(i)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
JAr~ 1
11
.::u i8
THIRD DIVISION
MEHITABEL, INC., G.R. Nos. 228701-02
Petitioner,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

- versus - BERSAMIN,*
LEONEN,
MARTIRES, and
GESMUNDO, JJ.
JUFHEL L. ALCUIZAR,
Respondent. Promulgated:

De~~~3. 2017

~
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

For the Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Coµrt challenging the May 19, 2016 Decision 1
and October 19, 2016 Joint Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CEB SP Nos. 07302 and 07321, which reversed the July 31, 2012
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and
consequently ruled that respondent Jufhel L. Alcuizar2 was illegally
dismissed from employment.

The Facts

Petitioner Mehitabel, Inc. is a duly registered corporation engaged in

manufacturing high-end furniture for export. 3 The company's Purchasing
Department is composed of only four (4) persons: one (1) Purchasing

·On leave.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and concurred in by Associate Justices
Pablito A. Perez and Gabriel T. Robeniol.
2
Also appears in the records as Jefhel Alcuizar.
3
Rollo, p. 14.
Decision 2 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

Manager, one (1) Purchasing Officer handling local purchases, one (1) QC
Inspector, and one (1) Expediter. 4 On August 31, 2010, the company hired
respondent as its Purchasing Manager. 5

Respondent was able fo earn a satisfactory rating during his first few
months in the company, but beginning March 2011, his immediate
supervisor, Rossana J. Arcenas (Arcenas), started receiving complaints on
his work ethics. Petitioner averred that respondent's dismal work
performance resulted in delays in the production and delivery of the
company's goods. 6

To address these issues, Arcenas talked to respondent and counselled

him to improve. As months passed, however, the complaints against
respondent's performance have exacerbated to the point that even the top
level officers of the company have expressed their dissatisfaction over his
ineptitude. 7

Sensing no improvement from the respondent and the nsmg

complaints, Arcenas decided to sit down and talk with respondent anew
sometime in early August 2011 to encourage the latter to shape up. She
advised respondent that should he fail to heed her advice, she may be forced
to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him for gross inefficiency.

Arcenas then alleged that respondent left the premises of petitioner's

company on August 10, 2011 and gave word that he was quitting his job.
Arcenas' narration was corroborated by Sherrie Mae A. Canete (Canete) and
Wilma R. Molina (Molina), the company's Human Resource Officer and
security personnel, respectively, both of whom were personally informed by
respondent of his intention to sever the ties with the company. 8 On even
date, petitioner wrote to respondent via registered mail to inform him that
the company decided to treat his act of leaving the office as a violation of its
code of conduct, specifically ·on the provision of abandonment. The letter
adverted to reads:

Mr. Alcuizar,

This morning, you left the office without asking permission from your
direct superior, Rosanna J. Arcenas, and only left word with Sherrie
Canete, Acting HR Officer, and the guard that you are quitting your job.

You are already aware that your leaving during working hours is a
violation of our company rules and regulations, particularly # 1 of Section
B (Behavior at Work) of our Code of Conduct which says:

4
Id. at 295.
5
Id. at 14.
6
Id. at 15.
7
Id. at 58.
8
Id. at 59-60.
Decision 3 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

"Abandoning work place or company premises during

working hours without prior permission from superior."

In view thereof, you are hereby advised to report back to work

immediately upon receipt hereof and thereupon submit your written
explanation as to why you should not be disciplined for committing the
above violation. Failure to submit said written explanation shall be
deemed a waiver of your right to present your side and shall constrain us
to decide on your case based on available evidence. 9

Despite respondent's receipt of the afore-quoted letter, he neither

reported back to work nor submitted his written explanation. 10 Instead of
receiving a reply, petitioner received summons pertaining to a labor dispute
that respondent had filed, docketed as NLRC-RAB VII 08-1241-2011.

Unbeknownst then to petitioner, respondent lodged a complaint for

illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary, 13th month pay, damages and
attorney's fees with claims for reinstatement and backwages against the
company and its president, Robert L. Booth (Booth). Respondent
emphasized that as early as May 29, June 10, and June 28, 2011,. petitioner
caused the publication in a newspaper and online a notice of a vacant
position for Purchasing Manager, the very same item he was occupying in
the company. Subsequently, he was allegedly advised by Arcenas on August
10, 2011 that the company no longer required his services for his failure to
satisfactorily meet the company's performance standards, and that he should
tum over his work to the newly-hired Purchasing Manager, Zardy Enriquez
(Enriquez). It was further alleged that Booth confirmed that respondent was
being replaced.

Seeking to absolve themselves from the charge, petitioner and Booth

countered that respondent was not illegally dismissed, and that it was
actually the latter who abandoned his post. 11 Anent the published job
opening, petitioner countered that it was a product of sheer inadvertence;
that what was actually vacant was the position of Purchasing Officer, not
Purchasing Manager. Respondent was allegedly informed of this
inadvertence.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On January 12, 2012, ·the Labor Arbiter Butch Donabel Ragas-

Bilocura, before whom the case was pending, rendered a Decision 12
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. She found that respondent failed
to establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal-a precondition
before the burden to prove that the dismissal is for a valid or authorized
cause can be shifted onto petitioner.

9
Id. at 148.
10
Id. at 61.
11
Id. at 16.
12
Id. at 253.
Decision 4 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC, in its July 31, 2012 Decision, 13 reversed the
14
ruling of the Labor Arbiter and ruled thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor

Arbiter is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE
ENTERED declaring validity in the dismissal of complainant. However,
for respondent's failure to observe due process, complainant is entitled to
be paid indemnity in the form of nominal damages in the amount of
Pl0,000.00

SO ORDERED.

Essentially, the NLRC held that there was dismissal for just cause. It
noted that while respondent was repeatedly informed of his below par
performance, he remained indolent, thereby causing needless delays in
production, customer complaints, lost shipments, and delivery issues.
Petitioner was then well within its right in dismissing complainant.
Nevertheless, while there exists a substantive ground for an employees'
dismissal, respondent is entitled to nominal damages for petitioner's failure
to observe procedural due process in terminating him from work.

Both parties moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC maintained its
posture. Hence, they filed separate petitions for certiorari before the CA,
which were eventually consolidated.

Ruling of the CA

On May 19, 2016, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads: 15

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari

filed by petitioner Jufhel L. Alcuizar, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07302
is PARTLY GRANTED while the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Mehitabel, Inc. and Robert L. Booth, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 07321, is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2012 and the
Resolution dated September 24, 2012 of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Seventh Division, Cebu City, in NLRC Case No. VAC-05-
000342-2012, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

A new decision is hereby rendered declaring petitioner Jufhel L.

Alcuizar as having been illegally dismissed. Consequently, Mehitabel, Inc.
is hereby ordered to reinstate Jufhel L. Alcuizar to his former position
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and benefits, form the date he was
illegally dismissed on August 10, 2011 up to the time of his actual

13
Penned by Presiding Commissioner Violeta Ortiz-Bantug and concurred in by Commissioner
Julie C. Rendoque.
14
Rollo, p. 305.
15
Id. at 24-25.
Decision 5 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

reinstatement. Mehitabel, Inc. is also ordered to pay Jufuel L. Alcuizar

attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of his monetary award.

Let this case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the proper
computation of Jufuel L. Alcuizar' s monetary awards, which Mehitabel,
Inc. should pay without delay.

SO ORDERED.

In reversing the NLRC, the appellate court applied Art. 4 of the Labor
Code, which prescribes that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Code, including its implementing rul.es
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. It ruled that as between
the divergent claims of the parties, more probative weight is to be accorded
to respondent's contention.

Based on the circumstances of the case, so the CA ruled, it was more

likely that respondent was verbally notified of the termination of his
employment on August 9, 2011; that a day after, or on August 10, 2011,
Booth confirmed the dismissal; and that feeling aggrieved, respondent
instantaneously filed an illegal dismissal case.

The CA could not appreciate petitioner's defense of abandonment,

absent proof of deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of respondent to
resume his employment. It found self-serving the affidavits of the
company's human resource officer and security guard who testified that
respondent allegedly told them that he was quitting his job. On the other
hand, respondent's immediate filing of the complaint for ill(!gal dismissal
negated petitioner's theory of abandonment.

Hence, the CA found no abuse of discretion, let alone one that is

grave, that can be attributed to the NLRC insofar as the latter's factual
finding that petitioner was actually dismissed.

Be that as it may, the appellate court, nonetheless, pronounced that

there was insufficient evidence to establish that the dismissal was for just
cause. The NLRC Decision upholding the validity of the dismissal was
therefore reversed, which reversal in turn became the basis for respondent's
entitlement to the benefits under Art. 279 of the Labor Code.. Meanwhile,
Booth was absolved from liability for lack of proof of gross negligence or
bad faith on his part.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration from the afore-quoted Decision

of the CA, but the appellate court was unconvinced.

This brings us to the instant recourse.

Decision 6 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

The Issues

Petitioner relies on the following grounds to support its postulation

that respondent was not illegally dismissed: 16

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (20rn Division)

COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING THE
RULE AS ENUNCIATED IN ARTICLE 4 OF THE LABOR CODE ON
AMBIGUITY IN EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS RULING THAT
RESPONDENT ALCUIZAR WAS DISMISSED FROM HIS
EMPLOYMENT

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT DID NOT
ABANDON HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH PETITIONER COMPANY

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT WAS
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING PETITIONER COMP ANY TO
REINSTATE RESPONDENT ALCUIZAR TO HIS FORMER
POSITION WITHOUT LOSS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS AND OTHER
PRIVILEGES WITH FULL BACKW AGES

v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADJUDGING PETITIONER COMP ANY
LIABLE IN PAYING THE RESPONDENT HIS CLAIM FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Petitioner stresses that the rule on the ambiguity in evidence can only
be invoked if there exists doubt in the evidence between the employee and
the employer. There being no substantial evidence on the part of respondent
establishing the fact of dismissal, petitioner claims that Art. 4 of the Labor
Code cannot then find application herein. It adds that the CA's finding that
"it is more likely that [respondent] was verbally notified of the termination
of his employment" is not anchored on evidence but purely on surmises and
conjectures.

16
Id. at 70-71.
Decision 7 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

On the issue of abandonment, petitioner advances the theory that

respondent's intention to sever his employment with petitioner was
established through the sworn statements of the company's human resource
officer and security guard. It was error for the CA to have so casually
dismissed their statements as self-serving since there was no showing that
there were factors or circumstances, other than a truthful account of what
transpired, that impelled the witnesses to give their testimonies. There is also
the matter of the logbook entry bearing the notation that respondent declared
that he is quitting his job, and the notice to report back to work that
respondent ignored, which were both overlooked by the CA.

Given the two circumstances above, petitioner would convince the

Court to reinstate the Labor Arbiter's finding that respondent was not
illegally dismissed-for not only did he fail to prove the fact of dismissal, it
was he who abandoned his work. Petitioner also postulates that respondent is
consequently not entitled to reinstatement, full backwages, and to the other
benefits under Art. 279 of the Labor Code. Finally, petitioner likewise
questions the basis for the award of attorney's fees.

In his Comment, respondent focuses on the unceremonious manner of

his dismissal from service. He directs Our attention to the newspaper
clippings and printout of online postings regarding the purported vacancy of
the position in the company that he occupied. He reiterates that his dismissal
was confirmed by Arcenas and Booth, and that, upon inquiry, he was
advised to make a proper turnover of his work to the new purchasing
manager. Thus, it is his contention that he never abandoned his post, but was
actually illegally dismissed from service. His immediate . filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal is evidence that he had no intention to sever ..
the employer-employee relation. He, therefore, prays for the dismissal of the
instant petition.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The respondent failed to establish the

fact of dismissal

Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. The burden of proof is
on the one who declares, not on one who denies. A party alleging a critical
fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence, for any decision
based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand without offending due
process. 17 And in illegal termination cases, jurisprudence had underscored
that the fact of dismissal must be established by positive and overt acts of an

17
Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines and/or Lindsay, 519 Phil. 494, 499 (2009).
Decision 8 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

employer indicating the intention to dismiss 18 before the burden is shifted to

the employer that the dismissal was legal. 19

In the extant case, the records are bereft of any evidence that would
corroborate respondent's claim that he was actually dismissed from
employment. His asseveration that Arcenas instructed him to turnover his
functions to Enriquez remains to be a naked claim. Apart from his bare self-
serving allegation, nothing in the records even hints of him being severed
from employment by petitioner.

The publication of the purported vacancy for Purchasing Manager

does not bolster respondent's claim of dismissal. We find more credible
petitioner's assertion that said publications were made through sheer
inadvertence, and that the vacancy is actually for the position of Purchasing
Officer, rather than Purchasing Manager. This version is corroborated by the
fact that petitioner caused an earlier publication, dated February 6, 2011,
advertising the vacancy for Purchasing Officer, but with qualifications
strikingly similar with, if not an almost verbatim reproduction of, those
subsequently published on the May 29, June 10, and June 28, 2011 notices
for Purchasing Manager in, to wit:

Qualifications for Purchasin Officer 20 Qualifications for Purchasin Mana er21

• I Must be a graduate of a business- • Must be a graduate of a business-
, related course from a reputable related course from a reputable
university university
• With five years expenence m a 1 • With five years experience in a
manufacturing industry, with at least manufacturing industry, with at least
three years of management experience three years of management experience
• Must be able to communicate 1 • Must be able to communicate
effectively in oral and written English, effectively in oral and written English,
self-motivated, highly-organized, able to relate and coordinate well within
resourceful and can work effectively in all the levels of the organization
high-pressured environment • A critical thinker, self-motivated, and
• Able to support the search and resourceful.
accreditation of highly potential and 1 • Able to support the search and
qualified contractors or supplier for the accreditation of highly potential and
company qualified contractors or supplier for the
• Able to relate and coordinate well company
within all the levels of the organization • Quality conscious and detail oriented,
• Quality conscious and must have a must have sense of urgency, and can
sense of urgency work effectively in high-pressured
environment

18
Noblejas v. Italian Maritime Academy Phi ls., Inc., G.R. No. 207888, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA
570.
19
Exodus International Construction Corporation v. Biscocho, G.R. No. 166109, February 23,
2011, 644 SCRA 76.
20
Rollo, p. 247.
21
Id. at 179.
Decision 9 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

The theory of petitioner is further supported by the affidavit of its

Human Resource Officer, Canete, who admitted to committing the erratum
thusly:

5. I caused the publication of the position of Purchasing Officer in SunStar

Cebu on February 6, 2011 right after [April Lyn Indab (Indab), then
Purchasing Officer,] informed us that she will not be staying lpng with
Mehitabel, as she was just waiting for a call from her prospective
employer from Bahrain. Alcuizar was fully aware of Indab's intention to
leave the company because, prior to putting out the advertisement for
Purchasing Officer, I asked him if he had someone in mind who could
replace Indab;

6. Unable to get qualified applicants for the position of Purchasing Officer

and because of the constant reminder by Indab of her impending
resignation, I again caused the publication of the same position in the
same local newspaper on May 29, 2011;

7. Not able to get any applicant from the recent newspaper advertisement,
we decided to post the vacancy of Indab's position on-line or on the web.
In line with this decision, I instructed our On-the-Job Trainee then,
Samantha Lagcao, sometime in the latter part of June 2011 to post the ad
out on Mynimo.com and Jobstreet.com.ph. Unaware of the typographical
error on the job position that I just published in Sunstar Cebu, I innocently
instructed Lagcao to use that particular advertisement on May 29, 2011 as
her template for the on-line announcement.

8. It was only when my attention was called by our HR Director, when she
received the job applications on-line, that I realized that there was a
mistake in the designation of the vacant position advertised in SunStar
Cebu on May 29, 2011. Instead of Purchasing Officer, what erroneously
appeared in said newspaper was Purchasing Manager. It was also at that
time that I realized that what were also posted by Lagcao on the websites
were erroneous.

9. Alcuizar knew about this error in the ads because I personally informed
him about it at the time when he asked me to immediately look for a
replacement for Indab after he received the latter's resignation letter on
July 20, 2011. In fact, I can vividly recall that incident because Al Guizar
demanded that I should expedite the hiring of Indab' s replacement as he
dreaded dealing with local purchases, which Indab was assigned to do. 22

Grave as the mistake in the designation of the position published

might have been, it' remains that Alcuizar was informed of the error
committed, and that it was made clear to him that he was never terminated
from service at that time in spite of his poor performance. With these
considerations, the Court cannot readily treat the publications, by
themselves, as sufficient substantial proof of the fact of dismissal.

22
Id. at 244-245.
Decision 10 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

Respondent abandoned his employment

In contrast, petitioner herein issued a Return to Work order to

respondent, which the latter received through registered mail. This
circumstance bears more weight and effectively negates respondent's self-
serving asseveration that he was dismissed from employment~ it more than
implies that the company still considered respondent as its employee on
August 10, 2011.

Respondent's non-compliance with the directive in the Return to

Work~ to Our mind, signifies his intention to sever the employment relation .
with petitioner, and gives credence to the latter's claim that it was .
respondent who abandoned his job. Moreover, such omission substantiates
the testimonies of Canete and Molina who positively attested to the fact of
respondent's desertion. In Cafiete's affidavit, for instance, she stated under
oath the following circumstances:
4. On August 10, 2011, at or about 9:30 a.m., Alcuizar dropped by
my office and surprisingly said to me, 'Ako nang gibilin ang company
phone and other company properties sa akong desk, pero dalhon lang nako
ang USB kay akoni.' (I already left the company phone and other
company properties, save for the USB since it's mine.) Reacting to his
statements, I then asked him, 'Unsaon man pag reach nimo if biyaan nimo
ang company cellphone?' (How can we reach you if you will leave the
company cellphone?) Alcuizar did not make any response and simply left;

5. Puzzled by Alcuizar's actuations and curious as to where he was

going, I called up Wilma Molina, the guard assigned at the company's
entrance gate, and asked if she happened to see Alcuizar leaving. It was
during my inquiry with Molina that I learned that Alcuizar had already
quit his job. 23 .'

And in Molina's narration:

5. Upon approaching the gate, I asked Alcuizar for his exit pass,
since it is our company policy that no one should leave the company
premises during working hours unless proper permission is secured.
Alcuizar replied by saying, 'Dili na nakinahanglan hasta ang exit logbook
coz I'm quitting my job!' (It's no longer necessary and also the exit
logbook because I'm quitting my job!);

6. Surprised by what I just heard from Alcuizar, I answered by

remarking, 'Ah, binuang sir.' (You're kidding, sir), to which he replied,
'Gi-surrender nanako ang company cellphone ug ubang company
properties. Dalhon ni nakong USB kay ako ni. Kahibawo na ani si Ma'am
Canete.' (I already surrendered the company cellphone and other company
properties. I am bringing with me my USB as I own this. Ma' am Canete
already knows this.)

23
Id. at 143.
Decision 11 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

7. Realizing that he was serious, I decided to let him out of the

company gate. And to record what had transpired, I immediately wrote on
the exit logbook the following notations, '13. Alcuizar Jufhel 811 9:3 7 - -
24
I am quietting [sic] my job/no exit pass.

Evident from the foregoing is that there is no dismissal to speak of, let
alone one that is illegal. Instead, it was respondent who clearly demonstrated
his lack of interest in resuming his employment with petitioner, culminating
in abandonment.

Respondent cannot harp on the fact that he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal in proving that he did not abandon his post, for the filing of the
said complaint does not ipso facto foreclose the possibility of abandonment.
It is not the sole indicator in determining whether or not there was desertion,
and to declare as an absolute that the employee would not have filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal if he or she had not really been dismissed is
non sequitur. 25

Apart from the filing of the complaint, the other circumstances

surrounding the case must be taken into account in resolving the issue of
whether or not there was abandonment. This was the teaching in Basay v.
Hacienda Consolacion wherein the Court can be quoted saying:

We are not persuaded by petitioners' contention that nothing was

presented to establish their intention of abandoning their work, or that the
fact that they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal negates the theory of
abandonment.

'It bears emphasizing that this case does not involve termihation .of
employment on the ground of abandonment. As earlier discussed, there is
no evidence showing that petitioners were actually dismissed. Petitioners'
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, irrespective of whether
reinstatement or separation pay was prayed for, could not by itself be the
sole consideration in determining whether they have been illegally
dismissed. All circumstances surrounding the alleged termination should
also be taken into account. 26

In the case at bar, there is sufficient basis for the NLRC's finding that
respondent had been indolent in his job. The- narration of Arcenas in her
affidavit detailing the specific circumstances wherein respondent was remiss
on his duties was substantiated by the electronic correspondences between
respondent and his supervisors. A peru~al of the emails revealed the clear
dissatisfaction of the company officers with respondent's dismal
performance that led to missed shipments, delayed deliveries, and lost
clientele.

24
Id. at 145.
25
Abadv. Roselle Cinema, G.R. No. 141371, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 262, 272.
26
G.R. No. 175532, April 19, 2010, 618 SCRA 422.
 J

Decision 12 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

In turn, it is beyond quibbling that a slothful work attitude falls

squarely within the ambit of gross and habitual neglect of duty, which is one
of the grounds for termination enumerated under Art. 297 (b) of the Labor
Code, to wit:

Article 297. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an

employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the

lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person
of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (emphasis added)

From these circumstances, it can be gathered that respondent's

departure on August 10, 2011 was merely a precursor to his scheme to tum
the table against petitioner. Realizing that his employment was at serious
risk due to his habitual neglect of his duties, respondent jumped the gun on
petitioner by lodging a baseless complaint for illegal dismissal even though
it was he who abandoned his employment.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED. The May 19, 2016 Decision and October 19, 2016 Joint
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP Nos. 07302 and
07321 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 12, 2012
Decision of Labor Arbiter Butch Donabel Ragas-Bilocura in NLRC-RAB
VII 08-1241-2011, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

J. VELASCO, JR.
sociate Justice
 Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 228701-02

WE CONCUR:

(On Leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

/MARVIC M.V.F. LEON

Associate Justice
L~fJ!/:rIRES
Associate Justice

R G. GESMUNDO

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the ooiniOn of the
Court's Division.

PRESBITEJ,(O J. VELASCO, JR.

ociate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the. writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

L, i v i ~~fo n C Se r k o t C "-.a 1' t

'1 hi rd nivii;;ion

JAN 1 ~: ?018