PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANILO FELICIANO, JR.

, JULIUS VICTOR
MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and ROBERT MICHAEL
BELTRAN ALVIR
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014 THIRD DIVISION LEONEN, J.

CRIME CHARGED: murder, the attempted murder

FACTS

On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the Sigma
Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of
the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men, Scintilla Juris Fraternity,
carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Within a few seconds, five (5) of the men started attacking them,
hitting them with their lead pipes. During the attack, hone of them recognized one of the attackers as
Robert Michael Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off. Some of them sustained injuries that required
hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder

ISSUE

Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants attacked
private complainants and caused the death of Dennis Venturina? (YES)

RULING

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of
their degree of participation, thus: Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in
the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle
that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the
physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose
evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the
same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable
for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a
crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly
explained in one case where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the
solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band
or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the
conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.

The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case arose from a single incident
wherein the accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in
agreement to do the highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to
run away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The
intent to kill was already present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-
appellants alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish
between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective liabilities of
their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of that intent to kill and
whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that can be appreciated.

It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of men armed with lead pipes and baseball
bats attacked Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted in Venturina's death. As correctly
found by the trial court and the appellate court, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina was
committed by a group that took advantage of its superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The
appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense.

Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz, this court stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence
of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For
treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.

The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to
the findings of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In particular, they ruled that although the
attack was sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad daylight with a lot of people who could see
them"and that "there was a possibility for the victims to have fought back or that the people in the canteen
could have helped the victims." This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this case were eating
lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they would be reasonably expected to be on guard for
any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead
pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation
where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back
against the attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would
preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight
physical injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack,
the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica,
Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants
took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill.

For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and
the attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.