RULE 36: Judgments, Final Orders and Entry

However, as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake committed by judges
367. Lacurom v. Judge Tienzo, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075, October 9, 2007 in the performance of their official duties renders them administratively liable.

LACUROM V JUDGE TIENZO • In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or deliberate intent to do an injustice, acts
done in their official capacity, even though erroneous, do not always
PLAINTIFF: ATTY. UBALDINO A. LACUROM constitute misconduct.
DEFENDANT: JUDGE JUANITA C. TIENZO
DATE: October 9, 2007 SEC. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without
PONENTE: NACHURA, J.: expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
TOPIC: RULE 36 which it is based.

FACTS: Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court likewise reflects the foregoing mandate, thus:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment
Administrative complaint against Judge Tienzo Gross Ignorance of the Law or or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
Procedure in connection with two (2) separate cases: one is for Replevin or Sum of personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
Money, while the other is an appealed case of Unlawful Detainer distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him,
and filed with the clerk of court.
First Charge: It is obvious that the decision rendered by respondent judge failed to conform to this
• Complainant, Atty. Ubaldino A. Lacurom, assails the issuance by respondent requirement.
judge of a writ of replevin in Civil Case is for violation of Sections 2(a), 6,and • The cryptic decision simply referenced the appealed decision of the MTCC
7, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. and forthwith found the same as compliant with procedural due process
o According to complainant, respondent judge should have desisted under the Rules of Summary Procedure
from issuing the writ as plaintiff failed to prove that he is the owner
of the subject vehicle, and consequently entitled to its possession. Nowhere in the decision does respondent judge make a statement of the facts which
o led to the filing of the appeal.
• Instead of ordering the return of the vehicle to the third-party claimant, issued • More importantly, the decision does not contain respondent judges factual
an order not only granting plaintiffs motion for delivery of the vehicle, but also findings, albeit affirming those of the MTCC, from which she based her
setting aside an earlier order which required plaintiffs to post an indemnity conclusions of law. Ineluctably, respondent judge transgressed the
bond. constitutional directive.

Second Charge:
• Respondent judge rendered a Decision in violation of the constitutional
mandate to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, and Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court echoing the same
requisite.
o Complainant further charges that respondent judge issued an order
written in the English language, and in a fashion that does not befit
an RTC Judge which thereby demonstrates her incompetence and
lack of diligence.
o However, complainant discloses that the inclusion of the foregoing
matter in his administrative complaint was merely at the behest of
his former colleague, Feliciano Buenaventura, a retired presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City.

ISSUES: WON defendant judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

HELD:

YES

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 1

 368. Barrazona v. RTC Br. 61, G.R. No. 154282, April 7, 2006 We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order or resolution like the
one specified above. A trial court should state in its order the reasons for the dismissal
BARRAZONA v. RTC BR. 61 of the complaint so that when the order is appealed, the appellate court can readily
determine from a casual perusal thereof whether there is a prima facie justification for
Petitioner: VANGIE BARRAZONA, the dismissal.
Respondent: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and SAN-AN
REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by RODRIGO Under Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, we require
CHUA TIU that resolutions disposing of a motion to dismiss shall state clearly and distinctly the
Date: G.R. No. 154282 April 7, 2006 reasons therefor, thus:
Topic: RULE 36: Judgments, Final Orders and Entry
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion. — After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action
FACTS: or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground
relied upon is not indubitable.
• San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent, owns a building
located in Baguio City. Vangie Barrazona, petitioner, has been leasing In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.
portions of the building identified as Units 203 A and B at the second floor.
The period of the lease is for two (2) years. This requirement proscribes the common practice of perfunctorily dismissing a motion
• Petitioner defaulted in the payment of the monthly rentals and failed to pay to dismiss for "lack of merit."
despite demands by respondent.
• Thus, respondent filed with the RTC a Complaint for Collection of Sum of While an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-appeallable,
Money with Damages. however, if the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari and prohibition are
• petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, proper remedies from such order of denial. In Time, Inc. v. Reyes: The motion to dismiss
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the was predicated on the respondent court’s lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action; and
allegations therein clearly indicate that the action is one for ejectment (illegal the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in
detainer) which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court case of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis of a motion to dismiss for lack
(MTC). of jurisdiction. Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the
• In an Order dated June 19, 2002, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
lack of merit. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari alleging that:
o (1) the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss; and
o (2) the Resolution denying her Motion to Dismiss is unconstitutional
as it does not state its legal basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Order of the RTC denying her Motion to Dismiss
violates the Constitution as it does not state the facts and the law on which it is
based. - YES

HELD:

The challenged Order is reproduced as follows:

ORDER
This Court finds that the grounds stated in the Motion to Dismiss to be without
merit, hence, the same is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 2

 369. Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corp., G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015 MeTC Decision is already final and executory after petitioner failed to timely file a
Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
SUMBILLA v. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
PLAINTIFF: JULIE S. SUMBILLA loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same
DEFENDANT: MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION
DATE: October 9, 2007 Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J. has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from
TOPIC: RULE 36 their operation if and when justice requires it. After all, procedural rules were
conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would
FACTS: hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to
[25]
the latter, as specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:
Sumbilla obtained a cash loan from Matrix Finance Corporation (Matrix). As partial
payment for her loan, petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 SEC. 2. Construction. – These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
to 0032868. The six checks have a uniform face value of P6,667.00. each. their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.
Upon maturity, all (6) checks were presented by Matrix to the drawee bank for payment. Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of
However, all were dishonored - drawn against a closed account. substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons called for
[27]
such actions. In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, we declared as follows:
Petitioner’s refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of the face
value of the dishonored checks culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or
of BP 22. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174. be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

January 14, 2009 - MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice
the six rubber checks. For each count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or
value of P6,667.00, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely
to P80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil liability for the six consolidated attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
cases was computed in the total amount of P40,002.00. rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for
Reconsideration before the MeTC. MR was denied - a pleading barred under Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The MeTC noted that prohibited motion attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
for reconsideration filed by the petitioner will not suspend the running of the period to technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
perfect an appeal. be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for having been this Court itself had already declared to be final.
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New
[28]
So petitioner elevated the matter via Certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC which Bilibid Prison when the Court corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the
held that MTC did not act with GAD in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by the indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused which exceeded the period of the
petitioner. MR by petitioner was likewise dismissed. imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of justice and only for the
[29]
penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else.
ISSUE: whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14,
[30] [31]
2009, which is already final and executory, may still be modified. Both People v. Gatward, and People v. Barro cited the duty and inherent power of
the Court to correct the erroneous penalties meted on the accused in a final and
HELD: YES (In this case but only as to the penalty imposed) executory judgments, and make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law.

The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the reasons

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 3

 [32]
anchored upon in Estrada v. People in ruling that it is befitting to modify the penalty
imposed on petitioner even though the notice of appeal was belatedly filed.
[33]
In Almuete v. People, the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is outside the
range of the penalty prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it was already final
on the ground of substantial justice, thus:

In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner.
If his penalty of imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with
law and he would be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months
and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to
the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum
should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13
years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend our Rules in
this case. “It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own [R]ules or except
a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x
Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in
the interest of substantial justice.” Suspending the Rules is justified “where there exist
strong compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a
miscarriage thereof.” After all, the Court’s “primordial and most important duty is to
render justice x x x.
[35] [36]
All the accused in Almuete v. People, People v. Barro, Estrada v.
[37] [38]
People, and Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison, failed to perfect their
appeal on their respective judgments of conviction, but the Court corrected the penalties
imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside the
range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to deprive the petitioner in
the present case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a sentence
which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the
maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the
[39]
defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.

Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of
BP 22. Moreover, since the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total
amount of the fine or one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage
rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by
[40]
the trial court, if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence.
Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be accordingly
corrected within the maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the
penalty of fine of P80,000.00 meted on petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to
321174 for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double the face value of each
rubber check involved or P13,334.00 only.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 4

 370. Delfino v. Anasao, G.R. No. 197486, September 10, 2014

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 5

 371. Club Filipino, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015 Supplemental MR

Club Filipino, Inc. vs. Bautista et al. • January 11, 2010 – Court GRANTED Club Filipino’s Motion for Leave and
GR No. 168406 NOTED Supplemental MR

PLAINTIFF: Club Filipino Inc. HOWEVER,

DEFENDANT: Benjamin Bautista, Ronie Sualog, Joel Calida, Johnny Arinto,
Carlito Presentacion, Roberto De Guzman • Because of this Court’s Resolution dated September 9, 2009 – an Entry of
DATE: January 14, 2015 Judgment was issued on October 26, 2010, declaring that this case had
PONENTE: J. Leonen become final and executory as of October 26, 2009. This court likewise
TOPIC: Entry of Judgment ordered the return of the case records to the CA for remand of the court of
origin
Facts: •
st
1 Manifestation and Motion - Club Filipino received the Entry of Judgment
on November 10, 2010 – 9 days after it filed a Manifestation and Motion
This is a case wherein Club Filipino Inc. and Club Filipino Employees Association arguing that the court prematurely issued the Entry of Judgment because
(CLUFEA) expired, in line with this, the Union repeatedly tried to negotiate with the it still had to resolve Supplemental MR
company, but the company refuses to do so, causing them to file a Notice of Strike, •
st
1 Very Urgent Motion to Resolve – prayed that his court resolve the
however, in their notice, they failed to attach the requisite counter-proposal of the Supplemental MR in order not to render the filing of its Supplemental MR
company because it was only subsequently filed. moot
o informed that court that the NLRC GRANTED respondents
• LA and NLRC held that their strike was illegal because of the procedural separation pay twice – that there is extreme urgency for the court
requisite was not complied to resolve the Supplemental MR
• CA and SC reversed the decision of LA and NLRC – holding that the use of •
nd
2 Very Urgent Motion to Resolve – reiterated that implementing the Writ
the phrase “as far as practicable” in the IRR means that the procedural of Execution in the illegal strike case “will only result in doubly
requisite it can be done away with if it is impracticable such as when compensating respondents to the utmost prejudice and manifest injustice of
compliance is impossible in this case Club Filipino Inc. taena ang kulit paulit-ulit, jowa ka ba
o That those employees that were part of the alleges illegal strike are
entitled for separation pay and back wages issue:
o NLRC to implement the Writ of Execution
1. W/N the Court prematurely issued the Entry of Judgment due to the pending
Respondents, filed for the illegal dismissal against Club Filipino Inc. Supplemental MR, NO
2. W/N the NLRC’s decision on the illegal dismissal case was res judicata on
• NLRC ruled that the Club Filipino committed illegal dismissal and that the the illegal strike, NO
illegally dismissed employees shall be entitled to the retrenchment program
Ruling:
Upon the the decision of CA
Supplemental MR
• Club Filipino Inc filed a Petition for Review on Certiorai – DENIED
st
• Filed 1 MR – DENIED with finality in the resolution dated September 9, 2009 Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the
o This court declared that it shall not entertain any futher pleadings Resolution dated July 13, 2009 is in the nature of a second Motion for
or motions and ordered that Entry of Judgment in this case be Reconsideration.
made in due course
As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a judgment or
Filling of Supplemental MR,
final resolution is prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
nd
• September 14, 2009, Club Filipino filed a Motion for Leave to admit (2 MR)
Supplemental MR Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for reconsideration
o November 3, 2009 – filed a Motion for Leave to File and Admit of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
Further Pleading/Motion – alleging that the Court failed to consider

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 6

This prohibition is reiterated in Rule 15, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme decision or resolution of this court is deemed final and executory after the lapse of 15
78
Court: Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court shall not entertain a days from the parties’ receipt of a copy of the decision or resolution. The grant of
second motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted leave to file the second Motion for Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day
in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds period. It only means that the Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should
79
of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the second Motion for Reconsideration be granted.
the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the 80
In Aliviado v. Procter and Gamble Philippines, Inc. this court explained that:
parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court’s
declaration. [i]t is immaterial that the Entry of Judgment was made without the Court having first
resolved P&G’s second motion for reconsideration. This is because the issuance of the
entry of judgment is reckoned from the time the parties received a copy of the resolution
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion
denying the first motion for reconsideration. The filing by P&G of several pleadings after
for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
receipt of the resolution denying its first motion for reconsideration does not in any way
bar the finality or entry of judgment. Besides, to reckon the finality of a judgment from
For this court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the second Motions receipt of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration would be absurd. First,
must present "extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave the Rules of Court and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a
74
first obtained." Once leave to file is granted, the second Motion for Reconsideration second motion for reconsideration. Second, some crafty litigants may resort to filing
75 81
is no longer prohibited. prohibited pleadings just to delay entry of judgment. (Underscoring in the original,
emphasis supplied)
This court explained the rationale for the rule in Ortigas and Company Limited
76
Partnership v. Judge Velasco, thus: This case became final and executory on October 26, 2009, after the lapse of the 15th
day from petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s receipt of the Resolution denying its first Motion
for Reconsideration. Entry of Judgment, therefore, was in order.
A second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinarily persuasive
reasons, and only upon express leave first obtained. The propriety or acceptability of
such a second motion for reconsideration is not contingent upon the averment of "new" Since this court did not issue any temporary restraining order to enjoin the execution of
grounds to assail the judgment, i.e., grounds other than those theretofore presented and the Court of Appeals’ Decision, the NLRC correctly proceeded in implementing the
rejected. Otherwise, attainment of finality of a judgment might be staved off indefinitely, Court of Appeals’ Decision in the illegal strike case.
depending on the party's ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving and formulating
"additional flaws" or "newly discovered errors" therein, or thinking up some injury or
Res judicata
prejudice to the rights of the movant for reconsideration. "Piece-meal" impugnation of a
judgment by successive motions for reconsideration is anathema, being precluded by
the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a judgment, act or proceeding There is no res judicata in the present case. Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. filed the illegal
must set out in his motion all the grounds therefor, and those not so included are strike because members of CLUFEA allegedly disrupted petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s
deemed waived and cease to be available for subsequent motions. business when they staged a strike without complying with the requirements of the law.
For their part, respondents filed the illegal dismissal case to question the validity of
petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.’s retrenchment program.
For all litigation must come to an end at some point, in accordance with established
rules of procedure and jurisprudence. As a matter of practice and policy, courts must
dispose of every case as promptly as possible; and in fulfillment of their role in the Although there is no res judicata, the actions have the same subject matter.1âwphi1 The
administration of justice, they should brook no delay in the termination of cases by subject matter of an action is "the matter or thing from which the dispute has
77 94
stratagems or maneuverings of parties or their lawyers. arisen." Both the illegal strike and illegal dismissal cases involve the dismissal of
respondents. In respondents’ action for illegal dismissal, respondents were found to
have been dismissed by virtue of a valid retrenchment program. The NLRC then ordered
In the present case, this court granted leave to petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. to file the
that they be paid separation pay based on the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in the Resolution dated January 11, 2010.
The Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, therefore, is no longer prohibited.

The grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, however, did
not prevent this court’s July 13, 2009 Resolution from becoming final and executory. A

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 7

 372. NTC v. Alphaomega Integrated Corp., G.R. No. 184295, July 30, 2014

ISSUES:
PLAINTIFF: NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION WON CA erred
DEFENDANT: ALPHAOMEGA INTEGRATED CORPORATION (a) in affirming the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s findings that AIC was entitled to its
DATE: July 30, 2014 claims for damages as a result of project delays, and
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: (b) in increasing the total amount of compensation awarded in favor of AIC
TOPIC: RULE 36 despite the latter’s failure to raise the allegedly erroneous computation of the
award before the CIAC in a timely manner, that is, within fifteen (15) days from
FACTS: receipt of the Final Award as provided under Section 17.1 of the CIAC Rules.
• AIC, a duly licensed transmission line contractor, participated in the public
biddings conducted by TRANSCO and was awarded six ( 6) government HELD:
construction projects
Significantly, jurisprudence teaches that mathematical computations as well as the
• In the course of the performance of the contracts, AIC encountered propriety of the arbitral awards are factual determinations
difficulties and incurred losses allegedly due to TRANSCO’s breach of their
contracts, prompting it to surrender the projects to TRANSCO under protest. The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal
on the matter of AIC’s entitlement to damages which the CA affirmed as being well
In accordance with an express stipulation in the contracts that disagreements shall be supported by evidence and properly referred to in the record.
settled by the parties through arbitration before the Construction Industry Arbitration • It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi judicial bodies, which have
Commission(CIAC) AIC submitted a request for arbitration before the CIAC acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
• filed an Amended Complaint against TRANSCO alleging that the latter are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when
breached the contracts by its failure to: affirmed by the CA
(a) furnish the required Detailed Engineering; • The CIAC possesses that required expertise in the field of construction
(b) arrange a well-established right-of-way to the project areas; arbitration and the factual findings of its construction arbitrators are final and
(c) secure the necessary permits and clearances from the conclusive, not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
concerned local government units (LGUs);
(d) ensure a continuous supply of construction materials; and (e) While the CA correctly affirmed in full the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s factual
carry out AIC’s requests for power shut down. determinations, it improperly modified the amount of the award in favor of AIC, which
modification did not observe the proper procedure for the correction of an evident
AIC prayed for judgment declaring all six (6) contracts rescinded and ordering miscalculation of figures, including typographical or arithmetical errors, in the arbitral
TRANSCO to pay, in addition to what had already been paid under the contracts, moral award.
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees
Section 17.1 of the CIAC Rules mandates the filing of a motion for the
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Final Award ordering the payment of actual and
foregoing purpose within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, viz.:
compensatory damages which AIC would not have suffered had it not been for the
project delays attributable to TRANSCO.
• Even if AIC itself made the requests for contract time extensions, this did not Section 17.1 Motion for correction of final award– Any of the parties may
bar its claim for damages as a result of project delays since a contrary ruling file a motion for correction of the Final Award within fifteen (15) days from
would allow TRANSCO to profit from its own negligence and leave AIC to receipt thereof upon any of the following grounds:
suffer serious material prejudice as a direct consequence of that negligence
leaving it without any remedy at law.
a. An evident miscalculation of figures, a typographical or arithmetical error;
• The Arbitral Tribunal upheld AIC’s right to rescind the contracts in (Emphasis supplied)
accordance with Resolution No. 018-2004

CA affirmed the Arbitral Tribunal’s factual findings that TRANSCO failed to exercise x x x x Failure to file said motion would consequentlyrender the award final
due diligence in resolving the problems regarding the right-of-way and the lack of and executory under Section 18. 1 of the same rules, viz.:
materials before undertaking the bidding process and entering into the contracts with
AIC.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 8

 Section 18.1 Execution of Award – A final arbitral award shall become
executory upon the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the
parties.

AIC admitted that it had ample time to file a motion for correction of the Final
Award but claimed to have purposely sat on its right to seek correction
supposedly as a strategic move against TRANSCO and, instead, filed with the
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on June 13, 2007 a "Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution for the Total Amount of 18,967,318.49 as Embodied in the Final
Award."

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 9

 373. DBP v. Guarina Agricultural and Realty Development Corp., G.R. No.
• In the meantime, DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession by the
160758, January 15, 2014 RTC. At first, the RTC denied the application but later granted it upon DBP's
motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Guariña Corporation assailed the
DBP v. GUARINA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. granting of the application before the CA on certiorari. After the CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari, DBP sought the implementation of the order for the
issuance of the writ of possession. Over Guariña Corporation's opposition,
the RTC issued the writ of possession.
Petitioner: DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT
RTC – Foreclosure sale was null and void.
CORPORATION
CA – Affirmed.
Date: G.R. No. 160758 January 15, 2014
Topic: RULE 36: Judgments, Final Orders and Entry
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the CA and its resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration were issued in accordance with law,
FACTS:
prevailing jurisprudential decision and supported by evidence. – YES
• Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from DBP to finance the development
of its resort complex situated in Iloilo. The loan, in the amount of
HELD: The submissions of DBP lack merit and substance.
₱3,387,000.00, was approved and Guariña Corporation executed a
promissory note, a real estate mortgage over several real properties and a
The agreement between DBP and Guariña Corporation was a loan. Under the law, a
chattel mortgage over the personal properties existing at the resort in favor of
loan requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party to
DBP as security for the repayment of the loan.
another who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that the same amount or
quality shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation, as it arises from the same cause
• The loan was released in several instalments, and Guariña Corporation used where one party is the creditor, and the other the debtor. The obligation of one party in
the proceeds to defray the cost of additional improvements in the resort a reciprocal obligation is dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the
complex. performance should ideally be simultaneous. This means that in a loan, the creditor
should release the full loan amount and the debtor repays it when it becomes due and
• Guariña Corporation demanded the release of the balance of the loan, but demandable.
DBP refused. Instead, DBP directly paid some suppliers of Guariña
Corporation over the latter's objection. DBP found upon inspection of the In its assailed decision, the CA found and held thusly:
resort project, its developments and improvements that Guariña Corporation xxxx
had not completed the construction works. DBP thus demanded that Guariña
Corporation expedite the completion of the project, and warned that it would x x x It is undisputed that appellee obtained a loan from appellant, and as security,
initiate foreclosure proceedings should Guariña Corporation not do so. executed real estate and chattel mortgages. However, it was never established
that appellee was already in default. Appellant, in a telegram to the appellee
• Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guariña Corporation, DBP reminded the latter to make good on its construction works, otherwise, it would
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. A notice of foreclosure sale foreclose the mortgage it executed. It did not mention that appellee was already in
was sent to Guariña Corporation. The notice was eventually published, default. The records show that appellant did not make any demand for payment of
leading the clients and patrons of Guariña Corporation to think that its the promissory note. It appears that the basis of the foreclosure was not a default
business operation had slowed down, and that its resort had already closed. on the loan but appellee's failure to complete the project in accordance with
appellant's standards. In fact, appellant refused to release the remaining balance
• Guariña Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance of the approved loan after it found that the improvements introduced by appellee
of the latter's obligations under the loan agreement, and to stop the were below appellant's expectations.
foreclosure of the mortgages. However, DBP moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, stating that the mortgaged properties had already been sold to The loan agreement between the parties is a reciprocal obligation. Appellant in the
satisfy the obligation of Guariña Corporation at a public auction. Due to this, instant case bound itself to grant appellee the loan amount of ₱3,387,000.00
Guariña Corporation amended the complaint to seek the nullification of the condition on appellee's payment of the amount when it falls due. Furthermore, the
foreclosure proceedings and the cancellation of the certificate of sale. loan was evidenced by the promissory note which was secured by real estate
mortgage over several properties and additional chattel mortgage. The promise of
• DBP filed its answer and trial followed upon the termination of the pre-trial appellee to pay the loan upon due date as well as to execute sufficient security for
without any agreement being reached by the parties.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 10

 said loan by way of mortgage gave rise to a reciprocal obligation on the part of NOTES:
appellant to release the entire approved loan amount. Thus, appellees are entitled • Having found and pronounced that the extrajudicial foreclosure by DBP was
to receive the total loan amount as agreed upon and not an incomplete amount. premature, and that the ensuing foreclosure sale was void and ineffectual,
the Court affirms the order for the restoration of possession to Guarifia
The appellant did not release the total amount of the approved loan. Appellant Corporation and the payment of reasonable rentals for the use of the resort.
therefore could not have made a demand for payment of the loan since it had yet The CA properly held that the premature and invalid foreclosure had unjustly
to fulfil its own obligation. Moreover, the fact that appellee was not yet in default dispossessed Guarifia Corporation of its properties. Consequently, the
rendered the foreclosure proceedings premature and improper. restoration of possession and the payment of reasonable rentals were in
accordance with Article 561 of the Civil Code, which expressly states that one
The properties which stood as security for the loan were foreclosed without any who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly lost shall be deemed for
demand having been made on the principal obligation. all purposes which may redound to his benefit to have enjoyed it without
interruption.
Since the foreclosure proceedings were premature and unenforceable, it only
follows that appellee is still entitled to possession of the foreclosed properties. • The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an
However, appellant took possession of the same by virtue of a writ of possession appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues
issued in its favor during the pendency of the case. Thus, the trial court correctly to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that
ruled when it ordered appellant to return actual possession of the subject the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical
properties to appellee or its representative and to pay appellee reasonable rents. considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement
xxxx on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having
been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the
We uphold the CA. law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to
43
determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case,
To start with, considering that the CA thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby
the Court is bound to uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court's factual adjudicated in the former appeal. – DOES NOT APPLY.
findings as affirmed by the CA are binding on appeal due to the Court not being a trier o The ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance of
of facts. the writ of possession was entirely independent from the judicial
demand for specific performance herein.
st
Secondly, by its failure to release the proceeds of the loan in their entirety, DBP had no o the ruling in CA (1 case) did not settle any question of law involved
right yet to exact on Guariña Corporation the latter's compliance with its own obligation herein because this case for specific performance was not a
st
under the loan. Indeed, if a party in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its continuation of CA (1 case) (which was limited to the propriety of
obligation, the other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected of it while the the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of DBP), and vice
other's obligation remains unfulfilled. In other words, the latter party does not incur versa.
delay.

Still, DBP called upon Guariña Corporation to make good on the construction works
pursuant to the acceleration clause written in the mortgage contract, or else it would
foreclose the mortgages.
Considering that it had yet to release the entire proceeds of the loan, DBP could not yet
make an effective demand for payment upon Guariña Corporation to perform its
obligation under the loan. Hence, Guariña Corporation would not be in default without
the demand.

Under the circumstances, DBP's foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the
mortgaged properties at its instance were premature, and, therefore, void and
ineffectual

Being a banking institution, DBP owed it to Guariña Corporation to exercise the highest
degree of diligence, as well as to observe the high standards of integrity and
performance in all its transactions because its business was imbued with public interest.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 11

 374. Sara Lee Philippines vs. Macatlang, G.R. No. 180147, January 14, 2015 RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS: That the appeal bond made by Petitioners are not
enough to perfect an appeal due to its amount being below the directed amount given
by the Courts
SARA LEE v MACATLANG
That the Confession of Judgement submitted by Petitions are not enough to satisfy the
PLAINTIFF: SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. claims of Respondents for being grossly inadequate to satisfy their claims and that they
DEFENDANT: EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, ET AL., lack all of the signatures and/or consent of all the 5,984 illegally dismissed employees
DATE: June 4, 2014 running counter to the nature of a compromise agreement.
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.
TOPIC: RULE 36 (Judgement, Order and Entry Thereof)
ISSUE:
FACTS: 1) WON the appeal bond of roughly Php 4.5M is enough to perfect an appeal.
2) WON the Confession of Judgement can be accepted as a valid compromise
Aris Philippines permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995 displacing 5,984 agreement between the parties.
rank-and-file employees. On 26 October 1995, FAPI was incorporated prompting former
Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was a HELD: 1) NO. The Corporations should have followed the direction of the Court and
continuing business of Aris. Sarah Lee Corporation (SLC), Sarah Lee Philippines (SLP) filed the additional amount requested by the Courts for the perfection of the appeal so
and Cesar Cruz were impleaded as defendants being major stockholders of FAPI and that the NLRC may proceed to try the merits of the case for illegal dismissal. The 10%
officers of Aris, respectively. requirement pertains to the reasonable amount which the NLRC would accept as the
minimum of the bond that should accompany the motion to reduce bond in order to
On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris employees suspend the period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10% is based on
illegal and awarded them monetary benefits amounting to P3,453,664,710.86. The the judgment award and should in no case be construed as the minimum amount of
judgment award is composed of separation pay of one month for every year of service, bond to be posted in order to perfect appeal.
back wages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Should the NLRC, after considering the merit of the Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond
The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond. They determines that a greater amount or the full amount of the bond needs to be posted by
posted a P4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond and the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be given a
ordered the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond. period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by
posting the required appeal bond.
The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang
petition), filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal The Petitioners are then directed to post the amount of PHP 725M in cash or surety
was not perfected due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond within 10 days of the decision to continue with the determination of the merits of
bond which is equivalent to the judgment award. the alleged illegally dismissed Respondents through the NLRC.

While the case was pending before the appellate court, the NLRC prematurely issued 2) NO. The Confession of Judgement cannot be accepted as a valid compromise
an order setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter for being procedurally infirmed. agreement.

The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to post an additional A confession of judgment is an acknowledgment that a debt is justly due and cuts off all
appeal bond of P1 Billion defenses and right of appeal. It is used as a shortcut to a judgment in a case where the
defendant concedes liability. It is seen as the written authority of the debtor and a
PETITIONERS' CONTENTION: That by the filing of the motion to reduce the bond and direction for entry of judgment against the debtor.
the positing of the bond of Php 4.5m, roughly equivalent to the 10% of the original
judgment award is enough to perfect an appeal. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is an agreement between
That the Confession of Judgement submitted by the Petitioners that is only signed by two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their
some of the aggrieved workers instead of the 5,984 illegally dismissed employees and difficulties by mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which everyone
only an amount of P342,284,800.00 is enough as a substitute for a valid compromise of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. A compromise
agreement that will dismiss the cases in dispute. must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and must have
been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 12

Article 273 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise agreements
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the basic policy of the State
"to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations,
including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or
industrial disputes.” A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is
reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of
what he was entering into.

A review of the compromise agreement shows a gross disparity between the amount
offered by the Corporations compared to the judgment award. The judgment award is
P3,453,664,710.86 or each employee is slated to receive P577,149.85. On the other
hand, the P342,284,800.00 compromise is to be distributed among 5,984 employees
which would translate to only P57,200.00 per employee. From this amount, P8,580.00
as attorney's fees will be deducted, leaving each employee with a measly P48,620.00.
In fact, the compromised amount roughly comprises only 10% of the judgment award.

SARA LEE VS MACATLANG - when there is entry of judgment, second motion for
reconsideration will not stop the running of the period. (according sa upperbatch)

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 13

XXXIX. RULE 37: New trial or reconsideration

375. Abe Industries, Inc. v. CA, 162 SCRA 48 (1998)

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 14

 376. Mendoza v. Bautista, 121 SCRA 760 (1983) the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner may be considered pro-forma, the
same having called the attention of the trial court to a point which the latter totally
Mendoza vs. Bautista ignored in the order dismissing the complaint. The requirement which the petitioner
GR No. L-45885 supposedly failed to observe in filing his motion for reconsideration was the failure to
attach an affidavit of merit to the same.
PLAINTIFF: Julian Mendoza
DEFENDANT: Hon. Bautista, Spouses Macapagal and Corazon Macapagal
Private respondents argue that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion
DATE: April 28, 1983
for new trial and, under Section 2 of Rule 37, when the motion for new trial is filed,
PONENTE: J. Vasquez
affidavits of merits should be attached to the motion. Once again, private respondents
TOPIC: Motion for New Trial
misinterpreted the rules.
Facts:
While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new
• This is a case wherein the Petitioner Julian Mendoza as contractor entered trial if based on a ground for new trial (2 Moran, 1970 Edition, p. 222), the so-called
a written contract with Spouses Macapagal, “Kasunduan sa Pagpapatayo ng "motion for reconsideration" which is not called as such in Rule 37 is the term commonly
Tirahang Bahay” for a consideration of 320k used to refer to a motion for new trial under subdivision (c) of Section I of Rule 37. An
o misunderstandings have ensued affidavit of merit is required in a motion for new trial pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 37 if
• Petitioner filed a complaint for Collection for Sum of Money for the motion for new trial is based on any of the causes mentioned in subdivision (a) of
o Additional work performed 148k Section I of Rule 37, to wit, fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. No similar
o Unpaid balance requirement is imposed for a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration under
• Both Failed to attend pre trial. No amicable settlement was reached. subdivision (c) of the same section.
• Respondents filed their Answer – filed a MTD, that the same does not state
cause of action The timeliness of the filing of this petition may not be validly questioned. The order
o Contended that petitioner may not claim the value of the additional dismissing the complaint was received by the petitioner on January 25, 1977. The
work performed – since there was no written authority motion for reconsideration was received on February 1, 1977. The order denying the
o And filed a counterclaim for damages for 37k against the unpaid motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner on March 21, 1977. Within
amount of 48k fifteen days thereafter or on April 4, 1977, the instant petition was filed before this Court.
• Petitioner filed an opposition
st
o That the dismissal ma be correctly held for the 1 cause of action
nd
but not for the 2
o MR - DENIED
• Judge GRANTED MTD
o That the additional price to be paid must be determined in writing

Issue: W/N the MR filed is equivalent to a Motion for New Trial, YES

Ruling:

The error in dismissing the complaint is quite obvious, as there is no basis for the
nd
dismissal as to the 2 cause of action for the recovery of the unpaid balance.

The instant proceeding is not a petiti/n for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No.
5440. It is illogical, therefore, to claim that the petitioner is resorting to this proceeding
as a substitute for appeal, it being an appeal in itself.

The contention that the petition was filed out of time is predicated on the claim that the
motion for reconsideration was defective for being pro-forma and for failing to comply
with the requirements of the Rules of Court regarding such a motion. We fail to see how

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 15

 377. Llantero v. CA, 105 SCRA 609 (1981) The Court of Appeals committed no error in remanding the case to the Court of origin
for execution of the judgment.
PLAINTIFF: MOISES LLANTERO represented by his son, TRANQUILINO • Petitioner's counsel's oversight cannot be considered excusable.
LLANTERO • This is one case where petitioner has to bear the adverse consequences of
DEFENDANT: COURT OF APPEALS his counsel's act, for, it has been held, a client is bound by his lawyer's
DATE: July 20, 1981 inexcusable negligence.
PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: As to the ownership it had been clearly established that the Corporation is the
TOPIC: RULE 37 registered owner of the large tract of land, of which the controverted portion forms part,
since July 8, 1914, and that neither Felicidad Campos, nor her predecessor-in-interest
FACTS: Eustaquio Alquiros, had been authorized to convey the portion in question.
• J.M. Tuason & Co is the registered owner of a parcel of land known as
the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision
o The Corporation instituted an action for recovery of
possession against Llantero before CFI Rizal
o It alleged that on March 23, 1957 petitioner, through force,
strategy and stealth, and without its consent, entered into,
occupied and subsequently constructed his house on a 200-
square-meter portion of the land

Petitioner, in his Answer, claimed that he bought the land on October 29, 1956
from Felicidad Campos, whose title thereto could be traced back to Telesforo
Deudor, the first known "owner" of the property.

RTC, rendered judgment ordering petitioner or any person claiming under him,
to remove his house and other constructions from the property in question to
surrender possession thereof to the Corporation;

CA, affirmed the Decision of the trial Court.

Petitioner received a copy of the same on May 30, 1967. Through counsel, he
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 14, 1967 by registered mail, but
erroneously placed a different docket
• As a consequence the judgment against petitioner became final, an
entry of judgment was made, and the records of the case were
remanded to the Lower Court for execution.

Before the Appellate Court, petitioner moved to set aside the entry of judgment
on the ground that, except for the mistake in docket number, reconsideration was
timely filed so that the Decision had not yet become final – DENIED

ISSUE: WON the judgment should be set aside

HELD:
NO
Petitioner's Motion, although seasonably presented from the foregoing standpoint, bore
an erroneous docket number
• It could not be attached to the expediente of the correct case. To all intents
and purposes, the Motion was legally inexistent.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 16

 378. PCIB v. Ortiz, 150 SCRA 380 (1987)
• PCIB replied arguing that (1) service of the judgment on COMMEX on July
15, 1978 was inefficacious, and the period for appeal should be reckoned only
from July 17, 1978 when COMMEX delivered the notice to PCIB's lawyers;
PCIB v. ORTIZ
and (2) there was no need to append an affidavit of merits to its motion for
reconsideration, this being required only when the motion for new trial was
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK
based on grounds other than excessive award of damages.
Respondent: HON. RODOLFO ORTIZ, ROGELIO MARAVILES, and QUEZON CITY
SHERIFF
Date: G.R. No. L-49223 May 29, 1987 • Maraviles submitted a rejoinder, pointing out that (1) the notice of the
Topic: RULE 37: New trial or reconsideration judgment was received by precisely the same person who had received the
notice of the Order; (2) an affidavit of merits was in fact indispensable
FACTS: because PCIB's lawyers were invoking excusable negligence as ground to
set aside the Order considering the case submitted for decision.
• The party directly affected in this case is the petitioner, Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank, hereafter simply referred to as PCIB, defendant in a civil
case before CFI Quezon City which was instituted by one of its depositors,
Rogelio Maraviles, for the recovery of damages resulting from the dishonor
of two (2) of his checks on account of the negligence of employees of PCIB. • The Trial Court denied PCIB's motion for reconsideration and decreed the
issuance of a writ of execution at Maraviles instance, "judgment ** being
• The law firm of Ledesma, Saludo & Associates appeared for PCIB in the suit, already final and executory."
and gave its address as 3rd Floor, LTR Building, 5548 South Superhighway,
Makati, Metro Manila. Holding office in the same LTR Building, at the ground • PCIB attempted a second motion for reconsideration.
floor, was a corporation known as Commercial Exponent Philippines,
Inc., COMMEX, for short. • Trial court denied second motion for reconsideration:
that defendant's counsel had been receiving orders and notices of
• After Maraviles had presented his evidence, the trial was reset for the hearing from this court, in this case, through COMMEX, whose authority
reception of PCIB's proofs, but the latter's lawyers failed to appear at the to do so the defendant is now estopped from denying, and (2) that even
appointed time. Consequently, the Trial Court dictated an Order considering granting arguendo that defendant's first "Motion for Reconsideration"
the case submitted for decision, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, dated August 15, 1978 was filed on time, the same did not interrupt the
ordering the payment to him by PCIB of P20,000.00 as moral damages; period of appeal since it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit,
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. as required by the rules, neither does the motion itself although verified
state the good and valid defenses, if any of the defendant which as ruled
• PCIB's lawyers filed on August 15, 1978 a Motion for Reconsideration. They by this Court in its order dated August 15, 1978, do not exist even in
argued that the award of damages was exorbitant, and proferred the following defendant's answer itself
explanation for their nonappearance at the continuation of trial:
ISSUE: Whether or not trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
The failure of Atty. Segundo Mangohig associate lawyer of the Firm who PCIB’s motion for reconsideration. – NO.
was personally handling the ** case suddenly resigned from the law firm.
HELD:
As is the usual procedure, Atty. Mangohig was required to submit a list
of his pending cases accounts with their respective status. Atty.
Mangohig did submit a report. Unfortunately, the present case was not The Trial Court's ruling that as "appears in the answer," PCIB "has no good and valid
defenses which might change or alter the judgment of this Court if it were to set it aside
listed in his report. Thus the present case was not reassigned in time for
another lawyer to attend the hearing. and reopen the case to allow the defendant to cross examine the plaintiff and to present
its evidence," appears to be correct. A perusal of PCIB's unverified answer in the
Court a quo discloses that is made up mostly of denials for lack of knowledge" and an
• An opposition was presented by Maraviles in which he asserted (1) that
averment of "special and affirmative defenses" consisting in the insinuation that the
judgment had already become final, notice thereof having been served on
dishonor of Maraviles checks was due to mechanical and human errors which are
PCIB, thru COMMEX, on July 15, 1978, and the fifteen-day period to appeal
expected and inevitable and for which reasonable allowance" should be made; and that
therefrom had already lapsed when PCIB's motion for reconsideration was
Maraviles should verify the amount of his deposit before issuing any check against it. In
filed on August 15, 1978; and (2) Mangohig's failure to include the case in his
the fight of its express admission that Maraviles did indeed have a sufficient deposit at
report did not constitute excusable negligence warranting relief.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 17

the time of the issuance of the checks in question, these defenses are patently of all jurisdiction over the case and leaves it with no alternative but to order, on motion,
unsubstantial and unmeritorious. It furthermore appears that no other defense has been the execution of the judgement.
asserted by PCIB, whether in an affidavit of merit attached to its two (2) motions for
reconsideration or otherwise. It would thus really make no sense, as the Court a In fine, it not being possible under the facts to ascribe the commission of an act with
quo opines, to set aside the judgment reopen the case and allow PCIB to present grave abuse of discretion to the Trial Court, none having been shown by the petitioner,
evidence of defenses which are inconsequential, and would not at all negate or mitigate the verdict must go against the latter.
its liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
It is true that when fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence is invoked as
ground of a motion for new trial, it should "be proved in the manner provided for proof
of motions," i.e., by "affidavits or depositions" unless the court should direct that "the
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." It is also required that
"affidavits of merits" be attached to the motion. A motion for new trial grounded on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence should thus ordinarily be accompanied by
two (2) affidavits: one, setting forth the facts and circumstances alleged to constitute
such fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence; and the other, an affidavit of
merits, setting forth the particular facts claimed to constitute the movant's meritorious
cause of action or defense. The reason for the first is quite obvious: it is to enable the
court to determine if the movant's claim of fraud, etc., is not a mere conclusion but is
indeed borne out by the relevant facts. The reason for the second is equally evident: it
would be useless, a waste of time, to set aside the judgment and reopen the case to
allow the movant to adduce evidence when he has no valid cause of action or
meritorious defense.

Where, therefore, a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, etc., is unaccompanied
by either or both affidavits, the motion is pro forma a scrap of paper, as it were, and will
not interrupt the running of the period of appeal. But where, as here, the motion for new
trial is founded not only on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also
on the ground of "award of excessive damages," as to which no affidavit of fraud, etc.,
or of merits is required, what being required of the movant being to "point out specifically
the findings or conclusions of the judgment" demonstrating the invoked ground, the
motion cannot be denied as pro forma simply because no affidavit of merits is appended
thereto, provided there be a specification of the findings or conclusions of the judgment
alleged to be erroneous because awarding excessive damages. The tenability of the
grounds is dependent upon different premises. The untenability of one does not of itself,
render the other unmeritorious.

Finally, it bears stressing that the filing of a proper motion for new trial interrupts the
running of the period of appeal which begins to run again from receipt of notice by the
movant of the order denying his motion. In this situation, the party adversely affected
has only the balance of the period of appeal within which to perfect his appeal, the
balance being the number of days remaining of the reglementary period after deducting
the time during which the motion was pending; i.e., from the date when the motion was
filed to the date when notice of the order of denial was served on the movant. If the
motion for new trial was filed on the last day of the reglementary appeal period, the
movant may appeal within the day following service on him of the notice of the order
denying his motion. It is well to also emphasize, in this connection, that the requirement
for the perfection of an appeal within the time prescribed is mandatory and jurisdictional,
that the lapse of said period without an appeal being taken operates to divest the court

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 18

 379. Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 159695, September 15, 2006
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the dismissal of the Solicitor
General's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the motion was in effect one
for a new trial and was pro forma?
REPUBLIC v. ASCUNCION
Held:
PLAINTIFF: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEFENDANT: RAMON G. ASUNCION, PEDRO ASUNCION, CANDIDA A motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for new trial if based on a
ASUNCION-SANTOS, LEONORA ASUNCION-HENSON, ARISTON ASUNCION ground for new trial. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion
and ANABELLE* ASUNCION-PERLAS for new trial must be based on the following causes: (a) fraud, accident, mistake or
DATE: September 15, 2006 excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and
PONENTE QUISUMBING, J. by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
TOPIC: RULE 37 (b) newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the
Facts: result.

Paciencia Gonzales Asuncion and the Heirs of Felipe F. Asuncion applied for the The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration did not aver grounds for new
registration of the titles of nine (9) parcels of land, with RTC of Bulacan. trial. The motion was not based on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
that would need affidavits of merit, nor is the motion based on newly discovered
Petitioner, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed the application on the evidence as to require affidavits of witnesses. The two main arguments raised by the
ground that the subject lands are inalienable forest lands of the public domain, within Solicitor General in the motion for reconsideration were: (1) that the trial court
the unclassified area of Bulacan, Bulacan. deprived petitioner of its right to present evidence; and, (2) that the decision was
tainted with serious errors of law and fact. Both are not the valid causes for new trial
The applicants’ motion to admit an amended application for eleven (11) parcels of land per Section 1, Rule 37. Hence, we are unable to agree with the trial and appellate
was granted by the trial court. courts that the motion for reconsideration was actually a motion for new trial.
The trial court also dismissed the application over two (2) other parcels, Psu-133934 &
Psu-138316.
Mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the court does not
automatically make a motion for reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is
Meanwhile, on June 29, 2001, the trial court had considered the case submitted for compliance with the requisites of the Rules.
decision16 and on July 10, 2001, rendered its decision ordering the registration of five
(5) parcels of land, denominated as Psu-115369, Psu-115615, Psu-115616, Psu-
118984, and Psu-121255 (amended). In his motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that:

Due to the applicants’ voluminous formal offer of evidence, the Solicitor General asked
11. Applicants failed to rebut the presumption that the land subject of their application
for additional time, until July 30, 2001, to file his comment on the applicants’ formal
belongs to the State. Applicants' Exhibits "L" and "L-1" show, on their faces, that they
offer of evidence.
 requested in 1977 for release of areas subject of their application and falling within the
unclassified region of Bulacan, Bulacan, per LC Map No. 637 dated March 1, 1927.
The Solicitor General received his copy of the decision. Five days later, on August 2, And that field personnel of the Bureau of Forest Development gave favorable
2001, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s recommendations in support of the applicants' requests. However, these documents
decision dated July 10, 2001, but it was denied on February 26, 2002. The trial court do not prove that the Director of the then Bureau of Forest Development, or the
ruled that the Solicitor General was in effect seeking a new trial and that the motion for Secretary of the DENR, or the President, had approved the recommendations
reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an affidavit of merit required by the contained therein and had certified the forest areas concerned as alienable and
second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. disposable.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking
the annulment of the Orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 26, 2002. The 12. This Honorable Court, with due respect, misapplied the concept of accretion as a
appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. mode of acquiring ownership in this case. Said mode was mistakenly applied to the
The appellate court considered the Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration as a boundary of applicants' estate which was roughly perpendicular (instead of parallel) to
motion for new trial and held that the case cannot be re-opened because the motion the bank of the Wawang-Dapdap River.
was filed after judgment.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 19

13. The 1953 CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 766, that applicants are the owners of the
land by virtue of accretion and a superior right to possess the same, does not amount
to res judicata as against the Republic because the then CFI was not a court of
competent jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable forest land of the public domain in
favor of private persons. Such power is vested exclusively, by delegated legislation, to
the President or his alter ego, the DENR Secretary.

These allegations stress that the findings or conclusions of the trial court were
allegedly not supported by the evidence or were contrary to law. Particular reference
is made to documentary evidence in paragraph 11. In paragraph 12, the error alleged
was misapplication of the concept of accretion. In paragraph 13, the Solicitor General
alleged that the trial court had erred in considering the 1953 decision of the Court of
First Instance in Civil Case No. 766 as res judicata relative to LRC Case No. 3681-M.
Patently, herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration was not pro forma.

However, our ruling that the motion for reconsideration was not pro forma does
not in any way mean that it is meritorious. As this Court held in Marikina Valley
Dev't. Corp. v. Hon. Flojo, public policy would be better served by according the
appellate court an effective opportunity to review the decision of the trial court on the
merits, rather than by aborting the right to appeal by a literal application of the
procedural rule relating to pro forma motions for reconsideration.

Since the Solicitor General filed his notice of appeal on March 20, 2002 or seven days
after he received the denial of the motion, the notice of appeal was filed within the
"fresh period" of 15 days to file the notice of appeal. Thus, the notice of appeal
deserves to be given due course.

Lastly, we find now that the Solicitor General improperly appeals before this Court the
trial court's decision in LRC Case No. 3681-M. We note that he had already appealed
said decision, by way of an ordinary appeal, when he filed the notice of appeal with
the trial court. In Marikina Valley Dev't. Corp. v. Hon. Flojo, it should be pointed out,
this Court directed the trial court to give due course to the notice of appeal.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 20

 380. Tadeja v. People, G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 21

 381. SJS Officers v. Lim, G.R. No.187836, March 10, 2015 As succinctly put by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Ortigas and Co. Ltd.
8
Partnership v. Judge Velasco on the effect and disposition of a motion for
PLAINTIFF: Social Justice Society reconsideration:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
DEFENDANT: Mayor Lim
DATE: March 10, 2015 The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by Rule 52 of the Rules of Court,
PONENTE: J. Perez does not impose on the Court the obligation to deal individually and specifically with the
TOPIC: Motion for New Trial grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way that the Court does in its judgment
or final order as regards the issues raised and submitted for decision. This would be a
Facts: useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already
set forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
This is a case in pursuant to a previous case decided by the SC declaring Ordinance movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to issues raised for the first
No. 8187 Unconstitutional and Invalid with respect to the continues stay of Pandacan time, these being, as above stated, deemed waived because not asserted at the first
Oil Terminals. Relocation should be settled. opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and summarily with the motion for
reconsideration, and merely state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII,
[Eto lang important, kasi eto lang MR] Constitution); i.e., the motion contains merely a reiteration or rehash of arguments
Shell filed a MR for the above cited decision – DENIED already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or the
basic issues have already been passed upon, or the motion discloses no substantial
1. Erroneous reliance on the factual pronouncements in G.R. No. 156052 argument or cogent reason to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment
entitled “Social Justice Society v. Atienza,” which, it argues, were completely or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too unsubstantial to require
unsupported by competent evidence;chanrobleslaw consideration, etc.
2. Adoption of “imagined fears, causes, surmises and conjectures interposed by
the petitioners,” which it also raises as totally unsupported by evidence
because the petitions, which involve factual issues, were wrongfully filed with Chevron filed a Motion for Clarification – DENIED
this Court;chanrobleslaw
3. Conclusion that there is no substantial difference between the conditions in Chevron now pleads that this Court review and clarify a portion of the Decision
2001 and the present setup with respect to the oil depots operations; and concerning what it understands as an unqualified statement that “all oil depots, in
4. Failure to dismiss the petitions despite the enactment of Ordinance No. 8187, general, even those outside of Pandacan, have no place in any densely populated
7 12
which, it maintains, has rendered the cases moot and academic. area.” The exact wordings in the Decision sought to be clarified read:

The Motion for Reconsideration must be denied. Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of
the depots where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products [are
REASON: just give a reason, just a little bit’s enough stored], regardless of whether or not the composition may cause explosions, has no
place in a densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, be it
It bears stressing that these cases were called in session several times to give the related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would definitely cause not only
members of the Court time to study and present their respective positions. Before the destruction to properties within and among the neighboring communities but certainly
Decision was finally promulgated, the Court had thoroughly deliberated on the mass deaths and injuries.
arguments of the parties, including the basic issues herein raised – the rationale for
upholding the position of the Court in G.R. No. 156052, on one hand, and the safety Stressing that a judgment should be confined to the lis mota of the case, Chevron posits
measures adopted by the intervenors, including the alleged “imagined fears, causes, that the paragraph sought to be clarified was a sweeping and categorical
surmises and conjectures interposed by the petitioners,” on the other; the argument of pronouncement sans factual basis or evidence against all oil depots inasmuch as the
whether or not the petition should have been filed with the trial court or at least referred prevailing circumstances, types of products stored or the safety measures in place vary
to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence; and the issue on whether or not the from one depot to another. If such is left as is, it claims that it would be tantamount to
enactment of Ordinance No. 8283 has rendered the instant petitions moot and interference with the policy making of the political departments of the government. –
academic. And for failure to reconcile diverse views on several issues, a Concurring and MALI DAW TO
Dissenting Opinion was written.
REASON: I still don’t have the reason and you don’t have the time and it really make
The grounds relied on being mere reiterations of the issues already passed upon by the me wonder if I ever gave a fck about you
Court, there is no need to “cut and paste” pertinent portions of the Decision or re-write
the ponencia in accordance with the outline of the instant motion. Moreover, the Decision should be taken as a whole and considered in its entirety. The
Decision is clear – it is the City’s Ordinance No. 8187 that has been declared

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 22

unconstitutional and invalid insofar as the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals clarification” or “plea for due process” or “prayer for a second look,” or “motion
24
is concerned. to defer, or set aside, entry of judgment,” or x x x, etc.. (Emphasis supplied)
This Resolution is final. Under pain of contempt, no further pleadings, motions or papers
For the same reasons, the allegation of encroachment on the policy making power of in the guise of the above-enumerated submissions shall, thus, be entertained in these
the political departments of the government is bereft of merit. cases.

Itigil na daw kaka-reconsider move on na daw huhu hahaha

Manifestation of Understanding by Petron

Dapat kapag Malabo nililinaw nga naman

Petron seeks to clarify whether the dispositive portion thereof on the submission of
“updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule” within forty-five (45) days is
limited to the operation itself and does not include the removal of the facilities. It
ratiocinates that it is the operation, and not the presence of the facilities, that runs
contrary to Ordinance No. 8119 (Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006)

REASON: maglinawan tayo bes, kulit mo eh

However, in the Decision dated 7 March 2007 in G.R. No. 156052, the Court granted
21
the petition which sought the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 and the immediate
removal of the terminals of the oil companies. By so granting the petition, it necessarily
follows that the relocation and transfer it ordered contemplates the complete removal of
the facilities.

These cases being a mere sequel to the earlier petition, we so hold that the relocation
and transfer contemplated therein include the removal of the facilities, especially so
when the city plans on building commercial establishments to replace the Pandacan
terminals and provide a source of employment for displaced employees. Accordingly,
the comprehensive plan to be submitted within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the
Decision shall also include the removal of the facilities.

ULTIMATE REASON OF SC: daming rason, still alive but I’m barely breathing

In anticipation of further attempts to delay the enforcement of this Court’s Decision dated
25 November 2014, the parties to these cases are hereby REMINDED of the
23
pronouncements in Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco on the import
of the denial of a motion for reconsideration. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon have
been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient weight
to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order. It means not only that the
grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is deemed
waived and may no longer be set up in a subsequent motion or application to overturn
the judgment; and this is true, whatever may be the title given to such motion or
application, whether it be “second motion for reconsideration” or “motion for

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 23

RULE 38: Relief from judgments, orders, or other proceedings HELD:

382. Demetriou v. CA, 238 SCRA 158

YES. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the
fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent
DEMETRIOU V CA
act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial
of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully
PLAINTIFF: ANTONIO DEMETRIOU, HARRIET DEMETRIOU, ET AL
his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
DEFENDANT: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RHODIE A. NIDEA
PRIVATE RESPONDENT: HILDA RALLA-ALMINE
DATE: November 14, 1994 On the other hand, intrinsic fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.: during the trial such as the use of forged or false document or perjured testimony,
TOPIC: RULE 38 which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case".
FACTS:
• Petitioners are co-owners of a lot registered in the name of Pablo Ralla
In the present petition, the allegation of fraud involves admission by the respondent
respondent’s deceased father and they owned 2/3 of the lot as evidenced by
court of an alleged false affidavit of loss, which alleged fraud is intrinsic in character.
a deed of sale
Thus, as the alleged fraud committed by the private respondent is not extrinsic in
• That at the time of the sale of the Property to the petitioners, there was a ten-
character, the instant petition for annulment of the order of the lower court should be
year lease contract over the property which was to expire shortly thus the
dismissed.
petitioners wait the termination of the lease before obtaining a new title in their
name
The appellate court is certainly right in holding that the use of a false affidavit of loss
• That to their great surprise and shock, the father of petitioners learned from does not constitute extrinsic fraud to warrant the invalidation of a final judgment. The
the Register of Deeds use of the alleged false affidavit of loss by private respondent is similar to the use during
trial or forged instruments or perjured testimony.
RTC by an order of Judge Nidea, the owner's duplicate copy is in the possession of
the petitioner had been declared of no further force and effect
In the case at bar, petitioners were not really kept out of the proceedings because of the
o and that a new second owner's duplicate copy of said title has been fraudulent acts of the private respondent. They could have rebutted or opposed the use
issued to the private respondent for the respondent told the judge
of the affidavit and shown its falsity since they were theoretically parties in the case to
that the TCT was lost/destroyed during the typhoon "Sisang" as
whom notice had been duly given.
stated in her affidavit of loss which petitioner alleged that it is
patently false and fraudulent since respondent knew fully well or
ought to have known that 2/3 of the property covered by the TCT But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud
had already been sold to the petitioners by petitioners but also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra
v. Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already
• The aforesaid order of Judge Nidea has become final and executory held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not
acquired jurisdiction. Consequently the decision may be attacked any time. It was,
Petitioner brought the action to the CA to annul the order of the judge to issue a new therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of
owner's duplicate certificate of title to private respondent judgment of the petitioners.
• It was clearly issued on the basis of the false and fraudulent representation
of private respondent, hence, it is null and void and must be annulled and set WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED
aside to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
CA denied the motion of petitioners on the ground that the fraud alleged therein was
notextrinsic fraud but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud which did not justify setting aside the (Not Extrinsic fraud but the SC allowed the setting aside of the decision and set
final decision of the trial court. it for trial because the Certificate of title has not been lost but was in possession
of another person)
ISSUE:WON the Judge erred in its decision

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 24

 383. Arcilla v. Arcilla, 138 SCRA 560 HELD:
NO. The pertinent provisions of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court on "Relief from
ARCILLA (SON) v. ARCILLA (HEIRS) Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings" state —
"Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding
Petitioner: LAUREANO ARCILLA thereof. — When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken,
Respondent: BASILISA ARCILLA, SERAPIA ARCILLA, MARCELA ARCILLA, against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
DIONISIA ARCILLA, ZACARIAS ARCILLA, GAVINA MOLO VDA. DE ARCILLA, negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the
CESAR M. ARCILLA, GLORIA M. ARCILLA, ANTONIO M. ARCILLA, POMPEY M. judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
ARCILLA, ERNESTO M. ARCILLA, ELENA M. ARCILLA, ASUNCION M. ARCILLA,
RANULFO M. ARCILLA, IGLESIA A. CAÑETE, ROSABELLA A. CAÑETE, and Sec. 3. Time for filing petition contents and verification. — A petition provided for in
HONORABLE FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, Presiding Judge of Branch IX of the Court either of the preceding sections of this rule must be verified filed within sixty (60) days
of First Instance of Cebu after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside,
Date: G.R. No. L-46674 September 16, 1985 and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or such
Topic: RULE 38: Relief from judgments, orders, or other proceedings proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the
Special civil action for CERTIORARI petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be."
The rule, therefore, is that in order for a petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be
FACTS: entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has
• A case was filed before the lower court is for annulment of a deed of sale faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of said Rule 38. Consequently,
allegedly executed by Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla in favor of one of his sons, in assailing the lower court’s dismissal of his petition for relief for having been filed out
petitioner Laureano Arcilla. It was originally filed and instituted by the said of time, it is incumbent upon herein petitioner to show that the said petition was filed
Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla but she died even before the pre-trial of the case within the reglementary period specified in Section 3, Rule 38. He has failed to do so,
and was therefore substituted by her other children. instead he argues on the merits of his petition for relief, without first showing that the
• Petitioner was a defendant in a case for Annulment of Sale with Damages, same was filed on time in the court below. On this ground alone, the instant case should
filed by the respondents be dismissed.
• Pre-trial was set in July 1975 but was reset in October 1975; Come October,
Petitioner and his counsel did not appear thus they were declared in default; Moreover, We agree with the respondent Judge that the petition for relief was filed late.
• The judgment favored the respondents declaring the deed of sale null and We note that the decision sought to be set aside was rendered on October 27, 1976.
void Petitioner, through counsel, received a copy of the said decision on November 8, 1976,
• Petitioner, through his new counsel, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and and he filed his petition for relief from judgment only on April 18, 1977. Clearly, the same
to Set Aside the Decision which the court denied was filed beyond the period allowed by Section 3 of Rule 38. As in previous cases, this
• Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that they were not Court holds and so rules that the instant petition filed after the lapse of the reglementary
notified of the setting for pre-trial to October and that petitioner learned of the period cannot be entertained.
decision of October 1976 only on March 1977 when the herein undersigned
counsel showed him a xerox copy of the same which the undersigned A deeper examination of the pleadings and the record of the case would show that
counsel procured a day earlier petitioner was present during the pre trial conference on July 1975 when the lower court
• Petitioner wants to set aside the decision based on mistake and or excusable re-set the pre-trial to October 1975. On the said date, however, although notified, both
neglect for their failure to inquire from their lawyer Atty. Monteclaros or with petitioner and his counsel did not appear, hence, the declaration of default.
this Court believing that they will be duly notified of any proceeding in Examining the petition for relief filed by petitioner, while the same appears verified and
connection with the case either by their lawyer Atty. Monteclaros or by the accompanied by an affidavit of merit, the allegations of fact made therein do not prove
Office of the Clerk of Court of this Court; Petitioner attached an affidavit of either fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, nor show a valid defense in
merit favor of the party seeking relief. The general allegation made therein to the effect that
"petitioner has a good and valid defense considering that the late Segunda O. Vda. de
• Court denied the petitioner’s motion because the petition for relief was filed
Arcilla voluntarily and willingly executed the document of Sale", is not sufficient
out of time for the judgment of this Court was received by counsel of
compliance with the rules. Since the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was written in
petitioners on November 1976, hence, the defendants had only up to January
English and it is admitted that Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla is an illiterate and do not know
1977 to file a petition for relief from judgment for notice to counsel is notice
how to read and write, it would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have secured
to the client.
the affidavit of Nemesio Jubay, the Notary Public who allegedly notarized the document
as well as the witnesses to the execution and signing thereof to show that the contents
ISSUE:
of the document was fully explained to said Segunda O. Vda. de Arcilla and that she
WON the petition for relief should be granted

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 25

voluntarily signed the same. This way, petitioner could convince the Court that in his
legal fight, he had a leg on which to stand. It thus results that reversal of the order
complained of, as well as the judgment rendered thereon would be an idle ceremony. It
would not advance or for that matter serve the ends of justice. It would only result in
another waste of time, effort and expense.
For the reasons stated above, the Order of the lower court dated May 8, 1977 denying
herein petitioner’s Petition for Relief should be affirmed.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 26

 384. Ibabao v. CA, 180 SCRA 70 tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because
of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by counsel
IBABAO v. CA (Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. II, 1966, citing Espinosa v. Yatco, 7 SCRA
78, January 31, 1963).
RULE 38
From the decision of the trial court from which respondents seek relief, a
FACTS: motion for reconsideration was filed but this was, however, withdrawn for being fatally
defective. The motion had failed to contain a notice of the time and place of hearing as
There are 2 cases which were consolidated. A civil case and a cadastral case before required by the Rules of Court. Thereafter, no appeal was filed by the respondents
the CFI of Romblon. The Civil Case was an action for quieting title/ recovery of causing the trial court's decision to become final and executory. Only then did the
possession/damages. The Cadastral proceeding involved lots which is the subject respondents file the petition for relief from judgment (Annex "F", page 68, Rollo)
matter of the case. explaining therein the reasons for the lack of notice of time and place of hearing of their
motion for reconsideration and alleging that "there is no other remedy left of the plaintiff
CFI rendered its decision dismissing Civil case and declaring Pantaleon Ibabao to be claimants to pursue or avail of but that provided in Sec. 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court."
the true and lawful owner of the Lots 21 22 49 175 (not all). Private respondents were
ordered to vacate said properties and to surrender complete possession thereof to the Yet no reasons were offered for their failure to appeal. No allegations of fraud,
petitioners. However, the remaining lots were adjudicated in favor of respondents. No accident, mistake, or excusable negligence as to prevent them from having done so
appeal having been filed, decision became final and executory. was made by the respondents. There was, likewise, no assertion that the decision of
the Court sought to be set aside was entered against them through such fraud, accident,
Respondent filed a Petition for Relief with Preliminary Injunction. While the said petition mistake, or excusable negligence. Thus, as the trial court held in its decision dated July
for relief was pending with the court, there was a fire that burned the provincial capitol 13, 1983, dismissing the respondent's petition for relief from judgment, "Plaintiffs" failure
resulting the loss of records. Thereafter, petitioner filed for reconstitution which was to appeal within the reglementary period of perfecting an appeal is NOT a ground to
granted. grant a petition for relief from judgment."

CFI: ruled in favor of the petitioners and dismissed the Petition for Relief for lack of merit. We find no error in this pronouncement of the court. The petition was at the
outset, rightfully dismissed by the trial court and the same should have been done by
Respondents appealed and pending, they filed an entirely separate and independent the appellate court. The latter's order for the reconstitution and retrial of the case
case for Annulment of Judgment with prelim injunction. This is the subject of the petition was erroneous. There had already been a reconstitution and trial of the case in the trial
as well as the ruling dismissing the petition for relief. court and judgment had been rendered thereon (Annex "C", p. 93. Rollo) under date of
July 13, 1983. In fact said decision begins with a statement that "this is a reconstituted
IAC: also dismissed the petition for annulment case." Consequently, the remand of the case is improper and would be dilatory. More
so, after this Court had already passed upon those very issues.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION IN THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT
OF JUDGMENT HAD RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE APPEAL FROM The remand of cases for purposes of reconstitution or retrial not a matter of
THE DECISION DISMISSAL NG THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT discretion. Rather it is a matter of necessity for the proper disposition of cases. It cannot
be denied where circumstances call for the retrial of the case by a lower court or for
HELD: NO further presentation of evidence by the parties where these are not within the jurisdiction
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy of the appellate court. However, it cannot be ordered where finality of judgment dictates
provided by law to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through otherwise. There is no exercise of discretion in cases where remand is unnecessary
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable bearing in mind that justice delayed is justice denied.
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or
adequate remedy. As to the first issue raised by the petitioners, the filing of an independent
action for annulment of judgment does not of necessity result in the abandonment of a
When a party had another adequate remedy available to him, which was petition for relief from judgment or an appeal therefrom, save in a case where both
either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the lower court, and actions are predicated on Identical grounds. No law precludes the simultaneous pursuit
he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing of both actions. However, the same may be barred by the principle of res judicata and
such motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule the proscription of the Rules of Court on multiplicity of suits as had obtained in the case
38. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the at bar. (Sec. 3, Rule 2; Sec. 2, Rule 38. The Revised Rules of Court).
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 27

 385. Quelman v. VHF, G.R. No. 138500, September 16, 2005

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 28

 386. Sps. dela Cruz v. Sps. Andres, G.R. No. 161864, April 27, 2007 denying their petition for relief from judgment by a petition for review on certiorari under
[11]
Rule 45, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy twice.
Sps dela Cruz vs Sps Andres Nevertheless, even if this Court were to delve into the merits of this petition, the same
GR No. 161864 must still be denied. What petitioners counsel did in this case was to attach an improper
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to their petition for review with the appellate
PLAINTIFF: Spouses Rolando and Teresita Dela Cruz court. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount
DEFENDANT: Spouses Feliciano Andres and Erlinda Austria and Director of to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceedings below.
Lands For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment
DATE: April 27, 2007 of the clients cause must be shown. The negligence of counsel must be so gross that
PONENTE: J. Quisumbing the client is deprived of his day in court, the result of which is that he is deprived of his
TOPIC: property without due process of law. Thus, where a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process
FACTS: of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Here, the
• Petitioners filed a case for annulment of title/ reconveyance against case underwent a full-blown trial. Both parties were adequately heard, and all issues
Respondents and director of lands over a lot before the MCTC. were ventilated before the decision was promulgated.
• MCTC decided to cancel the Title insofar as the 410 square meters owned It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from judgment, meritorious defenses
and occupied by petitioners were concerned; on appeal, RTC reversed the must be accompanied by the ground relied upon, whether it is fraud, accident, mistake,
decision excusable negligence, extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, there
• Petitioners, assisted by Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa, filed with the CA a petition being neither excusable nor gross negligence amounting to a denial of due process,
for review but was denied because the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping meritorious defenses cannot alone be considered.
was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead of petitioners
• Thereafter, Atty. Villarosa withdrew his appearance; Petitioners, assisted by While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in stone, it is equally true that strict
Atty. Hernandez, requested for an extension of time to file their petition before compliance with the Rules is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and
this Court. Later, they abandoned the motion and the case was declared for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business. Utter disregard of the rules
closed and terminated. cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
• Petitioners filed a petition for relief since the gross negligence of their WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
previous counsel did not bind them; CA denied the motion

ISSUE:
WON the petitioners can avail the petition for relief?

HELD:

NO. A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there
is no other available or adequate remedy. It may be availed of only after a judgment,
final order or other proceeding was taken against the petitioner in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
While the law uses the phrase any court, it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan
and Regional Trial Courts. The procedure in the Court of Appeals and this Court are
governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time, be
supplemented by additional rules promulgated by this Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition for relief in the Court of
Appeals.

Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
denial of a petition for relief from judgment is subject only to a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65. In seeking to reverse the appellate courts decision

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 29

 387. Purcon v. MRM Philippines, G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008 NO. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme
Court.
PURCON vs MRM PHILIPPINES
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered
PLAINTIFF: JULIO B. PURCON, JR. through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may file
DEFENDANT: MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. and MIGUEL L. RIVERA/MARITIME a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56,
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
DATE: September 26, 2008
PONENTE: REYES, R.T., J.: Section 1. Original cases cognizable. Only petitions
TOPIC: RULE 38 for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary
FACTS: and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the Supreme Court.
Petitioner filed a case for reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and
permanent disability benefits before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC In Dela Cruz v. Andres, a petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in
• He alleged that respondent hired him as a seaman on board the M/T the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court explained that under the 1997
Sarabelle 2; he signed a contract for 3 months and was extended for another Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty (60)
3 months days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set
o His work involved strenuous work; One day, he felt an excruciating aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
pain in his left testicle. After being examined by a doctor at excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioners good and
the port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia; after that he was substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should
repatriated due to his ailment. be filed with the same court which rendered the decision
• The company physician told him that he is fit to work but there was no
vacancy at that time Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase any court, it refers only to
• He asked another doctor and after a thorough medical examination and Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
evaluation, he was diagnosed with EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT; UPPER
RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH INPEDIMENT GRADE XIV. • As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued
Respondents answered that Hermia is not work related and that petitioner signed a the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old rule, a petition for relief
quitclaim and release from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court
LA dismissed the complaint for Hermia is not work related and that he was already
cured; the fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean that he was suffering The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform
from disability. procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial Courts and designation of
Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.
NLRC resolution became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries
of Judgments; petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under R.65 which CA dismissed Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by separate
due to formal infirmities; CA decision became final and executory provisions of the Rules of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by
additional rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under R.45 in the SC; SC denied the petition and it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA
ruled that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, failure to pay docket allows the remedy of petition for relief in the CA.
fees, and defective verification
• Petitioner filed for a petition for relief from judgment The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which
pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said

ISSUE: WON the petition for relief should be granted If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the
CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme
HELD: Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which
are beyond the concerns of this Court.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 30

Nevertheless, even if We delve into the merits of the petition, the same must still be
dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to excusable
negligence. Petitioners lack of devotion in discharging his duty, without demonstrating
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial
relief. For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.

The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was
due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to
a mistake of procedure by counsel.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 31

 388. Afdal v. Carlos, G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010 petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
AFDAL v. CARLOS
A petition for relief from judgment, if allowed by the Rules and not a prohibited
Petitioner: ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL
pleading, should be filed with and resolved by the court in the same case from
Respondent: ROMEO CARLOS
which the petition arose.
Date: G.R. No. 173379 December 1, 2010
Topic: RULE 38: Relief from judgments, orders, or other proceedings
In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC because
Petition for review it is a prohibited pleading in an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the
petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions
FACTS: for relief from judgments of the MTC. Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing the
• Respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners, petition for relief from judgment of the MTC.
Zenaida Guijabar (Guijabar), John Doe, Peter Doe, Juana Doe, and all
persons claiming rights before the MTC
The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a petition for certiorari with the
• Respondent alleged that the petitioners were occupying the lot by mere
RTC under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the MTC
tolerance and claimed that Petitioner Afdal sold the lot to him
over the person of petitioners in view of the absence of summons to petitioners. Here,
• He was constrained to file a complaint before the Lupon ng we shall treat petitioners’ petition for relief from judgment as a petition for certiorari
Tagapamayapa which petitioners ignored the notices and the Lupon issued before the RTC.
a "certificate to file action." Then filed it in the MTC
• Summons was served on the petitioners but they failed to answer thus
respondent was granted to present evidence ex-parte Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
• MTC ruled in favor of respondent; Pet filed for relief but later on withdrew for null and void.
they realized that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rules on Summary
Procedure A closer look at the records of the case also reveals that the first indorsement carried
• Petitioners filed a petition for relief before the RTC claiming that they are the the annotation that it was "unsatisfied/given address cannot be located." The second
owners of the lot which they purchased from spouses Ubaldo and that they indorsement stated that the summons was "duly served as evidenced by his signature
received no demand nor notice of the Lupon of one Gary Acob (relative)." While the last indorsement carried the annotation that it
• RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the petition should was "duly served but refused to sign" without specifying to whom it was served.
have been filed before the MTC in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for relief should be filed "in
such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when
proceeding be set aside." the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed
of.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in its judgment. In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt and personal service on
HELD: petitioners was rendered impossible. It failed to show the reason why personal service
could not be made. It was also not shown that efforts were made to find petitioners
YES. Clearly, a petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer personally and that said efforts failed.
cases, as in the present case, is a prohibited pleading. The reason for this is to achieve
an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of the case was it shown
procedure. that Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was
a person of suitable age and discretion residing in petitioners’ residence
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:
In this case, the process server failed to specify Gary Acob’s age, his relationship to
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When a judgment petitioners and to ascertain whether he comprehends the significance of the receipt of
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in the summons and his duty to deliver it to petitioners or at least notify them of said receipt
any court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file a of summons.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 32

In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons and the complaint in the Civil
Case by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioners and, thus, the MTC’s Decision is void. Since the MTC’s 23
August 2004 Decision is void, it also never became final.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the orders of the RTC
and REMAND the case to MTC for consolidation with the unlawful detainer case

(Example nanaman ng wala siyang remedy kasi bawal sa MTC tas walang jurisdiction
sa RTC kaya sabi ng SC, Certiorari under R.65 na lang kunwari yang petition for relief
nyo just to fill the vacuum)

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 33

 389. City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No.174411, July 2, 2014

Mistake bordering on extrinsic fraud

RULE 38

FACTS: Rule 38 of the Rules of Court allows for the remedy called a petition for relief from
judgment. This is an equitable remedy "allowed in exceptional cases when there is no
• Respondent, through her attorney-in-fact, Johnny Ferrer, to file a complaint other available or adequate remedy" that will allow for substantive justice. Section 1 of
for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction Rule 38 provides for the grounds that warrant the filing of a petition under Rule 38:
and/or temporary restraining order.
• She alleged that the demolition by the Petitioner City of the commercial fish
SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. – When a
center is unlawful for it failed to give direct notice to respondent and with
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
threat of taking over the property
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may
• The properties were valued at Five Million (P10,000,000.00) pesos." The file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
word, "ten," was handwritten on top of the word, "five." And asked for a proceeding be set aside.
judgment "ordering defendant corporation to pay plaintiff the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) pesos for the actual and present value of the
commercial fish center completely demolished by public defendant." The Courts may set aside final and executory judgments provided that any of the grounds
word, "million," was handwritten on top of the word, "thousand," and an for their grant are present.
additional zero was handwritten at the end of the numerical figure.
• Handwritten intercalation was not explained in any part of the records and in The presence of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence" must be assessed
the proceedings. from the circumstances of the case.
• Trial Court favored respondent and awarded 10M as actual damages;
Petitioner filed an MR but was denied due to lack of notice of time and
place of hearing Excusable negligence as a ground for a petition for relief requires that the negligence
• Petitioner city then filed a petition for relief with, together with an affidavit of be so gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it."
merit; City alleged that it was the City’s legal officer’s mistake, negligence This excusable negligence must also be imputable to the party-litigant and not to his or
and gross incompetence, that they lost in the case or should have been her counsel whose negligence binds his or her client. The binding effect of counsel’s
reconsidered or otherwise overturned negligence ensures against the resulting uncertainty and tentativeness of proceedings
• Trial court denied the petition of the City; But on MR, Trial Court granted the if clients were allowed to merely disown their counsels’ conduct.
petition for relief and reduced the award of actual damages from 10M to 75k
for petitioner has only proved that amount Nevertheless, this court has relaxed this rule on several occasions such as: "(1) where
• CA reversed the decision due to lacked a notice of hearing and was a mere [the] reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
scrap of paper that did not toll the period to appeal; It became final and (2) when[the rule’s] application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
executory property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require." Certainly, excusable
• Petitioner city does not deny that its motion for reconsideration lacked a negligence must be proven.
notice of hearing. It offered no explanation for this lapse, except for oversight
by its then counsel.
Fraud as a ground for a petition for relief from judgment pertains to extrinsic or collateral
ISSUE: WON CA erred in its decision fraud. This court explained this type of fraud as follows:

HELD: YES. This court has relaxed procedural rules when a rigid application of these Where fraud is the ground, the fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. The extrinsic or
rules only hinders substantial justice. collateral fraud that invalidates a final judgment must be such that it prevented the
unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and the losing
In this case, petitioner city motion for reconsideration filed was filed within the 15-day party from having an adversarial trial of the issue. There is extrinsic fraud when a party
period. The purposes behind the required notice of hearing — provide the time to study is prevented from fully presenting his case to the court as when the lawyer connives to
the motion for reconsideration and give an opportunity to be heard — were satisfied defeat or corruptly sells out his client’s interest. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a
when Maramba filed an opposition to the motion. counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from presenting his case to the
court.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 34

On the other hand, mistake as used in Rule 38 means mistake of fact and not mistake The gross disparity between the award of actual damages and the amount actually
of law. A wrong choice in legal strategy or mode of procedure will not be considered a proved during the trial, the magnitude of the award, the nature of the "mistake" made,
mistake for purposes of granting a petition for relief from judgment. Mistake as a ground and that such negligence did not personally affect the legal officer of the city all
also "does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court contributed to a conclusion that the mistake or negligence committed by counsel
might have committed in the trial [since] such error may be corrected by means of an bordered on extrinsic fraud.
appeal."
Petitioner city followed the procedure under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Section 4 of
Mistake can be of such nature as to cause substantial injustice to one of the parties. It Rule 38 provides that "[i]f the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify relief,
may be so palpable that it borders on extrinsic fraud. the court in which it is filed, shall issue an order requiring the adverse parties toanswer
the same within fifteen (15) days from the receipt thereof."
Petitioner city recounted the "mistakes, negligence, incompetence and suspicious
acts/omissions of city legal officer Atty. Roy S. Laforteza in the affidavit of merit signed The trial court mentioned in its November 18, 2004 order denying petitioner city’s
by then Mayor, Benjamin S. Lim: petition for relief from judgment that an answer with motion to dismiss was filed before
it. Maramba prayed that the "petition for review be outright denied for lack of merit [and]
that the writ of execution dated October 26, 2004 be accordingly implemented."98
a) He did not present testimonial evidence for the defense;

Thus, the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 38 was complied with when Maramba
b) He filed a Motion for Reconsideration of a decision most prejudicial to the
filed an answer with motion to dismiss, and the court considered this pleading in its
City on the last day, and did not even base his arguments on the transcripts
resolution of petitioner city’s petition for relief from judgment.
that clearly show that the plaintiff had presented absolutely no evidence/proof
of her claim for damages
Periods for filing a petition for relief under Rule 38. The time for filing a petition for relief
is found under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
c) He filed a motion for reconsideration without the requisite notice of hearing

SEC. 3 Time for filing petition; contents and verification. – A petition provided for in either
d) He kept the adverse decision, the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration
of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after
and the Order of Execution from this affiant, his immediate superior, and
the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside,
relied on his own devices
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the
Atty. Laforteza’s "mistake" was fatal considering that the trial court awarded a total fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting
amount of P11 million in favor of Maramba based merely on her testimony that "the the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
actual cost of the building through continuous improvement is Five Million (5M) more or
less"; that her husband spent $1,760 for a round trip business travel to the Philippines
The double period required under this provision is jurisdictional and should be strictly
to attend to the case; and that "for his accommodation and car rental, her husband spent
complied with. Otherwise, a petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the
more or less, P10,000.00 including round trip ticket.
reglementary period will be dismissed outright.

First, nowhere in the trial court’s decision penned did it state or refer to any document
The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is reckoned from actual
presented by Maramba to substantiate her claimed costs. Second, the body of the trial
receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration when one is filed.
court’s decision mentioned that Maramba was entitled to 1 million as moral damages
and P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees. This is inconsistent with the dispositive portion that
awarded P500,000.00 as moral damages and P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner city received a copy of the July 30, 2004 decision on August 11, 2004. It filed
a motion for reconsideration on August 26, 2004. On October 25, 2004, it received a
copy of the October 21, 2004 trial court order denying its motion for reconsideration.
Maramba now wants this court to overlook all these blatant discrepancies and maintain
Four days later or on October 29, 2004, it filed its petition for relief from judgment. Thus,
the P11 million unsubstantiated award in her favor on the sole ground that petitioner
the petition for relief from judgment was considered filed on time.
city’s assistant legal officer failed to include a notice of hearing in its motion for
reconsideration that was filed within the 15-day reglementary period.
WHEREFORE, The Court of Appeals’ decision are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Rule 36 to 38 GB pg. 35