Rule 128, Sec.

1- EVIDENCE DEFINED; quantum of evidence, burden of proof/of evidence

1. Vitarich v. Losin, GR 181560, November 15, 2010, Mendoza, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
Losin was in the fastfood service business named Glamours chicken House in Cotabato City. Vitarich had been her supplier of poultry meat. From July to November
1996, Losin’s orders allegedly amounted to P921k. During this period, Losin’s orders were being serviced by Directo, Rosa, and Baybay. The three were later
terminated by or resigned from Vitarich. They left without turning over some supporting invoices covering Losin’s orders. Vitarich sent demand letters to Losin
covering the alleged P921k. It appears that Losin had issued 3 checks of P288,463 which were dishonored. Vitarich filed a complaint for sum of money against Losin.

RTC ruled for Vitarich. CA reversed. Hence this petition.

HELD:
1) Generally, petitions for review under R45 covers questions of law only. One exception is when the findings of CA are contrary to those of the trial court. Here,
CA’s findings are in conflict with RTC’s. Thus, SC reevaluated the evidence of both parties.

2) As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather on the creditor to prove non-
payment. True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that
the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law. In this case,
however, the burden of proof is on Losin because she alleges an affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin failed to discharge that burden.

Losin failed to present a single official receipt to prove payment. A receipt is the best evidence of the fact of payment although not exclusive. All she presented were
copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich thru its agent Directo, a statement of payments made to Vitarich, and copies of pertinent history of her
checking account with RCBC. At best, these may serve only as documentary records of her business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the payments but are not
enough to prove payment.

2.1) Under Art. 1249 of NCC, checks produce the effect of payment only when encashed. Here, no cash payment was proved. It was not proved that the checks Losin
issued were actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, SC cannot consider that payment.

2. Tan v. Hosana, GR 190846, February 03, 2016, Brion, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
Respondent Jose Hosana is married to Milagros Hoasana. They bought a house and lot in Naga City. Milagros sold to petitioner Tomas Tan the property thru a deed of
sale by herself and on behalf of Jose thru an SPA. The deed of sale stated that the purchase price was P200k. Petitioner made a total payment of P700k and when he
asked Milagros why the consideration stated only P200k, Milagros said it was to save on taxes. Jose later filed a complaint to annul the sale, alleging that his SPA to
Milagros was forged.

RTC ruled for Jose and nullified the sale. CA affirmed, directing Milagros to reimburse Tomas P200k, finding that Tomas’ allegation that he paid P700k was not
established. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Tomas Tan has proven that he paid P700k, not P200k.
HELD: NO.
1) Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered synonymous to “greater weight of
evidence.” Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid Milagros P700k cannot be considered proof of payment. One who pleads payment has the burden of proving it
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. A mere allegation is not evidence.

2) Contention: The deed of sale cannot be used as basis for proof of the reimbursable amount of consideration since it is a void document.
Held:
While the terms of a void contract cannot be enforced, it does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the
course of executing the contract, i.e. what each party has given in the execution of the contract. Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the
truth respecting a matter of fact. The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated and its
actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed is not to enforce it.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. There is no rule that excludes admissibility of a void document.

Thus, here, while the deed is void due to provision of law prohibiting sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s consent, it does not preclude the possibility that
Tomas paid the consideration stated therein.

3) The consideration stated in the deed of sale is prima facie evidence of the amount paid by Tomas. Tomas Tan failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut the
consideration stated in the deed. A notarized deed of sale is a public document and prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein. Prima facie evidence is
evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence is sufficient to establish a given fact.

Thus, SC ordered Jose to return only P200k.

3. People v. Caranguian, GR 124514, July 06, 2000, Quisumbing, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
On Aug. 01, 1991, Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) members Lumboy and Capili informed PO3 Birung that they saw 2 former Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) agents at nearby Brgy. Catarauan, Cagayan. PO3 Birung formed a team to track down the 2 former CAFGUs. Composed of Birung,
Lumboy, Capili, and 4 others, they proceeded to Brgy. Catarauan. In single file with Capili and Lumboy in the lead, they crossed an improvised wooden bridge over a
creek. Suddenly, Capili and Lumboy came under gunfire. Lumboy died. The next day, a civilian informer named Palos informed Birung that the 2 former CAFGUs
that the CVOs saw were Bernardino Caranguian and one Garcia. Caranguian was charged with murder of Lumboy.

ISSUE:
Whether Birung’s testimony established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: NO.
The quantum of evidence required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Section 2 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[p]roof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." The task of the prosecution is two-fold: first, to prove that a crime was committed, and second, that
accused is the person responsible. Thus, the prosecution must be able to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence beyond reasonable doubt to justify
the conviction of accused. The reason for requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt is that the state has unlimited command of means with counsel usually of capacity
in contrast to that of defendant engaged in a distracting struggle for liberty if not for life.

Here, Birung testified that Lumboy and Capili informed him that they sighted 2 former CAFGUs. Lumboy did not actually see the CAFGUs but merely heard the
news from his place. Birung testified that he merely heard from the people of Brgy. Catarauan that there were 2 dismissed CAFGUs in the vicinity. He testified that
the day after the incident, a civilian named Palos told him the names of accused. But Palos did not even witness the shooting incident. Thus, the information given by
Lumboy or Palos to Birung as to accused’s identity is hearsay. The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told
him. R130, S36 provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, derived from his own perception. Birung’s
testimony is double/multiple hearsay based on thirdhand information related to him by someone who heard it from others.

4. Ladaga v. Mapagu, GR 189689, November 13, 2012, Perlas-Bernabe, J., En Banc.

FACTS:
These are 3 consolidated petitions for issuance of writ of Amparo. Representative Ocampo publicly disclosed an Order of Battle by PowerPoint presentation during
the International Solidarity Mission conducted by various organizations. Petitioners have their names included in what is alleged to be an Order of Battle of the PH
Army’s 10th Infantry Division (10th ID), a list containing names of personalities in southern Mindanao supposedly connected with the CPP and its military arm the
NPA. They perceive that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is a threat to their life, liberty, and security and they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings.

Atty. Ladaga claims that suspicious looking persons have been visiting her Davao City law office, posing as members of the military or falsely claiming to be clients.
The petitioners also cite press releases of respondents stating that the “10th ID has its order of battle and it is not for public consumption.”

Petitioners separately filed in RTC a petition for issuance of writ of amparo. RTC found no substantial evidence of the perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty, and
security, dismissing the petitions. Hence these petitions.

ISSUE:
Whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule- substantial evidence.
HELD: NO.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. SC, recognizing the evidentiary
difficulties of amparo petitioners due to the fact that the State, that is supposedly tasked by law to investigate, is itself involved in the enforced disappearance/EJ
killings, laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence. SC found it a proper rule in amparo cases to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced." Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is
inadmissible under the rules for as long as it satisfies "the most basic test of reason — i.e., RELEVANCE of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency
with all other pieces of adduced evidence." But this flexibility in admissibility of evidence does not do away with the requirement of substantial evidence in
showing state involvement in the enforced disappearance/EJK.

Here, the statement of Rep. Ocampo that respondents are the real source of the OB List is hearsay since he had no personal knowledge concerning its preparation and
only received it from an unnamed source described as a “conscientious soldier.” But even if the Court were to apply the appropriate measure of flexibility here by
admitting the hearsay testimony of Representative Ocampo, a consideration of this piece of evidence to the totality of those adduced, namely, the Press Releases
issued by the 10th ID admitting the existence of a military-prepared Order of Battle, the affidavits of petitioners attesting to the threatening visits and tailing of their
vehicles by menacing strangers, as well as the violent deaths of alleged militant personalities, leads to the conclusion that the threat to petitioners' security has not been
adequately proven.

The existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behavior of suspicious men or the violent deaths of certain personalities. No
substantial evidence of an actual threat to petitioners’ life, liberty, or security was proven. For even if the existence of the OB List or the inclusion of petitioners’
names therein can be inferred from the totality of evidence presented, still, no link was shown to relate the OB List either to the threatening visits received by
petitioners from unknown men or to the violent deaths of the three mentioned personalities (Pojas, Monzon, Peñera whom petitioners claim were killed since
they were included in the OB List).

Sec.2- SCOPE
5. PDIC v. Casimiro, GR 206866, September 02, 2015, Perlas-Bernabe, J., First Division.
FACTS:
PDIC filed a joint affidavit with Ombudsman charging private respondents Cu, Zate, and Apelo of Direct Bribery, Corruption of Public Officials, and RA 3019, S3(e).
The joint affidavit stated that when PDIC took over on Dec. 22, 2008 as statutory receiver the affairs of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI), Gomez, former cashier
of BDBI, submitted an affidavit to PDIC stating irregularities committed by respondents. Gomez’ affidavit stated that Apelo would provide Cu an advance warning of
any impending surprise bank examinations on BDBI by BSP. Cu would then make necessary steps to misrepresent BDBI’s status. In exchange for the advance
warnings, Cu and Zate gave Apelo, as “professional fees”, the aggregate amount of P140k thru deposit in Apelo’s bank account.

Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause, saying that there is no proof that Apelo subsequently withdrew the amounts deposited to his
bank account. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether probable cause was established thru the affidavit only.
HELD: YES.
1) SC does not interfere in Ombudsman’s determination of probable cause unless there is gadalej.

2) Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and
definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence. The merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well
as the admissibility of evidence, are better ventilated during trial.

3) Cu and Zate resorted to mere denials in view of the grave accusations against them, while Apelo ignored the complaint by not filing a counter affidavit despite due
notice, failing to debunk the charges against them. Thus, this establishes probable cause that respondents may have committed the acts charged.

4) Hearsay admissible in PI- Ombudsman erred in discrediting Gomez’s affidavit as inadmissible for being hearsay. Owing to the initiatory nature of PIs, the
technical rules of evidence should not be applied. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining PC in PIs since such investigation is merely preliminary. The
determination of PC can rest partially or even entirely on hearsay evidence as long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible. PC can be established with
hearsay evidence as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.

Here, there is substantial basis to credit Gomez’s affidavit, even if hearsay, considering she was a former cashier and treasurer of BDBI, a high-ranking officer that
may be privy to delicate transactions.

6. Buenaflor Car Services, Inc. v. David, Jr., GR 222730, November 07, 2016, Perlas-Bernabe, J., First Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner has a company policy as to purchase and delivery of automotive products from suppliers. De Guzman prepares the purchase order which is submitted to
respondent for approval. Once approved, it would be given to the supplier who would deliver the products. De Guzman would receive the products and submit a copy
of the purchase order to Del Rosario (Accounting assistant), who in turn prepares the request for payment. The check is then prepared. It is company policy that all
checks should be issued to the name of the supplier and not in “cash.” Later, 27 checks were discovered to have the words “OR CASH” inserted after the payee’s
name. When confronted, Del Rosario admitted that she inserted “OR CASH” upon respondent’s instruction. Her confession was put into writing (extrajudicial
confession).

Del Rosario and De Guzman were terminated from service. De Guzman filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA found that respondent and De Guzman, was
illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether NLRC and CA were correct in determining that the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible due to the res inter alios acta rule.
HELD: NO.
SC found that the dismissals were valid since it is unlikely that respondent, being the one who approves the purchase orders, had no participation in the scheme.
1) R130, S30 provides for the res inter alios acta rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Thus, an
extrajudicial confession is not admissible against a co-accused since it is considered as hearsay against them.

BUT NLRC should NOT have bound itself by the technical rules of procedure as it is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in deciding labor
cases. NLRC Rules state that the rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure.”

And even if the res inter alios acta rule applied, the exception on independently relevant statements applies. Under this doctrine, regardless of the truth or falsity of
independent relevant statements, the fact that such statements were made is relevant. The statements are admissible. This is primary not secondary evidence. The EJ
confession is independently relevant to prove participation of respondent in the scheme considering his vital role in petitioner’s procurement process.

Sec.3- ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

7. BSP Group, Inc. v. Go, GR 168644, February 16, 2010, Peralta, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner, domestic corporation, is presided by its representative Ricardo Bangayan. Respondent Sally Go is Bangayan’s wife who was employed in petitioner
company as cashier. Bangayan filed with the prosecutor’s office a complaint for qualified theft against Go, alleging that several checks worth a total of P1.5M issued
by petitioner’s customers were, instead of being turned over to the company’s coffers, indorsed by Go who deposited it to her personal account in Security Bank.
Thus, Go was charged in RTC with qualified theft. The prosecution moved for issuance of subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum against the managers or records
custodians of security Bank’s Divisoria branch and Metrobank Jose Abad Santos, Tondo Branch. RTC granted.

ISSUE:
Whether the deposit of checks to the Security Bank account is relevant to the allegation of theft of cash.
HELD: NO.
1) Whether the elements of qualified theft concur as to overcome the presumption of innocence is a question that must pass the test of relevance and competence under
R128, S3. Here, whether the evidence sought to be suppressed- the checks purportedly stolen and deposited in Go’s security Bank account- are relevant is to be
addressed by considering whether they have such direct relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence, or whether they relate
collaterally to a fact from which, by process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue.

Here, the fact-in-issue is that respondent has taken away cash of P1.5M from petitioner’s coffers. Supporting this allegation, petitioner seeks to establish the
elemental act of taking by adducing evidence that Go, at several times, deposited some of petitioner’s checks to her account in Security Bank.

2) Contention: There is no difference between cash and check such that the allegation of theft of cash in the information and the evidence that respondent stole checks
and deposited it in her bank account are connected.
Held: Checks irrelevant.
In theft, the evidence must prove that the offender has unlawfully taken money belonging to another. Petitioner tries to connect its evidence and the allegation of theft
by claiming that respondent had fraudulently deposited checks in her own name. But this line of argument seeks to establish not theft, but some other crime,
probably estafa. That there is no difference between cash and check may be true in other instances, like estafa (estafa by conversion where whether the thing
converted is cash or check is immaterial since a check is under commercial usage a substitute for cash). In estafa, the checks would be the best evidence to establish
the act of conversion in support of the proposition that the offender had indorsed it in his own name.

But theft is not of such character. Thus, for our purposes, as the Information in this case accuses respondent of having stolen cash, proof tending to establish that
respondent has actualized her criminal intent by indorsing the checks and depositing the proceeds thereof in her personal account, becomes not only irrelevant but
also immaterial and, on that score, inadmissible in evidence.

Likewise, the testimony of Marasigan (SB representative) on the particulars of Go’s supposed bank account with Security Bank are irrelevant since they do not have
any logical and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft. (Also, it is excluded by RA 1405, Bank Secrecy, for trying to establish
the existence of the bank account.)

8. De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit, AC 6470, July 08, 2014, Sereno, CJ., En Banc.
FACTS:
De Jesus filed an affidavit complaint against respondent, alleging that respondent had drafted and notarized a REM of a public market stall that falsely named De
Jesus as its owner. Thus, the mortgagee sued De Jesus for perjury and sum of money. Respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused De Jesus legal and
financial problems- a lease agreement without the signature of the lessees, and a sale agreement over a property covered by a CLOA, where respondent drafted and
notarized the agreement but did not advise De Jesus that the property was still covered by the period within which it could not be alienated.

An exchange of pleadings ensued. De Jesus submitted a motion for submission of additional evidence. Attached thereto were copies of documents notarized by
respondent:
(1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either
the principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease
contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8)
an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10) an unsigned Consent to Adoption.
ISSUE:
Whether these additional documents are admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
Contention: Respondent argues that the documents submitted in evidence by De Jesus are inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of RVI, S4 of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
Held: Admissible since not excluded and relevant.
In Tolentino v. Mendoza, a comparable argument was raised in which respondent opposed the admission of birth certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of
his grossly immoral conduct since these were obtained in violation of Rule 24, AO 1, s.1993. SC rejected his argument thus:
R128, S3 provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. The birth certs are relevant
to the issue. R24, AO 1 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that
procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render the records inadmissible in evidence. Since R24, AO 1 and the Rules on
Evidence do not provide for exclusion of such birth certificates, these are thus admissible.
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, IBP correctly
considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by complainant as additional evidence.

SC found that respondent is guilty of violating the CPR and suspended her from practice of law for 1 year and perpetually disqualifying her from being commissioned
as notary public.

9. People v. Samontañez, GR 134530, December 04, 2000, De Leon, Jr., J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Lolita delas Alas, 18yo, was found dead at 8pm in the middle of a sugar cane plantation in Nasugbu, Batangas, Brgy. Bunducan. She was raped before being killed.
Nobody witnessed the actual crime. But Roberto Samontañez was seen at around 630pm in the evening while he was in the act of coming out of the sugar cane
plantation near the place where the dead body was found. 3 days later, Roberto was fetched by police authorities from his workplace. During investigation, Roberto
admitted to the police that the other personal belongings of Lolita were inside his bag that was left at his workplace. The police recovered said personal belongings.
Samontañez was charged with rape with homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether the personal belongings and the confession are admissible.
HELD: NO.
Roberto had pleaded guilty during arraignment. But in a later hearing, he said that he pleaded guilty only because he was pressured by a police officer. SC found that
RTC should have propounded clarificatory questions on the matter like the identity of such policeman etc. Also, RTC, when Samontanez had pleaded guilty, failed to
emphasize that the plea would not reduce his death penalty. He was also not properly informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him. RTC also should
have probed deeper to secure every material detail of the crime.

1) RTC considered pieces of evidence that are inadmissible for being “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Roberto Samontañez was actually arrested by police November
28, 1995 at his workplace in Barangay Galicia III, Mendez, Cavite. It does not appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights
during the police custodial investigation which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution. It also does not appear that he was assisted by
counsel during the said custodial investigation. In the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from the appellant during the police custodial
investigation relative to the crime, including any other evidence secured by virtue of the said confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not
objected to during the trial by the counsel of the appellant. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim (wristwatch, Joop cologne, gold ring) recovered from
Samontanez’s bag after police illegally obtained a confession from Samontanez are inadmissible.

Once the primary source (tree) is shown to have been illegally obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible.

SC remanded the case to RTC for proper arraignment.

10. Navarro v. CA, GR 121087, August 26, 1999, Mendoza, J., Second Division. (RA 4200)
FACTS:
Jalbuena and Lingan, reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, went to Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. When a
dancer began to perform a strip act on stage and removed her brassieres, Jalbuena took out his camera and took a picture. Liquin, floor manager, and Sioco, security
guard, demanded to know why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied “Wala kang pakialam because this is my job.” When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out
his gun, he ran out. Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. The 3 policemen on duty, including petitioner, were having drinks.
Liquin and Sioco arrived and were met by petitioner. They talked for 15 mins. Then petitioner turned to Jalbuena and said “Putangina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin
xxx.” Lingan intervened. Petitioner told Sgt. Anonuevo to make a record of the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. This angered Lingan. Lingan and petitioner had a
heated exchange. Lingan then said, “Msyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo.” Petitioner replied, “Ah ganoon?” As Lingan was
about to turn away, petitioner hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell and tried to get up, but petitioner gave him a fist blow on the
forehead.

Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and Lingan. Petitioner was charged with homicide.

ISSUE:
Whether the tape recording is admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
Jalbuena’s testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. RA 4200 prohibits wire tapping:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word xxx.
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not
private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of
the persons such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he
recorded; and the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.

SC affirmed the conviction of homicide.

11. Reyes v. People, GR 229380, June 06, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe, J., Second Division. (Unreasonable search/seizure)
FACTS:
The prosecution alleged that at 8pm, a group of police officers from Rizal, including PO1 Monteras, was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona,
Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog.
After a few minutes, Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered
her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled something out from her breast area and held
a small plastic sachet on her right hand. PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with "LRC-1. He
conducted inventory and photography before Brgy. Captain Angeles. PO1 Monteras proceeded to Rizal Provincial Crime Lab and turned the item to Police Sr. Insp.
Villaraza who confirmed that the item contained shabu.

RTC convicted Reyes. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the shabu is admissible in evidence/Whether the arrest and search was lawful.
HELD: NO.
1) Under R113, S5, there are 3 instances when warrantless arrests may be done: 1) arrest in flagrante delicto, 2) Arrest in hot pursuit, 3) arrest of escaping prisoner.
For in flagrante delicto arrests, 2 elements must concur: 1) overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime,
2) the overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. For R113, S5(b) or hot pursuit, at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
Here, the 2 teenagers told the police that there is a woman with a tattoo without a description of such tattoo. The accused merely passed in front of the officers
and did nothing wrong against them. Reyes was not acting in a suspicious manner. PO1 Monteras said that Reyes smelled of liquor. But the act of walking while
reeking of liquor per se is not a criminal act.

Also, the requirements of R113, S5(b) are not met. Records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Reyes
and he even admitted that he merely relied on the 2 teenagers’ tip. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Personal knowledge does not include
unverified tips from strangers.

2) Also, for a valid consensual search, the police authorities must obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent established by clear and positive
proof which were not shown here.

3) Thus, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu is inadmissible for being fruit of the poisonous tree. And since the shabu is the corpus delicti of the crime
charged, Reyes must be acquitted.

4) Also, the officers committed unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule in RA 9165, S21 thru their admission that only the barangay captain was
present during the marking and inventory of the seized items. The records are bereft of any showing that efforts were made by the officers to secure the presence
of the other persons necessary under the law or justify their absence. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA 10640, requires, among others,
that the apprehending team shall immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the
accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.

12. People v. Gajo y Buenafe, GR 217026, January 22, 2018, Del Castillo, J., First Division.
FACTS:
The Intel Personnel Department of San Mateo (Rizal) Municipal Police Station conducted surveillance on accused Lawrence Gajo. On March 23, 2007, PO3 Justo,
PO1 Sangahin, and PO1 San Pedro planned to conduct a buy-bust operation against Lawrence. PO3 Justo approached Lawrence and told him “Pakuha ng dos,”
handing him two marked P100 bills. Lawrence said, “sandal lang, asa bahay.” He entered his house. After a while, co-accused Rico Gajo came out of the house and
handed PO3Justo a small sachet of shabu. PO3Justo removed his cap, the signal, and the team arrested Rico and Lawrence Gajo. They recovered 3 sachets of shabu
from the pocket of Rico. In the police station, PO3 Justo placed markings GMJ, GMJ 1 and GMJ 2 on the 3 sachets recovered from Rico. He also marked and placed
his initials on the sachet. Justo marked the seized items in the presence of PO1 San Pedro and Sangahin. At the time of marking, the accused was already inside
the jail.

ISSUE:
Whether the Chain of Custody Rule was complied with.
HELD: NO.
RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, S21 provides xxx. Chain of custody has 4 links:
1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug confiscated from the accused by the apprehending officer; 2) the turnover of the seized drug by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; 3) the turnover by the investigating officer of said item to the forensic chemist for examination; and, 4) the turnover
and submission thereof from forensic chemist to the court.

1) The first link, marking, must be done immediately upon seizure and in the presence of the apprehended violator of law . The marking sets apart the seized item
from other materials and is essential to preserve the integrity of the recovered drug. Here, the shabu was not properly marked. Justo did NOT immediately mark the
3 sachets of shabu from Rico and the one sachet recovered by PO1 San Pedro from Lawrence. The marking was done when the accused “was already inside the
jail.”

2) The second link was also not complied with. Justo supposedly turned over the shabu to investigating officer Benzon. But the prosecution did not present Benxon
to testify on the matter. This is another gap.

3) The third link was also infirm. The request for lab exam indicated a certain PO2 Cruz as the person who delivered the specimens to the crime laboratory for
examination. But PO2 Cruz was not presented to testify on his receipt of the seized shabu. This is another gap.

While the parties stipulated on the intended testimony of forensic chemist Apostol, this was rendered futile by the above mentioned gaps.

4) Also, no physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were made in the presence of accused, their counsel/representative, representative of media and
DOJ, and any elected public official. No justifiable reason was given. Thus, the integrity of the corpus delicti was compromised.

SC acquitted both accused Lawrence and Rico Gajo.

13. People v. Acosta, GR 238865, January 28, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
Alfredo Salucana went to Gingoog police station to report a mauling incident where Acosta purportedly hit him with a piece of wood. He also reported that Acosta
was illegally planting marijuana. These reports prompted 4 officers to proceed to Acosta’s home in Purok 2, Brgy. San Juan, Gingoog City. thereat, Salucana
positively identified Acosta. The officers rushed towards Acosta and arrested him. After the arrest, SPO4 Legaspi found 13 hills of marijuana plants planted beneath
Acosta’s gabi plants outside his home, a meter away from where he was arrested. The uprooted marijuana plants were marked and inventoried at the police station in
the presence of Acosta, Brgy. Captain Maturan. It was then delivered to Police Chief Inspector Esber of the PNP Regional Crime Lab. Esber turned over the
specimens to the evidence custodian.

ISSUE:
Whether the marijuana plants were seized according to the “plain view” doctrine.
HELD: NO.
The requisites for the plain view doctrine are:
(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular
area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
Here, the officers knew that the marijuana plants were planted by Acosta because such was disclosed by his foster father Salucana. Thus, Salucana apprised the
officers of the illegal planting of marijuana. Thus, when the officers went to Acosta’s house, they were already alerted to the fact that there could possibly be
marijuana plants in the area. The discovery was thus NOT inadvertent. The plain view doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually “searching” for
evidence against the accused.

14. Ladaga v. Mapagu, GR 189689, November 13, 2012 (See case 4)

RULE 129- WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

15. Juan v. Juan, GR 221732, August 23, 2017, Peralta, J., Second Division. (Judicial notice)
FACTS:
Respondent Roberto Juan claims that he began using the name and mark “Lavandera Ko” in his laundry business in 1994. He opened his laundry store in Makati in
1995. In 1997, the national library issued to him a certificate of copyright over said name and mark. The laundry business expanded with numerous franchise outlets.
He formed a corporation, Laundromatic Corporation, in 1997. “Lavandera Ko” was registered as a business name in 1998 with DTI. Respondent discovered that his
brother, petitioner Fernando, registered the mark “Lavandera Ko” with IPO in 1995 and that a certain Nacino was threatening respondent’s franchisees with criminal
and civil cases if they did not stop using the mark “Lavandera Ko.”

Respondent filed a petition for infringement of copyright and cancellation of trademark/name with RTC. RTC ruled that neither party can use “Lavandera Ko.” CA
dismissed the appeal based on technical grounds. Hence this appeal.

RTC’s ruling stated:

Based on the date taken from the internet — References: CCP encyclopedia of Philippine art, vol. 6 http://www.himig.com.ph (http://kahimyang.info /
kauswagan/articles/1420/today-in-philippine-history this information was gathered: "In 1948, Cecil Lloyd established the first Filipino owned record
company, the Philippine Recording System, which featured his rendition of Filipino folk songs among them the "Lavandera ko" (1942) which is a
composition of Santiago S. Suarez." Thus, the parties did not coin the mark. The heirs of Santiago Suarez are the rightful owners of the mark and work
“Lavandera Ko.”
ISSUE:
Whether RTC rightfully took judicial notice of the references it cited above (websites).
HELD: NO.
SC found that RTC confused trademark with copyright. The song “Lavandera Ko” is protected as a copyright under RA 8293, S172.1 (f) (Musical compositions with
or without words). But here, it is being used as a trademark.

1) Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them. Matters of
judicial notice have 3 requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it
must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of NOTORIETY. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court , and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally known, as basis of his action. Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries, or other
publications are judicially noticed provided they are of such universal notoriety as to be part of the common knowledge of every person.

2) Here, the article in the website cited by RTC patently lacks a requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the court because such article is not well and
authoritatively settled and is doubtful or uncertain. Some articles in the internet or on websites are easily edited, and their sources unverifieable.

SC remanded the case to RTC.

Sec.1- MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE

16. People v. Sevilleno y Villanueva, GR 129058, March 29, 1999, Bellosillo, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
At 10am on July 22, 1995, Paulino Sevilleno went to Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City. he brought bread and ice candy for his 9yo and 8yo nieces, Virginia and
Norma Baquia. He invited Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-an to “see a beta show.” At 11am, Rogelio Baquia, father of Virginia and Norma, arrived at
their house. He asked Norma where Virginia was. Norma told him that Virginia had gone with Paulino to Sitio Guindali-an. Rogelio looked for Virginia. Rogelio
bumped into the accused who denied knowing where Virginia was. The next day, he met the accused at the house of the former barangay captain of Sitio Guindali-an.
Paulino said that Virginia was in a sugarcane field known as “Campo 9. Rogelio and some officers went there and found Virginia covered with dried leaves, her dress
raised to her armpits, her lower torso naked, her legs spread apart. She had various wounds on her body. She was dead. Sevillano was charged with rape with
homicide.

Sevilleno was convicted by RTC. Hence this automatic review.

HELD:
SC held that the RTC did not conduct the required searching inquiry as to the plea of guilty of accused. It only asked 1) Do you understand your plea of guilt?, 2) Do
you know that your plea of guilt could bring death penalty? RTC did not explain the elements of the crime of rape with homicide. Also, accused’ PAO lawyers
counsel de officious were remiss in defending accused. They did not explain to Sevilleno the nature of the crime and the gravity of the consequences of his plea. They
did not conduct cross-examination.

1) RTC also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia because her testimony failed to establish that the incident happened within the territorial jurisdiction
of this court." The court did not consider her testimony purportedly because she only testified that her sister Virginia went with the accused to Guindali-an without
specifying as to what municipality or city it was part of. Again, this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires courts to take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and geographical divisions of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos
City (Negros Occidental).

17. Peltan Development, Inc. v. CA, GR 117029, March 19, 1997, Panganiban, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
Respondents Rey and Araujo filed against the 11 petitioners a complaint for cancellation of titles and damages. They allege that:
Respondents are applicants for free patent over a 197,527m2 land in Las Piñas, Metro Manila. They were issued Lands Bureau Survey Authority. They
had the property surveyed by a geodetic engineer. The processing and eventual approval of respondents’ free patent application have been held in
abeyance despite absence of opposition because of the alleged existence of several certificates of title of petitioners, namely Peltran Development- TCT
S-17992. The certificates of title of petitioners were all derived from OCT 4216. Respondents allege that OCT 4216 was fictitious and spurious. Thus,
the titles of petitioners are also fictitious and void.
Peltan filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses, alleging that the complaint states no cause of action. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA
reversed, treating the case as accion publiciana. Hence this petition for review.

HELD:
In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial
notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 (official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the PH xxx.). The said decisions also “form part
of the legal system”.
Here, SC has held in Margolles v. CA, rendered on Feb. 14, 1994 while the case was pending with CA that OCT 4216 and the certificates of title derived therefrom
are valid. This complaint seeks to nullify the same OCT 4216 for being “fictitious and spurious.” CA here found that respondents had a right over the property based
on their actual possession and pending application for free patent. But respondents’ right is premised on the allegation that OCT 4216 is fictitious or spurious. CA’s
treating this case as accion publiciana is but an exercise in redundancy since the same issue has been foreclosed by SC in Margolles. SC rendered Margolles ahead
of the CA decision here. It was incumbent on CA to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case.

SEC.2- DISCRETIONARY JUDICIAL NOTICE

18. Candelaria v. People, GR 209386, December 08, 2014, Perlas-Bernabe, J., First Division. (Circumstantial evidence, criminal case)
FACTS:
In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel worth P497k from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a company owned by
Jessielyn Lao. Petitioner Candelaria, a truck driver employed by Lao, together with his helper Romano, was dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in Laon Laan, Manila.
But at 5pm, Viron informed Lao thru a phone call that it had not yet received its order. When Lao called Candelaria on his phone, she did not receive any response. At
6pm, Romano returned at Unioil’s office alone and reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him. Lao thus reported the incident to police. A few days later, NBI
found the abandoned lorry truck in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel fuel. Thus, Lao filed a complaint for qualified theft against Candelaria.

RTC convicted Candelaria. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: Candelaria demurred to the prosecution’s evidence, arguing that there was no direct evidence that linked him to the commission of the crime as Lao had
no personal knowledge of what actually happened to the diesel fuel.
HELD:
All elements of qualified theft are present. Candelaria abused the confidence reposed upon him by Lao as his employer.

1) Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict accused only if
the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person. The circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and, at the same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of
guilt. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.

Here, the circumstances justify Candelaria’s conviction: (a) on August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao's Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil,
Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises on the same day
on board the lorry truck containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5pm, Viron informed Lao that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed to reply to
Lao's phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported
the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported
back to Unioil since then.

2) These circumstances together show that Candelaria committed the crime of qualified theft. The diesel fuel was placed under Candelaria’s custody and remains
unaccounted for. Candelaria did not profer any persuasive reason to explain the loss of goods and merely banked on general denial which is inherently weak.

3) Candelaria has also not reported back to Unioil. While flight per se is not synonymous with guilt, unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays a guilty
conscience.

4) The penalty for qualified theft depends on the value of the thing stolen. In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of an estimate given by the
prosecution, the courts may either 1) apply the minimum penalty under Art. 309 or 2) fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances. In
Merida v. People, we held it improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the time of commission of the theft since such evidence would be
“unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of independent and competent source of such information.”

In Lozavo v. People, we held that the trial court can take judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration.

Here, the value of diesel fuel may be readily gathered from price lists published by the DOE. Thus, the price of diesel fuel may be considered a matter of public
knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice. While the prosecution presented only the uncorroborated testimony of Lao as
to the price of diesel fuel stolen at P497k, SC, taking judicial notice of the fact that the price of diesel fuel in Aug. 2006, time of commission, is P37.60 to P37.86 per
liter- upholds the P497k. Here, the value of the goods may independently and competently be ascertained from DOE’s price publication. Also, the defense did
not contradict the P497k or cross-examined Lao as to her proferred valuation. Thus, SC here “fixed the value of the property taken based on the attendant
circumstances of the case.”

19. Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., GR 155110, March 31, 2005, Panganiban, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
DMC Urban Property Developers Inc. (DMC) owned a residential lot in Davao City. on December 1, 1993, it claims that Loui Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and
built thereon the Habagat Grill. Thus, DMC filed a complaint for forcible entry against Biraogo and Habagat Grill in MTCC. Biraogo claims that the Habagat Grill
was inside Municipal Reservation 1050 (Presidential Proclamation 20) and thus DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one of the vital issues was the location
of Habagat Grill, MTCC constituted a team of three geodetic engineers representing both parties and DENR tasked to determine precisely where Habagat Grill is
located, whether on respondent’s lot or in the reservation.

The team reported that Habagat Grill restaurant was occupying 934m2 of the lot in question. MTCC dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and cause
of action. RTC affirmed. CA reversed, holding that MTCC had jurisdiction, giving greater weight to the testimony of respondent’s real property manager Garcia, as
opposed to petitioner’s witness Ruiz, that HG was built on Dec. 1, 1993, not in 1992 as claimed by Biraogo because it was not clear as in what capacity Ruiz knew of
the facts he testified to. Thus, the complaint was filed within 1 year from the filing of the case on April 7, 1994. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether MTCC may take judicial notice of the estimated location of Times Beach under Presidential Proclamation 20 and that of Habagat Grill.
HELD: NO.
1) Which witness’ testimony to prefer- Under R133, S1 of RoC, among the facts to be considered by the court in determining which of the presented evidence has
superior weight is the witnesses’ means and opportunity to know the facts to which they testify. The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by these:

a) the Actor Rule- a person’s recollection of his own acts is more trustworthy than another person’s recollection of it, especially if it was done in the performance of a
duty. This rule has been applied to cases where a person’s testimony as to his own conduct conflicts with the testimony of an observer. b) the witness who had the
greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be believed in preference to one that had a slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent. c) the
witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely states the fact to be so, without adverting to any circumstance showing
that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the crew of a vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red and nothing more was
overcome by testimony of witnesses on the other vessel that the light was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the light was
observed. d) the witness, in a state of excitement, fear, or terror, is generally incapable of observing accurately. e) intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of
observation and memory of a witness.
Here, Garcia must be given greater weight since it was his task as real property manager of respondent to know about matters involving respondent’s
properties. In contrast, it was not explained how Ruiz could be deemed credible in his testimony as to those matters. Garcia’s relationship as employee of respondent
does not by itself determine the truth of his testimony. The test is whether the testimony is credible and in accord with human experience.

2) Judicial notice- Municipal courts may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited
to what the law is and what it states. Here, MTCC took judicial notice of the existence of Presidential Proclamation 20 which declared Times Beach a recreation
center. It took judicial notice of the location of the beach which was from the shoreline to the “road towards the shoreline”. Thus, it resolved that Habagat Grill must
be inside Times Beach which was owned by Davao City. thus, Davao City, not respondent, had a cause of action against petitioner. MTCC made its own estimate of
the location of the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by law.

MTCC cannot take discretionary judicial notice under R129, S2 of RoC because the exact boundaries of the lot covered by PP20 are NOT a matter of public
knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges due to their judicial functions.

Thus, CA correctly relied only on the report of the survey team and not on MTCC’s findings.

SC also found that respondent proved prior possession thru its predecessor and denied the petition.

20. Republic v. Science Park of the PH, Inc., GR 237714, November 12, 2018, Perlas-Bernabe, J., Second Division. (Judicial notice of other case pending with
same judge, exception: No objection)
FACTS:
Respondent SPPI filed an application for original registration of Lot 5809, a 7,691m2 land in Malvar, Batangas, claiming that the land is part of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in OCENO since prior to June 12, 1945, and the land is not encumbered by any
other person. SPPI presented a DENR-CENRO certification stating that the land is within the alienable and disposable zone under Project 39, Land Classification Map
3601. To prove its possession OCENO since June 12, 1945, it presented a 1955 tax declaration of Gervacio who previously owned the land.

MCTC ruled for SPPI, taking judicial notice of the authenticity of DAO 97-3737 despite the legal custodian of DENR’s official records Ms. Bautista not being
presented to identify DAO 97-37 based on a stipulation in LRC N-127, a land registration case filed by SPPI involving a different parcel of land previously
decided by the same MCTC between the same handling government prosecutor and same counsel for applicant, dispensing with the testimony of Ms. Bautista.
ISSUE:
Contention: MCTC should not have taken judicial notice of the record of other cases even when the other cases were heard/pending in the same court.
HELD: Judicial notice proper when not objected to.
SPPI asked MCTC for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under PD 1529, S14(1). The requisites are: 1) the land is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain at the time of filing the application for registration, 2) it and its predecessors II have been in OCENO, 3) since June 12, 1945. To prove alienability and
overcome the presumption that the state owns the land, the application must be accompanied by 2 documents: 1) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the DENR's official records; and (2) a certificate of land classification status issued by the
CENRO or PENRO of DENR based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
1) R129, S3 states xxx. "As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However,
this rule is subject to the exception that in the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of the case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made
to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated. Thus, for said exception to apply, the party concerned must be given an
opportunity to object before the court could take judicial notice of any record pertaining to other cases pending before it."

Here, the conditions for the exception to apply were established. The government handling prosecutor 1) did not object to the dispensation of the testimony of Ms.
Bautista and 2) satisfied himself that the copy of DAO 97-37 presented was duly certified by Ms. Bautista. Only then was the photocopy of the certified copy marked
as exhibit.

SC also said that the alienability requirement is required only at the time of filing, not from June 12, 1945.

2) But the required possession OCENO was not proven since as to this matter, only the testimony of Nelia was presented. Nelia was born in 1936 and claims that
when she was about 7yo or in 1943, she and other children would play around the land and gather fruits. But this testimony is insufficient to establish the character
and nature of possession required by law. Also, the earliest tax declaration presented was dated 1955, not June 12, 1945.

21. Trinidad y Bersamin v. People, GR 239957, February 18, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division. (Judicial notice of facts in other criminal case,
exception: close connection)
FACTS:
At 830pm of Nov. 14, 2014, PNP officers conducted a buy-bust operation to apprehend accused Jesus Trinidad who was purportedly involved in illegal drugs in
Aurelia St., Pasig City. After the sale, PO1Nidoy arrested Trinidad, frisked him, and recovered a 0.38 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunitions tucked at his back and
a 0.22 caliber rifle with 7 ammunitions and 2 magazines found beside the gate of his house. When asked if he had documentation therefor, Trinidad said they were just
pawned to him. Trinidad was charged with illegal possession of firearms under RA 10591.

Contention: Trinidad claims that he was also charged with the crime of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs which arose from the same incident. He was
acquitted therein because the prosecution failed to prove a valid arrest thru a legitimate buy-bust operation. He then offered in evidence the acquittal ruling, which
the prosecutor objected to for being immaterial to the case. the acquittal in the drugs cases should result in his acquittal in this case as well. RTC admitted said
evidence only as part of Trinidad’s testimony.

RTC convicted Trinidad. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

HELD:
There were 3 cases filed against Trinidad- 2 for violation of RA 9165 and the other is this case. In the drugs cases, Trinidad was acquitted not only due to unjustified
deviations from the chain of custody rule, but also on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a valid buy-bust operation, rendering
Trinidad’s in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest illegal and the subsequent search on him unreasonable. Thus, the acquittal in the drugs cases is material since
the firearms subject of this case were simultaneously recovered from Trinidad when he was searched subsequent to his arrest on account of the buy-bust
operation.

The findings on illegality of Trinidad’s warrantless arrest were made in the drugs cases, distinct from this case for illegal possession of firearm. The general rule is that
the courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records/evidence of other cases. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the
other case has a CLOSE CONNECTION with the matter in controversy in the case at hand. The case may be so closely interwoven or so clearly interdependent as
to invoke a rule of judicial notice.

Here, the drugs cases and this case are so interwoven and interdependent of each other since the drugs and firearms were illegally seized in a singular instance- the
buybust operation.
SC acquitted accused Trinidad.

Sec. 4- JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS

22. Alfelor v. Halasan, GR 165987, March 31, 2006, Callejo, Sr., J., First Division.
FACTS:
The heirs of the late Sps. Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a complaint for partition in RTC. Among plaintiffs were Teresita and her two children, Joshua and Maria
Katrina Alfelor. Teresita claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Sps. Alfelor. Respondent Josefina Halasan filed a
motion for intervention, alleging that she is the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, presenting a copy of a marriage contract dated Feb. 01, 1956.

Teresita stated that she knew of the previous marriage of Jose Alfelor with Josefina in the Reply-in-Intervention that she filed in the case. When Teresita testified,
she stated that she did not know Josefina personally, but she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did not live together
as husband and wife since Josefina disappeared a few months after the marriage. Jose did not annul his marriage with Josefina since he believed that he had a right to
remarry, not having seen Josefina for more than 7 years.

RTC denied Josefina’s intervention and ruled for Teresita and petitioners (Joshua and Maria). CA reversed, ruling that Teresita had admitted verbally and in writing
that Josefina had been married to Jose, applying R129, S4 that judicial admission no longer requires proof. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: While Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to Josefina in the Reply-in-Intervention, Teresita testified during hearing that this
matter was merely “told” to her by the latter and should be considered hearsay.
HELD:
Teresita and her co-heirs, petitioners, admitted the first marriage of Josefina in their Reply-in-Intervention filed in RTC:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were married on
February 01, 1956.
Teresita also admitted during testimony that she knew that Jose had been previously married to another. This admission is a “deliberate, clear, and unequivocal”
statement, made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later
challenge that fact as judicial admisisons are a waiver of proof. Thus, admissions made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such party. All proofs inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The
allegations, statements, or admissions in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot later take a position contrary with what was pleaded.

Considering Teresita’s admission, Josefina has the right to intervene in the partition case.

23. People v. Castillo y Lumayro, GR 131592-93, February 15, 2000, Puno, J., En Banc. (Extrajudicial admission in criminal cases by itself is insufficient to
prove guilt BRD)
FACTS:
The scene of the crime was the then on-going construction site of Gaisano Building in Iloilo city. Rogelio Abawag was being closely pursued by accused Julian
Castillo, a lead man in the construction site. The accused pointed a gun at Abawag and shot him. Abawag, about a half meter away from accused, fell on his knees
beside a pile of hollow blocks. Witness Acaso heard a second shot and a person screming, “Ouch, that is enough!” The accused then shot Abawag a third time despite
Abawag’s imploration. The police apprehended Castillo. Upon inquiry, the accused denied killing Abawag. The police found in his possession a .38 caliber handmade
revolver. Further inquiry revealed that accused owned the gun but had no license to possess it. Castillo was charged with homicide and illegal possession of
firearm.

ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial admission of Castillo by itself suffices to establish the element of lack of license to possess in illegal possession of firearm.
HELD: NO.
The elements of illegal possession of firearms under RA 8294 are 1) existence of the firearm, 2) the fact that accused, who owned or possessed the gun, did not have
the license to carry it outside his residence.

Here, the first element was established. Witness Acaso saw Castillo shoot the victim thrice with a .38 caliber revolver. The same gun was recovered from Castillos and
offered in evidence. But no proof was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element. This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime
as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. If the means of proving a negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on the party
averring said negative fact. As the Information alleged that the appellant possessed an unlicensed gun, the prosecution is duty-bound to prove this allegation. It is the
prosecution who has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged.

Thus, here, although Castillo himself admitted that he had no license for the gun recovered from his possession, his admission will not relieve the prosecution
of its duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt his lack of license. An admission is a 'statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in
connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction.' An admission in CRIMINAL
CASES is insufficient to prove beyond doubt the crime charged. Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in nature. Thus, it does not fall under R129, S4
(*since not “judicial” admission). It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence of license.

Also, the EJ admission was made without benefit of counsel. Thus, SC convicted Castillo only of homicide.

24. Constantino v. Heirs of Constantino, GR 181508, October 02, 2013, Perez, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
Petitioners’ “Pagmamana sa labas ng hukuman”- Pedro Sr., ancestor of petitioners and respondents, owned several lands. One was covered by Tax dec. 20814
consisting of 240m2 in Bulacan. Respondents Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan, great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., representing Pedro Jr., filed a
complaint against petitioners Oscar Constantino et al, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., to nullify a document entitled “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” and for the
reinstatement of Tax dec 20814 in Pedro Sr.’s name. The “Pagmamana” was executed to the exclusion of respondents.

Respondents’ deed of EJ settlement- Petitioners in answer allege that Pedro Sr. also had a land covered by Tax Dec 9534 of 192m2. Respondents adjudicated unto
themselves, thru a Deed of EJ Settlement with Waiver, to the exclusion of other heirs, the land with an area of 192m2. Petitioners claim that there was an
understanding that respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no longer share in the land subject of the “Pagmamana” in exchange for the land covered by Tax dec 9534.

RTC found both parties in pari delicto and upheld the validity of the “Pagmamana”. CA ruled for respondents, finding that the 192m2 lot actually belongs to Pedro Jr.,
thus not part of Pedro Sr.’s estate. Hence this petition.

HELD:
The petition does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal offense under Art. 1411. Art. 1412 also is inapplicable which speaks of contracts
void for illegality of subject matter. In pari delicto is inapplicable not only because there are 2 deeds, not one contract, but also because its application would result in
the validation of both deeds instead of their nullification as necessitated by their illegality.
1) The land subject of the deed of EJ settlement is part of Pedro Sr.’s estate. Apart from respondent Laquindanum’s statement that said land is not part of Pedro Sr.’s
estate, no other evidence was offered to support it. Also, CA contradicted the admissions made by respondents during pretrial where they stipulated that the land
covered by Tax dec 9534 belongs to Pedro Sr:
Respondents' admission:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax
Declaration No. 9535;
This is an admission against respondents’ interest of Pedro Sr.’s ownership of the 192m2 lot which was transferred to respondents’ mother, daughter of Pedro Jr.
Judicial admissions are binding on the party making the admissions.

2) Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions provided under R18, S7 of RoC which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial
order shall control the subsequent course of action thereby limiting the issues to be tried. Once stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their
counsels, they become judicial admissions of the facts stipulated. We held in Alfelor v. Halasan that a party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the
fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof.

2.1) The last paragraph (*?) of R18, S7 serves as a caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial admissions- for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in
the course of proceedings but which may not have been taken up in pre-trial can still be taken up. R18, S7 states:
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which
shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or
admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit the issues
to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.
2.2) Under R129, S4, two exceptions to the conclusiveness of JA are 1) when made thru palpable mistake, 2) when no such admission was in fact made. Here,
respondents failed to refute their admission/stipulation before and during trial.

RULE 130- RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

Sec. 1- OBJECT AS EVIDENCE
25. People v. Rullepa y Guinto, March 05, 2003, GR 131516, Carpio-Morales, J., En Banc. (Appearance as object evidence of age)
FACTS:
On Nov. 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in QC, Cyra May, then 3.5yo, told her, “Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at
sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.” Kuya Ronnie is accused Ronnie Rullepa, house boy, who was sometimes left with Cyra May at home. When Accused returned,
Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May told them was true. Ronnie admitted doing those things. Cyra May testified that Ronnie did these things to her twice
in his bedroom. Ronnie was charged with rape.

ISSUE:
Whether the appearance of Cyra May may be used to determine her age for the purpose of the aggravating circumstance of age in the crime of rape.
HELD: YES,
SC believed the testimony of Cyra May. This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra May’s age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her
private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial." Her testimony is corroborated by Dr. Preyra’s findings that
there were abrasions in her labia minora which could have been caused by friction with an erect penis. Thus, the first element of statutory rape (1. accused had carnal
knowledge of a woman, 2. Below 12yo) is established.

1) Relevancy- The victim’s age is relevant since it may constitute an element of the offense (Second element). It may also be a qualifying circumstance, warranting
the imposition of the death sentence (under 18yo and the offender is a parent etc., or under 7yo).

1.1) Guidelines- People v. Pruna established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:
1) The best evidence is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth.
2) Without the birth cert, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim.
3) If the birth cert or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or unavailable, the testimony of the victim’s mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth pursuant to R130, S40
shall be sufficient under these circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4) In the absence of 1-3, the complainant’s testimony suffices provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by accused.
5) It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
1.2) Some cases held that “The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below 10 is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof.” In some cases
also, SC held that without the requisite hearing under R129, S3, the courts cannot take judicial notice of the victim’s age. But the process by which the trier of facts
judges a person’s age from his appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. R129 is entitled “What
need not be proved.” But when the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact. Rather, he is
conducting an examination of the evidence , the evidence being the APPEARANCE of the person. A person’s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as
OBJECT evidence under R130, S1.

Ex. “The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an infant, in order to
fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of writings, to determine, whether they are blemished, the implements with which a crime was
committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another, are few illustrations xxx.”

1.3) Corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of the bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth.

2) Weight- There is thus no question as to the admissibility of a person’s appearance in determining his age. As to the weight to accord such appearances, Pruna’s
guideline No.3 states (alleged 3yo, sought to be proved less than 7 etc.) Under this guideline, the disparity between the allegation and proof of age is so great that the
court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the
person’s appearance, as object evidence of age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her age becomes greater which doubt must be resolved in favor of accused.

3) Here, Cyra May testified that she is only 3yo. Her mother testified that she is 12yo. Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (3yo) and the age sought
to be proved (below 12yo), RTC would have no difficulty in ascertaining the victim’s age from her appearance. Thus, the second element of statutory rape is present.

However, whether the victim is below 7yo (qualifying circumstance), there is reasonable doubt.a mature 3.5yo can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped 7yo.
Thus, the appearance of the victim as object evidence cannot be accorded much weight. The testimony of the mother by itself is insufficient.

Since there is no qualifying circumstance, SC imposed only the penalty of RP.

Sec.3- ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MUST BE PRODUCED
26. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., GR 143338, July 29, 2005, Chico-Nazario, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed in RTC a complaint for recovery of against respondents, alleging that it loaned to respondents P1M as evidenced by a promissory note executed by
respondents, binding themselves to pay petitioner 25 monthly installments of P40k with 23%interest per annum. Respondents defaulted. Thus petitioners filed the
complaint. Respondents filed an answer. After trial, petitioner identified Exhibit A, photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the
complaint.

Later, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. But since the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be fonud, petitioner instead sought admission of the
duplicate original of the PN which was identified as Exhibit E. RTC denied admission to this evidence and dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

HELD:
SC found that respondents were not able to specifically deny the PN as an actionable document and thus admitted its genuineness and due execution and recognized
their obligation to petitioner (The denials consisted of the defense of lack of consideration and that respondent Morales did not sign the PN.)

1) CA also applied the “best evidence rule” under R130, S3 to the proof to establish the terms of the writing- the PN.

According to McCormick, the only actual rule that the “best evidence” phrase denotes today is the rule requiring the production of the original writing, the rationale
being: 1) precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing, 2) there is substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by
handwriting or typewriting, 3) as to oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error.

1.1) Wordings not questioned- Since risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the best evidence rule, this rule is inapplicable to this
case since respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the PN. In their responsive pleadings, respondents’ principal defense is lack of consideration of
the PN and that respondent Morales did not sign it in his personal capacity. These contentions do not question the precise wording of the PN which should have
paved the way for application of the “best evidence rule.”

Also, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the PN. There was thus no need for petitioner to present the original PN. Their judicial admission
as to the genuineness and execution of the PN sufficiently established their liability to petitioner.

1.2) Besides, an exception to the BE rule is when the original document is in the possession of the adverse party. Petitioner, in its motion to inhibit, stated that had it
been given the opportunity by RTC, it would have proved that the original of Exhibit A was in respondents’ possession.

27. Lorenzana v. Lelina, GR 187850, August 17, 2016, Jardeleza, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
Ambrosia Lelina, married to Aquilino Lelina, executed a deed of absolute sale over ½ of an undivided land covered by Tax dec (TD) 14324 in favor of her son,
respondent Rodolfo Lelina. The deed of absolute sale specified only an area of 810m2 as the ½ property covered by the TD, but it contained the description of the land
covered by TD 14324. In 1996, respondent and his tenants were informed that the property was already owned by petitioner by virtue of a deed of final conveyance.
Thus, respondent filed an action for quieting of title in RTC. Petitioner claims that she acquired a land with an area of 16,047m2 (levied property) thru a foreclosure
sale which included respondent’s property. Reapondent is claiming ½ of the 16,047m2 described in the deed of absolute sale.

RT upheld respondent’s ownership of half of the levied property. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the photocopy of the deed of absolute sale is admissible.
HELD: YES.
1) Under R130, S3, best evidence rule, no document is admissible other than the original when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document. Thus, mere
photocopies are inadmissible. Nonetheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.
To exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility must be made at the proper time and the grounds specified. Objection must be made at the time the evidence is
formally offered. For documentary evidence, offer is made after all witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the
evidence is being offered. If a party fails to object at this time, such objection shall be deemed waived.

Here, the objection to the deed of absolute sale was belatedly raised. Respondent submitted his formal offer of evidence on Feb. 12, 2003, which included the deed of
absolute sale. While petitioner filed a comment and objection on Feb. 21, 2003, she only objected to the deed for being self-serving. Having failed to object on the
ground of inadmissibility under the BE rule, petitioner is deemed to have waived her objection.

2) SC found that respondent’s ownership over the ½ of the levied property is proven by the deed of sale since what defines a piece of land is not the area but the
boundaries stated as enclosing the area. It also cited Art. 1542 of NCC which state that sale of land on lump sum and not per unit of measure, the boundaries determine
the scope of the sale. SC found that petitioner’s title from the deed of final conveyance is invalid since this resulted from an invalid levy and execution for making the
Ambrosia’s separate/exclusive property answerable for the obligations of the Ambrosia’s husband.

28. Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez, GR 170604, September 02, 2013, Bersamin, J., First Division.
FACTS:
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, respondents claim that their parents were the owners of a land covered by TCT 84797.
They continued in possession upon their parents’ deaths. The TCT contained an entry, stating that the property had been sold to Prodon subject to right of repurchase.
Respondents allege that this entry was done maliciously by Prodon since the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist. Thus, they
prayed that this entry be cancelled and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.

Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase. Maximo had been given 6 months to repurchase, and Prodon claims
to have become the absolute owner due to the non-repurchase.

RTC ruled that the contents of the deed of sale, although it could not be presented, can be proven by secondary evidence under R130, S5 of RoC upon proof of its
execution and existence and of the cause of unavailability being without bad faith. RTC ruled that the existence was proven.

ISSUE:
Whether the BE rule applies to the deed of absolute sale where the issue is as to the existence thereof.
HELD: NO.
1) BE rule is inapplicable. The primary purpose of the BE Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court. The rule protects against
misleading inferences resulting from the introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings. But the evils of mistransmission of facts etc. arise only when the
issue relates to the terms of the writing. Thus, the BE Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced
concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In
such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.
Here, the action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by respondents as plaintiffs is
whether the deed of sale with right to repurchase had really existed. Despite the fact that the terms of the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the
Best Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with, without being
clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to be excluded.

Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than
the original document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of
Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.

2) The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed to establish the genuineness and
due execution of the deed. This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. Her
inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the
rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be
subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.

SC found that the loss of the original was not proven. Also, the annotation on TCT 84797 of the deed did not establish its existence. This proved at best that a
document purporting to be a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been registered.

29. Flores y De Leon v. People, GR 222861, April 23, 2018, Gesmundo, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
Private complainant France figured in a vehicular collision with a jeepney in QC. France and the jeepney driver went to the police station. PO2 Flores investigated the
incident. The jeepney driver was told to go home. France was told to return after 2 days and bring P2,000 for the return of his driver’s license. France became
suspicious since in his previous traffic violations, his driver’s license was claimed at MMDA office or city hall. Thus, France reported to the headquarters of
PAOCTF. An entrapment operation was organized with 4 500-peso bills dusted with ultraviolet powder. France went to Flores. Flores opened a drawer and told
France to drop the money inside. Flores then counted the money. France asked for his driver’s license. Then, PAOCTF team arrested Flores and confiscated the
marked money inside his drawer.

Flores was charged with simple robbery (extorsion). RTC and CA convicted him. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether mere photocopies of the marked money are admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
In People v. Tandoy,  the Court held that the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as
to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. 

Here, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence,
like a xerox copy thereof, is admissible. In contrast with People v. Dismuke,  where the accused was acquitted partly because of the dubious circumstances
surrounding the marked money, the existence of the marked money in the case at bar was never questioned. It was not disputed that the four (4) pieces of ₱500 bills
which were used as marked money, were produced and thereafter turned over to the police officer for dusting of fluorescent powder. The serial numbers of these
marked money were duly recorded in the memorandum prepared by the PAOCTF in connection with the entrapment operation, and the same set of ₱500 bills bearing
similar serial numbers was reflected in the request for laboratory examination after the conduct of the entrapment operation. More importantly, these four pieces of
₱500 bills were positively identified by the prosecution witnesses during the trial. As such, the absence of the original pieces of the marked money did not militate
against the cause of the prosecution.

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

30. RCBC Bankard Services Corporation v. Oracion, Jr., GR 223274, June 19, 2019, Cagiuoa, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
Respondents Moises and Emily Oracion applied for and were granted by petitioner credit card accommodations. They refused to pay petitioner the total amount of
P117k due under the credit card. Petitioner attached to its complaint against respondents “duplicate original” copies of the statements of account (SOA) and credit
history inquiry. The SOAs bear the name of Moises as addressee. Despite receipt of the SOAs, respondents refused to pay petitioner. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint
for sum of money against respondents under the Rules of Summary Procedure.

MeTC dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. RTC affirmed. Hence this R45 petition.

RTC ruled that the duplicate original copies of the SOA and Credit History Inquiry could not be considered original.

ISSUE:
Whether the duplicate copies of the SOA and CHI may be considered original under R4, S1 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
HELD: NO.
1) Admissibility- For the court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility. Under R3, S2 of the R on EE, an electronic
document is admissible if it complies with the rules on admissibility under RoC and R on EE.

Authenticity- R5 S1 states that the person introducing an electronic document (ED) has the burden of proving its authenticity. R5, S2 provides for the manner of
authentication. R9, S1 provides for the method of proof (affidavit of evidence).

Here, petitioner failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents thru the required affidavit of evidence. Petitioner had in mind when it filed the complaint
was to have its annexes admitted as duplicate originals.

Even R8, S1 on “Business Records as exception to the hearsay rule” requires authentication of the custodian or other qualified witness (“all of which are shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness). In the absence of such authentication thru the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified person, the
attachments cannot be admitted as business records excepted from the hearsay rule. Thus, the SOA and CHI fall within the hearsay rule and excluded under
R130, S36.

2) Thus, RTC and MeTC correctly applied the best evidence rule (R130, S3) in regarding the annexes as mere photocopies of the SOA’s and CHI and not the
original thereof.

3) R130, S4 of RoC and R4, S2 of the Rules on EE provide for the instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals. “Duplicate original copies”
or “multiple original copies” executed at or about the same time with identical contents are covered. If the copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be
called a “print-out or output” based on the definition of an ED (R2, S1[h] of R on EE) or a “counterpart” under R4, S2 of R on EE.

4) Only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be allowed under R130, S5 of RoC. The fact that the SOA and CHI has a stamp that
says “DUPLICATE ORIGINAL” and signed by petitioner’s collection support division head Mr. Ham did not make them “duplicate original copies” under R130,
S5. The necessary allegations to qualify them as “duplicate originals” must be stated in the complaint and supported by the pertinent affidavit of the qualified
person. If petitioner intended the annexes to be EDs, the proper allegations should have been made in the complaint and the required proof of authentication as “print-
outs”, “outputs”, or “counterparts” should have been complied with.

31. National Power Corporation v. Codilla, GR 170491, April 04, 2007, Chico-Nazario, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
MV Dibena Win, respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co.’s vessel, allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 moored at Cebu International Port. Thus,
petitioner filed in RTC a complaint for damages against respondent Bangpai. Petitioner adduced evidence, filing a formal offer of evidence consisting of Exhibits A to
V. Respondent Judge Codilla denied admission to exhibits A, C-S since they were mere photocopies and they do not fall under the definition of an ED under the R on
EE.

HELD:
Petitioner’s witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and making of petitioner’s documentary evidence. Thus, there was lack
of proper identification.

Another ground is that Exhibits A, C-S are mere photocopies of purported documents or papers. R130, S3 requires the original documents themselves when the
subject of inquiry are the contents of documents. Petitioner was given every opportunity to produce the originals of its documents, but it did not.

The documents do not fall under the definition of an ED under the R on EE (R2, S1[h]). The informations in the documents were not received, retrieved, or
produced electronically. Lastly, petitioner has not established by affidavit of evidence under R9 of R on EE the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said
documentary evidence.

32.Bartolome v. Maranan, AM P-11-2979, November 18, 2014, Per Curiam, En Banc.

FACTS:
Complainant alleges that respondent Rosalie Maranan, Court Stenographer in RTC Imus, Cavite, asked from her P200k, later reduced to P160k, to facilitate the filing
of her case for annulment of marriage. Respondent undertook to have the case decided in her favor without need of court appearances. Complainant reported the
matter to the police. During the entrapment operation, respondent was apprehended inside the premises of RTC in the act of receiving the money from the
complainant. In support of the allegations, complainant attached to her affidavit complaint the transcribed electronic communications (text messages) between her
and respondent and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing the video taken during the entrapment operation against respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the text messages and VCD are admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain conditions. “Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone
conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained. (R2, S1[k], R on EE) It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge
thereof. Here, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who
therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself
admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from
which the text messages originated was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted

Under R11, S1 of the R on EE, audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or
displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the
accuracy thereof. Here, complainant herself certified that the VCD and text messages are evidence of her complaint against respondent. Also, in administrative
cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.

SC dismissed respondent from service and forfeited her retirement benefits.

33. Maliksi v. Comelec, GR 203302,, March 12, 2013, Bersamin, J., En Banc.
FACTS:
Maliksi and Saquilayan were candidates for Mayor in Imus, Cavite during the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. Saquilayan won. Maliksi filed an
election protest in RTC. RTC ruled that Maliksi won. In the appeal with Comelec first division, Comelec first division ruled that since the integrity of the ballots had
been compromised and there is an allegation of ballot tampering, it examined the digital images of the contested ballots stored in the Compact Flash (CF) cards.
Comelec 1st division ruled that Saquilayan won. Comelec en banc affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Contention: The ballot images in the CF Cards are mere secondary evidence that should be used only when the physical ballots are unavailable. When the physical
ballots are unavailable, the election returns would be the best evidence of the votes cast.
HELD:
1) We have already ruled that the ballot images in CF Cards and the printouts of such images are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots and may be
used in an election protest. "The picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369." (An act authorizing the Comelec to use an automated election system) an automated election
system (AES) may be 1) paper-based, 2) direct recording election system, the May 10, 2010 used paper based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official
paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. The system captured the ballots in encrypted format
(cannot be read by unauthorized persons). Thus, the images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by PCOS, are likewise “official ballots” that faithfully captures
in electronic form the votes cast.

2) Maliksi is mistaken in his allegation that the images are mere secondary evidence. R4, S1 and 2 of the R on EE is clear (an ED shall be regarded as equivalent of an
original document xxx). The ballot images, which are digital, are electronically generated and written in the CF cards when the ballots are fed into the PCOS machine.
The ballot images are the counterparts produced by electronic recording which accurately reproduce the original, and thus are the equivalent of the original. The
digital images of the physical ballots are electronically and instantaneously generated by the PCOS machines once the physical ballots are fed into and read by the
machines." Hence, the ballot images are not secondary evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF cards are both original documents. The
ballot images in the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the official physical ballots.

34. MCC Industrial Sales Corp v. Ssangyong Corporation, GR 170633, October 17, 2007, Nachura, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is respondent Ssangyong, an international trading
company with head office in SoKor. The two conducted business thru telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma
invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC. If MCC conforms, its representative signs the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong by fax.
Ssangyong forwarded to MCC pro forma invoice ST2-POSTSO401 containing terms and conditions of MCC’s order of 220 metric tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless
steel. Since MCC could open only a partial letter of credit (LC), the order was split into two 110MT orders covered by invoice ST2-POST0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2. MCC failed to open a LC.

On September 11, 2000, Ssangyong wrote MCC, cancelling the sales contract under ST2-POST0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 and demanding payment of US$97k
warehousing expenses and losses. Ssangyong then filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against MCC in RTC.

After Ssangyong rested its case, MCC filed a demurrer alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices ST@-POSTS0401-1/-2.

RTC admitted the documents, citing RA 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. RTC ruled in favor of Ssangyong. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document under RA 8792?
HELD: NO.
RA 8792, S37 provides that “the interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its international origin.” This international origin can only refer to the UNCITRAL
Model Law, and its definition of “data message:
"Data message" means information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means  including, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy .
This definition is substantially the same as the IRR’s characterization of an “electronic data message” (EDM). RA 8792 provides:
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
Thus, the phrase “but not limited to xxx telex or telecopy” is deleted in RA 8792. When the Senate voted to adopt the term "electronic data message," it was
consonant with the explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United
Nations model law on electronic commerce." 

This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic
Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach". Facsimile transactions are NOT paperless, but verily are
paper-based. A facsimile machine is a device that can send or receive pictures and text over a telephone line. It digitizes an image by dividing it into a grid of dots.
Each dot is represented by a bit that has a value of either 0 (off/white) or 1(on/black).

In enacting RA 8792, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based
documents. Further, in a virtual/paperless environment, technically there is no original copy to speak of as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same.
Thus, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included  facsimile
transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.

Thus, RA 8792’s IRR went beyond the parameters of thel aw when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law’s definition of “data message.” SC held
that the terms EDM and electornic document in RA 8792 do not include a facsimile transmission.

But SC held that nonetheless, Ssangyong proved by preponderance of evidence the contract of sale and its breach since there were other invoices (ST20POST0401,
ST2-POSTS080-1/-2) and other unchallenged documentary evidence of Ssangyong.

Sec. 4- ORIGINAL OF DOCUMENT.

35. BPI v. SMP, Inc., GR 175466, December 23, 2009, Nachura, J., Third Division.
FACTS:
SMP, Inc. accepted the purchase order of Clothespak Manufacturing Phils. for 4000 bags of polystyrene products. These were delivered. As payment, Clothespak
issued postdated checks in favor of SMP but these were dishonored. Meanwhile, Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC_ filed a case against Clothespak for
recovery of sum of money. SMP filed a third party claim on the 4000 bags taken at Clothespak factory worth P3M, claiming to be the owner. The goods were not
released upon FEBTC’s filing of indemnity bond. FEBTC obtained favorable judgment against Clothespak. SMP thus filed this petition to recover from FEBTC
(predecessor in interest of BPI, petitioner) the value of the 4000 bags. SMP alleges that it was still the owner of the 4000 bags, anchoring this claim on Provisional
Receipt 4476 issued by Clothspak with the words “Materials belong to SMP until your checks clear.”

RTC ruled for SMP, ordering petitioner to pay SMP the value of the bags. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the provisional receipt is an original document.
HELD: YES.
SC found that the contract between SMP and Clothespak was a contract to sell and thus ownership was retained by SMP until after Clothespak’s checks cleared as
evidenced by the provisional receipt issued by SMP to Clothespak.

1) Contention: The provisional receipt is inadmissible in evidence and is in contravention of the best evidence rule.
Held:
The best evidence rule requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. No evidence is admissible other than the original document itself.
Here, the receipt is deemed as an original considering that the triplicate copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the other copies of
the same receipt involving the same transaction. (R130, S4[b]: “(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals”)

36. Capital Shoes Factory, Ltd. v. Traveler Kids, Inc., GR 200065, September 24, 2014, Mendoza, J., Second Division.
FACTS:
Petitioner CSFL, a foreign corporation engaged in manufacturing children’s shoes, and respondent TKI, domestic corporation engaged in importing footwear, entered
into an agreement wherein WKI would import the shoes made by CSFL form its China factory. As of July 10, 2005, the total unpaid accounts of TKI amounted to
US$325k. To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against TKI before RTC. During trial, CSFL, thru its witness, identified
several sales invoices and order slips it issued as evidence of its transactions with TKI. TKI objected thereto, arguing that these are mere photocopies. After presenting
its last witness, CSFL filed its formal offer of exhibits, seeking admission of these sales invoices and order slips. TKI objected again, saying that these are mere
photocopies.

RTC admitted the exhibits. TKI’s MR was denied. TKI filed a R65 petition in CA. CA denied admission of Exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 for being mere
photocopies. Susan Chiu, CSFL’s witness, only established the existence and due execution of the original invoices. Hence this petition.

HELD:
1) R130, S4(b) of RoC provides xxx. In Trans Pacific Industrial Supplies v. CA, we held that duplicate originals were admissible as evidence. (Ex. When carbon
sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be
charged thereby, produces a facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals.)

Here, Chiu, CSFL’s principal witness, satisfactorily explained that exhibits D to GG-1 and HH to KK-1 were duplicate originals of invoices and order slips and not
mere photocopies. She testified that per transaction, 2 invoices would be prepared- one copy for the customer and one copy for CSFL. Chiu convincingly explained
that CSFL usually prepared 2 copies of invoices for a particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The subject invoices were
duplicate originals as they were prepared at the same time. R130, S4(b) thus applies. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the testimony of Chiu.

2) TKI should have presented evidence instead of resorting to certiorari. In Lee v. People, we said: The order of RTC admitting in evidence photocopies of the
invoices, even if erroneous, is a mere error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioner was to adduce his evidence and, if he is convicted, to appeal.