THE 2ND LEGAL INSIDER, MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020

THE 2ND LEGAL INSIDER, MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

SLP NO. ………… OF 2016

IN THE MATTER OF:
RANSOM AND ORS. ..PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF INDIANA .. RESPONDENT

CLUBBED WITH

WP(C) NO. ………… OF 2016

ZIO FOUNDATION .. PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF INDIANA .. RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE REGISTRY OF THE COURT

OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..........................................................................................................2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...........................................................................................................3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...............................................................................................8

STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................................................9

ISSUES RAISED...........................................................................................................................10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...................................................................................................11

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..........................................................................................................i

I. WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN’S)

ACT, 2014 IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?...........................................................................i

II. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT AND SESSION’S COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN
REJECTING THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF RANSOM’S AGE OR NOT?........viii

III. WHETHER PETER SHOULD BE ACQUIITED OF ALL THE CHARGES LEVIED

AGAINST HIM OR NOT?.........................................................................................................xi

PRAYER.....................................................................................................................................xvii

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

¶ Paragraph
§ Section
< Below/Under/Lesser
> Above/Greater
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
b/w Between
Cri Criminal
GOI Government Of Indiana
Hon’ble Honourable
HRD Human Resource Development
IEA Indian Evidence Act
i.e That is
IPC Indian Penal Code
J. Justice
JJ. Juvenile Justice
Max. Maximum
Min. Minimum
NCRB National Crime Research Bureau
Ors. Others
POCSO Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
r/w Read with
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SLL Special Local Laws
Std. Standard
v. Versus
Yrs. Years

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

INDIANA’S CASES

S. NO. CASE LAWS CITATION PAGE NUMBER

1. Abdul Sattar v Crown AIR 1949 Lah 51 ix
2. Abdul Sayeed vs State of M.P (2010) 10 SCC 259 xiv
3. Aftab Ahamd Anasari v. State of 2010 2 SCC 583 xv
Uttaranchal
4. Ammini v. State of Kerela AIR 1995 Ker 252 xi

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5. Anil v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 69 ix

6. Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488 ix
7. Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. AIR 1979 SC 1149 x
State Of Haryana
8. Bable v. State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2012 SC 2621 xiii
9. Balakrishna Das Aggrawal v. AIR 1989 All 133 xi
Radha Devi
10. Barender Kumar Ghosh v. AIR 1925 PC 1 xiv
Emperor
11. B.A. Umesh v. State of Karnataka (2011) 3 SCC 85 xi
12. Bhaluka Behra v. State AIR 1957 Ori 172 xi
13. Bhim Singh v. State of (2015) 4 SCC 739 xv
Uttrakhand
14. C. Chenga Reddy v State of AP (1996) 10 SCC 193 xvi
15. Central Bureau of Investigation v. 2014 SCC OnLine SC viii
Swapan Roy 931
16. Darain Ahsan v. State of West (2012) 4 SCC 352 xiv
Bengal
17. Deepak v. State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCC 762 xiv
18. Delhi Administration v. Pali Ram A.I.R 1979 S.C. 14 xi
19. Gaurav Kumar v. State of (2015) 4 SCALE 531 ii
Haryana
20. Gulzhar Khan v. State A.I.R 1962 Pat. 225 xi
21. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad AIR 1955 SC 233 x
Ishaque
22. Hiralal Mallick v. State of Bihar 1977 CrLJ 1921 (SC) ix
23. Hukam v state AIR 1977 SC 1063 xvi
24. Kehar Singh v State (Delhi (1989) CrLJ 1 xiii
Administration)
25. Krishna Dalmia v. Shri J. S. R. AIR 1958 SC 538 iii
Tendolkar & Ors.
26. Kumaran Nair v. Bhargavi 1988 Cri. L. J. 1000 xi
27. Lallan bhai v. state of Bihar AIR 2003 SC 333 xiii

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
28. Mano Dutt v. State of Uttar (2012) 4 SCC 79 xiii
Pradesh
29. M.G. Badappanavar v. State of AIR 2001 SC 260 iii
Karnataka
30. National Legal Services Authority (2014) 1 SCC 1 v
v. Union of India and Others
31. Padaala Veera Reddy v. State of AIR 1990 SC 79 xv
A.P
32. Parichat v. state of Madhya AIR 1972 SC 535 xii
Pradesh,
33. PT Rajan v. TPM Sahir AIR 2003 SC 4603 x
34. Rajasthan v. shosha ram AIR 2013 SC 1760 xiii
35. Rajesh Rai v. State of Sikkim 2002 Cr.L.J. 1385 at P. xv
1390(Sikkim)
36. Raju Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 235 ix
37. Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. (2011) 11 SCC 111 xvi
State of Gujarat
38. Ranganath Sharma v. Satendra (2009) 1 SCC (Cr.) xii
Sharma 415
39. Re Sheikh Hussain AIR 1957 Mad 47 xi
40. Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT) of AIR 1952 SC 343 xv
Delhi
41. Rewa Ram v. State of Madhya (1978) Cr.L.J. 858 xv
Pradesh
42. Salil Bali v. Union of India & (2013) 7 SCC 705 i
Anr.
43. Selvi and others v. State of MANU/SC/0325/2010 xi
Karnataka
44. Sainik Motors v. State of AIR 1961 SC 1480 x
Rajasthan
45. Saligram v. State of Madhya 1990 Supp SC 60 xiii
Pradesh
46. Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga (2007) 13 SCC 360 xv
Singh and Ors.
47. Satyavir Singh Rathi, ACP v (2011) 6 SCC 1 xiii
State of Rajasthan
48. Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 10 SCC 402 xiii
49. Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 632 xv
50. Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West (2012) 7 SCC 646 xiii
Bengal
51. Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. AIR 1983 SC 484 xiv
State of Gujarat
52. State of Andhra Pradesh v. IBS AIR 1970 SC 648 xvi
Prasad Rao
53. State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. (2010) 15 SCC 69 xiii
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Sohan Babu
54. State of Bombay v. Kathikalu A.I.R 1960 S.C. 1808 xi
Oughad
55. State of Kerala v. Sankaran Nair AIR 1960 Ker 392 xi
56. State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha (2011) 7 SCC 437 xv
Ambaji Adsul (¶27)
57. State of Mysore v. Venappasetty 1973 CrLJ 1568 xii
58. State of Rajasthan v. Tej Ram. (1999) 3 SCC 507 xvi
59. State of Tamil Nadu Vs. K. (2011) 8 SCC 737 i
Shyam Sunder
60. State of U.P. v. Babu Ram AIR 1961 SC 751 x
61. State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 xv
62. Shabnam & Saleem v. State of 3 Supreme Court Cases viii
Uttar Pradesh (Cri) 309
63. Subramanian Swamy v. Raju (2014) 8 SCC 390 iv
64. Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. (2012) 9 SCC 249 xiii
State of Maharashtra
65. Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. (2012) 10 SCC 373 xiii
State of Maharashtra
66. Vinod Kumar v. State of Kerala (2014) 5 SCC 678 ix
67. Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 i
68. Vishal Yadav v. State of UP AIR 1984 SC 1682 xv

FOREIGN CASES

S.NO. CASE LAWS CITATION PAGE NUMBER

1. B. v. R. 123 J.P. 61 ix
2. F.V. Padwick [1959] Crim. L. Rev. ix
439
3. R. v. Gorrie 83 J.P. 136 Ix

STATUTES

1. Juvenile Justice Act (Care and Protection of Children Act), 2014

2. Indian Evidence Act, 1872
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860
4. Mental Capacity Act, UK, 2005
BOOKS

1. Amita Dhanda, N.S. Bindra’s Interpretation Of Statutes (11th Ed. Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon
2014)..........................................................................................................................................Xi
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
2. Dr. Hari Singh Gour, 1 Indian Penal Code (14th Ed. Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad
2013), State Of Mysore V. Venappasetty, 1973 Crlj 1568.......................................................Xii
3. Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, 2 Constitutional Law Of India (Universal Law Publishing Pvt. Ltd.,
New Delhi 2008)........................................................................................................................Iii
4. H.M. Seervai, 2 Constitutional Law Of India (4th Ed. Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
New Delhi 2004)...........................................................................................................................I
5. Justice G P Singh, Principles Of Statutory Interpretation (12th Ed. Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa, Nagpur 2010)..............................................................................................................X
6. Kd Gaur, Criminal Law Cases And Materials (7th Ed. Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon 2013).............Xii
7.M.P. Tandon, The Indian Penal Code (23th Ed. Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad 2005)....Xii
8. S.K. Sarvaria, R.A. Nelson’s Indian Penal Code (9th Ed. Lexis Nexis Butterworths Gurgaon
2002)..........................................................................................................................................xii

JOURNALS

1.Hon’ble Justice M.L Singhal, Medical Evidence and it’s use in trial of cases, J.T.R.I. Journal,
...................................................................................................................................................xiv
2. Justice Raghavendra Kumar, The case for reduction of the age of juvenility, Criminal Law
Journal, August, 2015..................................................................................................................ii
3. Justice Raghavendra Kumar, The case for reduction of the age of juvenility, Criminal Law
Journal, August, 2015, Press Note of Union Ministry of Women and Child Development, Press
Information Bureau, 2014...........................................................................................................iv

WEBSITES

1. A Guide for the Placement and Transcript Evaluation of Students See at:
http://www.palmbeachschools.org/multicultural/documents/TranscriptGuide.pdf (Last
Accessed At 1 March 2016)........................................................................................................ix
2. Chapter – 10 Juvenile in conflict with law See at http://ncrb.nic.in/ (Last visited 5 August,
2020)............................................................................................................................................ii
3. Legislative Brief The Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Bill, 2014 (Last Visited
On 5 August, 2020) See at: http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Juvenile
%20Justice/Legislative%20Brief%20Juvenile%20Justice%20Bi ll.pdf...................................vii

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
4. Mechanisms To Create And Support Treaties Conventions And Other Responses (Last
assessed on 5 August, 2020 at 1:38 pm) See at:
http://www.eolss.net/eolsssamplechapters/c14/e1-44-01/E1-44-01-TXT.aspx...........................v
5. Official entrance age to primary education (yrs.) (Last Visited 5 August 2020) See at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.AGES?page=2..................................................viii
6. Selected Information On School Education Government of India Ministry of Human Resource
Development Bureau Of Planning, Monitoring and Statics Division New Delhi 2011-12 (Last
accessed on 5 August 2020) See at:
http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/statistics/SISH201112.pdf..............................ix
7. Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Op-Ed., MISCHIEVOUS DISCRETION, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2,
2013 See at:
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130202/jsp/opinion/story_16509423.jsp#.VtnaOPl961s (Last
Accessed On 6 August 2020)......................................................................................................ix
8. The details have been presented in Table 10.4 at http://ncrb.nic.in/ (last accessed on 5th August
2020 at 3pm.................................................................................................................................iv
9. See at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/parliament-passes-juveline-
justice-bill-16-andabove-to-be-tried-as-adults/#sthash.fkpmBvOo.dpuf (last accessed on 5
August, 2020 at 1:05 p.m.)..........................................................................................................iv
10. See Two Hundred Sixty Fourth Report The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Department- Related Parliamentary Standing Committee Report On Human Resource
Development (Last assessed on 5 August, 2020 at 2:28 am)……………………………… ii

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The respondent humbly submits to the jurisdiction as invoked by the petitioners. Petitioner 2 and
3 approaches the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana under Article 1361 of the Constitution of
Indiana which gives discretionary power to the Supreme Court of Indiana to hear any matter on
appeal against the order passed by any court or tribunal in the territory of Indiana where justice
and equity so demands.

Whereas Petitioner 3 approaches this Hon’ble Supreme Court by filing a Public Interest
Litigation under Article 322 of the Constitution of Indiana which gives the power to the Supreme
Court any petition in the form of a writ.

The respondent reserves the right to rebut the same.

1
“(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave appeal
from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or
tribunal in the territory of India. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or
order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.” 2 32.
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
2
The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by this Part (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by
clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 ) (4) The right guaranteed by
this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Singhal Mr. Saxena

Employee
Son Daughter Son
Friends Friends Friends
Gaurav Ransom Peter Arther Phillips
Vaishali

Enemy

8th March, 2015 Exhibition 12th March, 10th March,

2015 Arrest 2015 Arrest
Death Death by
by head Asphyxia. Her
injury clothes were torn
and and she had
internal several scratches
bleeding and injuries.
Well aware of
Well aware of
circumstances
circumstances and
insufficiency of age

Juvenile

th
12th June, 2015 Case
28 July, 2015
remanded back to Juvenile
Guilty u/s 304,
Court
17th December, 2014 326, 354 r/w 34
Juvenile Justice (Care IPC, 1860 4th August, 2015 Guilty u/s
and Protection of 304, 326, 354 r/w 34 IPC,
Children’s) Act Appealed the High 1860 and sentenced for 3
Passed. Court which years in special home
rejected the same
20th January, 2014 Appealed the Sessions Court
Juvenile Justice (Care which dismissed the same
and Protection of
Children’s) Act Revision Petition in the High
enforced. Court which rejected the same

11th January, 2016 Appeal

PIL filed by ZIO
filed in the Apex Court
Foundation
challenging the act.
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ISSUES RAISED

……………………………….. ISSUE I………………………………..

WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT,

2014 IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?

……………………………….. ISSUE II ………………………………..

WHETHER THE HIGH COURT AND SESSION’S COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN REJECTING
THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF SHYAMA’S AGE OR NOT?

……………………………….. ISSUE III………………………………..

WHETHER SHEKHAR SHOULD BE ACQUITTED OF ALL THE CHARGES LEVELED

AGAINST HIM OR NOT?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN)

ACT, 2014 IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?

The JJ. Act, 2014 is Constitutional as it was the need of the hour. It preceded a consultative
process. It is not violative of the Art. 14 and Art. 21 as it permits reasonable classification of the
juveniles belonging to the age-group of 16-18 yrs. in case of commission of heinous offences.
The procedure followed is appropriate and stands the test under the Constitution. The Act is in
consonance with various International Covenants and Rules. Indiana is not an isolated country to
make such stringent laws to curb the menace of crimes in the society. The new act is not only a
beneficial piece of legislation but also a comprehensive legislation in juxtaposition to the JJ. act,
2000.

II. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT AND SESSION’S COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN
REJECTING THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF RANSOM’S AGE OR NOT?

The Courts of Law were justified in rejecting the test on the ground that it is certain that in all
probabilities his age was > 16 yrs. Even if the test would have been conducted no different
results would have been given. As per the preliminary assessment of the JJ. Board he was found
capax of committing the offence. His diabolic act satisfies the ingredients of § 302 of IPC, 1860.
Hence the order given by the High Court and the Session’s Court must be sustained and there
was no need of conducting the Ossification Test as it would be a futile effort.

III. WHETHER PETER’S CONVICTION BY THE JUVENILE BOARD, SESSION

COURT AND THE HIGH COURT WAS VALID OR NOT?

Peter’s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial, medical
and ocular evidence. The established chain of circumstantial evidence points towards only one
conclusion that Peter is guilty. Peter’s culpability is clearly established by his prior animosity
with Gaurav and Vaishali and his subsequent act of grabbing an opportunity to talk to Ransom.
His presence at the crime scene where he was seen sneaking away completes the entire chain of

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circumstantial evidence. Both Ransom and Peter shared hatred for Gaurav and Vaishali and acted
under common consensus. Hence, the decision of the High Court must be upheld.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE JUVENILE JUTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF

CHILDREN’S) ACT, 2014 IS CONSTITUTIONAL OR NOT?
(¶ 1.) The presumption of constitutionality is to be raised since in passing the law, the majority
of the elected representatives believe that the restrictions imposed by the law were reasonable.3

(¶ 2.) There has been a spurt in criminal activities by adults, but not by juveniles 4. In the case of
State of Tamil Nadu Vs. K. Shyam Sunder 5, the court emphasized that, “merely because the law
causes hardships or sometimes results in adverse consequences, it cannot be held to be ultra vires
the Constitution, nor can it be struck down”. It is submitted that the JJ Act, 2014 is constitutional
and it can be proved on the following grounds that: [A] The act was need of the hour, [B] The act
is consistent with Art.14 and Art. 21, [C] The procedure is appropriate, [D] The act is consistent
with International Law, [E] The act is a comprehensive legislation.

A. The act was the need of the hour

(¶ 3.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the act was the need of the hour and
the counsel of respondents have proposed this in two-fold manner.

i. That the act was passed to curb menace in the society

(¶ 4.) The POCSO Act, 2011 came into place when there was a sudden surge in the offences
relating to sexual activities, the guidelines were laid down on sexual offences at workplace after
the diabolic incident of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan6 and Criminal Amendment Act 2013 was
also made as a consequence of the Nirbhaya Case. History is replete with examples where

3
H.M. SEERVAI, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed. Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., New
Delhi 2004).
4
Salil Bali v. Union of India & Anr., (2013) 7 SCC 705.
5
(2011) 8 SCC 737.
6
AIR 1997 SC 3011.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

experience has acted as the best teacher and has demanded ‘Change’ in the law that can never be
static. As it is rightly said law is an instrument of Social change.

(¶ 5.) In an order passed on 6th April, 2015 7 the rate and the nature of crime in which the
juveniles are involved have increased, the Hon’ble J. has remarked: “Time has come to think of
an effective law to deal with the situation, we would request the learned Attorney General to
bring it to the notice of the concerned authorities so that the relevant provisions under the Act
can be re-looked, re-scrutinized and re-visited, at least in respect of offences which are heinous
in nature.”

(¶ 6.) The public outcry demanded more stringent punishment because of the increasing juvenile
crimes. The Delhi Gang rape case, the Shakti Mill Rape case and the Guwahati rape case
involving child offenders triggered a debate across the country about the inadequacy of
punishment who committed heinous crimes.8

(¶ 7.) The data provided for cases of juveniles in conflict with law reported under various SLL
that crimes have increased by 21.8% in 2014 as compared to 2013, as 4,136 cases of juveniles in
conflict with law under SLL reported in 2013 which increased to 5,039 cases in 2014.9

ii That a consultative process preceded the act

(¶ 8.) A standing Committee on HRD mentions that a comprehensive consultation process was
adopted before the passing of the Act. A review committee constituted under the Ministry of
Women and Child Development.10 The ministry has posted on its website a proposed draft of
The JJ. (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, 2014 for fifteen days suggesting broad
amendments.

B. The act is consistent with Article 14 and Article 21

7
Gaurav Kumar v. State of Haryana (2015) 4 SCALE 531.
8
Justice Raghavendra Kumar, The case for reduction of the age of juvenility, Criminal Law Journal, August, 2015
9
Chapter – 10 Juvenile in conflict with law See at http://ncrb.nic.in/ (Last visited 5 August, 2020)
10
See Two Hundred Sixty Fourth Report The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Department-
Related Parliamentary Standing Committee Report On Human Resource Development (Last assessed on 5 August,
2020 at 2:28 am)
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

(¶ 9.) The classification of age is reasonable and the procedure laid down in the new act for the
trial of children in conflict with law is not arbitrary. Constitutionality of the legislative and
executive acts should be tested on the anvil of constitutionalism and the ingrained principles.11

i That the classification made is reasonable

(¶10.) The most distinguishing provision of the JJ Act, 2014 is the classification that has been
created as provided in § 14(5)(f), of the Act which categorizes children in the age group of 16-18
who have been alleged for the commission of a heinous offence, shall undergo a preliminary
assessment with respect to their physical and mental capacity.

(¶11.) This stands the test of Reasonable Classification as laid down in the case of Shri Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Shri J. S. R. Tendolkar & Ors.,12 by a Constitution Bench that, in order, to
pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, filled namely, [A] the
classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia [B] differentia must have a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.”

(¶12.) Intelligible Differentia: categorizing all Juveniles in one category, irrespective of the
offence committed had resulted in over-classification. Unequals were treated equally as there
was no distinction b/w juveniles who committed petty offences and who committed heinous
offences.

(¶13.) This principle was reiterated by the Hon’ble SC in M.G. Badappanavar v. State of
Karnataka,13 by stating, “Equality is a basic feature of the Constitution and any treatment of
equals unequally or unequals as equals will be violation of basic structure of the Constitution.14”

(¶14.) The data by NCRB supports the differentiation. 872 juveniles were apprehended in the
age-group of <12 yrs., 11,220 juveniles were apprehended in the age-group of 12- 16 yrs. during
2014 whereas majority of juveniles apprehended (36,138) were <16-18 yrs. The percentage

11
DR. SUBHASH C. KASHYAP, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (Universal Law Publishing Pvt. Ltd.,
New Delhi 2008)
12
AIR 1958 SC 538.
13
AIR 2001 SC 260.
14
§3(x), Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. 2015 – Principle of Equality and Non-
Discrimination
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

shares of Juveniles apprehended under these age-groups were 1.8%, 23.3% and 74.9%
respectively.15

C. The procedure established to try the child as an adult is appropriate

(¶15.) It is submitted that the procedure for trial of a child stands the scrutiny of Article 21.

i Composition of the Juvenile justice board

(¶16.) § 4(2) lays down the composition of a JJ board and the board is empowered to take any
decision relating to the interest of the child and they may for this purpose take the help of
psychologist or any other expert.

ii Child friendly atmosphere along with reformation and rehabilitation

(¶17.) The provisions which ensure child friendly atmosphere and provide an opportunity for the
child to reform and rehabilitate are provided in § 18, 19 and 20, along with the preamble.16

(¶18.) As per the Ministry of Women and Child Development, this unique instrument of a two-
stage assessment brings about a balance that is sensitive to the rights of the child, protective of
his legitimate interests yet conscious of the need to deter crimes.17

(¶19.) Nobel Peace Laureate Kailash Satyarthi hailed the passing of the Act as a major
legislative reform measure.18 “Whether it’s a crime by a child or on a child, the focus has to be
on reform and restitution and not just deterrence. We welcome that no child <18 yrs. will go to
jail and instead be sent to a special place of safety till the age of 21,” he said. He added that the
protection framework provided under this law is extremely robust. Its provisions responded to
the perceptions, articulated by a wide cross-section of society for the need to have an effective
and strengthened system of administration of juvenile justice, care and protection.19

15
The details have been presented in Table 10.4 at http://ncrb.nic.in/ (last accessed on 5 th August 2020 at 3pm) ,
Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2014) 8 SCC 390.
16
“….by adopting a child-friendly approach in the adjudication and disposal of matters in the best interest of
children and for their rehabilitation…”
17
Justice Raghavendra Kumar, The case for reduction of the age of juvenility, Criminal Law Journal, August, 2015,
Press Note of Union Ministry of Women and Child Development, Press Information Bureau, 2014.
18
See at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/parliament-passes-juveline-justice-bill-16-
andabove-to-be-tried-as-adults/#sthash.fkpmBvOo.dpuf (last accessed on 5 August, 2020 at 1:05 p.m.)
19
Amendments to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Bill, Press Information Bureau, 2015.
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D. The act is consistent with international law

(¶20.) It is submitted that the new act is supported by UNCRC20 and the Beijing Rules, 1985.

i The act does not violate article 40 of UNCRC

(¶21.) Art. 40(1) deals with the treatment and promotion of the child's sense of dignity vis-à-vis
re-integration in the society. If the parliament has made any legislation which is in conflict with
the international law, then the Courts are bound to give effect to the Law, rather than the
international law. However, in the absence of a contrary legislation, municipal courts would
respect the rules of international law.21 Austin used his definition of law to deny the legal
character of international law, which he saw simply as positive morality. He did not deny the
existence of international rules however according to Austin such rules were not commanded
fundamentally for he, states, which are themselves sovereign cannot be subjected to the Law.22

(¶22.) Chapter II ‘General Principles of Care and Protection of Children’ is the most noteworthy
characteristic of the Act, providing for ‘Care, Protection, Rehabilitation and Justice for
23
Children’. It incorporates internationally accepted principles of presumption of innocence,
dignity and worth, family responsibility, non-stigmatizing semantics, privacy and confidentiality,
repatriation and restoration, equality and non-discrimination, and diversion and natural justice,
among others.

ii The act does not violate any other Article of UNCRC

(¶23.) The best interests of the child as required under Art. 3 of UNCRC have been taken care of
by incorporating §§ 19(1), 19(3) and 20 in the JJ Act, 2014. Even if he is tried as an adult, he can
be sentenced to a max. of life imprisonment with possibility of release as mentioned in § 21 of
the new act which is in consonance with UNCRC. The principles relating to juvenile justice
system have been incorporated in § 3 of the new act, the new act is being supported by UNCRC.

iii The act is supported by Beijing rules, 1985

20
United Nation Convention on the Rights of the Child. India ratified UNCRC on 11 December, 1992.
21
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and Others, (2014) 1 SCC 1.
22
Mechanisms To Create And Support Treaties Conventions And Other Responses (Last assessed on 5 August,
2020 at 1:38 pm) See at: http://www.eolss.net/eolsssamplechapters/c14/e1-44-01/E1-44-01-TXT.aspx
23
“Towards a comprehensive Juvenile Justice law” The Hindu 14th July 2014.
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(¶24.) The Beijing Rules, take into account penological objectives in addition to rehabilitation of
the offender. In Rule 17.1, the guiding principles of adjudicating matters involving juveniles are
enlisted: The reaction shall always be proportional to not only the circumstances and the gravity
of the offence, but also to the circumstances and needs of the juvenile as well as to the needs of
society.24

iv That the other countries also have similar laws

(¶25.) There have been laws in other countries where because of the societal changes similar
laws have been adopted. In Canada, referring to §13 of the Criminal Code of Canada, a youth
b/w age of 14 to 17 yrs. may be tried and sentenced as an adult in certain situations.

(¶26.) In the USA nearly all States permit persons <18 yrs. to be tried as adults. For example, in
California, the majority age is 18 yrs., but persons >14 yrs. may be tried as adults if they commit
serious crimes (rape, robbery, murder etc.). The state of New York pegs the age of juvenility at
16 yrs., and permits the prosecution of persons aged b/w 13-16 yrs. as adults in case of serious
crimes.

(¶27.) A unique feature of Blended Sentencing in the USA: a juvenile court may sentence a
convicted juvenile offender to both a juvenile and adult sentence. The adult sentence is
suspended on the condition that the juvenile offender successfully completes the term of the
juvenile disposition and refrains from committing any new offence.

(¶28.) In Nepal, the min. age of criminal responsibility is 10 yrs. A child is a person <16 yrs.
Youth b/w 16-18 yrs. are charged and tried as adults.

Indiana will not be one isolated case in the comity of nations, for having classified the offences
committed by juveniles as heinous and non-heinous and accordingly determining the age of
juvenility in matters of heinous offences in a differential way for children b/w the age-group of
16-18 yrs. The significant factor is that, the trial of Juvenile for violent crimes can take place
only after the assessment by the JJ. board and in that death sentence and life-imprisonment
cannot be awarded to the juvenile.25

24
Subramanian Swamy v. Raju Thr. Member Juvenile Justice Board and Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 390.
25
Supra 12
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E. The act is a comprehensive legislation

(¶29.) The JJ Act, 2014 is a comprehensive legislation when compared with the Act of 2000.
The Act provides for general principles of care and protection of children, procedures in case of
children in need of care and protection in conflict with law, rehabilitation and social re-
integration measures for such children and offences committed against children. One example is,
the word ‘juvenile’ has been replaced with the word ‘child’ and the expression ‘juvenile in
conflict with the law’ has been changed to ‘child in conflict with law.’

(¶30.) The new act has brought into its ambit the following beneficial provisions: [A] Child
Welfare Committee: Disposing of cases for children in need of care and protection; Frequency
of meetings not specified. In the new act; Committee to meet at least 20 days in a month. [B]
Adoption: No provision for inter-country adoption in the Act; the Guidelines Governing the
Adoption of Children, 2011 provide for inter-country adoption. In the new act, Inter-country
adoption allowed if adoption cannot take place within the country, within 30 days of child being
declared legally free for adoption. [C] Foster care: Temporary placement of a child to be given
for adoption, with a family for a short/extended period of time; biological family may be allowed
to visit. In the new act, it adds new provision for monthly checks on foster family by the CWC.
[D] After-care: Monetary and continued support for children after they leave special or children
home for a period of three yrs. or till 21 yrs. of age. In the new act, Onetime financial support to
children leaving child care institutions after completing 18 yrs. of age is given.26

II. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT AND SESSION’S COURT WERE JUSTIFIED IN
REJECTING THE TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF RANSOM’S AGE OR NOT?

(¶31.) It is the humble submission of the counsel of respondents that the High court and the
Session’s court were justified in rejecting the test for determination of Ransom’s age. This
contention is advanced in a three–fold manner. [A] The preliminary assessment was conducted in

26
Legislative Brief The Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Bill, 2014 (Last Visited On 5 August,
2020) See at: http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Juvenile%20Justice/Legislative%20Brief%20Juvenile
%20Justice%20Bi ll.pdf.
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consonance with the new act, [B] The ossification test should not be conducted, [C] The guilt has
been established beyond reasonable doubt.

A. The Preliminary assessment was conducted in consonance with the new act

(¶32.) The procedure for preliminary assessment has been laid down in § 15 and it has been
complied with. The counsel has proposed this contention in a three-fold manner:

i. The offence committed by Ransom was heinous in nature

(¶33.) As elucidated in § 2(33) of the JJ. Act, 2014 any offence which is punishable for an
imprisonment for >7 yrs. is termed as heinous offence. Ransom has been charged under § 302
r/w § 34 of the IPC, 1860 and murder is a heinous crime.27

ii. Ransom’s age falls under the category of 16 yrs.- 18 yrs.

(¶34.) Ransom dropped out of school after completing his 6th std., since then, he has been an
employee of Mr. Singhal for the last 6 yrs.28 Ransom’s age has been affirmed in the following
way: in the opinion of the World Bank the age at which students enter primary education, when a
student had studied full time and had progressed through the system without repeating or
skipping a grade is at least 6 yrs. 29 As stated by the Selected Information on School Education
2011-12, by GOI, Ministry of HRD, Bureau of Planning, Monitoring and Statistics: The min. age
for admission to Std.-1 for Primary School stage is generally 5 or 5+ yrs., or, 6 or 6+ yrs. The
min. age for admission to Std.-1 is 5 or 5+ yrs. in 20 States and in 6 UTs. 30 On the authority of a
Guide for the Placement and Transcript Evaluation of Foreign-Born Students 2010- 2011
provides the Lower Secondary – for Std. 1 is 6 yrs., authenticated by Department of

27
Gaurav Kumar v. state of Haryana 2015 SCC OnLine SC 287, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Swapan Roy.
2014 SCC OnLine SC 931, Shabnam & Saleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh 3 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 309.
28
¶ 1, factual matrix.
29
Official entrance age to primary education (yrs.) (Last Visited 5 August 2020) See at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.AGES?page=2.
30
Selected Information On School Education Government of India Ministry of Human Resource Development
Bureau Of Planning, Monitoring and Statics Division New Delhi 2011-12 (Last accessed on 5 August 2020) See at:
http://mhrd.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/statistics/SISH201112.pdf.
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Multicultural Education Based on information provided by IAU.31 Thus, in all probability

Ransom’s min. age is 16 yrs.

(¶35.) In addition to the above stated facts the counsel submits that the benefit of doubt of age is
always given to the accused as stated in plethora of cases by the Hon’ble apex court32.

iii. Ransom was capax of committing the offence

(¶36.) The counsel has further proposed this contention in a three-fold manner.

(i) He had the required mental and physical capacity

(¶37.) Sources have defined mental capacity as, “the mental ability to understand the nature and
effect of one’s acts”.33 In case of Hiralal Mallick v. State of Bihar34, the Hon’ble court relied
upon the Cross and Jones Introduction to Criminal Law’ that state: “A child of 10 yrs. or over,
but <14, is presumed to be incapable of committing a crime, but this presumption may be
rebutted by evidence of ‘mischievous discretion’, i.e., knowledge that what was done was
morally wrong.”35

(ii) Ability to understand the consequences of the offence

(¶38.) In the case of R v. Owen36, the court said that the proof of attainment of sufficient maturity
can be arrived at by the court on the consideration of all the circumstances of the case. It can be
inferred from the nature of the act and his subsequent conduct.37

(iii) Circumstances in which the offence was committed

(¶39.) There was sufficient degree of criminal intent, he was capax of committing the offence as
to justify his guilt under this case because when Gaurav tried to save his sister, one blow was
31
A Guide for the Placement and Transcript Evaluation of Students See at:
http://www.palmbeachschools.org/multicultural/documents/TranscriptGuide.pdf (Last Accessed At 1 March 2016).
32
Raju Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 235, Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488.
33
Subramaniam Swamy v. Raju 3 SCC (Cri) 482, Anil v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 4 SCC 69, Vinod Kumar v.
State of Kerala, (2014) 5 SCC 678, Mental Capacity Act, 2005 of U.K § 2 of the act.
34
1977 CrLJ 1921 (SC).
35
R. v. Gorrie 83 J.P. 136, B. v. R. 123 J.P. 61, F.V. Padwick [1959] Crim. L. Rev. 439.
36
Abdul Sattar v Crown AIR 1949 Lah 51.
37
Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Op-Ed., MISCHIEVOUS DISCRETION, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 2013 See at:
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130202/jsp/opinion/story_16509423.jsp#.VtnaOPl961s (Last Accessed On 6
August 2020).
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given on his head and several blows over his abdomen and Vaishali was also strangulated to
death.38

B. The ossification test should not be conducted

(¶40.) The counsel has humbly submitted this contention in two parts.

i Understanding the § 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2014

(¶41.) “The word ‘shall’ as observed by J. Hidayatullah “is ordinarily mandatory but it is
sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands” 39, and this is also
pointed out by J. Subarao that “When a statute uses the word ‘shall’, prima facie is mandatory,
but carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute”. 40 If different provisions are connected
with the same word ‘shall’, and if with respect to some of them the intention of the Legislature is
clear that the word ‘shall’ in relation to them must be given an obligatory or a directory meaning,
it may indicate that with respect to other provisions also, the same construction should be
placed.41 Furthermore, a provision in a statute procedural in nature although employs the word
"shall" may not be held as mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. 42 The provision of § 9(2)
of the JJ. Act, 2014 may be construed as both mandatory and directory.43

(¶42.) Two considerations for regarding a provision as directory are: [A] absence of any
provision for the contingency of a particular provision not being complied with or followed and,
[B] serious general inconvenience and prejudice that would result to the general public if the act
of the Government or an instrumentality is declared invalid for noncompliance with the
particular provision.44

(¶43.) In each case one must look to the subject matter and consider the importance of the
provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be

38
¶ 5, factual matrix.
39
Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1480.
40
State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 751.
41
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233.
42
PT Rajan v. TPM Sahir, AIR 2003 SC 4603.
43
JUSTICE G P SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Lexis Nexis Butterworths
Wadhwa, Nagpur 2010).
44
Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State Of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1149.
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secured.45 The counsel hereby submits that the observation of the division bench in the above
cited case law is very clear stating that a provision can be regarded as directory if it will not
result in serious general inconvenience and prejudice to the general public by reading it in that
manner. In addition, Ransom’s age in all probability is >16 yrs. thus, the ossification test will just
waste the Hon’ble court’s precious time.

C. His guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt

(¶44.) Identity of finger marks is the strongest evidence of the identity of person and such
evidence is admissible.46 In the case of B.A. Umesh v. State of Karnataka47, where fingerprints
found having evidentiary value, corroborative but clinching evidence, Appellant accused of rape,
murder and robbery. No eyewitness saw the commission of these crimes though there were
witnesses who saw him inside the house and leaving the house along with household articles. His
fingerprints however, found on handle of almirah lying in the room, held, fingerprints
scientifically established beyond doubt that the accused was present in the room where the
incident occurred. The counsel humbly submits that the Hon’ble court has time and again
emphasized on the importance and the admissibility of finger prints in the court of law48.

III. WHETHER PETER SHOULD BE ACQUIITED OF ALL THE CHARGES LEVIED

AGAINST HIM OR NOT?

(¶45.) The Hon’ble bench is beseeched to uphold the conviction of Peter upheld by the juvenile board,
Sessions Court and High Court as valid and appropriate as the fact that Peter has committed the offence
has been proved without an iota of doubt and is nothing but sheer certainty. This contention has been
proposed in a two–fold manner [A] Peter’s acts commend confidence under § 34 of IPC, 1860, [B]
There is sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

45
AMITA DHANDA, N.S. BINDRA’S INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (11th ed. Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon
2014).
46
Indian Evidence Act 1872, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
47
(2011) 3 SCC 85.
48
Re Sheikh Hussain AIR 1957 Mad 47, Selvi and others v. State of Karnataka MANU/SC/0325/2010, State of
Kerala v. Sankaran Nair AIR 1960 Ker 392, Gulzhar Khan v. State A.I.R 1962 Pat. 225, Delhi Administration v.
Pali Ram A.I.R 1979 S.C. 14, Kumaran Nair v. Bhargavi 1988 Cri. L. J. 1000, State of Bombay v. Kathikalu
Oughad A.I.R 1960 S.C. 1808, Ammini v. State of Kerela AIR 1995 Ker 252, Balakrishna Das Aggrawal v. Radha
Devi AIR 1989 All 133, Bhaluka Behra v. State AIR 1957 Ori 172.
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A. Peter’s acts commend confidence under § 34 of IPC,1860

(¶46.) In order to attract the provision of this section, it is not enough that there was the same
intention on the part of the several people to commit a particular criminal act or a similar
intention.49 Intention is a question of fact which is to be gathered from the acts of the parties.50 It
is trite law that § 34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. 51 It
means that if two or more persons do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them has
done it individually.52 Common intention requires a prior consent or a pre-planning. 53 For
attracting the § 34 of the impugned ethic necessitates commission of a criminal act by several
persons in furtherance of a common intention pointing out the participation of all54.

(¶47.) The presence of every ingredient can be clearly affirmed. Death of the deceased by
asphyxia and grievous blows indicate towards the commission of a criminal act. The other
essentials are further substantiated in a two-fold manner.

i. There is commonality of intent

(¶48.) In Ranganath Sharma v. Satendra Sharma55, it was held, “Direct proof of common
intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the
circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. The
prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or
meeting of minds of all the accused person be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it
must necessarily be before the commission of the crime.”

(¶49.) § 33 states that word act denotes a series of acts as well a single act. 56 Thus, even many
may have committed different acts, they have cumulatively committed criminal act which
resulted in deals of deceased and are liable for same punishment. 57 Even if Peter did not commit

49
KD GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. Lexis Nexis, Gurgaon 2013).
50
M.P. TANDON, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (23th ed. Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad 2005).
51
S.K. SARVARIA, R.A. NELSON’S INDIAN PENAL CODE (9th ed. Lexis Nexis Butterworths Gurgaon 2002).
52
DR. HARI SINGH GOUR, 1 INDIAN PENAL CODE (14th ed. Law Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Allahabad 2013).
53
State of Mysore v. Venappasetty, 1973 CrLJ 1568.
54
Parichat v. state of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 535.
55
(2009) 1 SCC (Cr.) 415.
56
§33, Indian Penal Code, 1860
57
Selvam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 10 SCC 402
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any overt act, it cannot save him from being held liable because if common intention is proved
§3458 can be invoked59 as he was willing to kill 60. Participation in the case of common intention
would not depend on the extent of overt act. 61 Without the support and assistance of others, it
would not have been possible for the main accused to carry out the act62, which further
strengthens Peter’s guilt. The court held it is difficult to distinguish from other accused so, they
all should be made culpable. 63 Movement of the accused to the crime spot and sneaking out from
there clearly indicates his common intention to murder the deceased. 64 It is a well settled
principle that the evidence as to transmission of thought sharing the unlawful design may be
sufficient to prove the accused guilty.65

(¶50.) The accused was present at the place of occurrence and also he indulged himself in a fight
with the deceased indicates his furtherance to common intention.66

ii. That Peter was present in the exhibition

(¶51.) The ocular evidence provided by Ram Manohar proves his presence.67 Peter too has not
disputed this fact. Mere distancing from the scene can’t absolve the accused 68. In cases involving
physical violence if a person is physically present, such presence of those who in one way or
other itself tantamount to actual participation in the criminal act. 69 Where out of 8 policemen one
was found merely standing, the court held that no distinguishing is plausible from the ors. 70. In

58
§34, Indian Penal Code, 1860
59
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (2012) 7 SCC 646, Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra
(2012) 9 SCC 249.
60
State of Andhra Pradesh v. M. Sohan Babu (2010) 15 SCC 69.
61
Mano Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 79.
62
Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 10 SCC 373.
63
Satyavir Singh Rathi, ACP v State of Rajasthan (2011) 6 SCC 1.
64
Saligram v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1990 Supp SC 60.
65
Kehar Singh v State (Delhi Administration), (1989) CrLJ 1.
66
Bable v. State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2012 SC 2621, Sayed Darain Ahsan v. State of West Bengal (2012) 4 SCC
352
67
¶ 6, factual matrix.
68
Lallan bhai v. state of bihar AIR 2003 SC 333.
69
Rajasthan v. shosha ram, AIR 2013 SC 1760.
70
Satyavir singh rathi, ACP v. state (2011) 6 SCC 1
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Sayed Darain Ahsan v. State of West Bengal 71 mere presence was given due importance, it
amounted to presumption of participation as established by the presumption juris et de jure.72

B. There is sufficient evidence to prove Peter’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt

(¶52.) The judgment pronounced by the Sessions Court opines that Peter’s case has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt before juvenile board which was later upheld by the High Court.

i. Creditworthy medical attestation present

(¶53.) The court emphasized that, even in if medical attestation supports the commission of
sexual assault on the victim. We needn’t elaborate on the issue any more, light of the concurrent
finding in clear terms holds that sign of commission of rape on the victim stood proved by
medical evidence beyond reasonable doubt.73 In present case, the fingerprints of Peter on
Vaishali’s body were enough to prove that a heinous offence was committed by him. 74 Moreover,
he was involved in inflicting grievous blows to Gaurav and strangulating Vaishali for her to die
of asphyxia.75

ii. Credible ocular testimony prevails

(¶54.) Witnesses are eyes and ears of justice; the oral evidence has primacy over the medical
evidence. Oral evidence can’t be rejected on hypothetical medical evidence provided the oral
testimony is reliable, creditworthy and inspires confidence.76 Thus, the position of law in
instances where a contradiction prevails b/w medical evidence and ocular evidence can be
crystallized to the effect that though the ocular testimony of a witness has greater evidentiary
value vis-à-vis medical evidence, when medical evidence makes the ocular testimony
impossible, that becomes a relevant factor in the process of evaluation of evidence. 77 As per §
118, IEA , all persons shall be competent witnesses, unless they are prevented from

71
(2012) 4 SCC 352.
72
Barender Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1
73
Deepak v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 762.
74
¶ 11, factual matrix.
75
¶ 7, factual matrix.
76
Hon’ble Justice M.L Singhal, Medical Evidence and it’s use in trial of cases, J.T.R.I. Journal, Issue – 3,
September, 1995, Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484.
77
Abdul Sayeed vs State of M.P, (2010) 10 SCC 259.
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understanding or answering question put to them virtue of tender yrs., extreme old age, disease
or infirmity lunacy or any other cause of same kind.78

(¶55.) A chance and ocular witness, Ram Manohar’s statement requires a cautious and close
scrutiny and his presence at the crime spot must be explained 79, if doubtful it must be discarded80.
But here, his presence is very well explained as it is corroborated by an undisputed fact of all
four fleeing away. Hence, a firm conclusion can be made that Peter is blameworthy.

iii. Circumstantial evidence is fully established

(¶56.) Human agency can express faulty picture but circumstantial agency cannot fail 81 literally
meaning men may tell lies, but circumstances do not.82 If the cumulative effect of all the facts
form a chain so complete83 the guilt, the conviction is justified ignoring the fact that isn’t, 84
relying on the maxim, “Evidence has to be weighed not counted.”85

(¶57.) In State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji Adsul86, the SC reiterated that in a case of
circumstantial evidence, if the prosecution is able to establish chain of events to satisfy
ingredients of commission of offence, accused would be liable to suffer consequences of his
proven guilt. In Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra87, the Apex Court described
the five golden principles that were laid down in Hanumant v. State of M.P88 of the proof based
on circumstantial evidence.

(¶58.) A chain of fully established facts consistent with hypothesis of the guilt excluding every
possible hypothesis except the one to be proved and should be of conclusive nature and tendency
not leaving behind any reasonable ground consistent with accused’s innocence. 89 In cases
dependent on circumstantial evidence, in order to justify the inference of guilt, all the
78
Sec 118, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
79
Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh and Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 360
80
Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632.
81
Rewa Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1978) Cr.L.J. 858.
82
Aftab Ahamd Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal, 2010 2 SCC 583.
83
Rajesh Rai v. State of Sikkim, 2002 Cr.L.J. 1385 at P. 1390(Sikkim)
84
Ibid
85
Padaala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P, AIR 1990 SC 79
86
(2011) 7 SCC 437 (¶27)
87
Vishal Yadav v. State of UP, AIR 1984 SC 1682
88
Ravinder Singh v. State (NCT) of Delhi, AIR 1952 SC 343.
89
State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114, Bhim Singh v. State of Uttrakhand (2015) 4 SCC 739
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incriminating facts and circumstances must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or
the guilt any other person and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis
than that of his guilt90 and the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn, should
be fully proved along with being conclusive in nature. 91 Any other hypothesis except the one to
be proved, provided by the Petitioners, however extravagant and fanciful, cannot be the basis of
an acquittal.92 The effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative doubts.93

(¶59.) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and in all probability the act must
have been done by the accused94 which has been clearly established as Firstly, Peter and Gaurav
were good old enemies.95 Secondly, the fight b/w them.96 Thirdly, Peter immediately grabbed
the opportunity of tying up with Ransom against their common enemies. 97 Subsequently, both of
them had prior knowledge about their visit to the exhibition. Lastly, Ram Manohar’s statement.98

(¶60.) Hence, materials produced on record are relevant, acceptable and rightly connect
circumstances, reliable, cogent and credible evidence.99

90
Hukam v state, AIR 1977 SC 1063
91
C. Chenga Reddy v State of AP, (1996) 10 SCC 193
92
State of Andhra Pradesh v. IBS Prasad Rao AIR 1970 SC 648
93
State of Rajasthan v. Tej Ram. (1999) 3 SCC 507
94
Ibid.
95
¶3, Factual Matrix
96
¶2, Factual Matrix
97
¶3, Factual Matrix
98
¶12 and 13, Factual Matrix
99
Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat (2011) 11 SCC 111
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

 THE 2ND LEGAL INSIDER, MEMORIAL WRITING COMPETITION, 2020

PRAYER

Whereof in the light of facts of the instant case, written pleadings and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed before this Hon'ble Supreme Court that it may be pleased to hold, adjudge and
declare:

1. That the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2014 is constitutional.

2. That Ransom is capax of committing the offences the charges of which are leveled
against him and that there is no need to conduct any test for determining his age.

3. That Ransom is guilty under §§ 302, 326, 354 r/w § 34 of IPC, 1860.

4. That Peter is guilty under §§ 302, 326, 354 r/w § 34 of IPC, 1860.

Pass any other order, which the court may deem fit in light of the facts of the case, evidences
adduced and justice, equity and good conscience.

And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the respondent shall duty bound forever pray.

Sd/-

Counsels for the Respondent

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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT