[Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982.

]
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant, vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

Facts:
Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with “acts unbecoming a
judge when the latter purchased a property which was previously the subject of litigation on
which he rendered decision. Respondent and his wife were also members of Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. to which their shares and interests in said property
were conveyed.

Respondent allegedly violated Article 1491, par. 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in in a case
decided by him and that he likewise violated Article 14, par. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce,
Section 3, par. H, of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce.

Held:

No. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the
United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be
deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of
the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
[G.R. No. 78780. July 23, 1987.]

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR.,

Facts:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in
Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of
withholding taxes from their salaries .

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in
response to representations that the Court shall direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the
withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was
reaffirmed by the Court en banc.

Issue:

Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

Held:

No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision
in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the
Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. 10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. 11 It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998.]

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.

Facts:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both
nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared
the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement
of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of
minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the
“majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
“minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus,
also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this
case for quo warranto.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as
Senate minority leader

Held:

No. The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a
certain number out of a total aggregate, it simply "means the number greater than half or more
than half of any total." The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause
simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the
senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less
the "minority," in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had
in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution mandates
that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of
all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader.