Individuation and Identity in Islamic
Individuation and Identity in Islamic
AND SUHRAWARDĪ
1
This treatise might have had its origins in Avicenna’s oral discussions with his other disciple Ibn Zaylā, who
wrote them down as notes, which were then transmitted by Bahmanyār. It is of little wonder, then, that
Bahmanyār shows close affinity with the work (cf. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 162–63; Janssen,
‘Les Ta’liqat’; but Reismann, Avicennian Tradition, 203).
Conclusion
How do abstract things become concrete? We have seen and followed two different
approaches to this question. Bahmanyār’s approach seeks to find the principle of
individuation in the spatiotemporal position of the outmost sphere. By contrast,
Suhrawardī’s approach abandons the task of finding the PI, since individuality is a primitive
and irreducible state of affairs. Despite these apparent differences, both approaches also
reveal a degree of similarity in their solutions to the problem of individuation. In whatever
way we want to solve it, we will always need something that is irreducibly individuated. For
Bahmanyār and Avicenna it is a particular property of objects, namely, their spatiotemporal
position. For Suhrawardī these are just the objects themselves.
As a final remark, I would like to draw some attention to the historical philosophical
background of the debate between Suhrawardī and Bahmanyār. The twelfth century is
known as the encounter between two different traditions of metaphysics. One comes from
Avicenna’s philosophy. The other comes from the traditional ontology of kalām. As I
mentioned in the introduction, the main focus of Avicenna’s metaphysics was on explaining
the status of universals, neutral essences, natures etc. On the other hand, mainstream
kalām metaphysics instead focuses on concrete particulars (cf. Frank, ‘Ašʿarite Ontology’,
Benevich, ‘Theory of Aḥwāl’). The clash of the two ontologies may shed light on the reasons
for disagreement between Bahmanyār, following Avicenna, and Suhrawardī. On the one
hand, Avicennists start from universals and therefore are in need of finding something, a
magical property that would turn universals into particulars. On the other hand, kalām
ontology and therefore Suhrawardī start from particulars. That is why they do not need to
explain particulars through anything else. There is no wonder then that the idea of
extramental things being distinct in themselves rather than through a certain property
may first be found in mainstream kalām metaphysics (Benevich, ‘Theory of Aḥwāl’, 163). It
has already been suggested elsewhere that some aspects of Suhrawardī’s metaphysics
correspond to the kalām ontology of bare particulars, given his argumentation against
extramental universals (cf. Wisnovsky, ‘Essence and Existence’, Benevich, ‘Essence-
Existence’). My final hypothesis, which certainly requires further research, is then that
Suhrawardī’s theory of individuation has its roots in kalām ontology as well. 2
2
This paper is a result of my research conducted in the “Heirs of Avicenna” project, funded by DFG. I am
grateful to Peter Adamson, Andreas Lammer, and anonymous reviewers for their helpful remarks on the first
draft of this paper.