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SOLIVEN

This resolution from the Supreme Court of the Philippines addresses three issues in consolidated cases involving libel charges against petitioners: 1) The issue of whether petitioners were denied due process in the filing of libel charges before administrative remedies were exhausted was declared moot based on subsequent events. 2) The Court interpreted the constitutional requirement for determining probable cause for arrest warrants and found that judges are not required to personally examine complainants but can rely on reports and documents to determine probable cause. 3) The Court did not directly address the third issue of whether the President can initiate criminal complaints but focused on resolving the prior two issues.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
40 views2 pages

SOLIVEN

This resolution from the Supreme Court of the Philippines addresses three issues in consolidated cases involving libel charges against petitioners: 1) The issue of whether petitioners were denied due process in the filing of libel charges before administrative remedies were exhausted was declared moot based on subsequent events. 2) The Court interpreted the constitutional requirement for determining probable cause for arrest warrants and found that judges are not required to personally examine complainants but can rely on reports and documents to determine probable cause. 3) The Court did not directly address the third issue of whether the President can initiate criminal complaints but focused on resolving the prior two issues.

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Rajkumari
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SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and


GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of
Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,


vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial
Court, at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE
MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,


vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE
CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR,
Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R.
Nos. 82827 and 83979.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners
were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of
Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988,
the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the
resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima
facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran
was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through
the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988.
With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due
process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of
submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect
waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does
not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be
given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as
may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution
now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an
accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

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