SABINA EXCONDE V.

DELFIN CAPUNO AND DANTE CAPUNO Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are
G.R. NO. L-10134 JUNE 29, 1957 liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.
FACTS:
It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused
and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school arts and trades and not to any academic educational
Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. 841; See 12
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of
when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor
Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that
with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while
his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is
when his son told him after the accident that he attended the clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city
parade upon instruction of his teacher. school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act
of Dante because he was not then a student of an institute of
Dante Capuno was accused of double homicide through arts and trades as provided by law.
reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and
Amado Ticzon. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and,
the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
separate civil action for damages against the accused. Dante damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged. Dante Capuno with them, is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the
was only (15) years old when he committed the crime. parental authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them
Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno in their company, educating them and instructing them in
and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation"
Isidoro Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if any (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of
of the accident, the former was not under the control, a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph,
supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was Spanish Civil Code). These defendants failed to prove.
sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only
convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint. TAMARGO VS. CA
GR NO. 85044, JUNE 3, 1992
ISSUE:
FACTS:
Whether or not Delfin Capuno is civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante. In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age,
shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that
RULING: resulted in her death.  The petitioners, natural parents of
Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural
Yes. Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the
which provides: tragic incident.
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next
preceding articles is enforceable not only for In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of adopt Adelberto Bundoc.  Such petition was granted on
persons for whom another is responsible. November 1982 after the tragic incident.  
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are liable for any damages caused by ISSUE: 
the minor children who live with them.
xxx     xxx     xxx WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive
effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their
where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents. daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by
shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter,
RULING: turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other
hand, petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended
and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics
the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU),
authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to
parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.
the suit for damages. “Parents and guardians are responsible
for the damage caused by the child under their parental As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil
authority in accordance with the civil code”. Case in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no
actual or physical custody over the adopted child. ISSUE: Are the parents of the Wendell Libi still liable for the
Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some death of Julie Ann Gotiong?
benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under
HELD:
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental
authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents Yes.
during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial
custody period either had not yet begin nor had been The subsidiary liability of parents for damages cause by their
completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual minor children is imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil
custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto. Code, which covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts
and criminal offenses. The parents' liability as being primary
Petition for review was hereby granted. and not subsidiary and liability shall ceased if the parents can
prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father to
CRESENCIO LIBI vs IAC prevent damage.
G.R. no. 70890, September 18,1992
In this case, the parents had not exercised due diligence in
supervising the activities of their son. It was only at the time
FACTS: of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was
drug informant of CANU and that the gun used in the
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box.
Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from
1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell having access to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary liable for
after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor
irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, who was living in their company. 
1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, CICL XXX v. PEOPLE
prompting the former to resort to threats against her. GR No. 237334, Aug 14, 2019
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each
from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, FACTS:
a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of
petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the At around 12:30 in the morning on January 1, 2010, private
scene of the crime inside the residence of private complainant Glenn Redoquerio (Redoquerio) was sent by his
respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. mother Lolita Redoquerio to buy iced tea powder from a
Jakosalem streets of the same city. store located in VVV, WWW, Quezon City. While he was at
the store, Glenn heard somebody say "Yan si Glenn anak ni
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the Purok Leader na humuli sa atin nuon." He looked back and
circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their saw CICL XXX, Christopher Puyo (Puyo) and Jayjay Narag
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their (Narag). CICL XXX suddenly poked a gun at the face of
respective theories drawn from their interpretation of Redoquerio. The gun was only about six (6) inches away from
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and R.edoquerio's face. CICL XXX pulled the trigger several times
evidence of physical facts. but the gun did not fire. CICL XXX then hit (hinataw) the left
temple and top of the head of Redoquerio with the gun. Puyo there was no fault or negligence on their part.
and Narag held the arms of Redoquerio while CICL XXX
punched him several times. Puyo then hit the head of Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or
Redoquerio with a stone causing the latter to loss (sic) minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if
consciousness. Redoquerio was in coma for 7 days while he such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
was confined at the East Ave1iue Medical Center. respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
Redoquerio incurred expenses for the treatment of his from execution, in accordance with the civil law. 
injuries as shown by various receipts.
In Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[32] the Court en
The RTC convicted CICL XXX of the crime of Frustrated banc interpreted the above provision to mean that the civil
Murder. liability of parents for criminal offenses committed by their
CICL XXX is also liable to pay private complainant Glenn minor children is direct and primary. The Court said:
Redoquerio actual damages in the total amount of
P18,922.90, P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
moral damages. under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents
for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise
The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of CICL XXX. direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of
fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the
In questioning his conviction, CICL XXX argues that because he diligence of a good father of a family.
was only seventeen (17) years old at the time he supposedly
committed the crime, then he is presumed to have acted xxxx
without discernment, and that it was the burden of the
prosecution to prove otherwise. CICL XXX then argues that Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby
the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden. rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal
ISSUE: authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it
Whether or not the parents of CICL XXX should be held is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary
offenses committed. liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
HELD: delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
YES. While CICL XXX is not criminally liable for his acts discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but
because the presumption that he acted without discernment under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15
was not overcome, he is still civilly liable for the injuries years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability
sustained by Redoquerio. It is well-settled that "[e]very shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. However, it does
not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also Article 101 of the RPC, however, provides that the foregoing
free from civil liability. Exemption from criminal liability does liability of CICL XXX's parents is subject to the defense that
not always include exemption from civil liability. they acted without fault or negligence. Thus, the civil aspect
of this case is remanded to the trial court, and it is ordered
The civil liability is imposed upon CICL XXX's parents because to implead CICL XXX's parents for reception of evidence on
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides that: their fault or negligence.

ARTICLE 101. Rules Regarding Civil Liability in Certain Cases. MARIA TERESA CUARA, represnted by her father ULISES
The exemption from criminal liability established in CUADRA vs. ALFONSO MONFORT
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following FACTS:
rules:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12 years old, and Maria Teresa
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil Monfort, 13 years old were both classmates in Mabini
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, Elementary School Bacolod City, Grade 6. In July 1962, their
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine teacher assigned the class to weed the school premises.
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without While they were doing so, MT Monfort found a headband and
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm and thereafter
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye.
 ISSUE:
Cuadra’s eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital Is St. Mary’s Academy liable for the negligent act of their
and stayed for 23 days; her eyes were attempted to be student?
surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right
eye. HELD:
NO. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under
Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monfort’s dad) custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
that Monfort should pay for actual damages (cost of acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under
hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s fees. their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for
petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
ISSUE: omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
Whether or not Monfort’s father is liable under Articles 2176 connection to the accident.
and 2180.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the
HELD: negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim. Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
NO. In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
inferred that Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing the jeep.
to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to
contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the
send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article
as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it 219 of the Family Code that "those given the authority and
was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally
and which no parent, however careful, would have any and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did of the unemancipated minor" was unfounded.
it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in
the child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on her Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed
upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent
parents. Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
G.R. NO. 143363, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the
accident.
FACTS:
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of
campaign was the visitation of schools from where the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened
along with other high school students were riding in a the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of
Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep
was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the
Sherwin died as a result of the injuries he sustained. His proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held
parents filed an action for damages against St. Mary’s liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Academy for its alleged negligence relying on Art. 219 of the
Family Code. The RTC ruled in favor or Spouses Carpitanos.
The CA affirmed but reduced actual damages.
 ST. JOSEPH'S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree
ROSALINDA TABUGO vs. of care, caution and foresight.
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S.
MIRANDA The proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent
G.R. No. 182353 June 29, 2010 failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that
occurred during the conduct of the science experiment.
FACTS: Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher
degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon school, its administrators and teachers.
inside St. Joseph College's [SJC's] premises, the class to which Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of
respondent Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the
science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
fillings under the guidance of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the
subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of Jayson's Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
class is Estefania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
doing the experiment without having adequately secured it have special parental authority and responsibility over the
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one custody.
of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by
looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the school, entity or institution.
compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles
of which hit Jayson's eye and the different parts of the bodies Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson's eyes demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but
were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
The parents of Jayson, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
should shoulder all the medical expenses of Jayson that had students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the custody.
accident caused by the science experiment. The counsel for Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite
SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained degree of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:
that the school cannot accede to the demand because "the
accident occurred by reason of Jayson’s failure to comply 1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert
with the written procedure for the experiment and his damage and injury to its students although it had full
teacher’s repeated warnings and instruction that no student information on the nature of dangerous science experiments
must face, much less look into, the opening of the test tube conducted by the students during class;
until the heated compound has cooled. Since SJC did not
accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on Jayson’s 2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect
behalf, sued petitioners for damages. the students who conduct experiments in class;

3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and

ISSUES:
devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from expected
risks and dangers; and
Is the act of jayson in looking at the heated test tube before
the compound had cooled in complete disregard of
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole
instructions given prior to the experiment was the proximate
time her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when
cause that led to his own injury?
the accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size
of the class—fifty (50) students— conducting the experiment
RULING:
is difficult to monitor.
NO. In this case, SJC failed to show that the negligence of
SJC cannot simply deflect their negligence and liability by
Jayson was the proximate cause of the latter's injury. We find
insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
her science class not to look directly into the heated
negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test
compound.
tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his
injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the
As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, Jayson is
chemicals independent of any intervening cause. SJC could
partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should not be
entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise bear the accordance with orders which the employer had the authority
consequences of his own negligence. Petitioners, therefore, to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee
should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted
their negligence. to him.

DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing The CA however reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela
business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the
G.R. No. 182356   December 4, 2013 vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance
of evidence. It noted that the interval between the date of
FACTS: the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to
suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded
Along North Ave. in Quezon City across the Veterans that this interval raised doubts on whether Joel’s reckless
Memorial Hospital, Juan dela Llana, while driving a Toyota driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela
Corolla, stopped said car when the signal light turned red. A Llana’s injury.
few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing
gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, ISSUE:
violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s Whether or not Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a
rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and
Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana, who was her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence, and thus,
seated at the front passenger seat of the Toyota Corolla. would absolve Rebecca, the employer of Jose, from any
liabilities.
The traffic investigation report stated that the truck driver,
Joel Primero, was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. HELD:

Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of YES.
"Pongkay Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand
business, was the employer of Joel. Once the negligence, the damages and the proximate
causation are established, the Court can then proceed with
After a month from said accident, Dra. dela Llana began to the application and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph
feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by.
Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth
the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. After paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on an
consulting few doctors, she then undergo a cervical spine employee’s act or omission may be instituted against the
surgery to release the compression of her nerve. employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee.
Dra. dela Llana then sued Rebecca for damages before the
RTC of Quezon City. In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate
causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by
cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its
between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
She pointed out that Dra. dela Llana’s illness became manifest intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without
one month and one week from the date of the vehicular which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
accident.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the pieces of evidence:
proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury to be
Joel’s reckless driving. It further declared that Joel’s (1) the pictures of her damaged car,
negligence gave rise to the presumption that Rebecca did not (2) the medical certificate issued by Dr. Milla and
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's (3) her testimonial evidence.
selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously
liable because she was the employer and she personally However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal
chose him to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash
ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muñoz Market, injury.
Quezon City. The Court concluded that the three elements
necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability were present: (1) First, Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the
that the employee was chosen by the employer, personally or damaged car show that the massive impact of the collision
through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in caused her whiplash injury. We are not persuaded by this
bare claim. The pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of
the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the
whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures. Mercury Drug v. Huang
G.R. No. 172122 , June 22, 2007
Second, the medical certificate, has no probative value for
being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or FACTS:
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge A Mercury Drug (MD) six-wheeler truck driven by Rolando Del
of another person who is not on the witness stand. Rosario and a Toyota Corolla driven by Stephen Huang were
both on C-5 highway, northbound, coming from the general
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the
contents of the medical certificate. However, she was not left innermost lane, while the truck was on the next lane to its
presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify right. The truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into
and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Also, the the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car
medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and
causation in fact between Joel’s reckless driving and Dra. dela landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost,
Llana’s whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the ran over the car and zigzagged until it stopped in front of
whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular accident. A Buellah Land Church.
perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested
to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from At the time of the accident, the truck driver had a Traffic
whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to Violation Receipt and his driver’s license had been
substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llana’s confiscated because of reckless drivin. The Huangs blame the
whiplash injury. truck driver for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence, while the petitioners allege that the immediate
Third, despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and and proximate cause of the accident was Huang’s
even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot recklessness. According to MD, truck driver was on the left
give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused innermost lane when the car bumped the truck’s front right
her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence. tire  the truck then swerved left, smashed into an electric
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference post, crossed the center island, and stopped on the other side
between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. of the highway. The car then crossed over to the center island
and landed on the same portion of C-5/. The RTC held
The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in Mercury Drug and Del Rosario solidarily liable which was also
evidence regarding: affirmed by the CA.

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate ISSUE:

knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and Whether Mercury Drug may be held solidarily liable with Del
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently Rosario
acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his
impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or RULING:
appearance of a person.
Yes. To be relieved of liability, MD should show that it
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in
received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
skill, experience or training which he shown to possess. performance of his duties. As the employer, it was required
that they examine the employees as to their qualifications,
In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot experience and service records. With respect to supervision,
be given probative value for the reason that she was not the employers should formulate standard operating
presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose
was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause disciplinary measures for their breach.
and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize
that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide In the present case, MD failed to show that it exercised due
a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and diligence on the supervision and discipline over their
effects of whiplash injury in her testimony. employees. On the day of the accident, Del Rosario was
driving without a license, only holding a TVR for reckless
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause driving. Del Rosario testified that he reported the incident to
by preponderance of evidence. She did not present any his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not even
testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the suspended or reprimanded. Mercury Drug failed to discharge
causal relation between the vehicular accident and her injury. its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del employer's liability for acts of its employees attaches only
Rosario. when the tortious conduct of the employee relates to, or is in
the course of, his employment. The question then is whether,
UNIVERSAL AQUARIUS, INC. and CONCHITA TAN v. Q.C. at the time of the damage or injury, the employee is engaged
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION in the affairs or concerns of the employer or, independently,
G.R. NO. 155990 September 12, 2007 in that of his own. An employer incurs no liability when an
employee's conduct, act or omission is beyond the range of
FACTS: employment.Unquestionably, when Resources' employees
The chemical plant of Universal Aquarius, Inc. (Universal) is staged a strike, they were acting on their own, beyond the
adjacent to the depot of Marman Trading (Marman) owned range of their employment.
by Conchita Tan. Q.C. Human Resources Management
Corporation (Resources) supplied Universal with Thus, Resources cannot be held liable for damages caused by
manpower/employees. the strike staged by its employees.

Rodolfo Capocyan (Capocyan), claiming to be the general

counsel/national president of the labor organization called SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME V.
Obrero Pilipino (Universal Aquarius Chapter), hereinafter RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN,
referred to as Obrero Filipino, sent a Notice of Strike to MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF
Universal. They picketed, barricaded and obstructed the entry KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL), PROVINCE OF
and exit of Universal's chemical plant and intercepted SOUTH COTABATO, REPRESENTED BY THE MUNICIPAL
Universal's delivery trucks. Marman's depot, which adjoined TREASURER AND/OR MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q.
Universal's plant, suffered a similar fate. MIGUEL, AND THE FIRST INTEGRATED BONDING AND
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.
Universal and Tan filed a Complaint against the strikers and
Resources before the RTC for breach of contract and damages G.R. NO. 163609 NOVEMBER 27, 2008
suffered due to the disruption of their respective business
operations. Universal and Tan aver that the complaint stated
FACTS:
a cause of action against Resources that would warrant
cognizance by the RTC; the allegations of the complaint
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South
clearly point out that Universal is suing Resources for the
Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel
latter's failure to supply the former with temporary workers
Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The
who will help in its business.
pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto
On the other hand, Resources contends that the complaint
Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan
stated no cause of action against it since there is nothing in
to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to
the allegations thereof that it participated in the acts
catch his Manila flight. The pick-up truck accidentally hit
committed by its employees.
Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National
Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. The
ISSUE:
intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters
Whether Resources is liable to Tan for the damages caused by
away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano
the Strike (NO)
was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident.
Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical
RULING:
attention, Marvin expired six days after the accident.
Anent Universal's claim for breach for contract and damages,
the Court is convinced that the Complaint sufficiently states a
cause of action against Resources. The Complaint alleged that Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the
Universal had a contract of employment of temporary parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC
workers with Resources; and that Resources violated said against respondents. In their complaint, they prayed that all
contract by supplying it with unfit, maladjusted individuals respondents be held solidarily liable for their loss. They
who staged a strike and disrupted its business operations. pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvin's death was
Given these hypothetically admitted facts, the RTC, in the Lozano's negligent and reckless operation of the vehicle. All
exercise of its original and exclusive jurisdiction,27 could have respondents denied liability for Marvin's death. Apostol and
rendered judgment over the dispute. Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up truck without
their consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that
However, with regard to Tan's claim for damages, the Court Marvin's sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible
finds that she has no cause of action against Resources. A to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the
thorough reading of the allegations of the Complaint reveals vehicle when it hit Marvin.
that Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the strike
effected by the employees of Resources. It is settled that an
RTC: In favor of spouses Jayme. Defendant Municipality of Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow
Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by employee although the person may have the right to control
other defendant being an agency of the State performing a the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of an
governmental functions. The same with defendant employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious
Hermogenes Simbulan, not being the owner of the subject liability, the driver's negligence should not be attributed to a
vehicle, he is absolved of any liability. The complaint against fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the
defendant First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company, Inc. vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have
is hereby ordered dismissed there being no cause of action over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an
against said insurance company. However, defendants Fidel application of the doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v.
Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel of Lombardi is instructive on this exception to the rule on
Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and vicarious liability:
severally to pay the plaintiff.
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as defendant-appellant truck, but only an intermediate and superior employee or
Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned, and the complaint agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat superior or
against him is DISMISSED. qui facit per alium is not properly applicable to him. His
power to direct and control the driver was not as master, but
ISSUE: only by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by
Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse's agent he was
Whether or not Mayor Miguel can be held solidarily liable for delegated Kruse's authority over the driver. x x x
the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him.
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful
RULING: employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal.
Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may not
be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
No. In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. Verily,
find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano
liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver
and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To
and his direct employer.
determine the existence of an employment relationship, We
rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's
power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other REBULTAN VS. SPS. DAGANTA
remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method G.R. No. 197908, July 04, 2018
of doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension
or dismissal. FACTS:

On May 3, 1999, at about 6:30 in the morning, along the

Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was
National Highway in Zambales, Cecilio Rebultan, Sr.
the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer
(Rebultan, Sr.) and his driver, Jaime Lomotos (Lomotos), were
of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that
on board a Kia Ceres, on their way to report for work in the
Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time
Masinloc, Zambales when they figured in a vehicular accident
of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several
with an Isuzu-powered passenger jeepney driven by Willie
occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still
Viloria (Viloria). The Kia Ceres was traveling northbound to
exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to
Iba, Zambales, while the jeepney was traveling southbound to
another person or entity because control over the employee
Cabangan, Zambales. The powerful impact resulted in serious
subsists. In the case under review, the Municipality of
physical injuries to Rebultan, Sr. and Lomotos, as well as
Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer notwithstanding
physical damage to both vehicles. Rebultan, Sr., who was 60
Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.
years old at that time, later died from his injuries.
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least
The heirs of Rebultan, Sr. (petitioners) filed a complaint for
supervision and control over Lozano and how the latter
damages against Viloria, and Spouses Edmundo and Marvelyn
operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the
P. Daganta (spouses Daganta) as the owners of the jeepney
accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim. Even
(collectively, respondents). Petitioners prayed for
assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
compensation for the loss of life and earning capacity of
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held
Rebultan, Sr., actual and moral damages, attorney's and
liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court
appearance fees, as well as other just and equitable reliefs.
ruled that mere giving of directions to the driver does not
Respondents alleged that it was the driver of the Kia Ceres
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
who was negligent, and who should be held responsible for
Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
the death of Rebultan, Sr. and the damages to the motor
vehicles. Daganta filed a third-party complaint against As long as it is shown that no control is exercised by the
Lomotos. Lomotos denied liability and prayed for the passenger in the concept of a master or principal, the
dismissal of the third-party complaint. negligence of the driver cannot be imputed to the passenger
and bar the latter from claiming damages. We note that
ISSUE: Lomotos acted as the designated driver of Rebultan, Sr. in his
service vehicle provided by the DENR. Thus, the real employer
W/N Viloria was negligent in driving the jeepney at the time of Lomotos is the DENR, and Rebultan, Sr. is merely an
of the collision intermediate and superior employee or agent. While it may
be inferred that Rebultan, Sr. had authority to give
RULING: instructions to Lomotos, "no negligence may be imputed
against a fellow employee although the person may have the
Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation.
same time does not necessarily depend on which of the
vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it is determined In sum, we hold that both drivers were negligent when they
by the imminence of collision when the relative distances and failed to observe basic traffic rules designed for the safety of
speeds of the two vehicles are considered. It is said that two their fellow motorists and passengers. This makes them joint
vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately tortfeasors who are solidarity liable to the heirs of the
the same time where it would appear to a reasonable person deceased.51 However, since the dismissal of the third-party
of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver approaching complaint against Lomotos was not appealed by respondents,
from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles and Lomotos is not party to the case before us, we have no
continued on their courses at their speed, a collision would authority to render judgment against him.
likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from
the left must give the right of precedence to the driver of the FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICE vs JOSE S. ESPINAS
vehicle on his right. G.R. no. 174156, June 20, 2012

Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield

the right of way to the driver on the right on approach to the
FACTS:
intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to
come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to approach Espinas, while driving, was hit by another car. The other car
the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able
yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on to get its plate number.
his right. He is not bound to wait until there is no other
After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas
vehicle on his right in sight before proceeding to the
learned that the owner of the other car, with plate number
intersection but only until it is reasonably safe to proceed.
UCF-545, is Filcar.
Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals, it was established that a
motorist crossing a thru¬-stop street has the right of way over After sending several letters to Filcar and to its President and
the one making a turn; but if the person making the turn has General Manager Carmen Flor, demanding payment for the
already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other damages sustained by his car without response, Espinas filed
side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru- a complaint for damages against Filcar and Carmen Flor
street, he is bound to give way to the former. demanding the amount of P97,910.00, representing actual
damages sustained by his car.
Applying Caminos, Jr., it is apparent that it is the Kia Ceres
Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car
which had the right of way. The jeepney driver making a turn
that hit and bumped Espinas’ car, the car was assigned to its
on the left had the duty of yielding to the vehicle on his right,
Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the husband of
the approaching Kia Ceres driven by Lomotos. Thus, we find
Carmen Flor. Filcar further stated that when the incident
that the CA erred in holding that it was Viloria, as the
happened, the car was being driven by Atty. Flor’s personal
jeepney's driver, who had the right of way.
driver, Timoteo Floresca.
Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the
It is a well recognized principle of law that the negligence of a incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca
driver, who, in turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen
cannot be imputed to a passenger who has no control over Flor.
him in the management of the vehicle and with whom he
sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is applied
more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those ISSUE:
engaged in public service, are involved.
whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle
which figured in an accident, may be held liable for the
damages caused to Espinas.
HELD: the registered... owner.  Instances are numerous where
vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or
Yes. injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the... identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant
driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article means of identification.  It is to forestall these...
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,
2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in
the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the damages or injuries caused on public highways. 
motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas' car;
and it is on the basis of this fact that we hold Filcar primarily The general public policy involved in motor vehicle
and directly liable to Espinas for damages. registration is the protection of innocent third persons who
may have no means of identifying public road malefactors
As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or and, therefore, would find it difficult if not impossible to
omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for seek... redress for damages they may sustain in accidents
the torts committed by himself and not by another. This resulting in deaths, injuries and other damages; by fixing the
general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code. person held primarily and directly liable for the damages
The obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that
one's act or omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, relief will always be available to them.
i.e., the person who committed the negligent act or omission. To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for
The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes... the damages would also prevent a situation where a
certain persons liable for the act or omission of another. registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability
One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable by passing on the blame to another who may have no means
for the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the to answer for the damages caused, thereby... defeating the
Civil Code states: claims of victims of road accidents. We take note that some
motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their
Article 2180.  The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but instances, do not have the financial means to pay for the
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. damages caused in case of... accidents.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when These same principles apply by analogy to the case at bar.
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all Filcar should not be permitted to evade its liability for
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. damages by conveniently passing on the blame to another
party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his
Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil
alleged driver, Floresca. Following our... reasoning in
Code, an action predicated on an employee's act or omission
Equitable, the agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to
may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for
assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas
the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.
who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the
Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle
makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law registration.
principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and
Thus, whether the driver of the motor vehicle, Floresca, is an
vigilance over the acts of one's subordinates to prevent
employee of Filcar is irrelevant in arriving at the conclusion
damage to another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of
that Filcar is primarily and directly liable for the damages
the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he
sustained by Espinas.
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any
recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the
Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable
driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust
The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a
vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of his right to be indemnified by the... actual employer of the driver
motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for
vehicle registration, which has been discussed by this Court in the injury caused to another.
Erezo, and cited by the CA in its... decision:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the

OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., vs. GERONIMO BACOY
owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or
G.R. No. 173870 April 25, 2012
injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual,
FACTS:
Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, registered owner’s vehicle in connection with his employment.
were on their way home from a Christmas party they
attended. Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that
Allan was still his employee at the time of the accident, a
Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends
by a Fuso passenger jeep that was being driven by Allan that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an
Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of employers vicarious liability for the employees fault under
petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a
public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.
Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route. Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case for subject vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses available
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability
against Allan before the Regional Trial Court. The said court for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.
declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged cohorts. Negligence
Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
children of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case, an independent Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under
civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally, the thing speaks for
Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged employers, itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant
namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in
Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the registered a well secured area not remote to the watchful senses of its
owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr.  driver Rodrigo.
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims’ Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that
deaths. They averred that Monsaluds have no cause of action caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep management of the defendant or his servants; and the
and that they were never the employers of Allan. Oscar Jr. accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen
even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case if those who had management or control used proper care, it
against Allan and his companions. The case was, however, affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient,
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the
The RTC, exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of
liability for insufficiency of evidence. However, their son care. 
Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The
RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as
loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part of established by jurisprudence are as follows:
a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an injury 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
is shown to be under his management and that in the unless someone is negligent;
ordinary course of things, the accident would not have 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of
happened had there been an exercise of care.  the person in charge and
Oscar Jr., moved for reconsideration and the lower court set 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
aside its earlier decision. voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
Geronimo appealed, and the CA granted the appeal. With injured.
regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to
the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the The above requisites are all present in this case. 
registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now
the operation of such vehicle. arises a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he
Oscar Jr., filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari. could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care
and diligence in preventing strangers from using his
ISSUES:  Whether Oscar Del Carmen Jr. is civilly liable to the jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
heirs of the victims. (YES)
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs
RULING: conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan
to use the jeep. 
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its
third persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.
 once the surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge
Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that of the proceedings, the acts or omissions of operating room
Allan was still his employee at the time of the accident, a personnel, and any negligence associated with such acts or
finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends omissions, are imputable to the surgeon. While the assisting
that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital, or
employers vicarious liability for the employees fault under engaged by the patient, they normally become the temporary
Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him. servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while the
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed upon
subject vehicle was stolen which are valid defenses available the surgeon for their negligent acts under the doctrine of
to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability respondeat superior.
for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.
ISSUE:
ROGELIO NOGALES vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
G.R. No. 142625, 19 December 2006. Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Estrada as its attending independent-contractor physician..
FACTS:
HELD:
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales who was
then 37 years old, was under the exclusive prenatal care of YES. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her fourth month of independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an
pregnancy or as early as December 1975. exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital. This
While Corazon was in her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent
Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and authority.”
development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a
dangerous complication of pregnancy. Around midnight of 25 The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two
May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains factors to determine the liability of an independent-
prompting Corazon and Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at contractor physician. The first factor focuses on the hospital’s
his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry
immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center. whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was
The following day, Corazon was admitted at 2:30 a.m. at the alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the
CMC after the staff nurse noted the written admission hospital. In this regard, the hospital need not make express
request of Dr. Estrada. Upon Corazon’s admission at the CMC, representations to the patient that the treating physician is
Rogelio Nogales executed and signed the “Consent on an employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be
Admission and Agreement” and “Admission Agreement.” general and implied.
Corazon was then brought to the labor room of the CMC.
Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was The second factor focuses on the patient’s reliance. It is
“hemorrhage, post partum.” sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the
plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the Regional its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
Trial Court of Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada, and the rest of
CMC medical staff for the death of Corazon. In their defense, In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a
CMC pointed out that Dr. Estrada was a consultant to be member of its medical staff. Through CMC’s acts, CMC
considered as an independent-contractor, and that no clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading
employer-employee relationship existed between the former the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an
and the latter. employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such
authority.
After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court rendered
judgment on 22 November 1993 finding Dr. Estrada solely The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a
liable for damages. Petitioners appealed the trial court’s perceived employment relationship with CMC in accepting Dr.
decision. Petitioners claimed that aside from Dr. Estrada, the Estrada’s services. Rogelio testified that he and his wife
remaining respondents should be held equally liable for specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon’s delivery not
negligence. Petitioners pointed out the extent of each only because of their friend’s recommendation, but more
respondent’s alleged liability. importantly because of Dr. Estrada’s “connection with a
reputable hospital, the [CMC].”
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
ruling and applied the “borrowed servant doctrine” to release In other words, Dr. Estrada’s relationship with CMC played a
the liability of other medical staff. This doctrine provides that significant role in the Spouses Nogales’ decision in accepting
Dr. Estrada’s services as the obstetrician-gynecologist for On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines,
Corazon’s delivery. Moreover, as earlier stated, there is no still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter
showing that before and during Corazon’s confinement at found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon
CMC, the Spouses Nogales knew or should have known that being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house
Dr. Estrada was not an employee of CMC. xxx CMC’s defense where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
that all it did was “to extend to [Corazon] its facilities” is measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the
untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that pains would soon vanish.
hospitals, such as CMC, are in the business of treatment.
Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains
The Court finds respondent Capitol Medical Center vicariously intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada. The amounts of Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon
P105,000 as actual damages and P700,000 as moral damages Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in
should each earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in
per annum computed from the date of the judgment of the width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal
trial court. fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced
stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC. V. AGANA operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in
G.R. NO. 126297, 126467, 127590, JANUARY 31, 2007 October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery.

FACTS: On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages
City General Hospital because of difficulty of bowel against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the
movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes . They
medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two
127590, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for
sigmoid." concealing their acts of negligence.

On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional
the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for
surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.
sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the Fuentes. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with
removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction
consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States. On
Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases,
hysterectomy on her. Natividad died and was duly substituted by her above-named
children. On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil favor of the Aganas.
took over, completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed, because in ISSUE:
the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, Whether Professional Services Inc. is liable for the negligence
the attending nurses entered the remarks: "sponge count of Dr. Ampil.
lacking 2” "announced to surgeon search done but to no avail
continue for closure." NOTE:
3 reasons given by SC to pronounce PSI vicariously liable.
Natividad Agana was discharged on April 24, 1984 and payed (1)Employer-Employee relationship. (2)Principle of Apparent
hospital bills amounting to 60,000 Php. Authority; (3) Doctrine of Corporate Negligence.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating
pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. HELD: YES.
Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural (1)In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the
consequence of the surgery. Dr. Ampil then recommended hospital and the physicians is rendered inconsequential in
that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of
nodes which were not removed during the operation. Appeals that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship
On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
went to the United States to seek further treatment. After visiting physicians. This Court held:
four months of consultations and laboratory examinations,
Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the
advised to return to the Philippines. hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their
work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for
‘consultant’ slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical
proof of completion of residency, their educational City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians
qualifications, generally, evidence of accreditation by the associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil
appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’
most cases, and references. These requirements are carefully conclusion that it "is now estopped from passing all the
scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in
review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or the public directory leading the public to believe that it
reject the application. vouched for their skill and competence." Indeed, PSI’s act is
tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City
After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality
consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico- health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital
interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and patient created the impression that they were its agents, authorized
audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the to perform medical or surgical services for its patients. As
privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them,
and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the accepted the services on the reasonable belief that such were
hospital. In addition to these, the physician’s performance as being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
a specialist is generally evaluated by a peer review committee servants.
on the basis of mortality and morbidity statistics, and
feedback from patients, nurses, interns and residents. A The wisdom of the foregoing ratiocination is easy to discern.
consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly Corporate entities, like PSI, are capable of acting only through
falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the other individuals, such as physicians. If these accredited
hospital or its peer review committee, is normally politely physicians do their job well, the hospital succeeds in its
terminated. mission of offering quality medical services and thus profits
financially. Logically, where negligence mars the quality of its
In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real services, the hospital should not be allowed to escape liability
control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff. for the acts of its ostensible agents.
While ‘consultants’ are not, technically employees,
the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate (3) The doctrine of corporate negligence as the judicial
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer- answer to the problem of allocating hospital’s liability for the
employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of negligent acts of health practitioners, absent facts to support
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the application of respondeat superior or apparent authority.
the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of Its formulation proceeds from the judiciary’s
the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating acknowledgment that in these modern times, the duty of
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer- providing quality medical service is no longer the sole
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and prerogative and responsibility of the physician. The modern
their attending and visiting physicians. hospitals have changed structure. Hospitals now tend to
organize a highly professional medical staff whose
(2) Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as competence and performance need to be monitored by the
the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or hospitals commensurate with their inherent responsibility to
agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It provide quality medical care.
imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a
contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates
a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the
into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. The concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the
applicability of apparent authority in the field of hospital public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable
liability was upheld long time ago in Irving v. Doctor Hospital care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility
of Lake Worth, Inc. for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform
such duty.
There, it was explicitly stated that "there does not appear to
be any rational basis for excluding the concept of apparent It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated
authority from the field of hospital liability." Thus, in cases on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City
where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and
out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the
that a patient has accepted treatment from that physician in operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive
the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the
hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze
negligence. were missing. In Fridena v. Evans,41 it was held that a
corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice
given to its agents or officers within the scope of their
authority and in reference to a matter to which their RULING:
authority extends. This means that the knowledge of any of
the staff of Medical City Hospital constitutes knowledge of NO. The operation of private pay hospitals and medical
PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’ clinics is impressed with public interest and imbued with a
report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the heavy social responsibility. But the hospital is also a business,
missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not only did and, as a business, it has a right to institute all measures of
PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who efficiency commensurate to the ends for which it is designed,
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an especially to ensure its economic viability and survival. And in
active step in fixing the negligence committed. This renders the legitimate pursuit of economic considerations, the extent
PSI, not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil to which the public may be served and cured is expanded, the
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for pulse and life of the medical sector quickens, and the
its own negligence under Article 2176. regeneration of the people as a whole becomes more visibly
attainable. In the institution of cost-cutting measures, the
MANILA DOCTORS HOSPITAL, Petitioner, v. SO UN CHUA and hospital has a right to reduce the facilities and services that
VICKY TY, Respondents. are deemed to be non-essential, such that their reduction or
G.R. NO. 150355 : July 31, 2006 removal would not be detrimental to the medical condition of
the patient.18 For the moment, the question to be
FACTS: considered is whether the subject facilities are indeed non-
essential - the air-conditioner, telephone, television, and
This case originated from an action for damages filed with the refrigerator - the removal of which would cause the adverse
RTC by respondents So Un Chua and Vicky Ty against health effects and emotional trauma the respondents so
petitioner Manila Doctors Hospital. The complaint is premised claimed. Corollary to this question is whether the petitioner
on the alleged unwarranted actuations of the petitioner observed the diligence of a good father of the family in the
hospital towards its patient, respondent So Un Chua (Chua), course of ascertaining the possible repercussions of the
who was confined for hypertension, diabetes, and related removal of the facilities prior to the removal itself and for a
illnesses. reasonable time thereafter, with a view to prevent damage.

Ty represented that she will settle the bills as soon as the With respect to the propriety of the notice of removal of
funds become available; that Ty pleaded to the management facilities, the evidence shows that the hospital staff,
that in view of the physical condition of her mother, Chua, accompanied by Sister Gladys Lim, SPC, Finance
the correspondences relating to the settlement of the unpaid Administrative Assistant of the hospital, through written and
hospital bills should be relayed to the former; that these verbal notices as per hospital policy, forewarned the
pleas were unheeded by the petitioner; that petitioner respondents, through respondent Ty and her sister, Judith
threatened to implement unpleasant measures unless Chua, of the impending removal of the facilities over a week
respondent Ty undertakes her mother's obligation as well as beforehand in view of their obstinate refusal to vacate and
the obligation of her sister, Judith Chua, to pay the transfer to a lower rate room or to update the mounting
hospitalization expenses; that petitioner made good its threat hospital bills which, by then, had swollen to approximately
and employed unethical, unpleasant and unlawful methods one million pesos. Respondent Ty refused to read many of
which allegedly worsened the condition of respondent Chua, the written notices sent by the Credit Department.
particularly, by (i) cutting off the telephone line in her room
and removing the air-conditioning unit, television set, and A hospital may legally detain a patient against his will when
refrigerator, (ii) refusing to render medical attendance and to he is a detained or convicted prisoner, or when the patient is
change the hospital gown and bed sheets, and (iii) barring the suffering from a very contagious disease where his release
private nurses or midwives from assisting the patient. will be prejudicial to public health, or when the patient is
mentally ill such that his release will endanger public safety,
Respondents thus prayed for the award of moral damages, or in other exigent cases as may be provided by law. Under
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees although respondent the common law doctrines on tort, it does not constitute a
Ty paid up to P435,000.00, more or less, she reneged on her trespass to the person to momentarily prevent him from
commitment to pay the balance in violation of the Contract leaving the premises or any part thereof because he refuses
for Admission and Acknowledgment of Responsibility for to comply with some reasonable condition subject to which
Payment dated October 30, 1990 which she voluntarily he entered them. In all cases, the condition of this kind of
executed; that she signed a Promissory Note on June 5, 1992 restraint must be reasonable in the light of the circumstances.
for the unpaid balance of P1,075,592.95 and issued postdated At any rate, as stated above, the patient is free to leave the
checks to cover the same. premises, even in the ostensible violation of these conditions,
after being momentarily interrupted by the hospital staff for
ISSUE: purposes of informing him of those reasonable conditions,
such as the assessment of whether the patient is fit to leave,
Is the Manila Doctors liable for damages claimed by Ty? insane, or suffering from a contagious disease, etc., or simply
for purposes of making a demand to settle the bill. If the savings accounts of CASA Montessori with interest at 6% per
patient chooses to abscond or leave without the consent of annum.
the hospital in violation of any of the conditions deemed to
be reasonable under the circumstances, the hospital may RTC rendered a decision in favor of CASA Montessori. On
nonetheless register its protest and may choose to pursue the appeal, the CA modified the Decision of the RTC and
legal remedies available under law, provided that the hospital apportioned the loss between BPI and CASA. The appellate
may not physically detain the patient, unless the case falls court took into account CASA’s contributory negligence that
under the exceptions abovestated. resulted in the undetected forgery. It then ordered Leonardo
T. Yabut to reimburse BPI half the total amount claimed; and
The courts a quo found that respondent Ty had "no choice CASA, the other half.
but to sign the promissory note in order for her mother to be
released from the hospital," thus suggesting that the hospital ISSUES:
refused to actually discharge or bodily release its patient,
respondent Chua, until arrangements had been made to (1) Should CASA be held liable for the other half of the total
settle the charges. However as testified by Sister Galeno, and amount loss on account of contributory negligence?
corroborated by Editha Vecino; and that, petitioner, a private
hospital established for profit, being also a business, by (2) Whether BPI should be held liable for the negligence of its
warning respondents that it shall withhold clearance, is officers.
simply exercising its right to protest against an absconding
patient as a precursor to avail of other appropriate legal HELD:
remedies; that, on the contrary, the respondents opted not to
leave because of their own promise not to leave unless the No.
hospital bills were fully settled; that the accusations found in
the Demand Letter dated May 19, 1992, and signed by the In this jurisdiction, the negligence of the party invoking
counsel for the respondents, particularly, that the petitioner forgery is recognized as an exception to the general rule that
"refused to discharge the patient, [respondent Chua,] despite a forged signature is wholly inoperative. Contrary to BPI’s
orders from the attending physician, Dr. Rody Sy," had all claim, however, we do not find CASA negligent in handling its
been refuted by Sister Galeno when she read its contents in financial affairs. CASA, we stress, is not precluded from
front of the counsel for respondents, emphatically telling him setting up forgery as a real defense.
that "we are not detaining his clients;" that "[respondent Ty]
was the one who told us that they are not going to leave the The financial statements are representations of the client; but
hospital unless they have fully paid the hospital;" and that, it is the auditor who has the responsibility for the accuracy in
most importantly, no physical restraint upon the person of the recording of data that underlies their preparation, their
respondent Chua or upon the person of her relatives had form of presentation, and the opinion expressed therein. The
been imposed by the staff. auditor does not assume the role of employee or of
management in the client’s conduct of operations and is
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. CASA MONTESSORI never under the control or supervision of the client.
INTERNATIONALE LEONARDO T. YABUT
G.R. No. 149454. May 28, 2004 Yabut was an independent auditor hired by CASA. He handled
its monthly bank reconciliations and had access to all relevant
FACTS: documents and checkbooks. In him was reposed CASA’s, trust
and confidence that he would perform precisely those
CASA Montessori International opened Current Account with functions and apply the appropriate procedures in
BPI, with CASA’s President Ms. Ma. Carina C. Lebron as one of accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Yet
its authorized signatories. he did not meet these expectations. Nothing could be more
horrible to a client than to discover later on that the person
After conducting an investigation, CASA Montessori tasked to detect fraud was the same one who perpetrated it.
discovered that nine (9) of its checks had been encashed by a
certain Sonny D. Santos in the total amount of ₱782,000.00 (2) Yes. For allowing payment on the checks to a wrongful and
fictitious payee, BPI -- the drawee bank -- becomes liable to
It turned out that ‘Sonny D. Santos’ with account at BPI’s its depositor-drawer. Since the encashing bank is one of its
Greenbelt Branch was a fictitious name used by Leonardo T. branches, BPI can easily go after it and hold it liable for
Yabut who worked as external auditor of CASA Montessori. reimbursement. It "may not debit the drawer’s account and is
Yabut voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of not entitled to indemnification from the drawer." In both law
Ms. Lebron and encashed the checks. and equity, when one of two innocent persons "must suffer
by the wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne
CASA Montessori then filed a Complaint for Collection with by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the
Damages against BPI praying that the latter be ordered to loss or who put it into the power of the third person to
reinstate the amount of ₱782,500.00 in the current and perpetrate the wrong."
 quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Proximate cause is determined by the facts of the case. "It is Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. Ramos denied liability for
that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquil, which
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos asserted
injury, and without which the result would not have the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda
occurred." Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon
Pursuant to its prime duty to ascertain well the genuineness prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.
of the signatures of its client-depositors on checks being The MeTC rendered the Decision dated 1 March 2006
encashed, BPI is "expected to use reasonable business exculpating (Ramos) from liability.
prudence." In the performance of that obligation, it is bound
by its internal banking rules and regulations that form part of ISSUE:
the contract it enters into with its depositors.
Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable for the negligence of
Unfortunately, it failed in that regard. First, Yabut was able to Rodel Ilustrisimo.
open a bank account in one of its branches without privity;
that is, without the proper verification of his corresponding HELD:
identification papers. Second, BPI was unable to discover
early on not only this irregularity, but also the marked YES, What is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly
differences in the signatures on the checks and those on the ignored these barricades and drove through it. Without
signature card. Third, despite the examination procedures it doubt, his negligence is established by the fact that he
conducted, the Central Verification Unit of the bank even violated a traffic regulation.
passed off these evidently different signatures as genuine. However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for
Without exercising the required prudence on its part, BPI Rodel’s contributory negligence in driving the Ford
accepted and encashed the eight checks presented to it. As a Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. We
result, it proximately contributed to the fraud and should be cannot exculpate Rodel from liability. Having thus settled the
held primarily liable for the "negligence of its officers or contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption
agents when acting within the course and scope of their of negligence on the part of Ramos. For the employer to
employment." It must bear the loss. avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his
employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by
presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the
LAMBERT S. RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises
G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009 the care and diligence of a good father of a family. Ramos’
driver was texting with his cellphone while running at a high
FACTS: speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew
that Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that
On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, the road was barricaded with barriers. As the employer of
along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City, a vehicular Rodel, Ramos is solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing committed by the former.
Plate Number XDN 210 (owned by C.O.L. Realty Corporation
and driven by Aquilino Larin) and a Ford Expedition bearing THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION V.
Plate Number LSR 917 (owned by Lambert Ramos and COURT OF APPEALS AND L.C. DIAZ AND COMPANY, CPA’S
driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo). A passenger of the sedan, G.R. NO. 138569 SEPTEMBER 11, 2003
one Estela Maliwat sustained injuries, she was
immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment. FACTS: L.C. Diaz and Company, a professional partnership,
opened a savings account with Solidbank.
C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly
driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Macaraya, filled up two savings
kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just deposit slips to be deposited with Solidbank. Macaraya
crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when Ramos’ instructed the messenger, Calapre, to deposit the money and
Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right gave him the Solidbank passbook.
rear door and fender. Upon investigation, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the
indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for two deposit slips and the passbook. Since the transaction
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C.
Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank.
the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to
hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him
P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting that "somebody” got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C.
(C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.
 Solidbank’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip with a check of unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings
P200,000. Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to account of L.C. Diaz. The appellate court reached this
Solidbank. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. conclusion after applying the provision of the Civil Code on
6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she quasi-delict.
could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When
Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, The Court of Appeals pointed out that the teller of Solidbank
Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got who received the withdrawal slip for P300,000 allowed the
the passbook. withdrawal without making the necessary inquiry. The
appellate court stated that the teller, who was not presented
The following day, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive by Solidbank during trial, should have called up the depositor
Officer, Luis C. Diaz ("Diaz"), called up Solidbank to stop any because the money to be withdrawn was a significant
transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could amount. Had the teller called up L.C. Diaz, Solidbank would
open a new account. On the same day, Diaz formally wrote have known that the withdrawal was unauthorized. The teller
Solidbank to make the same request. It was also on the same did not even verify the identity of the impostor who made the
day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the withdrawal. Thus, the appellate court found Solidbank liable
day before, of P300,000 from its savings account. The for its negligence in the selection and supervision of its
withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the employees.
authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L.
Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the The appellate court also ruled that the degree of diligence
withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received the required from Solidbank is more than that of a good father of
P300,000. a family. The business and functions of banks are affected
with public interest. Banks are obligated to treat the accounts
L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from Solidbank the of their depositors with meticulous care, always having in
return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank clients. The Court of Appeals found Solidbank remiss in its
with the Regional Trial Court. After trial, the trial court duty, violating its fiduciary relationship with L.C. Diaz.
rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the
complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ISSUE:
trial court. Is Solidbank liable?

Ruling of the Trial Court: HELD:

Yes, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
In absolving Solidbank, the trial court applied the rules on negligence, or culpa contractual.
savings account written on the passbook. The rules state that
"possession of this book shall raise the presumption of The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the
ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic Act No.
upon the production of the said book and entry therein of the 8791 ("RA 8791"), which took effect on 13 June 2000,
withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the declares that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of
depositor personally." banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance." This new provision in the general banking law,
At the time of the withdrawal, a certain Noel Tamayo was not introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme
only in possession of the passbook, he also presented a Court decisions, starting with the 1990 case of Simex
withdrawal slip with the signatures of the authorized International v. Court of Appeals, holding that "the bank is
signatories of L.C. Diaz. The specimen signatures of these under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
persons were in the signature cards. The teller stamped the meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of
withdrawal slip with the words "Saving Teller No. 5." The their relationship.
teller then passed on the withdrawal slip to Genere Manuel
("Manuel") for authentication. Manuel verified the signatures This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to
on the withdrawal slip. The withdrawal slip was then given to observe "high standards of integrity and performance" is
another officer who compared the signatures on the deemed written into every deposit agreement between a
withdrawal slip with the specimen on the signature cards. The bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking
trial court concluded that Solidbank acted with care and requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than
observed the rules on savings account when it allowed the that of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code
withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz. states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is
that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family.
Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence
required from banks — that banks must observe "high
standards of integrity and performance" in servicing their CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC. V.
depositors. Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine years ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
after the unauthorized withdrawal of the P300,000 from L.C.
Diaz’s savings account, jurisprudence at the time of the G.R. NO. 170631 FEBRUARY 10, 2016
withdrawal already imposed on banks the same high standard
of diligence required under RA No. 8791. FACTS:

Likewise, Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of

On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking
diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the
along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United
depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know,
Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300
or should know, that the rules on savings account provide
van was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes.
that any person in possession of the passbook is
To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and
presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to
hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident,
the wrong person, they would be clothing that person
went to her aid and loaded her in the back of the van.
presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating
Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista),
unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing to return
to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista
the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C.
appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby
Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to
subdivision with Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for Reyes,
observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the
an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the
passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to
hospital. Upon investigation, it was found that the registered
receive the same.
owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation
engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours.
L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its
Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the
its service driver. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a
(2) days after the accident.
presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was
negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal
burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no
aunt, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a
negligence on its part or its employees.
Complaint for damages against Bautista and Caravan. In her
Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of
Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not
Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van
present to the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom
that hit Reyes.
Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return
the passbook to him. The record does not indicate that Teller
RTC found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the
No. 6 verified the identity of the person who retrieved the
vehicle. CA affirmed RTC.
passbook. Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its
standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person
ISSUE:
retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that
Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case.

Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under Whether or not Caravan should be held liable as an employer,
the principle of respondeat superior or command pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
responsibility. The defense of exercising the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not RULING:
a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa
aquiliana. Yes. Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's
liability for quasi-delict provided in Article 2180, in relation to
The bank must not only exercise "high standards of integrity Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 read:
and performance," it must also insure that its employees do
likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
will comply with its fiduciary duty. Solidbank failed to present another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the teller who had the duty to return to Calapre the the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
passbook, and thus failed to prove that this teller exercised existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
the "high standards of integrity and performance" required of quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Solidbank’s employees.
.....
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
 plaintiff must first establish that the employer is the
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, registered owner of the vehicle in question. Once the plaintiff
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable
who live in their company. presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or defendant to show that no liability under Article 2180 has
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live arisen.
in their company.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise of the vehicle in relation to the actual driver is concerned,
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their recognizes that between the owner and the victim, it is the
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter former that should carry the costs of moving forward with the
are employed or on the occasion of their functions. evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or
motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of owner may have done in relation to that employment.
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry. The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is
accessible to the public.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which Registration of the van that hit Reyes. The Certificate attests
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. to petitioner's ownership of the van. Petitioner itself did not
dispute its ownership of the van. Consistent with the rule we
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades have just stated, a presumption that the requirements of
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under
custody. Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the
following: first, that it had no employment relationship with
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Bautista.
Contrary to petitioner's position, it was not fatal to
respondent's cause that she herself did not adduce proof that On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its
Bautista acted within the scope of his authority. It was employee at the time of the accident. On the second,
sufficient that Abejar proved that petitioner was the petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting
registered owner of the van that hit Reyes. within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the
accident. On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, it exercised the requisite diligence in the selection and
Article 2180's specification that "[e]mployers shall be liable supervision of Bautista.
for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks[.]" Second, the operation of In its selection of Bautista as a service driver, petitioner
the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable contented itself with Bautista's submission of a non-
for death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles. professional driver's license. Employing a person holding a
non-professional driver's license to operate another's motor
vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in Traffic Code, which provides:
which the employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 2180 requires proof of two things: first, an SEC. 24. Use of driver's license and badge. — ...
employment relationship between the driver and the owner;
and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or . . . .
her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the
registered-owner rule only requires the plaintiff to prove that No owner of a motor vehicle shall engage, employ, or hire any
the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the person to operate such motor vehicle, unless the person
vehicle. sought to be employed is a duly licensed professional driver.

Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence
both the registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the when it selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed
an actual violation of law. Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the
plaintiff for the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the
To prove that it exercised the required diligence in cause.
supervising Bautista, petitioner presented copies of several  Prior to this appeal, Plaintiff E. Meritt, a contractor, had a
memoranda and company rules. These, however, are collision with the General Hospital Ambulance which turned
insufficient because petitioner failed to prove actual suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any
compliance. Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition
Appeals emphasized that to establish diligence in the had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor
supervision of employees, the issuance of company policies was affected. The plaintiff is seeking a certain amount for
must be coupled with proof of compliance: permanent injuries and the loss of wages during he was
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. In order for
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government
hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and which later authorized the plaintiff to bring suit against the
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of GPI and authorizing the Attorney- General to appear in said
proper instructions intended for the protection of the suit.
public and persons with whom the employer has relations On the other hand, the Attorney-General on behalf of the
through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary defendant urges that the trial court erred:
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as 1. In finding that the collision between the plaintiff’s
may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur,
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and who is an alleged agent or employee of the
monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be Government;
the constant concern of the employer, acting through 2. In holding that the Government of the Philippine
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the
supervisory functions. plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true
that the collision was due to the negligence of the
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and
chauffeur; and
supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and
3. In rendering judgment against the defendant for the
plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of
said company guidelines and policies on hiring and sum of P14,741
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, ISSUE: 
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent
not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual 1. W/N the Gov’t. is legally liable to the plaintiff by
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the allowing a lawsuit to commence against it
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, 2. W/N the ambulance driver is considered as an
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to employee of the government
overcome presumption.
RULING:
For failing to overturn the presumption that the requirements
of Article 2180 have been satisfied, petitioner must be held The waiver of immunity of the State does not mean
liable. concession of its liability. When the State allows itself to be
sued, all it does in effect is to give the other party an
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State is liable.
because Bautista was already dropped as a party is equally The waiver of immunity of the State does not mean
unmeritorious. The liability imposed on the registered owner concession of its liability. When the State allows itself to be
is direct and primary. It does not depend on the inclusion of sued, all it does in effect is to give the other party an
the negligent driver in the action. Agreeing to petitioner's opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State is liable.
assertion would render impotent the rationale of the motor Art. 1903, Par. 5 of the Civil Code reads that “The state is
registration law in fixing liability on a definite person. liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage should have been caused by the official
to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
MERITT VS. GPI which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
GR NO. 85044, JUNE 3, 1992 applicable. The responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered
FACTS: by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
The case is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the claim.
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable
remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to The liability of the State has two aspects, namely:
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose 1.  Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the
any lawful defense. tortious acts of special agents only.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special 2.  Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in
agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent. private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
Hence, there can be no liability from the government. As employer.
stated by Justice Story of United States “The Government Under the aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State
does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special
the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would agents.  The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be
involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, specially commissioned to do a particular... task but that such
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental
public interest.” functions.  If the State's agent is not a public official, and is
commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then
SPOUSES FONTENILLA vs Hon. INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will...
G.R. no. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991 be held liable as such for its agent's tort.  Where the
government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within
FACTS: the meaning of the provision.
On August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only
operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be
government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune
officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its from tort liability.
regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco On the other hand, a service which might as well be...
Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it
Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a collects revenues from it, the function is considered a
result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the
were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. government exercising proprietary functions, by express
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National provision of Rep. Act No. 3601.
Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with
was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for juridical personality and not a mere agency of the
employment as such regular driver of respondent after having government.  Since it is a corporate body performing non-
passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the
maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation damage caused by the accident... resulting from the tortious
Administration (NIA) authorities. act of its driver-employee.  In this particular case, the NIA
assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as
Spouses Fontanilla instituted a civil case against respondent such, it becomes answerable for damages.
NIA for damages in connection with the death of their son This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the
resulting from the aforestated accident. existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA.  The
negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.
ISSUE: It should be emphasized that the accident happened along
the Marikina National Road within the city limits of San Jose
Is NAI, a government corporation, be held liable for the City, an urban area.  Considering the fact that the victim was
damages caused by its driver? thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a...
strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high
HELD: speed.  This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered
substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the
YES. fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 2180 read as follows: campsite as early as... possible", as shown by their not
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their normal and initial reaction.
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the
in any business or industry." driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed
within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely
Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver... observe the tort committed by the student will attach to
proper and allowed speed limit within the city. the teacher in charge of such student,
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed following the first part of the provision. This
to pay herein petitioners-spouses. is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the
FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners,  head thereof, and only he, who shall be
vs. held liable as an exception to the general
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF rule. In other words, teachers in general
APPEALS, respondents. shall be liable for the acts of their students
G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988 except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the
FACTS: canon of reddendo singula
sinquilis  'teachers' should apply to the
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of
Gabaldon Primary School in Pangasinan.  Defendant Edgardo establishments of arts and trades to the
Aquino was a teacher therein.  During that time, the school word "apprentices." 
had several concrete blocks which remnants of the old school
shop were destroyed in World War II.  Defendant decided to Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that
help clear the area, so he gathered 18 of his male students private respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable
and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school
making a hole where the stone can be buried.  It was left and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly
unfinished so the following day he called 4 of the 18 students admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent
including the Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation.  Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging. 
Defendant left the children to level the loose soil while he
went to see Banez for the key to the school workroom where From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private
he can get some rope.  It was alleged that before leaving, he respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of
told the children “not to touch the stone”.  After he left, the the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for
children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to
concrete block slide down.  Unfortunately, Novelito Ylarde take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their
was pinned to the wall causing serious physical injuries which persons. However, as earlier pointed out, petitioners base the
as a consequence led to his death, 3 days thereafter.  The alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article 2176
parents of the victim, herein petitioners, filed a suit for which is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article
damages against both Aquino and Soriano. 2180. 
With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this:
ISSUE: WON both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for Were there acts and omissions on the part of private
damages. respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which
have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?
HELD: Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for damages. 
From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that
As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross
responsible for the death of the child Ylarde , he being the negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of
head of an academic school and not a school of arts and adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten
trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete
Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2)
doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only required the children to remain inside the pit even after they
the teacher and not the head of an academic school who had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying
should be answerable for torts committed by their students. nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any
This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered
is only the head of the school who can be held liable. In the them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so
same case, We explained:  apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4)
went to a place where he would not be able to check on the
After an exhaustive examination of the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the
problem, the Court has come to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. 
conclusion that the provision in question The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his
should apply to all  schools, academic as pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection
well as non-academic. Where the school is to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but
academic rather than technical or natural for the children to play around. Tired from the
vocational in nature, responsibility for the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with
whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and
instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice
them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College
the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio
loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on
the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents and sentenced
that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the defendants to pay jointly and severally for the damages
negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, caused by the death of Napoleon Castro.
the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the
unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which ISSUE:
exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.
Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarily liable with
The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the Jimmy Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without
cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would have RULING:
foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and
more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in NO. The rationale of the liability under Article 2180 is that so
an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the
assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the
sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision
concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to over the conduct of the student." Likewise, "the phrase used
the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco in Art. 2180 'so long as the students remain in their custody
parentis  to his pupils would have made sure that the children means the protective and supervisory custody that the school
are protected from all harm in his company. and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time."
BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION
vs. IAC and HEIRS OF CASTRO A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in
G.R. No. 70458 OCTOBER 8, 1988 "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in
the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a
FACTS: situation of temporary adjournment of school activities
where the student still remains within call of his mentor and
Within the premises of petitioner BCF is an ROTC Unit which is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area
is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its
Philippines. THe ROTC Unit, by way of accommodation to the nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of
AFP is provided by the petitioner BCF, an office and an armory being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without
located at the basement of its main building. more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
Jimmy Abon was the duly appointed armorer of the ROTC. He contemplated in the law.
received his appointment directly from the AFP. Not being an
employee of BFC, he also received his salary from the AFP, Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Jimmy B.
and received direct orders from Captain Roberto Ungos, Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in
Commandant of the BFC ROTC Unit, and concurrent the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon
commandant of other ROTC Units in Baguio, as well as an AFP Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art.
employee/officer. Jimmy Abon was a commerce student in 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
BCF. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

On March 3, 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident,
of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had
University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and to keep
former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As the armory well guarded." Apart from negating a finding that
a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school when he
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be
Military Commission No. 30, AFP. held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was
supposed to be working in the armory with definite
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when
damages, impleading petitioners Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. he shot Napoleon Castro.
Petitioners also raise the issue that, under Art. 2180 of the it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Civil Code, a school which offers both academic and Yamyamin.
technical/vocational courses cannot be held liable for a tort
committed by a student enrolled only in its academic Also, there were evidences presented by Aquinas that they
program; however, considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not were not negligent in letting Sister Yamyamin teach to their
in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the school as they took steps to avoid it by requiring several
Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon such other issue. documents for her qualification which she complied with.

AQUINAS SCHOOL V. INTON

G.R. NO. 184202, JANUARY 26, 2011 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
FACTS: THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
Jose Luis was a grade three student at Aquinas School. CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., respondents.
Respondent Sister Yamyamin, a religion teacher who began G.R. Nos. 66102-04 August 30, 1990
teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose
Luis’ grade three religion class. FACTS:

On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the At 11am on December 24, 1966, Catalina Pascua, Caridad
blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes
classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas boarded the
this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose Luis jeepney owned by spouses Isidro Mangune and Guillerma
got up again and went over to the same classmate. This time, Carreon and driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat,
unable to tolerate the child’s behavior, Yamyamin Pampanga bound for Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to spend
approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several Christmas with their families for P 24.00. Upon reaching
times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s barrio Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear wheel of
seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that the jeepney detached causing it to run in an unbalanced
spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the position. Driver Manalo stepped on the brake, causing the
blackboard while seated on the floor. jeepney to make a U-turn, invading and eventually stopping
on the opposite lane of the road (the jeepney's front faced
As a result of the incident, Intons filed an action for damages the south (from where it came) and its rear faced the north
on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and (towards where it was going)). The jeepney occupied and
Aquinas. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Intos. However, blocked the greater portion of the western lane, which is the
they were not satisfied to the award of damages which they right of way of vehicles coming from the north. Phil. Rabbit
appealed to increase it and held Aquinas solidarily liable with Bus Lines claims that almost immediately after the sudden U-
Yamyamin. turn the bus bumped the right rear portion of the jeep.
Defendants, on the other hand, claim that the bus stopped a
few minutes before hitting the jeepney. Either way, as a
ISSUE: result of the collision, three passengers of the jeepney
Whether Aquinas School should be held solidarily liable with (Catalina Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida Estomo) died
Yamyamin. while the other jeepney passengers sustained physical
injuries.

HELD: A criminal complaint was filed against the two drivers for
NO. The SC applied the Four-Fold Test under Labor Code to Multiple Homicide. The case against delos Reyes (driver of
determine if there is EE-ER relationship between the Aquinas Phil. Rabbit) was dismissed for insufficieny of evidence.
and Yamyamin but they found out that there is none. Manalo (jeepney driver), however, was convicted and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment. (3) complaints for
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of
an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in Pangasinan. (1) Spouses Casiano Pascua and Juana Valdez
order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua while Caridad Pascua sued in
religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its her behalf Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. (2) Spouses
students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as heirs of Erlinda
Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task Meriales. And (3) spouses Mariano Estomo and Dionisia
of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like Sarmiento sued as heirs of Adelaida Estomo. All three cases
the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach impleaded spouses Mangune and Carreon, Manalo (jeepney
religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was owners), Rabbit and delos Reyes as defendants. Plaintiffs
quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over anchored their suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon
Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted and Manalo on their contractual liability. As against Rabbit
the school directress’ testimony in this regard. Consequently, and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based their suits on their
culpability for a quasi-delict. Filriters Guaranty Assurance involved, there were no options available to him to have
Corporation, Inc. was also impleaded as additional defendant avoided the collision.
in the first case only.
FOURTH.The proximate cause of the accident was the
The trial court ruled in favour of then plaintiffs, finding negligence of jeepney driver Manalo and spouses Mangune
defendants negligent and having breached the contract of and Carreon. They all failed to exercise the precautions that
carriage.The IAC reversed the ruling of the trial court, are needed precisely pro hac vice. In culpa contractual, the
applying primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the moment a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is
presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident unless and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by
contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the substantial factor evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence as
test (which concluded that bus driver delos Reyes, NOT prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil
jeepney driver Manalo, was negligent). Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to
a fortuitous event.
ISSUE:
The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the
Who are liable for the death and injuries of the passenger? unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua, the police who
arrived on the scene, his (Manalo's) conviction and the
RULING: application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. Spouses
Mangune and Carreon alleged that their mechanic regularly
Only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters maintains the jeepney and on the day before the collision, the
Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims mechanic actually checked the vehicle and even tightened the
or their heirs. bolts, thus the incident was caused by a caso fortuito. The SC
upheld the trial court’s findings that "in an action for damages
FIRST. The principle of "the last clear" chance is applicable in against the carrier for his failure to safely carry his passenger
a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding to his destination, an accident caused either by defects in the
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands automobile or through the negligence of its driver, is not a
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers’ liability.
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground LASTLY. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable
that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. with the carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage.
(1) the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
SECOND. The IAC erred in applying the presumption that the passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier
driver who bumps the rear of another vehicle is guilty and the is exclusively responsible to the passenger, even if such
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. breach be due to the negligence of his driver. In other words,
This presumption is based on the responsibility given to a rear the carrier can neither shift his liability on the contract to his
vehicle of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is driver nor share it with him, for his driver's negligence is his;
the rear vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in (2) that would make the carrier's liability personal instead of
a position to observe the vehicle in front of it. Such merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover only
presumption is rebutted by the evidence that shows that the the share which corresponds to the driver contradictory to
jeepney, which was then traveling on the eastern shoulder, the explicit provision of Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35 meters,
crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark Hence, only Isidro Mangune, Guillerma Carreon and Filriters
of approximately 15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. are liable to the victims
point of impact. (Basically, the U-turn was sudden and delos or their heirs and that the amount of indemnity for loss of life
Reyes could not have reasonably anticipated it even though is increased to thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).
he was the rear vehicle)
HERMANA R. CEREZO V. DAVID TUAZON
THIRD. The bus cannot be made liable under the substantial G.R. No. 141538: March 23, 2004
factor test (that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor FACTS:
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the
harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in
him from being liable). Contrary to the findings of the Pampanga. Tricycle driver, Tuazon, filed a complaint for
appellate court, the bus was travelling within the speed limit damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her
allowed in highways. He also had only a few seconds to react husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver, Foronda. The trial
to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show
is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited the family. Mrs. Cerezo
was held solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon
arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the
pursuant to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under
Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee,
Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an
render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
over Foronda who is an indispensable party to the case. She employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not
also contends that Tuazon failed to reserve his right to preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the
institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a
action. subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence,
the employer is also civilly liable directly and separate for his
ISSUE: own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in
selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the
Was the trial correct in holding Mrs. Cerezo liable for employer's liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.
damages?
The action can be brought directly against the person
HELD: responsible (for another) without including the author of the
act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
Yes, Mrs. Cerezo liable for damages. that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by
the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot
Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based be instituted till after the judgment against he author of the
on criminal law but on quasi-delict under the Civil Code. act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action;
action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from principal action.
a delict under Art. 103, RPC, or may give rise to an action for
quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the
choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi- subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence
delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To hold the
There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the
from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the
choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, employee's delict and corresponding primary liability are
affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action. established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then
the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180:
Employer's liability. However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-
delict, which is separate and independent from an action
Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the
Cerezo's contention. An indispensable party is one whose filing of a separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the
interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation, and filing of an independent action based on quasi-delict against
without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.
However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a

quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary liability on
the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable
for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay
for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or
renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. Where
the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party
because complete relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon
may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is

primary and direct, while the employer's liability based on a
delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct," as
contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided