertation, Tamangs in Nepal celebrated the 61st Anniversary

of the Founding of Nepal Tamang Ghedung with the program’s main topic: ghedung ko chha

dasak ra Tamang andolan [Six Decades of the Ghedung and Tamang Movement]. The program

attendees included many Tamang leaders representing different political parties, representatives

from the International Tamang Council, and All India Bouddha Tamang Association, Calcutta ,

and many other dignitaries. Addressing the program, the former Ambassador of Nepal to South

Korea, Kaman Singh Lama, called for a political front. He said: “Only political consciousness

would bring us our ethnic right. Hence the Tamangs who have imagined a multi-nations state

should unite politically and go ahead to achieve that goal.” At the end of the program, the chair

of the Ghedung, Mohan Gole, said “[i]n the past 61 years, the Ghedung has been successful in

establishing customs, festivals, costumes, and in the days ahead, we should establish our political

cause as the main issue for the movement to achieve our political right.” (esamata.com 2017)

[my translation].

The case of the Tamangs’ realization that they should now focus on “politics” rather than

on costumes and so forth is proof that the adivasi janajati organizations in Nepal should focus on

“politics”, and only then can they achieve the essence of their collective identity: Tamsaling. To

me, these processes are the harbingers of the future of Nepali politics.

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Arya and Non-Arya Peoples had Different Aspirations and Expectations of Prajatantra

[Democracy] founded in 1951.

Bhogiraj Chamling writes:

[I]nspired by the ethnic sentiment and organized thereafter, the Kiratis' imagination of
ethnic liberation was the life breath of the Liberation Army in 1950-51 revolution in
Bhojpur. The very inspiration for Kirati ethnic liberation was the real source of fighting
zeal. This fact may be misunderstood mistaken for 'narrow communalism'. But the fact is
'an oppressed ethnic group's quest for ethnic liberation itself is a contribution towards
making the pan-Nepali nationalism solid and strong. Pan-Nepali nationalism will not
solidify without realizing ethnic equality, lingual equality, and religious-cultural equality
in Nepal. Bhojpur's Rai to be involved and organized in 1950-51 revolution with the
feelings of ethnic liberation meant an additional positivity and strength to the democratic
revolution (Chamling 2073 v.s.:67)
Chamling's conclusion demonstrates that the quest and inspiration for ethnic liberation

[jatiya mukti] was fundamental to the Rai and Limbu involvement in the jana mukti sena [PLA],

in the revolution of 1950-51, which is otherwise understood as the 'revolution for democracy'

[prajatantra], meant an additional contribution towards Nepal's democratization process

(Hangen 2010). Nepali historians seem to have overlooked this fact. “The feelings of ethnic

liberation that arose in 2007 BS should not be overlooked…The same feeling, the same

sentiment once again arose during the Peoples' War (1996-2006). The adivasi have transcribed

their history through their involvement and activities in different revolutions observed by Nepal

so far, but the Nepali history writers are yet to acknowledge this” (Chamling 2073v.s.:64) [my

translation].

Nepali Politics is Caste-Based not Class Based

Politics in Nepal hitherto has been based on castiesm (Chakraborty 2000). Now new

identity based political parties are emerging. On the one hand such a new political emergence is

“an indicative of the failure of dominant parties” (SG. 1999: 2912) , as in Nepal’s case they have

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failed to address the aspirations of indigenous peoples. The indigenous peoples in Nepal wanted

at least to have provinces names based on their history, territorial identity and linguistic features.

But the dominant parties misunderstood such an identity based demand as divisive politics. In

this regard, the adivasi-janajati in Nepal are fighting an uphill battle to be constitutionally

recognized as culturally different. At this moment, their movement seems to have hit a snag in

the face of seemingly democratic but substantially casteist politics in Nepal. The problem is with

the state and the ruling political parties.

Identity, Not Economic Inequality, is the Real Basis of Politics in Nepal.

The politics of Limbuwan, from its genesis and even today, is not based on economic and

developmental interests. Limbuwan politics are based on the claims of saswat pahichan

[primordial identity]. No individuals can escape their sasswat pahichan so long as they care

about who they are as a cultural being, and as a member of human society. Such pahichan

[identity] is based on purkhauli itihas [ancestral history] about the ancestors who gave their lives

to defend the that-thalo [territory]. This is why the invoking of the past war with the Gorkhali

soldiers generates real political meanings in present day Limbuwan politics. The Limbu’s war

history, rather than defining events in the past, can be seen as providing the seeds that produce

new political relations in Limbu society. The imagination of belongingness to a Limbuwani that-

thalo, irrespective of where they live, now motivates Limbu people living in England, Hong

Kong, USA or elsewhere who set ablaze the constitution of Nepal after feeling excluded by the

state.

Two Identities: Dominant versus Subservient

During the tenures of both Constituent Assemblies (2008-2012, 2013-2015), a new talk

of the town surfaced in Nepal and among Nepalis abroad that the political parties, and therefore

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the politicians too, were divided into pro-identity [pahichan badi] and anti-identity [pahichan

birodhi] groups. The parties, known to be champions for liberating Nepali people from the

centuries old feudal suppression and oppression in Nepal, were now characterized as anti-

identity [pahichan birodhi] parties based on their own unsubstantiated generalizations that

delineating the federal provinces on the basis of identity would result in divisive consequences

for Nepal. After the first CA failed to promulgate the constitution within the slated time in June

2012, internal conflict within the so-called “anti-identity” parties escalated so much so that half a

dozen central level leaders from adivasi-janajati, madhesi, and muslim backgrounds quit the

Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML). These central level leaders’

renunciation of the CPN-UML caused further impact upon its wings as many cadres and leaders

associated with students and youth wings also quit the CPN-UML (described in chapter 5),

subsequently founding a new party called the Federal Socialist Party (FSP). This new party’s

main mantras were sanghiyata [federalism], jatiya samanata [ethnic equality], pahichan

[identity], and samajbad [socialism]. Bargiya mukti ko lagi samajbad, jatiya mukti ko lagi

sanghiyata [socialism for class liberation, federalism for ethnic liberation] was the FSP’s main

slogan. It was also said that they deserted the CPN-UML because it went against identity

[pahichan ko birudhda] as the CPN-UML did not support the CA’s sub-committee’s proposal of

14 federal states and 23 autonomous areas, mainly based on ethnic identities.

A question may be asked: Did the CPN-UML’s main leaders really hold an anti-identity

perspective on delineating the federal provinces? Did they really believe that delineating the

provinces on ethnic and linguistic lines would be so divisive that it would break the country into

pieces? To me, to characterize the political parties as pahichan birodhi [anti-identity] simply

because they were not supportive of ethnic or others identities is a mistaken judgement and

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unsubstantiated generalization. Were the dominant parties and their main leaders pahichan

birodhi, then they would not have enshrined the Hindu primordial symbolic markers: cow,

aryan, and sanatan dharma - the dominant symbols signifying the Nepalese state makers’

collective ancestral identity - in the constitution. The decision of the state makers’ or the main

leaders of the dominant parties to enshrine those three Hindu symbolic markers into the

constitution clearly demonstrated that the state makers or the ruling caste groups were as much

pahichan badi as the adivasi-janajati and madhesi allegedly were. Having known how the state

has been protecting cows and Bahuns for the last six centuries (described in chapter six) it would

not be correct to assume the state-makers as pahichan birodhis. The simple fact is that the state-

makers enshrined their identity in the constitution while denying the same for adivasi-janajatis.

The takeaway from the discussion above on pro versus anti identities is that no

individuals, groups, and societies can be pahichan birodhi [anti-identity] in Nepal. The history of

identity politics in Nepal - self-identified as arya or sanatan dharmi among the ruling castes and

the state-imposed identity of matawali upon the non-Hindu, non-aryan others (described in

previous chapters) - demonstrates that the state created two different but hierarchical identities,

namely a dominant identity and a subservient identity. The dominant identity was considered

symbolically pure and higher than that of the matawali identity. In this regard matawali identity

seemed to be assigned to create “the other”, an adversarial identity by the state makers as the

legal injunctions in relation to the protection of cows and Bahuns and other discriminatory legal

provisions against the matawalis demonstrate. The matawali identity has been known as adivasi-

janajati identity until now but their status as “the other adversarial” “enemy-like” identity seems

to have remained the same in the eyes of the dominant political parties, led by the ruling caste.

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Anti-National Identity and the Panchayat Regime’s Legacy

Adivasi-janajati identity politics is considered to be divisive in the eyes of the dominant

political parties and their leaders. The ruling groups of the ruling parties now characterize the

madhesi identity and adivasi-janajati identity based political parties as adversary and enemy-like

parties. Such an adversarial relationship between the dominant ruling parties and the madhesi

and adivasi-janajati identity based parties in Nepal is an exact reminiscent of those relationships

that could be seen between the politicians who supported the Panchayat regime under the

absolute monarchy and the then banned political party leaders some four decades ago. The then

Panchayat polity had its own rhetorical understanding of terms such as nation [rastra] and

nationalism [rashtrabad]. Only the Panchayat regime’s genuine supporters were said to be

rashtrabadi [nationalistic] then. Interestingly, supporters and the leaders of the banned parties

(Nepali Congress, Communist Parties) were called arashtriya tatwa [anti-national element]

during the mid-1970s when Panchayat politicians were at the helm. Those who believed in

multi-party democracy and did not support the Panchayat polity were characterized as arashtriya

tatwa [anti-national elements] by the ruling groups then. a. ta.—arashtriya tatwa—[anti-national

element] was the abbreviated term used to derogatively denote the democrats then, and multi-

party democracy was said to be divisive for the “mono-cultural” pan-Nepali nation. This was

done in similar manner as to how the madhesi and adivasi-janajati identity based political parties

and their leaders are charged as being divisive now.

The then Panchayat regime’s arashtriya tatwa are ruling the country now. Interestingly

enough, the same definition of rashtrabad from the time of the Panchayat regime has been

resurrected by some ruling parties in the face of madhesi and adivasi-janajati identity

movements. Given the resurrection of the rashtrabad from the Panchayat regime, one shall not

249
be surprised if the ruling parties and ruling groups will begin to characterize madhesis and

adivasi-janajtis as the new arashtriya tatwa [anti-national elements] in Nepal soon.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acharya, Baburam
2060 v.s. Prachin kalko nepal: sabhyatako arambhadekhi i.sa. 879 samma (Ancient Period’s
Nepal: From the Beginning of Civilization to CE 879). Pra. SriKrishna Acharya.

Acharya, Baburam
2012 v.s. Kirat nam. Lalitpur, Nepal: Jagadamba Press Private Limited.

Acharya, Baburam
1967 Sri panch badamaharajadhiraja prithvinarayana saha: sankshipta jivani (vol.1).
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