G.R. No.

L-12902             July 29, 1959

CEFERINO MARCELO, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
NAZARIO DE LEON, defendant-appellee.

Pedro D. Maldia and San Vicente and Jardiel for appellant.

BENGZON, J.:

The plaintiff has appealed from the order of judge Jose N. Leuterio of the Nueva Ecija court of first
instance, dismissing his complaint whereby he had asked that defendant be required to vacate a
parcel of land and to pay damages. The dismissal rested on two grounds, (a) the case pertained to
the Court of Agrarian Relations; and (b) as attorney-in-fact of the true owner of the land, the plaintiff
had no right to bring the action.

The record disclose that on February 4, 1957, Ceferino Marcelo, filed in the justice of the peace
court of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, a complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000 square meters
belonging to Severino P. Marcelo (who had given him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by
defendant "on the understanding that one-half of all the products raised in the occupied area, would
be given" to the landowner. The complaint alleged that after plaintiff had assumed the administration
of Severino Marcelo's properties, defendant delivered the products corresponding to the owner; but
when in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition to giving half of the produce, he
would have to pay a rental of two pesos per month, the latter refused, and continued refusing to pay
such additional charges. Wherefore, complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave
the premises and to pay damages and costs.

The defendant questioned the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the matter involved tenancy relations
falling within the authority of the Agrarian Court; he also challenged the capacity of plaintiff to sue.
He lost in the justice of the peace court; however, on appeal to the court of first instance, he raised
the same issues on a motion to dismiss, and then his views prevailed.

In this appeal, plaintiff insists he merely filed ejectment or detainer proceedings, which fall within the
justice of the peace court's jurisdiction. He claims the lot to be residential, and not agricultural. On
this point, His Honor noted that "the land covered by the title of plaintiff's principal covers an area of
59,646 square meters situated in the barrio of San Mariano, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. This land
obviously is agricultural, and it is too much to presume that barrio folks would occupy an area of
2,000 square meters more or less of land for a residence. The cultivation of the land by the
defendant and the sharing of the products thereof with the owner of the land characterize the
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff's principal as one of the landlord and tenant.

Indeed, from the allegations of the complaint, one could conclude that defendant had physical
possession of the land for the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. This
was agricultural tenancy of the kind called "share tenancy". In judging this relationship, the 2-pesos-
a-month-rental alleged in the complaint may be disregarded, because defendant never having
agreed to such imposition, it may not be held a part of the compensation payable for holding the
land. The circumstance that defendant built a dwelling on the agricultural lot does not ipso
facto make it residential — considering specially that the dwelling — photograph submitted with brief
— does not occupy more than 80 square meters occupied by him. In this connection, plaintiff argues
as follows:
 The defendant does not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees
because they are already full grown. He does not even do the actual gathering, and after
deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the fruits to the plaintiff all in consideration of
his stay in the land. He is not, therefore, a tenant within the meaning of that term as used in
Republic Act. No. 1199 for "A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivate the land for purposes of
production . . ."

Anyone who had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above description of the relationship.
He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds
and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plants pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean
"working or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems that defendant planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated
the lot) giving the landowner his corresponding share.

Now, the statutes provide that "All cases involving dispossession of a tenant by the landholder . . .
shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be
authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes". Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199);
and the court (Agrarian Relations) "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to consider,
investigate, decide and settle all questions and matters involving all those relationships established
by law which determine the varying rights of persons in cultivation and use of agricultural land where
one of the parties works the land". (Sec. 7, Republic Act 1267 as amended by Republic Act 1409.)

In Tumbagan vs. Vasquez, L-8719, July 17, 1956, we impliedly held that where a farmland occupies
agricultural land and erects a house thereon, the tenancy relationship continues subject to tenancy
laws — not to those governing leases.

In fact, the Agricultural Tenancy Law (Republic Act 1199) requires the landholder to give his tenant
an area wherein the latter may construct his dwelling (sec. 26), of course without thereby changing
the nature of their relationship, from landowner and tenant to lessor and lessee.

At any rate, this action must fail upon the second ground of defendant's motion to dismiss: the
plaintiff is a mere apoderado of the owner, Severino P. Marcelo.1 The rule is that every action must
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, (sec 2, Rule 3).

However, plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72, permitting "the legal representative" of any
landlord to bring an action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to litigate. Supposing that "legal
representative" as used in sec. 1, includes attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power attached to
the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in the name of Severino Marcelo, to "pursue any and all
kinds of suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts of the land". This action is not in the
name of plaintiff's principal.

For all the foregoing, the appealed order is affirmed with costs chargeable against appellant.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
 Arroyo vs. Granda, 18 Phil., 484; Hilario vs. La Congregacion, 27 Phil., 593.