A.M. No. MTJ-19-1925 (Formerly OCA IPI No.

17-2937-MTJ), June 03, 2019

FACTS:

The complainants father and respondent’s father-in-law entered into a Compromise Agreement
approved by the RTC. A survey was conducted and a Writ of Execution and a Demand for
Compliance/Delivery of Possession was served. Sheriff IV Romeo C. Alvarez, Jr. implemented
the writ of execution. Not pleased with the outcome of the survey, respondent judge thus
suggested that, if Sheriff Alvarez and his men were to push thru with the implementation of the
writ of execution, "something untoward might happen” ("kung padayonon nyo, basi
maghinagamo”). Complainant contended that respondent judge violated the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Respondent claimed that the intended fencing would have prejudiced him and his wife insofar
as their lot is concerned and that his action was justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code
under which the owner of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof, and under which the owner may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 429 or the Doctrine of “Self-Help” applies in this case.

RULING:

No. Article 429 or the Doctrine of “Self-Help” does not apply.

Respondent judge's reliance on Article 429 of the Civil Code is misplaced. The doctrine of "self-
help" enunciated in this article applies only when the person against whom the owner has the
right to use force (in order to exclude the former from the latter's property) is really an
"aggressor." In this case, Sheriff Alvarez was not an aggressor, as indeed he could not have
been one, because as an officer or agent of the court, he was simply carrying out his official
duty to implement the writ of execution covering Lot Nos. 703 and 706. The OCA was correct in
saying that respondent judge effectively took the law into his own hands, when he stopped the
implementation of the writ of execution using threats and intimidation. Needless to say, he also
clearly failed to accord due respect to legal processes.
G.R. No. 204626               June 9, 2014
PAUL P. GABRIEL, JR., IRENEO C. CALWAG, THOMAS L. TINGGA-AN, and the Heirs of
JULIET B. PULKERA vs. CARMELING CRISOLOGO
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:
Crisologo that she was the registered owner of two parcels of land properties were covered by
an Assessment of Real Property; that the payments of realty taxes on the said properties were
updated; that sometime in 2006, she discovered that petitioners illegal occupied her properties.

Petitioners countered that the titles of Crisologo were products of Civil Registration Case No. 1,
Record 211, which were void pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1271, entitled "An Act
Nullifying Decrees of Registration and Certificates of Title within the Baguio Town site
Reservation Case.

Hence, the TCTs could not be sources of legal rights. Second, Crisologo never took actual
possession of the subject properties after the alleged sale in 1967. She appointed an
administrator over the said property only in 2006.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of
land.

RULING:

The Court holds that Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject parcels of land.

The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
When parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to
determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication,
nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not
a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in
short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.

Although Section 1 of P.D. No. 1271 invalidated decrees of registration and certificates of title
within the Baguio Town site Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211, the nullity,
however, is not that sweeping. The said provision expressly states that "all certificates of titles
issued on or before July 31, 1973 shall be considered valid and the lands covered by them shall
be deemed to have been conveyed in fee simple to the registered owners" upon 1) showing
proof that the land covered by the subject title is not within any government, public or quasi-
public reservation, forest, military or otherwise, as certified by appropriating government
agencies; and 2) compliance by the titleholder with the payment to the Republic of the
Philippines of the correct assessed value of the land within the required period.
In the case at bench, the records show that the subject parcels of land were registered on
August 24, 1967. The titles are, thus, considered valid although subject to the conditions set.

G.R. No. 222297

FACTS:
Respondents alleged that they were the owners of a residential house situated in Barangay Sta.
Ines, Bulakan, Bulacan; that the house had been declared for taxation purposes in their names
for the year 2012. Petitioner and his wife Carolina donated 144 square meters portion of the
land in favor of respondents; that Erlinda Ventanilla "indicated to partition the said property," but
the house situated on said property constitutes a stumbling block on the partition of the said
property; that being the owners of the property, respondents merely tolerated the occupation of
the property by petitioner; that they demanded he vacate the house to give way to the
subdivision and partition of the property but to no avail; and that respondents filed a complaint
with the office of the Barangay but no amicable settlement was effected.

Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action saying that he and his
late spouse Carolina were the owners of the residential house; that he was also the registered
owner of the 289 square meters parcel of land, having bought the same from Erlinda Ventanilla

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents have a cause of action to eject petitioner from the subject property.

The Court's Ruling

No. From the documentary records, the property is co-owned by Carolina and Erlinda. Being co-
owners of the property, they are also the co-owners of the improvement thereon, including the
subject house.

Being a co-owner of the property as heir of Carolina, petitioner cannot be ejected from the
subject property. In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with
each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising [his] rights over the whole
property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he
shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is
actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner
exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of it.

Ultimately, respondents do not have a cause of action to eject petitioner based on tolerance
because the latter is also entitled to possess and enjoy the subject property. Corollarily, neither
of the parties can assert exclusive ownership and possession of the same prior to any partition.
If at all, the action for unlawful detainer only resulted in the recognition of co-ownership between
the parties over the residential house.
The parties, being co-owners of both the land and the building, the remedy of the respondents is
to file an action for partition.