AVERIA v. CAGUIOA GRP 10
AVERIA v. CAGUIOA GRP 10
, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA, in her capacity as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch LVII, Lucena City, and VERONICA
PADILLO, respondents.
FACTS:
Tomas Averia refused to participate in the hearing of the registration proceedings below,
claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act upon the said
case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Registration Act." The
respondent court then held the hearing ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the
registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent herein. In
his petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, it is argued that the lower
court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the absence of unanimity
among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner cites Fojas as v. Grey, however, it is not applicable to the instant
case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been
superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979.
Section 2 of the said P.D. No. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petitions
filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
upon such applications or petitions.” Consequently, and specifically with reference to Section
112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer
fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where
there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any "adverse claim or serious
objection." Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not only such
non-controversial cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as the question at
bar, which were beyond its competence before.