CASE NO. 1 by Lazaro in favor of Ricardo.

They contend that Lolo Matias desired that whatever

BLAS VS SANTOS inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaro’s) children.
G.R. NO. L-14070 MARCH 29, 1961
Petitioner: MARIA GERVACIO BLAS, MANUEL GERVACIO BLAS, Ricardo (private respondents) however presented in evidence a “Deed of Revocation
LEONCIO GERVACIO BLAS and LOIDA GERVACIO BLAS of a Deed of Sale” wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of his children for the
reason that it was “simulated or ctitious - without any consideration whatsoever.”
Respondent: ROSALINA SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratrix LAZARO’S VERSION: He executed a sworn statement in favor of his children.
of the Estate of the deceased MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BUT he also testi ed that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer
BLAS, in Sp. Proc. No. 2524, Court of First Instance of Rizal, who induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him
MARTA GERVACIO BLAS and DR. JOSE CHIVI, ve pesos (P5.00) to buy a “drink”. LABO

Trial court ruled in favor of Lazaro’s children. Ca a rmed TC’s decision.

FACTS: This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate
of Maxima Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by
ISSUES:1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid? NO
Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas, the greater bulk of which are set forth and described in
the project of partition presented in the proceedings for the administration of the estate 2. Was Ricardo’s registration of the deed of valid? YES
of the deceased Simeon Blas, had been promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to
be delivered upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, and requesting that the said HELD: SC rules in favor of Ricardo.
properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs. The complaint also prays for
actual damages in the amount of P50,000. Pursuant to Art 1347, the contract made in 1962 (sale of future inheritance) is not
valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
The alleged promise of the deceased Maxima Santos is contained in a document between the parties. (“No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.)
executed by Maxima Santos on December 26, 1936 attached to the complaint as
Annex “H” and introduced at the trial as Exhibit “A”. The complaint also alleges that the
However, Article 1544 governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of
plaintiffs are entitled to inherit certain properties enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof,
situated in Malabon, Rizal and Obando, Bulacan, but which properties have already multiple sales. The property in question is land, an immovable, and ownership
shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it rst in the registry of
been included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and
evidently partitioned and conveyed to his heirs in the proceedings for the property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of Ricardo was later than the
one in favor of Lazaro’s children, ownership would vest with Ricardo because of
administration of his estate. Spouses Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz have three children
they also have grandchildren. the undisputed fact of registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not
registered the sale to them at all.
One year after Marta Cruz died, Blas married Maxima Santos but they don’t have
Lazaro’s children contend that they were in possession of the property and that
children and the properties that he and his former wife acquired during the first
marriage were not liquidated. Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his Ricardo never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who
registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a
few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable
property.
whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her husband; that she promises
that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll be acquiring to WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or choose
any of them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by
said heirs.
CASE NO. 3
LIGUEZ VS CA
On 1937 Simeon Blas died while Maxima died on 1956 and Rosalina Santos became
administrator of her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon G.R. NO. L-11240 DECEMBER 18, 1957
Blas in his first marriage, together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs
of Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Petitioner: CONCHITA LIGUEZ
Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA NGO VDA.
Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon
Blas. The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas’ property DE LOPEZ, ET AL
precisely because Maxima promised that they’ll be receiving properties upon her
death. SUMMARY: Through a deed of donation, Salvador Lopez donated a parcel of land to
Conchita Liguez, who was then 16. In an action commenced by Conchita to recover
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs can acquire the properties that Maxima promised with the same, the CA found that the deed was null and void for having an illegal causa and
for Salvador’s lack of right to donate conjugal property. This was based upon the
them.
finding that Salvador donated the land in order to cohabit with and have sexual
relations with Conchita. The CA also rejected the claim based on the in pari delicto
HELD: Yes, they can acquire the properties that Maxima promised with them because
it was stated in Art. 1347 that “No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance rule. The SC found that the conveyance was indeed predicated on an illegal causa.
However, the pari delicto rule does not apply since at the time of the donation,
except in cases expressly authorized by law.”. In this case the contract was authorized
by law because the promised made by Maxima to their heirs before she died is a valid Salvador was a man advanced in years and Conchita was only 16. Furthermore,
Salvador’s forced heirs are barred from invoking the illegality of the causa, and are
reason and it should be enforceable upon her death and her heirs can now acquire the
succession of the properties in issue. thereby only entitled to a declaration of the donation as inofficious.

DOCTRINE: The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be
aided by the law but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this
CASE NO. 2
TANEDO VS CA Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a cause
of action or as a defense.
G.R. NO. 104482 JANUARY 22, 1996
A donation with illegal causa may produce effects under certain circumstances where
Petitioner: Belinda Taredo, for herself and representation of her brothers
and sisters, and Teofila Corpuz Tanedo, representing her minor the parties are not of equal guilt.
daughter Verna Tanedo
Respondent: The Court of Appeals, Spouses Ricardo M. Taredo and FACTS: Conchita Liguez filed a complaint against the widow and heirs of Salvador
Lopez to recover a parcel of 51.84 hectares of land in Davao. She averred to be its
Teresita Barera Taredo
legal owner, pursuant to a deed of donation executed in her favor by Salvador.
FACTS: October 20, 1962: Lazardo Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute
sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Tañedo, and the latter’s wife, Teresita At the time the deed was executed, Conchita was 16. She had also been living with
Salvador’s parents for barely a month. The deed of donation recites that the donor
Barera (private respondents) whereby he conveyed for P1,500 one hectare of his
future inheritance from his parents. Salvador, “for and in consideration of his love and affection” for Conchita, and “also for
the good and valuable services rendered to [Salvador] by [Conchita], does by these
February 28, 1980: Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro made another a davit presents, voluntarily give, grant and donate…”
to rea rm the 1962 sale. January 13, 1981: Lazaro acknowledged therein his receipt of
P 10,000.00 as consideration for the sale. The donation was made in view of Salvador’s desire to have sexual relations with
Conchita. Furthermore, Conchita’s parents would not allow Conchita to live with him
February 1981: Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children unless he first donated the subject land. The donated land originally belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Salvador and his wife, Maria Ngo.
(petitioners) through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980
CA: The deed of donation was inoperative, and null and void because:
On June 7, 1982, Ricardo recorded the Deed of Sale in their favor in the Registry of
Deeds a. Lopez had no right to donate conjugal property to Conchita;
b. The donation was tainted with illegal causa or consideration.
Petitioners led a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed

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 intervened in Salvador’s estate proceedings because she was a minor for its great
The CA also rejected Conchita’s claim based on the rule “in pari delicto non oritur part. Also, the donation did not make her a creditor of the estate.
actio,” as embodied in Art. 1306 of the 1889 Civil Code (as reproduced in Art. 1412 in
the new Civil Code). A donation with illegal causa may produce effects under certain circumstances
where the parties are not of equal guilt.
Conchita: under Art. 1274 (of the 1889 Civil Code), “in contracts of pure beneficence
the consideration is the liberality of the donor,” and liberality per se can never be
illegal, since it is neither against law or morals or public policy. CASE NO. 4
CERANTES VS CA
ISSUE/S: G.R. NO. L-33360 APRIL 25, 1977
1. WON the conveyance was predicated on illegal causa – YES
2. WON the in pari delicto rule applies – NO Petitioner: MAXIMINO CARANTES (Substituted by Engracia Mabanta
3. WON the alienation of conjugal property was void – only insofar as it prejudices Carantes)
Maria Ngo Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, BILAD CARANTES, LAURO
CARANTES, EDUARDO CARANTES and MICHAEL TUMPAO
RULING: Decisions appealed from reversed and set aside. Conchita Liguez entitled to
so much of the donated property as may be found, upon proper liquidation, not to
prejudice the share of the widow Maria Ngo in the conjugal partnership or the legitimes CASE NO. 5
of Salvador’s forced heirs. The records are remanded to the court of origin for further SPOUSES BUENAVENTURA VS CA
proceedings. G.R. NO. 126376 NOVEMBER 20, 2003

RATIO: Petitioner: SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and

Under the cited Art. 1274, liberality of the donor is deemed causa only in contracts CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES JUANITO EDRA and
that are of “pure” beneficence, or contracts designed solely and exclusively to NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA
procure the welfare of the beneficiary, without any intent of producing any JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN
satisfaction for the donor. Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and
FELICIANA LANDRITO, SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and
In this case, Salvador was not moved exclusively by the desire to benefit Conchita, but CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN and
also to secure her cohabiting with him, and so that he could gratify his sexual SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and
impulses. This is clear from Salvador’s confession to two witnesses that he was in love SOCORRO ANGELES, SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA
with her. and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO CARREON
and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and
Lopez would not have conveyed the property in question had he known that Conchita FE JOAQUIN, and SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA
would refuse to cohabit with him. The cohabitation was an implied condition to the ASIS
donation and being unlawful, necessarily tainted the donation.
FACTS:
Therefore, the donation was but one part of an onerous transaction (with Conchita’s Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of
parents) that must be viewed in its totality. plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel,
Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN.  (Note: So
The CA erred in applying the pari delicto rule. The facts are more suggestive of there are two sets of children here.)
seduction than of immoral bargaining.
c. It cannot be said that both parties had equal guilt. Salvador was a man advanced Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property
in years and mature experience, and Conchita was only 16 when the donation was executed by Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of their co-defendant
made. children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their names.
d. The CA did not find that she was fully aware of the terms of the bargain entered
into by her parents. The plaintiffs in this case sought for the declaration of nullity of the six deeds of sale
e. Her acceptance of the deed does not imply knowledge of conditions and terms not and certificates of title in favor of the defendants. 
set forth therein.
f. Witnesses testified that it was Conchita’s parents who insisted on the donation. They alleged that certain deed of sale were null and void ab initio because they are
simulated.
The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by
the law but will both be left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this They said that: a. Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale
Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality of the bargain either as a xxx over the properties in litis; b. Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in
cause of action or as a defense. But where the plaintiff can establish a cause of the sums reflected in the questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold
action without exposing its illegality, the vice does not affect the right to recover. times more valuable than the measly sums appearing therein; c. Thirdly, the deeds of
sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties (vendors and vendees);
Applied to the case: Conchita seeks recovery of the land based on the strength of a and d. Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a
donation regular on its face. To defeat its effect, the heirs must plead and prove that deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs
the same is illegal, which they cannot do, since Lopez himself, if living, would be (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime.
barred from setting up that plea.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action
Lopez could not donate the entirety of the property to the prejudice of his wife. against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over the
The donation is void only insofar as it prejudices the interest of his wife. properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made by
a. FC 1409: The conjugal partnership can be charged anything given or promised by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the
the husband in order to obtain employment for his children, or give them a consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued
profession. with sufficient factual and legal basis.
b. 1415: The husband may dispose of the property of the conjugal partnership for
purposes in Art. 1409. RTC ruled in favor of the defendants (respondents in this case) and dismissed the
c. 1413: The husband may for a valuable consideration alienate and encumber the complaint. Upon appeal, the CA upheld RTC’s ruling.
property of the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife.
ISSUES: 
To determine the prejudice to the widow, it must be shown that the value of her share 1. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration. NO
in the property donated cannot be paid out of the husband’s share of the community 2. Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price. NO
profits. However, the requisite data are not available to the court. The records need to
be remanded to the court of origin that settled Salvador’s estate. HELD:
Salvador’s forced heirs cannot invoke the illegality of the donation, but are 1ST ISSUE: THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION.
entitled to have the donation set aside insofar as inofficious , based on their rights If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price, the contract of sale is
to a legitime out of his estate. However, only the court of origin has the requisite data valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach of that manner of payment.
to determine whether or not it is inofficious. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the contract of sale is valid but
subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds of the parties as to the price,
Re: improvements in the land – governed by rules of accession and possession in because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated, then the contract is void.
good faith, since Maria and Salvador’s heirs were unaware of the donation to Conchita Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a contract of sale is simulated,
when the improvements were made. the sale is void.

Re: laches – Conchita only enforced her right as donee in 1951. But the Court It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of
highlights that in 1943, she was still sixteen; she only reached the age of majority in sale.  
1948. Her action 1951 was only delayed three years. Furthermore, she couldn’t have Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract.  Payment of

2|P a g e JLA
the price goes into the performance of the contract.  Failure to pay the consideration is
different from lack of consideration.  The former results in a right to demand the Thus, the two exceptions to the general rule that the form is irrelevant to the binding
fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid contract while the effect of a contract are:
latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.

Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely (a) Solemn Contracts - contracts which the law requires to be in some particular
simulated. form (writing) in order to make them valid and enforceable. Examples:
To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’s testimony stating 1. Donation of immovable property (Art. 749) which must be in a public
that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he would transfer a lot to instrument to be valid. in order "that the donation may be valid", i.e.,
her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of the purchase price. The existing or binding.
trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation of price credible.   2. Donation of movables worth more than P5,000 (Art. 748) which must be in
writing otherwise they are void.
Petitioners’ failure to prove absolute simulation of price is magnified by their lack of (b) Contracts that the law requires to be proved by some writing (memorandum) of
knowledge of their respondent siblings’ financial capacity to buy the questioned lots. its terms, i.e. those covered by the old Statute of Frauds, now Article 1403(2) of
On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners presented as evidence plainly the Civil Code.
showed the cost of each lot sold.  Not only did respondents’ minds meet as to the
purchase price, but the real price was also stated in the Deeds of Sale.  As of the filing For the latter example, their existence are not provable by mere oral testimony (unless
of the complaint, respondent siblings have also fully paid the price to their respondent wholly or partly executed) and are required to be in writing to be enforceable by action
father. in court.

2ND ISSUE: THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION However, the contract sued upon (compensation for services) does not come under
SHALL NOT INVALIDATE A CONTRACT.
either exception. While the last clause of Article 1358 provides that "all other contracts
Art. 1355.  Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. private one." Said Article does not provide that the absence of a written form in this
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides: case will make the agreement invalid or unenforceable.

Art. 1470.  Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may On the contrary, Article 1357 clearly indicates that contracts covered by Article 1358
indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some are binding and enforceable by action or suit despite the absence of writing.
other act or contract.  (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470 of
CASE NO. 7
the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale.  Indeed, there
GARCIA VS BISAYA
is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject matter of
G.R. NO. L-8060. SEPTEMBER 28, 1955
sale.  All the respondents believed that they received the commutative value of what
they gave.
Petitioner: PAULINO GARCIA
Respondent: MARIA BISAYA, ET AL
Ruling: In the instant case, the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid
consideration, and that the defendant children actually paid the purchase price
DOCTRINE
stipulated in their respective Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by
In Reformation of contracts, allegation of the real agreement or intention of parties is
the buyer to the seller is a factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
essential since the object sought in an action for reformation is to make an instrument
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
conform to the real agreement or intention of the parties.

FACTS: On May 20, 1952, plaintiff filed a Complaint against the defendants in the
CASE NO. 6
Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, alleging that on November 12, 1938,
HERNAEZ VS DELOS ANGELES
defendants executed in favor of plaintiff a deed of sale covering a parcel of land therein
G.R. NO. L-27010 APRIL 30, 1969
described; that the said land "was erroneously designated by the parties in the deed of
sale as an unregistered land [not registered under Act 496, nor under the Spanish
Petitioner: MARLENE DAUDEN-HERNAEZ
Mortgage Law] when in truth and in fact said land is a portion of a big mass of land
Respondent: HON. WALFRIDO DELOS ANGELES, Judge of the Court of
registered under Original Certificate of Title No. 6579 in the Office of the Register of
First Instance of Quezon City, HOLLYWOOD FAR EAST
Deeds of Oriental Mindoro"; that despite persistent demand from plaintiff to have the
PRODUCTIONS, INC., AND RAMON VALENZUELA
error corrected, defendants have refused to do so. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed for
judgment ordering defendants to make the aforesaid correction in the deed of sale. 
FACTS: Marlene Dauden-Hernaez, a movie actress, filed a case against Hollywood
Far East Productions its President and General Manager, Ramon Valenzuela, to Answering the Complaint, defendants denied having executed the alleged deed of sale
recover P14,700 allegedly the balance due for her services as leading actress in two and pleaded prescription as a defense. Traversing the plea of prescription, plaintiff
motion pictures. The complaint was dismissed by Judge De Los Angeles mainly alleged, among other things, that he "was without knowledge of the error sought to be
because her claim was not supported by an written document, public or private in corrected at the time the deed of sale was executed and for many years thereafter,"
violation of Articles 1356 and 1358 of the Civil Code. Upon a motion for having discovered the said error "only recently". 
reconsideration, the respondent judged dismissed the same because the allegations Trial court dismissed the case on the basis of prescription.
were the same as the first motion.
ISSUE: Whether petition must be dismissed because of prescription.

According to Judge De Los Angeles, the contract sued upon was not alleged to be in HELD: YES, but not because action has prescribed but because there was no
writing when Article 1358 requires it to be so because the amount involved exceeds cause of action.
P500.
Both appellant and appellees apparently regard the present action as one for the
ISSUE: Whether or not a contract for personal services involving more than P500.00 reformation of an instrument under Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the new Civil Code.
Specifically, the object sought is the correction of an alleged mistake in a deed of sale
was either invalid or unenforceable under the last paragraph of Article 1358?
covering a piece of land. The action being upon a written contract, it should prescribe
in ten years counted from the day it could have been instituted. Obviously, appellant
HELD: No. The order dismissing the complaint is set aside and the case is remanded could not have instituted his action to correct an error in a deed until that error
to the CFI. was discovered. There being nothing in the pleadings to show that the error was
discovered more than ten years before the present action was filed on May 20, 1952,
RATIO: Consistent with the Spanish Civil Code in upholding spirit and intent of the while, on the other hand, there is allegation that the error was discovered "only
recently", We think the action should not have been dismissed as having already
parties over formalities, in general, contracts are valid and binding from their perfection
prescribed before the factual basis for prescription had been established and clarified
regardless of whether they are oral or written. by evidence. 

However, as provided in the 2nd sentence of Art. 1356: We note, however, that appellant's Complaint states no cause of action, for it
fails to allege that the instrument to the reformed does not express the real
ART. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been agreement or intention of the parties. Such allegation is essential since the object
entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. sought in an action for reformation is to make an instrument conform to the real
agreement or intention of the parties. [Art. 1359, new Civil Code; 23 R. C. L., par. 2]. 
However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order
But the Complaint does not even allege what the real agreement or intention
that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain was. How then is the Court to know that the correction sought will make the instrument
way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable.... conform to what was agreed or intended by the parties? It is not the function of the

3|P a g e JLA
remedy of reformation to make a new agreement, but to establish and perpetuate the ZOSIMO ORGANISTA, DOMICIANO FLORES, FLORITA
true existing one. FLORES, EDUARDO FLORES, BENIGNA FLORES,
ANGELINA FLORES, MARCIAL FLORES, and MARIO
Moreover, Courts do not reform instruments merely for the sake of reforming them, but FLORES
only to enable some party to assert right under them as reformed. [23 R. C. L., par. 2].
If the instrument in the present case is reformed by making it state that the land therein
conveyed is already covered by a Torrens certificate of title, what right will the
appellant, as vendee, be able to assert under the reformed instrument when according
to himself, or his counsel states in his brief, said title is in the name of Torcuata
Sandoval, obviously a person other than the vendor? Would not the sale to him then CASE NO. 10
be ineffective, considering that he would be in the position of one who knowingly BORROMEO VS CA
purchased property not belonging to the vendor?  G.R. NO. L-22962 SEPTEMBER 28, 1972
Petitioner: PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V.
Perhaps appellant's real grievance is that he has been led to enter into the contract of BORROMEO, JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES
sale through fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the vendor or in the mistaken and CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR.
belief that, as stated in the deed, the property he was buying was unregistered land. Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE A. VILLAMOR, (Deceased)
But if that be the case, Article 1359 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that "the Substituted by FELISA VILLAMOR, ROSARIO V. LIAO
proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract." LAMCO, MANUEL VILLAMOR, AMPARO V. COTTON,
Appellant's complaint, however, does not ask for the annulment of the deed; neither MIGUEL VILLAMOR and CARMENCITA VILLAMOR
does it contain allegations essential to an action for that purpose. 
Facts: Jose A. Villamor was a distributor of lumber belonging to Mr. Miller who was
the agent of the Insular Lumber Company in Cebu City. Canuto Borromeo is a friend
CASE NO. 8 and a former classmate of Villamor. Villamor used to borrow some money to Borromeo
BENTIR VS LEANDE from time to time. When Villamor on one occasion with some pressing obligation to
G.R. NO. 128991 APRIL 12, 2000 settle with Mr. Miller, he borrowed from Borromeo a large sum of money for which he
Petitioner: Yolanda Resello-Bentir, Samuel Pormida, and Charito Pormida mortgaged his land and house in Cebu City.
Respondent: Hon. Mateo M. Leanda, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC, Tacloban City, Branch 8, and Leyte Gulf Traders, Inc. Mr. Miller filed civil action against the defendant and attached his properties including
those mortgaged to plaintiff, inasmuch as the deed of mortgage in favor of plaintiff
Nature of the Case could not be registered because not properly drawn up.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 17, 1997 and reinstating the order of Borromeo then asked for settlement of his obligation, but defendant instead offered to
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 7 dated December 15, 1995 execute a document promising to pay his indebtedness even after the lapse of ten
dismissing the action for reformation. years. Liquidation was made and defendant was found to be indebted to plaintiff in the
sum of P7,220.00, for which defendant signed a promissory note therefor on
FACTS: Yolanda Rosello Bentir et al entered into a contract of lease of a parcel of November 29, 1933 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, agreeing to pay 'as
land with respondent, Leyte Gulf Traders for a period of 20 years starting from May 5, soon as I have money'.
1968. The lease was extended for another four (4) years or until May 31, 1992.
There is also a stipulation on the note that defendant 'hereby relinquish, renounce, or
On May 5, 1989, petitioner Bentir sold the leased premises to petitioner spouse, otherwise waive my rights to the prescriptions established by our Code of Civil
Samuel Pormada and Charito Pormada. Respondent, Leyte Gulf Traders questioned Procedure for the collection or recovery of the above sum of P7,220.00. ... at any time
the sale alleging that it had a right of first refusal. Rebuffed, respondent, filed a case even after the lapse of ten years from the date of this instrument'. After the execution
seeking reformation of the expired contract of lease on the ground that its lawyer of the document, plaintiff limited himself to verbally requesting defendant to settle his
inadvertently omitted to incorporate in the contract of lease executed in 1968, the indebtedness from time to time. Plaintiff did not file any complaint against the
verbal agreement between parties that respondent has a right of first refusal over the defendant within ten years from the execution of the document as there was no
leased property. property registered in defendant's name, who furthermore assured him that he could
collect even after the lapse of ten years. After the last war, plaintiff made various oral
On December 15, 1995, the trial court through Judge Espina issued an order demands, but defendants failed to settle his account, — hence the present complaint
dismissing the complaint premised on its finding that the action for reformation had for collection.
already prescribed.
Court of First Instance of Cebu sentence the original defendant, the deceased Jose A.
On December 29, 1995, the respondent corporation filed a motion for reconsideration Villamor, to pay Canuto O. Borromeo, now represented by petitioners, the sum of
and on January 11, 1996, the respondent corporation filed an urgent ex-parte motion P7,220.00 within ninety days from the date of the receipt of such decision with interest
for issuance of an order directing the petitioners, or their representatives or agents to at the rate of 12% per annum from the expiration of such ninety-day period.
refrain from taking possession of the land in question. Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

But on May 10, 1996, respondent Judge Navidad issued an order reversing the order ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing the ruling of the CFI in finding the lack of
of dismissal on the grounds that the action for reformation had not yet expired and the validity of the stipulation amounting to a waiver in line with the principle "that a person
dismissal was premature and precipitate denying respondent corporation of its right tro cannot renounce future prescription"
procedural due process.
Ruling: Yes. CA erred in reversing the CFI’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the action for reformation shouldprosper  It is a well-settled maxim that between two possible interpretations, that which saves
rather than destroys is to be preferred.
HELD: N o . S i n c e t h e p u r p o s e o f a n a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f i s t o
secure an authoritativestatement of the rights and obligations of the Even from the standpoint of what for some is strict legalism, the decision arrived at by
p a r t i e s f o r t h e i r g u i d a n c e i n t h e e n f o r c e m e n t thereof, or compliance the Court of Appeals calls for disapproval. It is a fundamental principle in the
therewith and not to settle issues arising from the breach thereof, it maybe entertained interpretation of contracts that while ordinarily the literal sense of the words employed
only before the breach or violation of the law or contract to which it refers. Here,P is to be followed, such is not the case where they "appear to be contrary to the evident
brought the present action for reformation after an alleged breach or violation of the intention of the contracting parties," which "intention shall prevail."  
contractwasalreadycommitted byD. Such a codal provision has been given full force and effect since the leading case
of Reyes v. Limjap,  a 1910 decision. Justice Torres, who penned the above decision,
had occasion to reiterate such a principle when he spoke for the Court in De la Vega v.
Ballilos  thus: "The contract entered into by the contracting parties which has produced
CASE NO. 9 between them rights and obligations is in fact one of antichresis, for article 1281 of the
SARMING VS DY Civil Code prescribes among other things that if the words should appear to conflict
G.R. NO. 133643 JUNE 6, 2002 with the evident intent of the contracting parties, the intent shall prevail."
Petitioner: RITA SARMING, RUFINO SARMING, MANUEL SARMING, Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the rule of
LEONORA VDA. DE LOY, ERLINDA SARMING, NICANDRA separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows: 'On the supposition that the
SARMING, MANSUETA SARMING, ARTURO CORSAME, various pacts, clauses, or conditions are valid, no difficulty is presented; but should
FELY CORSAME, FEDERICO CORSAME, ISABELITA they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the nullity of the
CORSAME, NORMA CORSAME, CESAR CORSAME, RUDY principal obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added to it
CORSAME, ROBERTA CORSAME, ARTEMIO CORSAME, and do not go to its essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations
ELPIDIO CORSAME, ENRIQUITA CORSAME, and should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom,
GUADALUPE CORSAME TAN except in cases where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention
Respondent: CRESENCIO DY, LUDIVINA DY-CHAN, TRINIDAD FLORES, of the parties, is inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically
LUISA FLORES, SATURNINA ORGANISTA, REMEDIOS speaking, of that the nullity of which it would also occasion.' ...
ORGANISTA, OFELIA ORGANISTA, LYDIA ORGANISTA,

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The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law as condensed in the following
words: 'Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several
promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part only of the things to be done
are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or the promise, so far as it can be
separated, from the illegality, may be valid. The rule is that a lawful promise made for a
lawful consideration is not invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at
the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the
invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute expressly or by
necessary implication declares the entire contract void.
..."
What emerges in the light of all the principles set forth above is that the first ten years
after November 29, 1933 should not be counted in determining when the action of
creditor, now represented by petitioners, could be filed.

From the joint record on appeal, it is undoubted that the complaint was filed on
January 7, 1953. If the first ten-year period was to be excluded, the creditor had until
November 29, 1953 to start judicial proceedings. After deducting the first ten-year
period which expired on November 29, 1943, there was the additional period of still
another ten years. Nor could there be any legal objection to the complaint by the
creditor Borromeo of January 7, 1953 embodying not merely the fixing of the period
within which the debtor Villamor was to pay but likewise the collection of the amount
that until then was not paid. An action combining both features did receive the
imprimatur of the approval of this Court.

As was clearly set forth in Tiglao v. The Manila Railroad Company:  "There is

something to defendant's contention that in previous cases this Court has held that the
duration of the term should be fixed in a separate action for that express purpose. But
we think the lower court has given good reasons for not adhering to technicalities in its
desire to do substantial justice."  The justification became even more apparent in the
latter portion of the opinion of Justice Alex Reyes for this Court: "We may add that
defendant does not claim that if a separate action were instituted to fix the duration of
the term of its obligation, it could present better proofs than those already adduced in
the present case. Such separate action would, therefore, be a mere formality and
would serve no purpose other than to delay." There is no legal obstacle then to the
action for collection filed by the creditor. Moreover, the judgment of the lower court,
reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals, ordering the payment of the amount due
is in accordance with law.

CASE NO. 11
KASILAG VS RODRIGUEZ
G.R. NO. 46623 DECEMBER 7, 1939
Petitioner: MARCIAL KASILAG
Respondent: RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO
MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO

PROCEDURAL FACTS: This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the

decision of the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of
First Instance of Bataan. The said court held: that the contract is entirely null and void
and without effect; that the plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of
the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother
Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof; that the
defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their favor, with all the
improvements thereon and free from any lien

SUBSTANTIVE FACTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an

accompanying accessory contract of mortgage. The executed accessorycontract
involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having been acquired by means
of homestead. P for his part accepted the contract of mortgage.

Believing that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands P,
acting in good faith took possession of the land. To wit, the P has no knowledge that
the enjoyment of the fruits of the land is an element of the credit transaction of
Antichresis.

ISSUE: Whether or not P is deemed to be a possessor in good faith of the land, based

upon Article 3 of the New Civil Code as states “Ignorance of the law  excuses no one
from compliance therewith,” the P’s lack of knowledge of the contract of antichresis.

HELD: The accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements of on the land is

valid. The verbal contract of antichresis agreed upon is deemed null and void.

REASONING: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every person
who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is
invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith.” And in this case, the petitioner
acted in good faith. Good faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the
petitioner acted in good faith in his enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was
done through his apparent acquisition thereof.

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